Globalizing Independence Struggles of Lusophone Africa

Anticolonial and Postcolonial Politics

EDITED BY RUI LOPES
& NATALIA TELEPNEVA

Globalizing Independence Struggles of Lusophone Africa

Globalizing Independence Struggles of Lusophone Africa

Anticolonial and Postcolonial Politics

Edited by
Rui Lopes and Natalia Telepneva

ZED
LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

Zed
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK
1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA
29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland

BLOOMSBURY, Zed and the Zed logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in Great Britain 2024

Copyright © Rui Lopes and Natalia Telepneva, 2024

Rui Lopes and Natalia Telepneva have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Editors of this work.

Series design by Adriana Brioso
Cover image © UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata

This work is published open access subject to a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). You may re-use, distribute, and reproduce this work in any medium for non-commercial purposes, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence.

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-3503-7830-8
ePDF: 978-1-3503-7832-2
eBook: 978-1-3503-7831-5

Typeset by Newgen KnowledgeWorks Pvt. Ltd., Chennai, India

To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com
and sign up for our newsletters.

An ebook edition of this book is available open access on bloomsburycollections.com. Open access was funded by the Bloomsbury Open Collections Library Collective.

Bloomsbury Open Collections is a collective-action approach to funding open access books that allows select authors to publish their books open access at no cost to them. Through this model, we make open access publication available to a wider range of authors by spreading the cost across multiple organizations, while providing additional benefits to participating libraries. The aim is to engage a more diverse set of authors and bring their work to a wider global audience.

More details, including how to participate and a list of contributing libraries, are available from http://www.bloomsbury.com/bloomsbury-open-collections.

Contents

List of contributors ix
Acknowledgements xiii
Select abbreviations xiv

Introduction 1
Rui Lopes and Natalia Telepneva

Part 1 Ideas and Rhetoric of Liberation

1 Bourgeois revolutionaries: Holden Roberto, American anti-communism and the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile 21
Alexander J. Marino

2 'Our country or death': Reconstructing the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee's political ideology through its public discourse 41
Lazlo Passemiers

3 'If you want to call it Marxism, you may call it Marxism': Amílcar Cabral on class and national liberation 63
Rita Lucas Narra

Part 2 Networks and Strategies of Solidarity

4 The year after Africa: How the UN response to Angola and Goa militarized decolonization 83
R. Joseph Parrott

5 The struggle for Southern Africa: Constructing imaginaries around the unliberated region 103
Ana Moledo

6 Fighting for neutrality: The Sino-Soviet split, Afro-Asian conferences and the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies 121
Julião Soares Sousa

7 The Canadian Broad Left and the anticolonial struggle at home and abroad: The case of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies 139
Marçal de Menezes Paredes

8 The Condor spreads its wings: The South American secret missions in Africa after the Carnation Revolution 155
Gisele Lobato

Part 3 The Economy and Policies of Independence

9 Beyond 'flag independence': The Decolonization Committee and foreign interests in the Portuguese colonies, 1965–74 173
Aurora Almada e Santos

10 Polish relations with Angola, 1975–89: Transfer of knowledge and military assistance with limited economic outcome 191
Przemysław Gasztold

11 Globalizing violence and resistance in São Tomé and Príncipe 211
Gerhard Seibert and Inês Nascimento Rodrigues

12 The making of independent Cabo Verde: Militant non-alignment, active neutrality and fading anti-imperialism 227
Víctor Barros, Francisco Osvaldino Nascimento Monteiro and Suzano Costa

13 (Re)framing independence: The battle for Guinea-Bissau's film culture, 1975–80 243
Paulo Cunha, Catarina Laranjeiro and Rui Lopes

Further reading 261
Index 265

Contributors

Aurora Almada e Santos is a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History, NOVA-FSCH/IN2PAST. Her research focuses on Portuguese decolonization, namely the international dimension of the struggle for independence of the Portuguese African colonies. Her PhD thesis focused on the debate regarding Portuguese colonialism at the UN. One of her most recent publications is ' "Action Needed": The American Committee on Africa and Solidarity with Angola', in *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties* (2022).

Víctor Barros is a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History, NOVA-FSCH/IN2PAST. He has published articles on Portuguese colonialism, decolonization, transnational anticolonial solidarity, politics of memory and history writing. His PhD thesis on historical commemorations and the construction of public memory of the Portuguese Empire in the colonies in Africa was awarded the Agostinho Neto International Historical Research Prize in 2020.

Suzano Costa is a researcher at Political Observatory, University of Lisbon. He has authored several articles on Cabo Verdean foreign politics and edited, among other books, *Entre África e a Europa: Nação, Estado e Democracia em Cabo Verde* (2009); *As Relações Externas de Cabo Verde: (Re) Leituras Contemporâneas* (2013); and *Estado e Qualidade da Democracia em África: entre a Letargia Cívica e a Omnipresença do Leviatã* (2023). He holds a PhD in political science from the NOVA University of Lisbon.

Paulo Cunha is an assistant professor of Cinema and Media Studies at the University of Beira Interior, Portugal. His research interests focus on postcolonial studies, film culture and criticism. He has co-edited *Reframing Portuguese Cinema in the 21st Century* (2020).

Przemysław Gasztold is an assistant professor in the Department of Security Threats at the War Studies University in Warsaw, Poland, and a research fellow at the Historic Research Office of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw. His research interests focus on Polish intelligence services, relations between Poland and the Global South, and the Soviet bloc and international terrorism. Most recently, he co-edited *Terrorism in the Cold War (Vols. 1–2)* (2020).

Catarina Laranjeiro is a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History, NOVA-FCSH/IN2PAST. She is developing a six-year project on African vernacular cinema.

She holds a PhD in postcolonialisms and global citizenship from the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra, and has done research in Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, Cuba and Portugal. She has directed the film *Pabia di Aos* (2013) and co-directed *Fire in the Mud* (2023). She has participated in several projects that interlace anthropology, cinema and visual arts.

Gisele Lobato is a PhD candidate at the Interuniversity Doctoral Program in History (PIUDHist), Portugal. Her research focuses on the relations between the Brazilian dictatorship, the Portuguese Estado Novo and South African apartheid during the 1960s and 1970s. She holds a master's degree in African Studies from the University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL). In addition to her academic pursuits, she is an investigative journalist, having graduated from the School of Communication and Arts, University of São Paulo.

Rui Lopes is a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History, NOVA-FSCH/IN2PAST, and an honorary research fellow at the School of Historical Studies of Birkbeck, University of London. He has published on Cold War visual culture, African anticolonialism and the international history of the Estado Novo, including the book *West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1968–1974: Between Cold War and Colonialism* (2014). From 2016 to 2019, he coordinated the research project 'Amílcar Cabral: From Political History to the Politics of Memory'.

Rita Lucas Narra is a PhD candidate in history at NOVA University, Lisbon. Her research interests focus on the history of ideas, anticolonial thought and the Carnation Revolution. She is currently working on the influences of Third-Worldism in Portuguese politics in the second half of the twentieth century.

Alex J. Marino is a postdoctoral fellow in civil-military relations in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College. He is the co-founder and co-editor of the website *Historifans*, which publishes peer-reviewed articles on the intersection of history and popular fiction. Marino's research expands upon his dissertation 'The United States and Angola: Space, Race, and the Cold War in Africa', with a strong focus on the role of race and technology in US–Africa relations. He has a PhD and an MA in history from the University of Arkansas and a BA in history from the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Marçal de Menezes Paredes is an associate professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. He coordinates the African Studies Group in Rio Grande do Sul and the Intellectual History Group, both of them affiliated with the Brazilian Associaçao Nacional de Pesquisa em História. He is a member of the board of the Lusophone Studies Association (York University, Canada) and associate researcher of CEIS20 – Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies (Coimbra University). He is the author of *Portugal, Brasil, Africa historia, identidades e fronteiras* (2012), among other

publications related to Mozambique, Angola, Brazil and Portugal's contemporary history and identity.

Ana Moledo is a doctoral researcher in the Research Centre Global Dynamics at Leipzig University. Her PhD thesis investigates the history of anticolonial activism in the Lusophone African colonies from a spatial lens. She has most recently published 'The Quest for the Solidarity of the World's Working Class: Luso-African Liberation Movements and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) during the 1960s and Early 1970s', in *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Africa. New Perspectives on the Era of Decolonization, 1950s to 1990s* (2023).

Francisco Osvaldino Nascimento Monteiro is a professor at the University of Cabo Verde and an invited lecturer at Instituto Superior de Ciências Jurídicas e Sociais (Cabo Verde). His main domains of research are diplomacy and Cabo Verde's foreign relations, analysis of manual textbooks, social representations and the training of secondary school teachers. He has organized several scientific events and conducted workshops for academic and non-academic audiences about the pertinence of local history. He holds a PhD in education from the University of Santiago de Compostela and a Master's in European Studies from the University of Deusto, Spain.

Ines Nascimento Rodrigues is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra. Her research interests include memory studies, postcolonial theories, representations of colonial violence and the cultural history of indentured labour. She is currently a Marie Sklodowska-Curie postdoctoral fellow. Several of her publications have dealt with colonial liberation wars, discourses on violence and memory. One of her most recent books, co-authored with Miguel Cardina, is *Remembering the Liberation Struggles in Cape Verde: A Mnemohistory* (2022).

R. Joseph Parrott is an assistant professor of International and Transnational History at the Ohio State University. Interested in the intersection of foreign policies, decolonization and domestic politics, his forthcoming book, *Grassroots Diplomacy*, considers Portuguese liberation in Africa as a noteworthy component in transforming leftist politics and US engagement with the Global South. He is the co-editor of *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War* (2022).

Lazlo Passemiers is a senior lecturer in the University of the Free State's Department of History. His research interests focus on transnational histories of decolonization in Southern Africa. He is particularly fascinated by the former support networks of Southern African liberation movements and the relations that existed between the region's white minority governments and societies. He is the author of *Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the 'Congo Crisis', 1960–1965* (2019).

Gerhard Seibert is an associate researcher at Centro de Estudos Internacionais, ISCTE-IUL. He has conducted research in Mozambique, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and on Brazil–Africa relations and is the author of many publications, including

Comrades, Clients and Cousins. Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe (2006) and *The Wealth of History of the Small African Twin-Island State São Tomé and Príncipe* (2024). He has co-edited *Brazil-Africa Relations: Historical Dimensions and Contemporary Engagements* (2019).

Julião Soares Sousa is a researcher at CEIS20 – Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Coimbra. His interests lie in the history of the Portuguese Empire, liberation movements and the environmental history of Africa. He is the author of *Amílcar Cabral (1924–1973): Vida e morta de um revolucionário africano* (2016).

Natalia Telepneva is a lecturer in International History at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Her work focuses on the history of Soviet foreign relations, especially in Africa, as well as on the Cold War and global socialism. She has published on Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence in Africa and has co-edited *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World* (2018). She is the author of *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975* (2022).

Acknowledgements

Material in this book has been funded by IHC, NOVA-FCSH/IN2PAST through FCT — Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., under the projects UIDB/04209/2020, UIDP/04209/2020, and LA/P/0132/2020.

Select abbreviations

AAPSO	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
CONCP	Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of the Nationalist Organizations from the Portuguese Colonies)
DGS	Direcção-Geral de Segurança (General Directorate of Security, Portugal)
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde)
PIDE	Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defence Police, Portugal)
SWAPO	South-West African People's Organization
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for Total Independence of Angola)
UPA	União das Populações de Angola (Union of the Peoples of Angola)

Introduction

Rui Lopes and Natalia Telepneva

> *Revolution was a word we heard often inside Mozambique. In fact, one of the first points which Comrade Mabote made to us as we set out from the Zambian border for the interior was the imperative of mobilising against a recalcitrant colonialism like that of Portugal gave Mozambicans a chance most other African states had missed. Here nationalist self-assertion could not remain a surface phenomenon, but inevitably involved a basic re-ordering of social relationships inherited from traditional society and from colonialism – in short it meant, in Mabote's words, 'the opportunity to have a revolution'.*[1]

Thus John S. Saul, a Canadian activist and historian, recalled his impressions of his 1972 trip to the so-called liberated zones run by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). By the early 1970s, such carefully choreographed trips had become a staple in a series of diplomatic strategies adopted by Lusophone Africa's independence movements to showcase not only the efficacy of their guerrilla but also the transformative nature of their embryonic state structures. Saul's memoir serves as a reminder of these movements' revolutionary promise as well as of the ideational power they often carried beyond their local contexts. This multilayered resonance is the focus of *Globalizing Independence Struggles of Lusophone Africa*.

The book stems from two complementary, if seemingly contradictory, impulses. On the one hand, it is driven by the conviction that there is enough that is distinctive about the struggles for independence in Portugal's African colonies to merit close attention, thus compensating for the dearth of English-language scholarly books about this topic in a field largely dominated by studies on the British and French Empires. Such a focus can help complicate the grand narratives of decolonization, where the case of Lusophone Africa, if acknowledged at all, is typically addressed as a footnote-worthy outlier rather than as constitutive and transformative of the larger history of anticolonialism. On the other hand, we reject exceptionalist accounts that primarily explain the successes and failures of these liberation movements and postcolonial states through endogenous (and often essentializing) factors. Instead, while committedly recognizing the decisive agency of local actors, we argue that the trajectories of Angola, Cabo Verde,[2] Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe can only be understood by situating them at the nexus of twentieth-century globalization.

This research agenda – and, indeed, almost every word in the book's title – comes with its own baggage that deserves unpacking. For instance, 'independence', like 'decolonization', is a potentially misleading term to designate the end of colonial rule. Whether privileging a metropolitan lens (by speaking of 'transfer of power' and 'granting independence') or a subaltern perspective (stressing 'national liberation' and 'revolution'), historians traditionally use such concepts to identify a specific moment in time when colonies became officially recognized as sovereign states by the imperial authorities. Yet, as early as the 1960s, Ghanaian leader and pan-African theorist Kwame Nkrumah denounced forms of 'neocolonialism': as African countries continued to supply raw materials and cheap labour with little control over prices and salaries, they effectively remained exploited and subordinated to the interests of the former empires.[3]

More recently, increasingly challenged by activists and intellectuals who have reframed colonial power – and, correspondingly, anticolonial politics – as much vaster than administrative control, academia has gradually come to view the decolonizing process as both widely preceding formal sovereignty (entailing decades of resistance and theorization) and widely outlasting it (based on a critical analysis of enduring institutions, racism, economic dependency, curricula, public spaces and discourse). The latter view directly informs this book: while its texts follow the conventional use of 'independence' to refer to a historically situated change (and therefore labelling its aftermath as 'post-independence'), the volume spans the period from 1961 to the late 1980s, approaching the legal attainment of sovereignty by Portugal's African colonies in 1974/5 as an intermediary marker rather than an endpoint. Such chronology accepts the beginning of armed conflict as a watershed moment in the path towards independence, but it also acknowledges that this was but one aspect of broader political struggles for decolonization being waged on multiple fronts, many of which extended beyond the peace settlements with the Portuguese. The book's core aim is to advance and stimulate discussion about those struggles' scope, adopting a globalizing perspective that considers how far the *national* was shaped by the *global*.

By 'globalizing', we do not mean to insert Lusophone Africa in an inherently benign history of neoliberal globalization that underplays structural inequalities. Rather, the inspiration for this volume comes from an emerging scholarship interrogating the *impact* of decolonization on the broader history of the twentieth century. As Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson have argued, both late colonialism and decolonization were intrinsically 'globalizing' processes.[4] This is not to say that global connectivity – characterized by large-scale population flows, commerce, migration, and new transport and communication technologies – only emerged after 1945, or to further a naïve narrative of horizontal 'expansion of international society' that disregards foundational and lasting colonial legacies.[5] The goal, instead, is to understand how specific forms of anticolonial politics and imperial dissolution shaped today's world order, from fora like the United Nations Organization to the very reification of the nation-state.[6] In the past years a rich literature about decolonization's impact on international normative regimes has shown, for instance, that Global South actors both radicalized and undermined the UN's human rights agenda.[7]

Finally, the conceptual framework and the very expression 'Lusophone Africa' requires careful justification. For one thing, 'Lusophone' (i.e. Portuguese-speaking) is an inaccurate descriptor. While Portuguese remained the official language during and after colonialism, much of the population in this group of countries primarily communicated in African languages or variations of Creole. Regardless of what most people spoke, however, their communities were significantly affected by both Portuguese-speaking colonizers and anticolonial movements that defended the Portuguese language as a unifying tool. Rather than positing a coherent linguistic or cultural identity, then, 'Lusophone' is a synecdoche for a shared connection to Portuguese colonialism, working as an expedient shorthand to distinguish these countries from those in what is commonly known as Anglo- and Francophone Africa.

More problematically, 'Lusophony' has a neocolonial connotation linked to ideological and institutional efforts to reclaim Portugal's cultural (if not necessarily political or economic) centrality in the new countries' identities.[8] Its acritical use risks prolonging an imperial imaginary, homogenizing the former colonies by downplaying their differences as well as the ties and commonalities with other societies. Therefore, instead of naturalizing 'Lusophone Africa', this book seeks to problematize the concept's very (de)limitations, reflecting about the independence struggles' profound entanglement with global processes beyond Portugal, be they the rise of international fora, Third-Worldism, New Left activism, Cold War espionage, trade deals or film distribution.

With that in mind, the book is arranged around three central themes. Part 1 examines diverse ways in which nationalists from Lusophone Africa understood, interpreted and reworked contemporary ideas and rhetoric around statehood, culture and national unity. Part 2 expands the ongoing conversation about the contribution of African revolutionaries from the Portuguese colonies to fostering global networks and strategies, emphasizing their worldwide impact. Part 3 then draws out debates about achieving economic and political emancipation before and after independence, thus bridging the divide between the two eras. Before detailing each of these approaches, however, we will now briefly contextualize the struggles' common background.

The rise of African nationalism and the fall of the Portuguese Empire

Literature on the Portuguese Empire's final stages has amply documented some of its most outstanding features in terms of periodization, international status, authoritarianism, ideology and violent denouement. The empire's origins are typically dated back to the fifteenth century, when a host of adventurers, navigators and mercenaries, backed by Portugal's crown and its self-professed mission of spreading Christianity, began to explore the African coast, eventually setting up a network of small, fortified port cities around and beyond the continent, connecting trade networks from Lisbon to Nagasaki. The Portuguese profited mainly from the trade in goods and, most importantly, people, who were sold as slaves to work in Europe and on plantations in the Americas, including in Brazil, Portugal's largest colony (until

its independence in 1822). By the early twentieth century, this empire encompassed modern-day Angola and Mozambique, in Southern Africa, and Guinea-Bissau (then called Portuguese Guinea), further west, as well as the archipelagos of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, off Africa's Atlantic coast. Additionally, Portugal's possessions included Goa, Daman and Diu (on the Indian subcontinent), Macao (bordering China) and East Timor (bordering Indonesia).[9]

The peculiarity of a small, unindustrialized country with a peripheral status in Europe harbouring the world's third largest colonial empire did not go unremarked. In a seminal essay, Vladimir Lenin summed up a common understanding of Portugal's condition as simultaneously a sovereign metropole and a British protectorate.[10] Later, Perry Anderson would argue that Portugal's 'underdeveloped' economy made its empire particularly extractivist, coining the term 'ultra-colonialism' to describe 'at once the most *primitive* and the most *extreme* modality of colonialism'.[11] Angola and Mozambique became large centres for the growth of coffee and cotton, São Tomé a world-famous producer of cacao, and Guinea-Bissau a peanuts exporter. Lisbon's governments also profited from leasing the use of ports, railways and manpower to private concession companies and neighbouring governments, facilitating the transport of minerals extracted in the Belgian Congo, Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa. Still, Portugal remained predominantly agrarian and dependent on remittances from migrants in Brazil.[12] It was also politically unstable, with a 1926 coup instituting a military dictatorship.

The colonies were fundamental to the vision of Portugal's revival as a 'great European power' espoused by António de Oliveira Salazar, who was appointed prime minister in 1932. Salazar made a concerted push to expand trade with the empire, introducing compulsory crops and instructing local administrations to assist with the allocation of African labour. The drive towards economic autarky relied on a strict racial hierarchy (only officially abolished in 1961) between a majority of so-called indigenous (*indígenas*), who were deprived of citizenship rights and subjected to forced labour and often extortionate taxes, and a minority of 'non-indigenous' (*não indígenas*) who included white Europeans and the culturally 'assimilated' (*assimilados*).[13] Salazar's worldview was enshrined in the 1933 constitution of the New State (*Estado Novo*), a corporatist, Catholic single-party regime which he led for the next thirty-five years. Part of Europe's interwar fascist wave, the *Estado Novo* aggressively supressed political opposition and various freedoms through strict censorship and a succession of political police forces: PVDE (1933–45), PIDE (1945–69), DGS (1969–74).

While the need for colonial goods put increasing pressure on African labour during the Second World War (where Portugal remained neutral), only Angola and Mozambique were settler colonies with a significant Portuguese population. Salazar invested very little in the empire, leaving basic services such as education almost entirely to the Catholic Church. Even in Cabo Verde, whose population enjoyed some kind of de facto citizenship, colonial neglect contributed to devastating famines in the arid archipelago in 1941, 1943 and 1947–8, which endure in its inhabitants' collective memory.[14]

In the postwar era, the *Estado Novo* reformulated its imperial ideology, evoking the Portuguese Empire's 'originality' to sidestep the growing anticolonial momentum

abroad. It appropriated the theory of 'Lusotropicalism', from Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, according to which the Portuguese had less racist inclination than other European peoples and therefore a more benign, equalitarian relationship between colonizers and colonized. Accordingly, 1951's constitutional revision identified Portugal as an 'indivisible', 'pluricontinental nation' that officially (if not in practice) did not have colonies, but rather 'overseas provinces' (*províncias ultramarinas* or *ultramar*).[15]

Consequently, as other states gradually responded to independence demands, the *Estado Novo* steadfastly refused to consider decolonization. The first big test came in 1961 when a large strike in the north of Angola was met with overwhelming repression and followed by a series of riots in the colony's capital, Luanda, escalating to war. While unable to militarily prevent India's annexation of Goa, Daman and Diu later that year, the Portuguese dictatorship – under the leadership of Salazar and, since 1968, his successor, Marcelo Caetano – carried out protracted wars against anticolonial movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, which entailed abundant atrocities (like napalm showers or the infamous Wiriyamu massacre) and raids into neighbouring countries (including an attempted coup in Guinea-Conakry). These costly and increasingly unpopular wars – recalled in Portugal as a single 'colonial war' – eventually wore the regime down, ushering a movement of dissenting army captains to overthrow the *Estado Novo* on 25 April 1974, in a coup that immediately escalated into a popular, leftist uprising known as Carnation Revolution. It was during the ensuing revolutionary process, which lasted until November 1975, that Portugal's governments negotiated the independence of all its territories in Africa.

Until relatively recently, this story was treated as insular and idiosyncratic, having been marginalized in English-language historiography,[16] even if Portugal's links to South Africa were highlighted by a radical strand of Anglophone scholarship in that region since the 1980s.[17] Two developments changed this status quo. The first one arose out of the former metropole, where a surge of research funding from the Portuguese state and the European Union in the early 2000s brought about a generation of Portuguese historians with greater access to foreign debates, archives and bibliography, many of them studying abroad. Countering the imagery, inherited from Salazar, of late Portuguese colonialism as fundamentally unique and isolated by an overwhelmingly hostile international community, they stressed similarities and continuities with other imperial experiences while spotlighting the *Estado Novo*'s widespread international integration.[18] Joined by colleagues from other countries, these scholars revealed a more complex and ambiguous history, reassessing the importance of developmentalist models, of the NATO membership, of the Azores' geostrategic value to the Cold War and of the perspectives of Portugal's closest allies (the United States, the UK, France, West Germany).[19] In particular, research unearthed further connections to Rhodesia and South Africa, with the Portuguese Empire's collapse engineering a major crisis of white minority rule in the continent.[20]

A parallel strand brought together scholars of African and transnational history, international relations and political theory, among other fields, who shifted the focus away from efforts to prolong the Portuguese Empire and into the efforts to bring it down. They explored the nucleus of organized opposition to Portuguese rule that emerged

both in the diaspora and among educated Africans across the empire's urban centres – in Mindelo, Lourenço Marques, Luanda. Many of the men and women who later held leadership positions in the anticolonial movements grew up in families of either mixed race or *assimilado* parents. The majority were fluent in Portuguese alongside African languages and received education at either Protestant missions or at a handful of state-sponsored schools in the colonies, with some acquiring scholarships to study at universities in Portugal. Once there, several of them became involved in a movement of cultural resistance/renaissance to 'rediscover' African culture through literature, poetry and dance. Yet the *Estado Novo*'s fascist nature also inspired a more radical anti-fascist response, with many students moving on from cultural anticolonialism towards Marxism. A few joined the underground opposition in Portugal, spearheaded by the Portuguese Communist Party. Some left the country, mainly for Paris, where they continued their activism, often in conversation with Francophone African intellectuals, and others spent most of the 1950s working for the colonial administration while building up resistance networks. These activists would dynamize movements fighting for the independence of different colonies, yet their intersected paths created a bond, manifested in 'common front' organizations, most notably the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of Portuguese Colonies (1961–79).[21]

Although activists originally hoped for negotiated, peaceful decolonization, incidents of colonial violence such as the massacres at Batepá (1953), Pidjiguiti (1959) and Mueda (1960) gradually acquired mythical proportions, galvanizing people across the empire. After founding the African Party of the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC), a group led by Amílcar Cabral moved to Conakry in 1960 to prepare for armed struggle, as did the collective that had created the Popular Movement of the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In 1962, a coalition of Mozambican nationalist groups gathered in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, formed FRELIMO, headed by Eduardo Mondlane. In Congo-Lépoldville, a community of mainly Bakongo Angolans from the north of the country coalesced around Holden Roberto, who headed the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA). The 1961 uprising sped up the activists' timetable on preparations for armed struggle, with full-fledged war breaking out in Angola, pitting Portugal's troops against both the MPLA and the UPA. In 1963 and 1964, guerrilla campaigns were launched in Guinea-Bissau by the PAIGC and in Mozambique by FRELIMO.

While fighting the Portuguese military, the liberation movements faced local competitors and internal rivalries that would, to a large extent, determine the course of independence struggles as well as the countries' post-independence trajectories. In Angola, the MPLA faced competition from the UPA – which in 1962 became the National Front of Liberation of Angola (FNLA) – and from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Moreover, FRELIMO and the PAIGC had to cope with the assassinations of Mondlane and Cabral, in 1969 and 1973. The latter movement was nonetheless the most successful militarily, gaining enough ground to unilaterally proclaim Guinea-Bissau's independence in September 1973, although Portuguese recognition only came a year later, after the Carnation Revolution. Other independences followed in 1975: Mozambique (June), Cabo Verde (July), São Tomé and Príncipe (July), Angola (November).

Nonetheless, legacies of violence, deprivation and Cold War entanglement severely undermined the socialist dreams of the movements-turned-ruling parties. Branches of the PAIGC ruled separately over Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, with plans for unification being aborted in 1980 by the first of several Guinean military coups. FRELIMO and the MPLA contended with civil wars in Mozambique (1977–92) and Angola (1975–2002), respectively. The latter have also been presented as wars of 'external destabilization', acknowledging that, while there were undoubtedly important 'internal' dynamics, both conflicts mobilized multiple outsiders from the start.[22] For instance, the United States-backed FNLA and UNITA, along with South African troops, fought the Soviet-backed MPLA alongside Cuban troops.

Building on the latest findings while pushing for a deeper assessment of decolonization's historical ties to globalization, this book now gathers African, European, North and South American authors who draw on a trove of original written, oral and audiovisual sources from over twenty countries. We have organized their contributions around three main areas.

Ideas and rhetoric of liberation

Part 1 sheds light on the plurality of ideas and rhetoric among the anticolonial movements that engaged with repertoires stemming from diverse points of origin. On the one hand, this part expands a field of works insightfully analysing Lusophone African leaders' discourse and specific conceptions of independence struggle.[23] On the other hand, it defies the tendency, inherited from the first generation of Africanist scholars, to write the history of decolonization as a singular story of 'resistance' against colonial rule. Early accounts, written mainly by sympathetic foreign journalists and activists, focused on the liberation movements that later came to power – FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC – as representative of their nations-in-waiting.[24] These narratives of national liberation tended to downplay tensions and inequities within African societies as well as external influences.[25]

Since then, a rich scholarship has begun to challenge monolithic narratives in various ways. Some scholars did it by studying 'loyalists', namely African troops recruited by the Portuguese colonizers, like how British, French and Dutch had done.[26] Almost half of the colonial army in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau consisted of African troops by 1974, although studies of 'loyalism' in the Portuguese Empire remain relatively rare.[27] Another challenge came from those who emphasize the *transnational* nature of conflict in Africa, arguing that actors like the Katangese gendarmes in the Congo wars or the soldiers fighting for liberation of Southern Africa often defied strict national (or Cold War) characterization.[28] Finally, a number of works have addressed 'alternative' nationalist currents that competed with the 'dominant' modernizing ideologies.[29]

The authors in Part 1 enter into conversation with these strands while extending the discussion to further explore the *international* and *transnational* aspects of Lusophone African ideological projects. The first two chapters investigate the politics of actors in Angola and Mozambique that challenged prominent movements. Alex J. Marino

looks at UPA leader Holden Roberto, a 'bourgeois revolutionary' who countered the MPLA's socialism with notions of racial empowerment, economic development, individual liberty and anti-communism. While Roberto's contacts with US officials and the CIA are well known, Marino unravels the role of figures like historian John Marcum – the author of two comprehensive volumes on the Angolan Revolution[30] – in fleshing out a political framework to appeal to both African and American audiences. In turn, Lazlo Passemiers looks into the lesser-known Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), a 'small' movement that split from FRELIMO to contest a claim to represent the Mozambican nation. While reworking familiar motifs, like a commitment to revolutionary militancy and Third-Worldism, COREMO pursued its own brand of pan-Africanism, privileging connections with neighbouring struggles in Zimbabwe and South Africa over those in Lusophone Africa.

By contrast, no Lusophone revolutionary leader has received as much consideration as Amílcar Cabral. Often named alongside influential anticolonial thinkers like Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon, Cabral has inspired extensive biographies, translations, studies and militant writings.[31] In recent years, his texts, speeches and agronomic reports have been read through the lens of postcolonial theory.[32] Digging into this body of work, Rita Narra charts and intervenes in the longstanding debate over Cabral's ambiguous relationship with Marxism. Through a methodical close reading of his word choices, Narra reinterprets Cabral's evolving approach to the concept of 'class', explaining how his original understanding of 'culture' came to synthesize Marxist doctrine and pan-Africanist ideals. Together with the previous ones, this chapter shows that liberation movements consciously integrated their struggles in a wider context. Conversely, the following group of chapters foregrounds how outsiders incorporated these struggles into their own national and international disputes about decolonization.

Networks and strategies of solidarity

Part 2 reassesses the independence struggles' global ramifications by analysing networks and strategies developed by both allies and adversaries of the Lusophone African movements. Thus, this part contributes to recent advances in both Cold War studies and Africanist scholarship that have uncovered a story that stretched way beyond Portuguese borders. Drawing on the example set by Algeria's National Liberation Front during the Algerian War (1954–62), Lusophone African movements combined guerrilla fighting with active diplomacy.[33] One branch of scholarship has investigated this 'liberation diplomacy', mapping an impressive campaign to obtain support – within and beyond Africa – from foreign media, international institutions, governments and non-state actors (churches, trade unions, grassroots activist groups), forging relationships that carried over into the post-independence period.[34] Some of these networks transcended the male-dominated organizations, for example connecting women's activists in Portugal and the colonies.[35]

Following in the footsteps of Arne Westad's *Global Cold War*,[36] historians have 'rediscovered' the independence movements' prolific connections to socialist countries.

The training and equipment provided by those countries were critical to the conduct of guerrilla wars, since Western countries would not offer any military aid. New approaches have focused on the Warsaw Pact members, finding 'new forms of economic, political and cultural interconnectedness' that linked Europe's 'periphery' to the Third World.[37] It is now clear that the Soviets' supposedly 'junior allies' like the Eastern European states and Cuba, along with China, often took the initiative in supporting the independence struggles, actually prompting more decisive action from Moscow.[38]

Meanwhile, scattered studies have gradually shown that the independence movements also successfully pursued contacts in the West, where they found sympathetic activists who protested against local government and business ties to Portuguese colonialism. Solidarity committees popped up within every NATO country, donating cash, educational material, medical supplies and blood transfusions.[39] In the wars' final years, Lusophone movements even obtained humanitarian aid from the governments of Denmark, Netherlands and Norway, as well as from 'neutral' Finland and, above all, Sweden.[40] Their struggles have been incorporated in the 'long 1960s', when anticolonialism and Third-Worldism provided Western Europe's New Left not only with an 'access point' to engage with the Global South but also with an 'ideological template through which domestic political failings could be understood and contested'.[41]

Attempts to consider these links' broader significance have emphasized activism's transnational dimension, connecting people and ideas from the so-called First, Second and Third Worlds.[42] Conversely, a closer look at south–south dynamics has chipped away the Third World's supposed homogeneity, discerning in the non-aligned, Afro-Asian and pan-Africanist movements competing projects with very different priorities.[43] Rather than a teleological account of exponential connectivity, the influx of research has given us a better sense of the dilemmas faced by the movements' supporters.

The notion of multidirectional dynamics, whereby anticolonial solidarity transformed both the independence struggles on the ground and their supporters on the outside, is at the core of Part 2. The first two chapters focus on the impact on international cooperation and regional imagination. Joseph R. Parrott argues that the outbreak of war in Angola in 1961, combined with the Indian invasion of Goa, provoked a fundamental shift in the UN. In the ensuing discussions over violent responses to colonialism, the anti-imperial resolve of recently joined states ushered the West's growing scepticism towards this body. The implications of Parrott's chapter are further developed by Ana Moledo, who explores how 'Southern Africa' became an operative concept in various fora throughout the 1960s–70s. From pan-Africanist meetings to European solidarity networks, this regional unit occupied a central place in debates over the UN's limitations, human rights and the global expansion of the Cold War.

The following chapters address intersections between the Lusophone African struggles and seemingly unrelated political tensions. Julião Soares Sousa demonstrates that FRELIMO, the MPLA and the PAIGC were pushed to engage with the Sino-Soviet split, as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization became an arena of competition between China and the USSR. In line with their Cold War non-alignment, these movements tried to negotiate a neutral position towards the split while having

to make occasional concessions in order to safeguard key sources of material and diplomatic support. In turn, Marçal de Menezes Paredes zooms in on Canadian religious and leftist activists who in the early 1970s, directly inspired by the struggle in Mozambique, formed the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies. Paredes concludes that not only did the activists question Canada's historical, political and economic relations to the Portuguese Empire, but they also linked this cause to their country's own unresolved colonial features, especially in the context of Quebec's separatist movement.

Finally, Gisele Lobato's chapter highlights how the independence struggles also prompted transnational coordination among those who opposed decolonization. Taking as a starting point a secret operation carried out by Brazilians in 1975 Angola, Lobato exposes a complex of South American military, intelligence, police forces and mercenaries who exported to Africa the repressive apparatus of their home dictatorships. They followed a French doctrine about waging global war against a perceived blend of anticolonialism and communist expansionism, once again conveying how the history of Lusophone Africa entailed changing worldviews that far exceeded the horizons of purely national projects. With that in mind, our book's Part 3 is particularly concerned with how the development of these various ideologies and relationships ultimately affected the materialization of independence.

Economy and policies of independence

The premise of Part 3 is that the economic and policy demands of creating independent nations ushered in further international and transnational connections. The resistance against colonial and neocolonial business interests, like the pursuit of alternatives (in terms of socioeconomic, cultural and political models and partnerships), proved particularly challenging in the context of Lusophone Africa's position in the global political economy. To highlight these issues does not imply adopting a deterministic, defeatist perspective that purely characterizes – and seeks to justify – the independence projects as failures. Rather, it means revisiting a rich tradition of reflection and debate about the limits and paradoxes of anticolonialism.

Historians acknowledge the centrality of notions of 'development' and 'modernization' in revindications of anti- and postcolonial projects, albeit arguing over the extent to which these were informed by the Cold War or even by the migration of colonial experts to international institutions.[44] As argued by Adom Getachew, in the 1950s intellectuals like Nkrumah, W. E. B. Du Bois, George Padmore and Nnamdi Azikiwe approached decolonization as a process of 'reordering the world that sought to create a domination-free and egalitarian international order'. Their reinvention of 'self-determination' as an 'anticolonial concept' culminated in the UN's adoption of Resolution 1514, which decried foreign domination as a denial of fundamental human rights.[45] However, by itself the codification of this right, like the attainment of formal sovereignty ('flag independence'), did not amount to an egalitarian order. The tumults following the 1960 independence of Congo-Léopoldville – with the Belgian military backing up secessionist movements in an effort to reclaim control of mining

concessions – tragically illustrated the threat of continuous intrusion by former colonial powers.[46]

The ensuing series of coups across Africa (Algeria, Ghana, Mali) reinforced the sense that the initial experiments with 'African socialism' neither achieved the desired levels of economic prosperity nor did they protect the countries from outside interference. In fact, the history of decolonization could not be dissociated from the contemporary expansion of more internationalized production chains and markets. The global division of labour and uneven distribution of resources became the focus of analyses based on 'dependency theory' – and a critical revaluation of colonialism's economic impact made a bestseller out of Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. If political sovereignty and cultural emancipation dominated the political agendas of the first generation of African leaders, since the mid-1960s the priority shifted to economic justice, with Global South states pushing for a New International Economic Order.[47]

Against this background, Lusophone African leaders represented a second generation, critical of 'African socialism', seemingly favouring Soviet-style 'scientific socialism' as a vehicle for socioeconomic modernization.[48] After coming to power, they adopted certain elements of the 'Soviet model of development', promoting agricultural productivity through the nationalization of large agricultural conglomerates and investing in social welfare as well as in small-scale industrial enterprises to improve their countries' terms of trade, with help from international donors.[49] Within a few years, the MPLA and FRELIMO proclaimed Angola and Mozambique 'Marxist-Leninist states'. Without denying anti-imperialist ideals, Jeremy Friedman has argued that the establishment of Marxist-Leninist parties was not necessarily meant to facilitate takeover of the economy as much as 'the political and ideological control of the state and the population'.[50] Ideology would thus be a tool in facing opposition to what some perceived as elite-driven projects on the ruins of an empire where developmentalism had been closely tied to repression.[51]

Opposition was not merely internal: armed and funded by regional and Western backers, FNLA and UNITA, in Angola, and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), in Mozambique, posed military challenges to the MPLA and FRELIMO governments, which in turn furthered the need for support from socialist countries, reinforcing the Cold War entanglement. As recent literature has begun to delve into the economic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, however, it found them to be prone to complications and mismatched expectations.[52] In fact, the economic front was hardly linear: all Lusophone African states retained Portugal as a major trade partner and accepted aid and investments from Western and private enterprises, especially in key sectors that could fund military expenditure and modernization projects.

Part 3 revolves around these ruptures, continuities and compromises. It begins by showcasing diverging views about the significance of foreign investments. As stressed by Aurora Almada e Santos, during the independence wars, the anticolonial movements and their allies in the UN condemned Western economic agents that collaborated with – and profited from – Portuguese colonialism, including on supposedly developmentalist projects like the Cahora Bassa Dam. Santos's chapter reveals both the emergence of an economic front in the independence struggles and its limitations against a polarized UN. Przemysław Gasztold then shifts the focus to the

late 1970s–80s to see how far the Lusophone African movements were able to build on their wartime alliances in the post-independence era. Based on the case of Poland and Angola, Gasztold concludes that the former's cost-conscious pragmatism made it difficult to develop a mutually beneficial relationship.

A couple of chapters are devoted to the contrasting cases of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Uninhabited before the Portuguese had arrived in the fifteenth century and converted them into slave trade outposts, and therefore even more structurally shaped by colonialism, these territories were not the stage of liberation wars, but they nevertheless engaged in revolutionary projects following independence. According to Inês Nascimento Rodrigues and Gerhard Seibert, the smallest of the new countries, São Tomé and Príncipe, struggled to break away from the plantation system that had come to dominate its economy and social hierarchy. Attempts at socialist reforms were frustrated by successive practical obstacles, leading to an acceptance of Western principles in the late 1980s. In Cabo Verde, the PAIGC – whose cadres had been formed through the war in Guinea-Bissau – sought to extend its previous strategy of active diplomacy and non-alignment. As assessed by Victor Barros, Osvaldino Monteiro and Suzano Costa, however, in some ways the realpolitik of peace proved trickier than that of war, resulting in important concessions to former ideological opponents, including the companies and governments of the United States and South Africa.

The book's final chapter discusses the continuation of the independence struggle on the cultural front, which was likewise moulded by both foreign relations and economic interests. Paulo Cunha, Catarina Laranjeiro and Rui Lopes analyse the PAIGC's fight to liberate Guinea-Bissau's film culture from colonial traces, weaponizing film imports and production while drawing inspiration from Latin American revolutions. Bringing together the volume's leitmotifs, this case study once again demonstrates that, if these countries' histories were partly wrought by a shared resistance to Portuguese colonialism, they are just as inextricable from the Cold War, pan-Africanism, Third-Worldist revolutionary theories and the rise of global capitalism.

Under the slogan of 'national reconstruction', the independence movements of Lusophone Africa sought to tear down colonial oppression and replace it by new, forward-looking nations. As Cabral acknowledged, Guinea-Bissau had not been a unit before Portuguese occupation – it was an 'African nation, forged in the struggle' against colonialism.[53] This struggle – like those of Portugal's other colonies in Africa – was always more than armed violence. As it drew on – and mobilized – ideas, people and resources from around the globe, it vividly channelled the hybridity between national and global scales. Its hopes, victories and defeats thus remain a powerful starting point to learn about the contradictions and possibilities of change in the modern world.

Notes

1. John S. Saul, *Revolutionary Traveller: Freeze-Frames from a Life* (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2009), 76.

2. In late 2013, representatives of Cabo Verde asked the international community to use exclusively this Portuguese spelling in all other languages, rather than, for example, the then-usual English translation 'Cape Verde'.
3. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1966).
4. Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson, 'Rethinking Decolonization: A New Research Agenda for the Twenty-First Century', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed. Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
5. Sanjay Seth, 'Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations', *Millennium* 40, no. 1 (2011): 167–83.
6. Ismay Milford, Gerald McCann, Emma Hunter and Daniel Branch, 'Another World? East Africa, Decolonisation, and the Global History of the Mid-Twentieth Century', *Journal of African History* 62, no. 3 (2021): 394–410; Eva-Maria Muschik, 'Towards a Global History of International Organizations and Decolonization', *Journal of Global History* 17, no. 2 (2022): 173–90.
7. Steve Jensen, *The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Dirk Moses, Marco Duranti and Roland Burke, eds, *Decolonization, Self Determination, and the Rise of Global Human Rights Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
8. Michael Cahen, ' "Portugal Is in the Sky": Conceptual Considerations on Communities, Lusitanity, and Lusophony', in *Imperial Migrations. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship*, ed. Eric Morier-Genoud and Michael Cahen (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 297–315.
9. For an overview, see Anthony Disney, *The Portuguese Empire, Vol. 2: A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire – From Beginnings to 1807* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
10. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Chippendale: Resistance Books, 1999), 89.
11. Perry Anderson, 'Portugal and the End of Ultra-colonialism', *New Left Review* 1, no. 15 (1962): 90.
12. W. G. Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825–1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 61–116.
13. By 1953, *assimilados* added up to 2.7 per cent out of 10,388,360 inhabitants of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. See Dalila Cabrita Mateus, *A luta pela independência: A formação das elites fundadoras da FRELIMO, MPLA e PAIGC* (Mem Martins: Editorial Inquérito), 22–3.
14. António Carreira, *The People of the Cape Verde Islands: Exploitation and Emigration* (London: C. Hurst and Archon Books, 1982), 166; Alexander Keese, 'Managing the Prospect of Famine: Cape Verdean Officials, Subsistence Emergencies, and the Change of Elite Attitudes during Portugal's Late Colonial Phase, 1939–1961', *Itinerario* 36, no. 1 (2012): 49–70.
15. Cláudia Castelo, *'O Modo Português de Estar no Mundo': O luso-tropicalismo e a ideologia colonial portuguesa (1933–1961)* (Porto: Afrontamento, 1998).
16. Two key exceptions were Norrie MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire* (London: Longman, 1997), and Witney W. Schneidman's 1987, PhD thesis, published as *Engaging*

Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire (New York: University Press of America, 2004).

17. Ruth First, *Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant* (Sussex: Centre of African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University and Harvester Press, 1983); William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
18. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, 'Empire and Decolonization in Portuguese Africa', in *The Oxford Handbook of Portuguese Politics*, ed. Jorge M. Fernandes, Pedro C. Magalhães and António Costa Pinto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).
19. Rui Lopes, *West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship 1968–1974: Between Cold Ward and Colonialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Maria José Tíscar, *O Pacto Ibérico, a NATO e a Guerra Colonial* (Lisbon: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2014); Rui Lopes, 'Accommodating and Confronting the Portuguese Dictatorship within NATO, 1970–74', *International History Review* 38, no. 3 (2015): 505–26; Aurora Almada e Santos, *A Organização das Nações Unidas e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa: 1960–1974* (Lisbon: Instituto de Defesa Nacional, 2017); Melissa K. Byrnes, 'Diplomacy at the End of Empire: Evolving French Perspectives on Portuguese Colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s', *Cold War History* 19, no. 4 (2019): 477–91. See also the special issue 'The International and the Portuguese Imperial Endgame: Problems and Perspectives', *Portuguese Studies* 29, no. 2 (2013), edited by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto.
20. Jamie Miller, 'Things Fall Apart: South Africa and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire, 1973–74', *Cold War History* 12, no. 2 (2012): 183–204; John P. Cann and José Manuel Correia, 'An Unlikely Alliance: Portuguese and South African Airpower in Angola, 1968–1974', *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28, no. 2 (2017): 309–36; Maria Paula Meneses, Celso Braga Rosa and Bruno Sena Martins, 'Colonial Wars, Colonial Alliances: The Alcora Exercise in the Context of Southern Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 2 (2017): 397–410; Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses and Robert McNamara, *The White Redoubt, the Great Powers and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1960–1980* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
21. David Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1992); Mateus, *A luta pela independência*; Marissa Moorman, *Intonations: A Social History of Luanda, Angola, from 1945 to Recent Times* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008); Eric Morier-Genoud, ed., *Sure Road? Nationalisms in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique* (Boston: Brill, 2012); Branwen Gruffydd Jones, 'Anticolonial Poetics: Forging Solidarities and Imagining Futures', *Postcolonial Studies* 26, no. 1 (2023): 32–54.
22. Glenda Morgan, 'Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 4 (1990): 603–19.
23. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, 'Internationalism and Anti-racism in the Thought and Practice of Mondlane, Neto, Cabral and Machel', in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity*, ed. Robbie Shilliam (London: Routledge, 2010), 47–63; R. Joseph Parrott, 'Brother and a Comrade: Amílcar Cabral as Global Revolutionary', in *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War*, ed. R. Joseph Parrott and Mark Atwood Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 243–331.

24. The classic in this genre is Basil Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky: The Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, 1963–74* (London: Zed, 1981). See also Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).
25. Frederick Cooper, 'Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History', *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1516–45.
26. David Anderson and Daniel Branch, 'Allies at the End of Empire: Loyalists, Nationalists and the Cold War, 1945–76', *International History Review* 39, no. 1 (2017): 1–13.
27. Douglas L. Wheeler, 'African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (1961–1974)', *Armed Forces and Society* 2, no. 2 (1976): 233–50; John P. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961–1974* (Westport: Greenwood, 1997); J. P. Borges Coelho, 'African Troops in the Portuguese Colonial Army, 1961–74: Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique', *Portuguese Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (2002): 129–50; Pedro Aires Oliveira, 'Saved by the Civil War: African "Loyalists" in the Portuguese Armed Forces and Angola's Transition to Independence', *International History Review* 39, no. 1 (2017): 126–42.
28. Luise White and Miles Larmer, 'Introduction: Mobile Soldiers and the Un-national Liberation of Southern Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40, no. 6 (2014): 1271–4; Eric Kennes and Miles Larmer, *The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa: Fighting Their Way Home* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016).
29. Mustafah Dhada, *Warriors at Work: How Guinea Was Really Set Free* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1993); João M. Cabrita, *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000); Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali, *Guerrilhas e Lutas Sociais: O MPLA Perante Si Próprio (1960–1977)* (Lisbon: Mercado de Letras, 2018); John A. Marcum, *Conceiving Mozambique* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
30. John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Vol. 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950–1962* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), and *The Angolan Revolution, Vol. 2: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962–1976* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978).
31. Among others, Patrick Chabal, *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); John McCulloch, *The Twilight of Revolution: The Political Theory of Amilcar Cabral* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1983); Julião Soares Sousa, *Amílcar Cabral (1924–1973). Vida e morte de um revolucionário africano* (Coimbra: Author's Edition, 2016); Peter Karibe Mendy, *Amilcar Cabral: Nationalist and Pan-Africanist Revolutionary* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2019); Aurora Almada e Santos and Victor Barros, 'Introduction. Amílcar Cabral and the Idea of Anti-colonial Revolution', *Lusotopie* 19, no. 1 (2020): 9–35; António Tomás, *Amílcar Cabral: The Life of a Reluctant Nationalist* (London: Hurst, 2021).
32. Reiland Rabaka, *Concepts of Cabralism: Amilcar Cabral and Africana Critical Theory* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014); P. Khalil Saucier, ed., *A Luta Continua: (Re) introducing Amilcar Cabral to a New Generation of Thinkers* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2017); Filipa César, 'Reading Amílcar Cabral's Agronomy of Liberation', *Meteorisations* 32, nos. 2–3 (2018): 254–72; Tiago Saraiva, 'Black Science: Amílcar Cabral's Agricultural Survey and the Seeds of African Decolonization', *Isis* 113, no. 3 (2022): 597–609.
33. On Algeria's significance, see Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2002); Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, & the Third World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

34. Mustafah Dhada, 'Guinea's Liberation Diplomacy', *Portuguese Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (1995): 20–39; Patricia Gomes, 'The International Relations in the Politics of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde', *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 7, no. 2 (2008): 115–30; Daniel Kaiser, ' "Makers of Bonds and Ties": Transnational Socialisation and National Liberation in Mozambique', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017): 29–48; Federico Ferretti, 'Geopolitics of Decolonisation: The Subaltern Diplomacies of Lusophone Africa (1961–1974)', *Political Geography* 85 (2021): 102326; Rui Lopes, 'Conflicting Winds: The Liberation Struggle in Guinea-Bissau and the Quest to Decolonize the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies* (forthcoming).
35. Giulia Strippoli, 'Women's Transnational Activism against Portugal's Colonial Wars', *International Review of Social History* 67 (2022): 209–36.
36. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
37. This argument is put forward in James Mark and Paul Betts, eds, *Socialism Goes Global: Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Globalisation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022). For a slightly different take, see Kristin Roth-Ey, ed., *Socialist Internationalism and the Gritty Politics of the Particular* (London: Bloomsbury, 2023).
38. Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions. Havana, Washington, Pretoria* (Alberton: Galago Books, 2003); Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Philip E. Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva, eds, *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 197–220; Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca, eds, *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism, 1960–1990* (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2019); Catarina Laranjeiro, 'The Cuban Revolution and the Liberation Struggle in Guinea-Bissau: Images, Imaginings, Expectations and Experiences', *International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 1319–38; Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021); Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca, eds, *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Africa: New Perspectives on the Era of Decolonization, 1950s to 1990s* (Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023).
39. Norrie MacQueen and Pedro Aires Oliveira, ' "Grocer Meets Butcher": Marcello Caetano's London Visit of 1973 and the Last Days of Portugal's *Estado Novo*', *Cold War History* 10, no. 1 (2010): 29–50; Rui Lopes, *West Germany*, 66–101; R. Joseph Parrott, 'Boycott Gulf! Angolan Oil and the Black Power Roots of American Anti-Apartheid Organizing', *Modern American History* 1 (2018): 195–220; Corrado Tornimbeni, 'Nationalism and Internationalism in the Liberation Struggle in Mozambique: The Role of the FRELIMO's Solidarity Network in Italy', *South African Historical Journal* 70, no. 1 (2018): 194–214; Håkan Thörn, 'Nordic Support to the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa: Between Global Solidarity and National Self-Interest', in *Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 1960–1994*, ed. Arnold J. Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2019), 1–38; Victor Barros, 'The French Anticolonial Solidarity Movement and the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde', *International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 1297–318; Vincenzo Russo, *La Resistenza*

continua: Il colonialismo portoghese, le lotte di liberazione e gli intellettuali italiani (Milan: Meltemi, 2020).

40. Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vols. 1–3* (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999, 2002); Iina Soiri and Pekka Peltola, *Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa* (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999); Tore Linné Eriksen, ed., *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa* (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000); Christopher Munthe Morgenstierne, *Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Africa: A Flexible Response* (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003).
41. Robert Gildea, James Mark and Niek Pas, 'European Radicals and the "Third World" ', *Cultural and Social History* 8, no. 4 (2011): 449–71; Kim Christiaens, 'Europe at the Crossroads of Three Worlds: Alternative Histories and Connections of European Solidarity with the Third World, 1950s–80s', *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire* 24, no. 6 (2017): 932–54.
42. Maud Anne Bracke and James Mark, 'Between Decolonization and the Cold War: Transnational Activism and Its Limits in Europe, 1950s–90s', *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (2015): 403–17; Zeina Maasri, Cathy Bergin and Francesca Burke, eds, *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022).
43. Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki and Marco Wyss, 'Non-alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War', *International History Review* 37, no. 5 (2015): 901–11; Branwen Gruffydd Jones, 'Race, Culture and Liberation: African Anticolonial Thought and Practice in the Time of Decolonisation', *International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 1238–56.
44. Frederick Cooper, 'Writing the History of Development', *Journal of Modern European History* 8, no. 1 (2010): 5–23; Joseph M. Hodge, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-colonial Careering and the Early History of International Development', *Journal of Modern European History* 8, no. 1 (2010): 24–46; Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).
45. Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 2.
46. Frank Gerits, ' "When the Bull Elephants Fight": Kwame Nkrumah, Non-alignment, and Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957–66)', *International History Review* 37, no. 5 (2015): 951–69.
47. Frank Gerits, *Ideological Scramble for Africa: How the Pursuit of Anticolonial Modernity Shaped a Postcolonial Order, 1945–1966* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023); Sandrine Kott, *Organiser le Monde: Une autre histoire de la guerre froide* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2021), 145–78.
48. Patrick Chabal, 'People's War, State Formation and Revolution in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 21, no. 3 (1983): 104–25.
49. This was similar to West Africa in the 1960s. See Alessandro Iandolo, *Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 1955–1968* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022).
50. Jeremy Friedman, *Ripe for Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2021), 203.
51. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, 'A Modernising Empire? Politics, Culture and Economy in Portuguese Late Colonialism', in *The Ends of European*

Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons, ed. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 51–80.

52. Christine Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola: South-South Cooperation and Transfer of Knowledge, 1976–1991* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015); Bogdan C. Iacob and Iolanda Vasile, 'Agents of Decolonization? Romanian Activities in Mozambique's Oil and Healthcare Sectors, 1976–1984', and Pavel Szobi, 'Czechoslovak Economic Interests in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s', in *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War*, ed. Anna Calori, Anne-Kristin Hartmetz, Bence Kocsev, James Mark and Jan Zofka (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 133–63, 165–96; Elizaben Banks, 'Socialist Internationalism between the Soviet Union and Mozambique, 1962–91' (PhD diss., New York University, 2019); Marcia Schenck, *Remembering African Labor Migration to the Second World: Socialist Mobilities between Angola, Mozambique, and East Germany* (Cham: Springer, 2022).
53. Amílcar Cabral, 'New Year's Message', in *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral*, ed. Africa Information Service (London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 95.

Part 1

Ideas and Rhetoric of Liberation

1

Bourgeois revolutionaries: Holden Roberto, American anti-communism and the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile

Alexander J. Marino

The rivalry between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in the 1960s and 1970s defined the anticolonial struggle to free Angola from the Portuguese Empire.[1] After early successes, the FNLA and its leader, Álvaro Holden Roberto, dominated international attention and garnered recognition in 1963 from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the leader of the Angolan people. Rather than working together towards their common goal of Angolan independence, both parties used propaganda, diplomacy and armed conflicts to downgrade and delegitimize their rival. The two parties formed parallel governments in exile, each fielding armies, youth wings, foreign ministries, refugee services, soccer teams and even music albums in the United States.[2]

The MPLA leaders rejected Roberto's pro-American, bourgeois politics as anti-revolutionary, and they derided the FNLA as a tribal organization focused on Northern Angola. Roberto had no college experience, seemingly no intellectual foundation for leading a revolutionary movement. The MPLA propaganda worked for years to diminish Holden Roberto and the FNLA, and the long-simmering tension between the two exploded into a civil war in 1975. Because the MPLA won the Angolan Civil War and has governed the country since 1975, many of the critiques of the FNLA and Holden Roberto appear valid, and the MPLA has largely overshadowed the FNLA in historical studies of Angolan liberation. However, taking the MPLA's criticisms of Roberto at face value makes it difficult to understand the popularity and successes of a man who counted John F. Kennedy, Patrice Lumumba, Frantz Fanon and Habib Bourguiba as allies.

Holden Roberto's place as the first internationally recognized leader of an independent Angolan government highlights the fundamentally bourgeois nature of early Angolan nationalist leaders and the early Angolan Revolution. Roberto's personal successes in sports, business and politics reflected the aspirational goals of Angolan elites after the Second World War. Through his associations with Congolese political organizations, Roberto was recognized as a fierce proponent of anti-tribal, anti-racist politics. He was a skilled typist with experience running large organizations, and he

enjoyed a broad personal network with leaders across the globe. His brand of bourgeois politics helped him secure support from the United States and from American organizations, which allowed him to form the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio, GRAE), the first representative government of the Angolan people recognized by the OAU.

Holden Roberto's early successes became major challenges for the MPLA as it struggled to gain recognition from the OAU, the United Nations and the Angolan people in the early 1960s. The formation of the GRAE reflected his success in winning over a wide swath of Angolan elites, the vast majority of which had no college experience, yet nevertheless occupied prestigious positions in the colonial system. The GRAE's political agenda reflected the desires and aspirations of Angolan elites, particularly its admonition of forced labour and support for investing in the earning potential of workers. Studying the GRAE through its own documents and those of its closest international supporters helps understand the politics of the Angolan Revolution and the limits of bourgeois anticolonial radicalism.

Bourgeois revolutionaries

In the mid-twentieth century, an overwhelming number of Angolans left their birthplaces to pursue educational or employment opportunities that were either unavailable at home or that they hoped would further their income-earning potential. The lure of jobs in cities and towns was amplified by a desire to earn wages to avoid forced labour, a form of modern slavery. Bourgeois families in Luanda and major towns faced a class crunch as blacks from the countryside moved to urban areas seeking employment and whites from the metropole moved to the colonies for a cheaper cost of living. In 1945, then 22-year-old Holden Roberto became part of a fast-growing cohort, working as an accountant for the Belgian colonial administration in what is today the Democratic Republic of Congo, where tens of thousands of his compatriots also lived and worked. Congo offered virtually unlimited employment opportunities as it rapidly industrialized after the Second World War.[3] Conversely, only a small number of Angolans were able to pursue university degrees in Portugal or elsewhere in Europe, like the MPLA's Agostinho Neto, Mário Pinto de Andrade and Lúcio Lara.[4]

Because the difference in quality of life between wage-earners and the rural poor was so great, all wage-earners in Angola essentially functioned as a bourgeois class all the way up to the 1960s. Angola did not truly develop a black proletariat until after the beginning of the liberation war in 1961. Wages provided an escape from forced labour and access to modern material goods. However, they did not provide an escape from the racism of imperialism.

Black wage-earners sought to eliminate legal and structural disadvantages they faced in the economy by whatever means possible. Education seemed to hold the promise of greater pay and access to forms of legal recognition by the state, whether it was *assimilado* ('assimilated') status in Angola or *évolué* ('evolved') in Congo. In theory such a status allowed for Africans to fully enjoy their wealth by removing racial

barriers to public accommodations and some citizenship rights. These legal terms did little to achieve racial equality for the few who could attain that status, nor did it address structural issues like the racial pay gap and colour line in some professions.[5] Many turned towards international ideologies and political programmes to address these racial inequalities.

Garveyism, pan-Africanism and the Free Trade Union movement were popular political movements in Central Africa long before the creation of the GRAE and the MPLA. They were particularly prevalent among the members of a rising black bourgeoisie that faced racism impeding their material success. The revolution for them would be to remove whites from the top of colonial bureaucracies, allowing for black-owned businesses and black landlords to profit from capitalist exploitation. These ideas manifested themselves in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s through major conferences, messianic movements, underground dissemination of Marcus Garvey's *Negro World* and labour strikes. The borderland between Angola and Congo was a particular hotbed of this kind of activity, and Angolans in Congo were especially exposed to racial capitalist ideologies.[6]

Holden Roberto was but one of many Angolans who distinguished themselves in the Belgian Congo after the Second World War. Angolans were prominent in Congolese arts, music, sports, business and religion.[7] Angolans found ways to own property and open shops, even when Congolese were barred from doing the same. Angolans had to pay a tax at the border and carry a passport. They were ineligible to achieve the *évolué* status that formally freed one from native law and some of the colony's segregation decrees, even though they were informally considered as such.[8] They could be deported at the whim of authorities. Although Belgian employers and the Belgian state relied on Angolan labour, Angolans were quickly made scapegoats. Angolans were deported with great frequency, as the colonial state could do little to quell labour protest or messianic movements. Angolans played critical leadership roles in the 1945 strikes in Matadi and Léopoldville at the end of the war, pushing for better pay, improved living conditions and rights. Many were deported.[9]

Material success on one side of the Angola–Congo frontier meant little on the other side. The two bordering colonies featured competing official languages and currencies, meaning even those who had wealth or recognition as 'assimilated'/'evolved' faced arbitrary imperial dictates that differentiated life in each colony. Angolans who were informally considered *évolués* in the Belgian Congo for speaking perfect French and working white-collar jobs were not necessarily eligible for *assimilado* status in Angola, where one had to speak fluent Portuguese and follow Portuguese customs. Wages earned on one side of the border could not necessarily be easily spent on the other. For wealthier families like Holden Roberto's, which had business interests in Portuguese Angola, the Belgian Congo and French Central Africa, managing assets across colonial boundaries was a constant nightmare. Belgian, French and Portuguese authorities could shut the family off from access to their business interests and land holdings. The reality for Angolans in the mid-twentieth century was that there was nowhere to go to avoid systemic racism that limited career trajectories and citizenship rights.

Holden Roberto

Holden Roberto's connections in Congo with global anti-communists in the postwar years became the foundation for his political career and, ultimately, his contribution to Angolan independence. He emerged from the 1950s as the internationally recognized leader of the Angolan Revolution because he effectively represented and marshalled bourgeois Angolan values while also winning the support of American anti-communists. Roberto's grandfather was a Protestant preacher and church leader. After the Buta uprising and subsequent Portuguese crackdown on Protestant missionaries, Roberto's family joined other Protestants in fleeing to the Belgian Congo to worship freely. Like thousands of other Angolans, his parents chose life in Congo as an escape from Portuguese colonialism.[10]

Holden Roberto's considerable fame and professional networks propelled him to the forefront of Angolan nationalists. Roberto was a celebrity in Kinshasa from his days with the Daring Football Club, both as a player and as the team's treasurer. Through his work as a clerk for the Belgian colonial government, for private businesses and for the Kingdom of Kongo, Roberto had friends and allies in Congo, Angola and overseas. In the 1950s, he was closely associated with anti-tribal, anti-racist organizations in Congo, and he advocated for Angolan politics along similar lines. By the late 1950s he was the most famous Angolan in the world, and he used his celebrity status to bring attention to the cause of Angolan independence.

Football played an incredibly important role in Holden Roberto's political development. Roberto told historian John Marcum that 'he first became aware of his own leadership ability while playing football'.[11] Roberto played a pivotal role on multiple championship teams for Daring Club, a storied team with a massive fanbase. Roberto's first season with the club was one of its most memorable, remembered as 'the glorious phalanx of 1949'.[12] At one point in his career he was considered 'one of the most athletic players in [Kinshasa]'.[13] After a few years as a major contributor to the team on the field, Roberto transitioned to club management. He served as treasurer of the Daring Club as it grew to manage three other teams under the leadership of club president Cyrille Adoula. As treasurer, it would have fallen to Roberto to manage finances and find work for all four of the teams ran by the organization, as at that time Congolese footballers were not paid. Daring had the reputation as a club for clerks, having started in the schoolyard of a typing school and its players holding prestigious jobs in the colonial government or working for large commercial interests.[14] Adoula and Roberto led the team to a championship in 1955.[15]

Cyrille Adoula opened doors for Roberto in the world of international trade unionism. As a bank clerk and labour activist, Adoula was an early Congolese member of Paul Henri Spaak's anti-communist Socialist Party in Belgium.[16] The Socialists were an anti-communist workers' party that supported the Marshall Plan, NATO and European integration. Spaak's party had close ties with American labour organizer Irving Brown of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), who operated abroad on funds from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[17]

Roberto's own work as a clerk provided a vast network of his own within Congolese politics. He worked in Kisangani in the aftermath of the Second World War, where he befriended Patrice Lumumba and first participated in what some scholars have called the 'political awakening in the Congo'.[18] He was there when Antoine-Marie Mobe led the Association des Évolués de Stanleyville, who implored the organization 'to ignore this spirit of clan, of tribe, of region, to think only of our community of race and color … and to prepare for the Congo of tomorrow'. The Belgians deemed that Mobe had crossed beyond the approved rhetoric and goals of a 'non-political' organization and forced him to resign. Verhaegen argues that this was the inspiration for Patrice Lumumba's national politics a decade later.[19] There were also clearly echoes of Mobe in Holden Roberto's political rhetoric.

Roberto and this new class of clerks sought an end to traditionalism and an embrace of Western paternalism, with a wage-earning father as the leader of his own family unit. These clerks were opponents of the Bakongo matriarchy, which empowered maternal uncles to lead entire generations of a family. That meant uncles, rather than parents, controlled the decisions for children in a family, including those regarding education and employment. Congolese periodicals were filled with articles condemning the matriarchy and in support of Western paternalism, in sharp contrast to conservatives like the seminarian Joseph Kasa-Vubu of the party Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), who advocated for maintaining traditions in villages while opening limited opportunities for *évolués* in the cities.[20]

As an Angolan politician, Roberto constantly tried to operate counter to his uncle's conservative, pro-traditionalist approach. Through the Baptist Missionary Society, he sent letters to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie and to the president of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), A. J. Muste, for help and guidance on the situation in Angola. He received positive yet lukewarm responses from both.[21] However, in response to the 1951 letter, FOR member Homer A. Jack came to Kinshasa and met with Roberto and his compatriots. Roberto later told historian John Marcum that Jack was a 'man against racism in the U.S.' and that he had long been 'seeking out such a missionary' (emphasis in original).[22] In 1953, Jack became the leader of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), which was by far Roberto's most important connection to Washington.

