Gordon unbound : the heresthetic of central bank independence in Britain
Dellepiane Avellaneda, Sebastian (2013) Gordon unbound : the heresthetic of central bank independence in Britain. British Journal of Political Science, 43 (2). pp. 263-293. ISSN 0007-1234 (https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000221)
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This article combines theory and narrative to shed new light on the politics surrounding the making of central bank independence in contemporary Britain. Its central argument is that Gordon Brown's rewriting of the British monetary constitution in May 1997 constituted political manipulation in a Rikerian sense. The government removed a contentious issue from party politics in order to signal competence and enforce internal discipline. Building on Elster's constraint theory, the paper argues that Brown adopted a pre-commitment strategy aimed at binding others. The heresthetic move had dual consequences, both constraining and enabling. The institutionalization of discipline enabled New Labour to achieve economic and political goals. By revisiting the political rationality of precommitment, this article questions the dominant credibility story underlying the choice of economic institutions.
ORCID iDs
Dellepiane Avellaneda, Sebastian
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Item type: Article ID code: 42664 Dates: DateEventApril 2013Published25 July 2012Published OnlineKeywords: New Labour, Gordon Brown, British monetary constitution, Political theory, Sociology and Political Science Subjects: Political Science > Political theory Department: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (HaSS) > School of Government and Public Policy > Politics Depositing user: Pure Administrator Date deposited: 25 Jan 2013 15:23 Last modified: 21 May 2023 03:18 Related URLs: URI: https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/42664