

Time and sequence as key developmental dimensions in joint actions

Abstract only

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Abstract text

Joint action, generally defined as working together towards a common purpose, has become an important concept in many areas of cognitive science. On the one hand, joint action are structured and directed by the private knowledge, interests and intentions of the individual, and on the other they are publicly manifest in motor behaviour and available for sharing within a social context. Within mainstream cognitive accounts, to engage in a joint action requires an inferential process of representing the other's intentions and plans to coordinate actions towards a shared goal [1, 2, 3]. However, growing endorsement of a contrasting view from embodied and situated accounts of social cognition proposes that joint action is better understood as a dynamic, situated interactional process where participants "roll into" joint actions without requiring reflective or representational awareness [4]. This work proposes a rethinking of how we conceive inter-actions and their development from early on in human life. With particular reference to developmental studies [5], we advance a rationale for the conceptual framework of joint action to include its temporal and sequential structures as key analytical aspects for the study of how humans learn to understand and share meaning with others, in joint *interactions*.

Selected references

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