While Roberto focused on direct connections with international organizations, Kongo royalists in the Congolese city of Matadi sought to revive the power of the kingdom. Inspired by ABAKO's attempt to build a political movement based on Bakongo ethnic identity, the matriarchy and the memory of the Kongo Kingdom's past greatness, Angolans Eduardo Pinnock and Francisco Borralho Lulendo planned a trip to their homeland to measure support for a restoration of the throne in São Salvador. According to Roberto, 'around Christmas time' of 1951 they went into Angola 'to play football' as a 'ruse to contact with people'. When Roberto heard about their trip, he called them to Kinshasa to discuss the outcome. Although his uncle Manuel Barros Nekaka agreed with the Matadi group's plan to restore the monarchy, Roberto defied his uncle and rejected a return to the past. Roberto rejected organizing around the Bakongo identity and advocated for adopting a form of Angolan nationalism based on the politics he had known in Kisangani. He 'argued for a modern, supra-tribal nationalism', which the group rejected at the time.[23] For the moment his belief in a

modern Angola free of the monarchy sidelined him, but in the coming years it would put him in a stronger position of leadership.

A 1955 scandal in Bakongo politics along the Belgian Congo–Angolan frontier galvanized Angolans in Congo to rally for independence. When the king of Kongo died without an heir, Angolan Bakongo leaders living in the Belgian Congo's principal port, Matadi, led by Eduardo Pinnock, demanded a modern, Protestant king. Portuguese authorities refused, and instead a Catholic was crowned. Pinnock organized a protest across the border in Angola. Roberto and his uncle were against the plan from the start. Nevertheless, the 'Matadi Group' travelled to São Salvador and demanded the king abdicate in favour of a Protestant. The Portuguese humoured the protesters and allowed them their demonstration. The king remained in the throne, and the Matadi Group returned to the Belgian Congo defeated. Once the protesters had left the colony, the Portuguese government officially sealed the border. The closure of the frontier led Nekaka, Pinnock and Roberto to begin to talk about building international support for Bakongo nationalism. Roberto wrote again to the UN and asked for 'the people of the Kongo Kingdom' to become 'a Trusteeship of the United States of America'. Ignored by the UN, Roberto turned to the American consulate in Lépodville to further press the issue.[24]

Roberto met with the staff of the American consulate in Lépodville in late 1955, which led to a twenty-year relationship between him and the US government. Holden made such an impression on the consulate staff that Consul General Robert McGregor wrote a critical memorandum to his superiors questioning American policy in Africa. McGregor was 'sympathetic and attentive' during his meeting with Roberto but was frustrated that he knew that the United States' 'relationships with the Portuguese in Europe preclude … doing anything'. He wanted Washington to 'devise a propaganda campaign that would effectively destroy the myth that the Soviet is the champion of democracy and freedom'. He pointed out that American policy-makers were more than willing to 'tolerate or overlook conditions' in Angola while chastising the Soviets for similar behaviour in the Eastern Bloc. He noted, 'The United States, being tied to the Metropolitan powers, will in ten years be devoid of a policy that will appeal to an emerging and awakened indigenous population in Africa.' McGregor complained that American support for colonial regimes was 'in effect driving these well-meaning and sincere Africans towards the Communists', because the Soviet Union would actually 'raise the cry and at least point the finger at injustice'. What he wanted was for Washington to 'stand for freedom from all forms of oppression, for self-government, and for independence based upon self-determination', regardless of whether or not the State Department believed a people were ready for independence.[25]

Perhaps in a classic case of diplomats in the field driving foreign policy, Roberto left the US consulate with cash from the CIA and the promise of more in the future.[26] This included, but was not limited to, direct monthly payments amounting to $6,000 a year in 1955 dollars.[27] The money probably came from the consulate's budget for paying African informants to track potential sources of instability in the Belgian Congo.[28]

Following this breakthrough in 1955, Roberto's political activities accelerated. In 1956, he secretly visited Northern Angola to network with local Bakongo leaders and establish relations with non-Bakongo tribesmen in the area that would become the

main combat zone of the war of independence. He also quit his job to take a low-profile position with an insurance company. Under the leadership of Roberto, Nekaka and Pinnock, the Matadi and Léopoldville communities formed an official organization, the União dos Povos do Norte de Angola (UPNA), whose stated purpose was the independence of the old Kongo Kingdom from Portuguese rule. In the summer of 1956, the UPNA's leaders wrote letters directly to State Department officials seeking advice in identifying and contacting international supporters.[29] These letters raised the UPNA's profile among a growing group of advocates of rapid decolonization in Africa.

George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah's pan-African advisor, invited the UPNA to participate in the Conference of All African Peoples in Ghana set for 1958. The UPNA elected Roberto as its official representative, and the group fundraised from sympathetic donors for the trip.[30] The conference was a gathering of independence organizers from across the continent, including Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, Congo's Patrice Lumumba and, in the service of Algerian independence, Frantz Fanon. All had worked as clerks for the colonial regimes in their home countries. Roberto found himself plugged into a conference of clerks.[31]

Under the name 'Haldane Roberto' he made contacts with early arrivals in Accra and found that his peers agreed with him on his anti-tribal, supra-nationalist ideas. The tribal nature of the UPNA was off-putting to conference attendees, and they told him that he would find little support for such a cause. Roberto decided to drop the 'Norte' (north) from his organization and quickly produced literature and pamphlets for the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), which focused on democracy and national unity within an independent Angola.[32] Armed with a borrowed typewriter, Roberto was finally able to put his nationalistic ideas for Angolan independence on paper. He declared that the UPNA represented the past, and that the UPA was a forward-thinking movement that would provide relief to the Bakongo refugees in the Belgian Congo by securing independence from Portugal for all of Angola. Frantz Fanon later wrote in the newspaper of the Algerian National Liberation Front that 'the delegates from Angola were welcomed with emotion and an enormous anger was expressed on hearing about the discriminatory and inhuman measures employed by the Portuguese authorities'.[33] Roberto also left an impression on many Americans at the conference, like Irving Brown of the AFL-CIO, historian John Marcum and several members of ACOA, including George Houser.

George Houser of ACOA quickly became a prominent advocate for Holden Roberto in the United States. Houser used his steady stream of information from Roberto in his appeals as the head of ACOA. In 1960, George Houser reported to the US Congress that there were 'relatively strong organizations of Angolan people who are organizing in anticolonial movements' against Portugal in Léopoldville. He lobbied, in particular, for creating opportunities for African nationalists and supporting African labour movements. Houser pushed the State Department for funds to bring nationalist leaders and African students to the United States to directly compete with Soviet educational programmes. In a report to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), Houser argued that Africans tended towards workers' socialism that rejected communism and sought to regulate capitalism. He made clear that, in his view, this

meant trade unions were an important tool for the United States to prevent communist infiltration into the continent.[34]

Roberto's contacts with Americans deepened after the conference. Ghana paid for him to go to the United States, and Guinea issued him a passport under the name 'José Gilmore' and claimed him as a member of their UN delegation. He used the freedom of his diplomatic cover to visit a wide array of American officials and deepen his existing connections. Roberto frequented ACOA's New York headquarters and visited Fanon's hospital bed in Maryland.[35] Homer Jack of ACOA introduced Roberto to the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Senator John F. Kennedy.[36] Kennedy's office subscribed to the UPA's newspaper, *La Voix de la Nation Angolaise*, and viewed him as exactly the kind of anti-communist revolutionary the United States needed to wage Cold War in the Third World.[37]

As a sign of his commitment to African affairs, JFK sent W. Averell Harriman on a fact-finding mission to Africa during the presidential campaign of 1960.[38] Serving as Harriman's translator was Holden Roberto's close acquaintance, historian John Marcum. During the tour's stop in Kinshasa, Marcum set up a series of meetings with Holden Roberto's family and closest associates to gather intelligence on the Angolan leader. Marcum reported back to Harriman that Roberto was 'anti-communist in orientation' and wanted American support.[39] At the same time, Harriman and Marcum rejected entreaties from several members of the MPLA. Kennedy's envoys were aware of the MPLA's communist sympathies and avoided contact.[40] The message was clear: America wanted pro-Western, anti-communist Angolan allies. Kennedy believed this was vital for maintaining Angola's Western orientation after independence. Kennedy sought to dominate and determine the struggle brewing between Angola's independence movements as a part of his overall strategy for postcolonial Africa.

The UPA steadily recruited more followers among Angolans in Congo, who by the late 1950s numbered over a hundred thousand. Belgian authorities continued to deport Angolans to deter troublemaking, a practice that accelerated as Congo moved towards independence. Holden Roberto claimed that the wave of Angolans deported from Belgian Congo in 1959 after the riots that year in Léopoldville 'galvanized the political consciousness of the forced labourers [*sic*] and the spoliated peasants of Angola'.[41] In late 1960, Roberto lined up intensified efforts to organize in Northern Angola and, through allies in New York, got Angola and Portuguese Africa on the agenda for the spring session of the UN. These plans accelerated after the 4 February uprising in 1961 in Luanda.

On 15 March 1961, Roberto's UPA launched a three-pronged assault at Portuguese imperialism that nearly brought Lisbon to heel. In the UN Security Council, the United States under Kennedy voted for the first time against Portugal on a colonial issue. In Angola, UPA forces invaded from across the border in Congo. Prepared for the moment, Roberto addressed a crowd of reporters in New York and declared that Portuguese imperialism was 'an avalanche of violence which knows no bounds and has engendered violence on the part of the Angolans, a just anger which is aching to express itself'.[42]

Roberto's forces captured a large swath of Northern Angola and killed over 250 Portuguese civilians in its opening days. The offensive sparked a general revolt in

Northern Angola, and rebel bands roamed the countryside attacking every Portuguese in sight. UPA fighters also directed their violence against the Ovimbundu labourers who had replaced their brethren in the coffee fields, marking the first mass violence committed by Angolans against fellow Angolans during the war. Settlers fled and anarchy prevailed. With their leader abroad and little organizational direction, UPA forces were unprepared to govern the towns, plantations and military installations they had conquered. The haphazard offensive came to a halt a mere 30 miles from Luanda. Roberto never imagined the invasion would be so successful.[43]

Recruitment for the UPA soared after the 15 March invasion. Angolans living in Congo flocked the UPA headquarters in Lépoldville to join the movement. Roberto received promises of aid from nearly every African capital, as well as from international aid organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief and the African Service Institute.[44]

The Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile

Riding on the success of the initial 15 March invasion, Roberto led a consolidation of Angolan political movements into a big tent organization to bring all Angolan nationalists under unified leadership. In early 1962 he formed an alliance between the two largest Angolan groups in Congo – his own UPA and the Angolan Democratic Party (PDA) led by Emmanuel Kounzika – to form a National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). A week later, the FNLA announced the creation of the GRAE, with UPA and PDA leaders holding key positions in the new government's cabinet.[45] The newly created GRAE represented the culmination of Roberto's organizing among bourgeois Angolan leaders. His personal dynamism and rapid accumulation of political and military power were attractive assets to energized and enthusiastic revolutionaries.

The GRAE was the result of over a year of recruiting bourgeois Angolan leaders in Angola, Congo and Europe. It was already no small feat to bring together the PDA and the UPA, who together represented the tens of thousands of Angolans living in Congo working myriad jobs with competing patronage networks. With Holden Roberto as prime minister and Emmanuel Kounzika as vice-premier, the GRAE had two leaders with extensive personal wealth and networks in Angola and Congo, who could help fund the revolution and employ leaders with friendly business contacts. Kounzika was a clerk who had been involved in messianic movements on both sides of the border and eventually led his own commercial firm.[46] Command of the armed forces fell to Southerners who had served in the colonial army, first João Baptista, and then José Kalundungo after the death of Baptista in 1962. UPA cadres recruited Baptista when he was stationed in Noqui, sister city to Matadi across the border in Congo. A former nursing student, Baptista fled Angola in August 1960 and very quickly rose the ranks in the UPA, bringing other Angolan deserters across the border to form the nucleus of the UPA army. One of Baptista's followers was José Melo, who went on to receive training in Léopoldville from a Tunisian officer in early 1961. His forces were in the country on 14 March.[47] Also in 1961, Roberto convinced university student Jonas Savimbi, another Southerner, to become UPA's secretary general and the foreign

minister of the GRAE. He immediately secured new recruits among fellow Angolan university students in Europe and Southerners to the cause. Luanda also had strong representation most notably among a group of Catholic priests and seminarians led by Rosario Neto who was UPA vice-president.[48]

The GRAE quickly set out to develop diplomatic, informational, military and economic programmes to fully assert itself as a nation-state with all the levers of national power. It operated an army, provided refugee relief services, medical services, educational services, propaganda services, a labour union, a youth wing, a woman's organization and a large overseas diplomatic presence. The government viewed increasing kill counts in the field, number of refugees served and propaganda output as important metrics of the revolution. The GRAE opened an Angola office in New York and quickly began planning diplomatic missions in Algeria and Tunisia.[49]

The GRAE was exactly the kind of bourgeois revolutionary organization that American anti-communists could support. To make sure Angolan news struck the right tone with American anti-communist audiences, John Marcum and George Houser wrote or heavily edited Roberto's speeches. Historian Bill Minter congratulated Marcum for his excellent work on Roberto's public remarks, particularly singling out the consistent references to a 'Maxon-Dixon' line in Africa.[50] John Marcum wanted to make clear to his supporters that Americans needed to back the new organization, which he thought would 'determine the political complexion' of Africa and was, therefore, in dire need of American support. Without help from Washington, Marcum threatened that the United States might 'awaken to find that those who fought for ideals that we shared were eliminated'.[51]

The GRAE opened new lines of financial support among anti-communists that supplemented Roberto's existing funding from Ghana, Algeria, Tunisia, Congo, the CIA, the AFL-CIO and the ACOA. The GRAE-affiliated trade union, the General League of Angolan Workers (LGTA), wrote to Irving Brown in 1961 warning the AFL-CIO of the communist leanings of the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Angolais (UNTA), the MPLA-backed Angolan labour union.[52] With increasing pressure to act, AFL-CIO president George Meany wrote to the US State Department in December 1962 complaining that more work was needed to aid Angolan refugees because he had heard from Holden Roberto and Angolan unionists that the MPLA was 'receiving extensive aid from Iron Curtain countries'.[53] Meany worried that because 'Roberto's party is anti-Soviet, there is always the danger that the lack of any Western support will drive many into the hands of totalitarian movements', such as the MPLA, which Meany claimed was 'penetrated by pro-communist elements'.[54]

The AFL-CIO responded on its own to create the Emergency Relief to Angola (ERA) programme for refugees. AFL-CIO leaders Maida Springer and Irving Brown founded the ERA with the help of Thomas Melady's Africa Service Institute and the American Committee on Africa. The ERA operated massive donation drives among American unions, churches, business groups and civic organizations to support the GRAE's refugee relief efforts. Organizations in support of the ERA even included Catholic Relief Services, Church World Services, Lutheran World Relief, the African Research Foundation, the International Rescue Committee, the Chicago Dry Cleaners Association and the Africa Committee of the National Council of Churches. The

ERA sourced thousands of pounds of used clothing, typewriters, office equipment, automobiles, food, blankets, medical supplies and hundreds of thousands of dollars of medicine.[55] Unionized workers and churches poured in support from all over the country.

The main recipient of ERA donations was the GRAE's refugee relief service, the Serviço de Assistência aos Refugiados de Angola (SARA). Founded by Dr José Liahuca and Rui Teixeira, SARA directly grew out of efforts by George Houser of ACOA and John Marcum to create new avenues for supporting Holden Roberto's nationalist movement. Eventually SARA had the money to bring in Canadian Ian Gilchrist as a doctor. Gilchrist was a devout Christian and strong anti-communist, who dutifully wrote to American audiences of the dangers of communist propaganda seeping into Léopoldville and the need for a pro-American propaganda counter-offensive. The creation of GRAE led to a huge influx of funding for SARA and an expansion of its refugee services, including schools, hospitals and job-training programmes.[56]

The huge influx of foreign aid proved that the GRAE was a great propaganda success. It legitimized Roberto's leadership beyond his own ethnic group precisely when military activity in Angola decreased and his forces increasingly fought more against the MPLA rather than the Portuguese. Furthermore, in 1963 the OAU recognized the GRAE/FNLA as the one true Angolan liberation movement. Not only did the OAU recognize Roberto as the leader of the Angolan Resistance, it made the colony the top priority of its 'liberation agenda'.[57] This opened the door for more international funding while also marginalizing his main rival, the MPLA.

John Marcum reported to his contacts in the United States that the GRAE 'brought about a radical change in the Angolan situation'. He believed that the GRAE's rise sent the MPLA into a tailspin. Marcum noted that fighting between Neto and Viriato da Cruz led to a public fracturing of the MPLA leadership. Marcum believed that the rift between Neto and Cruz, along with the MPLA's proposed front with tribalist, monarchist, collaborationist and communist-aligned Angolan political parties, invalidated the MPLA in the eyes of the OAU.[58] He also reported that Léopoldville was emerging as a centre of liberation movements, with Holden Roberto in the centre, describing what would eventually become the Congo Alliance.[59] Ultimately, Marcum made clear that 'these developments offer tremendous opportunities to the Government in Exile, but create many problems for it as well. It must now begin to look and act like a government, step up the military campaign, and provide for the greatly increased medical needs which will result.'[60] The GRAE had at its disposal probably the maximum support available at the time from anti-communist forces in the world, which was realistically its only viable source of foreign aid.

The GRAE's closest African allies tried their best to limit Roberto's funding, arms and training from the socialist world. Frantz Fanon, who operated on Irving Brown-funnelled CIA funds even as he represented Algerian revolutionaries, was anti-MPLA.[61] Habib Bourguiba was likewise a longtime AFL-CIO ally and, by the CIA's estimation, 'firmly anti-Communist' and perhaps the most consistent North African ally of the GRAE.[62] When Washington worried that Roberto might take support from Beijing, Tunisian foreign minister Mongi Slim, a close supporter of Holden Roberto, assured Francis Russell, US ambassador to Tunisia, that 'Roberto and his associates

are anti-Communist, as is Adoula'.[63] Of course Congo was perhaps the most staunchly anti-communist of all newly independent African governments in the early 1960s, and the largest financial, political and military backer of the GRAE. Congo's anti-communist credentials were above reproach, even blocking Algerian volunteers from training GRAE cadres in Congo in response to the perception in Congo that the Algerian Revolution was moving towards communism. Congolese Sûreté chief Victor Nendaka assured the American ambassador to Léopoldville that Congo was 'engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Communism', and that the United States could 'count on me' to prevent communist aid to the GRAE.[64]

Although Congo was the GRAE's biggest supporter, it also severely limited Roberto's military options. One aspect of the GRAE's military strategy was to attack the Portuguese colonial economy, which ultimately paid for Portugal's counterinsurgency efforts. However, Roberto knew better than to cut Angola's Benguela Railroad, which was the main route for Congolese ores to make their way to global markets. The railroad was an easy target of significant value that Roberto's forces simply refused to attack. With limited military options, Roberto's main hope remained that the Kennedy administration would exert pressure on Portugal through diplomatic channels to accept Angolan independence.

Unfortunately for the cause of Angolan independence, the Kennedy administration was still trying to straddle the fence between supporting African nationalism and allies in Europe. Even though the White House produced several optimistic reports of the future success of the GRAE, a draft memo to the American ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, described Kennedy's goal as 'to protect both our African and European interests'. The Kennedy administration did not want Portugal to face 'broad sanctions' that would endanger American positions in Europe, particularly the Lajes Airfield in the Azores Islands.[65] In private, the United States did try to move Portugal towards decolonization. In a candid conversation in Lisbon, Undersecretary of State George Ball warned dictator António de Oliveira Salazar that Portuguese efforts to hold Angola would 'be frustrated by the violence likely to be initiated by opposing forces'.[66] The United States would not take any action that would decisively tip the scales in favour of Roberto and his government in exile. The GRAE would have to fight and win the war on its own.

Unfortunately for Holden Roberto, the military situation did not favour his Angolan National Liberation Army (ELNA). In some ways the ELNA was a victim of its own success: the 1961 attacks had secured an impossibly large area to defend. By the end of 1962, the ELNA's area of operations had shrunk along the border with Congo and in areas of rough terrain that made it difficult for the Portuguese military to support wheeled and tracked equipment. The army faced generally poor morale, especially after a series of purges in response to the death of Army Commander João Baptista in January 1962 and accusations against Roberto that he had ordered Baptista's execution.[67] Whereas the GRAE was quite capable of securing medicine and clothing for refugees, arms and ammunition were less forthcoming. To turn things around, Roberto needed more military support, particularly from his host, the Government of Congo.

To Holden Roberto's great dismay, Moïse Tshombe replaced FNLA supporter Cyrille Adoula as prime minister of Congo in 1964. African countries viewed Tshombe as a sellout

to European interests, and as prime minister he moved to normalize relations between Congo and Portugal. The GRAE suffered from guilt by association in its diplomatic efforts across the continent, even as Tshombe moved to stifle Roberto's movement. One Portuguese intelligence officer told an American counterpart that the Portuguese were 'delighted' that Tshombe was 'working hand in glove to deny him [Roberto] arms and material'.[68] Roberto vented to the Nigerian ambassador to Congo that Tshombe was planning on kicking the GRAE out of Congo, and that Congolese president Kasa-Vubu and his ABAKO party were making things difficult along the border with Angola. Roberto worried that Tshombe and Kasa-Vubu were planning to replace his allies in government, including Congolese military leaders like General Joseph Mobutu. Roberto feared that the conservative duo of Tshombe and Kasa-Vubu planned on liquidating the federal government and handing power directly to the customary chiefs.[69] In early 1964, US president Lyndon Johnson's administration strongly considered a plan to covertly intervene in support of Roberto and the GRAE. Amidst those discussions in Washington, Tshombe met with US Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennen 'Soapy' Williams, and asked him to recall the US ambassador and to stop all support for Roberto. When informed of the request, President Johnson acquiesced; he told Williams that he was worried that the Congo was disintegrating. Johnson decided that 'time was running out and the Congo must be saved'.[70] The 303 Committee, an oversight panel composed of members from the National Security Agency and the CIA, tabled Roberto's aid package in response.[71] Roberto's *annus horribilis* only got worse that summer when his relationship with Jonas Savimbi fell apart.

Jonas Savimbi's exit from the GRAE in July 1964 was viewed by many outsiders as the end of the movement's viability. Angered by the lack of progress in the war and the Bakongo monopoly over leadership positions, Savimbi quit the GRAE. After his departure, Ovimbundu membership plummeted. His critiques of Holden Roberto echoed earlier accusations of being an American puppet, tribalism and authoritarianism. The *New York Times* declared at the Cairo Conference of Heads of African States, where Savimbi announced his resignation, that 'Africans hear resistance in Angola has collapsed'.[72]

In the fallout from Savimbi's departure and Tshombe's squeezing of the GRAE's assets and funding, the various functionaries of the government in exile turned on Roberto as well. The government's refugee relief agency, SARA, collapsed as Roberto raided its funding to keep the rest of the GRAE solvent. He constantly borrowed money from SARA to cover expenses, both personal and governmental, dutifully tracking what he borrowed with the intent of paying back. SARA's revenue streams were different from that of the GRAE as a whole; some foreign donors send money and supplies directly to SARA. To secure his grip on the agency, Roberto replaced SARA's director with a Northerner who promptly chased off the organization's doctor, Dr José Liahuca. By mid-1965 more than half the nurses had quit, as well as most of the doctors, including founding members Ian Gilchrist and Rui Teixeira. Without money, doctors and nurses, SARA virtually ceased to exist. Dissidents in the GRAE, FNLA and UPA demanded that Roberto step down or make serious changes.[73] Seeing none, in 1965, the LGTA disaffiliated from the GRAE.[74] Roberto remained president of the GRAE, which at that point was a government in name only.

After a once promising start for the GRAE, by 1965 Holden Roberto's anti-communist bourgeoisie alliance fell apart. The Congolese government, once an ally, no longer allowed the GRAE to import weapons. The CIA reported that Roberto's military was hardly a coherent force, wracked by mutinies, low on morale and lacking basic supplies and ammunition. The overall opinion of Roberto among the embassy staff in Léopoldville plummeted. Even his staunchest supporters began to doubt his leadership. John Marcum, author of *The Angolan Revolution*, for the first time questioned 'Roberto's leadership ability and potential'. Marcum's opinion was particularly damning, given that the CIA viewed him as 'the closest American to Roberto'.[75]

Conclusion

The MPLA was the main beneficiary of Roberto and the GRAE's decline. Whereas the 1964 Cairo meeting was disastrous for Roberto, it was a resounding success for the MPLA. The African heads of state decided to create a committee to investigate the exclusion of the MPLA from the GRAE. More importantly for the MPLA, Holden Roberto's movement appeared in tatters after the defection of its foreign minister at a well-attended press conference. Taken together with other key defections, battlefield losses and persistent rumours that Roberto was an American crony, the GRAE appeared to be on the ropes. An official MPLA memo on the conference did not hold back the party's glee for Roberto's misfortune, musing that 'one wonders what will happen to the captain of the "Daring Football Club" whose president was Cyrille Adoula if the imperialists don't decide to give him a hand'.[76]

The very things that made the GRAE successful also explain how it unravelled in Cairo. Roberto was a micro-manager, and his personal rule was unsustainable, particularly as he grew paranoid after a series of assassination attempts. The GRAE was entirely dependent upon the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Roberto's American financial supporters. Congolese and American support would only go so far, and the GRAE suffered from the limitations imposed by its benefactors. Roberto's bourgeois supporters never provided decisive financial, diplomatic or military aid, and his government simply did not have the means to properly support troops in the field, refugee services in Congo and diplomatic efforts abroad. As his failures mounted, Roberto turned to his most loyal supporters, who all shared a similar upbringing in Congo. By 1964, the GRAE's inherent contradictions had chased off leaders representing Luanda and Southern Angola. The GRAE had become an inner circle of Roberto loyalists, mostly hailing from the north. Roberto had become the MPLA's caricature of him.

The GRAE made a contribution to the cause of Angolan independence. It represented the maximum support that wealthy Angolans living in Congo could muster with backing from American-led anti-communist organizations. They were plugged into a wider world of bourgeois rebels, in part because of American cultivation of such networks. American anti-communists supported liberals like Holden Roberto and the GRAE, but their support had limits. The GRAE was the manifestation of these

historical processes and contradictions inherent in the arrangement provided for its quick rise, and then fall.

Notes

1. On the rivalry between the MPLA and the FNLA during the early 1960s, Jean Martial Arsene Mbah, *As Rivalidades Políticas Entre a Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) e o Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA): 1961–1975* (Luanda: Mayamba, 2010); Miguel Júnior and Manuel Maria Difuila, *Military History of Angola: From the Sixteenth Century to the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington: AuthorHouseUK, 2018); Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2022); Alex Marino, 'The United States and Portuguese Angola: Space, Race, and the Cold War in Africa' (PhD diss., University of Arkansas, 2021); Alex Marino, 'America's War in Angola, 1961–1976' (MA diss., University of Arkansas, 2015).
2. With the help of historian John Marcum, the FNLA released the album *Angola Freedom Songs* on Smithsonian Folkways Recordings, and later the MPLA released *Angola: Forward, People's Power* on Paredon Records. See 'Interview with Barbara Dane and Irwin Silber of Paredon Records', 9 December 1991, tape 1, side A, Smithsonian Folkways, https://folkways-media.si.edu/docs/folkways/paredon_interview.pdf, 46.
3. John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950–1962* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), 50.
4. Fernando Andresen Guimarães, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict, 1961–76* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 39–40.
5. On 'assimilado' status in Angola, see Maria da Conceição Neto, Maria da Conceição Neto, 'Angola no Século XX (Até 1974)', in *O Império Africano (Séculos XIX e XX)*, ed. Valentim Alexandre (Lisboa: Instituto de História Contemporânea, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2000), 181–2. On 'évolués' in Congo, see Daniel Tödt, *The Lumumba Generation: African Bourgeoisie and Colonial Distinction in the Belgian Congo*, translated by Alex Skinner (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2021).
6. On the reach of Marcus Garvey in Africa, see Marcus Garvey, *The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, Vol. 9: Africa for the Africans June 1921–December 1922*, edited by Robert Abraham Hill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Robert Trent Vinson, *The Americans Are Coming! Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012). On messianic movements, see Wyatt MacGaffey, 'Kongo and the King of the Americans', *Journal of African History* 23, no. 3 (July 1982): 381–94.
7. Gary Stewart, *Rumba on the River: A History of the Popular Music of the Two Congos* (London: Verso, 2000); N'Goné Fall, ed., *Photographers from Kinshasa* (Paris: Revue Noire/DAP, 2002); Marino, 'United States and Portuguese Angola'.
8. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila – A People's History* (London: Zed Books, 2002), 41.
9. Letter, Renkin to the GG, 7 October 1910, Boma (II.A.1.a), AIMO 1640 9205 AGR-2; AIMO 1627 9175; AIMO 1819 9842 II; AIMO 1701; FPS GG 7329; FPS GG 18638.

10. On Tulante Álvaro Buta's revolt in northern Angola and the aftermath, see Jelmer Vos, *Kongo in the Age of Empire, 1860–1913: The Breakdown of a Moral Order* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 74; Brian Stanley, *The History of the Baptist Missionary Society 1792–1992* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), 337–9; R. H. Carson Graham, *Under Seven Congo Kings* (London: Carey Press, 1930), 123–8, 143–53.
11. 'Material for Profile on: Holden Alvaro Roberto', n.d., Folder 1 – Holden Roberto undated, Box 92, John Marcum Papers, Stanford University Special Collections (hereafter JMP).
12. 'Le Week-End Sportif de l'A.R.S.C.: Daring fait 4–1 devant une Fluviale très mordante', *Le Courrier D'Afrique*, 12 April 1954.
13. 'Les Sports: Football A.R.S.C.', *Le Courrier D'Afrique*, 2 July 1951.
14. Paul Bonga-Bonga, *Le football et ma vie en 'Rouche'* (Saint-Denis: Dagan, 2013), 135.
15. Elombe, 'Au Groupe Daring Léopoldville', *La Voix du Congolais*, April 1954, 325–6; Arbo, 'Le Championnat 1955 de l'A.R.S.C.', *Le Courrier D'Afrique*, 28 November 1955.
16. Pierre Artigue, *Qui sont les leaders congolais?* (Brussels: Editions Europe-Afrique, 1961), 18.
17. See Ben Rathbun, *The Point Man: Irving Brown and the Deadly Post-1945 Struggle for Europe and Africa* (London: Minerva Press, 1996); Anthony Carew, *American Labour's Cold War Abroad: From Deep Freeze to Détente, 1945–1970* (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2018); Robert Anthony Waters, Jr. and Geert Van Goethem, *American Labor's Global Ambassadors: The International History of the AFL-CIO during the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
18. Rene Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Westport: Praeger, 1982); Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo*; Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo* (Westport: Greenwood, 2002); Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
19. Benoit Verhaegen, *L'Association des Évolués de Stanleyville et les débuts politiques de Patrice Lumumba (1944–1958)* (Brussels: CEDAF, 1983), 37–8.
20. For example, see Daniel Kanza, 'La régime familial des Bakongo', *La Voix du Congolais*, no. 34 (January 1949): 24–6.
21. 'Holden Alvaro Roberto', n.d., Folder 1 – Holden Roberto undated, Box 92, JMP.
22. 'Holden Roberto (Jose Gilmore)', n.d., Folder 1 – Holden Roberto undated, Box 92, JMP; Homer A. Jack, *Homer's Odyssey: My Quest for Peace and Justice* (Becket: One Peaceful World Press, 1996), 259.
23. 'Angola', n.d., Folder 1 – Holden Roberto undated, Box 92, JMP; 'Material for Profile on: Holden Alvaro Roberto', n.d., Folder 1 – Holden Roberto undated, Box 92, JMP.
24. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 56–62. Belgian and Portuguese authorities had previously allowed freedom of movement across the border for cultural purposes.
25. Enclosure to Despatch 220, Confidential, 'Memorandum by the Consul General at Leopoldville (McGregor)', Leopoldville, 12/28/1955, 611.70/12 – 2855, RG 59, NARA II, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), 1955–7, Africa, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 9.
26. Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, 6/18/1961, INR/IL Historical Files, RG 59, *FRUS*, 1961–3, Africa, Vol. XXI, Doc. 350; Letter from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, 5/23/1961, Angola 1/61–6/61, Country Series, NSF, JFKL, *FRUS*, Vol. XXI, Doc. 349; Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 'Angola', Washington, 3/6/1967, Africa

General, 1967–8, INR/IL Historical Files, RG 59, *FRUS*, 1964–8, Africa, Vol. XXIV, Doc. 442; Memorandum from the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman), 'Holden Roberto', Washington, 7/17/1961, INR/IL Historical Files, RG 59, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, Vol. XXI, Doc. 352. This is years earlier than is frequently cited as the beginning of the CIA's support for Roberto. See United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session, on U.S. Involvement in Civil War in Angola* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976).

27. 'Holden Roberto', 7/17/1961, *FRUS*, 1961–3, Vol. XXI, Doc. 352; Victoria Brittain, 'Holden Roberto', *The Guardian*, 7 August 2007.
28. Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 182.
29. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 62–6.
30. Ibid., 62–4.
31. 'Biography Outline – H.R.', n.d., JMP Box 92 Folder 1.
32. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 66–7. The UPA was a precursor to the FNLA. Several non-communist groups in Leopoldville combined to form the FNLA as the army of the independence movement, with the GRAE serving as the Angolan Government in Exile. The acronyms are infuriating, as almost every Angolan group went through several alliances, schisms and aborted starts. See Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, for more on the politics of the nationalist groups.
33. Cited in Joao Manuel Neves, 'Frantz Fanon and the Struggle for the Independence of Angola', *Interventions* 17, no. 3 (2015): 419.
34. *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on United States Foreign Policy – Africa, January 28, February 11, and March 16 1960, 86th Congress, 2nd Session* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960), 187–92.
35. 'Holden Roberto (Jose Gilmore)', n.d., JMP Box 92, Folder 1; Holden Roberto biographical information, JMP Box 92 Folder 1.
36. Letter, Holden Roberto to John F. Kennedy, 'Dear Mr. President-Elect', 11/14/1960, Correspondence, Roberto, Holden, Box 10, William X. Scheinman Papers, Hoover Institute Archives.
37. Winifred Armstrong PPS, JFKL, Box 1.
38. Thomas J. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 59.
39. 'Miscellaneous Notes on Leopoldville', n.d., Box 11, 1960, JMP; 'Notes', n.d., Box 51, Notebook and Loose Notes *c.*1959, JMP; 'Miscellaneous Notes on Conditions in Leopoldville and the Congo (2)', 9–10 September 1960, Leopoldville, Box 406, Folder 5, African Trip, 1960 Zaire (Belgian Congo), N.Y. Files Post Gubernatorial, Special Files, Public Service PWAH.
40. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 94.
41. F.N.L.A. Department of Foreign Relations, *Angola: F.N.L.A./Events Nº6*, March 1974, 42.
42. Holden Roberto, 'Statement of Mr. Holden Roberto, President of the Union of Populations of Angola', 15 March 1961, Amistad Research Center, American Committee on Africa Records Addendum, 1949–2001, Box 94–1, Folder 2: Africa Freedom Day: Promotion and Publicity, 1961, 4.

43. On the 1961 uprisings, see Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*; Guimarães, *Origins of the Angolan Civil War*; René Pélissier, *La Colonie du Minotaure: Nationalismes et Revoltes en Angola (1926–1961)* (Orgeval: Montamets, 1978); John P. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961–1974* (Westport: Greenwood, 1997); Miguel Júnior and Manuel Maria Difuila, *Military History of Angola: From the Sixteenth Century to the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington: AuthorHouseUK, 2018); Witney W. Schneidman, *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2004); Douglas Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (London: Pall Mall Library of African Affairs, 1971); Lawrence Henderson, *Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).
44. Thomas Patrick Melady and Margaret Badum Melady, *Ten African Heroes: The Sweep of Independence in Black Africa* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2011), 100–2.
45. On the formation of the GRAE, see Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 243–8.
46. African American Institute, 'Biographical Data on Mr. Emmanuel Kounzika', 1968, Box 88, FNLA-GRAE 1968, JMP.
47. Interview Notes, 'Joao Batista', Kindualu, 9 January 1962, and Sa da Bandeira, 3 February 1962, UPA 1960–1961, Box 94, JMP.
48. George Houser, 'Nationalist Organizations and Leaders in Angola: Status of the Revolt', *Southern Africa in Transition Conference*, 11–13 April 1963, Howard University, Washington DC, ACOA Box 79 (pic 57), pp. 18–19; Letter, Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi to Carlos Salamanca, United Nations Secretariat Sub-Commission on Angola Chairman, 22 November 1961, UPA 1960–1, Box 94, JMP; 'Joint Declaration of Messrs. Holden Roberto and Joao Batistsa', December 1961, UPA 1960–1961, Box 94, JMP; 'Memorandum from the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (G.R.A.E.) to Chiefs of African States', ACOA Box 21 pt 1 p 44; ACOA Box 79 pt 4 p 64.
49. For an example of FNLA propaganda at the time, see Carlos Gonçalves, ed., *Free Angola* (New York: The Union of the Populations of Angola Information Service, 1962).
50. Letter, Bill Minter to John Marcum, 3 December 1962, Correspondence 1962–4 + 1967+8 'private' (?), Box 23, JMP; Marcum Box 92.
51. Letter, John Marcum to Thomas Farmer, 18 June 1962, Correspondence 1962–4 + 1967+8 'private' (?), Box 23, JMP.
52. Letter, Secretary General André Cassinda of the Ligue Generale des Travailleurs de l'Angola (LGTA) to Irving Brown, International Representative of the AFL-CIO, 22 August 1961, Folder 5: Congo and Angola 1960–1962, International Affairs Department, Irving Brown Files, 1943–1989, the George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18–004, UMD.
53. Quoted in Secretary of State Dean Rusk to American Embassy Leopoldville, 26 December 1962, JFKL, NSF Brubeck Box 386, Folder Portuguese Africa January 1963 to June 1963.
54. Letter, AFL-CIO President George Meany to US President John F. Kennedy, 17 December 1962, JFKL, NSF Brubeck Box 386, Folder Portuguese Africa January 1963 to June 1963.
55. See Box 9 AFL-CIO Folders 5 & 4, International Affairs Department, Irving Brown Files, 1943–1989, the George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18-004, UMD; Melady and Melady, *Ten African Heroes*, 100.
56. Ian Gilchrist, 'A Report on the Gilchrist Withdrawal from Leopoldville', Amistad Research Center, The Africa Fund Records, Box 483, Folder 6: Angola: (FNLA)

National Front for the Liberation of Angola and (GRAE) Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile, 1969–1960; see also ACOA Box 79.

57. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 100.
58. John Marcum, 'Developments in the Angolan Situation Summer, 1963', ACOA Box 79, Folder 61: Flyers, 1962.
59. Lazlo Passemiers, 'The Pan Africanist Congress and the Congo Alliance, 1963–1964', *South African Historical Journal* 70, no. 1 (2018): 82–107.
60. John Marcum, 'Developments in the Angolan Situation Summer, 1963', ACOA Box 79, Folder 61: Flyers, 1962.
61. Neves, 'Frantz Fanon'; Thomas Meaney, 'Frantz Fanon and the CIA Man', *American Historical Review* 124, no. 3 (2019): 983–95.
62. Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence, 'Current Intelligence Weekly Summary', 27 April 1961, CIA-RDP79-00927A003200010001-6, CREST.
63. Telegram, US Ambassador Francis Russell to the Secretary of State, 26 January 1964, Tunis, POL 30-2 Angola, Box 1886, RG 59, NARA II.
64. Telegram, James O'Sullivan to the Secretary of State, 9 January 1964, Léopoldville, POL 30-2 Angola, Box 1886, RG 59, NARA II.
65. Draft Telegram, 'Re: Portuguese Territories', n.d., NSF Brubeck Files Box 386, Portuguese Africa July 1963, JFKL.
66. Letter to Dr Salazar from Mr Ball, 21 October 1963, Portugal: General 9/9/63–10/20/63, NSF Box 154B, JFKL, 13.
67. On Baptista's death, see Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 236–41.
68. Luanda to SecState, 22 October 1964, POL 30-2 1964, Box 1886, RG59, NARA II.
69. Leopoldville to SecState, 11 July 1964, POL 30-2 1964, Box 1886, RG59, NARA II.
70. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds, *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 257.
71. Memorandum for the Record, Secret, Eyes Only, 'Meeting of 303 Committee on 6 August 1964', CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings, 1964, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIV, Doc. 425.
72. 'Africans Hear Resistance in Angola Has Collapsed', *New York Times*, 18 July 1964.
73. Ian Gilchrist, 'A Report on the Gilchrist Withdrawal from Leopoldville', Amistad Research Center, The Africa Fund Records, Box 483, Folder 6: Angola: (FNLA) National Front for the Liberation of Angola and (GRAE) Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile, 1969–1970.
74. 'Le comité de la Ligue générale des travailleurs angolais dit "non" à M. Holden Roberto', *Etoile du Congo*, 9 June 1965.
75. Information Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs (O'Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams), 'Deterioration of the Angolan Liberation Movement', Washington, 11/2/1964, NARA II, RG 59, CF, POL 30–2 ANG, *FRUS*, 1964–8, Vol. XXIV, Doc. 427.
76. Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, 'M.P.L.A. at the Cairo Conference', 1 August 1964, Brazzaville, Comunicado do MPLA sobre a Conferência do Cairo, w, Arquivo Lúcio Lara, Associação Tchiweka de Documentação, 3.

2

‘Our country or death’: Reconstructing the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee’s political ideology through its public discourse

Lazlo Passemiers

In March 1965, Kenneth Kaunda’s Zambian government organized a unity meeting between Mozambican liberation movements. While FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) refused to participate, the Mozambique African National Congress (MANC), the reconstituted National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), the Monomotapa National Democratic Union (UDENAMO-Monomatapa), the Independent Mozambique African National Union (UNAMI) and the reanimated Mozambique African National Union (MANU) subsequently agreed to join forces in their fight to overthrow Portuguese colonialism.[1] Three of these movements (UDENAMO, UDENAMO-Monomatapa and MANU) were splinter groups that had broken away from FRELIMO over personal and ideological disagreements. This new united front was formed in June 1965 and named the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO). To inform the world of its revolutionary intentions, COREMO announced in its constitution: ‘WHEREAS the situation in Mozambique demands the cry, “PATRIA OU MORTE – OUR COUNTRY OR DEATH”; [COREMO] DECLARES that it launches a strong and united call upon all true freedom-loving sons and daughters of Mozambique to come forward and wage a bitter fight … for the redemption of Mozambique from the imperialist yoke’.[2] After making this clarion call, COREMO competed with FRELIMO to lead Mozambicans to freedom from 1965 to 1974.

COREMO presented itself as a united and genuine movement in the fight for Mozambican independence. While Adelino Gwambe was elected as COREMO’s first president in 1965, the following year, it was led by Paulo Gumane, who significantly shaped COREMO’s development and trajectory. COREMO’s main operational base and source of support was Zambia. Kaunda’s government provided COREMO with permanent headquarters in Lusaka and a training camp in the Eastern Province on the border with Mozambique near Petauke. It also received moderate assistance from other governments, including Ghana, Egypt and the People’s Republic of

China. COREMO organized campaigns from Zambia into Mozambique, held a small operational presence in Mozambique and tried to secure funding and military training for its members waiting in exile. Its membership size, international support base and military capabilities were, however, undeniably smaller than FRELIMO's. Unlike FRELIMO, COREMO also failed to receive official recognition from the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC) or gain membership in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). This lack of recognition hampered its operational capabilities and forced COREMO to seek support from friendly heads of state, international donors and fellow liberation movements to maintain its existence.[3]

While founded mainly by leaders who had broken away from – and regularly critiqued – FRELIMO, COREMO should not simply be seen as an anti-FRELIMO movement. This was the most viable alternative liberation movement to compete with FRELIMO during Mozambique's liberation struggle, even if it was left out of the negotiation table in Lusaka in June 1974, where the Portuguese authorities and FRELIMO discussed Mozambique's decolonization. That same month, the Zambian government closed COREMO's offices, arrested and detained its members across Zambia and seized its military material. Those COREMO leaders who could escape joined the National Coalition Party (PCN), formed in August 1974. The PCN represented a coalition of smaller movements that wanted to contest FRELIMO's position as the sole representative of the Mozambican people in an election.[4] The dissolution into the PCN marks the formal end of COREMO's existence.

In this chapter, I use surviving fragments of COREMO's public discourse – spanning from 1965 to 1974 – to reconstruct part of its political ideology. Throughout its existence, COREMO regularly announced its view on Mozambique's liberation struggle, seeking to garner local and internal support. Using COREMO documents and media interviews, I discuss how leaders defined their struggle for independence in the broader context of Mozambique's anticolonial struggle, Africa's decolonization and the global Cold War. Such public discourse elucidates how COREMO's leadership presented the movement to its members (current and prospective) and to the wider world. The relationship between ideology and discourse is salient.[5] Discourse helps movements persuade their audience about the value of their existence, actions and goals. How and what ideas are presented is central to understanding a liberation movement's ideology.[6] Like all movements, COREMO communicated its political ideas via slogans; political rhetoric, manifestos and communiques; and imagery and visual symbols.[7] Official party material by movements like COREMO foregrounds neglected African voices and perspectives on historiographical topics like the Cold War and Africa's decolonization.[8]

An analysis of such public discourse provides historical insight into COREMO's smaller yet effective role in the fight against Portuguese colonialism. It clarifies how COREMO sought to promote its own vision of Mozambican decolonization at a time when significant ideological changes were happening in Mozambique, Africa and the outside world, thus contributing to the historiographical project of foregrounding 'alternative and competing national imaginations'.[9] My analysis is, however, limited to how *leaders* presented their liberation movement. The views of COREMO's rank-and-file members are not part of this reconstruction due to the methodological limitations

of my sources. This top-down approach, nevertheless, remains a valuable step in understanding COREMO's ideology. Leaders within political organizations have great impact on their movements' shared ideas, as they can 'strongly influence the specific contents of a political ideology, that is, its discursive superstructure'.[10]

From my analysis of COREMO's public discourse, three political ideologies stand out: African Nationalism, pan-Africanism and Third-Worldism. While this trinity was interconnected and a common feature of many African anticolonial movements,[11] a close reading of the discourse surrounding COREMO's interpretations and discursive uses deepens our understanding of Mozambique's liberation struggle. First, COREMO aligned itself with a version of African Nationalism that was centred around the notion of Africanism. As such, it provided Mozambicans with an alternative view of the struggle that competed with FRELIMO's non-racial version of African Nationalism shaped by scientific socialism. Second, as part of its pan-Africanist ideology of linking Mozambique's national liberation to Africa's continental liberation, COREMO primarily connected its struggle to liberate Mozambique to the struggles from across the southern African region rather than to a broader Lusophone African struggle. This regional perspective might result in a need to recalibrate – or at least broaden – our analysis of how some Lusophone African liberation movements perceived their identity and framed their struggle in a continental context. Third, despite COREMO receiving notable military support from China throughout the second half of the 1960s,[12] non-alignment and Third-Worldism, rather than Maoism, momentarily defined COREMO's discourse. COREMO's Cold War ideological framing around Third-Worldism and non-alignment significantly diminished from the late 1960s onwards. While much of the outside world and global powers perceived Mozambique's liberation struggle through a Cold War lens,[13] and FRELIMO increasingly gravitated towards the Soviet Union and scientific socialism, COREMO seemed less concerned with explicitly projecting its struggle to liberate Mozambique in a Cold War context.

While the historiography on Lusophone Africa's liberation struggles continues to grow, concerted efforts to study the political ideology of anticolonial movements are uncommon. Ronald Chicolte, Michel Cahen and Joel das Neves Tembe have conducted valuable research on ideology and the liberation struggle.[14] Meanwhile, Colin Darch and David Hedges have focused on the use of rhetoric during Mozambique's transition to independence.[15] Such studies, however, mainly focus on the ideology and discourse of the liberation movements that gained power after independence, like FRELIMO or the MPLA. The ideological profile of smaller and unsuccessful liberation movements has been neglected in historiography, especially when they have ceased to exist.

Historians have not adequately engaged with COREMO's political ideology. Most references to COREMO in the historiography occur as part of general studies of Mozambican history or Mozambique's struggle for independence.[16] There has been some research by Calisto Baquete and Corrado Tornimbeni that deals more directly with COREMO – but even this research provides a limited discussion of ideology. It also usually fails to consider COREMO on its own terms, rather seeing it as a form of anti-FRELIMO opposition.[17] Chicolte made one of the few concerted attempts at assessing COREMO's ideological alignment.[18] Unfortunately, his assessment ends in 1965, the year that COREMO was formed, so he could only analyse a small sample

of the movement's public discourse. Chicolte identified a 'strong explicit position' for anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, independence and self-determination, violent struggle, territorial unity, social justice, pan-Africanism and Third World unity.[19] While this assessment points in the right direction, it lacks detail and nuance. My research builds on Chicolte's efforts by analysing a more comprehensive collection of COREMO public discourse covering the period of 1965–74. This approach will shed light on COREMO's ideological change and continuity over time.

The public discourse that I use to reconstruct COREMO's ideological alignment has been preserved by various archives and repositories. The most important are Chicolte's papers at the University of Southern California (available online thanks to the Aluka project), the John Marcum Papers at Stanford University and the Portuguese national, diplomatic and military archives in Lisbon. All these archives have preserved fragments of COREMO's discourse that were meant for public consumption. I extensively relied on COREMO's organs to reconstruct its ideology and supplemented them with other public material such as communiques, party documents and media interviews. I looked for specific markers that could be linked to particular ideologies, having divided my analysis into three categories: national, continental and global ideological perspectives.

I acknowledge that COREMO's public discourse did not necessarily match its actions on the ground or represent a sincere expression of its leaders' views on Mozambican liberation. Further comparative analysis of COREMO's actions during the struggle, possibly in combination with an analysis of its leaders' private discourse, must be conducted to gain a fuller, balanced picture of COREMO's political ideology. While such additional analysis falls outside of this chapter's scope, examining public discourse is a crucial first step in the search for a holistic understanding of this neglected liberation movement.

COREMO and Mozambican liberation: A militant Africanist vision of African Nationalism

African Nationalism shaped COREMO's views on Mozambique's liberation. While various nationalisms emerged in the context of Africa's anticolonial struggles,[20] a common denominator was that they all wanted to overthrow colonial rule. The idea of a shared experience of suffering under colonialism in a specific colonial territory was commonly used to construct notions of nationhood in post-Second World War Africa.[21] A defining feature of African Nationalism was that the idea of the nation-state emerged before a nation of people was tied to such a project.[22] Most forms of African Nationalism also emphasized fighting tribalism by promoting national unity and accepted that colonially imposed borders should *initially* define the new nation-state.[23] COREMO's nationalism was based on a Mozambican identity and a Mozambican nation-state that would emanate from a joint effort by oppressed African Mozambicans to use armed struggle to liberate the colonial territory from Portuguese rule.

National unity was central to COREMO's African nationalist project. As a movement that rose out of the amalgamation of smaller liberation movements, COREMO

depicted itself as a united body that fought in the interests of all Mozambicans, both inside and outside of Mozambique.[24] This image was further emphasized after another unity meeting in 1971 in Zambia, which saw FRELIMO dissidents like Uria Simango join COREMO.[25]

While FRELIMO represented an earlier effort to form a united front, for COREMO's leaders FRELIMO was an illegitimate movement unwilling to cooperate with others.[26] In his 1967 memorandum submitted to the OAU's Summit Conference of Heads of African States, Paulo Gumane asked if it was 'correct that a struggle of seven and half million people be undermined by one Party? [FRELIMO]'.[27] Like most Mozambican liberation movements,[28] COREMO portrayed itself as the only true representative of Mozambique's liberation struggle, representing the people's interests, and it increasingly used its organs to discredit FRELIMO. The idea of presenting a united body of liberation movements aligned with the notion of unity of purpose that the OAU and pan-Africanist leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere or Kenneth Kaunda promoted.

Forging such unity around the Mozambican identity was central to COREMO's political ideology. Throughout its existence, it reasoned that unity among Mozambicans was the only way forward in the fight to overthrow Portuguese colonialism. Past failures by early anticolonial resistance and liberation movements to successfully rid Mozambique of Portuguese colonialism were attributed to a lack of unity, which had emerged because of a divide-and-rule strategy by the Portuguese colonial state.[29] COREMO made such appeals for unity inside of Mozambique via pamphlets[30] and outside of it in official publications and statements. But achieving such unity was easier said than done.

COREMO, like FRELIMO, had the difficult task of selling the concept of the Mozambican nation to Mozambicans, as such ideology needed to compete with existing local identities and conceptions[31] and was being constructed by Mozambicans outside of the national territory. It accepted Mozambique's colonial borders as a defining feature of such national identity, rejecting ethnic, cultural and religious divisions. I did not come across any signs of regional or ethnic favouritism. Instead, COREMO's discourse regularly emphasized the negative implications of such ethnic-based nationalism, which aligned with the stance of African nationalist leaders like Nkrumah and Kaunda against tribalism. In one of its 1967 pamphlets, COREMO's secretary general called 'for the complete liquidation of tribal ties as [COREMO] fights for the formation of a single family',[32] while in January 1973, Gumane argued that 'we must also wage a relentless war against provincialisms, regionalism and tribalism, for it is easier to fight against Portuguese colonialism than the evils of small-group mentality politics'.[33] When COREMO attended the unity meeting in Lusaka in July 1971, it announced that 'the new structure of COREMO must ensure the participation of people from all regions and from all walks of life'.[34] At least in its public discourse, COREMO took a strong stance against ethnic and regional nationalism.

COREMO's leadership in exile also acknowledged that their position as part of the Mozambican diaspora was disconnected from that of Mozambicans inside the colony. While the idea of a nation was often linked to being related by birth to a particular

territory,[35] the issue of Mozambique's significant diasporic community complicated matters. This was a common problem for Mozambican liberation movements, which were generally conceived abroad and did not have automatic support among the population inside Mozambique.[36] As such, COREMO's discourse regularly tried to close this gap by fostering the idea of unity among Mozambicans at home and in exile. It vouched that COREMO was 'ready to die side by side with our people at home' and promised that most of its leadership would be based inside of Mozambique at all times,[37] as 'no revolution can be a success if directed only from outside a given country'.[38] In his opening message for 1969, Gumane appealed 'for UNITY of all Mozambicans at home and abroad so that we can concentrate all our efforts and energy for the liberation of our Motherland [original emphasis]'.[39] COREMO was self-aware that its position outside of Mozambique might interfere with building a solid united force against Portuguese colonialism.

Since COREMO was formed at a time when anticolonial movements had turned to armed struggle, starting on 25 September 1964 when FRELIMO guerrillas attacked a Portuguese base in northern Mozambique,[40] its African Nationalism was also defined by militancy. The *Estado Novo*'s reluctance to weaken its grip over its colonies pushed Lusophone anticolonial movements towards violence. This evolution resulted in a new period of militant political action and discourse by nationalist movements inspired by contemporaneously popular liberation ideologies.[41] Anticolonial thinkers like Frantz Fanon argued that Africa's decolonization could not be achieved without liberatory violence, as the colonial system emerged from and depended on violence.[42] As Fanon states, 'In its bare reality, decolonization reeds of red-hot cannonballs and bloody knives. For the last be the first only after a murderous and decisive confrontation between the two protagonists.'[43]

Such a militant stance was central to COREMO's identity as an African nationalist movement. Before the formation of COREMO, leaders like Gwambe had long proposed the need for an armed struggle, and Gumane's reconstituted UDENAMO had already started military training for its members in Congo.[44] Soon after its formation, COREMO launched its armed wing, the Revolutionary Peoples' Army of Mozambique (EREPOMO), to lead its struggle. This was a crucial development, as competition between FRELIMO and COREMO emerged and armed insurrection inside Mozambique became increasingly vital in claiming authenticity as a liberation movement.[45] Such competition between movements was not unique to COREMO and FRELIMO, as illustrated by Alex Marino's chapter in this book, which addresses the tension between the MPLA and FNLA.

Much of COREMO's discourse and symbolism was militant and militaristic. In its constitution, COREMO described itself as a 'Politico-Military organization',[46] and its official motto was *Pátria ou Morte* (Our Country or Death).[47] The front cover of its organ, *The Valiant Hero*, depicted drawings of a muscular African man holding a spear and a COREMO flag,[48] and in the case of *O Combatante* (The Combatant), a silhouette of three men in combat fatigues, one holding a rifle and another holding COREMO's flag.[49] Even the names of these two magazines relied on military language. For COREMO, Mozambique's liberation had to be won through the barrel of a gun and with the blood spilt by Mozambicans.

As part of its militant stance, COREMO was critical of a negotiated settlement for Mozambique's independence or any reforms to the colonial system. It argued that any negotiations had to be advanced by Mozambique's liberation movements after the armed struggle had been conducted. It emphasized that 'the people of Mozambique are not prepared to sit back and listen to words that are meaningless to the freedom of Mozambique'.[50] However, COREMO's position as a liberation movement was precarious. Its position in the liberation struggle needed strengthening before COREMO could clarify the conditions it wanted to negotiate and compromise.[51] Even in 1973, when COREMO's military capacities and operations inside of Mozambique seemed to have significantly decreased due to the dominance of FRELIMO and the steady decline of COREMO's external support base, COREMO emphasized that past peaceful resolutions had failed, and that armed struggle was the only way forward for Mozambique's independence and liberation.[52] Nevertheless, as part of COREMO's merger into the PCN in 1974, and in Mozambique's new political context of a peaceful power transfer, COREMO leaders had to give up their vision of an armed victory.

COREMO coupled this militant stance with the idea of self-reliance in the struggle. As a movement that represented the Mozambican people, COREMO argued that it was in the self-interest of the masses to take and maintain control over their destiny. It continuously emphasized that the struggle for Mozambique's independence had to be conducted by Mozambicans themselves, with little outside assistance. In 1965, *The Voice of Coremo* declared, 'We are going to free ourselves with our own blood' and 'direct the revolution ourselves', as 'no Revolution can be a success if directed only from outside a given country'.[53] While COREMO considered external support a 'stimulating factor' for its struggle,[54] the main impetus had to come from the Mozambican people. This do-it-yourself attitude to liberation was clearly expressed in 1972 when it declared: 'Seven years ago when the armed offensive was launched, COREMO militants were badly armed with home-made guns, pangas, spears and arrows. Today, Coremo can boast of modern weapons mainly captured from the demoralised enemy troops.'[55]

The issue of self-reliance also influenced how COREMO spoke about external support for its struggle. While taking on a non-aligned stance towards sourcing international support, COREMO's constant downplaying of foreign assistance was probably shaped by its failure to receive official recognition from the ALC and attract significant foreign backing as its position in Mozambique's liberation struggle deteriorated. Influenced by decolonization and Cold War politics, the OAU and the AAPSO favoured FRELIMO over COREMO.[56] As shown throughout this book, international organizations like these served as crucial platforms for liberation movements to state their case and garner support. Despite consistent efforts to gain such recognition and support, COREMO's leaders were increasingly frustrated with their lack of success and used the language of self-sufficiency to bolster the movement's liberation credentials. This argument was evident when making comparisons to FRELIMO. They described COREMO as reliant on 'Mozambicans in all walks of life, educated, non-educated, with very little financial support from outside', and FRELIMO as reliant on an external 'network of fund-raising groups'.[57] To conjure up support, COREMO used the clarion call: 'Fellow Mozambicans, we are all aware that arms are bought by money, and since we don't have it, we must buy them

by our own blood as we have done in the past.'[58] In 1972, Vilankulu argued that 'if this policy of allowing foreigners to interfere in the internal affairs of Mozambique is taking place during armed revolution, what then will happen after independence'?[59] This notion of self-determination after independence was central to the discourse of African nationalist movements.[60] Regarding foreign assistance's future role in postcolonial Mozambique, they emphasized that once political power had been obtained, COREMO would implement a people-centred democracy and commence with the struggle for economic freedom by guarding against neocolonialism.[61]

COREMO also frequently used historical legitimacy to support its nationalist struggle. The idea that 'past national glories and military victories' were meant to foster a sense of patriotism in a nation has been an integral part of more conservative forms of nationalism.[62] Throughout its public discourse, COREMO firmly placed its fight against the Portuguese state in a longer historical struggle of resistance in Mozambique, from Maguiguana's (Gungunyane's successor) rebellion against the Portuguese in late nineteenth-century Gaza to Yao chief Mataka's longstanding opposition to colonial rule in Northern Mozambique.[63] COREMO argued that such earlier efforts across Mozambique bolstered its commitment.[64]

By connecting its struggles to previous anticolonial resistance, COREMO sought historical legitimacy and attempted to connect its external existence to the histories of Mozambicans inside the country. Links to such early forms of resistance are also reflected in some of the visual symbols COREMO used in its publications, depicting pre-industrial weapons used in popular uprisings in Mozambique, like the bow and arrow, spear and axe.[65] COREMO did not shy away from using such past anticolonial heritage, and its ideological discourse often focused on traditional African culture and referred to deep historical roots. It perceived its armed struggle as the last stage in this long history that would result in a final victory for Mozambicans.

While COREMO's nationalism crossed African ethnic or linguistic lines, it did not cross racial lines. Instead, Africanist ideas dominated its nationalist discourse. The conception of Africanism centred around African values, pride and unity and was closely orientated towards pan-Africanism.[66] Such a form of African Nationalism linked the notion of nationalism to that of race and the struggle for independence, and self-determination to the African identity.[67] While COREMO saw race as a social construct imposed through colonialism and referred to itself as a movement that united Mozambicans 'without discrimination of sex, ethnic origin, religious belief or otherwise',[68] it is evident that it wanted to represent the interests of African Mozambicans, especially those Africans who before 1961 had been classified as *indígenas* (indigenous) rather than those who had been 'upgraded' to the status of *assimilado* (assimilated).[69]

As far as I can tell, COREMO had no white members, and its policy on other racial groups, including *mestiços* (mixed race) or the Indian minority, was unclear. Non-Africans seem to have been excluded from its conception of the Mozambican nation. It emphasized that African Mozambicans were the original owners of Mozambique and declared that 'our basic outlook of Mozambican politics is African. We cannot afford to do otherwise because our country is part and parcel of the African continent.'[70] It

described itself as 'a mass organization and movement of all the people of Mozambique who share the belief in the African character of our country'.[71]

Unlike African nationalist movements that were critical of traditional African rule and authority (as they considered them impediments to national unity), COREMO defined itself as a movement that acknowledged and respected such African heritage.[72] COREMO declared its commitment 'to promote and support worthy African customs and culture' as one of its aims and objectives in its constitution.[73] The opening editorial for its periodical, *Voice of Coremo*, similarly noted, 'The Portuguese Government is violently usurping the powers of our people and Chiefs and rendering our culture and customs utterly useless.'[74] It critiqued the Portuguese colonial policy of overseas provinces and its *asssimilado* policy of destroying African culture and civilization[75] and vouched 'to bring back the lost heritage, the respects and the dignities of our Chiefs which the Portuguese imperialists, colonialists and oppressors have since denied them'.[76] While imagining a newly liberated nation-state, COREMO thus did not envision a complete break from Africa's cultural traditions.

The concept of African majority rule dominated COREMO's discourse about liberated Mozambique and further reflected the African-centred character of its ideology. In a 1972 memorandum submitted to the UN Committee on Decolonization by COREMO's secretary for information, Arcanjo Faustino Kambeu declared that 'our revolutionary violence is aimed at establishing a government of Africans by Africans for Africans, with all people who have their only loyalty to Africa and who are ready to accept the concept of African majority rule'.[77] He further explained that 'African majority rule can guarantee genuine freedom and a lasting peace in which all men, black & white, will be citizens of a common state and will live and be governed as individuals and not as distinctive racial groups'.[78] Such a new democracy would be shaped by Africans and marked by an end to racial discrimination.[79]

Kambeu's remark about loyalty to Africa and accepting African majority rule is reminiscent of South Africa's Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) leader Robert Sobukwe, who famously used this criterion to define who is African.[80] Sobukwe's views came from a long tradition of Africanist thinkers like Anton Lembede and A. P. Mda.[81] Like these South African intellectuals, COREMO argued that white economic, political and military supremacy had to be overthrown to establish African freedom. This new system would allow Africans to participate and shape institutions, create their own organizations and determine the country's make-up.[82] Similar to the case of its demands for armed victory, COREMO's Africanist views disappeared as the PCN demanded a multiracial future settlement for Mozambique.[83]

COREMO's form of African Nationalism thus offered Mozambicans a different pathway to Mozambican liberation. While national unity was central to the ideas of COREMO and FRELIMO,[84] COREMO was generally concerned with unity among Mozambique's African population. Unlike FRELIMO, which adopted a non-racial approach, COREMO believed that Africans should be the sole drivers of Mozambique's independence and oversee shaping its postcolonial future. Such an alternative view eventually lost to FRELIMO's vision, as COREMO was excluded from participating in Mozambique's negotiations and its postcolonial politics.

COREMO and African liberation: Pan-Africanism and Southern African solidarity

Nationalist movements commonly connected their discourses around anticolonial efforts for national liberation to broader international struggles.[85] Such international solidarity was a defining feature of socialist forms of nationalism.[86] In the case of African liberation movements, pan-African narratives were regularly employed in the discourse on national liberation.[87] For Nkrumah, national liberation was the first step of a long process that would lead to continental unity and, eventually, the true decolonization of Africa.[88] Since COREMO saw its struggle to liberate Mozambique as a way of emancipating and uniting Mozambican Africans, its allegiance to supporting the plight of other Africans was a logical next step. The connection between nationalist and internationalist struggles featured prominently in COREMO's public discourse, which used pan-African ideas to explain its objectives of national liberation.

COREMO consistently proclaimed its commitment to pan-Africanism. In 1973, Kambeu explained, 'Coremo, has always relied on the African people as the basis of our struggle and has been guided by the principles of Pan-Africanism.'[89] Such pan-Africanist alignment was also visible in COREMO's party flag, which included pan-Africanist colours of black, red, yellow and green. It declared its support of the OAU and believed that the African continent's further unification was central to African liberation struggles. Such views were, however, sometimes conflicting. *The Voice of Coremo* declared that COREMO was 'a Pan-Africanist Movement and shall respect the Principles of the [OAU] Charter',[90] which indicated recognizing national territorial integrity and autonomy. Yet the programme of COREMO's constitution committed 'to struggle together with the whole of Africa for the immediate eradication of all foreign domination politically, economically, socially and culturally and achievement of the complete political unification of Africa into ONE POWERFUL NATION',[91] which aligned with Nkrumah's more radical continental vision. As COREMO's views about postcolonial Mozambique are scarce, it is difficult to ascertain how it envisioned independent Mozambique's future relations with other African countries and to assess its commitment to move beyond national independence and eventually towards full African unity.

