Donor political preferences and the allocation of aid : patterns in recipient type

Greene, Zachary and Licht, Amanda (2023) Donor political preferences and the allocation of aid : patterns in recipient type. Conflict Management and Peace Science. ISSN 1549-9219 (In Press)

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Abstract

National executives in Western democracies are not unilateral deciders: they lead parties with long-term policy priorities and manage challenging multi-party coalitions. Leaders of donor states use foreign aid to pursue their goals, including enacting policy output consistent with party ideology or bargaining the ability to control aid policy away to a coalition partner. Because coalition governments empower partisan actors with distinct preferences and preferences for international engagement condition the effect of left-right ideology, we predict left-pro-internationalist governments prefer aiding the neediest recipients while right-internationalists emphasize trade opportunities. In particular, we find that the party preferences of the minister directly responsible for foreign aid, the Development Minister, predicts aid allocations. Our analysis contributes to a theory of foreign policy change as the outcome of complex domestic bargaining and negotiations.

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