Managerial incentives and firm survival

Colak, Gonul and Gounopoulos, Dimitrios and Loukopoulos, Panagiotis and Loukopoulos, Georgios; (2018) Managerial incentives and firm survival. In: Proceedings European Financial Management Association 2018 Annual Meeting. European Financial Management Association, ITA, pp. 1-75.

[thumbnail of Colak-etal-EFA2018-Managerial-incentives-firm-survival]
Preview
Text (Colak-etal-EFA2018-Managerial-incentives-firm-survival)
Colak_etal_EFA2018_Managerial_incentives_firm_survival.pdf
Accepted Author Manuscript

Download (1MB)| Preview

    Abstract

    We find that IPO firms with generously compensated CEOs and large pay disparities in the boardroom have lower failure rates and longer survival time in the periods following the offering. Economically, an interquartile change in the distribution of CEO pay (pay gap) results, on average, in a reduction of the failure risk probability by 21.81% (20.55%). The relationship between CEO pay and IPO survival is strengthened among firms with lower agency conflicts, while the link between pay gap and IPO survival is pronounced when CEO succession planning is more important. Both measures of managerial pay are associated with lower information asymmetry, better valuation, and superior operating performance in the post-IPO market. The results are robust to alternative interpretations and additional tests.

    ORCID iDs

    Colak, Gonul, Gounopoulos, Dimitrios, Loukopoulos, Panagiotis ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8790-1041 and Loukopoulos, Georgios;