COREMO anticipated that such pan-Africanist sentiments would aid its attempts to gain support from African countries and the OAU. In 1965, COREMO submitted a memorandum to the OAU that declared: 'It is our hope that the sincerity and faithfulness of the member states of the OAU bound by the Addis-Ababa Charter shall be the motivating factor to the recognition [of COREMO].'[92] This call for recognition and assistance aligned with the OAU charter's principles, demanding that all member states show 'absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories'.[93]

However, COREMO was not afraid to call out the OAU and its member states for decisions it deemed as acting against the spirit of pan-Africanism.[94] Nor did it refrain from critiquing the ALC's suggestion to dissolve COREMO and join FRELIMO, or desist from granting it official recognitions.[95] The lack of OAU support eventually affected COREMO. In 1972, it lamented, 'Up to now COREMO has not succeeded in

convincing as many independent African States, as it could be desired, of its right to the political, material and financial support for which the OAU Liberation Committee was created.'[96]

Southern Africa formed a central part of COREMO's pan-Africanist discourse. COREMO connected its armed struggle to liberate Mozambique to other Southern African liberation movements' efforts to topple white minority and colonial rule in the region. The first issue of *The Voice of Coremo* in 1965 articulated these views clearly by trumpeting that 'no inch of African Soil will remain an Island of Salazar Smith & Verwoerd'.[97] COREMO remained committed to these ideas throughout its existence. In January 1973, it reiterated its determination 'to help ease the situation by intensifying its armed struggle and consolidating its positions inside Mozambique and work for the complete elimination of colonialism and forces of evil in Southern Africa'.[98] COREMO's organs also regularly featured articles on Southern Africa's political situation and often used the liberation names, referring to South Africa as Azania and Rhodesia as Zimbabwe.[99] Leaders like Gwambe, Gumane and David Mabunda had lived, studied or worked in low- to mid-level working-class jobs in Southern African countries,[100] which probably shaped COREMO's connection to such regional interest and solidarity.

Pan-Africanist solidarity was an essential ideology in Southern Africa's regional liberation struggle, and fostering working relationships or supporting other liberation movements was promoted as central to accelerating the total liberation of the region.[101] In 1965, Paulo Gumane released a clarion call announcing that 'the nationalist leaders of Southern Africa must unite our forces and consolidate our efforts in a united front to confront the three enemies of Africa Salazar, Smith and Verw[oer]d with confidence'.[102] COREMO occasionally showed camaraderie with the PAC and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) by reporting on some of their activities. In 1966, *The Valiant Hero* featured an open letter read at the sixth anniversary of the Sharpeville and Langa massacres organized by PAC's Cairo mission,[103] while COREMO's organs featured articles that focused on the politics of ZANU.[104] Even though COREMO's relationship with ZANU remains unclear, its relationship with PAC extended beyond public discourse as, in 1968, COREMO assisted PAC members trying to infiltrate South Africa via Mozambique.[105] In turn, except in the case of some media interviews when its leaders visited Congo, COREMO did not even mention the FNLA, with whom it tried to establish longstanding relations.[106]

Commonalities between these movements existed. COREMO, PAC, ZANU and the FNLA were all categorized as 'inauthentic' liberation movements whose access to resources in the context of Sino-Soviet competition mainly came from China.[107] COREMO and the PAC also adopted a clear Africanist ideology. Gumane claims to have been a PAC member while working in the Cape Province in the 1950s, and Gumane's UDENAMO and PAC had both been part of the Congo Alliance from 1963 to 1964.[108] While calling for a unified fight against white minority rule and colonialism in Southern Africa, COREMO did not express a vision of extending such regional solidarity after attaining national independence.

A close reading of public discourse reveals that COREMO placed notably less emphasis on creating connections with a broader Lusophone African struggle. While there were examples of COREMO expressing solidarity with the struggles against

colonialism in Angola and Guinea-Bissau,[109] they featured less prominently. A possible explanation is that, apart from its attempts to establish a working relationship with the FNLA, COREMO did not form part of an established network like the CONCP.[110] Instead, it had to rely on working relationships with individual liberation movements like the PAC or FNLA for the occasional support. As part of the CONCP, FRELIMO emphasized its connection to a wider Lusophone struggle, representing a bond that emerged among leaders studying in Europe and fostered further in exile.[111] For COREMO, Mozambique's geopolitical position, its leadership's connections with Zimbabwe and South Africa and its lack of solid formal relations with other Lusophone African liberation movements seem to have been a more significant factor in shaping how it framed its struggle to liberate Mozambique.

COREMO and global liberation: Third-Worldism and non-alignment

National liberation projects in the 1950s and 1960s in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America coincided with the formation of various 'pan movements', which, in turn, were linked to the idea of Third-Worldism.[112] During the Cold War, anticolonial nationalism and 'pan solidarity projects' were coupled with the notion of a 'social and political consciousness of a common struggle against imperialism' among the world's oppressed people in the Third World.[113] These ideas about Third-Worldism were connected to Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and non-alignment formed an integral part of most versions of pan-Africanism. For pan-Africanists like George Padmore, African states needed to avoid developing exclusive links to either side of the Cold War.[114] African nationalist leaders like Ghana's Nkrumah and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nassar, who supported COREMO at the party's inception, were big proponents of non-alignment.[115]

COREMO's first president, Adelino Gwambe, used his past relationships with Ghana to secure a COREMO office in Ghana and receive financial support, while Valentino Sithole had been heading COREMO's mission in Cairo.[116] Bandung and the NAM symbolized contemporaneous attempts to form solidarity among Third World nations that had to operate in a bipolar Cold War world.[117] While Third-Worldism was created out of the Cold War, it was meant to oppose the dominant ideologies of Western capitalist and Soviet communist blocs and protect African, Asian and Latin American countries from new forms of subjugation.[118]

During its first years of existence (1965–7), COREMO's political discourse regularly mentioned Third-Worldism and non-alignment. In the context of such Third World solidarity, COREMO's international perspective extended beyond the African continent. One of the resolutions passed at COREMO's first annual conference in 1965 was that Mozambique's 'struggle can be won ONLY through intensification of a people's ARMED STRUGGLE at home and total collaboration with other Revolutionary movements throughout the World'.[119] COREMO's discourse continuously expressed solidarity with other nations worldwide, whether newly formed nation-states or those fighting for national liberation.[120] Its form of 'anticolonial internationalism' was moderate,

but sometimes elements of more radical anticolonial internationalism surfaced.[121] While respecting national sovereignty, moderate anticolonial internationalism sought equal cooperation and solidarity between nation-states and reconceptualized the international world order that would break the dependency on and interference by external nations.[122]

In the case of COREMO, the West received the most critique in its discourse, reflecting the position of more leftist-orientated non-aligned states that condemned capitalism.[123] While Gumane went on a tour to the United States in 1968 and 1973, and Vilankulu was COREMO's representative in New York from as early as 1972,[124] Western imperialism and capitalism, mainly linked to the United States, were attacked by COREMO in its public discourse. NATO's military support of Portuguese colonialism and the indirect economic exploitation of Mozambique by NATO member states were constantly critiqued.[125] This included the United States' military training of the Portuguese army, West Germany's supply of military material and Western involvement in constructing the Cahora Bassa Dam.[126]

COREMO considered its fight against the Portuguese colonial state as part of a broader international progressive movement against (primarily Western) imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism across the Third World.[127] In 1967, COREMO's secretary of information Julius Dzonzi broadcasted:

> The people of Mozambique are aware of the fact that they are not alone in their struggle. The people of the heroic Vietnam are with us, the peoples of Angola, Zimbabwe and Azania are with us. And we also know that the revolutionary nations and peoples of Africa and Asia, and above all the great Chinese people under the leadership of President Mao Tse-tung, are with us in the common struggle against imperialism.[128]

O Combatante similarly explained in 1972 that 'our people under their vanguard Party, COREMO, will continue to fulfil their internationalist duty and firmly support not only the colonial and oppressed people in Africa but also the anti-imperialist struggle of the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations throughout the world'.[129] Such support and solidarity were envisioned as a two-way streak, arguing that 'COREMO is one with all of you in your struggle because your struggle is our struggle and vice versa'.[130]

As part of this discourse, COREMO's struggle in Mozambique was depicted as part of a global fight that would result in 'the creation of a NEW WORLD' without imperialism, capitalism and exploitation by people or nations.[131] At a 1967 women's conference in Albania, COREMO's secretary for women's affairs, Priscilla Gumane (Paulo Gumane's wife), announced that 'the women and men, the brave sons and daughters of Africa, Asia, Latin American and the sisters and brothers of socialist Albania today constitute the storm centres of the world'.[132] COREMO greatly supported the idea of a new wind of change blowing across the Third World. In 1965, it expressed excitement and optimism about Indonesian president Sukarno's Conference of the New Emerging Forces (referring to the colonies fighting for or recently gaining independence) by declaring that the meeting would 'mean fair representation of the

oppressed and the underprivileged people of the world'.[133] Under Sukarno, Indonesia had become an essential player in the NAM, as he was intent on politically uniting the Third World. But most members of the NAM rejected Sukarno's more radical anti-Western outlook towards relations with former colonial powers and the UN.[134]

Like Sukarno, COREMO was critical of the UN. While sending various delegations to the UN, COREMO critiqued this supranational organization for being influenced by Western powers and lacking concrete action to stop colonialism and imperialism.[135] *O Combatante* described COREMO as the revolutionary 'baby' born of Mozambicans, which would resort to actions rather than words, as it was tired of UN's 'talks and promises'.[136] It declared that 'Coremo shall consciously pursue a POLICY of Positive Neutrality and Non-Alignment in International Conflicts and COLD WAR, but shall always stand for the TRUTH and for the Peoples Just Cause [original emphasis]'.[137] COREMO believed that the nation-state should not be abandoned, but instead, fair and equal relations should be established between nations.[138] This vision was aligned with the concept of Third-Worldism and non-alignment, representing a moderate form of internationalism.

COREMO's explicit mention of non-alignment disappeared after the movement's first few years. By 1967, COREMO had failed to become an AAPSO member, an organization which embodied the idea of Third World solidarity,[139] despite at least three attempts to gain membership. As discussed in Julião Soares Sousa's chapter in this book, the Sino-Soviet split had a toll on the AAPSO; so, as the Soviet Union's influence increased, COREMO's support from China is likely to have blocked its membership.[140] COREMO subsequently still linked its struggle to that of other oppressed peoples across the Third World, but the focus of its ideological discourse became more dominated by Mozambican African Nationalism and pan-Africanism.

While openly anti-imperialist, critical of capitalism and supportive of socialist-aligned liberation movements worldwide, COREMO rarely featured *explicit* communist or socialist ideological discourse in its publications or included strong and outspoken support for such ideals. COREMO's 1965 constitution and preamble featured clear socialist language and visions,[141] but its further discourse quickly refrained from mentioning such explicit ideological aims. COREMO occasionally celebrated leftist heroes like Vladimir Lenin, Ernesto Che Guevara and Mao Zedong and sought to draw lessons from the Russian October Revolution and the South Vietnamese Resistance.[142] In the 1960s, the People's Republic of China backed COREMO and Third-Worldism, providing COREMO with military training and material.[143]

Still, to what extent Maoism and Maoist interpretations of Third-Worldism inspired COREMO's political ideology remains unclear. While self-reliance, mass support and armed struggle were crucial components of Maoist thinking, COREMO hardly ever mentioned Maoism, the peasantry or a communist future in its public discourse. In a 1973 newspaper interview, Gumane even stated, 'We Africans can never be communist. We like to own land' and 'Community living in China suits the Chinese. But it wouldn't suit the Africans. We believe in ownership'.[144] COREMO's momentary support from China in the 1960s seems to have had little lasting influence.

While COREMO's use of Cold War ideological discourse decreased, FRELIMO's actions and views moved in the opposite direction. With growing support from the

Soviet Union, FRELIMO was drawn closer to Marxist-Leninism, especially under the leadership of Samora Machel.[145] While operating in the same international environment that shaped its liberation politics and trajectory as a liberation movement, COREMO's political ideology was much less determined by the Global Cold War, especially after its support from Cold War actors decreased.

Conclusion

When analysing COREMO's public discourse from 1965 to 1974, it becomes clear that African Nationalism, pan-Africanism and Third-Worldism defined COREMO's projected political ideology. First and foremost, the small Mozambican liberation movement was concerned with fighting for Mozambican independence. It proudly depicted itself as an African nationalist movement that represented the voice and interests of Mozambican Africans. In this way, it differed from FRELIMO's multiracial version. Reconstructing COREMO's political ideology demonstrates that Mozambique's liberation struggle was not solely driven by FRELIMO but instead entailed different, competing visions of liberation and independence.

Because of the strong sense of Africanism, COREMO also viewed its national struggle as connected to a broader pan-Africanist objective to liberate the continent. But unlike FRELIMO, the focus of COREMO's pan-Africanist discourse and solidarity was mainly concerned with that of neighbouring Zimbabwe and South Africa rather than a wider Lusophone Africa. COREMO's public discourse, therefore, reveals how the historiographical lens of a connected Lusophone African struggle provides a limited perspective on how smaller movements conceptualized their fight against colonialism.

COREMO's views of Mozambique's liberation struggle in the context of the global Cold War were also less explicit in its public discourse. In contrast to FRELIMO, socialism was not a defining feature of COREMO's ideology. While it momentarily embraced the concept of non-alignment and was consistently committed to Third World solidarity, any Cold War discourse by COREMO paled if compared to the weight of African Nationalism and pan-Africanism, which served as more useful rhetorical devices to contextualize the movement's struggle. Yet pan-Africanism as an ideal beyond national liberation and radical anticolonial internationalism did not prominently shape COREMO's political ideology either. While Cold War ideologies and power struggles affected COREMO's trajectory and decisions, analysing its public discourse reveals that moving beyond Cold War categorizations can produce novel perspectives on Africa's anticolonial struggles.

To advance the understanding of Mozambique's anticolonial history, it is best to approach COREMO as a sincere liberation movement. COREMO was not merely a movement created by disgruntled former FRELIMO members. Reconstructing COREMO's public discourse reveals a clear and consistent ideological projection about its struggle to liberate Mozambique, influenced by a unique mixture of national, regional and global forces and ideas.

Notes

1. 'Memorandum Submitted to the 3rd Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity Accra/Ghana', accessed 29 November 2023, www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/al.sff.document.chilco221. There is some disagreement about whether UNAMI and MANU eventually joined COREMO. See João Cabrita, *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 37–8.
2. 'COREMO Constituição e programa', accessed 9 January 2023, www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/al.sff.document.chilco246.
3. The most detailed historical analysis of COREMO can be found in Cabrita, *Mozambique*; John Marcum, *Conceiving Mozambique* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Corrado Tornimbeni, 'Dall'UDENAMO al COREMO: Un'opposizione al FRELIMO nella guerra di liberazione in Mozambico e il panorama continentale', *Afriche e Orienti* 21, no. 1 (2019): 47–66; Lazlo Passemiers, 'Mozambique's Neglected Nationalists in Exile: Retracing Coremo's Relations with the Congolese Government and the FNLA', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2023.2322873; Calisto Baquete, 'Génese da oposição à Frente de Libertação de Moçambique FRELIMO – (1960–1994): Caso do COREMO', unpublished paper.
4. Marcum, *Conceiving Mozambique*, 163.
5. Teun A. Van Dijk, 'Ideology and Discourse', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 175–96; Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 6th ed. (London: Palgrave, 2017), 43.
6. Alan Finlayson, 'Ideology and Political Rhetoric', in *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, 242.
7. Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 43.
8. Tycho van Der Hoog and Bernard C. Moore, 'Paper, Pixels, or Plane Tickets? Multi-archival Perspectives on the Decolonisation of Namibia', *Journal of Namibian Studies* 32 (2022): 77–106.
9. Miles Larmer and Baz Lecocq, 'Historicising Nationalism in Africa', *Nations and Nationalism* 24, no. 4 (2018): 893–917.
10. John T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico and Jaime L. Napier, 'Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities', *Annual Review of Psychology* 60, no. 1 (2009): 315–16.
11. See, for instance, Lisa Hoppel, *Internationalistischer Nationalismus: Lehren aus dem panafrikanischen Befreiungskampf* (Vienna: Promedia, 2019).
12. Alicia Altorfer-Ong, 'East Asian Support to the Southern African Liberation Struggle, 1960s to 1994', in *Southern African Liberation Struggles Contemporaneous Documents 1960–1994, Vol 8: Countries and Regions Outside SADC*, ed. Arnold J. Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe (Dar-es-Salaam: Mkukina Nyota, 2020), 300–2.
13. See, for instance, Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021), 5–8.
14. Ronald Chicolte, 'Conflicting Nationalist Ideologies in Portuguese Africa: The Emergence of Political and Social Movements, 1945–1965', Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Montreal, 15–18 October 1969; Michel Cahen, 'Luta de Emancipação Anti-colonial ou Movimento de Libertação Nacional?

Processo Histórico e Discurso Ideológico – o Caso das Colónias Portuguesas e de Moçambique em Particular', *Africana Studia* 8 (2005): 39–67; Joel das Neves Tembe, 'Uhuru na Kazi: Recapturing MANU Nationalism through the Archive', *Kronos* 39 (2013): 257–79.

15. Colin Darch and David Hedges, 'Political Rhetoric in the Transition to Mozambican Independence: Samora Machel in Beira, June 1975', *Kronos* 39, no. 1 (2013): 32–65.
16. Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History* (London: Rex Collins, 1978); Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (London: Hurst, 1995); Cabrita, *Mozambique*; Marcum, *Conceiving Mozambique*.
17. Baquete, 'Génese da oposição'; Tornimbeni, 'Dall'UDENAMO al COREMO', 47–66.
18. Chicolte, 'Conflicting Nationalist Ideologies'.
19. Ibid.
20. Larmer and Lecocq, 'Historicising Nationalism in Africa'.
21. Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 299; Hoppel, *Internationalistischer Nationalismus*, 32–3.
22. Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, 3rd ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 36–7.
23. Ibid., 36–8.
24. 'Full Text of the Message Delivered by the President of COREMO', *Valiant Hero* 2, no. 1 (January–March 1969).
25. 'Press Release by Mr P. J. Gumane', *COREMO Newsletter* no. 3 (September 1972).
26. 'Memorandum Submitted by the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) to the Summit Conference of Heads of African States, Held at: Kinshasa (Congo), on the: 11th September 1967', accessed 12 January 2023, www.aluka.org/stable/pdf/10.5555/al.sff.document.chilco267.
27. 'Memorandum Submitted by the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) to the Summit Conference of Heads of African States'.
28. Cahen, 'Luta de Emancipação Anti-colonial', 48.
29. 'Full Text of the Message Delivered by the President of COREMO', *Valiant Hero* 2, no. 1 (January–March 1969).
30. Arquivo Histórico Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (AHD-MNE), File: PROC 940,1 (8)D, Organizações Nacionalistas, Folder PAA 531, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique – COREMO ou Mozambique Revolutionary Committee – MORECO, Vol. III, from: PIDE Angola, Actividades do 'COREMO', 17 April 1967.
31. Cahen, 'Luta de Emancipação Anti-colonial', 42.
32. AHD-MNE, File: PROC 940,1 (8)D, PAA 531, Vol. III, from: PIDE Angola, Actividades do 'COREMO', 17 April 1967.
33. British Library (BL), EAP121, External Relations, Newsletters (1970–1973) (2/5/3/3), 'The Second General Conference of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee'.
34. *COREMO Newsletter*, no. 1 (January 1972).
35. Andrew Vincent, 'Nationalism', in *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, 530.
36. Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 520–1.
37. 'Editorial', *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
38. Ibid.
39. 'Full Text of the Message Delivered by the President of COREMO', *Valiant Hero* 2, no. 1 (January–March 1969).
40. Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 523.
41. Cahen, 'Luta de Emancipação Anti-colonial', 47.
42. Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 296.

43. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 3.
44. Tembe, 'Uhuru na Kazi'; Lazlo Passemiers, *Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the 'Congo Crisis', 1960–1965* (Oxon: Routledge, 2019), 88–9.
45. Liesegang and Tembe, 'Subsídios para a Historia da Udenamo e Frelimo'.
46. BL, EAP121, 2/5/3/3, 'The Second General Conference of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee'.
47. 'COREMO Constituição e programa'. While 'fatherland or death' would be a better translation, COREMO translated the phrase as 'our country or death'.
48. *The Valiant Hero* (7 April 1966).
49. *O Combatente* 1, no. 2 (24 August 1967).
50. 'Caetano and the Elections in Portugal', *O Combatente* 2, no. 3 (23 October 1969).
51. 'Editorial', *Valiant Hero* 1, no. 6 (9 March 1967).
52. BL, EAP121, 2/5/3/3, 'The Second General Conference of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee'.
53. 'Editorial', *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
54. 'Report on Operations', *O Combatente* 4, no. 1 (January 1971).
55. 'Editorial', *O Combatente* 5, no. 1 (2 January 1972).
56. Corrado Tornimbeni, 'The CONCP in Southern Africa and the OAU's Liberation Committee: Settling Internal Disputes for the Independence of Angola and Mozambique', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 48, no. 6 (2022): 1099–117.
57. 'The Danger of Dependency in the Mozambican Revolution', *COREMO Newsletter* no. 4 (October 1973).
58. 'Full Text of the Message Delivered by the President of COREMO', *Valiant Hero* 2, no. 1 (January–March 1969).
59. BL, EAP121, 2/5/3/3, 'The Second General Conference of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee'.
60. Vincent, 'Nationalism', 534–5.
61. 'The African Revolution Shall Triumph', *Valiant Hero* (January 1966).
62. Vincent, 'Nationalism', 535; Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 266–7.
63. 'The Struggle Now Waged by the People of Mozambique against Portuguese Colonialism', *O Combatente* 1, no. 2 (24 August 1967); Hendrickson, *Mozambique*, 90; Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 398.
64. 'A Christmas and New Year Message', *O Combatente* 2, no. 4 (24 December 1969).
65. *The Valiant Hero* (7 April 1966); *The Valiant Hero* 1, no. 6 (9 March 1967).
66. Gail Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: An Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 54–64.
67. Joy Hendrickson and Hoda Zaki, 'Modern African Ideologies', in *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, 714.
68. 'COREMO Constituição e programa'.
69. 'The So Called Non-racial Discrimination Policy in the Portuguese Territories', *O Combatente* 1, no. 2 (24 August 1967).
70. BL, EAP121, 2/5/3/3, 'The Second General Conference of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee'.
71. Ibid.
72. 'COREMO Constituição e programa'.
73. Ibid.
74. "Editorial', *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
75. Ibid.

76. 'COREMO Constituição e programa'.
77. Stanford University (SU), John Marcum Papers (M1726), Box 24, Folder 4, 'COREMO Pubs: Valiant Hero, O Combatente, Voice of COREMO, COREMO Newsletter', 'The Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) Memorandum Submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, 11 October 1972'.
78. Ibid.
79. 'The So Called Non-racial Discrimination Policy in the Portuguese Territories', *O Combatente* 1, no. 2 (24 August 1967); 'Editorial', *O Combatente* 5, no. 1 (2 January 1972).
80. Emma Daitz, 'Towards a Future without White People: Robert Sobukwe and the Category of the African', *South African Review of Sociology* 52, no. 2 (2022): 118–19.
81. See, for instance, Robert Edgar and Luyanda ka Msumza, eds, *Freedom in Our Lifetime: The Collected Writings of Anton Muziwakhe Lembede* (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2015); Robert Edgar and Luyanda ka Msumza, eds, *Africa's Cause Must Triumph: The Collected Writings of A.P. Mda* (Cape Town: Best Red, 2018).
82. 'The So Called Non-racial Discrimination Policy in the Portuguese Territories', *O Combatente* 1, no. 2 (24 August 1967).
83. Cabrita, *Mozambique*, 73–4.
84. Thomas Henriksen, 'The Revolutionary Thought of Eduardo Mondlane', *Genève-Afrique* 12, no. 1 (1973): 37–52.
85. Hoppel, *Internationalistischer Nationalismus*, 8–9, 38.
86. Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 272.
87. Hoppel, *Internationalistischer Nationalismus*, 21; Larmer and Lecocq, 'Historicising Nationalism in Africa', 900.
88. Hendrickson and Zaki, 'Modern African Ideologies', 718; Tavengwa Gwekwerere, 'Pan-Africanism and the Anti-colonial Movement in Southern Africa, 1950s–1990s', in *Routledge Handbook of Pan-Africanism*, ed. Reiland Rabaka (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 320.
89. SU, M1726, Box 24, Folder 4, 'The Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) Memorandum Submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, 11 October 1972'.
90. 'Press Conference', *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
91. 'COREMO Constituição e programa'.
92. 'Memorandum Submitted to the 3rd Assembly of the Heads of State'.
93. 'OAU Charter', accessed 25 February 2023, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf.
94. 'Editorial', *O Combatente* 1, no. 3 (30 September 1967).
95. 'Coremo Holds Talk with the African Liberation Committee Envoy', *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
96. 'Editorial', *O Combatente* 5, no. 1 (2 January 1972).
97. *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
98. BL, EAP121, 2/5/3/3, 'Coremo Press Statement on the Zambia-Rhodesia Crisis', 14 January 1973.
99. See, for instance, 'The Talks between Wilson and Smith On (Rhodesia) Zimbabwe', *Valiant Hero* 1, no. 5 (6 January 1967); 'Editorial', *Voice of COREMO* (1965); 'South Africa Aims at Penetrating into the OAU', *O Combatente* 1, no. 3 (30 September 1967); Julius Dzonzi, 'Trois Ans de Révolution Armée au Mozambique', *La Voix du Peuple*, 29 September 1967.
100. Marcum, *Conceiving Mozambique*, 24–6, 28–30, 59.

101. Gwekwerere, 'Pan-Africanism and the Anti-colonial Movement', 317, 324.
102. 'Paulo Jose Gumane, Clarion Call (Cairo, 1965)', accessed 20 January 2023, www.aluka.org/stable/pdf/10.5555/al.sff.document.chilco298.
103. 'An Open Letter to White South Africa', *Valiant Hero* (7 April 1966).
104. 'The Turbulent Situation in Zimbabwe and the Stand of Zambia', *Valiant Hero* 1, no. 6 (9 March 1967); 'The Most Feared Man in Zimbabwe Situation', *Valiant Hero* 2, no. 2 (March–May 1969).
105. Sifiso Ndlovu, Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, 'The South African Liberation Struggle', in *Southern African Liberation Struggles, Contemporaneous Documents, 1960–1994*, vol. 3, ed. A. Temu and J. Das Neves Tembe (Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2014), 583–6.
106. 'Le Président du "Comité Révolutionnaire de Mozambique" à Kinshasa', *Le Progrès*, 28 June 1966; 'Le Président du "Comite Révolutionnaire de Mozambique a Kinsahsa" ', *Le Courrier d'Afrique*, 2 July 1966; Passemiers, 'Mozambique's Neglected Nationalists in Exile'.
107. Altorfer-Ong, 'East Asian Support', 276–7.
108. SU, M1726, Box 34, Folder 3, 'COREMO 1964–74', 'Biography by Paulo Jose Gumane'; Passemiers, *Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics*, 88–9.
109. 'Le Président du "Comité Révolutionnaire de Mozambique" à Kinshasa', *Le Progrès*, 28 June 1966; *O Combatente* 1, no. 3 (30 September 1967); 'M. Gumane: "Nous nous tournons vers le Congo … pour la libération de notre pays', *Le Progress*, 7 July 1966.
110. Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali, 'Dreaming Together, Fighting for Freedom Together: African Progressive Nationalism and the Ideology of Unity in Portugal's African Colonies in the 1950s and 1960s', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 46, no. 5 (2020): 829–44.
111. Ibid.
112. Mark Berger, 'After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism', *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004): 9.
113. Anuja Bose, 'Frantz Fanon and the Politicization of the Third World as a Collective Subject', *Interventions* 21, no. 5 (2019): 674.
114. George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1956).
115. Berger, 'After the Third World?' 18; Hendrickson and Zaki, 'Modern African Ideologies', 721–2.
116. 'Documents Relating to COREMO Application for AAPSO Membership'.
117. Hendrickson and Zaki, 'Modern African Ideologies', 722; Andrew Smith, 'Pan-Africanism and Decolonization: Between the Universal and the Particular', in *Routledge Handbook of Pan-Africanism*, 115–16; Dietmar Rothermund, 'The Era of Non-alignment', in *The Non-aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade*, ed. Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Nada Boškovska (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 20.
118. Lorenz Lüthi, 'The Non-aligned: Apart from and Still within the Cold War', in *The Non-aligned Movement and the Cold War*, 97.
119. SU, M1726, Box 34, Folder 3, 'Resolutions Passed by the First Annual Conference of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee – COREMO'.
120. Hoppel, *Internationalistischer Nationalismus*, 62; Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 284.
121. Hoppel, *Internationalistischer Nationalismus*, 50.
122. Ibid., 50–1.

123. Nugent, *African since Independence*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 142–3, 173.
124. SU, M1726, Box 34, Folder 3, letter from Paulo Gumane to John Marcum, 10 April 1968; Cable from Amembassy Lusaka, to, Secstate, Washington DC, COREMO President to Visit US, 11 October 1973, accessed 14 January 2023, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973LUSAKA01860_b.html; *COREMO Newsletter* (January 1972).
125. 'Portugal and NATO', *Valiant Hero* (7 April 1966); 'Speech by Mozambique Delegation – COREMO', *Valiant Hero* (18 June 1966).
126. 'NATO Involvement in Portugal's Colonial Wars in Africa', *O Combatente* 4, no. 1 (January 1971).
127. Berger, 'After the Third World?', 9.
128. Julius Dzonzi, 'Trois Ans de Révolution Armée au Mozambique', *La Voix du Peuple*, 29 September 1967.
129. 'Editorial', *O Combatente* 5, no. 1 (2 January 1972).
130. Speech by Mozambique Delegation – COREMO', *Valiant Hero* (18 June 1966).
131. 'What Next?', *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
132. 'COREMO at Women's Conference', *O Combatente* 1, no. 5 (30 November 1967).
133. 'What Next?', *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
134. Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927–1992)* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 122–3.
135. 'On Colonialism', *Voice of COREMO* (1965).
136. 'The Struggle for Liberation in Mozambique and the UNO', *O Combatente* 1, no. 2 (24 August 1967).
137. 'Memorandum Submitted to the 3rd Assembly of the Heads of State'.
138. Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 284.
139. Rothermund, 'The Era of Non-alignment', 22; Altorfer-Ong, 'East Asian Support', 276.
140. Ana Moledo, ' "A New Phase of Anti-imperialist Cooperation": The Making of Liberation Alliances in 1960s' (Unliberated) Southern Africa', *Comparativ* 29, no. 4 (2019): 13–29; Altorfer-Ong, 'East Asian Support', 455.
141. 'COREMO Constituição e programa'; 'Constitution of Comite Revolucionario De Moçambique (Coremo): Preamble', accessed 16 January 2023, www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/al.sff.document.chilco245.
142. See various articles in *The Valiant Hero* (18 June 1966); *O Combatente* 1, no. 3 (30 September 1967); *The Valiant Hero* (1968).
143. Altorfer-Ong, 'East Asian Support', 300–3.
144. 'A Talk with a Terrorist', *Cape Times*, 24 March 1973.
145. Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*.

3

'If you want to call it Marxism, you may call it Marxism': Amílcar Cabral on class and national liberation

Rita Lucas Narra

If one employs the search tool on Amílcar Cabral's archive, the only document that appears under the category 'Marxism' is a footnote scribbled at the back of a cigarette pack – 'DO NOT FORGET TO ASK FOR THE BOOK! – *Principles of Marxism-Leninism* [emphasis added]'.[1] Nonetheless, the meagre search results can be misleading. Amílcar Cabral's framework of social and political analysis is imbued with Marxist concepts and formulas, although he consistently refrained from openly affiliating himself with Marxism. Indeed, several of his most renowned speeches made when he was leader of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde) engage in the core debates of Marxist doctrine, encompassing matters of class and class struggle, modes of production, philosophy of history and more. Confronted frequently with the 'Marxist question' – are you a Marxist? – Cabral adeptly manoeuvred through the enquiry, leaving it unresolved. This approach has been interpreted as a means to carve out a sphere of autonomy for Guinean and Cabo Verdean affairs within the Cold War.[2]

This chapter delves into some of Amílcar Cabral's key speeches to understand how Marxist doctrine influenced the ideological landscape of the PAIGC's national liberation project. In particular, I will explore Cabral's employment of the concept of *class* as a prism through which we can observe the tensions arising from the convergence of the classical Marxist doctrine and African settings. Cabral's uses of 'class' have received some scholarly attention, with a primary focus on his analysis of various social and economic groups and their roles within the context of liberation struggle.[3] Comprehensive overviews, however, are scarce. This chapter aims to fill this gap by offering an encompassing and diachronic analysis of Cabral's uses of class, critically mapping its evolution across the 1960s and the early 1970s. All the texts under consideration were originally speeches delivered by Cabral in various forums. Of special significance are his lectures presented at the Frantz Fanon Centre in Milan (1964), the Tricontinental conference in Havana (1966) and the PAIGC cadres' seminar in Conakry (1969).

Although the thorough reading of these speeches forms the core of this chapter, a first section will contextualize the discussion by outlining the manner in which Cabralian scholarship has approached the theme of Marxism and ideology more broadly. Then the chapter examines the overarching characteristics of the African Socialist corpus of ideologies, considering the pan-African background of Guinea-Bissau's armed struggle, and seeks to locate the role of 'class' within these narratives. The concluding sections map out Cabral's application of the concept of class during the 1960s and, finally, delve into the conceptualization of 'culture' he introduced in the 1970s. I argue that this later conceptualization may be interpreted as a culmination of the debates from the 1960s, featuring a resolute assertion of culture's 'class character' within the national liberation imaginary, bearing both Cabral's Marxist influences and the distinctive imprint of recent anticolonial African history.

This chapter has two distinctive features. First, it argues that Cabral's political discourse is not an adornment of more 'important' dimensions, as it is often claimed. Although Cabral was indeed aware of his audiences' likes, which influenced the way his speeches were designed, the mapping of the uses of 'class' and their evolution over time show Cabral's autonomous and long-lasting reflection upon these topics. Secondly, this chapter is fashioned as a case study of the anticolonial appropriation of originally Western concepts, providing a micro yet detailed picture of how these larger processes occurred.[4]

Rather than attempting a definite categorization of Amílcar Cabral's affiliation with Marxism or debating the applicability of Marxist constructs within African contexts, the chapter aims to unravel how key Marxist principles, debates and ideas shaped Cabral's political thought and, consequently, his practice. Approaching anticolonial theory[5] as an exercise in *ideological* non-alignment, I do not wish to present Cabral's national project as merely a variant of Marxist doctrine, but to examine how this intellectual tradition was harnessed to forge new 'revolutionary scripts'.[6] The analysis of Cabral's uses of class also contributes to our understanding both of his discursive strategies and of African anticolonial political thought more broadly. Concerning the latter, it is possible to see how Cabral participates in a global effort to decolonize originally Eurocentric political theories and formulations. Mapping his uses of class – and its absences – shows how this conceptualization changed over time and became one of Cabral's core concerns, but it also reveals his ability as a speaker, adapting key categories based on his audience.

Marxism and ideology

Although the intersection between Amílcar Cabral and Marxism has been the central subject of different studies,[7] it has mostly been integrated into broader debates concerning his political thought.[8] Over time, a significant part of Cabralian scholarship has downplayed the importance of ideology as an access point to Cabral's political universe, structured around a rigid division between speech and action. Cabral has been presented as a 'man of action … better understood if people look to what he did, rather than what he said',[9] and as a remarkable leader who was 'no ideological

simpleton', urging readers to look beyond his 'colourful socialist rhetoric'.[10] In 2002, Pablo Idahosa chose as epigraph for his essay on Cabral's understandings of culture and ethnicity a quote where Cabral posits that people fight for material benefits, not ideas.[11] In general, the argument goes that while other African leaders devoted much of their time to sophisticated theories of struggle, Cabral cultivated his pragmatism and wit, which in turn explained the remarkable achievements of armed struggle in Guinea-Bissau.

Amílcar Cabral's life path seemed to facilitate such a perception, which Cabral himself partially nurtured. Born in Bafatá (Guinea-Bissau), in 1924, and raised in Mindelo (Cabo Verde), Cabral arrived in Lisbon in 1945 to study not philosophy or politics but agronomy. After graduating, he worked for an agricultural research station in Guinea-Bissau where he was put in charge of the country's first agricultural survey, traversing the country and collecting data. Having become involved in student and anticolonial politics in Lisbon and Bissau, he founded the PAIGC in the late 1950s. With the support of Guinea-Conakry's president, Ahmed Sekou Touré, he then moved to Conakry, where he started mobilizing people and resources for the PAIGC's binational project of independence (and political unity) of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde. In 1963, the PAIGC initiated armed struggle in the neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, and Cabral remained the movement's undisputed leader until his assassination on 20 January 1973 in Conakry.

However, while he was a pragmatic leader, Cabral also valued ideology and emphasized the importance of ideological debate within the independence struggle, from Guinean forests to the stages of international forums. During a speech at the Tricontinental conference, Cabral identified 'ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, within the national liberation movements' as 'one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all'. Although revolution could fail even if based on 'perfectly conceived theories', Cabral argued, 'nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory'.[12]

As medicine against the 'poverty of ideology', Cabral largely relied on Marxist frameworks of analysis. He selected, adapted and bent Marxist theses, categories and imagery to align with the unique contexts of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde. The broad liberation ethos, cultivated by the Marxist tradition, the Marxist-Leninist analysis of colonialism and imperialism, as well as categories like 'mode of production', 'petty bourgeoisie' or 'class', alongside Marxist philosophy of history, constituted essential elements within Cabral's political thought. While he evaded straightforward answers when asked about his Marxist affiliation, Cabral did acknowledge the aspects that aligned him with Marxist principles. These included his goals of ending the 'exploitation of man by man' and achieving economic development by means of social justice and popular power, among others. In a Q&A session in the University of London, on 27 October 1971, he stated:

> But ideology is important to Guinea. As I've said, never again do we want our people to be exploited. Our desire to develop our country with social justice and power in the hands of the people is our ideological basis. Never again do we want to see a group or a class of people exploiting or dominating the work of our people.

> That's our basis. If you want to call it Marxism, you may call it Marxism. That's your responsibility.[13]

Since Cabral was the PAIGC's chief ideologue, his views significantly influenced the party's positions. In fact, the vast majority of the party's political manual was developed on the basis of passages from Cabral's speeches.[14] His non-committed stance would survive his assassination in 1973, and, in the aftermath of independence, PAIGC would be the only of the three major Lusophone anticolonial movements not to adopt Marxist-Leninism as the state's official ideology.[15] Yet despite Cabral's reluctance to define himself as a Marxist and the perception by some observers that his socialist project was the 'most viable African alternative to the Soviet model of socialist development',[16] his clear ideological affinity with Marxist doctrine, as well as his diplomatic skill, garnered him sympathy and thus support from the USSR and other socialist countries.[17]

The ambiguity surrounding Amílcar Cabral's ideological stance perplexed observers who relentlessly sought a definite answer on the matter throughout the 1960s and 1970s. While Cabral's evasive responses may seem like mere survival strategies in a polarized world, he also presented a compelling argument for PAIGC's geopolitical and ideological autonomy *beyond* the constraints of the Cold War. As pointed out by Teresa Almeida Cravo, even a proudly centrist, economically liberal publication like the British magazine *The Economist* could vouch for Cabral and the PAIGC's non-communist credentials.[18]

These political manoeuvres may appear abstract or rhetorical, but national liberation movements recognized the influence their discourse could wield on public opinion, producing tangible results, especially in Western countries. Ideological debates carried a broader significance for political conduct and were not considered mere embellishments of 'realpolitik' strategies, as they came to be increasingly acknowledged later.[19] Different schools of thought – Marxism, Liberalism, Humanism and the like – were creatively mobilized by anticolonial thinkers to carve out an autonomous political space for national liberation. These endeavours constituted an anticolonial approach to modernity, intent on crafting counter-hegemonic historical narratives. 'From Louverture to Lenin',[20] and onward to contemporary national liberation projects, anticolonial activists reshaped their ideological horizon and embraced the task of 'worldmaking'.[21]

Cabral's conceptualization of class: From Milan to Havana and Conakry

By the 1960s, 'African socialism' was the 'ideology of Africa'.[22] An umbrella term for a range of transformative projects pursued at different times in countries such as Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, Senegal and Tanzania, African socialism encompassed a diverse array of wide national and ideological iterations. They loosely converged around ideas of communalism, economic development and social justice.[23] Although many advocates were eager to stress that they were not communists or even Marxists,

African socialists engaged in some manner with Marxist doctrine, incorporating African contexts and sensibilities into an ideological framework originally tailored for industrialized settings. In this process, figures like Kwamme Nkrumah can be seen as presenting some of 'the most ambitious attempt[s] so far made in Africa to revise some of the basic postulates of Marxism-Leninism'.[24] This was manifested in arguments for 'leapfrogging' historical stages, the rejection of Marxism's entrenched atheism and the questioning of the universal mandate of some Marxist categories.

'Class' was one of such categories. The relevance of class as a political category in African settings became a significant subject of inquiry for African socialists, and these debates played a crucial role in shaping African postcolonial settings. In general, African socialists rejected class as something foreign to Africa. Some claimed 'class' was entirely absent from African scenarios, 'insist[ing] that no classes in the Marxian sense [could] be found'.[25] Others, like Nkrumah, justified its temporary existence in Africa as a colonial export, which introduced an until then unknown class structure. And still others, like Touré, claimed that even if classes were currently emerging in Africa, the progression could still be stopped.[26] They all agreed, nonetheless, that class was foreign to traditional structure and social system of Africa. This agreement stemmed from the belief either that African values inherently aligned with socialism, or that Africa's development had been impeded by colonialism, preventing it from reaching the historical *stage* where class distinctions would develop.

Regardless of the specific rationale, African socialists refused, in the words of Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere, to follow their European counterparts in 'sanctifying this conflict itself into a philosophy'.[27] Nyerere further pointed out that in indigenous African languages, there was no equivalent word for 'class'. This perspective was used to salvage the persecuted and supressed historical memory of precolonial Africa, portraying it as a society without class divisions and highlighting its supposed 'African essence' based on communal and fraternal values. This portrayal effectively established an idealized precolonial golden era as 'the social political ancestor' for the concept of African socialism.[28] The distant past therefore became the envisioned future, and the notion of conflict was conveniently attributed to the influence of colonialism and its neocolonial manifestations.

African socialism informed much of Amílcar Cabral's pan-African ideological landscape. Kenneth Grundy points out the strength of these ideas among West African political elites.[29] The PAIGC was headquartered in Guinea-Conakry while also harbouring bases in Senegal, which borders Guinea-Bissau to the north, and Cabral constantly communicated with figures such as Nyerere, Nkrumah, Touré and Léopold Senghor, so he was well aware of ongoing debates surrounding African socialism. However, his engagement often took the form of a counterpoint rather than a direct variation. Notably, the question of class would eventually emerge as a pivotal aspect of his political ideology.

The focus of Cabral's writings evolved in accordance with his shifting priorities. After youthful incursions into poetry during the 1940s and his agronomical research in the 1950s, Cabral turned to political and organizational matters in his writings. In the early 1960s, he was mainly concerned with the analysis and critique of Portuguese colonialism, a crucial step in garnering international recognition for the PAIGC's

cause, which was actively mobilizing for armed struggle at that time. Consequently, his public addresses did not delve into specific social conditions on the ground in Guinea-Bissau. The first speech in which *class* appears as a subject of debate is the lecture delivered in May 1964 at the Frantz Fanon Centre in Milan, an anticolonial hub of the Italian left founded in the previous year. Speaking before a Western audience who knew little about Guinea-Bissau, Cabral shared his conclusions about the attitudes of the country's different ethnic groups towards liberation struggle.

In Milan, Cabral engaged in a critical examination of fundamental tenets within Marxist doctrine, which probably appealed to the leftist audience. In particular, his lecture highlighted the shortcomings of Marxist theory regarding Guinean reality and PAIGC's organizational needs. He recounted how, during the initial phases of the liberation struggle, the core cadre of the PAIGC 'looked for the working class in Guinea and … did not find it'.[30] The divergence in context and circumstances led to a discrepancy over Marxist meanings and concepts. His European friends, continued Cabral, conceptualized revolution as the 'fall of the bourgeoisie'. They also struggled to grasp the unique nature of the PAIGC as a distinct entity, not conforming to the mould of a typical 'European party'.[31]

Cabral also addressed the exclusion of colonized peoples in historical narratives – a theme of prime importance in his discourse. The negation of the colonized peoples' historical process is one of colonialism's greatest weapons, argued Cabral. Notwithstanding the fierce opposition to imperialism, the Marxist doctrine was equally based upon that denial – an outcome of its European worldview. If 'all history was the history of class struggle' and class did not develop in colonized settings, as a result of its 'backwardness' according to *modern* standards, then colonized peoples found themselves *outside* of history. Cabral challenged such reasoning epistemologically:

> There is a preconception held by many people, even on the left, that imperialism made us enter history at the moment when it began its adventure in our countries. This preconception must be denounced: for somebody on the left, and for Marxists in particular, history obviously means the class struggle. Our opinion is exactly the contrary. We consider that when imperialism arrived in Guinea it made us leave history – our history. We agree that history in our country is the result of class struggle, but we have our own class struggles.[32]

Despite fierce criticism of the shortcomings of Marxist interpretations within African contexts, Cabral seldom overtly rejected them. Rather, in a style that became his trademark, Cabral offered modifications aimed at encompassing the complexities of colonized societies. He carefully navigated this task, avoiding a complete dismissal of the Marxist framework that posits history as a product of class struggle. In this vein, Cabral acknowledged that even Guinea-Bissau entailed 'its own class struggles'. However, he challenged the centrality of class struggle in colonial settings, arguing the *main contradiction* did not revolve around class divisions, but rather centred on the collective endeavours of an entire populace in opposition to the ruling class of imperialist nations.[33] Cabral regarded these questions as crucial in understanding the potential for revolutionary processes within so-called underdeveloped nations.[34]

While these considerations might seem confined to the realm of ideology, Cabral recognized their direct relevance to PAIGC's political and organizational problems. In this case, the non-centrality of class struggle in colonial settings raised a particularly important question: 'Somebody asked which class is the "agent" of history … Our answer is that it is **all** [emphasis original] the social strata of society … What commands history in colonial conditions **is not** [emphasis added] the class struggle.'[35] Cabral's analysis thus led him to recognize that the revolutionary potential in colonial locations resided in 'all the social strata', as people united in the rejection of the colonial system.

Cabral was nonetheless acutely aware that the 'dominated people … only present[ed] an ensemble vis-à-vis the oppressor'.[36] Thus, the end of Portuguese rule represented a major challenge to national unity. National liberation in itself, Cabral warned, was not intrinsically revolutionary, but rather a ground to be disputed by anticolonial radicals. Here lied the possibility, Cabral hoped and believed, of turning the 'negative' unity of anticolonialism into a 'positive' postcolonial political project.

The key potential for revolutionary transformation after independence lay within the group that Cabral designated as *petty bourgeoisie*. In colonial contexts, the *petty bourgeoisie* held a disproportionate degree of power, a consequence of intricate historical, political and social dynamics. Given the absence of a working class in Guinea-Bissau in a strict Marxist sense and limited abilities of the peasantry to lead the struggle, *petty bourgeoisie* acquired a level of influence that was out of proportion to their numbers. It was not a revolutionary force, but a 'physical force' which should be directed to revolutionary purposes.[37] The key role of the *petty bourgeoisie*, however, was problematic. Their leadership positions were marked by an internal struggle, torn between the allure of neocolonial temptations with their 'group interests' and the commitment to national-popular aspirations of the people. This duality posed a significant challenge to the advancement of the liberation movement. Cabral distilled this dilemma in a rhetorical question: 'Are we asking [the petty bourgeoise] to commit [class] suicide?'[38]

The precarious unity that characterized national anticolonial fronts was the main subject of Cabral's address at the Tricontinental conference in Havana, held at the Habana Libre Hotel in January 1966. There, Cabral gave one of the conference's most acclaimed speeches, entitled 'Presuppositions and Objectives of National Liberation in Relation to Social Structure', later widely known as 'The Weapon of Theory'. Before an audience of over five hundred delegates, Cabral spoke to those 'who want their revolution to be a *true* revolution',[39] as the meeting in Havana assembled the radical faction of national liberation and anti-imperialist movements from all across Africa, Asia and Latin America.[40] Cabral devoted the speech to 'the struggle against our weaknesses', singling out, as mentioned before, the poor practices of ideological debate and the absence of a theoretical framework for national liberation movements' action as the greatest among them. Expanding on a wide range of topics, the speech again explored in depth Marxist frameworks of analysis regarding anticolonial struggles.

A direct link can be traced between the speeches delivered in Milan and Havana, as the latter picks up in depth several questions introduced in the former. Once more, Cabral addressed the place of colonized peoples within historical narratives and its relation to class understandings. Given that class is held by many as the 'motive force

of history', Cabral questioned the audience in Havana if 'history begins only with the development of the phenomenon of "class" '. If one answered in the affirmative, colonized peoples then would be excluded from history, whether via an imperialist or via a Marxist lens. Rather than dismiss the thesis, Cabral 'provincialized' class struggle, presenting it as more context-dependant and circumscribed. He argued that class struggle was the motive force of history, but only in a specific historical period, stating, 'This means that *before* the class struggle – and necessarily *after* it, since in this world there is no before without an after – one or several factors was and will be the motive force of history [emphasis added].'[41] Cabral thus reassured the delegates that 'for people building socialism' history would not cease, even when the process of eliminating classes and class struggle would be complete.[42]

The concept of *class* continued to occupy a key position in Cabral's discourse as he addressed the role of ethnic differences in the progress of the national liberation movements. Ethnicity and class were often paired together as competing factors within the liberation struggle. In Havana, Cabral unambiguously asserted the primacy of class over ethnic or other differences as the core of division within the struggle: 'Contradictions between classes, even when only embryonic, are of far greater importance than the contradictions between tribes.'[43] This represented a small, but significant change in favour of the importance of class in comparison to his position in Milan, where he had resisted naming class the main contradiction in liberation struggles.[44]

It is possible that it was the nature of the audience – and the radical anti-imperialist agenda – which also influenced Cabral's understanding of class. Although 'neocolonialism' was not a new concern, its menace loomed particularly large at the hall of Habana Libre Hotel, where the majority of Tricontinental's delegates shared a commitment against foreign domination while championing armed revolt, socialism and the creation of new institutions to resist North American imperialism.[45]

Cabral also revisited the question he had raised two years earlier in Milan regarding the role of the *petty bourgeoisie*. Once again, he delved into the dilemma faced by this class. Cabral emphasized that the petty bourgeoisie, often positioned as a 'services class', removed from direct production and therefore lacking significant power found itself compelled to align with those who possessed real influence: either 'imperialist capital' or 'the native working classes'.[46] In contrast to the lack of clarity in Milan, Cabral was now resolute about the necessary course of action. Referring to this choice of the *petty bourgeoisie*, he famously stated, 'This means that in order to truly fulfil the role in the national liberation struggle, the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong.'[47]

From the speeches at Milan and Havana emerge a set of core questions to which Cabral steadily devoted his reflection. It is possible to observe how *class* was gaining space within his framework of analysis, increasingly entangled with a national imaginary. At times, the two dimensions (nation and class) even merged: if in 1964 Cabral described the driving agent of history as 'all the social strata', in 1966 he called it the 'nation-class'.[48]

However, while at the Tricontinental Cabral had expressed revolutionary optimism, the following years became very difficult for the armed struggle in Guinea-Bissau. Although the PAIGC expanded control over large swaths of territory in the earlier years, by the end of the decade major difficulties in the guerrilla became apparent. The PAIGC struggled to expand its operations in the eastern region, dominated by the Fula. Moreover, it seemed increasingly difficult to take control over fortified posts and towns while countering Portugal's air dominance. In 1968, the Portuguese General António de Spínola introduced a brand new 'counter-insurgency strategy' designed to win over the local population, which presented a further challenge to the PAIGC. The slow progress in the war generated much debate over military strategy including with the Cuban advisers who believed that Cabral needed to reenergize the pace of the armed struggle. By 1969, the war in Guinea-Bissau had stalled, exacerbating deep-seated grievances against the overwhelmingly Cabo Verdean leadership and the binational project.[49]

Other African developments were also of concern to Cabral. The late 1950s and early 1960s had represented a period of high optimism for Africa's social and economic transformation. However, events such as the so-called Congo Crisis, followed by a string of military coups in Algeria (1965), Ghana (1966) and Mali (1968) showed the continuous power of the former colonial rulers and of elites who were often frustrated with the state-led – and largely authoritarian – socialist-inspired economic development projects. Cabral was particularly friendly with Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, who had been ousted from power by the military in 1966 and who lived the rest of his life in exile in Conakry. To Cabral, the fundamental reasons for Nkrumah's downfall were internal, as the ex-president failed to foster internal unity and reduce the power of the 'tribal chiefs'.[50]

These concerns and developments must have informed the Cabral-led seminar held for PAIGC's cadres between 18 and 24 November 1969, in Conakry. The seminar consisted of a set of lectures (followed by questions and answers) which later became known under the title *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*.[51] Given the internal and external developments discussed above, Cabral's primary objective seemed to be to fortify ideological awareness by revising, dissecting and deliberating upon the fundamental concepts, organizational structures and goals of the PAIGC.

It is perhaps not surprising that speaking to the PAIGC cadres in Conakry, Cabral emphasized unity as a cornerstone of the anticolonial front against the Portuguese. Cabral gave a long presentation on the topic, delineating the potential of unity while simultaneously acknowledging its inherent limitations. He regarded unity as a concept that was fluid and adaptable, much like the evolving and dynamic nature of the term 'the people'. In essence, both unity and the concept of 'the people' were evolving abstractions. Cabral highlighted that Guinea-Bissau's geographical boundaries were a colonial construct, devoid of any preexisting history of political unity prior to the arrival of the Portuguese. PAIGC believed that embarking on an armed struggle against a common foreign enemy had the potential to catalyse the formation of a new Guinean-Cabo Verdean national identity, making no secret of the contingent character of its national project.[52]

In the Conakry seminar, although Cabral avoided the heavy Marxist jargon of his interventions for Italian intellectuals and Third World revolutionaries, the concept of 'class' surfaced in relation to the overarching theme of unity. In contrast with his speeches in Milan and Havana, Cabral downplayed the importance of class vis-à-vis ethnic distinctions within the process of forging an effective anticolonial coalition. Cabral noted that a distinctive advantage lay in the fact that their homeland lacked pronounced class disparities or extensive socioeconomic inequalities. He elaborated that while there were embryonic class differences, they did not constitute the primary determinant. Rather, the challenge stemmed from the presence of various ethnic groups, which Cabral identified as a significant vulnerability in their struggle for unity.[53] Although his discourse did not revolve around the concept of class per se, he emphasized internal division and exploitation as undermining unity at different moments in the history of Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau:

> All of you know what the social reality of our land is, the disastrous consequence of colonialist exploitation. But let us not put all the blame on the colonialists. There is also exploitation of our folk by our folk … Many of the Cape Verdean people suffered because of exploitation by landowners, themselves Cape Verdeans. Similarly, in Guiné, part of the great suffering of our people was at the hands of our own folk. We must not at all forget this, so that we shall know that to do in the future.[54]

The notion of class was thus subsumed into other categories, like exploitation, which were presumably deemed more resonant with his audience. After all, the goal of the PAIGC, according to Cabral, was not simply political independence. The objective was to ensure that the liberators of today did not turn into abusers of power of tomorrow: 'Our objective cannot be to go and tend to the governor's palace only to do in our land what the governor would like to do.'[55]

Culture: A class concept and a non-antagonist solution

One can provide two different interpretations as to why Cabral's discourse on class was fairly variable in the 1960s. In the 1980s, Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein undertook a broad conceptual inquiry to 'class' as a key modern category.[56] Approaching the endless polysemy of class across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they presented it as a production of an overlap between two different sets of meanings: class codifications rooted in 'attributes' and class understandings focused on 'processes'. In the first case, class referred to specific economic and social groups, and its uses searched for a clear set of attributes in social reality – for instance, the 'working class' as synonymous with an industrialized, urban workforce, expected to perform a wide range of political endeavours, which the PAIGC did not find in Guinea-Bissau. In the second case, however, the uses of 'class as processes' focused mainly on the imaginary of social stratification and issuing dynamics of domination and inequality. In the second interpretation, class became a relational concept and thus broadened

its appeal as a political and analytical concept, enabling non-Western actors to apply the concepts to their settings. The mid-1960s assertion of class primacy by Cabral, for instance, should be read in this light, given the absence in Guinea-Bissau of a class structure in Marxist terms. Indeed, part of the history of Marxism as 'travelling theory',[57] particularly to 'peripheral' contexts, can be read as the history of the tensions between class uses directed to attributes and class understandings aimed at processes – and in that regard, the Cabralian itinerary of class provides a fruitful case study.

The second interpretation takes the different uses of 'class' as an outcome of overlapping temporalities. The PAIGC operated in a particular context, waging an armed struggle at a time when most of the former colonies had already achieved independence. Nonetheless, in the Guinean territory freed from Portuguese control the foundations of the future postcolonial society immediately begun being laid, progressing with the guerrilla. The liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism and the liberation challenges of a postcolonial order represented two very different lenses and orders of problems, which overlapped in Guinea-Bissau. In each, *class* had different weights – and as Cabral had to address alternately each 'temporality', so class knew different positions in his discourse. In the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, class was downplayed so that the 'all the social strata' could emerge as the revolutionary agent – even if there existed, as we have seen, 'exploitation of our folk by our folk'. In a postcolonial order, however, class had a newfound centrality, as it provided the grammar to address the threat of neocolonialism.

With the progression of liberation struggle, as independence became a closer prospect, class became more important in Cabral's political thought. With the 'main contradiction' represented by colonialism fading away, the precarious character of anticolonial unity sharpened. Unlike Nkrumah, who by then had already turned vociferously against earlier African socialist stances and embraced a more favourable stance towards 'scientific socialism',[58] the closing of the decade finds Amílcar Cabral exploring the new possibilities offered by the national anticolonial project. This last attempt was expressed in Cabral's definition of culture introduced in the turn towards the 1970s, crossing Marxist influences and African liberation ideologies.

Throughout the 1960s, the concept of 'culture' did not have major appearances in Amílcar Cabral's discourse. In general, Cabral subscribed to pan-African and Negritude views on culture as the backbone of African identity, although he tried to 'move beyond the limitations of negritude'.[59] But Cabral could also be ruthless towards what he regarded as the 'backward' elements of African culture.[60] In the section he devoted to culture in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*, Cabral posited that African culture was something to be cherished through a political lens. However, if seen through a 'scientific' lens, culture was something in need of adjustments and correction.

In the 1970s, the concept of *culture* assumed a pivotal role in Cabral's writings and speeches. He delivered one of his initial lectures on this subject at Syracuse University in New York on 20 February 1970 titled 'National Liberation and Culture'.[61] He later presented variations of the same speech at a UNESCO experts' meeting in Paris in July 1972 and at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania on 15 October 1972, where Cabral received an honorary degree.[62] In these addresses, Cabral elevated culture to a central position within the framework of anticolonial struggle and thus the anchor

of the postcolonial future. By designating culture as the collective possession of the 'popular masses', Cabral rooted the potential for a liberated postcolonial future within a distinctly African context.

This marked a significant departure from his previous perspectives. Cabral had previously regarded popular masses as a 'physical force of revolution', rather than a revolutionary force. However, his stance underwent a shift, as clear from his lectures delivered at Syracuse, Pennsylvania and Paris. In these addresses, culture assumed a role synonymous with anticolonial resistance. As he stated in his New York address, in 1970, 'The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation on the ideological or idealist pane of the physical and historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated. Culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of history.'[63]

However, Cabral acknowledged that within the broader context of 'the people', culture was not distributed equally. He contended that while bourgeois groups might have fostered connections with colonial powers and thereby detached from their indigenous culture, the popular masses adopted a different stance. For them, culture became a survival strategy – a means to safeguard their identity and heritage amidst colonial suppression. In fact, Cabral accorded an almost mythical significance to culture, as seen in his 1970 speech: 'Repressed, persecuted, betrayed by some social groups who were in league with the colonialists, African culture survived all the storms, taking refuge in the villages, in the forests and in the spirit of the generations who were victims of colonialism.'[64]

In Cabral's conception, the popular masses thus became bearers of culture, their rightful guardians. Without them there would be no anticolonial resistance and indeed no nation to support the liberation struggle. According to Cabral, the liberation movement 'must furthermore embody the mass character, the popular character of the culture'.[65] Two years later, Cabral strengthened this defence of popular masses as bearers of culture. In a very similar passage as the one quoted above, he stated, 'Thus the question of a "return to the source" or a "cultural renaissance" does not arise and could not arise for the masses of these people, for it is they who are the repository of the culture and at the same time the only social sector who can preserve and built it up and make history.'[66]

Indeed, Cabral unambiguously asserted this late definition of culture as a class concept. In fact, it can be seen as the culmination of the volatile uses of the term throughout the 1960s. Some English translations of his Syracuse speech in 1970 fail to capture the categorical affirmation of the 'class character' of culture, often using terms like 'popular' or other terms interchangeably. However, upon consulting the original typewritten drafts in Portuguese, which bear Cabral's own handwritten corrections, the clarity of his stance becomes evident. Given the importance of the original text and the potential for misreading, allow me to provide a literal translation: 'If, in reality, the multiplicity of social and ethnic categories creates a certain complexity in determining culture's role in the liberation movement, it is vital not to lose sight of the decisive importance of the <u>class</u> character of culture for the liberation struggle, even when that category is or appears to be embryonic [original emphasis].'[67]

Through this class-based definition of culture a clear ideological path is outlined and fixed: to remain true to the liberation movement, popular aspirations must evolve into national imperatives and vice versa, merging them in the process. The petty bourgeoisie is seen as having the opportunity to utilize the space created by armed struggle to foster a 'total identification with the environmental reality' and promote a 'progressive cultural identification of the various social groups participating in the struggle'.[68] This definition of culture builds upon earlier reflections about the in-between condition of the petty bourgeoisie as the revolutionary vanguard group, and the terminology of 'class suicide' disappears.

When recalling Cabral's 1964 lecture in Milan, where he identified 'all the social strata' as potential agents of Guinea-Bissau's revolution, it becomes evident that a significant transformation has taken place. Cabral now clearly identifies a revolutionary agent *within* the social national strata, specifically 'the popular masses'. His speeches are also increasingly addressing internal political divisions. Nonetheless, Amílcar Cabral remains steadfast in his commitment to the national liberation project, pursuing an ideological solution that can extend the original anticolonial unity beyond the departure of the Portuguese, anchoring it in a postcolonial context.

While overtly informed by class analysis, Cabral resisted embracing antagonism as an engine force of socialist revolution. This rejection of antagonism is very clear, given that Cabral still posited the liberation struggle as the space capable of 'bring[ing] diverse interests into harmony', resolving contradictions and defining common objectives.[69] Echoes of the different African socialist worldviews may be identified here, although in different historical circumstances. Unlike his African socialist counterparts, on the one hand, Cabral embraced the analytical and political usefulness of class for PAIGC's national project; but on the other, he accompanied African socialists in their resistance to 'sanctify' class conflict itself 'into a philosophy' via appeals to class struggle.[70]

Conclusion

The investigation of Cabral's approach to the concept of 'class' shows the great adaptability of the PAIGC's founding leader and the evolution of his ideas according to changing circumstances. Speaking in international leftist circles, such as in Milan and Havana, Cabral directly engaged with Marxist concepts familiar to his audiences, applying them to the African context. If, in Milan, Cabral argued that the main contradiction in the national liberation movement did not revolve around class divisions, at the more radical Tricontinental conference, he centred class struggle as the defining characteristic of division. In turn, while speaking to the PAIGC cadres in Conakry in 1969, Cabral did not theorize the concept of 'class' but rather focused on unity. Still, the class-based framework entered his discourse by way of discussions around 'internal' inequality, bringing to light the privileged native elites which collaborated with colonialism.

Amílcar Cabral's notion of class, however, did not solely depend on his target audience. It was subjected to evolution as a result of internal and external events. Cabral devoted a growing attention to 'class' across this period, as the revolutionary hopes

of anticolonial radicals began to fade away. The string of African coups and Cabral's own growing awareness of divisions inside his binationalist liberation movement, the PAIGC, compounded his worries about the complicity of postcolonial African political elites with the imperialist powers. Thus, Cabral increasingly emphasized unity and internal exploitation in his 1969 lectures.

Cabral's views on culture then offered both an explanation and a possible solution to the dangers emanating from the post-independence context. As the departure of the Portuguese grew as a real possibility in the early 1970s, the danger of neocolonialism and internal divisions suddenly became a more pressing concern. Thus, Cabral elevated culture to a class concept, designating the popular masses as its guardians against foreign domination. This shift marked a departure from his earlier focus on revolutionary forces, now emphasizing culture's crucial role in resistance. Cabral's speeches at institutions like Syracuse University framed culture as both a historical product and a determinant of history. He saw culture as a means for the marginalized to preserve their identity and counter colonial oppression. Amid Guinea-Bissau's approaching independence, Cabral's synthesis of ideologies aimed to unify diverse groups under a shared cultural framework for the postcolonial era.

In a context of increasingly frustrated revolutionary hopes, Cabral drew on Marxist doctrine and the pan-African body of socialist ideologies, but sought to carve out a distinct approach. Such a solution only seemed possible given the recent African history of unity against colonialism and the wide range of possible futures available for a short period – different futures still being envisioned in a 1972 Guinea-Bissau about to gain its formal independence.

Notes

1. FMSMB, Documentos Amílcar Cabral (DAC), Folder 07058.019.010, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=07058.019.010. Non-confirmed date of 1960.
2. Rui Lopes, 'Conflicting Winds: The Liberation Struggle in Guinea-Bissau and the Quest to Decolonize the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies* (forthcoming).
3. Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Culture, Consciousness and Armed Conflict: Cabral's déclassé/(lumpenproletariat?) in the Era of Globalization', *African Identities* 4, no. 1 (2006): 99–112; Tom Meisenhelder, 'Amílcar Cabral's Theory of Class Suicide and Revolutionary Socialism', *Monthly Review* 45, no. 6 (1993): 40–8.
4. 'Before we give such ideas up, we would do well to examine carefully not only what they are, but how they have been used – and perhaps, in being used by people in colonies, given a new meaning.' Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*, 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 15.
5. Isaac Kamola, 'A Time for Anticolonial Theory', *Contemporary Political Theory* 18, no. 2 (2019): 67–74.
6. Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein, eds, *Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).
7. Timothy W. Luke, 'Cabral's Marxism: An African Strategy for Socialist Development', *Studies in Comparative Communism* 14, no. 4 (1981): 307–30; Luciana Bastos Dias,

'Amílcar Cabral e o Marxismo: dos anos de Lisboa à liderança do movimento de libertação durante a Guerra Fria (1948–1973)' (MA diss., Universidade de Lisboa, 2020).

