Foreign aid provision and election to the United Nations Security Council

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Uzonyi, Gary (2025) Foreign aid provision and election to the United Nations Security Council. International Political Science Review. ISSN 1460-373X (https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121251398841)

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Abstract

Why are some countries elected to the United Nations Security Council, while others are not? This study highlights the role of money in elections to demonstrate that states that provide more foreign aid are more likely to be elected to the Security Council. The provision of foreign aid increases a state’s electoral chances through two mechanisms: (1) perceptions of good international citizenship, and (2) soft power influence. Econometric analysis of OECD official development assistance provision and all Security Council elections since 1960 provides strong support for the argument. The case of Turkey helps illustrate the mechanisms.

ORCID iDs

Uzonyi, Gary ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6006-993X;
CORE (COnnecting REpositories)