Market structure, trade liberalization and the GATS

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Francois, J.F. and Wooton, I. (2001) Market structure, trade liberalization and the GATS. European Journal of Political Economy, 17 (2). pp. 389-402. ISSN 0176-2680 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00033-7)

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Abstract

In this paper, we examine the interaction between the different modes of market access commitments in services (cross-border and establishment), market structure, and regulation. In this context, we focus on the impact of improved domestic market access for a foreign-service provider on a domestic service market. We work with a model where the domestic industry is assumed to be imperfectly competitive and, as a result of domestic regulation, able to act as a cartel. We also examine the incentives for the domestic firms to accommodate the entry of the foreign firm by inviting it to join the cartel.

ORCID iDs

Francois, J.F. and Wooton, I. ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5084-6379;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)