Boys and their toys : status inconsistency in non-democratic regimes and the import of major weapon systems

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Johnson, Richard A.I. and Shreve, Aaron P. (2024) Boys and their toys : status inconsistency in non-democratic regimes and the import of major weapon systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 68 (10). pp. 2101-2127. ISSN 0022-0027 (https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231220021)

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Abstract

Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.

ORCID iDs

Johnson, Richard A.I. ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9009-2986 and Shreve, Aaron P.;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)