Hedge fund incentives, management commitment and survivorship
Qiu, Judy and Tang, Leilei and Walter, Ingo (2018) Hedge fund incentives, management commitment and survivorship. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management. (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11408-018-0309-4)
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Abstract
Management ownership in hedge funds sends conflicting signals—signals which reduce investors’ perception of survivorship risk. We document that decisions on management ownership are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. We examine the impact of managerial ownership decisions on fund survivorship risk by accounting for unobserved fund manager motivations that affect both ownership decisions and survivorship risk. Our findings suggest that the conventional argument that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.
ORCID iDs
Qiu, Judy, Tang, Leilei ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0422-9892 and Walter, Ingo;-
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Item type: Article ID code: 64135 Dates: DateEvent8 May 2018Published8 May 2018Published Online8 May 2018AcceptedNotes: This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11408-018-0309-4 Subjects: Social Sciences > Commerce > Accounting Department: Strathclyde Business School > Accounting and Finance Depositing user: Pure Administrator Date deposited: 23 May 2018 13:10 Last modified: 11 Nov 2024 12:00 URI: https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/64135