8. Ronald H. Chilcote, 'The Political Thought of Amílcar Cabral', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 3 (1968): 373–88; Patrick Chabal, 'The Social and Political Thought of Amílcar Cabral: A Reassessment', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 19, no. 1 (1981): 31–56; Mustafah Dhada, *Warriors at Work: How Guinea Was Really Set Free* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1993); P. L. Ehioze Idahosa, 'Going to the People: Amílcar Cabral's Materialist Theory and Practice of Culture and Ethnicity', *Lusotopie* 9, no. 2 (2002): 29–58; Reiland Rabaka, *Concepts of Cabralism: Amílcar Cabral and Africana Critical Theory* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014); Julião Soares Sousa, *Amílcar Cabral (1924–1973): Vida e Morte de um Revolucionário Africano* (Coimbra: Author's Edition, 2016); José Neves, 'Ideology, Science, and People in Amílcar Cabral', *História, Ciências, Saúde-Manguinhos* 24, no. 2 (2017): 333–47.
9. Chabal, 'The Social and Political Thought of Amílcar Cabral', 31.
10. Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 56–7.
11. Idahosa, 'Going to the People'.
12. Amílcar Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory', in *Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle – Selected Texts by Amílcar Cabral* (London: Stage 1, 1969), 75.
13. Amílcar Cabral, *Our People Are Our Mountains: Amílcar Cabral on the Guinean Revolution* (New York: Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola & Guinea, 1972), 21.
14. *Manual político do P.A.I.G.C* (Lisbon: Cadernos Maria da Fonte, 1974).
15. FRELIMO and MPLA did it in 1977.
16. Luke, 'Cabral's Marxism', 381.
17. Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2022).
18. Teresa Almeida Cravo, 'Western Representations of the Liberation Struggle in Guinea-Bissau', in *The Portuguese Colonial War and the African Liberation Struggles: Memory, Politics and Uses of the Past*, ed. Miguel Cardina (New York: Routledge, 2024), 162.
19. Frank Gerits, *The Ideological Scramble for Africa: How the Pursuit of Anticolonial Modernity Shaped a Postcolonial Order, 1945–1966* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2023).
20. Nick Nesbitt, 'From Louverture to Lenin: Aimé Césaire and Anticolonial Marxism', *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 19, no. 3 (2015): 129–45.
21. Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).
22. James McCain, 'Personality and Culture: A Case of African Socialism', *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 5, no. 1 (1974): 17.
23. Emmanuel Akayeampong, 'African Socialism: The Search for an Indigenous Model of Economic Development?' *Economic History of Developing Regions* 33, no. 1 (2018): 69–87.
24. B. D. G Folson, 'Afro-Marxism: A Preliminary View', *African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs* 6, no. 4 (1976): 93.
25. Kenneth W. Grundy, 'The "Class Struggle" in Africa: An Examination of Conflicting Theories', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 2, no. 3 (1964): 382.
26. Folson, 'Afro-Marxism'.

27. Julius Nyerere, *Essays on Socialism/Ujamaa* (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1969), 9.
28. Folson, 'Afro-Marxism', 98.
29. Grundy, 'The "Class Struggle" in Africa', 382.
30. Amílcar Cabral, 'Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guine', in *Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle – Selected Texts by Amílcar Cabral* (London: Stage 1, 1969), 54. In his chapter in the present book, Alex J. Marino addresses the similar circumstances within which Angolan nationalism developed.
31. Ibid., 55.
32. Ibid., 56.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 49. Cabral considered that the petty bourgeoisie was divided in three groups: one remained loyal to colonial authorities, one (the largest) remained undecided regarding the liberation struggle, and the other revolted.
38. Ibid., 74.
39. Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory', 74.
40. Roger Faligot, *Tricontinentale* (Paris: La Decouverte, 2013).
41. Cabral, 'The Weapon of Theory', 77.
42. Ibid., 78.
43. Ibid., 55.
44. Cabral, 'Brief Analysis', 53.
45. R. Joseph Parrott, 'Introduction', in *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War*, ed. Mark Atwood Lawrence and R. Joseph Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 1–42.
46. Cabral, 'Weapon of Theory', 89.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 86.
49. Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral*, 94; Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, 113–17.
50. Natalia Telepneva, 'Our Sacred Duty: The Soviet Union, the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961–1975' (PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015), 155.
51. Amílcar Cabral, 'Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance', in *Resistance and Decolonization*, ed. Reiland Rabaka (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 75–156.
52. Amílcar Cabral, 'Unity and Struggle', in *Amílcar Cabral: Unity and Struggle – Selected Texts* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 28–43.
53. Amílcar Cabral, 'To Start Out from the Reality of Our Land – To Be Realists', in *Amílcar Cabral: Unity and Struggle*, 61.
54. Ibid., 54.
55. Cabral, 'Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance', 65.
56. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1988).
57. Edward Said, 'Traveling Theory', in *The World, the Text, the Critic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 226–47.
58. Kwame Nkrumah, *Class Struggle in Africa* (London: Panaf, 1970).

59. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, 'Race, Culture and Liberation: African Anticolonial Thought and Practice in the Time of Decolonisation', *International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 1242.
60. Zeyad el Nabolsy, 'Amílcar Cabral's Modernist Philosophy of Culture and Cultural Liberation', *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 32, no. 2 (2020): 231–50.
61. Amílcar Cabral, 'National Liberation and Culture', in *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amílcar Cabral* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 39–56.
62. At the UNESCO meeting of experts on the concept of 'race', 'identity' and 'dignity' held in Paris between 3 and 7 July 1972, Cabral's speech was titled 'The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence'. At Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, his speech appeared under the title 'Identity and Dignity in the Context of the National Liberation Struggle' on 15 October 1972.
63. Cabral, 'National Liberation and Culture', 41.
64. Ibid., 49.
65. Ibid., 44.
66. Amílcar Cabral, 'Identity and Dignity in the Context of the National Liberation Struggle', in *Return to the Source*, 61.
67. FMSMB, DAC, Folder 07061.033.003: 5, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=07061.033.003.
68. Cabral, 'National Liberation and Culture', 48.
69. Ibid.
70. Nyerere, *Essays on Socialism*, 9.

Part 2

Networks and Strategies of Solidarity

4

The year after Africa: How the UN response to Angola and Goa militarized decolonization

R. Joseph Parrott

Lusophone decolonization was a truly global process. The *Estado Novo* regime defined Portugal as a multicontinental nation, stretching from Europe and spanning the globe through its numerous African 'provinces' centred on massive Angola and its Indian enclaves clustered around Goa all the way to Chinese Macao and tiny East Timor. Portugal's Empire was therefore broadly entwined with the Global South – the regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America that shared long histories of colonial domination – and so was anti-imperial resistance to it. Yet Portugal, a small and extremely poor state by European standards, dominated by an inflexible dictatorship dedicated to social conservatism and imperial nostalgia, successfully held on to its empire more than a decade longer than its more powerful neighbours. In the process, it compelled a militarization of nationalist organizing. The result is a historical case study that reflects major trends surrounding decolonization and which outlasted familiar British and French examples to shape the direction of global anti-imperial politics.

Portugal's intertwined history with the UN during Lisbon's *annus horribilis* of 1961 captures the origins of this process and its impact on global debates about empire and liberation. In March, a nationalist rebellion broke out in Angola, eliciting a violent Portuguese response. This set the stage for the Indian invasion and eventual annexation of the imperial enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu just before the new year. Both events landed before the UN Security Council (UNSC), bringing the organization's championship of rights-based discourse into conflict with its central mission of maintaining international peace and the territorial integrity of member states. And since the Euro-American powers established the foundations of the UN and the international law it upheld, these events also pitted the inviolability of imperial borders against the growing commitment to self-determination championed by an expanding Southern membership.[1] While the UN's successful rearticulation of self-determination legitimized liberation movements, its inability to respond decisively to these cases defined limitations on matters of decolonization that bolstered the militant turn in Southern nationalism.

This chapter therefore contributes to a growing literature on the complex role of the UN in decolonization. Africa has been central to this discussion, with the intervention

in post-independence Congo garnering the most attention, but this focus downplays the global nature of imperialism and the role the body played in articulating a broad language of resistance. Rather, as Adom Getachew recently argued, Southern states used the UN to advance a new definition of self-determination as 'non-domination' that went beyond the idea's European origins. This directly informed the 1960 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Peoples and a variety of projects aimed at creating a more egalitarian world order.[2] Yet how these broad ambitions could compel transfers of power remains a footnote, in part because most studies focus on Anglo- and Francophone colonies in which political independence was either achieved or promised by 1960. Despite the Global South's successful reimagination of self-determination and global economics, it proved difficult for the UN – and its members – to achieve such transformations when metropolitan states like Portugal resisted. There were, according to Eva-Maria Muschik, 'limits to what critiques in New York could achieve on the ground', so UN success generally came when assuming a trusteeship role that filled the void left by already departing colonial governments.[3] As the linked cases of Angola and Goa illustrate, impasses between rights-based discourses and political realities often demanded militant responses. Nationalists then justified their revolutions by citing customs that evolved at the UN but which did not always appear in official resolutions.

The events of 1961 defined an increasingly militant tone for anticolonial politics just months after the Year of Africa gave millions hope that rapid, peaceful decolonization was possible. Southern actors collaborated across continental divides to legitimize liberating violence as an acceptable response to colonial subjugation, referencing and informing UN debates as they sought to integrate this idea into international law and practice. The armed invasion of Goa by India, the global symbol of non-violent activism, represented a powerful testament to this trend, especially when it received effective sanction through international acquiescence. These events simultaneously revealed and encouraged a shift in the tenor of Third World politics towards a new brand of revolutionary anti-imperialism.[4] The UN became a useful body for criticizing Portugal and legitimizing nationalist challenges to the status quo *ex post facto*, but the impetus for change relied on military action.[5] The friction between this political reality and the founding ideology of the UN convinced many within Western states that the body had strayed dangerously from its original purpose and offered diminishing returns. The result was a clarification of the UN's limited ability to promote the actual process of political decolonization even as it played an invaluable role institutionalizing Southern challenges to the Northern-dominated international system.

Angola and the limits of UN decolonization

The post-Second World War international order legitimized the process of decolonization but made few concrete plans on how to achieve it. The enshrinement of human rights and the concept of national self-determination in the UN's Charter and foundational structures gave colonial populations hope that movements for independence might gain sympathetic international hearings. Yet the body itself was

designed and influenced by European countries that continued to view empire as their right, meaning it would take a transformation in membership and philosophy to position bodies like the UN's Trusteeship Council against colonialism.[6] Beginning with the Philippines in 1946 and India in 1947, decolonization spread from Asia to Africa, picking up speed after the recognition of Ghana's independence in 1957. These transfers of power moved more slowly than subject peoples desired, but they accelerated as colonial revolts and intellectual challenges to empire mounted. Insurgencies in Vietnam, Kenya, Malaysia and Algeria pressured European powers to abandon formal colonialism, while the proliferation of new states in the Global South articulated a powerful international condemnation of broader practices of empire through the UNGA and its more democratic committees.

The issue became central to global politics in 1960 when seventeen Sub-Saharan nations gained independence during what became known as the Year of Africa. African and Asian states now outnumbered European representatives and their Western allies in the UNGA, creating conditions that shifted the priorities of the body towards the concerns of the Global South. In December, the passage of General Resolution 1514 (XV) on Granting Independence to Colonial Peoples established new precedent when it argued that 'all peoples have the right to self-determination' and that the denial of these rights through the 'alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation' of colonialism was no longer acceptable. It called for an end to violence aimed at political protest and urged the immediate transfer of power in dependent territories 'without any conditions or reservations', though there was no clear sense of how such transfers would occur.[7] The months following this resolution therefore became a pivotal test for the form Southern struggles for self-determination would take. The focus came to rest squarely on the dwindling number of European holdouts who refused to consider decolonization, with tiny Portugal and its globe-spanning empire earning special interest. The day after passing Resolution 1415 (XV), the UNGA passed another declaration pointedly identifying Lisbon's overseas possessions as non-self-governing territories and demanding information.[8]

Portugal's *Estado Novo* was not surprised by the attention, having spent the previous decade bolstering its empire while facing challenges from powerful neighbours like India. Reclassifying the colonies as overseas provinces in 1951 to evade supranational oversight, the dictatorship of António Salazar deployed an expansive surveillance system and swift violence to maintain an oppressive order. The state jailed nationalists, detaining or exiling them to distant outposts across the empire in hopes of containing agitation. When signs of nationalist or labour unrest bubbled to the surface, Portugal responded with decisive force. In one example, the military response to peaceful protesters crossing the Goan border from India in 1955 resulted in nearly two dozen dead and over two hundred wounded. Four years later, state police killed and wounded at least twenty-five striking workers on the Pidjiguiti docks of Guinea-Bissau.[9] Such efforts maintained an internal quiescence even as they increased tensions with neighbouring states.

Yet nationalists were organizing, often in exile, and trends at the UN provided momentum for these fledgling movements if not necessarily an ultimate solution. In 1961, Amílcar Cabral, the head of the Conakry-based PAIGC, offered a measured

appreciation of the newfound assertiveness of the UN, praising it for challenging the 'myth' of Portugal's overseas provinces. Cabral took encouragement from the demonstration that an 'overwhelming majority of UN members' were committed to resolving the problem of Lusophone colonialism in ways that 'increase the isolation of the Portuguese government' while strengthening the nascent anticolonial movements. But he lamented that well-intentioned resolutions offered little more than 'moral victor[ies]'.[10] The body itself proved incapable of successfully intervening to compel decolonization, a perception reinforced by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's ineffective intervention in the Congo that led Cabral to lump the UN with 'American imperialists and Belgian colonialists' after the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.[11] Ultimately, Cabral concluded that '[the UN] has shown itself incapable of resolving disputes between colonised peoples and the colonial powers'.[12] The organization provided an important voice championing decolonization, but it lacked the power and authority to force it.

Rather, the UN offered useful justifications for what Lusophone nationalists like Cabral believed was the necessary response to stubborn colonialism: armed revolt. Portugal's suppression of African nationalism and refusal to cooperate with UN fact-finding missions signalled that the relatively peaceful political evolution towards independence that occurred in Ghana or Guinea-Conakry was unlikely. Yet the UN Resolutions affirmed that the days of colonialism were decidedly over. The result was a global impasse that the most influential nationalists concluded could only be broken by force of arms. Cabral referenced the Algerian War against France as proof that armed struggle was the necessary response to the silencing of political will.[13] The PAIGC began patiently preparing for an armed revolt and formalizing linkages with like-minded nationalists in other colonies with the hopes of creating a multi-front challenge to Portugal's Empire. While reflecting on the UN resolutions that closed the Year of Africa, Cabral told a French audience that the choice facing the burgeoning freedom campaigns in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Goa was clear: 'Either the government allows the effective exercise of political and democratic activities in our countries or it intensifies preparations for the outbreak of a colonial war.'[14]

This outbreak of organized violence came sooner than anticipated. On 15 March 1961, the Congo-based UPA invaded Angola from the north, inspiring a revolt that invited a destructive Portuguese response. This capped off months of unrest in Angola that undermined the Portuguese narrative of quiescent colonies. The UPA operated outside Cabral's coalition, but it had its own ambiguous relationship with the UN. Originally founded as a Bakongo nationalist organization, the party that became the UPA spent the late 1950s unsuccessfully lobbying for UN recognition with help from the American Committee on Africa.[15] By the end of 1960, the young nationalist Holden Roberto, directly influenced by the Algerian model, asserted control over the UPA and set it on the path towards armed revolt.[16] Yet there was still a role for the body to play, and the UPA invasion coincided with a UNSC vote on a resolution condemning Portuguese colonialism first proposed by the coalition of Afro-Asian states in response to earlier unrest. As his troops crossed the border, Roberto warned reporters in New York that Portugal was 'attempting to bamboozle the world with legalistic nonsense' about the domestic nature of the conflict while 'exterminating

the African population of Angola by forced labor … deportations, assassinations and terror'.[17] The UPA justified its revolution as a response to the violent nature of Portuguese colonialism.

The same day Roberto made this speech, the UN voted on a Security Council Resolution calling for Portugal to move towards self-determination and provide information to the UN on conditions within its colonies. Sponsored by Liberia, the debate from 14 to 15 March centred around whether rising tensions in Angola threatened international peace and merited UNSC attention. While Portugal argued it held the sovereign right to maintain order in its territory, delegations from the Global South objected. The Ghanian representative echoed Roberto in claiming that the genesis and maintenance of colonial control relied on the use of force and concluded by citing Resolution 1514 (XV) demanding that 'all armed action or repressive measures' against dependent populations be discontinued.[18] These arguments represented a direct challenge to the imperial sovereignty enshrined in both international law and UN practice to that point.

Yet moving beyond the familiar language of self-determination, a central contention of their argument was that Portugal no longer had a monopoly on violence, and that continued repression would invite and justify wider conflict. As the representative from the United Arab Republic presciently intimated just hours before news of the UPA invasion broke, 'force may delay the attainment of independence, but the nationalists will have the last word'.[19] While rejecting the legitimacy of revolutionary violence, the threat of it served to sway the United States, which was desperate to avoid another conflagration like that in the Congo.[20] But the UNSC's European powers remained unconvinced, as did many of their allies. The resolution did not pass due to a fatal number of abstentions but was newsworthy as the first time that the United States voted against a NATO ally (and with the Soviet Union) on a colonial issue. This fit with Roberto's goal to use the militant threat of revolution to push the UN and wider international community into 'exert[ing] pressure on Portugal'.[21]

The United States' vote infuriated the Salazar regime, but the reality was the Western powers remained deeply sceptical of expanding the UN role in decolonization. The Kennedy administration, which was only three months into its tenure, believed that the relatively moderate Liberian proposal in the UNSC – bound to fail due to French and British hostility – would soothe calls for more assertive measures in the General Assembly. This latter route held the potential for the 'creation of UN machinery on Angola', which Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the State Department wanted to avoid given the international body's disastrous intervention in the Congo and an assuredly irate reaction from Portuguese dictator Salazar.[22] Rusk saw the vote as making the best of a difficult situation, simultaneously protecting a NATO ally while encouraging Portugal to reevaluate existing policies. More than currying favour with the Global South, the US government saw itself buying time for Lisbon and warding off more radical proposals.

While Roberto and other nationalists hoped the vote would be the first step in formalizing world opinion against Portugal, the reality is that neither the United States nor its allies had any plans to let that happen. All sought to avoid inviting the UN into the Western alliance's affairs, though this did little to dissuade howls of protest

from Salazar's government. Rather, Washington officials hoped to deal with the matter internally as part of a Western solution to the problem of empire. But that summer, both France and a somewhat reluctant Britain rejected the United States' push to increase pressure on Portugal through NATO, fearing that any such move would create problematic precedents for their own empires. This combined with US scepticism of the UN route to undermine serious efforts against Portugal.[23]

Both the United States and Great Britain adopted unilateral embargoes on the sale of military materiel to Portugal for use in the colonies, but they blocked discussions of similar policies through the UN and NATO. As a result, Lisbon faced only minor roadblocks, obtaining weapons of war from France, West Germany and other sympathetic nations, even if it could not access all the British and US materiel it would have liked. As the summer turned to fall, Portugal used its superior military might to roll back the gains made by Roberto's UPA, reclaiming effective control of Angola by August 1961.

The result was a setback for the cause of decolonization at the UN. Permanent European members and the vetoes they wielded made it practically impossible for Afro-Asian states to redirect the UNSC. Their activism would be limited to the General Assembly and committees such as the Trusteeship Council, where the powerful Western European states and their American allies worked to manage any new initiatives. This raised barriers to the creation of effective new machinery as the Global South sought to direct the UN towards the thorny questions of decolonization. The body's primary activities remained information gathering and dissemination, which was itself limited in Angola by Portugal's lack of cooperation.[24]

Nationalists celebrated UN actions, but primarily because they further legitimized their causes and by extension their increasingly militant movements. Triumphantly referencing Portugal's 'defeat' at the UN in early 1961, Cabral's PAIGC argued, 'We want them to be isolated in the world, since an isolated enemy, alone, without support, is easier to defeat.'[25] Like the UPA, Cabral's party was preparing for an armed conflict because it believed this was the most likely solution for ending Portuguese rule. It also believed the mobilization of world opinion against Lisbon justified this course of action and revealed an emerging embrace of revolutionary liberation politics, at least among Southern states.

Goa, the triumph of armed intervention

The shift towards militancy did not fit neatly with the foundational ideas of the UN, but it became part of a broader effort by Global South states to challenge the inequalities of international law. This shift became most apparent in a dispute over another Portuguese territory, the Indian enclave of Goa. Along with a handful of non-contiguous coastal territories that dated to Portugal's period of exploration and expansion in the 1500s – notably Daman and Diu – Goa was at the centre of a diplomatic row between India and Lisbon since the former's independence in 1947. Having quashed a Goan nationalist movement in the 1940s, Portugal became the lone European state seriously resisting

decolonization on the subcontinent after the de facto transfer of power to India of French Pondicherry (Puducherry) in 1954–6. The trend encouraged a new wave of nationalism in Portuguese territory and in the regional metropolis of Bombay (Mumbai). By the mid-1950s, nationalist resistance took two forms, one coordinating a series of peaceful campaigns of Gandhian civil disobedience known as Satyagraha and the other advocating militant uprisings. Portugal responded with force to both, but the non-contiguous nature of its holdings made a defence difficult outside Goa. In 1954, nationalists managed to take over the upriver holdings of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, requesting permission to join the Indian state that surrounded the newly freed territories.[26]

This created a conundrum for Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. He sought leadership of the transnational anti-imperial and non-aligned movements in part by globalizing ideas of non-violence pioneered by Gandhi, which were closely associated with Nehru's Indian National Congress. India promoted collaboration with newly independent states through mutual respect for territorial sovereignty and non-aggression, formalized in the Panscheel concept, which informed the vision of neutrality that Nehru championed at the famed Bandung conference of 1955.[27] Yet pacifist did not mean passive, and Nehru emphasized active confrontation with colonial powers, especially in the UN. In the 1950s, India enhanced its reputation with Global South states by leading the attack on South African apartheid (specifically its treatment of ethnic Indians), sanctioning Portuguese territories after the assault on Satyagrahis in 1954, and actively agitating against Portugal at the UN in ways that augured for the resolutions of 1960.[28] But Nehru's government hesitated to directly antagonize the NATO member – going so far as to forbid Indian protesters to cross the Goan border – so the revolt in Dadra and Nagar Haveli offered a problematic wrinkle. Nehru refused Lisbon's request to send troops through Indian territory to stifle the rebellion and provided expertise to the free government, but Delhi ignored requests for annexation despite a local referendum – much to the irritation of many within Nehru's own party.[29] Indian foreign policy sought to build prestige and trust with both Western and Southern states by walking a tightrope of peacefully assertive anti-imperialism; Dadra and Nagar Haveli threatened that balance.

The frustrations boiled over as supranational bodies proved deferential to imperial powers despite Indian attempts to promote Southern priorities within them. While preferring action in the increasingly friendly UNGA, India also worked through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) despite objecting to Portugal's referral of the Dadra and Nagar Haveli issue. While arguments concentrated on differing interpretations and translations of two-hundred-year-old treaties and decrees, India mounted a broader challenge to the nature of international law using two key arguments. First, Indian officials questioned the value of law defined by imperial precedents, objecting to the court's usage of agreements and customs created between European powers, since India only agreed to ICJ resolution on issues arising after 1930 – which should not include claims to Portuguese sovereignty from centuries past. Second, it subtly sought to legitimize the right of anticolonial revolution as a legitimate means of self-determination, arguing in 1957:

> When a people, by a successful insurrection, have liberated itself from an unwanted colonial rule and has organized itself as an independent community under a de facto government, international law – and least of all the Charter of the United Nations – does not place any restriction on the right of that community to decide in full freedom its own political destiny.[30]

The Indian government essentially argued that Portugal had no right to reassert its rule over colonies that forcibly freed themselves from European control, anticipating key ideas that emerged at the Security Council hearings on Angola in 1961. In particular, it championed a logic for international recognition of Global South sovereignty that rejected historic colonial claims based on force while subtly legitimizing militant forms of nationalism.

This diplomatic duel did little to assuage a growing number of critics within India. Nehru felt that Portugal's Empire was an archaic fantasy that was bound to follow the fate of the more powerful French and British Empires that fled India and were now quitting Africa. But it was taking longer than anticipated and fuelling frustration. Domestic audiences called for a forceful conclusion to the matter, with India's powerful UN representative and defense minister, Krishna Menon, playing to constituents when he publicly mused in 1959 that 'Goa is our territory … Whether the territory of Goa is liberated by means of force or by means of persuasion is a question we ourselves will have to decide'.[31] Such statements created an opening for more assertive action. The next year, Goan nationalists in Bombay watching the Year of Africa unfold decried Nehru's 'bankruptcy of policy' since the supposed leader of the Non-Aligned Movement seemed content to watch others solve the Portuguese problem.[32]

The ICJ's 1960 verdict only added fuel to this fire. Relying heavily upon Luso-British agreements and customs from the prior century, the court concluded that Portugal maintained a civilian rite of passage to its sovereign territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli but that India was under no obligation to allow foreign military forces to traverse its territory.[33] The conclusions did nothing to resolve the standoff but seemingly bolstered imperial claims just months before major UN resolutions began chipping away at legal justifications for European imperialism.

The decision set the stage for the Angola debate, but it also highlighted the extent to which the tenor of Third World politics was shifting. After all, Portugal was far from alone in resisting local demands for self-determination. The Algerian struggle that inspired Lusophone nationalists grew directly from a French refusal to consider African decolonization, even after its earlier defeat in Vietnam.[34] Southern leaders increasingly drifted towards this more militant vision of Southern nationalism, initially headlined by state leaders like Egypt's Gamel Abdel Nasser but later most closely associated with revolutionaries like Cabral. The Egyptian leader supplied arms to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), then turned his attention to the Lusophone colonies, directly contrasting with Nehru's cautious, legalistic attempts to negotiate peaceful transfers of power. The diverging visions of Third World diplomacy represented by Nehru and Nasser were enshrined in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, where each sought to bend the new organization to their specific vision of global diplomacy.[35]

Nehru thus faced domestic and international pressure to adopt a more assertive stance even before Angola raised the stakes. Just months after the ICJ decision in 1960, an editorial in the *Times of India* lambasted Nehru for waiting for African decolonization to weaken Portugal: India was 'already a free country … will it not be more in keeping with our self-respect if we freed Goa first and prepared the way for the liberation of Portuguese territory in Africa?'[36] After the Angolan rebellion put Portugal on the defensive both militarily and in the court of world opinion, Dadra and Nagar Haveli represented an obvious opportunity, setting off a clamour among Indian nationalists. Nehru responded by abandoning his reticence and accepting a constitutional amendment in August that integrated the territories into the Union 'in deference to the desire and request of the people'.[37] Lisbon refused to recognize this status, but it revealed a new assertiveness in Indian politics that used ideas of self-determination to justify a legally questionable action. Nehru even used the opportunity to publicly entertain the possibility of military conflict with Portugal.[38]

Domestically, Indian advocates believed this was the first step towards the forcible annexation of Goa, which would decisively end European imperialism on the subcontinent while reasserting India's leading position in the increasingly militant Third World movement. Africans also demanded Indian action, believing a defeat in Goa would weaken Portugal and accelerate the timeline of decolonization despite the collapse of the Angolan rebellion. These two trends converged dramatically at the seminar on the Portuguese colonies that took place in Delhi in October 1961.

The conference used Angola as pretext to rejuvenate the Goan cause by linking it with militant African ideas of revolution. According to its originator, P. D. Gaitonde of the National Congress of Goa, Nehru hesitated to approve the conference, only acceding at the insistence of his cabinet.[39] After all, the conference increased pressure on India by reinforcing and publicizing linkages between Goan and African movements. These had been forged via the web of empire, where the few colonials that gained access to higher education bonded as outsiders in Portugal and became vocal critics of it in subsequent years. Portugal created yet more ties when it exiled Goan nationalists arrested during the mid-1950s crackdown to Angola, where they interreacted with African activists.[40]

As these national movements cohered against Portugal, the PAIGC's Amílcar Cabral sought to coordinate the multicontinental nature of the joint struggles. The formation of CONCP in 1961 officially added multiple Goan organizations to a coalition of leftist African nationalists, with the Goan League's João Cabral coordinating European propaganda efforts in London.[41] The CONCP's first conference at Casablanca in April 1961 directly inspired the Delhi gathering, and there was a tangible sense that African militancy was strengthening Indian calls for action.[42] During opening remarks, the official convener of the Seminar on Problems of the Portuguese Colonies – parliamentarian K. K. Shah – set the tone for proceedings when he declared '[this] is not a get-together of wishful thinkers and helpless people, but a gathering of freedom fighters'.[43]

Nehru demanded that the gathering be termed a seminar to limit its political implications, but there was little doubt that the October conference was meant to encourage a shift in India's handling of Portuguese issues. Presentations from both

African nationalists and domestic officials placed the priority on action that could not be curtailed by Western opposition. Summarizing a session in which two CONCP members – João Cabral and the Mozambican Marcelino Dos Santos – urged India to liberate Goa, the future president of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda explained, 'It is urgent that the Afro-Asian nations should do something more than pass resolutions, resolutions will have no response from Portugal.' While a self-professed adherent of non-violence, Kaunda recognized that 'theory and practice did not often go together', ambivalently concluding that 'man had always used force to convince other men'.[44] Jonas Savimbi – the charismatic foreign affairs chief of the UPA and future leader of his own breakaway Angolan faction – was less circumspect in one of his earliest international appearances. He earned national headlines with his statement calling for Indians to join with Angolans in shedding blood for the independence of their nation.[45]

The seminar determined that there were only two courses of action, either concerted effort at the UN by Afro-Asian nations or a resort to arms, with the latter receiving the lion's share of support. The UN served a function, but most attendees agreed it could not deliver independence to Afro-Asian nations. Dos Santos captured the emerging sentiment when he explained that African nationalists did not oppose the supernational body but understood that 'the United Nations was used by imperialists', citing the Congo as the prime example. The UN was 'not completely ineffective' since 'it had allowed the voice of the oppressed to be heard', but without reorganization there seemed little likelihood of it giving material support to those struggling to be free.[46] Still, the UN remained a useful barometer of world opinion, which was warming to the idea of liberation by force. As P. D. Gaitonde concluded, Angola demonstrated that 'public opinion in the United Nations had turned against Portugal', meaning if India 'moved into Goa, there would be no determined opposition'.[47]

Even as militancy won out, the attendees looked to Nehru and India to guide the Third World response. Kaunda spoke for many present when he said that, whether it be peaceable or not, 'We expect the government of India to give us a lead in this matter.'[48] Young African nationalists shared this perspective. While African liberation parties were preparing for war, they believed the military and diplomatic capabilities wielded by the Indian state stood a better chance of forcing Portugal to the negotiation table quickly than would their revolts. They hoped a military victory in Goa might topple the Portuguese dictatorship's house of cards. This reinforced the sentiment of those like Krishna Menon within Nehru's government, linking continued leadership of the Third World movement with a more assertive form of anti-imperialism.[49] The arguments proved convincing. 'African criticisms of Indian "weakness" over Goa,' one British diplomat reflected a short time later, 'had a most powerful influence in persuading Mr. Nehru to agree finally to the resort to force.'[50] As the seminar wound down, Nehru admitted that the world had changed.[51] Though he maintained the importance of non-violence, the prime minister declared at the seminar's closing rally that 'other methods' were necessary resolve the problem of Portuguese colonialism. It would 'not be long', he concluded, before Goa, Daman and Diu were free.[52]

The aggressive shift in Indian discussions of Goa, and obvious military preparations, put Portugal on the defensive for the second time in a year. The Lisbon government, desperate to line up international condemnation of the looming conflict, beseeched

the United States and the UK to record their opposition to any use of force.[53] Both obliged, but there was a sense that the invasion would be difficult to avoid without Portugal entering negotiations on Goa, which Salazar refused. Portugal's oldest ally was reluctant to act since the UK found itself caught between a NATO ally and a member of the Commonwealth. The British government agreed that Delhi should 'encounter international indignation' but signalled disinterest in moving much beyond symbolic assistance.[54] The US representatives believed that India would easily win any confrontation, so they argued the most logical response was to proactively seek a UNSC Resolution as tensions rose. Yet like the British, they were careful to avoid the image of 'doing the work for the Portuguese'.[55] And Portugal was far from excited about any appeals to the UN. Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira described a UNSC resolution as a 'two-edged sword' thanks to Portugal's objections that the body had any authority over its colonies, but a desperate Salazar accepted the manoeuvre.[56] These interventions ultimately failed to dissuade Nehru from taking military action. On 17 December, Operation Vijay began the invasion of Goa, Daman and Diu, overwhelming the paltry European garrisons starved by Portugal's military deployments in Africa. Though Salazar ordered his troops to fight to the death, casualties were minimal, and surrender came quickly. On 19 December, Portugal's 450-year-old Indian Empire ended.

British and American officials admitted the Indian invasion solved the thorny Goa issue, but it caused problems of its own. At the UNSC meeting held in response to the invasion, Portugal appealed to international law to protect its sovereignty, while the core Indian argument expanded on earlier challenges to it. Specifically, India's UN representative (and future foreign secretary) C. S. Jha defended his country by critiquing the historically unequal acceptance of military conquest that underwrote European empire:

> The greatest thing that has happened in this twentieth century is that no longer can colonialism be tolerated, whether in Asia, in Africa or in Latin America or anywhere else … we accept many tenets of international law. They are certainly regulating international life today. But the tenet which says, and which is quoted in support of colonial Powers having sovereign rights over territories which they won by conquest in Asia and Africa, is no longer acceptable. It is the European concept and it must die. It is time, in the twentieth century, that it died.[57]

The argument unnerved US and British delegations despite their critical views of Portuguese colonialism. Indeed, the Indian argument sought to justify military invasion as a way of remedying the tensions between national rights and the inherited borders of empire, a precedent with wide implications across the Global South. Pointedly paraphrasing a Nehru justification of non-violence, US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson retorted 'that no right end can be served by a wrong means'.[58] The UK and the United States lined up behind a UNSC resolution demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops and the restoration of Portuguese power, but it (predictably) failed to advance thanks to a Soviet veto. The opposing resolution calling for Portugal to withdraw its troops and facilitate the end to colonialism in India also failed, with the UK, the United States and France opposing.[59] The lone response came from the UNGA, which passed

a resolution the next day criticizing Portugal's non-compliance with Chapter XI of the UN Charter and Resolution 1542 (XV) without directly mentioning Goa.

The United States and Britain worried over the precedent set by the invasion, but officials knew that it solved a lingering problem with no ideal solutions. Such resignation was apparent in the United States' early warnings to Nehru, admitting amidst admonitions that 'Goa is a colonial issue, and recognizes that colonial age is passing'.[60] Privately, British officials were even more direct. 'All history, our own history not least,' one of Britain's UN diplomats reflected after the incident, 'proves that is futile to argue that force must never be used to alter the existing political arrangements … it would be hypocritical to pretend that international machinery exists capable of adjudicating and arranging change by peaceful means.'[61]

The UN had neither the ability nor the will to wrest control of colonial possessions from European states; India did. The action proved decisive, but it opened a pandora's box, potentially legitimizing force with the UN as an *ex post facto* rubber stamp. But Portugal was fast becoming the prime example of outdated colonialism, and India was an important if independent Western ally with powerful influence in the Global South. As one British diplomat lamented in early 1962, 'Goa was a rotten case to make a stand.'[62] Force of arms solved the Goan issue once and for all, and the UN – along with most of its member countries – accepted the new status quo despite howls of protest from Lisbon.

'The United Nations is bleeding to death'

The Goan invasion solved the problem of Portugal's Indian colonies, though when combined with events in Angola (and the Congo), they did little to solve the dilemma of the rights versus sovereignty argument. Indeed, they actively undermined the one body designed to manage these issues. Nationalists echoed Marcelino Dos Santos in seeing the UN as a useful forum for airing grievances but an ineffective check on Euro-American policies that ignored demands for self-determination. By contrast, Western critics of the UN blanched at the rising power of Southern states and their acceptance of anti-imperial militancy. Ironically, both attributed this to the flawed structure of the UN that allowed certain subsets of countries to control the Security Council or General Assembly, creating unequal applications of international law and custom. While distinct and often opposing, these perspectives combined to weaken attempts to position the UN as a trusted interlocuter in the process of decolonization.

The events of 1961 dramatized the weakness of UN enforcement abilities without direct support from the superpowers. Euro-American control of the UNSC and their unwillingness to confront allies like Portugal justified Southern militancy, which in turn narrowed the options of acceptable action available to the great powers. The stalemate threatened the UN's ability to act on colonial issues at all and its larger peace-making capabilities. 'The trouble,' one UK official reflected in early 1962, 'is that our position on the Congo, Angola and Goa has put us in such a difficult position in the UN that we cannot possibly hope to carry any weight' even when tractable colonial issues were raised.[63] The tendency towards obstruction on anticolonial measures reinforced

nationalist dismissals of the UN and frustrated independent Global South like India, who chafed at their inability to turn General Assembly resolutions into concrete policies in the powerful UNSC. The events of 1961 demonstrated for many countries that – as Chinese diplomats forcefully stated – any thought that the UN could advance decolonization under Euro-American domination was 'sheer illusion'.[64]

The lessons of 1961 therefore evolved around a practical legitimization of force. If Angola demonstrated that the UN could not persuade even the least powerful European country to accept decolonization, then Goa revealed that neither was it likely to resist the forceful eviction of those same European states. This promoted direct threats to Lisbon's Empire, with Tanzanian foreign minister Oscar Kambona reportedly stating that 'if [Portugal] maintained its present intransigent attitude, Tanzania would have to follow the example of action adopted by India in the case of Goa'.[65] But more concerning was the potential threat to the many small enclaves that Western countries held at the borders of independent anti-imperial states. These included city states like British Hong Kong and US territories like Puerto Rico, as well as imperial rump colonies like Dutch Papua New Guinea. This latter territory became a focal point of Western concerns, with Indonesian Prime Minister Sukarno referencing Goa in a retort to statements of US opposition to the use of force.[66] While Indonesia did not invade, the threat of violence helped accelerate negotiations for a transfer of power in 1962 and loomed over discussions of Portuguese Timor for another decade. As a US expert argued in 1966, 'The precedent of Goa and external assistance to rebel groups in Africa indicate that any Indonesian Timorese adventure could be justified as defence against the "permanent aggression" of colonialism.'[67] Sukarno and other Global South leaders felt they had justification for using force to right past wrongs, and their reticence depended on calculations about their ability to weather the Western blowback that would follow.

Such calculations meant that Goa did not provide a clear blueprint for forcing Portugal's hand in Africa. While Kambona blustered about invasion, Tanzania lacked India's powerful geopolitical position and massive army, while Mozambique and Angola presented more difficult strategic challenges than did Portugal's poorly garrisoned Indian enclaves. Rather, India's defence of its actions in 1961 combined with displays of international support for the Angolan struggle and the victory of the FLN in Algeria to provide a powerful argument for armed nationalism rather than state-led liberation. It was therefore nationalists like Eduardo Mondlane, a onetime UN official soon to be elected president of FRELIMO, who ultimately understood exactly how Goa 'represented a precedent or a lesson for Portuguese Africa'.[68] Just over two years later, FRELIMO launched a guerilla war in Mozambique with support from Tanzania, joining Cabral's PAIGC that began fighting in Guinea-Bissau the year before. This highlighted a different legal debate about support for liberation movements by third party states like Tanzania, which began with Angola and received strong support from the Southern bloc at the UN and the acquiescence of many Western states.[69]

The emphasis on local revolution relegated the UN to a largely symbolic role, especially among African nationalists. The events of 1961 reaffirmed Cabral's belief that Portugal would only decolonize through force, and the UN's inability to enforce its decrees – which damaged its reputation and threatened to reduce the resolution on

decolonization to 'an academic exercise' – cemented the need for liberating violence.[70] Lusophone nationalists like Cabral came to believe that armed revolution was the most rational method for guaranteeing African access to the rights guaranteed by the UN Charter, and – as Ana Moledo notes in this volume – this logic became a central component of anti-imperial solidarity throughout Southern Africa in the 1960s. A year after the PAIGC launched its revolution in January 1963, Cabral warned his army to fight against the 'tendency to expect outside help … and to remember first our own efforts'.[71]

Where Cabral saw the value of the UN was in its ability to legitimize nationalist revolutions and isolate Portugal's access to materiel and economic support. As the PAIGC liberated territory and established basic public services, it looked to the UN to underline its claims to governing authority. It was with this in mind that the party invited a UN observing team – appointed by the General Assembly – to visit Guinean liberated zones in 1972. The visitors noted the 'marked progress achieved' in governing liberated territory and creation of local services, and the PAIGC touted their recommendation that there be 'concerted action by the international community to exercise pressure on the Government of Portugal'.[72] This established the PAIGC as the government-in-waiting for independent Guinea-Bissau and encouraged the party to unilaterally declare independence seven months before the collapse of the Lisbon dictatorship in 1974. The UN remained useful in Southern eyes as a tool for highlighting the new consensus on political self-determination but earlier enthusiasm for its role in creating new global structures favouring the Global South was tempered by the reality that nationalist parties would have to wrest control of their countries by their own force of arms.[73]

While Global South actors expressed frustration with the UN, their use of it to define this new era in global affairs alienated Westerners accustomed to seeing international law and supranational bodies bend to their interests. General Resolution 1514 (XV) and the creation of the Special Committee on Decolonization in late 1961, explored by Aurora Santos in this volume, reinforced an existing wariness of the UN common within transnational Euro-American conservatism, which feared diluting national sovereignty and the extent global hierarchy. For this group, the events surrounding Portugal dramatically illustrated how Southern anti-imperialism and neutralism were undermining Western hegemony. Portuguese propaganda cultivated these attitudes, directing campaigns at Anglo-American conservatives that depicted Portugal's actions in Angola as a response to communist subversion and arguing that UN actions played into Soviet hands. While not all saw the immediate spectre of communism, they agreed that Portugal was the victim of anti-Western sentiment that threatened to turn the international system against its prime architects. The US political commentator Roscoe Drummond captured a popular sentiment when he noted that 'it is evident that many if not most of the newly independent African and Asian nations are disposed to support the use of force when they like its purposes (as in the case of Goa) and oppose it when used by Western countries'.[74] This anticolonial logic proved equally frustrating to European officials, with British UN Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean publicly complaining about 'the apparent approval in some cases of the use of violence' and insisting that 'the rules of the charter do in fact apply to all members'.[75] While

he clarified that the comments were not meant as a criticism of the UN, it signalled growing Western frustration with the rapidly changing body.

This apparent hypocrisy provided fuel for Cold Warriors, who openly questioned the value of continued Western membership. 'Is it not quite clear,' one conservative peer asked the British foreign minister during a testy exchange in the parliament, 'that the United Nations neither intends nor has the power to stop aggression anywhere?'[76] More pointed was the United States' future presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, who lamented that after years of being charitable to the UN despite personal misgivings, the events of 1961 convinced him that 'the United States no longer has a place in the United Nations'.[77] The American clamour became so loud that President Kennedy felt obliged to respond in his January 1962 State of the Union address. There, he reaffirmed his administration's faith in the UN and promised continued support as a direct rebuttal to 'those who would abandon this imperfect world instrument because they dislike our imperfect world'.[78] While scholars like Sean Byrnes have argued for reaction against Third World liberation as central to the rise of New Right political movements in the 1970s, reaction to the events of 1961 hint that hostility towards the UN and its role supporting this cause in fact evolved alongside attempts by Southern nationalist to reshape the rules of the international system.[79]

Yet the reality was that it was not only conservatives who lamented how events played out in 1961. Even where sympathy for Portugal was lacking, the Goan invasion shook Western confidence in both the UN and those who held out hope for a peaceful process of decolonization. The fact that Nehru, a global champion of non-violence and international organizations, was swayed by the rising anger of African and Indian nationalists received special attention. In late December 1961, João Cabral wrote from London that the press and political parties alike almost universally condemned the Indian resort to force; a drastic change from the summer when public opinion leaned towards the Angolan cause.[80] US columnists mirrored this response with especially vitriolic condemnations of Nehru, whom they portrayed – along with the Non-Aligned Movement for which he was the American face – as hypocritical and likely fraudulent.[81] For many, it was impossible to conclude that the UN was not complicit in this hypocrisy given recent events. 'The United Nations,' the syndicated columnist William S. White wrote, 'is bleeding to death.'[82] The strength and breadth of these responses played directly into Salazar's hands, providing a much-needed counter against UN resolutions that reduced both popular and moral pressure for Western governments to act on African issues.[83] This allowed Salazar to mobilize Portuguese military and political forces to maintain domination of the country's remaining colonies for over a decade more.

Conclusion

The events surrounding Portugal's Empire in 1961 had global implications, not least for the UN. Angola represented one of the first events to test the anti-imperial resolve of Southern states after the Year of Africa, while the Goan invasion represented the first instance since its inception that the UN did not

successfully condemn a case of territorial annexation. These events did not cause the death of the UN; even Portugal remained an unenthusiastic member. But they did accelerate the growth of Western scepticism towards the body, as the Global South sought – with mixed success – to challenge the laws and customs created by European empires. Resolution 1542 (XV) successfully recast self-determination as a form of anti-imperialism, but the justification of liberating violence faced stronger opposition. Nonetheless, while no resolution formally endorsed such measures, the body established new customs by privileging claims of Southern nationalists and liberation parties over extracontinental European sovereignty. Goa proved an outlier rather than a firm precedent, with the twenty-year Indonesian occupation of East Timor and the short-lived Argentinian conquest of the Falklands failing for unique reasons, but the successful violation of the UN's prohibition on force broke the seal on Western animosity towards the organization and the rapidly growing power of Southern states in it. This set its own precedent. When anti-imperial states tried to use the UN to establish such grand projects as the New International Economic Order, they confronted powerful Western opposition that resisted the transfer of economic power just as Portugal resisted formal decolonization, with the UN once more struggling to compel change.

The lesson then was that nationalist movements would be the agents of change. This was accomplished in Lusophone Africa by adopting an increasingly militant, and militarized, opposition to Portugal. This fit within a broad global transition from the measured internationalism of the Bandung era – that among other strategies envisioned the UN reshaping global hierarchies – to a period dominated by Tricontinentalism.[84] This revolutionary Third-Worldism embraced aggressive, leftist ideas of revolution that sidelined cautious, institution-minded leaders like Nehru in favour of a new wave of guerilla intellectuals that included Amílcar Cabral and Marcelino dos Santos, who embraced armed conflict to address the stubborn problems of imperialism. In the process, they positioned their parties alongside North Vietnam and Cuba as icons of anti-imperialism for the 1960s and 1970s. It was these military revolutions in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola that undermined the Lisbon dictatorship and finally brought down the Portuguese Empire.

Notes

1. See, for example, Alanna O'Malley, *The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America Britain and the United Nations during the Congo Crisis 1960–1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018); Nicole Eggers, Jessica Lynne Pearson and Aurora Almada e Santos, eds, *The United Nations and Decolonization* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).
2. Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 11.
3. Eva-Maria Muschik, *Building States: The United Nations, Development, and Decolonization 1945–1965* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022), 10–11.
4. See R. Joseph Parrott, 'Introduction', in *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War*, ed. R. Joseph Parrott and Mark Atwood Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 1–40.

5. This argument provides a slightly more critical take on detailed studies on the UN and Portugal conducted by Aurora Almada e Santos. See Santos, 'The United Nations and Portuguese Colonies, 1961–1962: Information Gathering and the Evolving Interpretation of Article 73(e)', in *United Nations and Decolonization*, 171–205; Santos, *A organizaçaõ das Naçoẽs Unidas e a Questaõ Colonial Portuguesa: 1960–1974* (Lisbon: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2017).
6. See Susan Pedersen, 'Foreword', in *The Institution of International Order: From the League of Nations to the United Nations*, ed. Simon Jackson and Alanna O'Malley (London: Routledge, 2018), ix–xiv.
7. UN General Assembly, 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.
8. UN General Assembly Resolution 1542 (XV), 'Transmission of Information under Article 73e of the Charter', 15 December 1960, Fifteenth Session, Reports Adopted under the Reports of the Fourth Committee, 30.
9. See P. D. Gaitonde, *The Liberation of Goa: A Participant's View of History* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987), 108; Peter Karibe Mendy, *Amílcar Cabral: Nationalist and Pan-African Revolutionary* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2019), 102.
10. 'Relatório do PAIGC sobre a luta de libertação em 1961', 1961, Folder 04602.011, Papers of Amílcar Cabral, Casa Comum, Fundação Mário Soares (hereafter DAC).
11. 'Declaração de Amílcar Cabral à Agência Chine Nouvelle sobre o assassinato de Patrice Lumumba', 14 February 1961, Folder 07064.058.009, DAC.
12. Amílcar Cabral, 'Guinea and Cabo Verde against Portuguese Colonialism', in *Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts of Amilcar Cabral* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 19.
13. R. Joseph Parrott, 'Brother and a Comrade: Amílcar Cabral as Global Revolutionary', in *Tricontinental Revolution*, 245–75.
14. 'Conferência de imprensa de Amílcar Cabral em Paris', undated (*c.*1961), Folder 07058.017.019, DAC, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=07058.017.019#!3. While undated, the document makes contemporary references to the Goan League and a November 1960 UN resolution.
15. Letter, Houser to Ncaca, 25 January 1958, Box 79, American Committee on Africa Papers, Tulane University (New Orleans, LA).
16. For more on Roberto, see the chapter by Alex J. Marino in this volume.
17. Holden Roberto, 'Statement of Mr. Holden Roberto, President of the Union of Populations of Angola', 15 March 1961, ACOA, Armstrong Papers, NYPL. ('Interview with an Angolan Nationalist', no date (likely early 1961, late 1960), Armstrong Papers, NYPL.)
18. UNSC, 945th Meeting, 14 March 1961, 17 (Document N6228552).
19. Ibid., 27.
20. UNSC, 946th Meeting, 15 March 1961, 19–20 (Document N6228684).
21. 'U.S. Praised by Angolan', *The Sun* (Baltimore), 25 March 1961.
22. Telegram, Rusk to USUN New York, 6 March 1961, Box 1821, CDF 60–63, RG 59, National Archives (College Park, MD).
23. Conversa com Sr. John H. Ferguson, 15 May 1961, PAA 287, Pasta 922, Arquivo Historico Diplomatico.
24. See Santos, 'United Nations and Portuguese Colonies'.
25. 'Comunicados sobre os acontecimentos de Luanda, o caso do Santa Maria, as prisões na Guiné, etc.', *c.*1961, DAC, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualiza dor?pasta=07073.132.002#!5.

26. See Gaitonde, *The Liberation of Goa*, chs 10–11; Sandrine Bègue, *La Fin de Goa et de l'Estado da Índia, Vol. 1* (Lisbon: IDI-MNE, 2007), ch. 6; Nishtha Desai, *Liberation vs Armed Aggression: The Media Responses to Goa's Liberation* (Panaji: Goa Directorate of Art and Culture, 2011), ch. 1.
27. Chandrasekhar Dasgupta, 'A Brief History of Panchsheel', *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 1 (2016): 26–31.
28. Ryan Irwin, 'Imagining Nation, State, and Order in the Mid-Twentieth Century', *Kronos* 37 (November 2011): 12–22.
29. Gaitonde, *The Liberation of Goa*, 110–12.
30. Rejoinder of the Indian Government, 26 November 1957, 'ICJ Pleadings, Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Vol. III', 301.
31. Quoted in Lok Sabha Secretariat, *V.J. Krishna Menon* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1991), 11–12.
32. 'Provisional Govt. of Goans: Leader's Plea to Centre', *Times of India*, 5 September 1960.
33. See ICJ, 'Report of Judgements, Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 12 April 1960'.
34. Even the treaty ceding Pondicherry to India was not formally approved until 1962, after prolonged war forced the French government into recognizing Algerian independence.
35. Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 291.
36. 'Goa' *Times of India*, 28 September 1960, 6.
37. This act would not be recognized by Portugal until the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974. www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/amendments/constitution-india-tenth-amendment-act-1961
38. Record, 987th Meeting of the Security Council, 18 December 1961, 2 (N6303710).
39. Gaitonde, *The Liberation of Goa*, 151.
40. Aquino de Bragança is a Goan example of the former; P. P. Shirodkar, the latter.
41. Cabral had actively collaborated with the Africans beginning as early as 1960. Estatutos da CONCP, April 1961, Pasta 04604.023.017, DAC.
42. Gaitonde, *The Liberation of Goa*, 151.
43. Indian Council on Africa, *Report of the Seminar on Problems of the Portuguese Colonies* (October 1961), 5.
44. Ibid., 15–16.
45. 'Action of UN to Oust Portuguese', *Times of India*, 22 October 1961.
46. Indian Council on Africa, *Report of the Seminar on Problems of the Portuguese Colonies*, 19.
47. Ibid., 18.
48. 'Action of UN to Oust Portuguese', *Times of India*, 22 October 1961.
49. Indian Council on Africa, *Report of the Seminar on Problems of the Portuguese Colonies*, 4.
50. 'India: The Invasion of Goa', 29 December 1961, CRO Ref: SEA 41/1 No. 37, DO 201/12, UKNA. Nehru acknowledged the pivotal role of Angola. A. G. Mezerik, *Goa: Portuguese Colonial Policy, Indian Campaign, UN Record, Chronology* (New York: International Review Service, 1962), 45.
51. 'Steps Must Be Found to Stop Lisbon's Massacre', *Times of India*, 24 October 1961.
52. 'India May Adopt "Other Means" to Free Goa', *Times of India*, 24 October 1961.
53. Lisbon to Secstate, 11 October 1961, JFKL (Day II 094).

54. Foreign Office Memo, 188, 29 December 961, FO 371 159711, UKNA.
55. Memo, Robert J. Johnson to Kaysen, 12 December 1961, Box 155, NSF, JFKL.
56. Lisbon to Secstate, 8 December 1961, JFKL (Day II 99).
57. Proceedings, UN SC N6303710, 11–13.
58. Ibid., 19.
59. Parliamentary Question, House of Lords, 20 December 1961, 739.
60. Washington to New Delhi, 14 December 1961, JFKL (Day II 121).
61. Telegram, J.E. Cable to London, 3 January 1962. The diplomat concluded that the peaceful changes accomplished after 1945 were merely 'intelligent response to force or the threat of force'.
62. Handwritten response to telegram, J.E. Cable to London, 3 January 1962, FO 371 159711, UKNA.
63. Ibid.
64. Statement by the Peoples Republic of China on Goa, 19 December 1961, FO 371 159711, UKNA.
65. Quoted in Francisco Proença Garcia, *Análise Global De Uma Guerra: Moçambique, 1964–1974* (Lisbon: Prefacio, 2003), 153.
66. Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 11 December 1961; Edward C. Keefer, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia* (Washington: USGPO, 1994), 481.
67. Donald E. Weatherbee, 'Portuguese Timor: And Indonesian Dilemma', *Asian Survey* 6, no. 2 (1966): 692.
68. Quoted in José Manuel Duarte de Jesus, *Eduardo Mondlane: Um Homem A Abater* (Coimbra: Almedina, 2010), 85–6.
69. Tom Ruys, 'The Indian Interventions in Goa – 1961', in *The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-Based Approach*, ed. Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten and Alexandra Hofer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 10.
70. Cabral, 'At the United Nations', in *Revolution in Guinea*, 49.
71. Cabral, 'Estudos relativos à luta armada e ao seu desenvolvimento', January 1964, DAC.
72. United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, A/8723/Rev.1, vol. III, chapter X, Annex I (New York, 1975), 105–6.
73. Ryan Irwin argues a similar shift comparing Indian and South African struggles over anti-apartheid. See Irwin, 'Imagining Nation, State, and Order', 19.
74. Drummond, 'US Shouldn't Quite UN', *Huff*, 23 January 1962.
75. Sam Pope Brewer, 'British Support to UN Affirmed', *New York Times*, 25 January 1962.
76. Parliamentary Question, House of Lords, 20 December 1961, 740–1.
77. 'Goldwater Now Feels US Should Quit UN', *Austin Statesmen*, 21 December 1961.
78. John F. Kennedy, 'Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union', 11 January 1962, The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/236917.
79. See Sean T. Byrnes, *Disunited Nations: US Foreign Policy, Anti-Americanism, and the Rise of the New Right* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2021), ch. 1.
80. Letter, João Cabral to Marcelino dos Santos, 28 December 1961, Folder 04606.047.062, DAC. See also Cable, Bogota Chancery to London, 21 December 1961, FO 371 159711, UKNA.
81. Bill Henry, 'Nehru Opened a Pandora's Box', *Los Angeles Times*, 28 December 1961.

82. William S. White, 'Acts Like India's Latest Assure Death of the UN', *Austin American Statesmen*, 22 December 1961.
83. Portugal compiled an English-language collection of global newspaper articles criticizing the Goan invasion, which it distributed in the United States and elsewhere.
84. See Parrott, 'Introduction'.

5

The struggle for Southern Africa: Constructing imaginaries around the unliberated region

Ana Moledo

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the winds of change blowing across Africa came up 'against a stony wall running somewhere across the southern part of the continent'.[1] The southern region was far from being a homogeneous conglomerate, but rather a patchwork of territorial and political entities including colonies, protectorates and self-declared independent countries. Besides being the last bastion of European colonial domination in Africa, it was also home to white-minority regimes that stood in the way of ending decades of racial inequality and oppression. Despite these differences, the region became for various actors at the time 'a space of interdependent fates'.[2] For those in power, cross-border collaboration was meant to protect the status quo, while for the liberation movements it proved to be a way to strengthen their diplomacy and leverage their claims in continental and international settings. The latter, supported by external allies, relied on the performative resonance of regional discourses and imaginaries not only to advance their nationalist causes in the international scene but also to expose the ambiguities of pan-African and global systems of governance. Thus, although Southern African revolutionary unity in the period up to the mid-1970s was no more than 'rhetorical expressions of solidarity', the resonance and impact it had on international and continental debates demonstrates the extent to which this thinking regionally shaped politics and activism.[3]

I argue that regional imaginaries in the 1960s and early 1970s were influenced not only by Cold War rivalries but also by an intensification of international human rights debates. The UN's weakness as a mediator, the Eastern Bloc's interest in establishing itself as an actor in these discussions and a growing mobilization of Western human rights activist groups were key elements in bringing diverse actors together and developing a seemingly coherent narrative – at least from outside – of the region's present and future. This chapter engages with various states of the art, from the scholarship on transnational anticolonial solidarities[4] to literature on the impact of decolonization on international organizations[5] and more recent studies on the engagement of the Global South and Global East with human rights discourses.[6] In doing so, it attempts to blur the lines between strict Cold War historiography and more recent global history approaches on transregional cooperation in the age of decolonization, by disentangling

overlapping and conflicting imaginaries about the Southern African region advanced by liberation movements alongside, in parallel with or in opposition to other regional and international actors.

Following a brief overview of the relationships between regional liberation movements in the 1960s, the chapter shows how some of the first international debates on the issue of decolonization and black majority rule in Southern Africa were heavily conditioned by an increasing instrumentalization of human rights rhetoric. Socialist-oriented international institutions were key in sponsoring the formation, at least on paper, of a supposed coalition of revolutionary forces in the region. The Khartoum alliance was no more than a diplomatic gesture, mainly because those involved were actually unwilling to commit, but it evinced the risk of the region being divided along Cold War lines. This provoked swift reactions from neighbouring independent states seeking a more moderate dialogue with the West on the future of the region. The early 1970s saw a breakthrough in this regard, mainly due to the impetus given by Western activism to the regional revolutionary cause that channelled Southern African liberation politics into new arenas of intellectual and political debate.

The Portuguese colonies were part of Southern Africa? Wary prospects of revolutionary unity in the early 1960s

Sharing borders at the southern tip of the continent does not seem to have been as decisive in this history of cooperation as having to fight a common enemy. Liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, South-West Africa or Zimbabwe had crossed paths in exile on a regular basis, whether at conferences or within the various hubs of decolonization spread across the continent.[7] Socialization was not restricted to the leadership, but the rank and file often shared training and instruction camps in places such as the Soviet Union, Algeria or Tanzania.[8] A sign of the cordial relationship that was beginning to blossom between the leadership of the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa dates back to 1962, when Robert Resha and Nelson Mandela met with representatives of the Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) in Rabat.[9] However, it was not until the decade's second half that these same movements saw the need to strengthen their links and work more coordinated, to try to stop the 'unholy alliance' of the colonial and white-minority regimes in the region.[10]

The resolutions adopted by the CONCP's second conference, held in October 1965 in Dar es Salaam, were probably the first document produced by the front that recognized 'the urgent nature of the problems facing the peoples of Southern Africa'.[11] The 'anti-African alliances that seek to perpetuate white domination in Southern Africa … through the investments of the South African government's financial capital' were a threat that CONCP members could not ignore.[12] Thus, they declared their willingness to 'explore with nationalist and anti-imperialist organizations in Southern Africa ways and means of practically and rapidly establishing a strong coordination of efforts in the common national liberation struggle'.[13]

Despite the hesitant positions and lack of unanimity among CONCP member organizations regarding greater involvement alongside other Southern African nationalist forces,[14] the common geopolitical threat was crucial for imagining, and to some extent realizing, scenarios of cooperation. Rapprochement between South Africa, the region's political and economic engine, and the Portuguese regime threatened to escalate the conflict in Angola and Mozambique and hindered the guerrillas' advance.[15] Little did the thirty-four delegates at the Dar es Salaam conference know that the regional situation would become even more unfavourable to their political and military strategies only one month later. Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence would ultimately be a victory in maintaining the status quo of the white-minority regimes that – bolstered by a Cold War-inspired climate of communist menace – strengthened the Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury axis in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[16]

In August 1967 the ANC formed a military alliance with the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and launched the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns to open up transit routes through Rhodesia into South Africa. The joint operations were a failure, but both liberation movements repeatedly claimed that these had a major impact as morale boosters and as a 'demonstration of the liberation movements' capacity to meet and sustain the struggle in a new way'.[17] The erstwhile leader of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, called it 'the best example' of the closer cooperation between regional movements,[18] yet nothing similar ever took hold between FRELIMO and other neighbouring revolutionary forces during the liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies.[19] Although the ANC-ZAPU military example remained an isolated case, the cooperation between these two movements and those of the CONCP thereafter progressed in the international arena. It was in contact with international partners, organizations and activist groups that liberation movements realized the growing appeal of a regional approach to anticolonial and anti-racist struggles in Southern Africa.

The Southern African challenge to UN action: Defining the region by its absence in human rights debates

The interrelation of the Southern African nationalist struggles was increasingly recognized by the liberation movements themselves, but international interest on the region as a whole certainly encouraged and spurred the feeling that closer cooperation was the right advocacy path. This was stated, for instance, by representatives of thirty-two governments, liberation movements, NGOs and experts who participated in the 'International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa', organized by the UN in Kitwe, Zambia, in 1967. The meeting was perceived by prominent international guests, such as the director of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), George Houser, as a recognition of 'the unity of the struggle in the whole of Southern Africa', which should be also reflected within the UN architecture itself with the enlargement of financial initiatives such as the UN Trust Funds for South Africa to include the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia.[20]

Despite Houser's belief in the need to address the problems of the region as a whole through concrete measures, the seminar's final declaration offers a more moderate reading of the discussions in Kitwe. There were no concrete pledges of material or financial support, but the indirect recognition of the liberation movements as interlocutors and, particularly, of the armed struggles they had undertaken as a way of claiming their rights: 'The Seminar notes that the opponents of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in Southern Africa have become increasingly disillusioned with the ability of the United Nations to end these evils by peaceful methods, and the African liberation movements recognized by the OAU are now firmly committed to armed struggle for achieving their legitimate rights as defined in the Charter of the United Nations.'[21] The absence of any explicit reference to the right to self-determination is striking, precisely when barely a year had passed since the General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), whose first article enshrined the right to self-determination as the basis for guaranteeing other (economic, political, social and cultural) rights. In this regard, Kitwe revealed that there were exceptions to applying the language of rights to certain contexts, and the Southern African region as such was one of them.

The tone used in the final declaration suggests that the meeting's atmosphere was rife with criticism of UN failure to enforce its resolutions and pressure its member states to implement them. Such reproaches, as R. Joseph Parrott acknowledged in the previous chapter, had been brewing since the early 1960s following the events in Angola and Goa. Yet, during the seminar in Kitwe, the situation in the Southern African region was framed as 'an open challenge to the authority of the UN', which threatened to irreparably damage its authority if not addressed 'by effective action'.[22] This is why the international organization used this opportunity to reach out to regional actors (i.e. nationalist movements as well as independent frontline countries, including Zambia itself) and make it clear that as the embodiment of the 'morality of the international community' the UN was still a crucial player.[23] However, it was not only the UN that positioned itself as a leading international interlocutor to solve the region's problems, as other international organizations took the lead and tried to advance the cause of Southern Africa's liberation.

The year 1968 was designated UN International Year for Human Rights. Borrowing the universalist rights rhetoric, international organizations east of the iron curtain concentrated on singling out the region as one of the main bastions in the struggle for the global realization of human rights. The engagement of communist organizations and anticolonial movements with the rights discourse certainly defies a more neutral reading of human rights movements like that proposed by Samuel Moyn.[24] Yet the fact remains that, although they were not part of the exclusive group headed by the UN that enthusiastically championed the rights cause, both Eastern Bloc institutions and African nationalists had appropriated parts of the narrative and made their own interpretations.[25] Self-determination was perceived as an 'elementary human right', and therefore the struggle for human rights in those areas still under the yoke of colonialism went hand in hand with liberation politics.[26]

In May 1968, the four-day conference 'Against Racism and Neo-colonialism – for the Liberation of Southern Africa' took place in East Berlin. Convened by the Central

Council for Asian, African and Latin American Sciences in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and sponsored by the East German and Soviet Afro-Asian solidarity committees as well as the permanent secretariat of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), over twenty-five scholars from six socialist countries and representatives of the ANC, ZAPU, FRELIMO, SWAPO, MPLA and PAIGC attended. In the opening address, the GDR's deputy minister of higher education, Gregor Schirmer, acknowledged that the conference taking place in 1968 was by no means accidental: 'The UN decisions against all forms of racialism, and for implementing human rights all over the world, logically meet with all-around support from the government and the population of the GDR. [The conference] is to be regarded as a scientific contribution of the scientists of the socialist countries and of the national liberation movements to implementing the humanistic UN declarations.'[27]

It may seem commonplace from today's point of view that decisions taken in the UN context should serve as reference. However, neither the Soviet Union nor East Germany had ratified the international human rights covenants at that time, and they would not do so until the end of 1973. The language of human rights had long been a prisoner of Cold War rivalries, being instrumentalized by the West to consolidate its moral superiority over the socialist bloc.[28] And yet, by the late 1960s, certain political and intellectual sectors in Central and Eastern Europe began to resort to the very same language to expose the contradictions within the human rights system itself.[29] The African South represented a weak point in that system. While the UN General Assembly condemned racialism and colonialism, permanent members of the UN Security Council (i.e. the United States, France and Great Britain) maintained a policy of connivance or passive acquiescence with colonial and racist regimes in the region. In this light, Lúcio Lara's (MPLA) intervention during the conference did not refrain from criticizing 'the inefficiency of the United Nations whose work is confined to adopting well-meant resolutions without the prospect of being realized'.[30]

In face of what was perceived as paralysis on the part of the international body that aspired to be the human rights police, participants of the 1968 Berlin conference set out to provide the definitive evidence on 'the perfection of the system of "white" domination and their intensified integration into a reactionary bloc in Southern Africa'.[31] This not only meant an 'escalation of terror and exploitation' within the region itself but 'constitute both in the form of the military confrontation and the dangerous policy of infiltration a growing danger to the sovereignty of the independent African states and a danger to world peace'.[32] These arguments justified the 'just armed struggle … the only effective means at the disposal of the peoples to liberate themselves'.[33] Unlike the UN seminar held in Kitwe less than a year earlier, which expressed its utmost concern on 'the immediate consequences of the violence',[34] partners in the Eastern Bloc concentrated on establishing the analytical framework that would lend international legitimacy to the armed conflicts in the region. Going beyond the UN's view of the region as a challenge, threat or a powder keg, Eastern European experts and government representatives were eager to promote regional imaginaries of anticolonial revolutionary unity as an alternative to the exploitative alliance of imperialist and racist regimes.

