Strategic trade in pollution permits

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Dickson, Alex and MacKenzie, Ian A. (2018) Strategic trade in pollution permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 87. pp. 94-113. ISSN 0095-0696 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.009)

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Abstract

Markets for pollution have become a popular regulatory instrument. In this article we investigate the implications of strategic trade in pollution permits. The permit market is developed as a strategic market game, where all firms are allowed to behave strategically and their roles as buyers or sellers of permits are determined endogenously with price-mediated trade. In a second stage, firms transact on a product market and we allow for a variety of market structures. We identify a unique equilibrium in permit exchange, investigate the properties of this equilibrium, and consider the effect of strategic behavior in the product market.

ORCID iDs

Dickson, Alex ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9386-9036 and MacKenzie, Ian A.;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)