Born after the Volcker Rule : regulatory change, managerial remuneration and hedge fund performance

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Bowe, Michael and Kolokolova, Olga and Yu, Lijie (2024) Born after the Volcker Rule : regulatory change, managerial remuneration and hedge fund performance. European Financial Management, 30 (3). pp. 1668-1707. ISSN 1354-7798 (https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12457)

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Abstract

Substantial remunerative benefits accrue to managers of new hedge funds launched after the implementation of the Volcker Rule if their previous employer is a large US bank. After the rule, ex-bankers' funds charge higher management fees and receive more flows as compared with other new hedge funds established during the same period. This phenomenon is related to changes in investor perception of the distribution of skills of new fund managers rather than to the actual differences in skills. Ex-bankers' funds are indistinguishable from other funds in terms of performance, risk, and liquidation probability, both before and after the Volcker Rule.

ORCID iDs

Bowe, Michael, Kolokolova, Olga and Yu, Lijie ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0648-3878;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)