Shortly after the Berlin conference, two of the participants, the ANC's secretary general Duma Nokwe and the MPLA's Lúcio Lara, attended the World Peace Council (WPC) presidential committee meeting in Nicosia (Cyprus). Their speeches are striking for the apparent paradox they contain: the violence of white supremacist/colonialist regimes in Southern Africa and their international supporters posed a serious threat to world peace while the violence of the liberation forces served as 'a decisive instrument for achieving universal peace'.[35] Nokwe and Lara's presence at the meeting was not only intended to update WPC delegates on the developments in the south of the continent, but to mobilize the organization's support for putting the liberation movements in the spotlight of international aid. The call for an international conference in support of Southern African liberation movements had already begun to take shape in 1967 and was supported by AAPSO.[36] Guinea-Conakry, Somalia and Sudan were discussed as potential locations for a conference bringing together not only representatives of socialist countries and institutions close to the Eastern Bloc, but also democratic organizations and committees from various Western European countries. 'Effectiveness, not symbolism' was, according to Lara, what the movements expected from an event that aimed at softening Cold War divisions in terms of support.[37] Yet the 1969 Khartoum conference would go down in history precisely for its symbolism in staging an alliance between a selected group of nationalist forces from the region that would not only underscore bloc disputes but also intrabloc cleavages.[38]

Radicalism in Khartoum, moderation in Lusaka: Framing the region along Cold War fault lines

Óscar Monteiro, FRELIMO's representative at the 1968 Berlin scientific conference, concluded his speech on that occasion by proclaiming that the liberation movement he represented had taken sides in the global ideological conflict of that time: 'Faced with the choice between the exploited masses on the one side and the exploiting colonials on the other, the West, that is to say the capitalist countries, have sided with the latter … We have taken note of this, and we too have chosen.'[39] However, the chosen side – 'the progressive mankind' – was far from being a uniform and harmonized bloc. 'The East' was severely divided. Sino-Soviet rivalry represented a major obstacle that the movements had to overcome to avoid becoming embroiled in struggles that did not favour their prime cause, as Julião Soares Sousa recalls in his chapter in this book. Movements like the ANC closed ranks behind Moscow, while the CONCP assumed a more cautious stance so as not to burn bridges on either side.[40] However, China's exit from organizations such as AAPSO or WPC, which had become key partners in the CONCP movements' international strategy, further linked the fates of these movements with the Soviet Union.[41] This undoubtedly paved the ground for their recognition as 'authentic' liberation movements vis-à-vis other nationalist groups competing in the same territories.[42] Following this reasoning, the literature on the subject has considered the solidarity conference with the peoples of Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies that took place in Khartoum, Sudan, in January 1969, as

a central moment in the process of 'otherness', which delineated the region 'along the fault lines of its external allies'.[43]

External intervention in the formation of the so-called Khartoum alliance is not only evident in the sponsorship of organizations like AAPSO and WPC. Without foreign patrons, the much-lauded revolutionary unity would probably have come to nothing, as mistrust and even animosity behind the scenes abounded between some of the movements involved. SWAPO and MPLA, for instance, had severed relations as a result of the former's 'tactical alliance' with the MPLA's rival, UNITA.[44] FRELIMO officials in turn were wary of ANC comrades, who 'seek in meetings and in the international arena to take advantage of our prestige, the fruit of our struggle and sacrifices, to obtain support and justification for their situation … they [ANC] create confusion about the nature of our collaboration to imply that they are also fighting'.[45]

However, even though FRELIMO members saw their role in this context as that of 'a locomotive that drags the load that was hitched to it', they were able to identify precisely when the load threatened 'to drag us off the tracks we have laid out'.[46] Sérgio Vieira, member of the FRELIMO delegation to the Khartoum conference, recalled that the ANC wanted 'that the unity between the ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC, SWAPO and ZAPU would be solemnly declared in a document' following the precepts of the ANC's Freedom Charter.[47] According to Vieira, Mondlane himself 'immediately aborted the attempt to make our organizations [CONCP], which are really engaged in a vanguard struggle, ideological and diplomatic satellites of an organization [ANC] which materially has not yet embarked on an advanced form of struggle'.[48] Such statements clearly suggest that contentious issues were swept under the rug for the sake of an apparent alliance.

There are nevertheless other aspects of the Khartoum conference that deserve attention, perhaps less influenced by the perennial shadow of Soviet intervention that often creeps into this kind of analysis. Appeals to Western support and the justification of armed struggle as 'the only possible alternative to slavery' appear recurrently in the conference proceedings.[49] Although the list of participants shows a significant presence of Western Europeans, most of these delegations were made up of representatives of communist and socialist parties as well as peace movements.[50] The liberation movements were probably aware that in order to win the hearts and minds of Western public opinion, it was necessary to go beyond the usual mediators of anticolonial causes and broaden their portfolio of collaborators. However, they were equally aware that their advocacy of violent methods of liberation posed a moral pitfall to some in Western societies, which is why they sought to focus on the bloodthirsty methods and crimes committed by the enemy against the civilian population, prisoners of war and displaced persons, allegations that might bring them closer to international groups linked to humanitarian causes. In this way, the harshness and violence of centuries of colonialism and, more specifically, the ruthless suppression of protests and revolts at the beginning of the decade, served in a way to legitimize the violence of a war of liberation.[51]

For several political actors on the African continent however, the Khartoum conference had failed to speak 'the language of the West'.[52] Only three months after the meeting, representatives of thirteen East and Central African governments released

'The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa', a joint statement preaching moderation and seeking to disentangle the region from Cold War discourses. That the signatories included independent countries such as Zambia and Tanzania, which continued to provide logistical and material support and to harbour liberation movements, might be striking were it not for the fact that the Manifesto itself was no more than a conciliatory instrument intended to tone down any signs of radicalism resulting from the revolutionary unity displayed at Khartoum. The Manifesto did not compromise on the main issues, 'principles of human equality and national self-determination', but it recognized that the signatories 'have always preferred and still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence'.[53] They even went on so far as to assert that 'if peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make possible it in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change'.[54]

In contrast to the Khartoum resolutions, in which a regional reading of the political and military challenges was used to reinforce a coalition imaginary, the Lusaka Manifesto clearly pointed out that 'the obstacle to change is not the same in all countries of Southern Africa'.[55] In some ways, this undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the revolutionary alliance that claimed to fight a common enemy. The Lusaka Manifesto addressed the realities of the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, South-West Africa and the Republic of South Africa separately and tried to avoid parallels that would lead one to presume, for example, that the white settlers in Mozambique would behave like those in Rhodesia at any given point. Not a single mention was made of the cooperation between the regimes of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia and the possible interdependencies this could create in conflict resolution in any of these fronts.

Likewise, the Manifesto sought to establish a dividing line in order to prevent the instrumentalization of these conflicts in the global context: 'The inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Mozambique, Angola and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, is not only *irrelevant* to the ideological conflict of power-politics, but is also *diametrically opposed* to the politics, the philosophies and the doctrines by her Allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home [emphasis added].'[56] In this way, the signatories pointed the finger at certain Western powers, stripping them off the argument that they had to protect civilization against communist encroachment and holding them up to the mirror to recognize that what was happening – particularly in the Portuguese colonies– went against the moral and normative standards they themselves claimed to uphold.

The UN General Assembly welcomed the Manifesto some months afterwards.[57] In a commentary published in the first issue of the Tanzanian *African Review* in 1971, political scientist Nathan Shamuyarira, member of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), claimed that the Manifesto had been 'well received' not only by political representatives in the United States and Western Europe but also that the South African government 'found itself in agreement with certain parts'.[58] The region's liberation movements – not only those of the Khartoum alliance – opposed it but, according to Shamuyarira, they 'refrained from campaigning against the document'.[59] Despite the abandonment and discouragement that the Manifesto apparently provoked among the freedom fighters, the Zimbabwean nationalist admitted that it was nothing

more than 'an instrument for pan-African diplomacy outside the continuing work of liberation', as signatory states such as Tanzania or Zambia remained financially and materially committed to the movements.[60]

Diplomacy proved to be of almost no help in resolving Southern Africa's problems. The Lusaka Manifesto failed to break the deadlock in the region with its calls for dialogue, and even gave carte blanche to some states to continue doing business with the supremacist and colonialist regimes.[61] Once again demonstrating the relevance of regional events for continental and international politics, the heads of government of East and Central African states, adopted in October 1971 the Mogadishu Declaration, which 'reviewed the situation with regard to the question of decolonization of Southern Africa' and concluded that 'there is no way left … except armed struggle to which we already give and will increasingly continue to give our fullest support'.[62] This new declaration not only shifted the tone away from the Lusaka Manifesto, but also showed that the independent countries of the region were growing impatient with the slow pace of conflict resolution. It was not only about the independence of their neighbours, but also about safeguarding their own, which was under threat by the 'outward looking policy of Pretoria' and their proximity to the frontline.[63]

The meetings and resolutions adopted in Khartoum and Lusaka, as well as the Mogadishu Declaration, show to what extent the developments in Southern Africa as a whole were gaining international attention, and how regional imaginaries threatened to become more and more entangled in Cold War dynamics and discourses. Diverse actors from inside and outside the region, whether they were international organizations (AAPSO, WPC) or governments (Soviet or East Central African), collaborated, encouraged and, at times, also bypassed nationalist movements in an attempt to shape the discourses and narratives about the position of the region in global political debates. Although the liberation movements might appear to be puppets in this complex setting, the fact remains that they also profited from the ambiguous strategies of their sponsors. This put them in the international public eye, opening doors to mobilize material, humanitarian or moral support for their struggles. Khartoum, Lusaka and Mogadishu served to appeal to Western action, at different levels, advocating different means, but making it clear that the present and immediate future of the region depended largely on what happened in NATO countries such as France, Britain or the United States. Southern Africa's rollout in the West accelerated with the turn of the decade. The early 1970s saw the emergence of a wave of activism spearheaded by non-partisan organizations and pressure groups – in direct connection with the liberation movements – that revealed the great mobilizing capacity of regional narratives and whose impact could not go unnoticed.

Western activism and the Southern African question: Advancing regional revolutionary perspectives

It is no coincidence that Southern African activism in 'the West' took off precisely at the beginning of the 1970s. On the one hand, the 'exceptional temporality' of Portugal's imperial endgame led to peculiar overlaps between (late) debates on decolonization

and the breakthrough of human rights politics.[64] On the other, transnational advocacy networks like that created in opposition to apartheid increasingly enabled the emergence of truly global solidarity cultures.[65] If anticolonialism was somehow losing currency among certain Western sectors, partly as a result of disenchantment with the autocratic trajectories of many postcolonial states, (individual) human rights on the other hand emerged as a new universal utopia.[66] The amalgamated (regional) activism resulting from the overlap of apartheid and Lusophone anticolonial initiatives that congealed in informal, less institutionalized grassroot groups, profited from this conjuncture and accelerated the mobilization of Western audiences. At stake was the way in which regional struggles were framed and conveyed as fractions of a whole.

At a 1973 conference at Manchester University, ANC militant Joe Slovo gave a speech in which he argued that the struggle of the liberation movements in the Southern African region was indivisible. Before an audience of trade union and political representatives, intellectuals, students and activists from various organizations, Slovo claimed that despite differences in 'the detailed correlation of forces in each zone, the level of achievement, the techniques of struggle, the precise nature of the enemy in each of these territories … within *the complex as a whole*, the enemy is indivisible and part of *a single sub-system of exploitation* with international links which act both militarily and economically in concert [emphasis added]'.[67] Revolutionary action and change in Southern Africa were, in the eyes of the South African nationalist exiled in Britain, 'organically interrelated'.[68] The argument was not new to the audience but it highlighted once again the importance of joining forces at the levels of freedom fighters, activist committees and movements representing different nationalist causes in the UK and the West more generally.

The early 1970s saw important mobilization initiatives that emerged from the joint work of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) and anticolonial groups such as the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (CFMAG). The Dambusters Mobilizing Committee, which campaigned against the involvement of British corporations in the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam (now known as Cahora Bassa) in Mozambique, is the best example of such a cooperation. Cabora Bassa perfectly embodied the alliance between the Portuguese and South African regimes to secure economic, political and military power in the region, and as such became a powerful frame of transnational protest that even succeed in stirring up the debates of the UN Decolonization Committee, as Aurora Almada e Santos explains later in this volume.[69] The participation of Barclays through the provision of loans to businesses involved in the hydroelectric scheme put the bank in the crosshairs of activists in the UK, who deployed innovative methods of protest at various levels.[70] Direct action against Barclays led the bank to withdraw from any dealings related to the construction of Cabora Bassa by 1972, an event that was interpreted as a success of the activists and that laid the groundwork for further boycotts against British banks and companies operating in South Africa.[71]

Connections between activist groups and organizations involved in the protests against Cabora Bassa and, to a lesser extent, the Cunene dam scheme in Angola, favoured the exchange of information and the production of printed materials that furthered the 'thinking regionally' of Western audiences. Transnational institutions

such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) joined this collective exercise of knowledge production with its own publications, which sought to 'educate' its member churches and 'warn the wider public' that seeing these projects 'in isolation will be to underestimate its relevance in the context of the South African racist regime and the Portuguese colonialist regime and their combined attempts to consolidate the "white belt" in Southern Africa'.[72]

This certainly resonated with the words of Slovo at the Manchester conference and, more broadly, with the ideas of a group of South African exiles very active in the Western European anti-apartheid sphere as well as in the production of knowledge about the Southern African region. It was the case for instance of Ruth First, married to Joe Slovo, as well as Ronald Segal, Mary Benson or Ray and Jack Simons among others. The intellectual work of these people found a home in the Penguin African Library, under Segal's direction, which opened the door to the publication of a variety of critical studies on the apartheid regime,[73] South-West Africa and the Portuguese colonies,[74] some of them even authored or with forewords by nationalist leaders such as Eduardo Mondlane or Amílcar Cabral.[75] The Penguin series was notable for its radical tone and critical way of examining the continent's political, economic and social evolution and, more specifically, the various volumes on the Southern African territories helped to reinforce a joint, quasi-academic reading of the region.[76]

These activists also became indispensable actors in the institutional debates of the early 1970s that sought a political solution to the region's problems. At the 1973 UN-OAU conference on Southern Africa in Oslo, Lord Anthony Gifford of the CFMAG; Abdul Minty of the British AAM; Reverend John Collins, founder of the International Defence and Aid Fund[77]; or Baldwin Sjollema, director of the Programme to Combat Racism of the WCC, were some of the few 'individual experts' invited to share the table with representatives of nine regional liberation movements, ministers of foreign affairs and ambassadors of fifty-four countries, UN agencies and OAU executive members.[78] The Oslo conference also included other actors who had tried years before to advance regional prospects of political action, such as Romesh Chandra of the WPC, members of the AAPSO secretariat, or the Soviet economist Vasily Solodovnikov, one of the main figures behind the scientific conference organized in East Berlin in 1968. In this way, the 1973 conference seemed to complete a cycle of truly global mobilization on behalf of the region, transcending Cold War divisions.

The president of the conference recognized in the foreword to the proceedings: 'Not all the ideas which emerged from the conference may be politically viable, but the Oslo conference in itself represents an important step towards freedom and independence for the peoples of southern Africa'.[79] Unlike the 1967 UN seminar in Kitwe, which had been plagued by pessimism and shadows of doubt about the UN and the international community's action vis-à-vis the region, the Oslo meeting showed that all those at the table were willing to discuss proposals for action within international normative frameworks. The resolutions of the Human Rights Commission, the discussions on the application of Geneva Conventions to the conflicts in the Portuguese colonies, the humanitarian support programmes of the various UN agencies, all these were signs of moving in the direction of, or at least meeting halfway, the needs of those fighting for independence in Southern Africa.[80] Finally, Oslo was a further manifestation of

the fact that 'thinking regionally' was something done by activist groups, individuals and organizations in close relation with regional actors, but something that took place mainly outside the boundaries of the region itself.

Conclusion

Revolutionary interdependencies in the region became more clearly exposed once Angola and Mozambique became independent.[81] The post-1974 developments cemented ideas and imaginaries about the alliance between liberation movements as if it were a matter of course, without questioning its origin and trajectories.[82] This chapter addressed this issue by looking at the diverse dimensions and arenas (i.e. political, institutional, activist) in which the region was thought, imagined and projected and questioning how actors outside the region intervened at different times and with diverse motivations to expose various interdependencies and contest powerful imaginaries of imperialism and white supremacism. During the period addressed in this chapter, 1960s–mid-1970s, the liberation movements did not seem to own the regional narrative as much as foreign actors, but they were nonetheless able to identify the power of attraction that a regional approach had in shaping international politics and activism, and so they also embraced to a certain extent this 'thinking regionally' to strengthen their diplomatic connections and increase the visibility of their claims.

As the coming together of AAPSO and WPC with regional actors showed, and the episode of the Lusaka Manifesto confirmed, Cold War narratives impacted on imaginaries and discourses about the region, particularly about the means to solve regional problems that threaten to spill over and compromise the sovereignty of neighbouring independent states. However, regional imaginaries were also a way of escaping the narrowness of Cold War bipolarity, and of bringing global actors closer together by discussing, for example, the region's position in global debates about human rights. In this regard, the rights discourse, which was partly appropriated and reinterpreted by African nationalists as well as their partners in the east, not only served to expose the contradictions of liberal internationalism but also gave them an entry pass to insert their political claims more clearly into the agenda of international organizations such as the UN. The visions of regional unity analysed here were mainly aspirational and had little or no political trajectory at the time, but these projects nevertheless displayed some significance in attracting continental and international attention and creating the contours for future intraregional cooperation.

Notes

I would like to thank Robin Möser and the participants of the PhD working group on Global History (ReCentGlobe, Leipzig University) for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the text. The research for this chapter has been conducted during

my PhD within the Collaborative Research Centre 1199, 'Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition', funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

1. UN Press Services, 'Statement by Secretary General to International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism at Kitwe, Zambia', press release, New York, 24 July 1967, 4, Fonds Secretary General U Thant 1961–1971, UN Archives and Records Management Section.
2. Ismay Milford, 'Federation, Partnership, and the Chronologies of Space in 1950s East and Central Africa', *Historical Journal* 63, no. 5 (2020): 1347.
3. For an overview of the different forms of regional (political) unity imagined, attempted or discarded even before they began, see Chris Saunders, 'Visions of Unity: Southern Africa and Liberation', in *Visions of African Unity: New Perspectives on the History of Pan-Africanism and African Unification Projects*, ed. Matteo Grilli and Frank Gerits (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 142.
4. Due to size restrictions, only a few examples can be mentioned: Alina Sajed and Timothy Seidel, 'Anticolonial Connectivity and the Politics of Solidarity: Between Home and the World', *Postcolonial Studies* 26, no. 1 (2023): 1–12; Zeina Maasri, Cathy Bergin and Francesca Burke, eds, *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties*, Racism, Resistance and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022); Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi, *Transnational Histories of Southern Africa's Liberation Movements*, Southern African Studies (London: Routledge, 2020).
5. Among the most recent studies are Eva-Maria Muschik, 'Towards a Global History of International Organizations and Decolonization', *Journal of Global History* 17, no. 2 (2022): 173–90; Nicole Eggers, Jessica Lynne Pearson and Aurora Almada e Santos, eds, *The United Nations and Decolonization*, Routledge Studies in Modern History 69 (London: Routledge, 2020); Alanna O'Malley, *The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo Crisis 1960–1964*, Key Studies in Diplomacy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018).
6. As a starting point, consider Paul Betts, 'Rights', in *Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonisation*, ed. James Mark and Paul Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 180–220; A. Dirk Moses, Marco Duranti and Roland Burke, eds, *Decolonization, Self-Determination, and the Rise of Global Human Rights Politics*, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Steven L. B. Jensen, *The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values*, Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
7. Eric Burton, 'Hubs of Decolonization: African Liberation Movements and "Eastern" Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar Es Salaam', in *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, ed. Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2019), 25–56; George Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar Es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961–1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021); Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975*, The New Cold War History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2022).
8. Helder Adegar Fonseca, 'The Military Training of Angolan Guerrillas in Socialist Countries: A Prosopographical Approach, 1961–1974', in *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, ed. Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca (Oldenbourg: De

Gruyter, 2019), 103–28; Christian A. Williams, 'Living in Exile: Daily Life and International Relations at SWAPO's Kongwa Camp', *Kronos* 37 (2011): 60–86.

9. *Robert Resha, Marcelino Dos Santos, Amália Fonseca, Nelson Mandela, Mário Pinto de Andrade e Aquino de Bragança, Rabat*, 1962, Photograph, 1962, 07223.002.033, Fundação Mário Soares / Arquivo Mário Pinto de Andrade. The CONCP was an umbrella organization founded in Morocco in 1961 that coordinated the internationalization strategies of various nationalist movements from the Portuguese colonies.
10. Sue Onslow, 'Resistance to "Winds of Change": The Emergence of the "Unholy Alliance" between Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa, 1964–5', in *The Wind of Change. Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization*, ed. Larry J. Butler and Sarah E. Stockwell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 215–34.
11. CONCP, 'Resoluções Da II Conferência Da CONCP, Em Dar-Es-Salam' (Dar es Salaam, 1965), 19, 04603.007, Fundação Mário Soares / Documentos Amílcar Cabral.
12. Ibid., 20.
13. Ibid.
14. Saunders points out that in its early years 'the MPLA did not see itself as belonging primarily to "Austral Africa", but primarily to the CONCP and to a certain extent to the Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA)'. Saunders, 'Visions of Unity', 138, 143.
15. Maria Paula Meneses, Celso Braga Rosa and Bruno Sena Martins, 'Colonial Wars, Colonial Alliances: The Alcora Exercise in the Context of Southern Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 2 (2017): 397–410.
16. Sue Onslow, 'Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Nationalism and External Intervention', in *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation*, ed. Sue Onslow, Cold War History Series 24 (London: Routledge, 2009), 14; Christopher R. W. Dietrich, '"A Climate of Collaboration": The Rhodesian Oil Embargo and Portuguese Diplomacy in Southern Africa, 1965–1967', *Itinerario* 35, no. 1 (2011): 97–120.
17. Gregory Houston, Moses Ralinala, Jabulani Sithole and Bernard Magubane, 'The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns', in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. I: 1960–1970*, ed. South African Democracy Education Trust (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004), 539.
18. Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 211.
19. The idea may have been considered even before the alliance between the ANC and ZAPU. Cadres of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, accompanied by FRELIMO guerillas had previously explored the possibility of reaching the northeastern corner of South Africa through Mozambique. However, as the southern provinces were not yet under FRELIMO's control, the idea of reaching South Africa by this route was discarded. See Houston et al., 'The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns', 487–8.
20. George M. Houser, 'A Paper for the International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination, and Colonialism in Southern Africa (Draft)' (1967), 8, ACOA 106/29, ProQuest History Vault: Black Freedom Struggle in the 20th Century: Organizational Records & Personal Papers, Part 1a.
21. United Nations Office of Public Information, *Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa*, Lusaka, 24 July–4 August 1967, 5.
22. Ibid., 4–5.

23. UN Press Services, 'Statement by Secretary General to International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism at Kitwe, Zambia', 2; Ryan M. Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 141–4.
24. Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). Indeed, according to Betts, 'Human rights became a point of contact between new allies of Cold War politics, namely Second and Third World elites.' Betts, 'Rights', 181.
25. Human rights were not only instrumentalized to voice anticolonial criticism but were as well a 'crucial device for [Portugal's] imperial resilience'. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, 'The Inventors of Human Rights in Africa: Portugal, Late Colonialism, and the UN Human Rights Regime', in *Decolonization, Self-Determination, and the Rise of Global Human Rights Politics*, ed. Roland Burke, Dirk A. Moses and Marco Duranti (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 314.
26. Central Council for Asian, African and Latin-American Sciences of the GDR and Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the GDR, *Against Racism and Neo-colonialism for the Liberation of Southern Africa. Summary of Proceedings* (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1968), 5; see also Meredith Terretta, 'From Below and to the Left? Human Rights and Liberation Politics in Africa's Postcolonial Age', *Journal of World History* 24, no. 2 (2013): 408.
27. Ibid., 9.
28. Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, 45.
29. Ned Richardson-Little, 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in East Germany. Socialist Appropriation and Dissident Contestation, 1948–1989', *Zeitgeschichte-online*, 7 December 2018, https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/universal-declaration-human-rights-east-germany.
30. Central Council, *Against Racism and Neo-colonialism*, 53.
31. Ibid., 7.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. UN Office of Public Information, 'International Seminar on Apartheid', 5.
35. Lúcio Lara, 'L'Afrique Australe et Le Mouvement de La Paix (Speech by Lúcio Lara at the Meeting of the Presidency of the World Peace Council)', Nicosia, 6 June 1968, 7, 0104.000.018, Associação Tchiweka de Documentação (ATD) / Arquivo Lúcio Lara (ALL).
36. AAPSO, 'The Eighth Session of the Council of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation: A Brief Report', Nicosia, 13 February 1967, 8, 0090.000.030, ATD/ALL.
37. 'Note Sur La Conf. Intern. de Solidarité Avec Les Peuples Des Colonies Africaines', Nicosia, 6 June 1968, 4, 0104.000.026, ATD/ALL.
38. Graham identified the Khartoum moment as the 'true origins' of what he called 'myth of liberation solidarity'. See Matthew Graham, 'The ANC and the "Myth" of Liberation Solidarity: "Othering" in Post-Apartheid South(Ern) Africa', *Africa Insight* 44, no. 1 (2014): 176–90.
39. Central Council, *Against Racism and Neo-colonialism*, 82.
40. Thomas Scott, 'The Diplomacy of Liberation: The International Relations of the African National Congress of South Africa, 1960–1965' (PhD diss., University of London, 1989), 364–6; Steven F. Jackson, 'China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–93', *China Quarterly*, no. 142 (1995): 388–422.

41. Soares Sousa's chapter in this volume provides a detailed account of the impact the Sino-Soviet competition had on the diplomatic stances of Lusophone African liberation movements.
42. Regarding the labelling of movements in the region as authentic and non-authentic, see Graham, 'The ANC and the "Myth" of Liberation Solidarity'; Ana Moledo, ' "A New Phase of Anti-imperialist Cooperation": The Making of Liberation Alliances in 1960s' (Unliberated) Southern Africa', *Comparativ. Zeitschrift Für Globalgeschichte Und Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 29, no. 4 (2019): 13–29.
43. Graham, 'The ANC and the "Myth" of Liberation Solidarity', 83. On the Khartoum conference, see Víctor Barros, 'Connected Struggles, Anticolonial Solidarity and Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies in Africa', in *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties*, ed. Zaina Maʿāṣirī, Cathy Bergin and Francesca Burke, Racism, Resistance and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022), 131–53.
44. Mbeto Traça, interview with the author, 16 February 2023; Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa: Formation of a Popular Opinion 1950 – 1970*, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vol. 1 (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 1999), 291.
45. Sérgio Vieira, 'Algumas Notas Referentes as Relações Entre Os Movimentos de Libertação Das Colonias Portuguesas e Africa Austral Durante a Preparação Da Conferencia de Khartoum', n.d., 5, Departamento das Relações Exteriores (DRE), 29 M, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique (AHM) / Fundo da Frelimo (FF). I would like to thank Alba Martín Luque who brought this document to my attention.
46. Ibid., 2.
47. Ibid., 4.
48. Ibid.
49. AAPSO, *International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa, Khartoum, 18–20 January 1969* (Cairo: Afro-Asian Publications, 1970), 21.
50. Ibid., 52–76.
51. Prewar massacres, such as those of Baixa do Cassange (Angola, 1961), Mueda (Mozambique, 1960) or Pdjiguiti (Guinea-Bissau, 1959), became symbols of the moral collapse of the colonial regime and were often addressed in nationalist narratives as turning points for launching armed struggles in the different territories. On efforts by Lusophone African anticolonial activists to legitimize 'liberating violence' as a response to the violent nature of colonialism and how they tried to insert this discourse into normative arenas, see Parrott's chapter in this volume.
52. Borrowed from a quote included in the commentary of the Lusaka Manifesto by Nathan Shamuyarira; see Nathan M. Shamuyarira, 'The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa: Lusaka 14th–16th April, 1969', *African Review* 1, no. 1 (1971): 73.
53. 'Manifesto on Southern Africa Adopted by the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, Lusaka, 14–16 April 1969', Lusaka, 14 April 1969, 2, https://www.jstor.org/stable/al.sff.document.ydlwcc0124.
54. Ibid., 3.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. UN General Assembly, 'Resolution 2505 (XXIV): Manifesto on Southern Africa, Adopted by the General Assembly during Its 24th Session, 16 September–17

December 1969', 1970, A/RES/2505(XXIV), UN Digital Library, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/202194.

58. Shamuyarira, 'The Lusaka Manifesto', 73.
59. Ibid. He mentioned fourteen signatories, but the Manifesto cites only thirteen: Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
60. Ibid., 78.
61. Like Malawi: Jamie Miller, 'Africanising Apartheid: Identity, Ideology, and State-Building in Post-Independence Africa', *Journal of African History* 56, no. 3 (2015): 449–70.
62. 7th Summit Conference of East and Central African States, *Mogadishu Declaration* (Cairo: Atlas Press, 1971), 8–9.
63. Ibid., 6.
64. Jerónimo and Monteiro, 'The Inventors of Human Rights', 314; Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds, *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s*, Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).
65. Håkan Thörn, *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
66. Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, 118–19.
67. Joe Slovo, 'Revolution against Portuguese Colonialism in the Context of Southern Africa and Some Common Problems of the Liberation Movements', *Revolution against Portuguese Colonialism*, Manchester, 1973, 4, GB/101/117/1/13/4, Ruth First Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London.
68. Ibid., 5.
69. Initially conceived as an infrastructure-based development project that would increase settlement, mining and transportation throughout the Zambezi valley, the dam rapidly transformed into a militarized buffer zone in which South Africa and Portugal aimed at blocking the southward spread of FRELIMO and, eventually, ANC guerrillas. Allen F. Isaacman and Barbara S. Isaacman, 'Extending South Africa's Tentacles of Empire: The Deterritorialisation of Cahora Bassa Dam', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2015): 542.
70. The Dambusters acquired, for instance, shares of Barclays to attend and boycott shareholder meetings. See 'Report of Activities Easter 1971–Easter 1972, Presented by the AAM and the CFMAG and Dambusters at the Lund Conference of Solidarity', Lund, 1973, CFMAG/1/3, Archives of the CFMAG, Bishopsgate Institute, London. West German activists used similar tactics: Rui Lopes, *West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1968–1974: Between Cold War and Colonialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 75.
71. On the Barclays boycott and others that followed, see Nerys John, 'The Campaign against British Bank Involvement in Apartheid South Africa', *African Affairs* 99, no. 396 (2000): 415–33.
72. WCC Programme to Combat Racism, *Cunene Dam Scheme and the Struggle for the Liberation of Southern Africa* (Geneva: WCC Publications Office, 1972).
73. Brian Bunting, *Rise of the South African Reich*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964); Jack Halpern, *South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965); Mary Benson, *South Africa: The Struggle for a Birth Right*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966); Jack Simons and Ray Simons, *Class and Color in South Africa*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969);

Freda Levson Troup, *South Africa: An Historical Introduction*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969); Cosmas Desmond, *The Discarded People*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971).

74. Ruth First, *South West Africa*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963); James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963); William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975); John Paul, *Mozambique: Memoirs of a Revolution*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975).
75. Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*; Basil Davidson, *Liberation of Guinea: Aspects of an African Revolution*, Penguin African Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).
76. On this see the author's doctoral thesis: Ana Moledo, 'Spaces of Liberation: Networks, Practices and Imaginaries of Lusophone African Liberation Movements' Diplomatic Revolution (1960s–1974)' (PhD diss., Leipzig University, 2024).
77. IDAF, headquartered in London, was one of the main organizations behind the opposition to Apartheid and a major funder of AAM.
78. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, *The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo 9–14 April 1973, Vol. I* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1973).
79. Ibid., 8.
80. See the intervention of António Neto, MPLA representative, at the conference: ibid., 92–7.
81. Saunders, 'Visions of Unity: Southern Africa and Liberation', 143–4.
82. On history-making by liberation movements in power and how they use the myth of a common regional history, see Graham, 'The ANC and the "Myth" of Liberation Solidarity'.

6

Fighting for neutrality: The Sino-Soviet split, Afro-Asian conferences and the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies

Julião Soares Sousa

In April 1955, representatives from twenty-nine newly independent countries met in Bandung, Indonesia, for the first Afro-Asian conference. Their aim was to inaugurate a movement to promote solidarity, interaction and interconnection among its members. After a week of deliberations, the delegates declared total support for the independence of all peoples and the disruption of the current bipolar global order. The meeting represented a milestone in the emergence of neutralism and non-alignment, its emphasis on decolonization challenging the Cold War's ideological priorities.[1] Since then, much has been written about the so-called spirit of Bandung, including its ambivalent impact in terms of African and Asian political solidarity.[2]

On a more practical level, the conference inspired further attempts to institutionalize the Afro-Asian movement, creating crucial forums for the discussion, articulation and negotiation of support networks and collective strategies. Among these was the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), formally inaugurated in Cairo in 1957. While Cairo became the headquarters of the AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat, led by the Egyptian writer Yusuf Al-Sibai, large conferences took place every two or three years in different cities, starting with Conakry (Guinea-Conakry), Moshi (Tanzania) and Winneba (Ghana). Between these sessions, the AAPSO's Council (composed of heads of different delegations) and Executive Committee (thirty members) also held meetings abroad to decide on organizational matters.

From its very first meetings, this organization helped raise awareness about Portuguese colonialism and offered a platform for the leaders of Lusophone liberation movements, who participated in all of AAPSO's major conferences. Shortly after opening the MPLA office in Conakry in early 1960, Viriato da Cruz, Lúcio Lara and Hugo de Menezes took part in the second AAPSO conference, held in that city on 11–15 April.[3] As the MPLA's secretary general, Cruz went up to the tribune and made a speech in which he questioned whether Portugal would accept a peaceful transition to independence.[4] At the Cairo AAPSO meetings in early 1961, following the massacres and uprising in Angola, the delegates denounced Portugal's 'retrograde' and 'fascist

colonization', urging Afro-Asian nations to support the local liberation movements.[5] The AAPSO's 1963 conference in Moshi condemned the alliance between António de Oliveira Salazar's dictatorship and white-minority regimes in southern Africa, calling for an economic boycott of Portugal and its condemnation at the UN.[6] The resolutions of the sixth AAPSO Conference Council held in Algiers (Algeria) in March 1964 explicitly identified armed warfare as 'the only effective way to end Portuguese colonialism', demanding multisided assistance for revolutionary organizations fighting in Portugal's colonies, including their free circulation in Afro-Asian countries, military equipment, educational and consumer goods for the combatants and populations of the liberated zones, and facilities for the transit of military and sanitary supplies.[7]

At the same time, although excluded from the Bandung conference, the Soviet Union took an active role in the AAPSO from the start, as did the People's Republic of China (PRC). They established their own solidarity committees, which integrated the AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat, using Cairo as a hub to connect with Afro-Asian states and liberation movements.[8] Yet both of them maintained ambiguous stances regarding neutrality and non-alignment. According to Roy Allison, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev recognized as a positive type of neutralism the foreign policy of European, Asian and African countries that abstained from military and political alliances with the great powers.[9] In the report presented to the twenty-second congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in 1961, Khrushchev similarly defined the boundaries of neutralism to that of Yugoslavia and the Third World, considering it as a method of keeping Africa and Asia out of the Cold War competition.[10] Soon, however, the USSR's leadership came to see neutralism as a threat to its own security interests.[11] Meanwhile, although the Chinese promised to respect the non-alignment policies of African, Asian and Latin American countries, in 1959 Chairman Mao Zedong denounced neutrality as camouflage, claiming that such a 'third way' did not exist.[12]

Fears about the ability of the PRC and the USSR to respect neutrality appeared early on: already in 1957, several delegates at the AAPSO's foundational meeting questioned whether it was justified to invite those two states to join the organization.[13] Such fears of disruption proved well-founded: while China and the USSR were close allies in the 1950s, a string of mutual grievances led to disagreement and then open conflict in the 1960s, with the AAPSO becoming a disputed stage in what became known as the 'Sino-Soviet split', with widespread ripple effects. This split caused what the first President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, called the 'New Division of Africa'.[14]

This chapter looks at the intersection between these two concerns of the Afro-Asian bloc. It begins by discussing how the rivalry between the USSR and the PRC played out in Afro-Asian forums, where both states used the cause of anticolonial liberation to gather support for their side. A second section focuses on the efforts of representatives of the MPLA, PAIGC and FRELIMO (the most prominent Lusophone liberation movements, coordinated through their joint organization CONCP) to maintain neutrality and non-alignment, under constant pressure. The chapter offers a close insight into this process by drawing on the paper collections of Lúcio Lara and Mário Pinto de Andrade, key figures in the MPLA, and of Amílcar Cabral, the PAIGC's founding leader. This is complemented by sources from Portuguese

institutions that closely monitored the evolving situation, including the secret police PIDE/DGS, the Defence Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and Salazar's cabinet. The chapter concludes that, despite their programmatic adhesion to neutrality and non-alignment, the liberation movements were dragged into the global ideological competition due to the need for international assistance in their struggles. The Sino-Soviet split thus proved very damaging, limiting efforts to generate support for anticolonial struggles among the Third World and, ultimately, limiting the very strength of Third-Worldism.

The role of the liberation struggles in the Sino-Soviet competition

The origins and the fundamental reasons behind the Sino-Soviet split have been the subject of much scholarly debate. Since the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war against the nationalist Guomindang and the establishment of the PRC, in 1949, the country's leadership, under Mao Zedong, established close links to the Soviet Union. However, as argued by Sergey Radchenko, Mao always harboured grievances against what he considered to be an 'unequal alliance' with the USSR. After Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin at the twentieth congress of the CPSU, in 1956, Mao hoped he could become an equal partner with the Soviets and launched the 'Great Leap Forward', which aimed to rapidly increase industrial production and agricultural output. While the scheme proved a tragic failure, Mao was unhappy when Soviet advisors criticized his attempt to speed up China's modernization.

Other disagreements followed and, towards the late 1950s, the PRC increasingly pursued an assertive foreign policy, for example by inviting African revolutionaries on organized tours to showcase its example. In 1959, the Soviets' insufficient support for China in its border dispute with India led to clashes at the meetings of the Warsaw Pact. The Chinese government's behaviour angered Khrushchev, who unilaterally withdrew all Soviet experts from China in July 1960. Their relations grew increasingly hostile, as the PRC entered a competition for the leadership of the international communist movement. Although both sides made several attempts to rebuild the relationship in the 1960s, all of them proved unsuccessful.[15]

Once the split emerged in the early 1960s, the PRC tried to sway the Afro-Asian nations and liberation movements to take its side by centring the conflict on how to best fight colonialism and imperialism. By then, the AAPSO and its subsidiary bodies had gained a reputation for being under Soviet control, a narrative pushed forward vigorously by Western anti-communist propaganda.[16] Now, the Chinese sought to undermine the USSR's soft power, starting with an effort to move the AAPSO's headquarters away from Egypt, whose leader Gamal Abdel Nasser had grown close to the Soviet Union.[17] One line of argument in affirming the PRC as the true revolutionary vanguard was based on race, establishing a certain parallelism between what was dubbed 'Soviet Imperialism' in the East and enduring colonialism and neocolonialism in the Third World.[18] China presented itself as the only one of the two countries with the right conditions to align with the 'nations of colour'.[19] It sought to capitalize on the

division between 'whites and non-whites', 'developed and underdeveloped' and 'rich and poor' countries at opposite ends of imperialist dynamics.[20]

The other key point of contention concerned the issue of peaceful coexistence. At the twentieth congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev declared that war between socialism and capitalism was not inevitable and argued for 'peaceful' competition between the two systems, including in the battle for the Third World. He also tried to pursue disarmament, which he hoped could help cut down domestic military spending.[21] Although détente with the West did not fully materialize in the late 1950s, and a number of major crises in superpower relations occurred between 1956 and 1962, 'peaceful coexistence' remained a goal for the Soviet leadership. In turn, China defended the so-called Lenin thesis about the inevitability of war between capitalism and communism. According to this perspective, Khrushchev's advocacy of peaceful coexistence amounted to a denial of the legitimacy of the revolutionary people's wars, waged by peoples or countries 'conquered by other countries'.[22] For instance, when Khrushchev agreed to remove nuclear weapons from Cuba in exchange for a (secret) agreement for the United States to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey, thus ending the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Mao Zedong accused the Soviets of betraying the Cuban Revolution.

In the early 1960s, China's arguments found supporters in international forums. At the third AAPSO Executive Committee meeting, held in Gaza (December 1961), the Algerian delegation, influenced by China, conveyed their frustration with the Soviet attitude towards their struggle against French rule. Although the USSR supported the Algerian struggle, its defence of disarmament was understood by the Algerians as extending to the liberation movements.[23] The following year, in the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference held in Cairo (February), when the Turkish delegation wanted to vote a resolution on general and complete disarmament, supported by the USSR, it was vehemently opposed by Mao Dun, chairman of the Union of Chinese Writers.[24] Revisiting the racialist argument, Mao Dun appealed for distrusting the intentions of non-Afro-Asian countries.[25] His forceful stance was welcomed by most African delegates at this conference, including from liberation movements like the PAIGC, MPLA and UDENAMO (one of the movements that would later form the FRELIMO).[26]

The Sino-Soviet dispute resurfaced at the second Afro-Asian lawyers' conference held in Conakry (October 1962), where the Soviet delegation drafted an amendment to the general declaration in which they defended that 'the struggle for national independence was directly linked to peace and disarmament'.[27] The Chinese delegation reacted by directing violent attacks against the Soviet position and the West.[28] The final declaration made a call for 'continuous struggle against the interventionist policy of aggression, domination and war of imperialism with NATO as its leader'.[29]

Such vociferous dedication to liberation, however, was not akin to productive discussion. At the AAPSO's third conference, in Moshi (February 1963), the speech of the head of the Chinese delegation, Liu Ning-Yi, garnered great acclaim by emphasizing assistance for the just struggle for national liberation.[30] However, when the delegates of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa tried to concentrate the focus of the discussion on a specific action for the liberation of the territories still

under colonial rule, the Chinese kept the focus on the Soviets, whom they claimed would never support these struggles because they were 'whites'.[31]

Moshi represented the peak of Chinese influence. While the second conference of the AAPSO Executive Committee, held in Nicosia (September 1963), was dominated by the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian dispute, Chinese soft power appeared to be in decline. During the debates, the Soviet delegate, Mirzo Tursun-Zade, stated that the only alternative to peaceful coexistence was a world catastrophe. In response, the Chinese attacked the Test Ban Treaty (negotiated in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis), which the USSR had signed a few days earlier along with the United States and the UK, banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, space and underwater. Beijing's strategy backfired: the majority of African delegates (liberation movements included) opposed nuclear testing, so they backed the USSR. In the end, an isolated Chinese delegation flatly refused to sign the final resolution.[32]

The Soviets tried to mount a defence against the Chinese position. At the sixth Afro-Asian Solidarity Council meeting in Algiers (March 1964), when the Chinese argued the USSR's defence of peaceful coexistence meant the Soviets had renounced anti-imperialist and revolutionary struggle, Soviet delegate Bobodjan Gafurov countered by explaining that the USSR supported disarmament to avoid a nuclear conflict with the West but this did not imply that 'the peoples in struggle should be disarmed'.[33] The replacement of Khrushchev by Leonid Brezhnev brought forth a more proactive posture. In the proceedings of the presidium of the Soviet Solidarity Committee, on 5 February 1965, Tursun-Zade argued that China's constant challenges meant the Soviet delegation had to be more attuned about the will of the Third World at the forthcoming fifth AAPSO conference: 'These people want to fight against imperialism, neocolonialism, and we thus have to start from the will of those people,' although 'of course bearing in mind the need to fight for peace, disarmament, and all other issues related to the peace campaign.'[34]

In the preparatory events preceding Winneba, participants issued a call not to use the AAPSO as a platform for 'disputes of dogmas' and, allegedly, there was less squabbling between the Chinese and the Soviets.[35] Nevertheless, the head of the Chinese delegation, Liao Cheng-Chi, tried to push for a resolution giving primacy to the liberation struggle over issues of peace and disarmament.[36] He also accused the USSR of not providing enough support to North Vietnam and only sending defective weapons. In response, the Soviet delegation made a point of reasserting its anti-imperialist credentials: the head of the delegation, Fikryat Tabeyev, announced that Soviet volunteers were fighting side by side with Vietnamese forces against the common enemy. As for African liberation struggles, which were also on the agenda, Tabeyev proposed widening the activities of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund. He also backed Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella's initiative of collecting money for the solidarity fund under the slogan of 'dinar for independence'.[37]

The most resonant decisions at Winneba, however, concerned future events. One of them was the decision to hold a Latin American people's solidarity conference in Havana, in January 1966, which turned out to be a historical landmark, spawning the enduring Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Most delegates at what became known as the Tricontinental conference – including

those of the Lusophone liberation movements – did not identify themselves with the friction between China and the USSR.[38] For them, the fundamental contradiction was between capitalism and socialism, or between colonialism and liberation, but not within the socialist world. Joseph Parrott argues that this conference represented 'a radical worldview justifying Third World revolution, best termed Tricontinentalism'. According to him, the Tricontinental united two currents: the current of the October Socialist Revolution, headed by the USSR, and that of the Revolution of National Liberation, led by China and Cuba. Thus, it ended the neutralism that had been defended in Bandung and had been consolidated as a political and ideological project in September 1961, at the first conference of the non-aligned countries, in Belgrade.[39]

More controversially, the delegates at Winneba also agreed to hold the AAPSO's fifth conference in Beijing, which was particularly threatening for the USSR.[40] The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee's efforts to reverse this decision created further tension in the movement. Sino-Soviet disagreement continuously dominated meetings right up until the AAPSO's eighth council session, in Nicosia (February 1967), whose key item on the agenda was the location of the upcoming conference. In Nicosia, the Soviet Union, India and several Afro-Asian countries favoured hosting the next conference in Cairo instead, thus commemorating the tenth anniversary of the first gathering there, back in 1957.[41] In response to the changing power dynamics, China de facto withdrew from the AAPSO in 1968. The shift was clear: if at Winneba two liberation movements from South-West Africa (Namibia) had been admitted to AAPSO, in Nicosia the more pro-Soviet SWAPO remained while the more pro-Chinese SWANU was expelled.[42] To aggravate matters, the internal turmoil caused by the cultural revolution, launched by Mao Zedong in 1966, led to the PRC's temporary diplomatic isolation. Except for Tanzania, the Chinese scaled down their commitments in Africa.

Following its 'victory' at Nicosia, the USSR used the advantage to reinforce its influence in the AAPSO. The Soviets now focused on the issues of major concern to Afro-Asian states: the Vietnam War, the Arab-Israeli conflict and African liberation. After several years of preparation, the Khartoum conference for solidarity with the peoples of Portuguese colonies took place between 18 and 21 January 1969. It was during that conference, which hosted representatives from fifty-six countries and twelve international organizations, that the Soviet-supported liberation movements – MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC, as well as South Africa's ANC, Zimbabwe's ZAPU and Namibia's SWAPO – were declared the only 'authentic' representatives of the liberation struggle. The so-called Khartoum alliance was supposed to strengthen links between these liberation movements and launched the Cairo-based Mobilization Committee to coordinate assistance to them.[43]

From the Soviet perspective, Khartoum was a success. In a speech to the presidium of the Soviet Solidarity Committee, the deputy of the CPSU's International Department, Rostislav Ulyanovsky, argued that Khartoum demonstrated the defeat of the Chinese thesis about the imperialists prevailing against the socialist countries and liberation movements. The main evidence was North Vietnam, which continued to resist the US aggression with Soviet assistance. He also underlined successes in Guinea-Bissau's

armed struggles while highlighting that the leaders of both FRELIMO and MPLA, Eduardo Mondlane and Agostinho Neto, had come closer to the Soviet position on race and scientific socialism. Ulyanovsky concluded, 'We have defeated the accusation that we are pacificists incapable of armed struggle, but now we should think about how to make the great experience of our people accessible for the public.'[44]

In the period 1963–7, the Afro-Asian front had been severely affected by the Sino-Soviet disagreements. China's emphasis on anti-imperialism and armed struggle had found favour with many members of the AAPSO, for whom the priority was the liberation of the African continent more than 'peaceful coexistence' and disarmament. The PRC's influence in international forums reflected the popularity of the Chinese Revolution that quite a few African leaders had witnessed during their tours in the 1950s, as well as the influence of Mao Zedong's ideas about peasant-based armed struggle. Subsequently, the Soviets, as argued by Jeremy Friedman, had moved to embrace anti-imperialism in response to the Chinese challenge.[45] By the late 1960s, they had successfully fought back, having managed to effectively exclude the Chinese from the AAPSO, at Nicosia, and then solidify their influence, at Khartoum. Although China's internal problems played a major part, such an outcome was a result of sustained Soviet lobbying and backchannel diplomacy. In many ways, such lobbying contracted the ideas of the liberation movements on neutrality and non-alignment, which will be the subject of the following section.

The role of Sino-Soviet competition in the liberation struggles

Contrary to what Portuguese authorities claimed, the CONCP movements could not be considered mere instruments of 'Soviet imperialism'.[46] All of them searched and received different types of aid, not only from the USSR and China but from any country willing to contribute. For instance, they welcomed donations from Scandinavian governments and various grassroots solidarity committees in Western countries. It was clear from early on that they could not rely exclusively on Soviet support. According to Galia Golan, the USSR used the issue of armed struggle versus achieving independence by peaceful means as one of its factors for allocating funding.[47] It was the imposition of these criteria, in Westad's view, that dictated the initial approach of the liberation movements to China.[48] So, the African delegations' criticism of the Soviet defence of peaceful coexistence at the AAPSO secretariat meeting in Cairo in January 1961 was not an accident. They suspected that peaceful coexistence and disarmament advocated by the USSR might also involve them.[49] It is not credible, however, that the USSR advocated the disarmament of the liberation movements. In 1960, it was supporting the *Movimento de Libertação dos Territórios sob Dominação Portuguesa* (MLTSDP) from Portuguese Guinea with scholarships,[50] while incentivizing also the negotiation path with colonialism.[51] From the beginning, it seems that the Soviets did not care about the liberation movements, a fact taken advantage of by China in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict which, by 1960, had worsened significantly.

In the context of this conflict, the liberation movements would place a high value on neutrality and non-alignment from the start. In an interview with the Algerian newspaper *Révolution Africaine* in February 1963, Agostinho Neto defined non-alignment as 'the application of the right of our people to freely establish the political, economic and social structures of their country. Additionally, the establishment of relationships with all countries is based on mutual respect for the sovereignty of states, and non-participation in military blocs.' He concluded, 'We understand by non-alignment the practice of a policy independent of the two blocs.'[52] Speaking at a conference in Léopoldville three months later, Mário Pinto de Andrade declared, in line with Neto, that the aid they sought could not be limited to the countries of the East or the West. He also rejected taking a side in the conflict between these two blocs.[53] In July, interviewed by *Tribune du Tiers-Monde*, Andrade restated that his movement defended positive neutrality and non-alignment, accepting support from wherever it came.[54] Later, Amílcar Cabral would denounce Tricontinental's mistake of placing the Soviets and the Chinese in the Committee of Assistance and Aid to the National Liberation Movements while leaving out the African countries.[55] In his view, this changed Tricontinental into a 'monocontinental'.[56]

As the Sino-Soviet split unravelled in the early 1960s, however, the liberation movements could not help but become embroiled in the conflict. In November 1963, FRELIMO's vice-president Uria Simango complained to the Soviet representative at the AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat in Cairo, Latyp Maksudov, about the split's damaging impact on the liberation struggle.[57] What worried Simango was the USSR's and the PRC's insistent pressures to condemn their respective rival. When Mondlane had recently travelled to China seeking support for FRELIMO, Beijing had demanded that he cease further contact with the Soviet Union.[58] According to the memoirs of Helder Martins, a Mozambican doctor who was part of UDENAMO and later joined FRELIMO, during the campaigns to gain followers, the USSR and China requested that 'his friends align themselves'. They resisted such demands, which they recognized as ultimately hurting communist organizations worldwide and the liberation movements in particular.[59] Likewise, Simango refused to attack any country to please a particular side, despite being thought to support the pro-Chinese faction of FRELIMO.[60] By contrast, the tension spilt into the interior of the MPLA, where the second secretary general, Agostinho Neto, clashed with his predecessor, Viriato da Cruz, who openly sided with the PRC. Cruz was expelled from the movement in 1963 and moved to China.[61] As a result of the refusal to take sides, since 1965 the Chinese assistance to both the MPLA and PAIGC declined substantially.[62]

The leaders of the CONCP movements worried not only over the strings that the Chinese attached to assistance, but also over the PRC's attempt to frame the Third World project in terms of a fundamentally non-white racial identity. As argued by Jeffrey Byrne, China's rhetoric ultimately failed in Africa because the majority of the continent's postcolonial states had to contend with multiethnic and multiracial societies.[63] Similarly, the Lusophone movements were dealing with internal criticisms which often revolved around accusations that multiethnic leaders dominated the black rank-and-file members. At the MPLA, the clash between Cruz and Neto concerned, among other issues, the former's charges against the racially mixed *mestiços*' dominant

position in the movement.[64] Meanwhile, Guinean students in the USSR denounced the dominance of Cabo Verdeans in the PAIGC leadership.[65] Thus, although the movements' leaders favoured China's stance regarding peaceful coexistence, they found Beijing's views on race highly problematic.

As a result, the liberation movements adopted, towards the Sino-Soviet split, what can be called a neutrality of 'convenience', but also of 'expediency' and 'necessity'.[66] These different approaches to neutrality were articulated and combined in a nonlinear way throughout the 1960s, even if the movements continued to defend, discursively and programmatically, neutralism and non-alignment. In a report to MPLA members following a trip to China in June 1964, Agostinho Neto reaffirmed his neutral position on the Sino-Soviet conflict.[67] Two years later, when the PRC convened, in Beijing, a separate assembly of the Afro-Asian Writers Association as an alternative to the one scheduled by the official Cairo-based direction, pressuring the participants to condemn Soviet revisionism, a group of Southern African liberation movements (including the MPLA and FRELIMO) issued a statement accusing China of divisionism.[68] Even the PIDE suspected Neto never took a favourable stance on either side, preferring to play a dubious game, at least during Khrushchev's leadership.[69] He appeared concerned with the ideological divergences in the socialist bloc, and their consequences for solidarity with the liberation movements.[70]

Yet the need for Soviet assistance sometimes conditioned the decision-making, or at least occasionally earned the Soviet side greater goodwill. This was especially the case following the Tricontinental conference, when China's relation with the CONCP movements soured to the point that Cabral complained, in a party meeting, that the Chinese press had begun publishing fake stories about the PAIGC.[71] The PRC also began privileging relations with competing independence movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, which rendered the USSR's continuous support even more central.

One of the instances of collaboration with the USSR involved the AAPSO's 1967 council meeting in Nicosia, where the Soviets sought to reverse the decision to hold the organization's following conference in Beijing. Cabral helped push the Soviet agenda by reaching out to Chinese-allied liberation movements from Southern Africa (namely from Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia),[72] who had signed a statement on the penultimate day in which they blamed the 'main collaborators of American imperialism' and 'Soviet revisionists' for 'committing frenetically' the destruction of 'the unity of the African-Asia peoples'.[73] Having failed in his mission, Cabral bitterly complained about those movements in an internal meeting of the PAIGC, in 1968.[74]

Moscow also sought to recruit MPLA's Lúcio Lara to play a similar role at Nicosia. In a report about a long conversation with the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, in January, Lara revealed that the committee's secretary, Nicolai I. Bazanov, expressed deep concern about the attitude the Chinese would take at the conference, providing a list of how various delegations were expected to vote on the matter. Bazanov, who had been informed by Agostinho Neto of the CONCP's decision not to attend the conference if it was set in Beijing, tried to convince Lara to further lobby their case in Nicosia, thus strengthening their position due to Lara's status as a member of the MPLA's Political Bureau. Nevertheless, despite Bazanov's insistence, reminding him

that the Soviets intended to increase support for the liberation movements, especially those of the Portuguese colonies – 'in which Angola occupied' for them 'the first place' – Lara reaffirmed the MPLA's autonomy, replying that he could not attend because their delegation had already been chosen. Lara's direct participation was presumably all the more important for the Soviets because the Chinese were also organizing their campaign at Nicosia, including several Afro-Asian delegates and prominent figures, among them Viriato da Cruz.[75]

The Soviets continued to pressure the Chinese issue even after their 'victory' in Nicosia and ostensive success at Khartoum. In October 1969, Neto travelled to Moscow to discuss further assistance to the MPLA, apparently unsatisfied with the quantity and quality of the war material from the USSR. At the meeting he held with Prime Minister Alexei Kossyguin, he was asked to sign a declaration condemning 'the Chinese hegemonists and their thesis', which Neto refused to do.[76] This divergence is narrated in the extensive introduction to the five volumes titled *Agostinho Neto e a Libertação de Angola (1949–1974)*, coordinated by Maria Eugénia Neto and Irene Neto, widow and daughter of Agostinho Neto.[77] Allegedly disappointed with the demand and the course of the conversation, Neto and Aníbal de Melo left Moscow without saying goodbye to the Soviet leaders.[78] Neto had previously been in Beijing, where he refused to sign a document condemning 'Soviet hegemony'.[79]

Despite being difficult to confirm these alleged Soviet pressures, the divergences seem to have had other motivations. According to Soviet sources, the meeting deteriorated because Neto and Melo were upset with the attitude of the Soviet military who allegedly 'interrogated' the Angolans about the progress of guerrilla warfare, accusing them of lack of progress.[80] In public, the Soviets maintained a vision of solidarity and harmony with the liberation movements. At the international conference on solidarity with the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, held in Rome (June 1970), they first publicly admitted they were supplying military assistance to those independence struggles, but did not acknowledge any linkage. Even when speaking to the members of the Solidarity Committee in private, Rostislav Ulyanovsky, a Soviet expert on Third World affairs, stressed that Moscow did not 'request ideological loyalty from the liberation movements'.[81]

By now, it has been well documented that the USSR's relationship with Agostinho Neto was fairly complicated due to a combination of personal issues, frustrations about the lack of military progress, and Neto's apparent preference for Yugoslavia.[82] In the early 1970s, the MPLA entered a turbulent period, characterized by recurrent internal crises and splits, leading the USSR to suspend assistance to the organization in 1974, shortly before the Carnation Revolution.[83] It is therefore unsurprising that Neto continued to emphasize neutrality in public pronouncements. At the Rome conference, he stated, 'In our unwavering struggle, through numerous difficulties of all kinds, we have always an attitude of independence which is imposed upon us by the supreme interests of our people. We want this attitude to be understood by all our sincere friends.'[84] The previous month, in an interview to the Egyptian newspaper *El Gamhoureya*, he had already stressed that while the MPLA accepted aid from the USSR and Eastern European countries this did not mean taking a position in favour of Moscow against Beijing, even if his movement had stopped receiving any help from China due to the existence of 'certain divergences'.[85]

Neto claimed he was not a Marxist, despite having read Marx and Lenin and having visited Moscow a few times.[86] In a meeting with the senior representatives of the MPLA, in 1972, he once again praised independence of thought and action as among the 'greater interests' of the Angolan people.[87] Moreover, in 1974, he charged the Sino-Soviet split with weakening the socialist camp, compromising 'the relations of solidarity which had transformed these countries into an impenetrable iron fortress'. He added that the 'relations of solidarity had changed and the major or minor conflicts stained the ideal proclaimed by socialism'.[88]

Although generally more cautious in public pronouncements, Amílcar Cabral too was critical of the Sino-Soviet split and its consequences for the Afro-Asian front. In an internal PAIGC meeting held in May 1968, Cabral acknowledged that 'Afro-Asiatism' (his term) was a necessity, having provided important support for Algerian independence, yet it had lost importance from the moment it started being directed by states rather than by 'non-governmental' organizations. He seemed to be referring to the growing control of the AAPSO by its largest funders, namely the USSR and China (which covered two-thirds of the organization's budget), followed by Egypt. Still, the PAIGC's leader professed hope that the AAPSO would manage to overcome the Sino-Soviet conflict and maintain an equidistant position at the Cairo-based Secretariat, adding that the Chinese were 'dishonest' in their campaign to move the Secretariat to Conakry or Colombo, in Sri Lanka. He also criticized Soviet stances that could create further conflicts, albeit without clarifying what those stances were.[89]

As for FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane was quite vehement against accusations, especially from the West, that his movement was 'controlled' by communist countries. He stated that regarding 'the suggestion that we are remotely guided by Moscow and Beijing because we accept their support … those who know Frelimo know that this is not true. Help us, in the West, and you will soon see whether or not we are aligned'.[90] Hans Abrahamson and Anders Nilsson suggest that the FRELIMO's neutralist stance changed after Mondlane's assassination in 1969, with the USSR becoming more influential,[91] but Natalia Telepneva has challenged this idea.[92] Conversely, Ian Taylor argues that during Samora Machel's subsequent leadership, FRELIMO came under the influence of Beijing.[93] Joel das Neves Tembe and Alda Romão highlight the movement's eclectic posture in seeking support from countries ranging from the USSR and China to Yugoslavia, Cuba, Israel, Egypt, Sweden and Denmark.[94] The choice for eclecticism over any kind of narrow commitment is something that the three largest liberation movements shared.

Conclusion

The USSR and, especially, the PRC used the Afro-Asian conferences to influence the liberation movements and their allies in the context of the Sino-Soviet split. Although the AAPSO never lost its anticolonial character, this split transformed the organization's conferences and meetings into a privileged stage of dispute between the two rival states, whose schism ended up informing debates around peaceful coexistence, disarmament and revolutionary warfare, among other issues. This often prevented the AAPSO from

effectively focusing on the specific needs and demands of the liberation movements, who therefore sought to resist the pressures to subordinate their struggles to parallel disputes, be they the Cold War or the Sino-Soviet split.

In principle, all the largest Lusophone liberation movements advocated neutrality, non-alignment and freedom of thought and action, but, in practice, these values were hard to enforce given the need for assistance in the wars waged against colonialism. Therefore, in some instances, it is more accurate to speak of pseudo-neutrality and pseudo-non-alignment, as circumstances forced a political stance that was closer to one of the sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict. By 1970, Amílcar Cabral's posture was much closer to the USSR than to the RPC, as was the case, to a lesser extent, with the leaderships of the MPLA and FRELIMO, despite their difficult relationship with the Soviet Union. Of the three movements, FRELIMO emerged as the only one that maintained simultaneous support from China and the USSR, without any interruption. Yet the steady pressure came to reveal, as argued by Wyss, Handrimäki, Bott and Schaufelbuehl, that genuine neutrality does not exist.[95] Or, to quote Nyerere, that neutrality is impossible.[96]

Even so, it is worth acknowledging that the movements' concessions were made in tension with their general orientation. From Bandung, they had inherited the emphasis on safeguarding independence, sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states. They were also synchronized with the spirit of the Tricontinental, condemning actions that could weaken socialist unity. Although there is no doubt that the socialist countries flew the 'banner of internationalism' and gave the greatest support to the liberation movements, figures like Agostinho Neto nurtured much clearer sympathies, not for a world divided between superpower-driven blocs but for the notion of a non-aligned bloc that arose to create balance and defend the underprivileged peoples. Ultimately, although the conflicts in the Afro-Asian conferences and meetings of the mid-1960s considerably tarnished the reputation of Third-Worldism in the eyes of the liberation movements, those conflicts also undermined the very prestige of China and the USSR. The movements therefore maintained a formalist position towards the OSPAA, defending the organization's autonomy, just as they sought to defend their independence.

Notes

1. Jason Parker, 'Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Post-war Era', *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 5 (2006): 867–92; Jeffrey James Byrne, 'Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-alignment', *International History Review* 37, no. 5 (2015): 912–32.
2. Heloise Weber and Poppy Winanti, 'The "Bandung Spirit" and Solidarist Internationalism', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70, no. 4 (2016): 391–406; Joseph Hongoh, 'The Asian-African Conference (Bandung) and Pan Africanism: The Challenge of Reconciling Continental Solidarity with National Sovereignty', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 70, no. 4 (2016): 374–90; Joshua Eisenman,

'Comrades-in-Arms: The Chinese Communist Party's Relations with African Political Organisations in the Mao Era, 1949–76', *Cold War History* 18, no. 4 (2018): 429–45.

3. Lúcio Lara, *Documentos e comentários para a História do MPLA. Até Fev. 1961* (Lisbon: D. Quixote, 1999), 456–8.
4. Ibid., 457.
5. Arquivo Histórico Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (hereafter AHD-MNE), 221, Dispatch from Portugal's Embassy in Cairo, 24 January 1961; '4ª e 5ª conferencia – Conselho da Organização, Comité Executivo/Congressos e Conferências Internacionais. Actividades do Conselho de Solidariedade Afro-Asiático (A.A.P.S.O.), Ano de 1960/61/62/63/64', Dispatch from Foreign Office, 8 February 1961.
6. AHD-MNE, 221 PAA, 'Conferência e Congressos Internacionais. 4.ª Conferência da Organização de Solidariedade dos Povos Afro-Asiáticos'.
7. AHD-MNE 221 PAA, 'Conferência e Congressos Internacionais. 6.ª Conferência do Conselho de Solidariedade Afro-Asiático, Argel, Março de 1964'. African delegates at the Afro-Asian solidarity meeting (28 March 1964) stressed the need for armed struggle.
8. Jeremy Friedman, 'Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s', *Cold War History* 10, no. 2 (2010): 259; Charles Neuhauser, *Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, 1957–1967* (Harvard: East Asian Research Center, 1970), 23; David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2012), 60, 94.
9. Roy Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Struggle of Non-alignment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3, 22.
10. Nikita Khrushchev, *An Account to the C.C. CPSU to the 22nd Congress of the Party: October 17, 1961* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 33.
11. Marco Wyss, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Sandra Bott and Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, 'Introduction: A Tightrope Walk – Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War', in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or within the Blocs?*, ed. Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl and Marco Wyss (London: Routledge, 2016), 3–4.
12. Guy Arnold, *The A to Z of the Non-aligned Movement and the Third-World* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 210; Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng, *China's Japan Policy: Adjusting to New Challenges* (Hackensack: World Scientific, 2014), 92.
13. AHD-MNE 221, Dispatch from the Foreign Office, 31 December 1960; 'Afro-Asian Bloc Shaken by Red Chinese Hostility', *Washington Post*, 6 December 1959.
14. Peter Calvocoressi, *Independent Africa and the World* (London: Longman, 1985), 101.
15. Lorenz Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Sergey Radchenko, 'The Sino-Soviet Split', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. M. Leffler and O. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 349–72; Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).
16. International Documentation and Information Centre (Interdoc), *Activities of Communists World Organisations: Special Edition – Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO)* (The Hague: Interdoc, 1969), 1.
17. Neuhauser, *Third World Politic*s, 25; Ismali Debeche, 'The Role of China in International Relations: The Impact of Ideology on Foreign Policy with Special

Reference to Sino-African Relations (1949–1986)’ (PhD thesis, University of York, 1987), 483.

