Strategic trade in pollution permits

Dickson, Alexander and MacKenzie, Ian A. (2016) Strategic trade in pollution permits. Preprint / Working Paper. Strathclyde Discussion Papers in Economics, Glasgow.

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Abstract

Markets for pollution have become a popular regulatory instrument. Yet these markets are often highly concentrated, which may lead to strategic behavior by all participants. In this article we investigate the implications of strategic trade in pollution permits. The permit market is developed as a strategic market game, where all firms are allowed to behave strategically and their roles as buyers or sellers of permits are determined endogenously with price-mediated trade. In a second stage, firms transact on a product market and we allow for a variety of market structures. Our framework establishes the endogenous determination of equilibrium price, market structure, and levels of exchange in the permit market.

ORCID iDs

Dickson, Alexander ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9386-9036

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• Item metadata

  Item type:	Monograph(Preprint / Working Paper)
  ID code:	57146
  Dates:	Date Event 29 January 2016 Published
  Keywords:	pollution market, market power, strategic market game, Commerce, Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  Subjects:	Social Sciences > Commerce
  Department:	Strathclyde Business School > Economics
  Depositing user:	Pure Administrator
  Date deposited:	27 Jul 2016 15:31
  Last modified:	23 Sep 2021 00:57
  URI:	https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/57146