Security criteria for planning and operation in the new GB market

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Bell, K.R.W. (2006) Security criteria for planning and operation in the new GB market. In: CIGRE Session, 2006-08-27 - 2006-09-01.

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Abstract

This paper summarises the overall objectives of the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) introduced in April 2005, describes the motivation for the development of a single GB Security and Quality of Supply Standard (GB SQSS), outlines the basic principles of the GB SQSS, describes the main differences between the different standards used by the three GB transmission licensees prior to BETTA and shows how these differences have been reconciled into a single Standard that takes into account both investment planning issues and system operation, including weather-related risk management. BETTA was introduced with the stated purpose of allowing generators and suppliers throughout Great Britain to trade in unified markets accessed through consistent and non-discriminatory transmission arrangements. Fundamental to the co-ordination of network investment planning, outage planning and real-time system operation on a GB basis has been the development of a single GB SQSS that is transparent to all transmission stakeholders and can be consistently applied by the Scottish licensees that remain responsible for network investment in Scotland as well as by the GB System Operator and owner of the transmission system in England and Wales – National Grid. The GB SQSS superseded and harmonised a variety of security standard documents used prior to BETTA. There were some differences between the pre-BETTA standards in respect of secured events, the event consequences that should be avoided, the wording of security criteria and their interpretation. For example, the scope and presentation of double circuit security in operational timescales appeared very different in Scotland from that in England and Wales. The great majority of the differences were successfully resolved – for example, resolution of the double circuit security differences was achieved through recognition of shared attitudes to risk on the part of the three GB transmission licensees. As a result, the GB SQSS is believed to be clear and to afford consistent application thus minimising the scope for unequal treatment of different customers or undue risks to system security.

ORCID iDs

Bell, K.R.W. ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9612-7345;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)