18. James Mark and Quinn Slobodan, ‘Eastern Europe in the Global History of Decolonization’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed. Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 360–1.
19. AHD-MNE 203PAA – ‘Penetração Comunista em África. Províncias Ultramarinas Portuguesas, publicações e artigos’.
20. Otto Pick, ‘Introduction: Political and Ideological Aspects’, in *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, ed. E. J. Feuchtwanger and Peter Nailor (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), 6.
21. Vladislav M. Zubok and Hope M. Harrison, ‘The Nuclear Education of Nikita Khrushchev’, in *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, ed. John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May and Jonathan Rosenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 148, 152.
22. P. H. Vigor, *The Soviet View of War and Neutrality* (London: Routledge, [1975] 2021) 23, 40.
23. Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, 89.
24. Alan Hutchinson, *China’ s African Revolution* (London: Hutchinson, 1976), 42; Alaba Ogunsawo, *China’s Policy in Africa 1958–71* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 96.
25. Friedman, ‘Soviet Policy’, 259.
26. Fundação Mário Soares, Casa Comum [FMS-CC], Dulce Almada to Osvaldo Lopes da Silva, 23 February 1962, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=04607.051.013; Eduardo dos Santos, *Panafricanismo de Ontem e de Hoje* (Lisbon: self-published, 1968), 157.
27. AHD-MNE, 349 PAA, NATO-Comite de África 1962–1963. Documentos vários, ‘US Draft Contribution to the NATO Experts Committee on Africa’, 22 March 1963, 38.
28. Neuhauser, *Third World Politics*, 37.
29. AHD-MNE, 349 PAA, NATO-Comite de África 1962–1963. Documentos vários, ‘US Draft Contribution to the NATO Experts Committee on Africa’, 22 March 1963, 38.
30. AHD-MNE 220 PAA, Conferências Afro-Asiáticas, ‘3.ª Conferência de Solidariedade dos Povos Afro-Asiáticos, Moshi (Tanzânia, 4/11 Fev. de 1963)’, 164.
31. AHD-MNE, 349 PAA, NATO-Comite de África 1962–1963. Documentos vários, ‘US Draft Contribution to the NATO Experts Committee on Africa’, 22 March 1963, 35; Neuhauser, *Third World Politics*, 41.
32. AHD-MNE, 221 PAA, ‘Conferência e Congressos Internacionais. 4.ª Conferência da Organização de Solidariedade dos Povos Afro-Asiáticos’, 4–5; AHD-MNE, 349 PAA, NATO-Comite de África 1962–1963. Documentos vários, ‘US Draft Contribution to the NATO Experts Committee on Africa’, 22 March 1963, 180–1; Pontian Godfrey Okoth, *USA, India, Africa, during and after the Cold War* (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2010), 251; Alexander Voevdskiy, ‘The Sino-Soviet Split and Soviet Policy towards Southern African Liberation in the early 1960s’, in *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Africa: New Perspectives on the Era of decolonization, 1950 to 1990s*, ed. Chris Saunders, Helder Adegar Fonseca and Lena Dallywater (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2023), 182.
33. AHD-MNE 221 PAA, Conferências e Congressos Internacionais. 6.ª Conferência do Conselho de Solidariedade Afro-Asiático, Argel, March 1964; ‘Les désarmement pour éviter une guerre nucléaire ne signifie pas que les peuples en lutte contre l’impérialisme doivent être désarmées’, *L’ Humanité*, 26 March 1964.

34. Cited in Natalia Telepneva, 'Our Sacred Duty: The Soviet Union, the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961–1975' (PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015), 131.
35. Interdoc, *Activities of Communists World Organisations*, 45.
36. Hutchinson, *China´s African Revolution*, 77.
37. AHD-MNE 221, 4ª e 5ª conferencias – Conselho da Organização Comité Executivo, conferências internacionais, conferencia de Solidariedade dos Povos Afro-asiáticos – 4ª conferencia – Winneba – Ghana – Maio 1965. Aerogram from Portugal delegation in NATO, 26 May 1965; 'Reportage, Comment on Afro-Asian Conference: USSR Delegate Speech', in *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Issues 91–95*, ed. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Reston: Central Intelligence Agency, 1965), BB11.
38. Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Malden: Blackwell, 2001), 213.
39. R. Joseph Parrott, 'Tricontinentalism and the Anti-imperial Project', in *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War*, ed. R. Joseph Parrott and Mark Atwood Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 2.
40. David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third* World (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973), 185–7.
41. AHD-MNE, 221 PAA, Congressos e Conferências Internacionais, Conselho de Solidariedade Afo-Asiática, Ano 1967, 8.ª Sessão, Nicosia, 13/17 Fevereiro 1967; 'La Solidarité Afro-Asiatique afronte une violente crise par suite de la lutte existant entre la Chine et L' URSS', *Bulletin d'Information*, 7 February 1967.
42. Associação Tchiweka de Documentação [ATD], 8.º Conselho de Solidariedade dos Povos Afro-Asiáticos (OSPAA), 13 a 16 de Fevereiro de 1967 (Nicosia), 2.
43. On Khartoum, see Ana Moledo's chapter in this volume.
44. Telepneva, 'Our Sacred Duty', 183.
45. Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, 148–79.
46. AHD-MNE, 482 PAA, Angola – Geral – Vol. III – 'Agitação nas Províncias Ultramarinas – actividades de indivíduos relacionados com os movimentos nacionalistas – Mário de Andrade (1963/4/5/6)'. Confidential dispatch from the Ministry of the Colonies, 10 November 1964.
47. Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World* (Boston: Allen & Unwin Hyman, 1988), 311.
48. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 162.
49. Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, 62–5, 89.
50. Julião Soares Sousa, 'Amílcar Cabral, the PAIGC and the Relations with China at the Time of the Sino-Soviet Split and of Anti-colonialism: Discourses and Praxis', *International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 1274–96.
51. Vladimir Shubin and Andrei Tokarev, 'War in Angola: A Soviet Dimension', *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 90 (2001): 607–18.
52. Interview with Neto, in Lúcio Lara, *Um amplo movimento. Itinerário do MPLA através de documentos de Lúcio Lara, v.3 (1963–1964)* (self-published, 2008), 48.
53. AHD-MNE, 482 PAA, Angola – Geral – vol. III – Agitação nas Províncias Ultramarinas – actividades de indivíduos relacionados com os movimentos nacionalistas – 'Conference de presse de Mario de Andrade, chef du department dês affaires exterieur du M.P.L.A.', 7.

54. AHD-MNE, 482 PAA, Angola – Geral – vol. III – Agitação nas Províncias Ultramarinas – actividades de indivíduos relacionados com os movimentos nacionalistas – Mário de Andrade (1963/4/5/6), *Tribune du Tiers-Monde*, June–July 1963, 10.
55. Eric Gettig, 'A Propaganda Boon for US: The Havana Tricontinental Conference and the United States Response', in *Tricontinental Revolution*, 226.
56. Armando Ramos-Personal Archive (hereafter ARPA), PAIGC, Reunião do dia 27-5-68, fl.46.
57. Voevdskiy, 'Sino-Soviet Split', 183.
58. Telepneva, 'Our Sacred Duty', 104.
59. Helder Martins, *Porquê Sakrani? Memórias dum Médico duma Guerrilha esquecida* (Maputo: Editorial Terceiro Milénio, 2001), 174–5.
60. Ibid., 185.
61. Judie Yuzhou Sun, 'Viriato da Cruz and His Chinese Exile: A Biographical Approach', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 46, no. 5 (2020): 845–61; letter from Cruz to Miguel, Borges, Santos, Amaro and Miguel, in Lara, *Um amplo movimento*, 38; Arquivo Nacional, Torre do Tombo [ANTT], PIDE-DGS, Pº 5500 CI (2), José Eduardo Macedo dos Santos, Informação nº 993-CI(2), NT 7396 – Assunto: Actividades do MPL; origem: D.G.S. – Angola; Data de origem: 28/8/72, 17–18.
62. Sousa, 'Amílcar Cabral, the PAIGC and the Relations with China'.
63. Byrne, 'Beyond Continents'.
64. Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2022), 74.
65. Constantin Katsakioris, 'Students from Portuguese Africa in the Soviet Union, 1960–74: Anti-colonialism, Education, and the Socialist Alliance', *Journal of Contemporary History* 56, no. 1 (2021): 155–6.
66. Using the framework from Daniel Ayiotis, 'Irish Military Neutrality: A Historical Perspective for Modern Consideration', in *The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security*, ed. Jonathan Carroll, Matthew O' Neill and Mark Williams (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 394.
67. Martins, *Porquê Sakrani?* 194.
68. ANTT, PIDE/DGS, Proc. 3144, 'Conferência dos Escritores Afro-Asiáticos em Pequim – Relatório n.º 12' – SC/CI (2), NT 7251, 45–47, and 'O Comunismo mundial: a 3.ª Conferência Afro-Asiática dos Escritores, do princípio de Abril de 1967, SC/CI (2), NT 7251, 2–3'; Pieter Vanhove, ' "A World to Win": China, the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau, and the Reinvention of World Literature', *Critical Asian Studies* 51, no. 2 (2019): 144–65.
69. ANTT, PIDE/DGS, Viriato Francisco Clemente da Cruz/MPLA, Del. A, L, Inf. 110.00.30 – NT – 2555, pasta 4, Relatorio de Pesquisa n.º S/N e S/data, 33.
70. FMS-CC, 'Sobre a libertação nacional', June 1985, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=04357.006.008.
71. ARPA, PAIGC, Reunião interna 25-5-1968, 2.ª Reunião, fl. 10.
72. ATD, 8.º Conselho de Solidariedade dos Povos Afro-Asiáticos (OSPAA), 13 a 16 de Fevereiro de 1967 (Nicosia), Declaration de Nicosie, 1–3.
73. Ibid., 1; Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, 105.
74. ARPA, PAIGC, Reunião Interna de 26-5-68 – Domingo (Assuntos Externos), fl. 38.

75. ATD, 'Relatório de viagem à RFA, à RDA e à URSS por Lúcio Lara, Dezembro 1966–fevereiro de 1967', 4–5.
76. Agostinho Neto e a Libertação de Angola (1949–1974), Arquivos da PIDE-DGS, Vol. I, 1949–1969, 293.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, 123.
81. Shubin and Tokarev, 'War in Angola', 610.
82. Jovan Čavoški, 'Yugoslavia's Help Was Extraordinary: Political and Material Assistance from Belgrade to the MPLA in Its Rise to Power, 1961–1975', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 21, no. 1 (2019): 134–9.
83. Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, 144–50.
84. ATD, Arquivo Lúcio Lara, 'Os Representantes no exterior do Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, chamados a reunir-se para passar em revista', 13–14.
85. Agostinho Neto e a Libertação de Angola (1949–1974), Arquivo da PIDE/DGS, Vol. II, Fundação Dr António Agostinho Neto, 2011, 815.
86. Ibid.
87. ATD, Arquivo Lúcio Lara, 'Os Representantes no exterior do Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, chamados a reunir-se para passar em revista', 14.
88. 'Sobre a libertação nacional' (1985), http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=04330.005.001.
89. ARPA, PAIGC, Reunião do dia 27-5-68, fl.43–4, 46.
90. ANTT, PIDE/DGS, Eduardo Mondlane, SC-SR, Proc. 337/61 NT – 3052 2.º Vol., Informação n.º 488 – SC/CI(2), Assunto: descontentamento no seio da Frelimo; Origem: PIDE Moçambique; data de Origem: 27/4/67, classificação: C-3, fl. 83.
91. Hans Abrahamsson and Anders Nilsson, *Mozambique, the Trouble Transition: From the Socialist Construction to Free Market Capitalism* (London: Zed Books, 1995).
92. Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, 2, 15.
93. Ian Taylor, *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise* (London: Routledge, 2006), 94.
94. Joel das Neves Tembe and Alda Romão Saúte Saíde, 'Moçambique e a Luta de Libertação na África Austral, 1960–1994', in *Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents (1960–1994), Vol. 2*, ed. Arnold J. Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe (Dar-Es-Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2014), 289–90.
95. Wyss et al., 'Introduction: A Tightrope Walk', 5.
96. Julius Kambarage Nyerere, *Neutrality Is Impossible* (Auckland: Citizen's Association for Racial Equality, 1974).

7

The Canadian Broad Left and the anticolonial struggle at home and abroad: The case of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies

Marçal de Menezes Paredes

The struggle for independence in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa went far beyond the military battles. Its impact must be broadened to narratives centred around those colonized nations. Even before guerrilla wars began in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in the early 1960s, anticolonial movements developed a political strategy on a global scale. This strategy involved creating a transnational network that spanned Africa, Asia and Latin America. As a growing body of scholarship has demonstrated, the Cold War was neither static nor simply bipolar.[1] Through 'decolonization hubs' located in Dar es Salaam, Cairo and Algiers, to name just a few, the movements that fought against Portuguese colonialism fostered a global range of connections.[2] Such global connections enabled those movements to develop their intellectual, military and diplomatic agency, consolidated within the Afro-Asian Bloc at the UN and among the Non-Aligned Movement.[3] Still, the process was multidirectional, empowering and transforming some of their interlocutors as well. Notably, the liberation movements integrated the 'Global Sixties' and 'Seventies', forging productive ties with counterculture activism and solidarity movements in the West.[4] The extent of those contacts could surprise a non-specialized observer: several solidarity committees emerged in Scandinavian countries and across Europe, as well as in Australia and Canada.[5]

The history of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (hereafter TCLPAC) encapsulates the sheer variety of political links and mutual influences that developed between partners from seemingly distant backgrounds. Established in 1972 in Toronto, the TCLPAC brought together activists, professional politicians, intellectuals and religious missionaries that organized various actions to support Africa's liberation struggle.[6] Its activities encompassed a wide spectrum, including the publication of books, manifestos and leaflets, as well as the organization of a plethora of public events, cine debates, marches and the welcoming of representatives of the Lusophone anticolonial movements in Canada. This chapter

devotes particular attention to the trajectory of John S. Saul,[7] one of TCLPAC's founders whose militant and academic activity bridged Canada's domestic debates with the agenda of the liberation struggle. Through this so-far-neglected case study, the chapter sheds new light on the articulation between African decolonization, the 'Global 1970s'[8] and Canadian society and activism. Much more than mere support for a political cause, that relationship reveals a wide field of influence that acted in both directions, connecting not only critical subjects but also peoples' lives. Yet, manifesting itself in a global perspective, the political militancy in the 1970s circulated from and to the Global North, clearly learning and improving its knowledge along the way.

This chapter shows how the TCLPAC's political action connected domestic debates about social justice, including the Quebec independence movement, with the campaign to end Portuguese colonialism in Africa. Both causes shared a common belief in the potential for creating a new world that transcended the existing capitalist framework. This political vision facilitated connections among various global leftist movements. In Canada, activists like John S. Saul and civil society organizations engaged in a broader struggle against capitalist oppression, emphasizing the links between global business interests and the oppression experienced by independence movements across different hemispheres, encompassing both the Global North and South. This solidarity reflected a shared aspiration for change and a commitment to challenging existing power structures on a global scale. In vocalizing the importance of Lusophone African independence, they mingled with other critics within the anti-capitalistic movements elsewhere and, particularly, denounced the ties to Canadian business.

The chapter's principal focus is on the committee's origins and early years, before it was renamed the Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC). The research is based on documents of the TCLPAC located at the Harriet Tubman Institute for Africa and its Diasporas at York University, Toronto, which contains reports, action projects, tickets, personal notes, folders, leaflets, books, newspapers and photos. In addition, two serial publications organized by TCLPAC/TCLSAC stood out: the *TCLSAC Report* (published between 1977 and 1984) and the *Southern Africa Report* (published between 1985 and 1995). These documents are supplemented by written testimonies and interviews made with activists. Through this wide range of sources, this chapter reveals how far 1970s militant activism went in terms of disclosing supposedly distant struggles and showing, conversely, how they had close and familiar ties to Canada.

Canada's connection with Africa

Canadian territory was the original land of several indigenous communities before modern colonialism. European presence brought tension between the substantial Anglo-Saxon immigration within the context of British colonialism and the legacy of French colonialism as represented by the province of Quebec. The interplay and tensions between these different cultures (natives, Anglophone and Francophone) shaped Canada's politics and society, which gradually obtained sovereignty through

the 'Act of Union' (1841), the creation of the 'Dominion' of Canada (1867) and the attainment of autonomy through the Westminster agreements (1931).[9]

The attainment of political autonomy in modern Canada did not end political conflicts stemming from colonial times. Like Australia and New Zealand, Canada was known as a 'white dominion' and, as with all members of the Commonwealth, it grappled with significant issues related to the treatment of the indigenous population. It is worth mentioning that the Canadian relationship with another member of the British Commonwealth – South Africa – dates back to the Anglo-Boer Wars (1899–1902). In South Africa, Australia and Canada, the native inhabitants did not enjoy the same rights and privileges as the representatives of modern colonialism. The relationships between the Commonwealth's elite offered opportunities for Canadian global business. In fact, Canada's independence could be perceived as a means to expand capitalist enterprises rather than a vehicle for fostering equal opportunities for people of different descent. In essence, the former colony's status was closely tied to the inherited global privilege of being a 'white dominion'. Understanding this aspect is crucial for grasping the criticisms the Canadian Broad Left directed towards the state from the 1960s onwards.

In 1949, Canada participated in the foundation of NATO, thus closely aligning its military interests with those of the United States and European colonial powers like France, Belgium, Portugal and the UK. In addition to its Commonwealth connection, in the late 1950s, Canada started to develop an independent foreign policy strategy. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Lester Person,[10] the Canadian government earned a reputation as a 'global peacemaker' after its involvement in the UN Task Force during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. During the Vietnam War, Canada's government further solidified this image as it welcomed United States' draft evaders and refused to deploy troops to the conflict. These two sides of Canada's foreign engagement – the alliance with the hegemonic economic and military interests of the Global North and the promotion of peace and progressive values – remained in place during the governments of John Diefenbaker (1957–63).

These two facets of Canada's foreign relations became even more prominent under the leadership of Pierre Eliot Trudeau (1968–79, 1980–4). Probably the most renowned (and most controversial) leader in Canadian politics, much of P. E. Trudeau's political action caused intense debate in Canadian civil society. The contradictions in Trudeau's foreign policy became obvious when, on one hand, his government maintained economic agreements with South Africa and, on the other hand, Canada joined the UN in condemning that country's apartheid system, particularly after the 1976 Soweto Massacre. The TCLPAC/TCLSAC played a key role in denouncing this discrepancy between official rhetoric and practical actions.

The times associated with P. E. Trudeau were paradoxical in Canada. The prime minister's popularity has been labelled as 'Trudeaumania'.[11] During his term as minister of justice in 1967, he openly defended progressive policies. For example, he supported the decriminalization of homosexuality and fostered a pluralistic and secularized society, famously declaring to CBC News reporters that 'there is no place for the State in the bedrooms of the nation'.[12] In a similar vein, he had a difficult relationship with President Richard Nixon since he refused to send Canadian troops to Vietnam and

provided refuge to draft evaders from the United States. Simultaneously, Canada decreased its economic and international dependence on Great Britain and the United States, principally by diversifying its global business engagements and having an independent foreign policy.[13]

However, some of Trudeau's policies faced internal challenges. One notable instance was the separatist movement in Quebec, which gained momentum during the Quiet Revolution/Révolution Tranquille (1967–70) that shaped the Francophone Canadian province with a wave of political, social and cultural transformations. In that context, Trudeau became the powerful political adversary of Jean Lesage and René Levesque.[14] For the Canadian Left, Quebec's separatism was a shortcut to building a socialist alternative in North America. In response to a series of violent actions by the separatist Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) in 1970, Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act which limited civil liberties and gave police far-reaching powers to maintain public order, even deploying tanks to guard federal offices and employees in the Ottawa area. At the same time, he supported the vision of a bilingual country and reinforced Canadian federalism.

Trudeau's time in office also coincided with a greater awareness of liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies, especially among religious institutions. In fact, Canada's relationship with Portuguese-speaking African countries stretched as far back as the end of the nineteenth century when Canadian missionaries began their work in Portuguese colonial territories. This relationship was exemplified by their presence in regions like the Highlands of Bié in Angola, where they established the Dondi Mission. These missionary efforts created a significant breach within the rigid framework of Portuguese colonialism, providing alternative education opportunities to the local population. For instance, Jonas Savimbi, who later became the leader of UNITA, spent time at the Dondi Mission. In 1968, Reverend Sid Gilchrist, a medical missionary in Angola, published *Angola Awake*, a book which condemned the church's silence and disregard for colonial violence. As a result of this publication, the United Church of Canada (UCC) underwent a consistent change in the institutional stance towards Portuguese colonialism. Garth Legge, a member of the UCC's board of directors, highlighted the book as a pivotal moment that prompted the institution to reevaluate its position and take a more critical approach to colonial practices.[15]

Further action followed. In 1970, religious movements organized the Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR). This task force formulated what became known as the 'Black Paper' as a critical response to the Canadian government's 'White Paper', which outlined the official 'Foreign Policy for Canadians'.[16] The government's 'White Paper' had a dual purpose of defending social justice at the UN while promoting domestic economic growth.[17] Under the leadership of Cranford Pratt, who had previously served as the first provost of the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika, religious and civil movements established an extensive network of non-governmental organizations to exert pressure against the government's duplicitous stance on African colonialism.[18] The Black Paper was clearly formulated in response – and in opposition – to the White Paper, especially on the issue of white-minority rule in Southern Africa and Portuguese colonialism. It was a harsh denunciation of the hypocrisy of vocalizing support for human rights while continuing to do business

with white supremacist regimes in Southern Africa. In this sense, rather than promote economic grown, the Canadian business at the time bolstered poverty, racism and colonialism.

Thus, the foundation of TCLPAC in 1972 should be understood within the context of civil society's response to the dual nature of Canada's foreign policy. As indicated earlier, activists affiliated to religious organizations often took the lead in these efforts. In fact, the first headquarters for the TCLPAC was located at a hall adjacent to St Paul's Church at 121 Avenue Road, a space provided by the church. Reverend Murray McInnes, who had worked for ten years in Benguela's Plateau in Angola, assumed leadership of TCLPAC. Among the activists involved in this cause was Judith Marshall, who had experience working on social projects with displaced peasants in Kenya and had received a religious education influenced by Liberation Theology. Composed of a core group of dedicated activists, in the 1970s, those key figures – John Saul, Murray McInnes and Judith Marshall – worked together with others like Jonathan and Nancy Barker, Kae Elgie, Joe and Mary Vise, Kim Jarvi and Doug Sider, among others, who brought specific expertise and energy engaging Canadian civil society in their campaign against Portuguese colonialism.

John S. Saul and the politics of transactional activism in Africa

By zooming in on the academic and political trajectory of John S. Saul, we can find the contact points of a transnational network which articulated a global activist agenda revolving around revolutionary anticolonialism. Born in 1938, Saul came from a family of Irish descent who had immigrated to Canada during the 'Great Famine' of 1840–50. He started his first academic training in Toronto. However, it was as a student at the University of Princeton (with Harper H. Wilson) and in London (with Ralph Miliband in the London School of Economics) that he gradually became a 'revolutionary'.[19] It was also through these progressive academic lenses that Saul forged relations with Tanzania when he arrived at its capital Dar es Salaam in 1965.

Since the independence of Tanganyika and much more after its unification with Zanzibar in 1964, after which it became known as 'Tanzania', the country drew the attention of many leftist intellectuals and militants, fuelling the momentum of the global 1960s. There were several reasons for this status. As a 'Cold War city' during the 1960s and 1970s, Dar es Salaam was a 'magnetic city' principally for Marxist intellectuals and political activists who mixed with leaders of the African liberation movements hosted by Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere. Somewhere along Nkrumah Street and Independence Avenue, activists like Malcolm X, Angela Davis, Che Guevara and Oliver Tambo crossed paths and often interacted with intellectuals like Walter Rodney, Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovani Arrighi, to mention a few. This intense political atmosphere fostered extensive connections since 'not just Southern African decolonization and pan-Africanism, but US civil rights, Black Power, and global Marxism were all shaped by Dar es Salaam in ways that have been forgotten but were well-known at the time'.[20]

Another reason stemmed from Nyerere's transformational project. In 1967, the ruling TANU party released a policy on 'Socialism and Self Reliance', announcing a massive rural transformation through the collective agricultural resettlement of rural communities. Under the slogan of *ujamaa* (or 'brotherhood' in Swahili), Nyerere's search for 'African socialism' adapted the influence of Chinese Maoism to the context of Tanzania's postcolonial politics. Rereading African traditions of commonality, TANU government reinforced its role as a unique representative of 'the people' and centralized power in a one-party system. This vision was a manifestation of Nyerere's aspiration to construct a socialist society uniquely tailored to a Third World country. Rather than following a Soviet model of development, it drew inspiration from Maoism, reinterpreting African traditions of communalism and shared values.[21]

Thus, John Saul's trip coincided with a pivotal moment in Tanzania's history. For him and his wife Pat Saul, what began as a planned six-month stay in Dar es Salaam in 1965 extended to seven years. During this period, they gave lectures and actively participated in academic and political changes at the University of Dar es Salaam. These were exciting and transformational times in Tanzania. However, Saul's days were not made of inspiring encounters and agreements. Nyerere's *ujamaa* project, in fact, had a profound impact on the University of Dar es Salaam, where Saul taught at that time. After the Arusha Declaration, the university changed its name to the University of East Africa. It also underwent major heated discussions about the training and the curriculum to construct a new society based on values of *ujamaa*.

One major dispute among the 'visitant left' at the university unfolded between John S. Saul and his friend Walter Rodney, a Guyanese historian, economist and political activist. Saul was part of the so-called Group of Nine that proposed a complex change to the University's curricula. Education had to form new mentalities and practices committed to socialism in Tanzania. Notwithstanding the consensus about the political and educational task, Rodney stood against the proposition, mobilizing racial and nationalistic concepts in a meeting in 1971. According to Rodney, seeing white foreigners proposing changes for African American and black African academic colleagues was unfair. For Rodney, such proposals showed arrogance and a colonial attitude. According to Leo Zelig, John Saul considered Rodney's assumption as a 'very opportunistic and highly rhetorical brand of black-nationalist racism'. Rodney countered that he was not using racial but historical and social perspectives. Saul emphasized the ideological path. Others said Saul wanted to lead rather than listen.[22] This case had both academic and political consequences. The end of Saul's contract at the university was possibly linked to this and also other personal issues. The dispute also caused a break in the relationship between Rodney's and Saul's families. As a haven for an extensive range of activists, the urban space of Dar es Salaam created broader comradeship and global political synergy, boosted discussions, assembled rumours and sometimes produced divergences and rifts among the leftist intellectuals.

Dar es Salaam also hosted FRELIMO's offices. Founded in 1962 under the leadership of Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, FRELIMO launched its armed struggle in Mozambique from a base in Tanzania in 1964. Living in Dar es Salaam, Saul observed the progress of FRELIMO's guerrilla campaign and internal conflicts inside the movement, which came out in the open especially after the assassination of

Eduardo Mondlane in January 1969. In 1972, Saul received a special invitation from Samora Machel (FRELIMO's president since 1970) and Jorge Rebelo (with whom he had worked in the edition of *Mozambique Revolution*, FRELIMO's English-language magazine) to join a delegation of intellectuals and journalists to get to know the liberated zones in the Tete province, in northwest Mozambique.

Saul's trip to the liberated areas between August and September 1972 marked a transformative moment in his understanding of the liberation struggle. This experience, as recounted in his memoir, profoundly impacted his perception of the commitment and determination of young FRELIMO soldiers. Immersed in the realities of war supply logistics and the intricate dynamics between the military forces and the rural populations, Saul's perspective on the intricate interplay between political theory and social practice took on a new depth. A figure who exemplified this phenomenon to him was Sebastião Mabote, the FRELIMO military chief of operations, with whom Saul travelled through the liberated areas. Saul's conversations with Mabote left a lasting impression on him, which he encapsulated in a metaphor: 'The atomic bomb in this war is the people's consciousness.'[23] This metaphor symbolizes the ways in which FRELIMO militants attached importance to the Cold War in their struggle. It also shows how anticolonial struggles in Mozambique's Tete province could connect to broader struggles against Western capitalism.

After returning from this transformative trip to Mozambique and before taking a plane back to Canada, Saul visited FRELIMO's leader Samora Machel. Meeting in a garden with his family, Machel urged Saul to spread the message about the significance of the Mozambican people's struggle against Portuguese colonialism. According to Saul's memoirs, Machel told him, 'The knowledge of our country's struggle is, in your country, still this much' (and he held his thumb and forefinger positioned merely a millimetre apart). 'You must go and help us to do something about that.'[24] This conversation remained with Saul for the rest of his life. More than that, it might have added a personal dimension to the concrete sense of political commitment he previously had. He thus continued his activism, linking Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa and Canada.

The time John Saul spent in Dar es Salaam during the highpoint of Nyerere's *ujamaa* project, as well as the relationships he built with radical left intellectuals, connected him with FRELIMO's anticolonial struggle. Saul saw in the liberated zones of Mozambique a paradigmatic example of an alternative world, free from colonialism, racism and capitalism, which he saw as interconnected. Nyerere's *ujamaa* project offered an opportunity how a vision, inspired by socialism, could work in a Third World country. In fact, *ujamaa* seemed like an attractive alternative to the Soviet model that was criticized by the independent left at the time, especially after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Samora Machel's charisma and conviction, as well as the communal agriculture and collective production Saul witnessed in the Tete province, were also incredibly impactful, even more so than *ujamaa*. In FRELIMO's liberated areas, race was used as a political tool echoing the rise of Maoism within the movement (as it was in the case between him and his former friend Walter Rodney). After returning to Toronto, he began a long career promoting 'solidarity with those engaged in the struggle against a

common global adversary: capitalist-driven imperialism'.[25] These ideas found their way into the activism promulgated by the TCLPAC in the 1970s.

The return to Toronto and the committee's foundation

Once the TCLPAC was established in 1972, it began a challenging task of connecting the inequalities produced by capitalism in Canada with the violence of Portuguese colonialism. From the outset, TCLPAC established partnerships with other Canadian NGOs. One of these partners was the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO), created in 1961 to promote international solidarity projects in Third World countries. Another was OXFAM-Canada. Besides, students and professors from African Studies programmes joined forces as part of a broader leftist movement in Canada. The connections between domestic and international agendas are clear from the TCLPAC report from 1982: 'Our focus was to mobilize support for the liberation struggle in the Portuguese African colonies and to make the connection between those struggles and the long-term task of mobilizing for a radical transformation in Canada.'[26]

One of the key campaigns run by the TCLPAC/TCLSAC highlighted the relationship between Canadian multinational corporations and Portuguese colonialism. The campaign involved a range of political actions, including the exposure of Canadian banks that held funds from colonialist businesses. They also initiated political and cultural educational programmes designed to persuade Canadian civil society about the significance of ending colonialism in Africa. To foster a transnational perspective, TCLPAC also welcomed leaders of the anticolonial movements in Canada, providing them with a platform in the Canadian media. These initiatives' strategies had connections to the campaigns initiated by international support committees formed in the 1960s in the United States, Britain, France and Scandinavia, among other countries.

From the outset, TCLPAC also joined forces with actions organized by other transnational committees in Canada. One example is their links with the Gulf Boycott Coalition, which launched a robust campaign against the financial ties between Gulf Oil and colonial Portugal, mobilizing in cities like Ohio and Boston.[27] Founded in Texas in 1901, Gulf Oil began its operations in Canada in 1942 and later merged with the British American Oil Company in 1956. Canada's refining of Angolan oil developed in response to opportunity, as environmental legislation and the lobbying by ecological movements had made it difficult to refine Angolan oil in the United States. That was the reason why the Canadian government had offered to build infrastructure so that refining could occur in the Canadian maritime islands, the Nova Scotia region. According to calculations by TCLPAC made in 1974, Gulf Oil Canada in Tupper, Nova Scotia, refined at least a third of more than 6 million tonnes of crude oil originating from the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. The business would generate large profits, with Gulf Oil sending around 50 million US dollars to Portugal through fees, thereby indirectly financing the colonial wars.

To counter Gulf Oil's involvement in Angola's oil, TCLPAC members purchased the company's shares, which allowed them to attend the company's annual meeting in 1973. As a result, they obtained crucial strategic information that accelerated the campaign

against the relationship between Canadian corporations and Portugal. Between 1974 and 1975, TCLPAC stepped up a radical critique of the financing of white supremacist colonial regimes in Africa on the pages of *New Magazine*, denouncing the Canadian corporate system, which included business giants such as Falconbridge, Alcan, Massey Fergusson and Gulf Oil itself.[28]

In 1973, the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) produced a document titled *Investment in Oppression*, which strongly criticized the Canadian corporate sector and white-minority regimes. TCLPAC members became actively involved in this movement. As John S. Saul put it, 'Many of had indeed sought to carry out a struggle on two fronts, both against the structures of oppression as they manifested themselves in southern Africa but also those agents engaged in placing North America on the wrong side of the war for the future of Southern Africa.'[29] For Saul and his fellow activists, the imperative was to align with the oppressed and exploited people rather than maintain business relations with colonial power and exploitative corporations. For these left-leaning critics of the government, Africa's struggle for social justice and independence amplified their criticism of Canadian society.

In 1974, twenty-five TCLPAC members attended the Gulf Oil General Shareholders' Meeting at the Royal York Hotel in Toronto. The meeting was also attended by members of OXFAM, the Anglican Church and the United Church of Canada, and Saydi Mingas, a member of the MPLA. The meeting symbolized TCLPAC's international network and exemplified its global political perspective. The network extended beyond the Canadian left, incorporating Mingas, who spoke about colonial oppression in Angola. To TCLPAC, colonialism was not just an issue outside Canada. In fact, it extended to include the capitalist multinational entities operating within the country, represented by Canadian companies.[30] By denouncing the internal connections to external oppression and highlighting how Canadian profit was linked to racism and colonialism, TCLPAC aimed to foster humanitarian consciousness in Toronto and elsewhere in the country.

The 'Solidarity Cinema' project was another campaign organized by the TCLPAC. Designed to reach a diverse audience beyond engaged militants, this initiative involved screening films about feminism, trade unionism and issues related to Latin America, Asia and Africa. An interesting example of this project was the screening of *Behind the Lines*, a documentary by British filmmaker Margareth Dickinson in 1971 during her trip to the FRELIMO-liberated areas. This film offered images and sounds from the anticolonial struggle, bringing them closer to the consciousness of Canadians. The films were shown for eight to ten weeks each year, attracting audiences of four hundred to five hundred people every Saturday night.[31]

The Solidarity Cinema project mobilized its audience to support the committee in their efforts to aid the anticolonial struggle. These activities allowed TCLPAC to raise funds and collect donations, which were then used to send materials directly to the PAIGC, MPLA and FRELIMO. These events facilitated a north–south connection and provided tangible evidence of connections between Canadian corporations and the enemies of African liberation. The struggle for justice and freedom was thus not limited to far-off places but could also be fought in the everyday life of Canadians. As TCLPAC observed with hindsight in 1982: 'It was an epoch that seemed to foster linkages among the issues of the left from the Artistic Woodworkers strike to native

people protests against Hudson Bay and permitted TCLPAC to maintain a connection between Southern African struggles and progressive forces at home.'[32]

Another recurring theme in the materials and activities organized by TCLPAC was its connection to Québec's independence movement. This was a sensitive subject and a source of significant social tension, leading to substantial criticism of the policies of Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau. Within the context of initiatives like 'Solidarity Cinema', posters featuring the slogan 'Québec-Angola: zones a libérer' (Quebec-Angola: zones to liberate) were circulated. This slogan symbolizes the parallel drawn by TCLPAC activists, who sought to mobilize political analogies between the colonialist forces of Portugal and the capitalist, Anglophone Canadian state. In the opinion of TCLPAC and its members, the Francophone province of Quebec was doubly colonized, first by English-speaking Canada and then by international capitalism.[33]

Within the broader leftist circles in Canada, the separatist movement in Quebec was seen as a potential avenue for fostering a socialist experiment within North America. The linkages they made served a dual purpose: while expressing support for Quebec's demand for separatism, they found resonance with Angola's struggle against Portuguese colonialism. In both cases, the common enemy was represented by capitalist interests associated with the Canadian government and Canadian corporations. This alignment allowed TCLPAC to build a bridge between seemingly distinct movements, highlighting the interconnected nature of struggles against oppression, colonization and exploitation. It underscored the belief that these struggles, even when geographically distant, shared a common source of oppression and injustice.

The committee's activities and the effectiveness of its campaigns drew the ire of far-right activists in Canada. In 1973, members of the supremacist group Western Guard forcefully disrupted an event organized by the committee to raise funds for the purchase of a truck to be sent to Mozambique. During the event, they violently assaulted the attendees, shouting 'White Power! This Encounter Is Over!' The attackers threw a table against a window, damaged other items, vandalized notebooks and documents and caused injuries to the attendants. Shafrudine Khan, the representative of FRELIMO in North America, was among those at the meeting during this attack. Khan, who had experience as a FRELIMO member dealing with colonial oppression in Mozambique, noted that he was no stranger to such incidents.[34]

While TCLPAC activism invited backlash from right-wing activists, their messages about the duplicity of Canada's foreign policy gained international resonance and a broad audience. In Canada, the campaign against Canada's 'business as usual' approach to commercial relations with Portugal drew attention from the Toronto press. Between 1973 and 1974, articles published in *This Magazine*, *Canadian Forum* or *Monthly Review* acquired increasing domestic repercussions. Combining efforts with other NGOs, TCLPAC meetings and campaigns sparked media attention and mobilized political discussions. TCLPAC also continued the campaign by participating in international events. For example, in 1973, John S. Saul criticized Canada's official stance at the annual social science conference at the University of East Africa in Dar es Salaam:

> The Canadian government *voiced* criticism! But this is not the main point to be made in the essays collected here. Instead, they seek to underscore the fact that

> 'official Canada' (corporate and governmental) *acted* in a manner entirely opposite to that suggested rhetoric. Far from backing the African people struggling for freedom, official Canada actually *supported the Portuguese* in their futile colonial wars. Indeed, it is precisely in the juxtaposition of Canada's words and Canada's deed that once can trace the essential pattern of Canada's policy towards 'Portuguese Africa'.[35]

The text from Saul's speech in Dar es Salaam denouncing the Canadian government for being on 'both sides of the street' achieved truly transnational resonance. The conference Saul gave in Tanzania was disseminated in Canada in the following years, first in the media and then in printed editions, showing the reach of the committee's campaign that linked the Global South and the Global North.

Expanding their strategy, TCLPAC worked to provide opportunities for members of FRELIMO to have a platform in Canadian media. The strategy of allowing these activists to speak directly to the Canadian public lent greater legitimacy to the committee's activities. One notable instance of this approach occurred in 1973 when Marcelino dos Santos, the vice-president of FRELIMO at the time, gave an interview to the Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC), the federal public communication channel. In the interview, dos Santos criticized the Canadian government:

> Really, Canada has made many statements but … I must say frankly that, knowing and having heard what Canada had said several times … but knowing that Canada is doing nothing real to help the liberation movements, one should at least ask: is … the Government of Canada sincere? We don't believe it is, and we hope that Canada will try to show us that it is really sincere … . I'm forced to think that Canada continues to think it preferable to have relations with colonialist and fascist regimes than with people who are fighting for their freedom and their dignity.[36]

The similarity of messages delivered by TCLPAC and Marcelino dos Santos show how a global leftist agenda intersected with the anticolonial struggle in Africa. In fact, the importance attributed to the interview can be evidenced by the fact that the interview was first transcribed in a TCLPAC publication from 1974, and later republished in two of John Saul's books: *Revolutionary Traveller* and *On Building a Social Movement*.

By hosting and supporting the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique, the activities of the committee became increasingly dynamic. TCLPAC events took place in Toronto with the presence of Shafrudine Khan and Marcelino dos Santos, both from FRELIMO, and Saydi Mingas, from the MPLA. Notably, the MPLA's leader Agostinho Neto was in the TCLPAC's office preparing for an interview when he received a phone call informing him of the coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974. It is symbolic that news of the Carnation Revolution – with all its implications for the end of Portuguese colonialism and Angola's independence – came to the attention of the future first Angolan president at the TCLPAC headquarters.

The recognition of the TCLPAC's importance followed shortly afterwards. During Mozambique's independence celebrations held at the Machava Stadium in Maputo

on 25 June 1975, Canada was represented by members from TCLPAC, not the government. One of them was John Saul, who later recalled being deeply moved by the ceremony and listening to Samora Machel's speech at the stadium.[37] Saul stayed for a number of days in Maputo, and, as he later recalled, it was clear to him from numerous exchanges that the project of economic transformation in the country would proceed along socialist lines.[38]

As independent Mozambique seemed to move into a more egalitarian direction, John Saul and other committee members developed new ways of collaborating with the new governments of post-independent Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. However, cooperation with FRELIMO took on the most active forms. Shortly after independence, the committee set up social and educational programmes to help Mozambique build their own unique model of socialism. They became international cooperants and even mobilized Canadian volunteers through the Project Mozambique to work in Maputo. A number of committee members would become involved in the construction of the new state. John S. Saul gave courses in political science at the University Eduardo Mondlane. Another TCLPAC activist, Judith Marshall, worked in popular education and literacy projects in the Maputo-Matola industrial region between 1978 and 1984, working closely with the Minister of Education, Graça Machel.

Conclusion

After the fall of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, the TLPAC was renamed Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, symbolizing a deeper level of understanding of liberty beyond the formality of independence and the creation of new states. Southern Africa was to be free and achieve genuine autonomy only after white supremacy's rule ended in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It is well known that after independence, Mozambique and Angola became the stage of brutal civil wars that practically destroyed the economic infrastructure, creating a massive contingent of displaced populations, causing many casualties and generating hunger and social and humanitarian destabilization on an enormous scale. The impact of the so-called wars of destabilization reached beyond Mozambican and Angolan territory, affecting most of Southern Africa. The challenges presented for the future of Mozambique, therefore, demanded the reinforcement of international alliances. Reacting positively to this new scenario, the newly named committee and its members cooperated with other transnational solidarity committees while developing a consistent relationship with the FRELIMO government.[39]

The end of the white supremacist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa and the independence of Namibia refreshed the political committee's agenda. On all these fronts, TCLPAC/TCLSAC was an active Canadian partner as an international cooperant in loco or as activists in Toronto, where they produced publications, organized events and demonstrations and received artists and activists from across Southern Africa. The pages of the *TCLSAC Report* (1977–84) and the *Southern Africa Report* (1985–2000) covered practically all the significant events in the region. In addition, they provided

an active interpretation of the geopolitical situation at the time, connecting the global, regional and local political struggles.

As demonstrated, Toronto emerged as a significant hub that extended support for the cause of ending Portuguese colonialism, reaching far beyond the Portuguese-speaking world. In the 1970s, TCLPAC committees bridged seemingly disparate struggles, forging connections between the fight for independence in Portuguese African colonies and domestic movements for social justice, including Quebec's pursuit of autonomy. By emphasizing the common thread of opposing capitalist interests and oppression, they sought to bring together diverse segments of society under a unified banner of justice. As this chapter showed, ideas picked up by Canada's left-wing activists through their experience of anticolonial struggle in the Portuguese Empire influenced the criticisms they levelled at their own government on a number of different levels. For the activists, this struggle showcased deficiencies in Canada's foreign policy while presenting a vision for a better future and social justice that was lacking in their domestic context.

Notes

This research was supported by a Visiting Professor Scholarship Abroad granted by the CAPES-PrINT project and a Productivity Fellowship granted by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development and PUCRS. I am grateful to José C. Curto, Arshad Desai and Frank Luce for giving me various kinds of support during this project.

1. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Cold War Interventions and the Making of Our Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
2. Eric Burton, 'Hubs of Decolonization: African Liberation Movements and "Eastern" Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar es Salaam', in *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East'*, ed. Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders and Helder Fonseca (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 25–56; George Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar es Salaam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022); Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization & Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
3. Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2007); Aurora Almada e Santos, *A organização das Nações Unidas e a questão colonial portuguesa 1960–1974* (Lisbon: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2017).
4. Jeremi Suri, 'Counter-cultures: The Rebellion against the Cold War Order, 1965–75', in *The Cambridge of the Cold War, Vol. 2*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvin Leffler (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 460–81.
5. D. Anglin, T. Shaw and C. Widstrand, eds, *Canada Scandinavia and Southern Africa* (Upsalla: Nordiska afrikainstitutet, 1978); Tor Sellstrom, *Sweden and the National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vol. II: Solidarity and Assistance – 1970–1994* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikanistitutet, 2002).
6. Marçal de Menezes Paredes, 'Para Além da Lusofonia: o Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC) do Canadá e a Luta Anticolonial

em Angola e Moçambique (1972–1975)', *Revista Tempo & Argumento, Florianópolis* 14, no. 35 (2022): 2.
7. John S. Saul is a professor emeritus of political science at York University, Toronto, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. Author of several books, he received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the Canadian Association of African Studies in 2011. He has made many contributions to the Socialist Register and has also taught in Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa. He passed away on 23 September 2023.
8. Duco Hellema, *The Global 1970's: Radicalism, Reform and Crisis* (New York: Routledge, 2019).
9. P. B. Waite, 'Confederation', *Canadian Encyclopedia*, 29 October 2019, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/confederation. Accessed 22 October 2021.
10. Lester Pearson (1897–1972): Canadian academic, diplomat and politician, he was prime minister of Canada between 1963 and 1968 when he was the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada. Pierre Elliott Trudeau succeeded him. During the Suez crisis, he had outstanding action at the UN during the resolution of the conflict, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. Along with the Swede Dag Hammarskjöld, secretary general of the UN, he is considered one of the fathers of the modern concept of 'peacekeeping'.
11. Robert Wright, *Trudeaumania: The Rise to Power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Toronto: Harper & Collins, 2016).
12. The interview was broadcast on 23 February 196 and is available at www.cbc.ca/archives/no-place-for-the-state-in-the-bedrooms-of-the-nation-1.4681298.
13. J. L. Granastein and R. Bothwell, *Pirrouette: Pierre Trudeau Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1990).
14. René Durocher, 'Quiet Revolution', *Canadian Encyclopedia*, 4 March 2015, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/quiet-revolution. Accessed 22 October 2021.
15. Garth Legge, 'Foreword', in Sid Gilchrist, *Angola Awake* (Toronto: Ryerson Presse, 1968).
16. João Victor Scheffer, ' "Banking on Apartheid": A Campanha contra os bancos Canadenses na revista TCLSAC Reports (1977–1984)' (MA diss., School of Humanities, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2023).
17. Linda Freman, *Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
18. Renate Pratt, *In Good Faith: Canadian Churches against Apartheid* (Waterloo: Wilfried Laurier University Press, 1997).
19. John S. Saul, *Revolutionary Traveler: Freeze-Frames from a Life* (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2009).
20. Andrew Ivaska, 'Decolonizing Refugees: Exile and Political Possibility in 1960s Dar es Salaam', *Stateless Histories*, 24 January 2022, https://statelesshistories.org/article/decolonizing-refugees-exile-and-political-possibility-in-1960s-dar-es-salaam. On Dar es Salaam and its cold war politics, see Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making*.
21. On different economies of development, see Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania between the Village and the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Alessandro Iandolo, 'The Rise and Fall of the "Soviet Model of Development" in West Africa, 1957–64', *Cold War History* 12, no. 4 (2012): 683–704.
22. Leo Zelig, *A Revolutionary for Our Time: The Walter Rodney* (Chicago: Heymarket, 2022), 171.
23. Saul, *Revolutionary Traveler*, 75.
24. Ibid., 24.

25. Ibid., 10.
26. *TCLSAC Reports Magazine*, November–December 1982, 5.
27. R. J. Parrot, 'Boycott Gulf! Angolan Oil and the Black Power Roots of American Anti-Apartheid Organizing', *Modern American History* 1, no. 2 (2018): 195–220.
28. For example, see TCLPAC, 'Larceny by proxy: Gulf Oil Canada Ltda. and Angola". This Magazine, January, 1974. And TCLSAC, Words and deeds. Canada, Portugal and Africa. Toronto: TCLSAC, 1976. For more details, see de Menezes Paredes, 'Para Além da Lusofonia'.
29. John S. Saul, *On Building a Social Movement: The North American Campaign for Southern African Liberation Revisited* (Nova Scotia: Fernwood, 2017), 36.
30. In the same context, the committee was infiltrated by a far-right spy in its ranks. According to sources, soon after the discovery, a flyer with information about it was prepared and distributed widely to groups on the Canadian left. *TCLSAC Reports Magazine*, November–December 1982, 6.
31. *TCLSAC Reports Magazine*, November–December 1982, 6.
32. Ibid., 5.
33. Saul, *Revolutionary Traveler*, 95.
34. Ibid., 25.
35. TCLSAC, *Words and Deeds: Canada, Portugal and Africa* (Toronto: TCLSAC, 1976), 2.
36. This interview was broadcast on the radio in 1973 and first transcribed in the book by John S. Saul, published by TCLPAC in 1974, with the title *Canada and Mozambique*. The same interview was later republished in his other two more recent publications in a historical review tone: *Revolutionary Traveler* (2009) and *On Building a Social Movement* (2017).
37. Saul, *Revolutionary Traveler*, 109.
38. Ibid., 111–12.
39. They had connections with the PAIGC government in Guinea-Bissau until the 1980 coup and have been with the MPLA government on a smaller scale since 1977.

8

The Condor spreads its wings: The South American secret missions in Africa after the Carnation Revolution

Gisele Lobato

When Angola gained independence, at midnight between 10 and 11 November 1975, sounds of gunfire burst out in the skies over Luanda, in celebration of the liberation. On the other side of the Atlantic, at that same moment, the Brazilian government issued a press release: although ruled by a right-wing dictatorship, Brazil became the first country to recognize the MPLA. However, while a Brazilian diplomat attended the festivities in the new country's capital, other representatives of that same dictatorship regretted the outcome. They were members of a mission sent to Northern Angola to militarily support the rival FNLA, whose hope of occupying power faded on the eve of the day set for independence, with their defeat by Agostinho Neto's troops in the Battle of Quifangondo.

Taking this episode as a starting point, this chapter analyses how the expectation of decolonization of the Portuguese Empire, generated by the Carnation Revolution, increased the South American security sectors' interest in Africa. It adopts the expression 'security sectors' to refer to the complex amalgamation of military, police and civilian organizations that made up the intelligence and repression community of the Southern Cone dictatorships. Fearing the communist advance on the continent, individuals and state bodies from the Southern Cone sought to create new channels of intelligence and carried out operations on the other side of the Atlantic – sometimes contrary to their diplomats' directives. The secret operation by a police unit from Rio de Janeiro in Northern Angola in 1975 fits into this context, but it was not an isolated case.

My work is part of a growing historiographical strand seeking a more decentred view on the Global Cold War.[1] Instead of focusing exclusively on the influence of the dispute between the North Americans and the Soviets, this approach considers the possibility of a real autonomy of other actors involved in the process. In particular, the agency of South American dictatorships has already been emphasized by Tanya Harmer in her analysis of the overthrow of Salvador Allende's socialist government by a military coup in Chile in 1973. Harmer demonstrates that the United States did not act alone and was sometimes dragged into inter-American affairs by regional players, most notably Brazil, which was 'often far more concerned, zealous, and

impatient about combating Castro and Allende than the Americans'. Although their 'counterrevolutionary crusade' was partly funded and supported by the United States, right-wing leaders in Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, far from being mere pawns, increasingly took 'ownership of the Cold War in the era of realpolitik and détente, overtaking the United States' own anticommunist mission and standing as powerful alternatives to Cuba's revolutionary example'.[2]

The series of coups in Latin America in the 1960s–70s and the involvement of some of these countries with Africa must be situated not only in the context of the Cold War but also within the broader story of decolonization. Antony G. Hopkins divides decolonization into three categories: formal, which corresponds to the dismantling of European empires; informal, which deals with claims for autonomy by countries that retained their formal independence but were clearly subordinated to an external power; and internal, relating to the uprising of groups marginalized by a particular government – such as the mobilization of the North American black movement.[3] For Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson, decolonization and globalization established a dialectical relationship, conditioning each other. More than a globalized process, decolonization was also 'actively globalizing', since the end of empires stimulated different notions of belonging, creating ideological borders that did not necessarily correspond to geographic ones. By catalysing new projects of statehood, independence sharpened 'popular identification within and between nations and communities undergoing similar struggles for freedom'.[4]

The case of South America's security sectors is an example of this 'actively globalizing' character of the decolonization process. Until now, historians have focused on cooperation between groups fighting against colonial domination and related civil movements, but the solidarity networks were not exclusive to revolutionaries. They also formed between conservative elites. Kyle Burke, in his study of far-right movements in the 1970s–80s, compares these groups to the 'similar networks of concerned citizens and non-governmental organizations that transformed geopolitics in the second half of twentieth century'. Like them, the figures who populate the book *Revolutionaries for the Right* 'contemplated the links between local, national, and international developments', cultivating relationships across borders and similar modes of activism while 'fashioning programs that functioned independently of states and, sometimes, against their laws'.[5] If revolution did not respect borders, neither did counterrevolution.

The South American security sectors' main entry points in Africa were the strengthening of connections with the apartheid regime and with Portuguese groups that resisted decolonization in Angola. From the mid-1970s onwards, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and, to some extent, Argentina experienced an explosion of *sudafricanofilia* (South African-philia), with mutual visits, increased trade and development cooperation.[6] Current literature primarily justifies these relationships through South Africa's need to break with the growing isolation derived from the international condemnation of the apartheid system. With fewer and fewer channels of cooperation with the great powers, Pretoria approached military dictatorships commanded by the Chilean Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990) and the Paraguayan Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1989). South African attempts to promote a naval pact involving South American countries for the security of the South Atlantic from the mid-1960s tend to be interpreted in this context. Explanations

behind South Americans' motivation to engage with South Africa usually focus on trade, technical cooperation, supply of weapons and concerns about the increase in the Soviet naval presence in the South Atlantic after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967.

Brazil is usually seen as an exceptional case. While its neighbours promoted mutual high-level visits with South Africa, Brasília sought to distance itself from Pretoria to privilege its trade relations with newly independent African countries, ruled by black majorities.[7] It is precisely for being an outlier that the Brazilian case broadens our understanding of South Americans' security interests in Africa, highlighting the influence of the *guerre révolutionnaire* (revolutionary war) ideology for transatlantic connections between conservative security elites. There is, however, a preliminary dimension to my research: the overlapping of services, the existence of parallel hierarchies, the absence of a body devoted exclusively to actions abroad and the documentation gaps make it difficult to establish precisely which structure was responsible for a given operation.[8] Further studies and the discovery of new documents will be necessary to establish more accurate chains of command.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first one presents the French revolutionary war doctrine and its influence in South America, which is identified here as the basis of the regional concerns with the advance of African decolonization. The second part discusses Operation Condor, the anti-communist cooperation network built by the Southern Cone dictatorships from the 1970s onwards to unite efforts to combat leftist guerrillas. The third and the fourth parts present evidence of South American contacts, respectively, with the FNLA in Angola and the South African apartheid regime after the fall of the Portuguese Empire. Although it is not yet possible to determine whether the actions had any coordination, their synchronicity and similarities bring new questions about the Cold War in the South Atlantic. They suggest that the independence of the Portuguese colonies, especially Angola, represented for the Latin America security sectors an advance of the communist threat to its eastern border, which demanded a reaction. This fear compelled individuals and state bodies from the Southern Cone to establish new intelligence channels and conduct operations in Africa, often diverging from their diplomats' directives. These actors shared the feeling of being part of a single great global war, in which Western Christian civilization was under attack.

Internal enemy, global threat: The *guerre révolutionnaire*

In 1957, in an address at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), French General Jacques Allard expressed his fears about the USSR. The commander declared that the Soviet strategy was no longer focused on the East–West axis, but on surrounding Europe by drawing 'a vast enveloping curve', which passed through Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. Fostering 'a myth of nationalism' and the 'pretext of the people's right for self-determination', Moscow was heading towards the conquest of the Third World and, through this manoeuvre, France was under attack. 'Our last, our ultimate line of defense is Algeria,' he said.[9]

General Allard's speech took to the highest-level concepts in vogue in the French military, which was still processing the bitter defeat in the Indochina War (1946–54).

Officers involved in the conflict returned from South-East Asia willing to understand the causes of the setback. The revolutionary war doctrine was developed mainly by junior officers, with support at the top of the military hierarchy, and did not form a homogeneous body of thought, but rather an amalgamation of disparate texts, conferences, books and regulations.[10] The Algerian War's outbreak in 1954 not only served as an opportunity to enhance the theory with the experience in Africa but also provided a laboratory for the application of the new doctrine.

The French doctrine assumed that the new conflicts would not involve conventional forces or nuclear weapons, which the French considered an Anglo-Saxon obsession. The real threat would be an 'infinitely small war', fought not between sovereign governments but within a state, albeit commanded from abroad.[11] For them, the insurgents' motivation was 'either Communism, or a Communist-inspired movement, or an irresponsible nationalism that easily lends itself to Soviet exploitation'.[12] Erasing the boundaries between internal and external conflict, the doctrine inserted the colonial impasse in the Cold War discourse.

The French interpretation of uprisings in the Third World fell on fertile soil in regimes that already had a strong anti-communist bend. In the case of the apartheid regime, it influenced the philosophy of 'total onslaught', advocated by P. W. Botha – minister of defence (1966–81) and prime minister (1978–84). As Jamie Miller puts it, Botha and the South African Defence Force (SADF) related all opposition to a single communist point of origin.[13]

The French school of thought also spread to South America.[14] The doctrine arrived in the region through the military, but it did not take long to also influence conservative political elites. Raising fears about an alleged communist advance in the region, this line of thinking defended authoritarian solutions to the problem, which favoured the series of right-wing coups in the mid-twentieth century. Among the legacies of the French doctrine in Latin America was the construction of the 'internal enemy' – a fluid concept, which encompassed not only the revolutionary left, but almost all opposition – the legitimation of authoritarianism, the primacy of secret services, and the massive use of torture.

In addition to its impact on South American domestic politics, the *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine influenced the way military sectors interpreted the international context. The doctrine's followers saw themselves as participants in a global war, which was advancing like a wave. The Portuguese colonel Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, a theorist influenced by the French school who played an important role in disseminating its precepts in Brazil, identified this 'wave' with a communist plan for 'world domination in phases'.

In it, the number one target is monsoon Asia, followed by India and Japan. Once this part of the Earth, generally unprepared for armed resistance against the outside, had been conquered, it would go to West Asia and, via Suez, to White or Muslim Africa. This wedge would 'slow down' European resistance and facilitate an almost insensitive progression into black Africa, which Westerners, worried about their own security, could not defend. Europe and Australia would then follow, reserving for the final phase the Western hemisphere, considered as 'impregnable', through the subversive centres of the Caribbean and the indigenous 'masses' of many Ibero-American countries. The 'capitalist fortress', made up of the United States and Canada, could not live on its own

and would, according to the plan, prefer to agree to capitulation rather than suffer the fate of Nazi Germany.[15]

Oliveira attributed this 'plan' to an alleged memorandum written by Mao Zedong, which was allegedly presented at an extraordinary meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1953. The Portuguese colonel admitted he was unaware of 'any secure basis for the veracity of this plan', but considered that 'the evolution of world events, from 1945 onwards' lent it credibility.[16] The ideologists of counterrevolution thus understood nationalist uprisings as a coordinated attack by Moscow and Beijing. The image was that of a military column advancing, as in a classic war. After decolonization swept through North Africa, danger lurked around Sub-Saharan Africa and, in the event of its fall into enemy hands, the Communists would target the former colonial powers and Latin America. The influence of such ideas in South America can be found, for example, in the statements made in 1976 by the Argentine General Alberto Marini:

> If the West does not come along in support of South Africa, the fate of this region will soon be cast. If left to succumb unaided, control of the Indian Ocean will be inexorably lost, and in less than a decade Europe will be communised. Then, without a doubt, it will be our America's turn, and then we will lament past mistakes, impossible to amend.[17]

The convergence between Marini's, Oliveira's and Allard's ideas is evident. In a very similar fashion, the three defended the vision that they were in a state of a global war between 'Western Christian civilization' and 'International Communism'. This was a unique and global enemy, which used different disguises: in Algeria and Angola, it camouflaged itself as independence movements; in Soweto, it raised a voice against racism; in Uruguay or Brazil, it called for the return of democracy.

Originating in France, the *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine disseminated a Cold War perspective on the upheavals in the Third World, influencing not only the domestic politics of the countries it reached but also their interpretation of the international context. This doctrine propagated the belief in the interconnectedness of conflicts across regions, viewing them as part of a coordinated plan by international communism. In response, adherents of the doctrine sought to establish cooperation networks to collectively address this perceived threat, thus demonstrating the significance of ideology in shaping global events.

Operation Condor: The anti-communist crusade in the Southern Cone

The Cuban Revolution (1959) reawakened anti-communist sentiment among Latin American elites and increased US concern for regional security. This context favoured the multiple right-wing military coups that spread across the region from the 1960s onwards. Military dictatorships were inaugurated in Brazil and Bolivia in 1964, followed by Chile and Uruguay (1973) and Argentina (1976). These countries joined Paraguay, where the military had been in power since 1954.

On the far-left, the Cuban experience strengthened the idea that the only viable path to revolution was through armed struggle, a current of thought that was reinforced by the military coups and the consequent democratic collapse. The armed left was the main, but not the only, target of repression by Latin American dictatorships, marked by assassinations, torture and the disappearance of dissidents. At the end of 1972, leftist groups from four countries began coordinating their efforts, formally announcing an alliance in Buenos Aires in 1974. The coalition, known as the Revolutionary Coordination Junta (*Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria* – JCR), brought together members of Chile's *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR), Argentina's *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP), Uruguay's Tupamaros and Bolivia's *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN). Although prominent positions within the JCR were held by Brazilian exiles in Chile, none of the Brazilian guerrillas formally joined the organization.[18] While it is now understood that the JCR's Brazilian connections were marginal, intelligence reports from Brasília often mention the possible involvement of groups like the ALN (*Aliança Libertadora Nacional*) in activities related to the junta.[19] The Brazilian interest in the JCR can be justified based on this perception.

According to Roberto Simon, the JCR primarily served as a network of solidarity among far-left groups, particularly active in Western Europe, rather than a platform for launching joint armed operations.[20] Nevertheless, the Southern Cone dictatorships perceived the junta as a significant multinational threat, prompting the establishment of Operation Condor, a cooperative effort launched in 1975 by the intelligence services of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. On 28 September 1976, FBI agent Robert Scherrer wrote a telegram from Buenos Aires detailing the regimes' coordination. According to his report, the Southern Cone dictatorships' intelligence services engaged in the exchange of information with the goal of eradicating terrorist activities and jointly conducted operations to combat subversion. The document also reveals that 'a third and most secret phase of "Operation Condor" involves the formation of special teams from member countries who are to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out sanctions up to assassinations against terrorists or supporters of terrorist organizations'.[21]

After 1974's Carnation Revolution, Portugal became a safe haven for South American exiles who left Chile following the coup against Allende in 1973.[22] In 1974, the JCR opened an office in Paris and another one in Lisbon a year later. These developments made Europe a priority for Operation Condor's 'global war'. However, the testimony of a former Condor operative – retired Brazilian Colonel Paulo Malhães – indicates that the concerns of South American security sectors were not limited to Europe.

In a 2014 interview, Malhães – a former member of the dictatorship's Army Intelligence Centre – revealed that he had been to Angola before Portugal's departure and later met with Angolans and South Africans in Brazil to discuss an intelligence partnership. Without going into detail, he dismissed Operation Condor as 'bullshit' and claimed that the real operation, called *Arco-Íris* (Rainbow), extended beyond the American continent to encompass the whole world.[23] The colonel was murdered about two months after the interview,[24] without having the opportunity to clarify his contacts with Africa. The formal existence of an 'Operation Rainbow' can neither been proven nor ruled out conclusively. Similarly, there is no definitive evidence to

confirm the formal existence of an 'African arm' within Operation Condor. However, available documents and testimonies suggest the existence of connections between South American security sectors and African anti-communist groups, as will be demonstrated in the next sections.

Archival documents indicate that a possible motivation for the Southern Cone dictatorships' incursions into Africa was the fear of links between South American guerrillas and African leftist groups. The Foreign Information Centre of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a report to the National Information Service on 30 April 1976, detailing an alleged Cuban plan to train JCR guerrillas in Angola:

> In the first stage, the recruitment of militants from various countries, including Brazilians (currently located in Córdoba) in Buenos Aires, is planned. They will be linked to the JCR base, which will take charge of their travel arrangements to receive military training in Cuba.
>
> In a subsequent phase, the militants will proceed to Angola, integrating Latin American Brigades. The main idea is to allow these individuals to gain military experience by engaging in combat against the remaining nuclei of UNITA and FNLA. Subsequently, these militants would be relocated to their countries of origin and Europe.[25]

Another indication of this concern is in a 1977 CIA report. The document describes the JCR's performance in Europe, stating that groups of Latin American exiles formed a brigade in Portugal, which would have received authorization from the MPLA to train in Angola.[26]

The South African Bureau for State Security (BOSS) also produced a report linking South American guerrillas with Africa. The Information Survey 26/78 dated 19 July 1978 states that 'terrorists from Argentina (Montoneros) and Uruguay (Tupamaros) are preparing to enter the terrorist battle in Southern Africa'. Members of these organizations, reports BOSS, would be undergoing training in Tanzania, with the help of Cuba and Algeria. In addition, a delegation of Montoneros reportedly had talks with the Mozambican minister of foreign affairs in April 1978 in Maputo and would have been in contact with Robert Mugabe to support actions in Rhodesia and South-West Africa. The BOSS did not rule out that members of the Montoneros and Tupamaros could infiltrate Portuguese refugees to commit terrorist acts in South Africa or Rhodesia, as well as not ruling out the risk of attacks on its diplomatic corps in South America.[27]

The reports produced by intelligence agencies in Brazil, the United States and South Africa exhibit a tendency to magnify the perceived threat posed by solidarity between leftist movements. For this analysis, however, it is less important to know the dimension of solidarity between Latin American guerrillas and African countries and movements. More relevant is to note that, even if imaginary, the threat was considered real. This perception of a global threat influenced the actions and strategies undertaken by the South American security sectors. Not only was such perception behind the emergence of Operation Condor, but it should also be considered when analysing the incursions of Southern Cone's actors in Africa in the 1970s'.

South American secret mission in Angola in 1975

In the second half of 1975, a group of elite police officers from Rio de Janeiro carried out an unofficial mission in Angola, providing support for Holden Roberto's FNLA. Led by Detective Inspector José Paulo Boneschi and including at least five other officers, the team worked as explosives specialists alongside FNLA troops in the runner-up to Angola's independence on 11 November 1975. In parallel with the Brazilian support, the FNLA also received US assistance during the period. CIA agent John Stockwell described Boneschi's presence at Holden Roberto's headquarters in Ambriz near Luanda:

> Roberto drove in from the airstrip and shook my hand distractedly. He had on slacks, a light jacket, and a beige golf cap. I barely had time to get a glass of water before he ushered me into one of the new Volkswagen minibuses and we drove away. With us were three whites: a tall, broad Portuguese named Chevier; a heavy-set man dressed in the uniform complete with major's insignia, parachute wings, and a red beret; and Falstaff … According to Falstaff, the one in utilities was a Brazilian army major, apparently there as an observer. And what were Falstaff and the Brazilian major doing in Ambriz? Falstaff ducked this question, changing the subject. But the answer was obvious. Brazil was not uninterested in the Angolan outcome.[28]

Boneschi was the military man Stockwell referred to in his memoir. The other Brazilian, 'Falstaff', was the conservative journalist Fernando Luís da Câmara Cascudo, hired by Roberto to work in FNLA's propaganda. The team of police officers led by Boneschi was recruited in Brazil by a member of the FNLA and, although the agents formally travelled as 'volunteers', the operation was linked to Brazilian intelligence.[29] The Portuguese Fernando Fernandes Xavier ('Chevier', in Stockwell's book), a former PIDE inspector who also joined the FNLA, reported that the group of police received, in Angola and Kinshasa, short and frequent visits by a captain of the Brazilian army in search of information.[30] Within the intricate security apparatus of the Brazilian dictatorship, it was not uncommon for police and military forces to collaborate in joint operations. When it came to undercover missions abroad, the use of police personnel instead of the military carried a lower political risk if their involvement were to be exposed. The visits of an Army captain, however, suggests the mission was not solely a police endeavour, indicating a potential connection to one of the regime's intelligence agencies.

