Mayall : a framework for desktop JavaScript auditing and post-exploitation analysis

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Rapley, Adam and Bellekens, Xavier and Shepherd, Lynsay A. and McLean, Colin (2018) Mayall : a framework for desktop JavaScript auditing and post-exploitation analysis. Informatics, 5 (4). 46. ISSN 2227-9709 (https://doi.org/10.3390/informatics5040046)

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Abstract

Writing desktop applications in JavaScript offers developers the opportunity to create cross-platform applications with cutting-edge capabilities. However, in doing so, they are potentially submitting their code to a number of unsanctioned modifications from malicious actors. Electron is one such JavaScript application framework which facilitates this multi-platform out-the-box paradigm and is based upon the Node.js JavaScript runtime—an increasingly popular server-side technology. By bringing this technology to the client-side environment, previously unrealized risks are exposed to users due to the powerful system programming interface that Node.js exposes. In a concerted effort to highlight previously unexposed risks in these rapidly expanding frameworks, this paper presents the Mayall Framework, an extensible toolkit aimed at JavaScript security auditing and post-exploitation analysis. This paper also exposes fifteen highly popular Electron applications and demonstrates that two-thirds of applications were found to be using known vulnerable elements with high CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) scores. Moreover, this paper discloses a wide-reaching and overlooked vulnerability within the Electron Framework which is a direct byproduct of shipping the runtime unaltered with each application, allowing malicious actors to modify source code and inject covert malware inside verified and signed applications without restriction. Finally, a number of injection vectors are explored and appropriate remediations are proposed.

ORCID iDs

Rapley, Adam, Bellekens, Xavier ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1849-5788, Shepherd, Lynsay A. and McLean, Colin;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)