Executive compensation in less regulated markets : the impact of debt monitoring

Marshall, Andrew and Pinto, Helena and Tang, Leilei (2019) Executive compensation in less regulated markets : the impact of debt monitoring. European Journal of Finance, 25 (18). pp. 1883-1918. ISSN 1351-847X (https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2019.1668448)

[thumbnail of Marshall-etal-EJF-2019-executive-compensation-in-less-regulated-markets]
Preview
 Text. Filename: Marshall_etal_EJF_2019_executive_compensation_in_less_regulated_markets.pdf
Accepted Author Manuscript
Download (1MB)| Preview

Abstract

This paper shows that in the lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) voluntary corporate board structures might not reduce agency costs between shareholder and executive directors. In this less regulated market we find that the extent of debt affects executive pay. Also the theoretical determinants of executive pay affect CEO and other executives' pay and incentives differently in this market. We find no evidence that debt levels affect CEO pay in a matched sample of Main Market firms. Our results suggest that debtholders could be better monitors of executive directors' actions, in comparison to voluntary governance committees in less regulated markets.

ORCID iDs

Marshall, Andrew ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7081-1296, Pinto, Helena and Tang, Leilei ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0422-9892;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)