Stockwell's ignorance of who the Brazilians were might indicate that their presence in Angola took place through the Portuguese military personnel who joined the FNLA, rather than via the Americans. Since the late 1960s, Brazil sought to maintain cordial relations with Portugal, but shied away from any military involvement with its former metropole. However, a part of the officer corps did not accept this strategy, and the last years of the Portuguese *Estado Novo* saw a rapprochement between the armed forces of the two countries. For example, in 1967, Portugal and Brazil established an information

liaison through their military attachés. One of the Brazilian demands was for details of Cuban activity in Guinea-Conakry, since the country's intelligence suspected that Cuba was organizing subversive actions targeting Brazil from West Africa.[31]

This background helps to understand the connections established by Malhães and Boneschi with Africa after the Carnation Revolution. The imminent end of the Portuguese Empire, in addition to aggravating the fear that Africa could serve as a springboard for communism to reach the Americas, also broke an important link in the field of intelligence. It was necessary to compensate for the departure of the Portuguese by opening new contact channels in Africa for exchanging information and eventual joint operations.

Both Boneschi and Malhães belonged to what Elio Gaspari called the Brazilian dictatorship's *porão* (basement).[32] They were agents directly involved in the repression and fight against the 'internal enemy', practitioners of torture and linked to intelligence.[33] Indoctrinated by the *guerre révolutionnaire*, the *porão*'s representatives opposed President Ernesto Geisel's project to promote a distension of the dictatorship. Geisel assumed power in 1974 with the aim of gradually relaxing the regime's authoritarianism. The president's plan frustrated those who advocated for the military to maintain their grip on power, resulting in a period of military anarchy. This unrest was only brought under control in 1977 following the resignation of the Minister of the Army, Sylvio Frota, a staunch hardline general.[34] Frota opposed the process of redemocratization and had already accumulated conflicts with Geisel. Brazil's recognition of the MPLA government of Angola also drew criticism from the most radical factions within the dictatorship, as General Frota recalled in his memoirs:

> I did not know, in advance, of the official Brazilian intention to recognize the People's Republic of Angola, because, as I have already mentioned, these decisions were normally taken by the President of the Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I was aware of the fact only through the press. The comments were bittersweet – I heard them from many colleagues and from officers in general – since we, the military, followed the revolutionary events in Portugal and its colonies with great attention. We were very interested in its military and ideological aspects.[35]

The position of military personnel such as Frota directly clashed with the foreign policy adopted by Brazil in the mid-1970s. Since the government of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969–74), who preceded Geisel in power, Brazilian diplomacy aimed to distance itself from Cold War constraints and secure a more autonomous position on the international arena. This policy emphasized forging south–south relations and prioritizing Brazil's economic interests over ideological considerations. Brazilian diplomacy sought to establish closer ties with Africa's newly independent nations, recognizing their potential as consumer markets and oil suppliers. The recognition of the MPLA in Angola thus occurred within the broader framework of Brazil's efforts to foster closer relations with Africa. Hence, it is not surprising that the mission of Brazilian police officers that helped the FNLA in 1975 was organized without the knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition to Brazilians, accounts from two different sources mention the presence of a Uruguayan official with Roberto's troops on the eve of Angolan independence. These reports refer to him as Eloy Méndez Carrero, allegedly a photographer who worked alongside Cascudo's team. One of the testimonies is from Pedro Alberto Rodrigues da Silva, a former member of the Brazilian Air Force who joined the FNLA as a mercenary. Silva, who keeps in his personal archives a photograph of Carrero in front of a small airplane, says the Uruguayan presented himself as a 'freelance journalist' and took 'hundreds of photos', but he also proved to be an 'experienced pilot', with whom he had the opportunity to fly. Carrero claimed he had served in the Uruguayan Air Force.[36]

We do not know whether Carrero used his real name or whether he was really from Uruguay, since concealing an agent's identity is common practice in secret services. What can be ascertained, however, is that this man played an important role in the FNLA. Former PIDE inspector Fernando Xavier keeps in his personal archives, in addition to another photo of Carrero, a document signed by Holden Roberto, from August 1975, which states that 'Eloy Méndez Carrero, lieutenant colonel aviator, is in charge of all the initial arrangements for the operation of the Nagaje Air Base and the Angolan Air Force'.[37] While the FNLA's aerial capabilities were quite modest, the document shows that Roberto clearly placed a high level of trust in Carrero. Months later, however, his troops would be defeated by the MPLA.

Angola was seen as an 'eastern border' of South America, with only the Atlantic Ocean separating the two regions. When Portugal maintained control, Angola had presumably remained immune to communist expansion, but the MPLA's impending rise to power now marked a turning point. Although Brazil officially sought to deideologize its diplomacy and foster closer ties with Africa, this perspective was not universally embraced within the Brazilian authorities. The military regime's more conservative factions interpreted the potential ascent of a Marxist movement in Angola as a realization of their worst fears: communism had taken hold in Africa, and Latin America could be next. Despite being modest in scale, Brazilian aid to the FNLA holds significance as a practical demonstration of this concern. While the presence of a Uruguayan agent among Holden Roberto's troops requires further study, it suggests that this sentiment may not have been exclusive to Brazilians.

'Embassy not to be advised': South American dictatorships and South Africa

After Portugal's departure from Angola in 1974, South Africa became the main ally of South American dictatorships on the continent. In May 1976, a telegram from the South African ambassador in Uruguay to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed that a colonel named Ricardo Galarza would travel to Africa on the thirtieth of that month. The document did not provide any details regarding Galarza's specific role or position, only indicating his desire to meet, in South Africa, the chief of staff intelligence, General Hein du Toit. The two had previously met months earlier in Montevideo. The message carried a warning, 'Uruguayan embassy not repeat not to be advised.'[38]

Galarza wanted to know about the 'subversive situation' in South Africa – in reference to the anti-racist struggle within the country and the fight for the independence of Pretoria-controlled South-West Africa (modern-day Namibia). He also inquired about the current situation in the region, seeking information on which countries could be considered friends and on Cuban presence on the continent. Additionally, he expressed interest in obtaining the South African perspective on the United States' plans for Southern Africa. The documentation further indicates that, with South African help, the Uruguayan colonel also visited at least Kinshasa and Swaziland, and had conversations with the Rhodesian and Malawi embassies in South Africa. On 9 July 1976, he flew back to Buenos Aires.[39]

In the case of Brazil, one indication of the secret contacts with the apartheid regime is provided by the abovementioned Malhães, who claimed to have received South Africans in Brazil. The interview of former Portuguese Army Command Manuel Gaspar corroborates this statement. Gaspar joined the South African Armed Forces following the independence of his native Mozambique and the failure of the far-right armed group he helped found in Portugal, CODECO (Commandos for the Defence of Western Civilization). Gaspar narrates that around 1978, he served as translator for a delegation of the Brazilian security forces who had undergone anti-terrorism training at the National Intelligence School in Pretoria:

> There were three in all. It was Roberto Porto, who was from the Military Police, and my biggest contact was with him, because he was the head of the delegation. And he came with two other individuals, from other branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces or linked to the security of the Brazilian State. They came here to essentially 'drink it' [learn], and they did it. I know that there was an agreement between the South African government and the Brazilian government for training: a team would go from here to Brazil, to train future anti-terrorist intervention groups there, from the Military Police.[40]

In addition to welcoming the Brazilians, Gaspar narrates that he travelled to Brazil with a South African delegation, having visited training facilities in São Paulo and near the mouth of the Amazon River. He also spent two days in Rio de Janeiro, in a house in Barra da Tijuca that belonged to an officer 'linked to the Brazilian intelligence services'. According to his testimony, the South African delegation was led by the then Major Cornelius 'Neels' van Tonder, who also made contacts in Brasília during the trip.

Gaspar also remembers the visit of Chileans to the National Intelligence School around the time the Brazilians were there, 'to create a rapid intervention force, because they had a lot of problems with Allende's dissidence'. This statement matches Anthony J. Leysens' findings about Chilean officers of various branches of the armed forces having attended staff courses in South Africa. Leysens also states that Chilean military personnel, based in South-West Africa, assisted the South African forces in the 1970s–80s, in the interception and translation of Spanish Cuban radio messages.[41]

Argentina was another country that had secret links to the South African Defence Force. Even before the military coup that overthrew Isabel Perón's civilian government in March 1976, a local businessman, Ramiro Sangiao, sent to the South African

military attaché in Buenos Aires a request he had received from the Argentine Federal Police to arrange a short top-secret exchange visit to South Africa in order to discuss methods of fighting guerilla forces in both countries.[42] The trip did not happen, due to the change in command of the Federal Police with the death of General Alberto Villar.[43] With the establishment of the dictatorship in Argentina, however, relations between the two countries intensified. The Final Report, prepared by South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in 1996 to report on human rights violations during apartheid, informs that 'Alfredo Astiz, a notorious torturer, was one of four torture experts attached to the Argentinian Embassy in Pretoria in 1979. During his stay, there were several seminars where South African security police and the Argentines exchanged ideas regarding methods of interrogation'.[44]

The examples of covert cooperation between South American dictatorships and South Africa in the field of security reveal a multifaceted network with several dimensions. One aspect is the establishment of intelligence links and the exchange of information, as demonstrated by Galarza's mission. Another dimension involves the exchange of techniques and training, exemplified by the visits of Brazilians and Chileans to the National Intelligence School in Pretoria and by the reported interest of the Argentine Federal Police in discussing methods of fighting guerilla forces. Lastly, these contacts also suggest an interest in operational cooperation, such as the use of Chileans to interpret Cuban radio messages for the South African Armed Forces. The mapping of these contacts indicates a mutually beneficial relationship, which aimed to reinforce the capabilities of both the apartheid regime and its South American partners in combating their adversaries.

Conclusion

The decolonization of Lusophone Africa had numerous international implications. In Portugal, the weariness caused by thirteen years of wars in the colonies played a pivotal role in prompting a faction of the armed forces to overthrow the decades-long dictatorship. The independence of Angola and Mozambique also raised concerns among the white elites of South Africa and its neighbouring Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), who feared that the newly independent governments might provide a safe haven for guerrillas who posed a threat to their power. The Angolan Civil War challenged Cold War détente and prompted involvement from major global powers, as well as peripheral actors such as Cuba and South Africa. The civil war in Mozambique, since 1977, also involved forces from neighbouring countries. This chapter has illuminated yet another globalizing effect resulting from the dismantling of the Portuguese Empire: its impact on South America's information and security community.

In the 1960s–70s, several Latin American democracies were replaced by right-wing military regimes that once again put the continent under US influence. Until the fall of Allende in Chile, Cuba played a significant role in providing support to left-wing guerrilla movements in the region. Nevertheless, the 1973 coup in Chile prompted Cuban leaders to recognize the limited prospects for exporting revolution to South America. It was at this juncture that Fidel Castro's regime redirected its attention

towards Africa,[45] where the actions of its armed forces were crucial to the MPLA's victory in Angola in 1975.

The advancement of communist influence revitalized the notion among South American military elites that African decolonization was connected to a global conflict. For them, although a victory was achieved in Chile in 1973, the MPLA's ascendance in Angola demonstrated that the war was by no means over. The spectre of communism now cast its shadow upon the Southern Cone via the South Atlantic, aligning with the predictions made by the ideologues of the French revolutionary war doctrine.

The circulation of the French school's political ideas resulted from a more interconnected world, but it also fostered new linkages. Born in Indochina, the *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine was later applied in Algeria and reached Latin America. From there, it took a boomerang route, stimulating Latin Americans to look to Africa. The Portuguese Empire's collapse was interpreted as an enemy advance, leading to the establishment of connections between the security apparatuses of the Southern Cone and African anti-communists, such as the apartheid regime. South Africa and Latin American dictatorships, as peripheral players in the Cold War, shared a common status as bastions of the Western Bloc. However, they were also arenas of internal power struggles, where elites inheriting a European colonial legacy faced the aspirations of subjugated populations. Consequently, the alliance between actors from these territories should be understood not solely as a chapter in the bipolar conflict but as a part of the decolonization process itself.

Further research is necessary to fully assess the extent of interactions between Latin American security sectors and Africa during the 1970s. While the events recounted in this chapter suggest the existence of a cooperative network among right-wing groups of the Global South, the level of coordination remains uncertain. Remnants of these events indicate that the African contacts of South American security actors might have been a reaction against a perceived solidarity between Latin American guerrillas and African liberation movements, seen as a threat. After all, the JCR had served as a justification for the creation of Operation Condor, and the activities of its members in Europe influenced South American strategies for engaging with that continent. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that reports of the group's presence in Africa could have boosted the extension of South American repression beyond the South Atlantic.

The contacts examined in this chapter primarily involved state actors, namely military and police personnel. Therefore, their actions cannot be entirely separated from the strategies pursued by the states they represented. However, constraining our interpretation solely to the framework of interstate relations would be overly restrictive. These movements had a transnational nature, driven by shared worldviews such as anti-communism and the *guerre révolutionnaire*, which transcended geographical boundaries. The emphatic warning for the Uruguayan Embassy in South Africa 'not to be advised' of Galarza's mission makes it clear that the South American security sectors' actions in Africa were, at the very least, not consensual within certain governments. This division between the military and diplomats, which is also evident in the case of the Brazilian police officers' secret mission in Northern Angola, serves as a reminder that states are not monolithic entities. A country's foreign policy often reflects internal

power struggles. Amid these internal disputes, the primary allies for a particular group could be found among sectors of other countries that share similar ideas and concerns.

In the Brazilian case, the side that was defeated in the power game of the 1970s consisted of the most radicalized military officials, many of whom held positions within the intelligence and security community. The adoption of a foreign policy based on economic pragmatism, which led Brazil to recognize the MPLA, clashed with the concerns of the regime's hardline faction, whose top priority remained the fight against communism, whether it was in Rio de Janeiro or on the battlefields of Quifangondo.

Notes

This work was funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal (grant SFRH/BD/129939/2017).

1. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
2. Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 10.
3. Antony G. Hopkins, 'Globalisation and Decolonisation', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no. 5 (2017): 729–45.
4. Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson. 'Rethinking Decolonization: A New Research Agenda for the Twenty-First Century', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed. Martin Thomas and Andrew Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 4–5.
5. Kyle Burke, *Revolutionaries for the Right: Anticommunist Internationalism and Paramilitary Warfare in the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 7.
6. Daniel Waksman-Schinca, 'El eje entre Sudáfrica y el Cono Sur Americano', *Nueva Sociedad*, no. 39 (1978): 97–106.
7. Anthony J. Leysens, 'South Africa's Military-Strategic Link with Latin America: Past Developments and Future Prospects', *International Affairs Bulletin* 15, no. 3 (1991): 23–47.
8. For a detailed portrayal of Brazil's intelligence and repression systems, Carlos Fico, *Como eles agiam: os subterrâneos da ditadura militar: espionagem e polícia política* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2001); Lucas Figueiredo, *Ministério do silêncio: a história do serviço secreto brasileiro de Washington Luís a Lula (1927–2005)* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2005), 129.
9. Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 25.
10. Rodrigo Nabuco de Araujo, 'Repensando a Guerra Revolucionária No Exército Brasileiro (1954–1975)', *Contemporânea. Revista de Sociologia Da UFSCar* 8 (2017): 88; Christopher Cradock and M. L. R. Smith, ' "No Fixed Values": A Reinterpretation of the Influence of the Theory of "Guerre Révolutionnaire" and the Battle of Algiers, 1956–1957', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 4 (2007): 73–4.
11. Cradock and Smith, 'No Fixed Values', 74; João Roberto Martins Filho, 'A Conexão Francesa: Da Argélia Ao Araguaia', *Varia Historia* 28, no. 48 (2012): 525.
12. Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare*, 25.

13. Jamie Miller, 'Yes, Minister: Reassessing South Africa's Intervention in the Angolan Civil War, 1975–1976', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 3 (2013): 4–33.
14. Marie-Monique Robin, *Escadrons de La Mort, l'école Française* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2008); João Roberto Martins Filho, 'A Influência Doutrinária Francesa Sobre Os Militares Brasileiros Nos Anos de 1960', *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 23, no. 67 (2008): 39–50; Araujo, 'Repensando a Guerra Revolucionária', 87–104; Leneide Duarte-Plon, *A Tortura Como Arma de Guerra – Da Argélia Ao Brasil: Como Os Militares Franceses Exportaram Os Esquadrões Da Morte e o Terrorismo de Estado* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2016); Cristian Gutiérrez Tapia, *La Contrasubversión Como Política: La Doctrina de Guerra Revolucionaria Francesa y Su Impacto En Las FF.AA. de Chile y Argentina* (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2018).
15. Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, *Guerra Revolucionária* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1965), 40.
16. Ibid.
17. Waksman-Schinca, 'El eje entre Sudáfrica', 97–106.
18. Samantha Viz Quadrat, 'Operação Condor: O "Mercosul" Do Terror', *Estudos Ibero-Americanos* 28, no. 1 (2002): 168–9; Roberto Simon, *O Brasil Contra a Democracia: A Ditadura, o Golpe No Chile e a Guerra Fria Na América Do Sul* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2021), 546.
19. Arquivo Nacional (Brazil), SNI, BR DFANBSB V8.MIC, GNC.AAA.83031040. 'JCR. Reuniões no Brasil, em NOV-DEZ/80 e JAN/81', 20 April 1981.
20. Simon, *O Brasil Contra a Democracia*, 548.
21. National Security Archive (US), Argentina Declassification Project, document 06, FBI cable, '[Condor: Chilbom]', secret, 28 September 1976, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/2843995/Document-07.pdf (accessed 18 March 2023).
22. Rodrigo Pezzonia, 'Exílio Em Português: Política e Vivências Dos Brasileiros Em Portugal (1974–1982)' (PhD thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2017), 77.
23. 'A memória do terror', testimony by Paulo Malhães to the State Truth Commission of Rio de Janeiro. http://comissaodaverdade.al.sp.gov.br/upload/010-depoimento_paulo_malhaes.pdf (accessed 15 June 2023).
24. 'Coronel Paulo Malhães, que assumiu torturas, é encontrado morto no Rio', *Folha de S.Paulo*, 25 April 2014, www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/04/1445454-coronel-paulo-malhaes-que-assumiu-torturas-e-encontrado-morto-no-rio.shtml (accessed 19 March 2023).
25. Arquivo Nacional (Brazil), CIEX – MRE, BR DFANBSB IE.0.0.15. 'JCR. Cuba. Angola', 30 April 1976.
26. CIA Records/FOIA (US), Argentina Declassification Project – The 'Dirty War' (1976–83), document no. 00513825, 'The Junta for Revolutionary Coordination (JCR)', 29 July 1977, www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/SANITIZEDTHE%20JUNTA%20FOR%20RE%5B15516008%5D.pdf (accessed 19 March 2023).
27. Archive for Contemporary Affairs of the University of the Free State (South Africa), Collection No. PV 476, File No. 1/97/1/1/26.
28. John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978), 126.
29. Gisele Lobato, 'O Brasil e a Independência de Angola (1975): Política Externa Oficial e Diplomacia Militar Paralela' (MA diss., ISCTE–Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, 2015); Gisele Lobato, 'The Strange Case of Brazilian Support to the FNLA in the Final Stage of Angolan Decolonization (1975)', *Afriche e Orienti*, no. 3 (2017): 31–48.
30. Testimony of Fernando Fernandes Xavier, Lisbon, 9 February 2019.

31. Arquivo da Defesa Nacional (Portugal), fundo 2.2, série 11, caixa 40, processo 6, ofício secreto nº 135, 'Serviço de Informações Estratégicas', do adido militar, naval e aeronáutico de Portugal no Rio de Janeiro para o chefe da 2ª Repartição do SGDN, de 23 de maio de 1967.
32. Elio Gaspari, *A Ditadura Escancarada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002).
33. Boneschi appears on the list of torturers prepared by the 'Brasil Nunca Mais' project: 'Os Funcionários', in *Projeto Brasil Nunca Mais* (São Paulo: Arquidiocese de São Paulo, 1985). Paulo Malhães assumed, in the aforementioned testimony, that he was one of the mentors of a clandestine centre in the city of Petrópolis that became known as *Casa da Morte* (House of Death).
34. Elio Gaspari, *A Ditadura Encurralada* (Rio de Janeiro: Intrínseca, 2014), 14.
35. Sylvio Frota, *Ideais Traídos* (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006), 198.
36. Testimony of Pedro Alberto Rodrigues da Silva, e-mail, 10 February 2019.
37. Personal archives of Fernando Fernandes Xavier, 002/8/75, from Holden Roberto to Comando Militar de Carmona, 28 August 1975.
38. Department of Defence Archives (South Africa), Military Intelligence, group 1, box 130, AMI/SK/8/23, 'Besoeke vanuit die buiteland: Uruguay'.
39. Ibid.
40. Testimony of Manuel Vicente da Cruz Gaspar, Pretoria, 27 November 2019.
41. Leysens, 'South Africa's Military-Strategic Link with Latin America', 36–7.
42. Department of Defence Archives (South Africa), Military Intelligence, group 1, box 124, AMI/SK/5/27, 'Skakeling met Polisie'.
43. Ibid.
44. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Final Report* (Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998), 196.
45. Harmer, *Allende's Chile*, 18.

Part 3

The Economy and Policies of Independence

9

Beyond ‘flag independence’: The Decolonization Committee and foreign interests in the Portuguese colonies, 1965–74

Aurora Almada e Santos

When taking a stand on methods and procedures for the Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (hereafter Decolonization Committee) established by the UN in 1961, the United States and the UK suggested that the body analyse general situations rather than individual territories.[1] They further proposed the body avoid decisions based on narrow majorities and instead sought consensus without resorting to a vote. Despite these opinions, the committee established a list of priorities for the study of the colonized territories individually and went on to adopt decisions through majority voting.[2] The dependent territories in Africa became a priority and, almost from the inception of the committee’s activities, the economic dimension of the right to self-determination was central to the debate on Portuguese colonialism. Stressing the right of the colonized peoples to dispose of their natural wealth and resources, as well as to freely pursue economic development, in 1965 the committee centred on the activities of foreign interests, whether economic or otherwise, in the Portuguese colonies. The reports on the subject highlighted a range of contentious ideas and diverse interpretations depending upon the concerns of member states.

This chapter examines how the Decolonization Committee addressed the interplay between foreign interests and colonial domination in the Portuguese colonies, from 1965 to 1974. Following other colonial powers, Portugal engaged in late colonial development projects from the 1950s to the end of the *Estado Novo*. Individual colonies, but especially Angola and Mozambique, received government funds to be channelled primarily into infrastructure, communication and industrialization.[3] The development efforts also centred around attracting the interest of international corporations, opening up the colonies to direct foreign investments.

This unfolding of development in Portuguese colonies has been the subject of different interpretations. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto characterize Portuguese colonial developmentalism as repressive, combining coercion, programmed strategies and processes of differentiation.[4] Cláudia Castelo assumes that

development in the Portuguese colonies, pursued after a shift towards a modernizing and technocratic discourse, was subordinated to metropolitan and white settlers' interests, neglecting almost entirely the Africans' social needs and welfare.[5] Specifically looking at the Development Plans pushed from 1953 onwards, Ricardo Ferraz and Víctor Pereira conclude that these plans, while investing more in the metropole than in the colonies, reflected a commitment to colonial domination.[6] Michael Mahoney complements this argument, adding that the relationship between development and colonialism in Portugal's case changed dramatically after the country's embrace of modernization theory to legitimize the hold on the colonies.[7]

An understanding of how international organizations like the UN – which were in the process of shaping a developmental agenda – perceived Portugal's developmental endeavours in its colonies is largely absent from scholarship. Drawing from underutilized UN records, Portuguese diplomatic sources, files of non-state actors and scholarly literature, this chapter sheds light on this largely untold story. The main argument is that the Decolonization Committee's focus on foreign interests in the Portuguese colonies unveiled multiple and overlapping fractures among member states. The chapter demonstrates how the fragmentation, fuelled by member states' concerns and Portugal's behind-the-scenes diplomacy, divided the body along the Cold War rivalry, the North–South divide and the opposition between the anticolonial majority and the supporters of Portugal.

The chapter is arranged into three parts, starting with a sketch of the controversies sparked by the Decolonization Committee's assertion that foreign interests were obstructing self-determination in the Portuguese colonies. The second part follows the discussion after the committee's statement that foreign interests impeded self-determination in all colonized territories. Finally, it examines the committee's involvement in the transnational campaign against the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique and the hydroelectric scheme in the Cunene River in Angola, denounced as symbols of cooperation between Portugal, white minority regimes and foreign interests in Southern Africa. In the end, the chapter intends to broaden the terrain covered by the studies on Portuguese decolonization and the UN involvement in the process, by analysing a topic that remains poorly understood.

Foreign interests in the Portuguese colonies: 1965–6

After the war erupted in Angola in 1961, the UN placed Portuguese colonialism on its agenda. In November, the organization set up the Decolonization Committee tasked to oversee the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (hereafter Declaration), adopted in Resolution 1514 (XV), on 14 December 1960.[8] The Declaration proclaimed the right to self-determination and entailed a claim that the peoples should freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. In the same vein, the document upheld the right to pursue economic, social and cultural development.[9] The tendency to not confine self-determination to the political sphere and to include provisions on the right to economic self-determination, although far from unanimously accepted, reflected the association with the human

rights discourse that was gaining momentum at the UN.[10] Many resolutions related to the subject of self-determination and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) made attempts to establish that self-determination had to encompass economic rights and was essential for the enjoyment of all other human rights.[11]

Arguably, the inclusion of an economic dimension within the right to self-determination influenced the efforts of the Decolonization Committee to challenge colonial domination as much as the political dimension. To some degree, this reflected an ongoing debate about the real meaning of self-determination and the ways to move beyond 'flag independence' to achieve effective control over the economies of the newly independent countries.[12] The Decolonization Committee enjoyed a central position in this debate, building on the right to economic self-determination. Initially composed of seventeen and afterwards enlarged to twenty-four members, the distribution of seats at the committee reflected broad regional balance at the UN.[13] The driving force behind the committee came from African and Asian countries, which shared a history of colonial domination and economic backwardness when compared to the so-called Western industrialized states.[14] Although competing viewpoints and rifts prevented them from forming a homogenous group, they established a loosely bound network with a degree of commonality.[15] The Afro-Asians lobbied the UN to prioritize matters concerning the Global South, such as colonialism, racial discrimination and economic and social development.[16]

Although Portugal was absent from the Decolonization Committee because it refused to cooperate with the UN on decolonization, the Afro-Asians weaponized the body against the Lisbon government. The first explicit proposal to investigate the role of foreign interests in the Portuguese colonies was put forth by the Soviet Union.[17] The country turned against the activities of international monopolies that held interests in the Portuguese colonies as part of its discourse challenging Portugal's colonial rule in Africa. While the Portuguese colonial issue was not a high priority for the USSR, it served as a means to win the goodwill of the Afro-Asian majority.[18] Harbouring suspicions about Soviet rhetoric and concerned about Cold War influence, the Afro-Asians sought to lead the debate on decolonization.[19] Together with Yugoslavia, in July 1964 they endorsed the study of the activities of foreign interests, whether economic or otherwise, in the Portuguese colonies.[20] Thus, the Afro-Asians helped embroil the Portuguese colonial issue in the ongoing debate on 'permanent sovereignty over natural resources' (PSNR) – as a right to enjoy the benefits of resource exploitation – that was taking place inside and outside the UN.

Starting from the early 1950s, the debate on PSNR revolved around efforts to ensure for the non-self-governing territories the benefits from the exploitation of their natural resources. It was also motivated by the desire to provide the postcolonial states with legal tools to defend their economic sovereignty against potential claims by other countries, namely the former colonial powers, and foreign companies.[21] A highly controversial topic, the debate on PSNR was affected by the schism between North and South and by Cold War rivalry, making it difficult to reach a consensus among the UN member states.[22] One dimension of this debate tried to align self-determination, sovereignty over natural resources and human rights. The debate would also follow other directions, with the Global South actively emphasizing state control over natural

resources and pursuing ways of implementing the PSNR. The Global South wanted to promote a link between sovereignty over natural resources and a global commitment to their economic development.[23]

The Decolonization Committee's decision to study foreign interests in the Portuguese colonies was also influenced by a diverse range of actors. Soon after the beginning of the war in Angola, the UN decided to use a plurality of sources to gather information on Portuguese colonies, such as petitions and public hearings with representatives of anticolonial organizations, refugees, religious institutions, solidarity groups and individuals.[24] These hearings provided a platform for accusations that Portugal was exploiting both the human and natural resources of its colonies with the support of foreign interests. In particular, the anticolonial organizations alleged that Portugal engaged in forced labour, supplied cheap manpower to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and promoted white settlement and appropriation of lands owned by Africans.[25]

This initiative resonated with and was influenced by campaigns launched by many solidarity organizations established in Western countries to support the struggle for independence in the Portuguese colonies. Among these, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) emerged as the most vocal, attaining the status of a non-governmental organization at the UN.[26] The US corporate investments in the Portuguese colonies, as well as in Southern Africa, became one of the main concerns of the ACOA.[27] The organization conducted research on the subject, studying, for instance, the use of Angolan coffee by the US food companies or the interests of the American oil companies in the Portuguese colonies. Leaflets or background papers –such as *US Investment and Economic Involvement in the Portuguese Colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea* – publicized the committee's findings.[28] As a weapon for expediting the end of colonialism, in 1966 ACOA launched a campaign with the objective of ending the US companies' investments in the Portuguese colonies.[29]

It was within this atmosphere that the study of the activities of foreign interests, whether economic or otherwise, in the Portuguese colonies unfolded. The Decolonization Committee assigned the study to Subcommittee I, composed of eight members: Denmark, Ethiopia, Mali, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, USSR and Yugoslavia.[30] The basis for the Subcommittee's work was the papers prepared by the Secretariat on various aspects of Portuguese colonialism. The body also brought together the information volunteered to the Decolonization Committee by petitioners, primarily the anticolonial organizations, whose representatives, as stated above, mobilized the discourse against foreign interests as a tool in the fight for sovereignty. From its report issued in 1965 one can infer the Subcommittee's stand that political and economic self-determination were indivisible.[31] The document asserted that the resources in the colonies rightfully belonged to the African populations, aligning with the PSNR. It denounced the exploitation of mining and land resources in Angola and Mozambique either directly by Portuguese companies or indirectly through international monopolies originating from countries like Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France, Norway, South Africa, the UK and the US.[32]

While highlighting that Portugal and foreign interests in its colonies were linked by a system of mutual advantages, the report propelled a set of ideas. These included

acknowledging that foreign interests were helping Portugal strengthen its colonial domination, bearing responsibility for the suffering of the colonized populations.[33] And, as they were a source of financial and material assistance to Portugal, the assumption was that foreign interests played a role in the suppression of national liberation movements and reinforced Portuguese control over the populations. Consequently, the report concluded that foreign investments were obstructing the implementation of the Declaration in the Portuguese colonies.[34] What also emerged from the document was that it was among states – namely the NATO members – whose citizens owned companies or had economic interests in the Portuguese colonies that Portugal found stronger support to persevere in its refusal to apply the UN Charter and resolutions.[35]

In its complementary report issued in 1966, Subcommittee I thinking about foreign interests in the Portuguese colonies remained unchanged, with the report restating the idea they obstruct self-determination.[36] Probably to counter criticism about the lack of detailed information on how foreign interests operated, the document extended its analysis to specific sectors. Reviewing the situation in agriculture and industrial transformation in Angola and Mozambique, it concluded that Portugal had put in place regulations favouring white settlers and companies with foreign capital in ownership of land and in production, treatment and commercialization of agricultural products.[37] While noting that all commercial crops in Angola and Mozambique were in foreign hands, the document enunciated the negative consequences of such a situation for local populations. Furthermore, the conclusions brought to the fore the interests linking Portugal and privately owned railways in Angola and Mozambique, with the report arguing that the railroads built with foreign capital aimed to help the development of white settlements inland, the transportation of minerals and other resources, as well as to generate foreign exchange.[38]

The report additionally analysed the economic relations between Mozambique, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In 1965, the white minority government in Southern Rhodesia proclaimed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, at the same time when South Africa's rule in South West Africa (Namibia) was being challenged by an armed struggle. In this context, the UN framed the Portuguese colonial issue in the regional context, denouncing the formation of an 'unholy alliance' between Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal.[39] The organization handled the situations in the Portuguese colonies and Southern Africa as having the same traits. The study of foreign interests was an example of such an approach, with the report denouncing the reinforcement of economic relations as a result of an increase in South African investments in Mozambique.[40] Concerning Southern Rhodesia, whose minerals circulated through the Portuguese colonies, the report also perceived a major threat, indicating that after the UDI economic cooperation with Mozambique had intensified.[41]

Both reports triggered a discussion within the Decolonization Committee, exposing how divisive their conclusions were among member states. At the heart of the dispute was the idea that foreign investments were hindering the implementation of the Declaration. The US, Italy, the UK, Australia and Denmark took a rather strong stand against this claim, casting doubts on the report findings and highlighting what they perceived as the positive role of foreign interests in the economic development

of Portuguese colonies.[42] The US and the UK particularly questioned the rationale of both reports, with the American representative arguing they provided a Marxist and simplistic view endorsed by a small number of Subcommittee I members, who were convinced that private investment was a form of exploitation.[43]

With Australia's backing, the US strongly rejected the notion that NATO supported Portugal's colonial policy. Denmark, as a member of Subcommittee I, went further asking that the report include the Danish position that foreign interests were not an obstacle to self-determination.[44] Such affirmations must be read, as explained by Joseph Parrott in Chapter 4 of this volume, in the context of the Western countries' dual policy of providing rhetorical support for self-determination while avoiding condemnation of a NATO member state. Due to the strategic importance of the Azores base and its membership of NATO, Portugal was able to leverage the Cold War as a protective shield at the UN.[45] Another explanation for the Western countries' declarations was the reluctance to accept international pressure on their companies. The US corporations in particular were under attack for their investments in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, with accusations that their economic interests were shaping America's attitudes towards decolonization and apartheid.[46]

The Western objections were not accepted by the Afro-Asian and the socialist countries that endorsed the report as an accurate depiction of the situation in the Portuguese colonies.[47] By using the same language in these debates, the Afro-Asians and the socialists forged an anticolonial coalition, evincing that the Cold War divide was only one dimension of the fractures prompted by the Subcommittee I conclusions.[48] Countries of both blocs – for example, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, USSR, Bulgaria, Poland and Tunisia – opposed accusations about the ideological bias of the reports, with the Soviet, Bulgarian and Polish representatives heavily criticizing NATO for giving assistance to Portugal that was used in the repression of the anticolonial organizations.[49] Meanwhile, the representatives of Ethiopia, Mali and Syria felt that the Western countries misinterpreted the reports, arguing the documents did not condemn all private investments since in the cases where there was no racial discrimination the investments could benefit the local population.[50]

The rhetorical power of the Afro-Asian and socialist anticolonial coalition had a substantial impact and, as in other UN bodies, led many countries to refrain from taking a stand on the Portuguese colonial issue. The Latin American members of the Decolonization Committee – Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela – exemplified this behaviour, by choosing not to intervene in the discussions to avoid confrontation with the anticolonial majority. Amidst this politically charged atmosphere, in 1965 the Afro-Asian and socialist coalition voted in favour of the report, while Australia, the US and the UK rejected it. Chile, Denmark, Italy and Venezuela abstained.[51] The same situation occurred in 1966 when the complementary report was adopted with the backing of the Afro-Asian and socialist votes.[52] The voting echoed what was going on in other parts of the UN system, whereas the anticolonial majority proposed penalizing decisions against Portugal, the number of supporters dwindled, with the Western and Latin American countries voting against or abstaining.[53]

Scholarship has highlighted the reasons for the Western countries voting patterns at the UN, but the motivations behind the abstentions of the Latin Americans – that

were championing the development agenda and also had concerns about the role of international companies in their economies – are less well known.[54] As Portuguese diplomatic papers reveal, they were being targeted by Portugal's backstage diplomatic efforts. Since 1961, with the assistance of Spain and Brazil, who did not want to be isolated in their support of Portugal at the UN, Portuguese diplomats attempted to win the Latin American votes.[55] By the middle of the 1960s, Portugal expanded its network of embassies and consulates in Latin America to enhance its influence and secure votes at the UN.[56] Another factor to be considered was the responsiveness of some Latin American countries to the US policy on Portuguese colonialism.[57] Countries headed by conservative governments, like Chile until the 1970 election of Salvador Allende, were always eager to know the US position and aligned with Western countries when voting on the Portuguese colonial issue.[58] The voting practices of the Latin Americans demonstrated that the North–South divide on the exploitation of natural resources was blurred due to the fracture introduced by the Portuguese colonialism at the UN.

Foreign interests in colonized territories: 1967–8

Following the recommendations of the Decolonization Committee, the General Assembly decided to extend the study of foreign interests obstructing the implementation of the Declaration to all colonized territories. Foreign interests in colonized territories became an annual item on the UN agenda, with the Decolonization Committee studying the issue and presenting a report to the General Assembly, whose members subsequently passed a resolution in the plenary. The Subcommittee I 1967 report expressed concern about the relentless penetration, consolidation and expansion of foreign interests that were an obstacle to the fulfilment of the Declaration.[59] For Subcommittee I, foreign interests in colonized territories were tantamount to the exploitation of natural resources and manpower, with the help of discriminatory laws. By the same token, the report stressed that all economic sectors of the colonized territories were dominated by foreign monopolies and white settlers to the detriment of their development and future economic prospects.[60] The report also linked foreign interests to racial discrimination and the repression of the national liberation movements. Foreign interests, the report maintained, were endangering international peace and security insofar as they were an obstacle to the independence of the colonized peoples.[61]

As the examination of foreign interests within the framework of one of the UN Charter's fundamental principles gained prominence, the report gave special attention to the situation in the Portuguese colonies.[62] By summarizing the key conclusions reached in 1965 and 1966, the document showcased both adaptation and evolution, with the disappearance of some ideas and the introduction of new elements. Although maintaining that foreign interests and Western support of Portuguese colonial policy could not be divorced, the report articulated a less inflammatory critique of Portugal's NATO partners. Compared with the preceding reports, a slight change in perspective was apparent, as the Subcommittee I now wanted to demonstrate that international monopolies sought to influence certain Western countries, motivating

them to obstruct the implementation of the Declaration.[63] Similarly, less information on the impact of South African and Rhodesian companies in the Portuguese colonies found its way into the report. Another departure from earlier documents was a major focus on Portugal colluding with foreign interests to increase profits collected from mining and agricultural sectors in Angola and Mozambique.[64] Additionally, the report invested much more effort in comparing the revenues obtained by foreign interests with those retained by local populations, to demonstrate that suffering was an outcome of foreign-led exploitation.[65]

As the previous discussions had anticipated, Australia, Finland (that replaced Denmark at the Decolonization Committee), Italy, the UK and the US launched an assault on the report. These countries understood that the evidence given in support of the report was unsubstantial and that the conclusions were based on generalizations and ideological quarrels.[66] The essential aspect of Western argument continued to be that the report did not establish a distinction between foreign interests harmful to the colonized subjects and those that were beneficial to them.[67] They pointed out how the situation was different depending on the territories and as such it was difficult to make rigorous comparisons between all the colonies. To highlight contradictions and undermine the technical credibility of the document, the Western countries warned against relying on information coming from only a few cases.[68] They also proposed greater attention be paid to the economic policies, the rules for creating companies, the minimum wage, the cost of living, the guarantees against racial discrimination and the freedom of association in the colonized territories.[69]

These arguments found resonance among the Latin American countries. Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay branded the Subcommittee's conclusions as questionable and, in the Chilean case, its representative presented reservations about the report.[70] The Western and Latin American attitudes stood in stark contrast to the claims of those countries seeking to establish credibility for the document. Tunisia, Syria, USSR, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Poland, Mali, India, Tanzania, Iraq and Sierra Leone dismissed Western claims and insisted on the validity of the report conclusions'.[71] In particular, Ethiopia disagreed with the Western position that the report condemned all foreign investments, explaining that only those hindering political aspirations and not safeguarding the interests of the populations were being condemned.[72] To answer criticisms about the technical flaws of the document, Tunisia suggested the creation of a group of experts tasked with summarizing the information on the subject.[73]

Despite the appearance of unity, Afro-Asian countries like Madagascar and Iran aligned with the Western claim that the report relied on simplifications and generalizations and asked for an in-depth study of labour codes and investment laws in the colonized territories.[74] Ivory Coast went even further, arguing that foreign investments were not always an impediment to independence.[75] There were several reasons why these countries opposed the view of the anticolonial majority. Some of it was due to Portugal's backstage diplomacy, which, for example, targeted Madagascar, pushing for the country to abstain when voting on the Portuguese colonial issue.[76] Portugal also likely applied pressure upon Iran verbally in New York, even if Portuguese papers only document backstage diplomatic efforts towards the country in the early 1970s.[77] As for Ivory Coast, its deviation from the anticolonial majority was

motivated by the fear of Soviet influence in Africa, prompting calls for dialogue with the colonialist and white minority regimes.[78]

Regardless of these divergent perspectives, votes from Afro-Asian, socialist and Latin American members upheld the report. Australia, the UK and the US voted against it, while Finland and Italy abstained.[79] The novelty lay in the behaviour of the Latin American countries, whose ambiguity on the Portuguese colonial issue was evident in their often contradictory voting behaviour.[80] Based on the Decolonization Committee report, the General Assembly approved Resolution 2288 (XXII), on 7 December 1967. The resolution was, in fact, a condemnatory one, using strong language. It declared as a contravention of the UN Charter and an obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration all colonial powers' initiatives to deprive the colonized subjects of the full enjoyment of their natural resources.[81] Furthermore, the resolution strongly condemned the exploitation of the colonized territories and peoples, as well as the methods used by foreign interests to perpetuate colonialism. In terms of measures to be implemented, the Assembly called upon the colonial powers to prohibit the exploitation of human and natural resources in ways that ran counter to the interests of the colonized territories, ending practices that obstructed local populations' access to natural resources and addressing injustice and discrimination in labour remuneration.[82]

Symptomatic of the fragilities in enforcing its decisions, the General Assembly did not establish mechanisms to oversee the implementation of Resolution 2288 (XXII). Being only decided to maintain the item on the agenda, the Decolonization Committee reappointed Subcommittee I to continue the study. In 1968, the body spent less time on the subject, resulting in fewer confrontation among member states. The new report concluded that the colonial powers and the countries whose nationals had interests in the colonized territories made no efforts to implement Resolution 2288 (XXII).[83] Referencing previous conclusions, the Subcommittee admitted that the various forms of exploitation that deprived the populations of the natural resources indispensable to viable independence had actually become more entrenched.[84] After Finland, Italy and Ivory Coast restated their views, the member states adopted the report with a voting similar to the previous year (6-3-2), revealing continuing divisions among member states regarding the role of foreign interests in colonized territories.[85]

While the Decolonization Committee's stance on the question of foreign interests did not change, the General Assembly adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards Portugal. Several factors contributed to this shift: the expectation of a change in Portugal's colonial policy under the incoming prime minister, Marcelo Caetano; the desire to surpass divisions and to secure Latin American votes; and the reduced attention given to Portuguese colonialism due to its study alongside the situations in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.[86] On 18 December 1968, the General Assembly approved Resolution 2425 (XXIII), reflecting this new approach, since it did not go as far as the previous decision on foreign interests. Unlike the Resolution 2288 (XXII), instead of issuing a 'strong condemnation', it only 'condemned' the exploitation of the colonized territories and peoples by foreign interests and the methods they adopted.[87] However, the key difference was the less elaborated requests for administering powers and to member states to take measures ensuring that foreign activities did not undermine the rights and

interests of the colonized subjects.[88] This resolution made clear that the UN was not a coherent entity, lacking continuity in its decisions. This outcome was by no means new and would persist in the following years, underscoring the many contradictions the organization faced in its efforts to challenge Portuguese colonialism.[89]

Cabora Bassa Dam and Cunene Hydroelectric: 1969–74

The more the Decolonization Committee studied foreign interests in colonized territories, the more it repeated the interpretation they were an obstacle to self-determination. In its 1969 report, the Subcommittee I started commenting on the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam (now known as Cahora Bassa), a hydroelectric scheme on the Zambezi River in Mozambique. The project was of strategic importance for Portugal to portray its colonialism as a source of development for the colonies.[90] In 1968, Portugal entrusted the construction of the dam to the Zambezi Consortium Hydroelectric (ZAMCO), formed by companies from the FRG, France, Italy, Portugal, South Africa and Sweden.[91] In response, FRELIMO contested the construction of Cabora Bassa, launching attacks on the construction site and denouncing the project internationally, including at the UN. When dealing with the subject, Subcommittee I argued that foreign investors, specifically the Anglo-American Corporation and the South African companies, wanted to produce electricity but also to build up Portuguese settlements.[92] Thus, it concluded the interests behind Cabora Bassa would help maintain Portuguese rule in Mozambique, whereas South Africa, as the prime consumer of the electricity to be produced, would extend its influence on the territory.[93]

These references to Cabora Bassa were an echo at the UN of the emergence of a transnational campaign against the dam across the globe. This transnational campaign was part of the movement of solidarity towards the anticolonial and anti-racist organizations in Southern Africa, a process that mobilized different actors as referred by Ana Moledo in Chapter 5 of this volume. The campaign against Cabora Bassa mobilized governments, international organizations, non-state actors (solidarity groups, trade unions, students, youth groups, churches, peace movements and so on), alongside concerned individuals.[94] Activists formed numerous action groups and local Cabora Bassa groups, whose activities included researching and analysing data, dissemination of information through publications of booklets, articles, letters and postcards, staging public demonstrations and advocating for boycotts of companies associated with the project.[95] The opposition against Cabora Bassa fostered transnational connections with similar groups in different countries and also with FRELIMO.[96] The pressure exerted by the campaign forced two companies involved in the construction to eventually withdraw from the consortium.

Branding the dam as an example of Portugal's non-compliance with UN Resolutions, until 1974 Subcommittee I put forward a set of conclusions about Cabora Bassa. In particular, the body argued the project was an extension of a military and paramilitary industrial complex under the aegis of South Africa designed to penetrate neighbouring territories.[97] According to this view, Portugal and the minority regimes undertook the project with the help of foreign monopolies to further oppress the populations and

suppress the liberation struggles in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia.[98] As a culmination, the Subcommittee I concluded the dam would allow introducing one million settlers, thus strengthening white supremacy in Southern Africa and escalating international tensions.[99]

The centrality accorded to Cabora Bassa resonated in considerations regarding the Cunene River scheme in Angola. After an agreement with South Africa, Portugal launched a water use plan for the Cunene River that provided for the construction of twenty-eight hydroelectric improvements, some of them funded by South African capital. This came at a moment when the denunciation of foreign interests in Angola resulted in the launching of boycotts: one in the US against the Gulf Oil Corporation operations in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda and another targeting Angolan coffee in the Netherlands.[100] Like Cabora Bassa, Cunene was viewed by Subcommittee I as a tool to consolidate and to further strengthen the colonialist and racist regimes in Southern Africa.[101] Foremost, the body concluded that the electricity to be produced would benefit mines in Namibia, owned by companies from Canada, the FRG, the UK and the US. Voicing scepticism, the Subcommittee linked the Cunene project to increasing cooperation between Portugal and South Africa.[102] It argued the scheme would allow the expansion of foreign commercial interests, which were already depleting the Angolan mineral resources. Accusing Portugal of arbitrarily regrouping and resettling local populations, Subcommittee I saw Cunene as the beginning of a broader plan to settle up to a million immigrants in Angola and Namibia.[103]

With the opposition to Cabora Bassa and Cunene becoming a rallying cry, the debate about the Subcommittee I conclusions did not undergo the same scrutiny as before. In 1969, several countries made reservations about the report of the Subcommittee I and a separate vote was taken on one of its recommendations.[104] Nevertheless, no country outright opposed the document, which was adopted by seventeen votes and four abstentions. One year later, the UK (whose representative avoided engaging with the subject of Cabora Bassa), Venezuela and Ivory Coast voiced reservations, with the Venezuelan representative even declining to participate in the voting. With fourteen votes in favour and two abstentions, the report won the support of the Decolonization Committee.[105] From 1971 onward, the situation changed since major opponents to the Subcommittee I conclusions, the US and the UK, vacated their seats at the Decolonization Committee, while other Western countries like Italy, Norway and Australia were replaced.[106] In the case of the US and the UK, the departure was motivated by the constant criticism of their actions from other member states and it had an impact on the voting of the Subcommittee I reports.[107] Although many countries – including Ivory Coast, Sweden and Venezuela – continued to express reservations, between 1971 and 1974 the Decolonization Committee adopted the reports without objections.

As the General Assembly continued to pass conciliatory, rather than condemnatory, decisions concerning Portuguese colonies, on 12 December 1969 the body issued Resolution 2554 (XXIV), which was a moderate document, introducing little innovations. Among these was the affirmation that foreign interests exploiting the colonized territories were a major obstacle to political independence and enjoyment of natural resources by the populations.[108] In the request to colonial powers and countries

whose citizens and companies had interests in colonized territories, the document singled out Southern Africa, asking for no more investments in the region. It further requested all states to take effective measures to cease the supply of any assistance the colonial powers were using to repress the liberation movements.[109] In Resolution 2703 (XXV), of 14 December 1970, the General Assembly maintained the conciliatory position, although nuances were visible. Here, Cabora Bassa was mentioned for the first time in an Assembly's decision, being described as a plot to perpetuate domination, exploitation and oppression in Southern Africa by the governments of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.[110]

Between 1971 and April 1974, the organization stepped up its support to the liberation struggle in Portuguese colonies and challenged Portugal with its decisions on foreign investments in colonized territories. Portuguese colonialism gained a relevance never seen before, due to growing discontent with Marcelo Caetano's rule, the discussion of the item separately from the situations in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, while the willingness to win broad support for the resolutions gradually lost importance.[111] In Resolution 2873 (XXVI), of 20 December 1971, the General Assembly condemned both the Cabora Bassa and the Cunene River projects as aiming to further entrench colonialist and racist domination in Southern Africa and as a source of international tension.[112] It deplored the policies of the governments which did not prevent their nationals and companies under their jurisdiction from participating in the schemes. The resolution also urgently requested to those governments to take measures to terminate such participation and ensure an immediate withdrawal from these projects.[113]

Using the technique of repetition to convey past conclusions about Cabora Bassa and Cunene, Resolution 2979 (XXVII), of 14 December 1972, and Resolution 3117 (XXVIII), of 12 December 1973, testified to how the UN's approach to the subject changed towards the use of an increasingly condemnatory language.[114] Four main dispositions ran through these resolutions. First, the Assembly condemned the policies of the colonial powers and other countries which continued to support foreign interests engaged in the exploitation of resources from the colonized territories.[115] Second, it strongly condemned the continuation of the Cabora Bassa and Cunene River projects. Third, it condemned the policies of those governments which had not prevented their citizens and companies from taking part in the projects. Finally, once again, it made urgent requests for measures to terminate the participation in activities related to both projects.[116]

The overthrow of the *Estado Novo* on 25 April 1974 accelerated the dissolution of Portugal's rule in Africa and signalled the end of the Decolonization Committee's investigation into the activities of foreign interests in Portuguese colonies. In the negotiations for independence between Portugal and the liberation movements the political dimension of the right to self-determination took precedence and none of the agreements signed referred to foreign interests. Nevertheless, the liberation movements agreed to respect the financial commitments taken by Portugal in the name of the colonies provided they were concluded in the interest of the territories. As the dam neared completion at the moment of Mozambique's independence in July 1975,

the ownership of the Cabora Bassa company and the negotiation of its debt settlement became the most contentious legacy of Portuguese late colonial development drive.[117] The dam remained a source of economic and diplomatic friction between Mozambique and Portugal until 2007 when the Mozambican government took control of the hydroelectric company as the majority shareholder.[118]

Conclusion

The study of the activities of foreign interests in Portuguese colonies unfolded during a narrow and specific period, when diverse and, often, contested topics came together under the umbrella of the Portuguese colonial issue at the UN. It illustrates some of the characteristics of the UN debate on Portuguese colonialism, including the mobilization of the language of rights, the repetition of ideas for legitimation, the contradictions held by the organization, the limits of the General Assembly's power to enforce its decisions and the variety of perspectives presented by member states. An analysis of the debate allows us insights into how the diplomatic and rhetorical campaign against Portuguese colonialism waged within the UN widened its scope from the political realm to the economic one. The origins, goals and rhetoric behind the Decolonization Committee conclusions can be traced to divergent political imaginaries, informed by an array of actors and circumstances both inside and outside the UN. Although after 1974 the subject was not contemplated in the negotiations for independence, it helped shape the perception that Portuguese colonialism, similarly to the white minority regimes in Southern Africa, was backed by wider international interests.

The trajectory of this debate within the Decolonization Committee mirrored the broader tensions present within other UN bodies as they wrestled with the Portuguese colonial issue. Examining this debate held at the committee reveal multiple fractures that were only bridged at the price of Western disengagement from the body. The two camps in the committee, one advocating condemnation of foreign interests in Portuguese colonies as obstructing independence, and the other insisting for recognition of the role of those activities in the economic progress of the territories, aligned with the rift within the UN between East and West. However, the fractures went beyond the Cold War conflict, thus revealing a more complex picture.

The North–South divide on the PSNR was additionally on display, although the debate made clear that the Latin Americans often yielded to Portugal's backstage diplomacy and were not sympathetic to the rhetoric of other Global South countries on the issue of foreign investments in Portuguese colonies. The impact of the divide between the anticolonial majority and Portuguese supporters was as important as those of the East–West binary of the Cold War and the North–South divide on resource sovereignty. The anticolonial coalition formed by the Afro-Asian and the socialist countries used the debate on foreign interests to try to galvanize world opinion against Portuguese colonialism. Yet, the debate also illustrated their members were united by loosely compatible agendas, which failed to form a fully coherent strategy.

Notes

This work was supported by the Institute of Contemporary History, funded through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, I.P., under the scope of the projects UIDB/04209/2020, UIDP/04209/2020 and LA/P/0132/2020.

1. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/5238. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux (Pour la Période du 20 Février au 19 Septembre 1962) (Canada, 1963), 7.
2. Ibid., 18–19.
3. Scholarship on this subject is meagre: Cláudia Castelo, 'Developing "Portuguese Africa" in Late Colonialism: Confronting Discourses', in *Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in Twentieth Century Colonialism*, ed. Joseph Hodge, Gerald Hodl and Martina Kopf (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 63–86; Cláudia Castelo, 'Ciência, Estado e Desenvolvimento no Colonialismo Português Tardio', in *O Império Colonial em Questão (Sécs. XIX–XX): Poderes, Saberes e Instituições*, ed. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo (Lisbon: Edições 70, 2012), 317–47: Fernanda Rollo, 'O Programa de Assistência Técnica: O Interesse Americano nas Colónias Portuguesas', *Ler História* 47 (2004): 81–123; António José Telo, *Economia e Império no Portugal Contemporâneo* (Lisbon: Cosmos, 1994); G. Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825–1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985); Gervase Clarence-Smith, 'Business Empires in Angola under Salazar, 1930–1961', *African Economic History* 14 (1985): 1–13; Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira, 'A Lógica da Consolidação da Economia de Mercado em Angola, 1930–74', *Análise Social* 21, no. 1 (1985): 83–110.
4. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto, 'A Modernizing Empire? Politics, Culture, and Economy in Portuguese Late Colonialism', in *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons*, ed. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 51–80.
5. Cláudia Castelo, ' "Novos Brasis" em África: Desenvolvimento e Colonialismo Português Tardio', *Varia Historia* 30, no. 53 (2014): 507–32.
6. Ricardo Ferraz, *Os Planos de Fomento do Estado Novo: Quantificação e Análise* (Lisbon: Edições Sílabo, 2022); Víctor Pereira, 'A Economia do Império e os Planos de Fomento', in *O Império Colonial em Questão*, 261–95.
7. Michael Mahoney, 'Estado Novo, Homem Novo (New State, New Man): Colonial and Anticolonial Development Ideologies in Mozambique, 1930–1977', in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, ed. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele and Michael E. Latham (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 165–98.
8. Aurora Almada e Santos, 'O Comité de Descolonização da Organização das Nações Unidas e os Movimentos de Libertação das Colónias Portuguesas: 1961–1976' (MA diss., Nova University of Lisbon, 2009).
9. United Nations, Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960, https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/152/88/pdf/nr015288.pdf?token=knwE1F5Dbm4bBKoKxG&fe=true (accessed 28 April 2012).
10. Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, *Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
11. Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 39.

12. Reiland Rabaka, *Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition, from W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral* (New York: Lexington Books, 2009), 187.
13. Santos, *O Comité de Descolonização*, 25–9.
14. In this chapter, the term 'Western' is used to refer to the US, Canada, Central, Western and Northern European countries, Australia and New Zealand.
15. Samantha Christiansen and Zachary Scarlett, eds, *The Third World in the Global 1960s* (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 3.
16. Chris Alden, *Sally Morphet and Marco Antonio Vieira, The South in World Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1.
17. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/5800/Rev.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux. 1964 (Canada, 1965), 169–71.
18. Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021).
19. Fernando Martins, 'Portugal e a Organização das Nações Unidas: Uma História da Política Externa e Ultramarina Portuguesa no Pós-guerra (Agosto de 1941–Setembro de 1968)' (MA diss., Nova University of Lisbon, 1995), 187.
20. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/5800/Rev.1, 179.
21. Nico Schrijver, *Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3.
22. Ibid., 6.
23. Isabella D. Bunn, *The Right to Development and International Economic Law: Legal and Moral Dimensions* (Oxford: Hart, 2012).
24. Aurora Almada e Santos, 'The United Nations and Portuguese Colonies, 1961–1962: Information Gathering and the Evolving Interpretation of Article 73(e)', in *The United Nations and Decolonization*, ed. Nicole Eggers, Jessica Lynne Pearson and Aurora Almada e Santos (London: Routledge, 2020), 171–205.
25. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/5238, 138–40.
26. Aurora Almada e Santos, ' "Action Needed": The American Committee on Africa and Solidarity with Angola', in *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties*, ed. Zeina Maasri, Cathy Bergin and Francesca Burke (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022), 154–78.
27. African Activist Archive (hereafter AAA), Michigan State University (hereafter MSU), ACOA, 1967 Report.
28. AAA, MSU, ACOA, 1969 Report.
29. David Vogel, 'Tracing the American Roots of the Political Consumerism Movement', in *Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present*, ed. Michele Micheletti, Andreas Follesdal and Dietlind Stolle (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2004), 87–8.
30. Santos, *O Comité de Descolonização*, 33.
31. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6000/Rev.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux. 1965 (United States, 1966), 237.
32. Ibid., 237–8.
33. Ibid., 238.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 239.

36. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6300/Rev.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux. 1966 (United States, 1967), 402–3.
37. Ibid., 403.
38. Ibid., 404.
39. Aurora Almada e Santos, *A Organização das Nações Unidas e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa (1960–1974)* (Lisbon: Instituto de Defesa Nacional, 2017), 157.
40. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6300/Rev.1, 404.
41. Ibid.
42. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6000/Rev.1, 205.
43. Ibid., 206.
44. Ibid., 207–8.
45. Luís Nuno Rodrigues, *Salazar e Kennedy: A Crise de uma Aliança* (Lisbon: Editorial Notícias, 2002).
46. AAA, MSU, Executive Director's Report to the Annual Meeting of the American Committee on Africa Executive Board, 12 April 1965.
47. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6000/Rev.1, 207.
48. Ilya V. Gaiduk, *Divided Together: The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations* (Stanford: Stanford University Pres, 2012).
49. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6000/Rev.1, 206–10.
50. Ibid., 208–9.
51. Ibid., 237.
52. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6300/Rev.1, 404.
53. Santos, *A Organização das Nações Unidas*, 50.
54. See, for instance, Pedro Aires Oliveira, *Os Despojos da Aliança. A Grã-Bretanha e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa, 1945–1975* (Lisbon: Tinta-da-China, 2007).
55. Santos, *A Organização das Nações Unidas.*
56. Arquivo Histórico Diplomático (hereafter AHD), Fundo POI, Mç. 511, Processo POI-03, Ano de 1971, Informação de Serviço Secreta do MNE, Elaborada por José Calvet de Magalhães a 15 de Janeiro de 1970.
57. AHD, Fundo POI, Mç. 164, Processo XM-1, Ano de 1961, Vol. III, Telegrama da Missão de Portugal na ONU para o MNE, de 10 de Junho de 1961.
58. AHD, Fundo POI, Mç. 163, Processo XM-1, Ano de 1961, Vol. II, Telegrama da Embaixada de Portugal em Santiago do Chile para o MNE, de 8 de Abril de 1961.
59. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6868 et Add.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux (Canada, 1968), 23.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 30.
62. Ibid., 24–30.
63. Ibid., 30.
64. Ibid., 24.
65. Ibid., 25–6.
66. Ibid., 3.
67. Ibid., 10.
68. Ibid., 3.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., 8–10.

71. Ibid., 5–11.
72. Ibid., 7.
73. Ibid., 5.
74. Ibid., 7–8.
75. Ibid., 10.
76. Many examples of Portuguese backstage diplomacy between 1961 and 1974 can be presented. See AHD, Fundo POI, Mç. 207, Processo WE-Geral, Ano de 1963, Telegrama da Embaixada de Portugal em Tananarive para o MNE, de 26 de Julho de 1963.
77. AHD, Fundo POI, Mç. 600, Processo POI 6, Ano de 1972, Vol. II, Telegrama do MNE para as Embaixadas de Portugal em Ankara, Atenas, Bangkok, Beirute, Bogotá, Brasília, Bruxelas, Buenos Aires, Camberra, Caracas, Copenhaga, Dublin, Estocolmo, Haia, Helsínquia, Islamabad, Lima, Londres, Madrid, Manila, México, Montevideu, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Pretória, Quito, Roma, Santiago do Chile, São José da Costa Rica, Teerão, Tóquio, Viena, Washington e Zomba, de 28 de Outubro de 1972.
78. Klaas van Walraven, *Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa. 1963–1993* (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 1999), 225.
79. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/6868 et Add.1, 12–13.
80. Santos, *A Organização das Nações Unidas.*
81. United Nations, Resolution 2288 (XXII), 7 December 1967, https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/236/23/pdf/nr023623.pdf?token=J3cc8nOgLN3wgSzy3P&fe=true (accessed 28 April 2012).
82. Ibid.
83. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/7320 et Add.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux (United States, 1969), 4.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 1–2.
86. Santos, *A Organização das Nações Unidas*, 242–3.
87. United Nations, Resolution 2425 (XXIII), 18 December 1968, https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/243/85/pdf/nr024385.pdf?token=qcCmuubhOVwyNKZbAI&fe=true (accessed 28 April 2012).
88. Ibid.
89. Santos, *A Organização das Nações Unidas*, 22.
90. Konrad J. Kuhn, 'Liberation Struggle and Humanitarian Aid: International Solidarity Movements and the "Third World" in the 1960s', in *The Third World in the Global 1960s*, 75.
91. Allen F. Isaacman and Barbara S. Issacman, *Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa and Its Legacies in Mozambique, 1965–2007* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013).
92. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/7623/Rev.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux. Vol. II (New York, 1974), 9.
93. Ibid.
94. Kuhn, 'Liberation Struggle and Humanitarian Aid', 75–6.
95. For an example of the materials produced about Cabora Bassa, see AAA, MSU, ACOA Fact Sheets, Power to the Portuguese Empire from General Electric, 5 April 1971.
96. Kuhn, 'Liberation Struggle and Humanitarian Aid', 79.

97. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/8423/Rev.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux. Vol. II (New York, 1975), 124 ss.
98. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/8723/Rev.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux. Vol. II (New York, 1975), 1–5.
99. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/9623/Rev.1. Rapport du Comité Spécial Chargé d'Étudier la Situation en ce qui Concerne l'Application de la Déclaration sur l'Octroi de l'Indépendance aux Pays et aux Peuples Coloniaux. Vol. II (New York, 1977), §8.
100. AAA, MSU, ACOA, Annual Report 1972.
101. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/8423/Rev.1, 124 ss.
102. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/8723/Rev.1, 5–6.
103. Organisation des Nations Unies, A/9623/Rev.1, §8.
104. United Nations, A/8023/Rev.l/Add.l. Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (New York, 1975), 5.
105. United Nations, A/AC.109/PV.774, 3 November 1970. Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 38–40.
106. Santos, *O Comité de Descolonização*, 26–7.
107. Ibid.
108. United Nations, Resolution 2554 (XXIV), 12 December 1969, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/202301?ln=en&v=pdf (accessed 28 April 2012).
109. Ibid.
110. United Nations, Resolution 2703 (XXV), 14 December 1970, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/201936?ln=en&v=pdf (accessed 28 April 2012).
111. Santos, *A Organização das Nações Unidas*, 314–15.
112. United Nations, Resolution 2873 (XXVI), 20 December 1971, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192161/?v=pdf (accessed 28 April 2012).
113. Ibid.
114. United Nations, Resolution 2979 (XXVII), 14 December 1972, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/191773/usage?ln=en&v=pdf (accessed 28 April 2012); United Nations, Resolution 3117 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/191343/files/A_RES_3117 (accessed 28 April 2012).
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Marta Patrício, 'Cahora Bassa nas Relações Bilaterais entre Portugal e Moçambique: 1975–2007', *Revista Portuguesa de Ciência Política* 2 (2012): 147–58.
118. Ibid., 156.

10

Polish relations with Angola, 1975–89: Transfer of knowledge and military assistance with limited economic outcome

Przemysław Gasztold

Poland was one of the first countries to recognize Angolan independence the same day it was proclaimed – 11 November 1975. Diplomatic relations were established already on 21 November 1975, and at that time Warsaw was deeply engaged in the support of the MPLA government on different levels.[1] Mutual contacts date back to the 1960s when the Polish Solidarity Committee started to provide basic assistance to the MPLA and other national liberation movements fighting against Portuguese colonial rule. However, in comparison to the other members of the socialist bloc, Poland was reluctant to grant the MPLA more advanced military assistance.[2] After the MPLA took power in Angola and began to pursue the Marxist course of modernization, the authorities in Luanda could rely on assistance coming from the Soviet bloc, mainly from the USSR, Cuba and the GDR. Poland also took part in facilitating the MPLA's socialist approach to development. In fact, in the late 1970s, the Polish Foreign Ministry listed Angola as one of the top priorities for their diplomacy in Africa.[3] The relationship was very active in political, military and economic areas in the late 1970s, but lost impetus after the introduction of the Martial Law in Poland in December 1981.

Although Angola was recognized as an important country for the Polish authorities, the multifaceted encounters between both countries have not yet been carefully examined.[4] This chapter aims to fill this gap by reconstructing the most significant spheres of cooperation, analysed in separate sections devoted to political, economic and military engagements. It draws primarily on sources coming from Polish archives: the Archives of Modern Records (Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) records); the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (diplomatic records); the Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance (intelligence files); and the Central Military Archive – Military Historical Office (military files). The first section reconstructs Warsaw's policy towards the Angolan struggle for independence in 1975. Then, the chapter evaluates political and economic cooperation which began after the MPLA took power, underlining its achievements and explaining the limitations. Finally, the last part discusses Polish military and intelligence involvement in Angola

and provides conclusions which recapitulate the mutual relations, as seen from the broader perspective.

