Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests

Tools

Dickson, Alex and MacKenzie, Ian A. and Sekeris, Petros G. (2022) Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests. Games, 13 (6). 83. ISSN 2073-4336 (https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083)

[thumbnail of Dickson-etal-Games-2022-Rent-dissipation-in-simple-Tullock-contests]
Preview
 Text. Filename: Dickson_etal_Games_2022_Rent_dissipation_in_simple_Tullock_contests.pdf
Final Published Version
License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 logo
Download (288kB)| Preview

Abstract

We investigate observed rent dissipation—the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent—in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox—where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable—with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small.

ORCID iDs

Dickson, Alex ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9386-9036, MacKenzie, Ian A. and Sekeris, Petros G.;
  • Item type:Article
    ID code:83517
    Dates:
    Date
    Event
    13 December 2022
    Published
    9 December 2022
    Accepted
    3 November 2022
    Submitted
    Notes:This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in the Theory and Applications of Contests and Tournaments
    Subjects:Social Sciences > Economic Theory
    Department:Strathclyde Business School > Economics
    Depositing user: Pure Administrator
    Date deposited:13 Dec 2022 15:50
    Last modified:11 Nov 2024 13:41
    Related URLs:
    URI:https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/83517
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)