Strategic trade in pollution permits

Dickson, Alex and MacKenzie, Ian A. (2018) Strategic trade in pollution permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 87. pp. 94-113. ISSN 0095-0696

Preview

Text (Dickson-MacKenzie-JEEM-2017-Strategic-trade-in-pollution-permits)
Dickson_MacKenzie_JEEM_2017_Strategic_trade_in_pollution_permits.pdf
Accepted Author Manuscript
License:

Download (315kB)| Preview

Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.009

Abstract

Markets for pollution have become a popular regulatory instrument. In this article we investigate the implications of strategic trade in pollution permits. The permit market is developed as a strategic market game, where all firms are allowed to behave strategically and their roles as buyers or sellers of permits are determined endogenously with price-mediated trade. In a second stage, firms transact on a product market and we allow for a variety of market structures. We identify a unique equilibrium in permit exchange, investigate the properties of this equilibrium, and consider the effect of strategic behavior in the product market.

ORCID iDs

Dickson, Alex

and MacKenzie, Ian A.;

Share and Export
Citations and altmetrics

Item metadata

Item type:	Article
ID code:	60839
Dates:	Date Event 31 January 2018 Published 27 May 2017 Published Online 14 April 2017 Accepted
Keywords:	pollution market, market power, strategic market game, Commerce, Environmental Sciences, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Pollution, Economics and Econometrics
Subjects:	Social Sciences > Commerce Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > Environmental Sciences
Department:	Strathclyde Business School > Economics
Depositing user:	Pure Administrator
Date deposited:	06 Jun 2017 00:55
Last modified:	09 Jul 2021 02:50
Related URLs:	Journal or Publication
URI:	https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/60839

CORE (COnnecting REpositories)