Political Accountability and the Returns to Peace

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Borbely, Daniel and Bühler, Mathias and Mueller, Joris and Norris, Jonathan (2026) Political Accountability and the Returns to Peace. Discussion paper. University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.

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Abstract

Why do some economies recover from armed conflict much better than others? We provide evidence that political accountability determines whether post-conflict societies realize the peace dividend. We study Cambodia, where a nationwide landmine clearance campaign created large local potential surpluses by freeing arable land and reducing victimization by 48%. Whether these surpluses translate into realized development depends on accountability. Using a staggered difference-in-differences strategy, we show that clearance raises the probability of any nightlights by 7.3 percentage points in areas with strong pre-existing demand for checks and balances on political elites. Where such demand is weak, the effect is close to zero. Elite capture explains the divergence. In low-accountability areas, clearance increases land concessions, deforestation, land disputes, and labor displacement. Where accountability is strong, clearance instead raises household consumption by 22%. Post-conflict recovery requires not just the existence of a peace dividend but political constraints on its capture.

ORCID iDs

Borbely, Daniel, Bühler, Mathias, Mueller, Joris and Norris, Jonathan ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9603-8481;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)