Strategic trade in pollution permits
Dickson, Alex and MacKenzie, Ian A. (2018) Strategic trade in pollution permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 87. pp. 94-113. ISSN 0095-0696
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Abstract
Markets for pollution have become a popular regulatory instrument. In this article we investigate the implications of strategic trade in pollution permits. The permit market is developed as a strategic market game, where all firms are allowed to behave strategically and their roles as buyers or sellers of permits are determined endogenously with price-mediated trade. In a second stage, firms transact on a product market and we allow for a variety of market structures. We identify a unique equilibrium in permit exchange, investigate the properties of this equilibrium, and consider the effect of strategic behavior in the product market.
Author(s): | Dickson, Alex ![]() | Item type: | Article |
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ID code: | 60839 |
Keywords: | pollution market, market power, strategic market game, Commerce, Environmental Sciences, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Pollution, Economics and Econometrics |
Subjects: | Social Sciences > Commerce Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > Environmental Sciences |
Department: | Strathclyde Business School > Economics |
Depositing user: | Pure Administrator |
Date deposited: | 06 Jun 2017 00:55 |
Last modified: | 06 Dec 2019 05:09 |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/60839 |
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