Recent works on the Soviet bloc's encounters with the Global South underline different motivations which propelled the multidimensional relationships. East European states perceived the Third World as a battleground with Western – especially the United States' – influence and supported various state and non-state actors which identified themselves as socialist or Marxists while constructing an alternative to the interconnected capitalist system. The scope of such encounters among the particular countries of the Soviet bloc differed significantly but usually included economic expertise and advice, transfer of knowledge, scholarships and arms deliveries. Soviet bloc connections with the Third World were, however, limited by numerous factors, such as economic weaknesses of both parties, the deeply rooted economic links the newly decolonized states maintained with their former metropoles and the debt crisis of the 1980s.[5]

This chapter argues that although it was quite simple for Warsaw to establish a cordial and close political relationship with Angola based on a shared Marxist ideology, economic cooperation proved difficult since both countries encountered similar obstacles and had to face their centrally planned economies' chronic problems. There were however certain areas, like maritime economy, where such cooperation succeeded, mainly because the two partners found a specialized niche of a less-inclined ideological nature which proved to be mutually beneficial. In fact, Polish encounters with Angola reflected broader patterns of 'Second-Third World' economic interactions, which often shaped the Soviet bloc's relationships with the Global South.[6] Following Sanchez-Sibony, this chapter argues for the primacy of economic advantage over ideological considerations as a major driving force in East–South relations.[7]

From low-key to intensive engagement: Political cooperation

Following the Carnation Revolution, Portugal's governments began the process of recognizing the independence of its colonies. On 15 January 1975 the Portuguese government signed an agreement (known as Alvor Agreement) with the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, which established a transitional government in Angola. The agreement also set a date for Angola's independence for 11 November 1975. However, the Alvor Accord did not lead to peace as almost immediately sporadic violence between the three groups escalated into a civil war with the MPLA receiving support from the Soviet bloc, while the FNLA and UNITA gained backing from the United States and South Africa. Having countered an assault on the capital Luanda, on 11 November, the MPLA proclaimed the establishment of People's Republic of Angola with Agostino Neto as president and formed the new government.

Poland carefully observed the dynamic situation in Angola in the aftermath of the coup in Portugal. In late January 1975 the MPLA's Central Committee invited socialist states to the commemorations of the fourteenth year of struggle for independence, held

in Luanda.[8] Poland was represented by Lucjan Wolniewicz, an ambassador to Congo-Brazzaville. In Luanda, he met with Neto who asked about opening a Polish diplomatic mission and suggested initiating economic relations because such a move would break the monopoly of capitalist states which had already established their missions in Luanda. Neto also requested material support and asked specifically for military vehicles and trucks. Wolniewicz suggested to Warsaw that Poland should provide some assistance to the MPLA because in terms of class struggle this movement was ideologically very close and had real prospects of taking power in the country. Besides, he underlined that Angola was rich in raw materials. Overall, Wolniewicz was quite impressed by how the MPLA was handling the situation. However, he also underlined possible threats, 'Luanda looks like a European city. I did not encounter any signs of racial segregation here, typical for African capitals. … Despite the apparent calmness, one can sense a certain tension in the city, fear and the uncertainty of tomorrow. Night shootouts are considered here normal.'[9]

The Foreign Ministry agreed with Wolniewicz that it was time to increase Polish support for the MPLA. Stanisław Turbański, the head of the Foreign Ministry's 5th Department, responsible for relations with Africa, wrote in a report from March 1975 that Poland should increase its presence in former Portuguese colonies by establishing diplomatic missions and initiating economic cooperation.[10] The Soviet bloc's policy towards Lusophone Africa was also discussed in March 1975 in East Berlin, during the meeting of socialist solidarity committees. It turned out that other countries (USSR, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria) provided material aid to the Angolan partisans significantly exceeding the sums allocated for this purpose by Poland. Writing to the deputy foreign minister Jan Czapla in April 1975, the secretary general of the Polish Solidarity Committee, Kwiryn Grela, argued that Poland should increase support since 'we cannot limit ourselves to verbal declarations of solidarity' at such a crucial juncture.[11] In June 1975 Stanisław Piłotowicz, Soviet ambassador to Poland, met with Jan Szydlak, member of the PUWP Politburo, and presented the Soviet views on the situation in Angola. He underlined that Moscow had already begun to supply military equipment to the MPLA via People's Republic of the Congo. Although Piłotowicz did not express directly the need for Polish engagement in the matter, reading his statement between the lines, one might understand that he expected some kind of contribution from Warsaw.[12]

Soon, the issue of military aid was also raised by Colonel Henrique Teles (Iko) Carreira, the commander of the MPLA Armed Forces, who came to Warsaw in August 1975 during his tour in the socialist countries. Carreira described the difficult situation on the ground which resulted from the reorganization of the army and emphasized the lack of weapons and means of transportation.[13] He explained that the MPLA had already secured military assistance from the Soviet Union and the GDR, so his organization's leadership only requested some additional backup from Poland.[14] The Polish Foreign Ministry responded positively and suggested to Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz to arrange deliveries of military equipment.[15] Therefore, taking into account the MPLA's requests and Moscow's expectations, Warsaw decided to provide ad-hoc assistance in the form of Gaz-69 off-road vehicles (twenty), K-750 motorcycles (twenty), radio transmitters, uniforms and medications.[16] Military equipment was

shipped by sea on MS *Brodnica* from Szczecin and arrived at Pointe Noire in Congo in mid-November 1975.[17] One can however observe this Polish aid package did not include weapons or ammunition.[18]

Already on 11 November, Poland recognized the MPLA as the government of Angola and opened a diplomatic mission in Luanda in April 1976. Initially, the embassy was run by chargé d'affaires a.i. Kazimierz Wojewoda, who also worked for the Polish military intelligence (*Zarząd II Sztabu Generalnego*) under codename 'MAREK'.[19] He was replaced in November 1976 by Ambassador Roman Paszkowski, a general who just retired from the post of the commander of the Polish National Air Defence Forces.[20] His nomination indicated that Warsaw wanted to have in Luanda someone very trusted and loyal and signalled that Poland put emphasis on the military relations with the newly established MPLA government.

Relations between Poland and Angola actively developed in the late 1970s through a series of high-level delegations. In April 1977, President Neto visited Warsaw where he met with the chairman of the state council, Henryk Jabłoński, to sign the 'Declaration on strengthening friendship and on deepening cooperation' which set the guidelines for developing relationships in different areas.[21] Neto's visit was broadly covered in the state media, which informed about the designs for socialist development in Angola. While in Poland the president was protected by the Government Protection Bureau in the operation codenamed 'NEGRO', and such a codename mirrored stereotypical views over Africa still widespread within Polish society.[22] Although Neto's visit was a propaganda success, the 1977 MPLA Congress in Luanda made only small public references to Poland's contribution to Angola's development and rather focused on the role of other socialist countries, especially Cuba.[23] Aware of its relatively smaller role but willing to strengthen relations with Angola, Warsaw arranged Jabłoński's return visit to Luanda.

Henryk Jabłoński travelled to Luanda in December 1978 and spent a couple of days there trying to achieve several goals. First of all, his visit was to confirm Polish support for the socialist way of development in Angola.[24] Secondly, the trip was expected to boost Polish-Angolan economic relations 'based on the principle of mutual benefit'. Finally, Warsaw perceived the visit as a visible gesture of solidarity and as a 'contribution' to the Soviet bloc's strategy in developing ties with the Third World. During his stay in Luanda, Jabłoński met several times with Neto. Beyond the discussions about the ongoing wars and volatile international situation, both heads of state signed an 'Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation'.[25] Polish and Angolan representatives also signed an intraparty agreement between the PUWP and the MPLA about the exchange of delegations and party materials, as well as assistance in ideological training.[26]

However, the political cooperation did not go according to plan since there were no party exchanges between 1979 and early 1980.[27] Only in April 1980 did an MPLA delegation arrive in Poland to learn more about the PUWP's organizational structure and local activities.[28] Angolan guests explained they were in the process of building the mass party and were particularly interested how the Communist Party operated on different levels.[29]

Polish experiences in the latter were, however, not so encouraging. After the failed efforts to modernize the economy through Western loans, the PUWP leadership

under Edward Gierek faced growing economic problems which resulted mainly from the poor management and increasing foreign debts.[30] Unstable economic conditions became the breeding grounds for unrest, and in September 1980, following the mass workers' protests, the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 'Solidarity' was founded. It soon became a political and social movement consisting of nearly 10 million Poles who challenged communist rule. Although the PUWP's leadership quickly purged Gierek's proponents, only in December 1981 General Wojciech Jaruzelski conducted the military putsch by implementing the Martial Law and took power, banning 'Solidarity'.[31] After the introduction of Martial Law, Poland found itself in relative international isolation. Western countries condemned the brutal crackdown on 'Solidarity', imposed sanctions and refused to maintain any political relationships with the government.[32]

Conversely, many Third World countries supported the Polish regime.[33] In June 1982, Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos sent a letter to Jaruzelski where he voiced solidarity with the PUWP struggle against 'the internal and international reaction'.[34] In turn, Warsaw turned to the Third World and used its contacts with 'progressive' or Marxist regimes to break the diplomatic isolation. One such visit took place in June 1982 when a delegation headed by Alexandre Rodrigues (Kito), member of the MPLA Politburo, visited Warsaw and met with Jaruzelski.[35] Angolan guests were informed about the political situation in Poland and the circumstances that led to Martial Law. They admitted that Angola faced very similar problems and had to fight the 'enemies on the internal and external fronts'.[36] At that time the ruling MPLA was building the party-state and engaged in the struggle with Maoist, 'left-extremist elements' and dissent voices within its own ranks, as well as with the military insurgency coming mostly from the UNITA.[37]

Angolans also used high-level visits to seek support for controversial political moves. In April 1984 President dos Santos went to Warsaw in the aftermath of the 'Lusaka Accords' signed by Angola and South Africa two months earlier. The ceasefire agreement included the creation of a joint commission which was to monitor the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. In return, the MPLA agreed to prevent SWAPO forces from operating in the area from which the South Africans withdrew.[38] The deal was however highly criticized by Cuba and other socialist states, including the Soviet Union. According to Poland's Foreign Ministry, Santos's visit intended to explain the circumstances of the Accords, reducing the distrust and fear over the Angolan talks with South Africa. The Angolan delegation even prepared a draft communique which confirmed 'Polish solidarity' with the recent decision taken by the MPLA government. Warsaw, however declined to sign it and agreed to more general wording. Overall, the visit was evaluated by Poland's Foreign Ministry as very fruitful.[39] It also gave a new dynamism to the ideological contacts, and both sides signed the new agreement on cooperation between the MPLA and the PUWP which included yearly exchanges of high-ranking delegations.[40]

Poland also used 'soft power' to develop its relationship with the MPLA. For example, Warsaw frequently invited top echelons within the MPLA, as well as high-ranking officials from the military and intelligence services to spend holidays in Poland.[41] In August 1987, Alexandre de Lemas de Lucas, member of the MPLA's Central

Committee and one of the leaders of People's Vigilance Brigades, visited Poland for holidays.[42] In September 1978, daughters of the former Angolan president, Irena and Leda Neto, came for a one-week stay.[43] Poland also invited Angolan war veterans for medical treatment.[44] For example, in January 1988 Domingos Ribeiro, member of the MPLA Zaire Province leadership was admitted to a Polish hospital.[45] Other exchanges involved mutual visits by Polish and Angolan youth and parliamentary groups.[46]

In August 1989, Warsaw was visited by the Secretary of the MPLA's Central Committee Paulo M. Junior.[47] His visit took place just after the parliamentary elections which paved the way for a peaceful transformation and collapse of communism in Poland. Moreover, his visit was probably the last official contact between the People's Republic of Angola and People's Republic of Poland. A few months later, the latter state ceased to exist and was replaced by the Republic of Poland. While evaluating the political relations between these countries one might say that they were active and 'friendly' which was bolstered by ideological affinity. Poland also used Angola to reduce its international isolation after the introduction of Martial Law. Such cordial contacts, however, did not influence economic cooperation, which in the 1980s remained quite limited.

Economic and educational cooperation

Polish-Angolan economic cooperation had its own dynamics, shaped by both countries' domestic politics. The nature of Warsaw's economic involvement in Angola was part of the broader policy framework negotiated via the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). During the meeting in Moscow, 12–14 April 1977, COMECON's members decided that the main priority in supporting the Angolan economy was to replace approximately thirty thousand Portuguese experts who had departed before independence. According to the plan, each socialist country was to prepare a certain number of specialists who would be sent to Angola on temporary contracts.[48] All the COMECON members decided to provide loans which would cover some expenses for the specialists and agreed to increase the number of scholarships for Angolans.[49]

In practice, socialist states rarely coordinated their engagement in the matter and in fact tried to pursue their own agendas by balancing between the goals of 'socialist solidarity' and expected financial profit. While Poland fulfilled some of the COMECON's obligations, its economic policy was rather shaped (and limited) by Angola's economic realities. Moreover, in 1978 Warsaw adopted the 'Strategy for the long-term development of relations between the People's Republic of Poland and developing countries'. This document clearly underlined that cooperation with the Third World should firstly serve Polish economic development, then serve the interests of socialist bloc, and finally should strengthen 'progressive tendencies' within the Global South.[50] Such a strategy prioritized economic benefits and had a significant impact on Warsaw' relationship with Luanda.

Polish-Angolan economic cooperation began already in 1976 when there was no official governmental agreement in the matter.[51] Soon, in April 1977, both parties

signed the Trade Agreement and Agreement on Economic Cooperation. Warsaw marked Angola in 1979 as one of its top priority countries in Africa which meant that the MPLA's government should be a focal point of Polish engagements on African continent.[52] The reason why Angola was granted such a special status derived from ideological and political premises, and mainly resulted from a socialist way of development pursued by Luanda. In fact, the Soviet bloc leadership held high hopes that Angola would become the first Marxist-ruled state in Africa. Moreover, there were high expectations among Poland's Foreign Ministry that close political links would transform into fruitful economic cooperation. Warsaw believed that it would soon gain access to Angolan raw materials, including oil. As Szobi has argued, Czechoslovak economic expectations in Angola were driven by prospects of economic gain, similarly to Poland.[53] The reality, however, soon brought many disappointments.

Economic cooperation between Angola and Poland began in 1976, reaching the peak in 1980–1 when Warsaw became Angola's third largest trade partner in the Soviet bloc, following the USSR and the GDR (see Table 10.1).[54] The boost in economic cooperation that took place between 1978 and 1981 resulted from the five-year loan granted (with interest of 4.5 per cent) to Angola which was used to acquire trucks, construction machinery, tractors and spare parts.[55] The MPLA leaders frequently complained that during their withdrawal, the Portuguese military took with them almost all trucks, paralysing communications in the country.[56] In late 1976 the Angolan state owned only 450 trucks and 300 buses, while 3,000 trucks belonged to private hands. Although the government tried to address this challenge by buying Boeing 737 and five Jak-40 planes, it was not enough to secure communications between distant parts of the country.[57] Thus, in order to fill this gap, between 1977 and 1980 Poland delivered to Angola 1,639 Star-266 trucks, 292 tank trucks, 68 workshops for vehicles, 155 buses and 220 tank trailers.[58] This was one of the biggest deals in terms of volume the Polish automotive industry ever had, and Star-266 trucks are still seen on the Angolan roads.

While Warsaw provided Luanda with trade loans worth 105 million USD between 1977 and 1981, Polish import from Angola remained limited. In 1976–7, Warsaw purchased coffee and, in 1982, bought sisal and coffee worth 2 million USD. Initially, Poland was exporting more than importing from Angola which led to a trade disbalance, and Angola began to pile up debts to Poland (see Table 10.2). In 1984, Poland bought 20.6 million USD worth of coffee which was used to pay the Angolan debts.[59] However, as we will see, the debt problem would never be resolved.

Another problem revolved around the implementation of agreed projects. In October 1985, 'Pol-Mot', the Polish state-run company responsible for export of cars,

Table 10.1 Polish Export to Angola in Million USD

1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
0.3	9.2	37.6	13.3	45.3	30.8	3.6	1.8	1.1	3.8	1.2

AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 12 February 1987.

Table 10.2 Angola's Export and Import in Million USD

	Export to Angola			Import from Angola			Trade turnover		
	1985	**1984**	**1983**	**1985**	**1984**	**1983**	**1985**	**1984**	**1983**
Bulgaria	7.3	3.2	18.0	6.5	–	–	13.8	3.2	18.0
CSRS	4.5	1.3	0.8	–	–	–	4.5	1.3	0.8
Yugoslavia	–	9.0	–	–	–	–	–	9.0	–
Cuba	20.8	11.0	4.0	1.5	7.0	–	22.3	18.0	4.0
GDR	35.0	58.0	30.0	80.0	100.0	55.0	115.0	158.0	85.0
Poland	3.8	1.1	1.8	7.0	39.8	5.8	10.8	40.9	7.6
Romania	–	4.0	–	–	0.1	–	–	4.1	–
Hungary	5.5	3.8	1.4	–	–	–	5.5	3.8	1.4
USSR	70.0	200.0	62.0	–	–	–	–	200.0	62.0

trucks and tractors, signed a contract (worth 51.5 million USD) for the deliveries of 1,000 Star-266 trucks to Angola. However, it soon turned out that Polish industry had very limited capacity and was able to produce only three hundred trucks.[60] Soon, this number decreased to 150 trucks.[61] Details remain scarce but it seems this deal did not go through, at least not in its original version. The floundering of the deal was not an exception. Although the governmental agreements from 1977 included cooperation in maritime economy, mining and construction industry, between 1976 and 1989 only a small number of joint projects was actually executed due to Angolan economic problems and lack of hard currencies required for funding foreign investments.

A further aspect of Polish-Angolan cooperation included the provision of scholarships. Educational aid became a significant tool that allowed the Soviet bloc countries to support Third World actors by sharing knowledge and expertise in different areas.[62] It was also a big part of Poland's contribution to development in Angola. In 1976, Warsaw provided Luanda with 150 scholarships, mostly for maritime studies, but their provision was not fully used since there were few eligible candidates.[63] It seems that initially only thirty-three students were admitted at Polish universities.[64] In the following years, the number of scholarships was reduced, for example, eight Angolan students were admitted in 1983 and only seven in 1984.[65] In 1986, Warsaw granted the MPLA thirty-one scholarships at universities and two places in high schools.[66] In the mid-1980s, the Angolan authorities complained about the poor conditions their students encountered in Poland and even threatened they would no longer make use of the scholarships if conditions did not improve. Polish authorities rejected the accusations, but continuous doubts about conditions might explain why the numbers of Angolan students in Poland were much lower than in other socialist countries.[67]

Although the number of scholarships provided to Luanda was relatively small, Warsaw systematically engaged in developing the maritime sector in Angola, which became one of the few fields of successful long-term cooperation. In 1976, Poland covered the cost of three specialists who came to Angola to conduct a survey about

developing small marine shipyards. Soon, another twenty maritime experts arrived at Luanda while three specialists were sent to Brazil to supervise construction of shipping vessels for Angola.[68] A major undertaking involved Poland covering the cost of the two-year course (one-off) at Maritime School in Świnoujście which was attended by thirty Angolans. Additionally, in 1979 Poland obtained a 2 million USD contract to organized and run the School of Fishery in the port city of Namibe, which was initially staffed by twelve lecturers and fifteen Polish instructors.[69] In 1985, the Polish state-run Foreign Trade Enterprise 'Navimor' signed an agreement for the construction of ten fishing vessels. The deal was worth 2.7 million USD and was financed by a 'Kuwait Fund'.[70]

Assistance in the development of the maritime sector was one of the longest projects Warsaw had in Angola until 1989. When communism was collapsing in Poland, there were several dozen Polish professors and instructors at the Namibe school.[71] Moreover, these contacts survived the Cold War. In 2005, 'Navimor' built a brand-new complex of Academy of Fishery and Marine Sciences in Namibe, which became one of the biggest Polish educational projects in Africa.[72]

In the mid-1980s, the MPLA government raised concerns about the Soviet-Angolan fisheries agreement, complaining that Soviet practices might lead to overfishing. Thus, the Angolan government suggested that it may grant some concessions to Poland, in order to counterbalance the Soviet fishing. The Polish declined the Angolan offer: 'The proposal of cooperation, based on allegations against [another] socialist country, is unacceptable to the Polish side.' In reality though, the proposal was rejected because economic calculations showed the deal would not be profitable for the Polish fishing companies.[73]

Angola also became an important destination for Polish experts and instructors. In 1976, two Polish surgeons arrived at Luanda to work at the local hospital.[74] In 1983, 'Pol-Mot' signed an agreement worth 569,400 USD with the Angolan Ministry of Defence for the employment of thirty specialists who were to maintain Polish trucks and vehicles. After some time, however, the Angolans terminated the deal and specialists returned home. Between 1981 and 1983, Polish experts from the Institute of the Potato in Bonin, specialized in agricultural research, conducted surveys on improving the production of potato in Angola, but due to military operations close to the plantation they too left the country. Still, in 1986 there were twenty-two Polish experts working there on individual contracts (mainly university teachers, doctors, engineers).[75]

A major obstacle which considerably hindered economic cooperation between the Soviet bloc and the Global South was growing indebtedness, and this problem was particularly clear in the case of Polish foreign trade with Angola.[76] Due to economic mismanagement, Poland's debt to Western countries increased from 16 billion USD in 1978 to 26 billion USD in 1982.[77] This pressed the government to look for hard currency in foreign exchanges, and significantly limited investments based on barter agreements and low-rate loans. Angola's debts also piled up, reaching 3 billion USD in the mid-1980s.[78] Growing economic problems across the Soviet bloc heightened the MPLA's concerns about the prospects of economic relations with the socialist states. Meanwhile, Eastern European states had little power to enforce repayment from the Global South partners.[79]

These factors had a major impact on the shape of trade turnover between Poland and Angola. In 1982, due to economic problems, Angola suspended payments to Polish companies. As a result, the country's debt to Poland increased to 103.5 million USD by 1982, significantly reducing the volume of Polish export, because leadership in Warsaw was worried about the Luanda's solvency.[80] When the Angolan delegation to Warsaw tried to convince the Polish authorities to postpone at least part of the payments in May 1983, Warsaw remained reluctant, arguing that Poland faced similar economic problems, but even on larger scale.[81] After President José Eduardo dos Santos visited Warsaw in April 1984, the sides agreed to defer the payments of 49.1 million USD until 1989.[82] However, underlying issues remained unchanged and in 1986 Angola again suspended the payments of its debts to Poland.[83]

While in the mid-1970s Poland had high hopes to benefit from rich Angolan raw materials, especially oil, these did not materialize. Unlike other sectors in the economy, the MPLA government did not nationalize oil production, which was administered by the US Gulf Oil.[84] In fact, Luanda preferred to sell its oil on the world market to earn hard currency (badly needed to fund the war) rather than trade it with the Soviet bloc. Therefore, the MPLA government very rarely exported oil to its socialist partners in Europe.[85] In 1984, Poland was able to buy 100,000 tonnes of oil and 6,750 tonnes of coffee which were then re-exported by Warsaw to capitalist states with approval from Luanda.[86]

In subsequent years, however, Angola refused to trade in oil, since the MPLA government wanted to sell it only for hard currency rather than as part of the barter agreements. Angola wanted to support its imports from Poland with necessary loans. In turn, Poland was only willing to trade if the partner provided the irrevocable letter of credit which included solid bank guarantees for the transaction, which was not beneficial for Angola.[87] Both countries struggled to increase the mutual trade turnover but due to their economies' complex structures, Angola's underdevelopment, colonial legacy and foreign indebtedness, they failed to find an appropriate solution. In other words, Angolan trade with the Soviet bloc became more complicated, and especially less profitable. This explains why Luanda's biggest trade partners in the 1980s were Portugal and France.[88]

There were a number of reasons why Angola's trade with the socialist countries remained limited. The MPLA government argued that Soviet bloc could not provide the goods Angola really needed, like food. Luanda tried to find a way to boost the trade in a way which would not engage hard currencies, but it was nearly impossible.[89] There were also occasions when Western companies offered bribes to outbid socialist companies, thus gaining access to Angolan natural resources.[90] Moreover, economic problems in Angola resulted in large increase of its debt to Poland which in 1987 amounted to approx. 73 million USD.[91] In the mid-1980s, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade evaluated that economic cooperation with Angola was possible, however it was limited due to Luanda's financial problems.[92]

Overall, economic cooperation with Angola was significantly limited compared to Polish relationship with other African states like Nigeria and Libya[93] mostly because these countries did not implement the socialist way of development and conducted trade in US dollars. Both sides faced the similar challenges related to the central-planned

economy, had large foreign debts and were looking for hard currencies. This all had a damaging effect on mutual trade which almost came to a standstill in the 1980s.

Polish military and intelligence involvement

Since the outbreak of the civil war, the MPLA strongly relied on the Soviet bloc for the constant inflow of weapons. Although the majority of the deliveries were arranged by the USSR, Cuba or the GDR, Warsaw also engaged in enhancing the MPLA's military capabilities. While Poland's first aid package from 1975 included only non-lethal equipment, subsequent deliveries consisted mostly of weapons and ammunition. Angolan authorities usually did not buy weapons in the Soviet bloc but received them on the non-refundable basis, as a token of 'socialist solidarity' and support for their Marxist agenda. Thus, Poland's government decided in December 1975 to grant urgent military assistance in the form of weapons, ammunition, medications and food.[94]

Between 24 January and 5 February 1976, these goods were airfreighted from Warsaw to Luanda in four flights by IŁ-62, which belonged to the Polish LOT airline.[95] At the same time Poland sent to Angola a special delegation consisting of military instructors whose goal was to provide the guidelines on how to handle the donated military equipment. Three military intelligence officers were also embedded in the delegation.[96] They were working undercover as employees of CENZIN, the Polish state-run enterprise responsible for arms trade, and their primary goal was to set up a temporary military intelligence station.[97] The station operated from 23 January to 5 February 1976 and sent to Warsaw fifteen reports about the political and military situation in Angola.[98]

After the deliveries from early 1976 were completed, Poland's Foreign Ministry concluded that there was already enough weapons in Angola, so Warsaw should engage in other forms of assistance, for example by providing special training for Angolan sailors and by sending military instructors.[99] The draft project estimated such (one-off) support would cost 1.1 million USD.[100] It seems that such an ambitious project did not materialize, but in May 1976 Warsaw decided to send two naval officers to evaluate the possibility of establishing training assistance to Angolan sailors.[101] Commodores Józef Kośmider and Tadeusz Pawelec arrived to Luanda in October 1976, and beyond their official obligations, they were also tasked with secretly collecting information about the military and political situation on the ground.[102] After one month, they returned to Poland and reported that Angola needed urgent development of a modern Navy, however the infrastructure was very poor and the military lacked skilled professionals who would be able to operate Soviet-made equipment.[103]

Although Poland's Foreign Ministry claimed that MPLA possessed enough weapons, in the following years Warsaw organized several military aid packages, usually in response to Angolan requests. For example, in September 1977, Luanda asked for 10,000 weapons and ammunition to equip the civil defence troops. 'They want to use it for propaganda purposes during the parade on 11 November' – reads the cipher-text from Luanda. Angolan authorities even agreed to cover the shipping

costs. However, documents do not indicate whether the deliveries were executed. Nevertheless, in October 1977, the USSR did provide the MPLA with 30,000 pieces of weapons.[104] In January 1978, Warsaw donated to Angola 'kbk rifles'[105] (13,000), PPSz submachine guns (2,000) and ammunition.[106] Soon, in April 1978, another aid package was transferred and it included 82 mm mortars (100) with ammunition (60,000), film projectors (2) and uniforms for men and women (1,400).[107] In February 1979, Poland airfreighted military equipment to Luanda and on the way back took several Angolans, probably for medical treatment.[108]

After the Martial Law in Poland was lifted in July 1983, Warsaw continued its support to the MPLA and in December 1983 donated PPSz submachine guns (500) with ammunition (305,000), TT pistols (100) and tropical uniforms (1,000).[109] One of the last aid package was delivered in 1986 as a response for request formulated by Afonso Van-Dunem, the Angolan minister of foreign affairs.[110] Warsaw shipped to Luanda PPSz submachine guns (500), TT pistols (100), 7.62 mm ammunition (305,000), 50 tonnes of hardtacks, as well as medications and uniforms.[111] In 1986 Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs provided also a training for unknown number of Angolan 'security' officers.[112]

Besides military support, Poland also engaged in limited intelligence activity. In August 1976, the head of Soviet advisors in Angola, general Ilya Ponomarenko, requested that the Polish mission in Luanda create a position of military attaché. He argued that the opening of such a post would guarantee the dominance of representatives from the Warsaw Pact countries over envoys from other socialist countries, like Yugoslavia, North Korea or Vietnam.[113] Poland's Ministry of Defence quickly granted the request and used the office as a base for establishing its permanent military intelligence station.[114] The station was established in late 1976 and operated until mid-1982. Beyond collecting information, Polish military intelligence did not have any significant results; and in 1981 the station's achievements in the selection and recruitment of human assets were evaluated as 'insufficient'.[115]

After the introduction of Martial Law in Poland, Jaruzelski's regime conducted purges in the Foreign Ministry, closing several diplomatic missions and military attaché offices, located mostly in the Third World. Such decisions were motivated primarily by economic considerations, designed to save hard currency. Angola was included on the 'savings list', which indicated that Warsaw in fact ceased to perceive this country as its number one priority in Africa. Thus, the office of the military attaché and the military intelligence station in Luanda were shut down in 1982.[116]

However, Polish civilian intelligence presence remained active in the country. In April 1982, civilian intelligence (*Departament I Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych*) established its own station (codename 'ANDOS') inside the Polish embassy in Luanda, which however was smaller than its military predecessor in terms of staffing.[117] Its main aim was to provide counter-intelligence protection for Polish experts working in Angola, and to secure the constant inflow of up-to-date information on the political situation.[118] The station was closed in 1990,[119] after Poland's democratic transition led to the reconfiguration of Warsaw's foreign policy priorities, which shifted away from the Global South to the Western world.[120]

Conclusions

The Polish approach towards the MPLA's struggle with Portuguese colonialism was ambivalent. While Warsaw publicly supported the national liberation movements, it did not often provide military support. Such an ambiguous stance was, however, abandoned after Angola gained its independence in 1975. Change in the Polish position resulted from the clear Marxist course pursued by Luanda and engagement of the other socialist states. Warsaw was aware of its minor contribution to the decolonization process and, to some extent, wanted to compensate for its previous modest support by engaging more broadly in equipping the Angolan army with modern weaponry and in modernizing the country's infrastructure.

In the late 1970s, Poland treated the MPLA-ruled Angola as its number one priority in Africa. Indeed, frequent political contacts on the highest levels and exchanges of different delegations, which took place almost every year, might suggest that Warsaw forged a close cooperation with Luanda. These active relations, however, did not transform into successful economic cooperation. Poland conducted a very pragmatic policy based on calculations of cost-effectiveness. While political and ideological support was broadly provided as a token of socialist solidarity and did not require much investment, economic collaboration proved to be unprofitable due to contradictory interests derived from the economies' different structures. Moreover, both parties became disillusioned about the economic prospects offered by the socialist world system. While the late 1970s saw the rise of trade and might be evaluated as a 'honeymoon' in their relations, Poland's internal crisis and growing debt led to a 'separation' by the mid-1980s. From then on, economic cooperation was very limited and remained so until 1989.

There were, however, significant areas where Poland contributed to Angolan industrial development, and these spheres were not entirely related to ideological cooperation. The transfer of knowledge might serve as an example of a concrete way in which Poland shared its experience with Angola. The most important contributions were provided within the maritime industry and, remarkably, they stood the test of time, being the only joint project that continued after the collapse of communism.

Notes

This research was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under the research project no. 2019/35/D/HS3/03581.

1. Krzysztof Szczepanik, Anna Herman-Łukasik, Barbara Janicka, eds, *Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski. Informator. Tom IV. Afryka i Bliski Wschód 1918–2009* (Warsaw: MSZ, 2010), 22.
2. On the Polish relations with the MPLA, PAIGC and FRELIMO: Przemysław Gasztold, 'Lost Illusions: The Limits of Communist Poland's Involvement in Cold War Africa', in *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War*, ed. Philip E. Muelenbeck and Natalia Telepneva (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 197–220; Przemysław Gasztold and Klejd Këlliçi, 'PRL, kraje socjalistyczne i Globalne Południe

w latach 1955–1980: stan badań i postulaty badawcze', *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* no. 41 (2023): 49–92; Przemysław Gasztold, 'Broń, dekolonizacja i Zimna Wojna – ograniczona pomoc wojskowa PRL dla Trzeciego Świata', *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość*, no. 41 (2023): 208–44.

3. Angola was recognized as a top-priority country in Africa together with Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Nigeria. The second priority was granted to Sudan and Tunisia. Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych [hereinafter AMSZ], Departament V, 26/86, w-6, 023-50-82, Narada partyjno-zawodowa Departamentu V MSZ, Warsaw, 4 January 1979.
4. On the Polish-Angolan relations, see Filip Urbański, 'Polityka Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej wobec Angoli i Mozambiku – próba rekonstrukcji', *Vade Nobiscum* 15 (2015): 289–300.
5. Eric Burton, James Mark and Steffi Marung, 'Development', in *Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonization*, ed. James Mark and Paul Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 75–114; James Mark and Yakov Feygin, 'The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Alternative Visions of a Global Economy 1950s–1980s', in *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World*, ed. James Mark, Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Steffi Marung (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 35–58.
6. Pavel Szobi, 'Czechoslovak Economic Interests in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s', in *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War*, ed. Anna Calori, Anne-Kristin Hartmetz, Bence Kocsev, James Mark and Jan Zofka (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), 165–96.
7. Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1–12.
8. Archiwum Akt Nowych [hereinafter AAN], KC PZPR, LXXVI-541, Szyfrogram nr 1300/I z Dar Es Salam, 31 January 1975.
9. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-541, Sprawozdanie Lucjana Wolniewicza z pobytu w Luandzie w dniach od 2 do 7 lutego 1975, Kinshasa, 12 February 1975.
10. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Pilna notatka Stanisława Turbańskiego na temat naszych zadań w świetle stanu i perspektyw dekolonizacji w Afryce, Warsaw, March 1975.
11. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-541, Pismo sekretarza generalnego PKSzNAiA Kwiryna Greli do podsekretarza stanu w MSZ Jana Czapli, kwiecień 1975 r.
12. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Informacja o sytuacji w Angoli przekazana członkowi Biura Politycznego, Sekretarzowi KC – Janowi Szydlakowi przez Ambasadora ZSRR Stanisława Piłotowicza, Warsaw, 21 June 1975.
13. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-541, Notatka Henryka Sobieskiego w sprawie pomocy wojskowej dla MPLA, [1975].
14. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-682, Informacja o wizycie w Polsce delegacji Ludowego Ruchu Wyzwolenia Angoli /MPLA/, [1975].
15. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-682, Pismo z MSZ do Prezesa Rady Ministrów PRL Towarzysza Piotra Jaroszewicza, Warsaw, August 1975.
16. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-541, Wykaz sprzętu, wyposażenia mundurowego, lekarstw i narzędzi chirurgicznych przeznaczonych dla MPLA, [1975].
17. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-541, Dotychczasowa pomoc Polskiego Komitetu Solidarności z Narodami Azji i Afryki dla MPLA (Angola), Warsaw, 24 November 1975.

18. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-682, Decyzja Prezydium Rządu [projekt], [1975].
19. Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej [hereinafter AIPN], 2602/17290, Notatka służbowa ze spotkania ze współpracownikiem 'Marek' przeprowadzona w dniu 5 kwietnia 1976 r. w kawiarni 'Świtezianka', 5 April 1976, 37.
20. Szczepanik et al., *Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski*, 22.
21. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Deklaracja o umocnieniu przyjaźni i pogłębieniu współpracy między Polską Rzeczpospolitą Ludową a Ludową Republiką Angoli, Warsaw, 28 April 1977.
22. AIPN, 0827/115, Wizyta w PRL prezydenta Ludowej Republiki Angoli Antonio Agostino Neto kryptonim 'Negro', 1977.
23. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Sprawozdanie z I Zjazdu MPLA w Luandzie, Warsaw, 14 December 1977.
24. AAN, KC PZPR, XI-531, Pilna Notatka w sprawie wizyty Henryka Jabłońskiego w LRA w dniach 1–5 grudnia 1978, Warsaw, 10 November 1978, 11.
25. AAN, KC PZPR, XI-531, Porozumienie między PRL a LRA o przyjaźni i współpracy, Luanda, 4 December 1978, 28–32.
26. AAN, KC PZPR, XI-531, Notatka informacyjna o wizycie Przewodniczącego Rady Państwa PRL, Towarzysza Henryka Jabłońskiego w Ludowej Republice Angoli w dniach 1–5 grudnia 1978, Warsaw, 9 December 1978, 15–27.
27. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Ludowy Ruch Wyzwolenia Angoli – Partia Pracy / MPLA-PT/, [1980?].
28. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Ludowy Ruch Wyzwolenia Angoli – Partia Pracy / MPLA-PT/, Warsaw, May 1989.
29. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-682, Notatka Wydziału Zagranicznego KC PZPR z pobytu delegacji KC MPLA – Partia Pracy Angoli w dniach 28.04–6.05.1980, Warsaw, 10 May 1980.
30. Aleksandra Komornicka, 'From "Economic Miracle" to the "Sick Man of the Socialist Camp" ', in *European Socialist Regimes' Fateful Engagement with the West National Strategies in the Long 1970s*, ed. Angela Romano and Federico Romero (London: Routledge, 2020), 78–106.
31. Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, 'The Polish Crisis: Internal and International Dimensions', in *From Solidarity to Martial Law: The Polish Crisis of 1980–1981 – A Documentary History* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2007), 1–43.
32. Patryk Pleskot, *Kłopotliwa panna 'S'. Postawy polityczne Zachodu wobec 'Solidarności' na tle stosunków z PRL (1980–1989)* (Warsaw: IPN, 2013).
33. On the MENA countries' approach to 'solidarity': Przemysław Gasztold-Seń, 'Państwa arabskie wobec 'Solidarności' (w świetle źródeł polskich)', in *Świat wobec 'Solidarności'*, ed. Paweł Jaworski and Łukasz Kamiński (Wrocław: IPN, 2013), 577–604.
34. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-682, List Przewodniczącego MPLA-PT, Prezydenta LRA José Eduardo dos Santosa do I sekretarza KC PZPR Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego, Luanda, 23 June 1982.
35. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Ważniejsze wydarzenia w stosunkach między PZPR i MPLA-PT, Warsaw, May 1989.
36. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-682, Notatka dot. wizyty w Polsce delegacji MPLA-PT, Warsaw, 7 July 1982.
37. Jeremy Friedman, *Ripe for Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2021), 194–210; Stephen L. Weigert, *Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961–2002* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 69–103.

38. Chris Saunders, 'The South Africa-Angola Talks, 1976–1984: A Little-Known Cold War Thread', *Kronos*, no. 37 (2011): 115–17.
39. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Notatka informacyjna o wizycie przyjaźni w PRL partyjno-państwowej delegacji angolskiej z przewodniczącym MPLA-PT, prezydentem ARL José Eduardo dos Santosem, Warsaw, 14 April 1984.
40. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Ludowy Ruch Wyzwolenia Angoli – Partia Pracy / MPLA-PT/, Warsaw, May 1989.
41. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Sugestie do rozmowy przewodniczącego delegacji KC PZPR Stanisława Bejgera z przewodniczącym MPLA-PT i prezydentem ARL José Eduardo dos Santosem, Luanda, 25 February 1987.
42. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Ważniejsze wydarzenia w stosunkach między PZPR i MPLA-PT, Warsaw, May 1989.
43. AIPN, 0827/218, Plan przedsięwzięć ochronnych dot. pobytu w PRL córek Prezydenta Angoli Antonio Agostino Neto, Warsaw, 31 August 1978, 3.
44. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Sugestie do rozmowy przewodniczącego delegacji KC PZPR Stanisława Bejgera z przewodniczącym MPLA-PT i prezydentem ARL José Eduardo dos Santosem, Luanda, 25 February 1987.
45. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Ważniejsze wydarzenia w stosunkach między PZPR i MPLA-PT, Warsaw, May 1989.
46. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-682, Sprawozdanie z pobytu oficjalnej delegacji FSZMP na I Krajowej Konferencji JMPLA, Warsaw, 5 December 1978; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Aneks nr 2 – Ludowa Republika Angoli [1986]; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Sprawozdanie z wizyty oficjalnej delegacji Sejmu pod przewodnictwem Wicemarszałka M. Wieczorka w Angoli w dniach 14–19.01.1989, Warsaw, 21 February 1989.
47. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Program wizyty w Polsce Sekretarza KC MPLA-PT Paulo M. Junior /11–14.08.1989/.
48. Bulgaria (822 specialists), Hungary (50), GDR (229), Cuba (4047), Poland (200), Czechoslovakia (242) and USSR (507).
49. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Współpraca krajów członkowskich RWPG z Ludową Republiką Angoli, [1977].
50. AAN, KC PZPR, XI-549, Założenia strategii długofalowego rozwoju stosunków PRL z krajami rozwijającymi się, Warsaw, April 1978, 22.
51. AAN, KC PZPR, XI-531, Notatka informacyjna o wizycie Przewodniczącego Rady Państwa PRL, Towarzysza Henryka Jabłońskiego w Ludowej Republice Angoli w dniach 1–5 grudnia 1978, Warsaw, 9 December 1978, 22.
52. AMSZ, Departament V, 26/86, w-6, 023-50-82, Narada partyjno-zawodowa Departamentu V MSZ, Warsaw, 4 January 1979.
53. Szobi, 'Czechoslovak Economic', 165, 174.
54. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986.
55. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986.
56. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Sprawozdanie specjalnego wysłannika PAP Mirosława Ikonowicza z podróży do Angoli, May 1977.
57. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka Ministerstwa Handlu i Gospodarki Morskiej odnośnie sytuacji gospodarczej Ludowej Republiki Angoli, Warsaw, 19 April 1977.

58. AMSZ, Departament V, 25/86, w-1, 23-3-81, Pismo Dyrektora Naczelnego Pol-Mot inż. Edwarda Pietrzaka do Ambasadora PRL w Luandzie Romana Czyżyckiego, Warszawa, 27 February 1981.
59. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986.
60. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka informacyjna w sprawie dostaw samochodów ciężarowych do Angoli, Warsaw, 17 February 1986.
61. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Notatka w sprawie oferty na samochody ciężarowe Star 266 dla Angoli, Warsaw, January 1987.
62. Alena Alamgir, 'Mobility', in *Socialism Goes Global*, 298–305.
63. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Ludowa Republika Angoli – notatka informacyjna Departamentu V MSZ, Warsaw, 25 November 1977.
64. AIPN, 0827/242, Notatka informacyjna dot. Ludowej Republiki Angoli, 27 October 1978, 101.
65. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Angolska Republika Ludowa – notatka informacyjna Departamentu V MSZ, Warsaw, 11 February 1987.
66. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Sugestie do rozmowy przewodniczącego delegacji KC PZPR Stanisława Bejgera z przewodniczącym MPLA-PT i prezydentem ARL José Eduardo dos Santosem, Luanda, 25 February 1987.
67. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Sprawozdanie z przebiegu i wyników obrad VI sesji polsko-angolańskiej Komisji Mieszanej, Warsaw, 9 November 1985; Szobi, 'Czechoslovak Economic Interests', 189.
68. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Ludowa Republika Angoli – notatka informacyjna, Warsaw, 25 November 1977.
69. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986; AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Informacja dotycząca współpracy polsko-angolskiej, Warsaw, 17 February 1987.
70. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986.
71. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Sprawozdanie z wizyty oficjalnej delegacji Sejmu pod przewodnictwem Wicemarszałka M. Wieczorka w Angoli w dniach 14-19.01.1989, Warsaw, 21 February 1989.
72. Academy of Fisheries and Marine Sciences in Angola. www.navimor.pl/academy-of-fisheries-and-marine-sciences-in-angola,50,en.html (accessed 5 April 2023).
73. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Informacja dotycząca współpracy polsko-angolskiej, Warsaw, 17 February 1987.
74. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Ludowa Republika Angoli – notatka informacyjna, Warsaw, 25 November 1977.
75. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986.
76. Burton et al., 'Development', 109.
77. Janusz Kaliński, 'Kryzys gospodarczy w latach 1979–1982 zwiastunem upadku PRL', *Optimum. Economic Studies* 103 (2021): 11.
78. Max Trecker, *Red Money for the Global South: East-South Economic Relations in the Cold War* (Oxon: Routledge, 2020), 135.
79. Szobi, 'Czechoslovak Economic', 179; Burton et al., 'Development', 109.
80. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986.

81. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Instrukcja dla Wiceprezesa Rady Ministów tow. Zbigniewa Madeja do rozmów z delegacją partyjno-rządową LRA w Warszawie w dniach od 20 do 23 maja 1983, Warsaw, 18 May 1983.
82. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986.
83. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Angolska Republika Ludowa – notatka informacyjna, Warsaw, 11 February 1987.
84. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, 'Business Success, Angola-Style: Postcolonial Politics and the Rise of Sonangol', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45 (2007): 599.
85. Szobi, 'Czechoslovak Economic', 182.
86. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Angolska Republika Ludowa – notatka informacyjna, Warsaw, 11 February 1987.
87. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Uwagi o sytuacji gospodarczej Angoli i dwustronnych stosunkach ekonomicznych polsko-angolskich, [1987?].
88. Trecker, *Red Money*, 135.
89. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-682, Informacja o pobycie delegacji KC PZPR w Angoli [1986].
90. Szobi, 'Czechoslovak Economic Interests', 180–1.
91. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Uwagi o sytuacji gospodarczej Angoli i dwustronnych stosunkach ekonomicznych polsko-angolskich, [1987?].
92. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-679, Notatka na temat aktualnego stanu polsko-angolskich stosunków gospodarczych, Warsaw, 5 November 1986.
93. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-444, Wymiana handlowa z krajami rozwijającymi się, [1981].
94. AIPN, 2602/14021, Decyzja nr 151/75 Prezydium Rządu z 12 grudnia 1975 r. w sprawie pomocy dla Ludowej Republiki Angoli, 3–4.
95. Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe – Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne [hereinafter CAW-WBH], Komisja Planowania przy Radzie Ministrów – Zespół Wojskowy [hereinafter KPpRM-ZW], 1307/97/74, Pilna Notatka MSZ o sytuacji w Ludowej Republice Angoli i wnioski w sprawie naszych dalszych działań wobec LRA, Warsaw, 16 February 1976, 25.
96. AIPN, 2602/14021, Notatka służbowa, 26 January 1976, 51–3.
97. AIPN, 2602/14021, Rozkaz operacyjny dla kpt. Jana Lewińskiego na wyjazd do LRA, 27 January 1976, 54–6.
98. AIPN, 2602/14021, Notatka służbowa dot. podsumowania pracy operacyjno-informacyjnej Oddziału X na terenie Ludowej Republiki Angoli, 9 February 1976, 94–5.
99. CAW-WBH, KPpRM-ZW, 1307/97/74, Pilna Notatka MSZ o sytuacji w LRA i wnioski w sprawie naszych dalszych działań wobec LRA, Warsaw, 16 February 1976, 25–40.
100. CAW-WBH, KPpRM-ZW, 1307/97/74, Notatka w sprawie postulowanej pomocy gospodarczej i wojskowej dla LRA, Warsaw, 23 February 1976, 53.
101. AIPN, 2602/12845, Decyzja nr 55/76 Prezydium Rządu z dnia 10.05.1976 w sprawie udzielenia bezzwrotnej pomocy gospodarczej oraz stworzenia warunków rozwoju współpracy gospodarczej i wymiany handlowej z LRA, 39.
102. AIPN, 2602/12845, Instrukcja specjalna dla kmdr Józefa Kośmider i kmdr por. Tadeusza Pawelca udających się dnia 9 października 1976 r. do Angoli, 8 October 1976, 71–2.

103. AIPN, 2602/12845, Sprawozdanie z pobytu w LRA specjalistów Marynarki, 11 November 1976, 100–2; Sprawozdanie z pobytu w LRA specjalistów Marynarki Wojennej, 22 November 1976, 110–15.
104. CAW-WBH, Komisja Planowania przy Radzie Ministrów, 1307/97/125, Szyfrogram nr 3393/III z Luandy, 20.09.1977, 61–2; Urbański, 'Polityka Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej wobec Angoli', 298.
105. Probably AK-47 assault rifles.
106. CAW-WBH, KPpRM-ZW, 1307/97/189, Decyzja nr 9/89 Prezydium Rządu z 18 stycznia 1978 r. w sprawie udzielenia Ludowej Republice Angoli pomocy bezzwrotnej, 148.
107. CAW-WBH, KPpRM-ZW, 1307/97/189, Decyzja nr 60/78 Prezydium Rządu z 27 kwietnia 1978 r. w sprawie udzielenia Ludowej Republice Angoli pomocy bezzwrotnej, 107.
108. AIPN, 0827/268, Przedsięwzięcie ochronne nr 11/79 dot. wylotu samolotu czarterowego do Luandy w dniach 12–15.02.1979, 1–20.
109. CAW-WBH, KPpRM-ZW, 1312/97/196, Postanowienie nr 25/83 Prezydium Rządu z dnia 31 grudnia 1983 r. w sprawie udzielenia bezzwrotnej pomocy wojskowej Ludowej Republice Angoli, 68.
110. AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-681, Angolska Republika Ludowa – notatka informacyjna Departamentu V MSZ, Warsaw, 11 February 1987.
111. CAW-WBH, Komisja Planowania przy Radzie Ministrów – Pion Spraw Obronnych, 1315/97/24, Postanowienie nr 21 Prezydium Rządu z dnia 12 maja 1986 r. w sprawie udzielenia bezzwrotnej pomocy Libijskiej Arabskiej Dżamahiriji Ludowo-Socjalistycznej i Angolskiej Republice Ludowej, 56.
112. AIPN, 1593/1, Notatka służbowa, Warsaw, 28 October 1986, 60.
113. AIPN, 2602/12845, Szyfrogram nr 1556/III z Luandy, 13 August 1976, 69.
114. AIPN, 2602/12845, Notatka służbowa dot. otwarcia Attachatu Wojskowego w Luandzie /Angola/, [1976], 70.
115. AIPN, 2602/16169, Załącznik nr 1 do pisma nr 1/82 dot. oceny pracy rezydentury w Luandzie za rok 1981, 8 February 1982, 292–5.
116. AIPN, 2602/16169, Pismo nr 2/82, 2 April 1982, 302; AIPN, 2602/16169, Załącznik nr 1 do Pisma nr 2/82, 5 April 1982, 304–5.
117. AIPN, 003171/64 vol. 1, Postanowienie o założenie teczki ogniwa operacyjnego w Luandzie – Angola, Warsaw, 2 April 1982, 3.
118. AIPN, 003171/64 vol. 2, Teczka ogniwa operacyjnego w Luandzie (Angola) kryptonim 'Andos', 1–273.
119. The exact date of closing the station is blurred, which means this information is still classified; however, it seems that the station did not operate after 1990.
120. AIPN, 003171/64 vol. 1, Postanowienie o zakończeniu i przekazaniu sprawy do archiwum Zarządu Wywiadu UOP, Warsaw, date blurred, 10.

11

Globalizing violence and resistance in São Tomé and Príncipe

Gerhard Seibert and Inês Nascimento Rodrigues

São Tomé and Príncipe is a small two-island nation in the Gulf of Guinea. The archipelago was uninhabited until the late fifteenth century when the Portuguese gradually occupied and colonized the territory with settlers and enslaved Africans. The islands served as a sugar producer and a crucial outpost for the transatlantic slave traffic. After the formal abolition of slavery in São Tomé in 1875, the Portuguese brought in – with different levels of coercion – 'contract workers' (*contratados*) from Angola, Mozambique and Cabo Verde, to work in the re-established plantation economy (of coffee and, later, cocoa). The so-called contract work (in practice, forced labour) in the plantations (*roças*) was comparable to slavery, due to its recruitment methods and severe labour conditions.[1] This plantation system was already shaped by key transnational dimensions: on the one hand, the slave-like labour conditions of the *contratados* became the target of a British campaign against 'slave cocoa' that in 1909 culminated in a boycott of São Tomé's cocoa; on the other, Portuguese planters capitalized on the expertise of foreign crop scientists to increase productivity.[2] During the anticolonial struggle, São Tomé's nationalists denounced the brutal plantation and labour system as part of a wider experience of colonial violence. This legacy played a central role in the state and nation-building process, informing, immediately after independence, the nationalization of the plantations.[3]

As the previous chapters have shown, the Cold War and anti-imperialist thought of the time profoundly shaped the political struggle against Portuguese colonialism and the early post-independence period of Portugal's former African colonies. The same applies to the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. However, unlike Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, this archipelago – like Cabo Verde – did not experience an armed struggle in its territory. Moreover, until 1974 the local population was practically unacquainted with anticolonial theory. Therefore, only the ensuing international political context, the specific circumstances of Portugal's decolonization and the cohesion of liberation movements in Portugal's African colonies can explain that within a few months the left-wing nationalist party – the Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP) – consisting mainly of a small group of nationalists in exile took power mostly uncontested after independence in July 1975.

It is an irony of history that during the Salazar dictatorship the few nationalists from this archipelago and other colonies were politically socialized during their student years in Portugal, where they accessed political ideas inspired by Bandung, the Algerian liberation struggle, the Cuban revolution, pan-Africanism, Marxism and socialism in general, which dominated the debates and discourses within their associations. Many African students were also in touch with Portuguese underground left-wing parties like Movimento de Unidade Democrática (MUD) Juvenil and Partido Comunista Português (PCP). Consequently, many of those students became influenced by Marxism, which Patrick Chabal later categorized as 'at the time the only coherent ideology that opposed the Salazar regime'.[4] Later, this option was reinforced when the regime refused to engage in any form of decolonization.[5] While Portugal's other African colonies continue to receive substantive scholarly attention, the case of São Tomé and Príncipe has been largely ignored even by specialized literature, even though its continuities and particularities can illuminate the extent to which an international framework shaped independence beyond armed conflict. With that in mind, this chapter rebuilds the political history and ideological foundations of the archipelago's first nationalist group, the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP), created in 1960, and of its 1972 successor, the MLSTP, when analysing the anticolonial and early postcolonial processes of this small and remote archipelago within global history. In São Tomé, the MLSTP never formally adopted Marxism-Leninism, although this was a clear trend in the political project implemented in the first years of independence.[6]

After independence, the country faced significant socioeconomic challenges and was highly susceptible to exogenous events, particularly as far as the then socialist countries are concerned. Several factors prevented a successful reform of the dominant plantations, further weakening the country's economy. The country lacked adequately trained and experienced professionals to properly run the nationalized plantations. Agricultural work on the plantations, which once symbolized slavery and colonial oppression locally, met the same popular resistance as before independence. Additional factors affecting the economy were fluctuations of international cocoa prices, as well as periods of severe drought in the early 1980s, which undermined cocoa production, the country's primary export product. Therefore, the socialist ideology of São Tomé's leaders coincided with the need to diversify the country's foreign relations, both economically and diplomatically, a process with similarities to Cabo Verde, described by Barros, Monteiro and Costa in Chapter 12 of this book. The MLSTP's option was to a certain extent influenced by Cold War dynamics, as it had to rely on both superpowers (and their allies) for the necessary resources and assistance.

The option for a socialist one-party state guided by the socialist countries and the Cuban experience, we argue, was conditioned by Cold War bipolarization, by the consequent socialist option of the liberation movements and by the support of the socialist countries that exported their models to extend their geopolitical influence, as well as by the Portuguese Revolution in 1974/5.[7] However, from the mid-1980s onward, the country's material demands ushered in a change in political direction.

São Tomé's modest liberation struggle, 1960–74

Due to insularity and limited size, which made it easy for the Portuguese security forces to quash any potential opposition, there was no significant political action, let alone armed resistance against colonialism in São Tomé. Consequently, the liberation struggle was fought exclusively from exile in the political and diplomatic arenas. São Tomé and Príncipe's first nationalist group demanding independence, the CLSTP, was created in September 1960 by Miguel Trovoada and João Guadalupe de Ceita, two Santomean students in Portugal, while they were on holidays in São Tomé, together with local friends Leonel d'Alva, António 'Oné' Pires dos Santos and a few others.[8]

Because the foundation of Portuguese colonialism in the archipelago relied on the exploitation of *contratados* from other African colonies through forced labour, it is not surprising that questions regarding the plantation system were one of the committee's central axes. The CLSTP's political programme demanded the abolition of privileges for whites; the establishment of a republican, democratic, secular, anticolonial and anti-imperialistic regime; and the abolition of forced labour. Further demands included the introduction of an eight-hour workday, free medical care, gradual abolition of unemployment, literacy campaigns and compulsory primary education. Regarding the plantation economy, the programme called for an agrarian reform, the gradual development of planning, the end of agricultural monoculture and the mechanization of agriculture.

Finally, it advocated the principles of an independent foreign policy committed to African unity and non-alignment to the military blocks.[9] Miguel Trovoada, CLSTP chairman, represented the group at the CONCP's foundation meeting in April 1961. Concerning São Tomé and Príncipe, the CONCP's final resolution demanded Portugal's expulsion from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and denounced manoeuvres to create a hostile environment between the Santomeans and the African *contratados* on the *roças*, thus impeding their unity of action against the common enemy.[10] This point referred to the fact that generally the local creole population refused plantation work and lived socially and spatially segregated from the *contratados* confined in the plantations. At the time the islands had a total population of about 63,700 inhabitants, of whom 22,600 were plantation workers from Angola, Mozambique and Cabo Verde.

While in Portugal's other colonies diplomacy was a counterpart to war on the ground, in this case the international arena was the very core of the liberation struggle. In 1961, Trovoada and Carlos Graça established a CLSTP delegation in Libreville, Gabon. At the same time, another group of the CLSTP settled in Accra at the invitation of Ghana's president Kwame Nkrumah, who had established a Bureau of African Affairs that hosted several African liberation movements. In contrast to the movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, the CLSTP lacked any rival organization. It was also unable to carry out anticolonial actions in the islands themselves where the Portuguese secret police PIDE (International and State Defence Police) easily maintained tight control. Notwithstanding the absence of significant political actions at home, thanks to the support of other CONCP members, in 1962 the UN General Assembly officially recognized the CLSTP as the sole legitimate representative of the Santomean people.

In September that year, Trovoada addressed the UN Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration where he denounced Portuguese colonial rule in the archipelago.[11] In May 1963, in Addis Ababa, Trovoada and Graça participated as observers in the foundation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Subsequently the OAU recognized the CLSTP as liberation movement, and its Liberation Committee provided the CLSTP office in Libreville with financial aid.

Amidst internal strife, the CLSTP's activities were scarce, and in November 1965, PIDE attributed the absence of nationalist agitation in São Tomé to the insular situation and a lack of organization of the few nationalist-minded individuals.[12] Following their expulsion from Accra after the 1966 military coup, São Tomé's nationalists exiled in different countries met again only in July 1972 when eight nationalists gathered in Santa Isabel (now Malabo) to reconstitute the CLSTP as MLSTP. As Trovoada's leadership aspirations lacked consensus, Manuel Pinto da Costa, who had earned a PhD in economics in East Berlin in 1971, emerged as a compromise candidate and was elected MLSTP secretary general.[13] Like his comrades, Pinto da Costa was part of São Tomé's small, educated elite. Following secondary education in Luanda and Lisbon, he arrived in East Berlin in the early 1960s. His training in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) convinced him that a socialist transition was viable in his country.

In January 1973 the OUA Liberation Committee officially recognized the MLSTP.[14] However, it is worth noting that the Directorate General of Security (DGS, which replaced the PIDE in 1969) in São Tomé was, apparently, unaware of the existence of the MLSTP at the end of 1973. At the time the DGS's fortnightly report stated that 'although we have not received much information from abroad, we have the impression that the CLSTP [*sic*] is inactive or disorganised'.[15] The lack of awareness of the existence of MLSTP on the islands would change only after Portugal's Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974.

The struggle for independence arrives in São Tomé, 1974–5

On 12 July 1975, the country became independent under MLSTP leadership. When the national flag was raised for the first time and MLSTP secretary general Manuel Pinto da Costa, the country's first president, gave his inaugural speech, the message was one of revolution and unity. The symbolism contained in this statement, in the presence of hundreds of Santomeans and a Portuguese delegation led by Admiral Rosa Coutinho, is not surprising, considering the long history of colonial oppression and the troubled months on the islands following the Carnation Revolution.

The MLSTP – recognized by the Portuguese authorities as the sole interlocutor in October 1974 – set up the transitional government on 21 December the same year. The period from May 1974 to July 1975 was however characterized by diverse conflicts and tensions within the MLSTP, between the MLSTP and other projects as well as by the initial absence of political identification between the MLSTP and the islands' population.[16] Soon after the Carnation Revolution, two groups emerged, the Frente

Popular Livre (FPL) in May and the Associação Cívica Pró-MLSTP in June, which was an instrument of the MLSTP since its leadership decided to remain in Libreville.

The FPL was short-lived, particularly because it was advocating a federalist solution for the archipelago.[17] Moreover they were intimidated and marginalized by their opponents, who denounced them as reactionaries, neocolonialists and enemies of the people. Finally, in August of the same year, the FPL announced its dissolution and the integration of its members into the MLSTP.[18] On 28 August 1974, MLSTP secretary general Pinto da Costa spoke for the first time directly to the population in the radio programme 'The Voice of the People of São Tomé and Príncipe' broadcast from Libreville. He said that the military coup in Portugal had created better conditions for the anticolonial struggle but had not brought independence. He stressed that the MLSTP would struggle not for jobs in the Portuguese colonial administration but for total independence. Further he praised the FPL's dissolution and invoked the unity of all nationalist forces under MLSTP leadership, since a divided people could not defeat the enemy. Echoing the traditional line of CONCP's original movements, he also declared that the struggle was directed against Portuguese colonial oppression, but not against the Portuguese people.[19]

The other competing project would become the Associação Cívica Pró-MLSTP, which intended, in the absence of the party leadership in the territory, to function as its 'legal arm' in the struggle for total independence. Since June 1974, successively more than twenty young students arrived from Lisbon to wage the political struggle. They had been politically socialized by the ideas of pan-Africanism, black power, Marxism and Maoism. Thanks to the determination and militancy of these students, they succeeded in mobilizing the local population and *contratados* alike. But regardless of their participation in the independence struggle, the African plantation workers remained largely absent in the actual political process.

This group of young educated people, inspired by Marxism-Leninism and imbued with a revolutionary discourse, endeavoured to energize a set of actions among the population, from strikes and demonstrations to the invasion of agricultural properties and boycotts to commercial shops, which generated fear among the about two thousand Portuguese residents and antagonism with the newly appointed governor (later high commissioner) António Pires Veloso.[20] One of the most sensitive issues in which they became involved, and which eventually led to the Cívica's rupture with the MLSTP, was related to the Caçadores 7, a colonial troop made up of Santomean soldiers. The students of the Associação Cívica (and two ministers in the transitional government) wanted this military contingent – whom they considered reactionary – dismantled and replaced by a popular militia. Pires Veloso refused to do so, threatening to anticipate the independence date that was defined in the Algiers Agreement, signed on 26 November 1974, and to cut Portuguese funding to the islands after independence, among others. The Cívica wanted to get rid of the troops they saw as a threat for a future socialist regime, whereas Pires Veloso wanted to prevent a (perceived) radical leftist regime after independence. Faced with this situation, MLSTP leader Pinto da Costa returned earlier to São Tomé in March 1975, at which point he gave in to Pires Veloso to neutralize and dissolve the Cívica, which had become a threat to his own power aspirations.[21]

If, during the struggle for independence in 1974–5 the actions of the extinct FPL were recurrently connoted as imperialist, the participation of the Cívica in the liberation struggle became, in turn, at least partially silenced during the MLSTP single party regime, so that its elder leadership emerged as the main symbol in the archipelago's liberation from colonialism. In a territory that achieved independence without resorting to armed struggle, in addition to the elections held on the eve of independence, the legitimacy of the MLSTP was sustained, above all, on two axes. On the one hand, in mythical and foundational narratives centred around the binomial of heroism and sacrifice, and considered precursors of the Santomeans anticolonial resistance, such as the Batepá massacre in 1953, when dozens of Santomeans were killed by colonists mobilized by Governor Carlos Gorgulho (a national holiday was established commemorating this event after independence).[22]

On the other hand, MLSTP's legitimacy also rested on memorializing its liberation struggle credentials. While there has never been a war in São Tomé, the figure of the combatant remains central, even if this combatant does not carry a weapon 'in his hand', as alluded to in the lyrics of the Santomean national anthem composed by the renowned poet and nationalist Alda Espírito Santo.[23] The case of the two men who accidently died on 6 September 1974 are a particular example of this move. They are the only fatalities registered during the independence struggle. On that day, Santomean soldiers, alarmed by demonstrators, discovered weapons hidden in boxes loaded on a lorry in front of a bakery in the city. Alarmed by the agitation among the about two hundred people present, the Military Police appeared on the scene and fired in the air. After the incident the stevedore Manuel Rodrigues Pita known as Giovani was found dead hit by a stray bullet in a hollow some seventy metres away from the bakery. On the same day, Paulo Ferreira, a young Santomean soldier, died after falling from a moving jeep because he was overtired following a long mission. After independence, 6 September became a holiday called Day of National Heroes (in 1980 renamed Day of the Armed Forces) in homage of the two men who lost their life by accidents on that day.

The conflict between the elder MLSTP leadership and the Cívica was not only ideological, but to some extent also generational since most of the student activists were in their twenties. In the end it was a power struggle that was decided in favour of the moderate faction thanks to the active intervention of Pires Veloso who succeeded in turning most of the people against the Cívica. In addition to Pinto da Costa's eagerness to ensure his leadership, Pires Veloso wished to prevent a group he labelled 'radicals' from gaining power.

São Tomé's socialist one-party state, 1975–90

Like the movements who came to power in Portugal's other former African colonies, MLSTP adopted a political and economic model based on a sole ruling socialist party as the guiding force of state and society, and a centralized planned economy.[24] At the time of independence São Tomé and Príncipe had a population of about 80,000 people. Socialism would coexist with other currents of political thought, as well as with the

characteristics of small island states, such as the prevalence of face-to-face interactions and a tendency to personalize and patronize the political process.[25]

The ruling party selected the national flag, based on its own flag with the pan-African colours of Ethiopia, as well as the national holidays and historic heroes. It renamed Christmas Day on 25 December 'Day of the Family' to emphasize the socialist state's secular nature.[26] For the same reason, the MLSTP replaced the islands' traditional local Catholic feasts by secular district festivals organized by the party. Many Portuguese names of streets and those of schools were replaced by the names of progressive African leaders.[27] However, the MLSTP did not assign streets the names of non-African revolutionary leaders as, for example, FRELIMO did in Maputo.

In foreign policy, São Tomé and Príncipe's government looked to the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) as natural political allies, and while officially non-aligned, socialist states were also regarded as such. At least until 1989, Portugal was the only non-socialist country with a resident ambassador in the country, while the Soviet Union, GDR, Cuba, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Angola maintained embassies in São Tomé. Governmental trips also reflected São Tomé's ties with socialist countries. In December 1975 President Pinto da Costa made his first official visits to Romania, PRC and North Korea.[28] Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada paid visits to Cuba in September 1976 and the USSR the following month.[29] In April 1977 Pinto da Costa visited the GDR.[30]

The following year São Tomé signed its first economic cooperation agreement with East Berlin, while the MLSTP endorsed a partisan cooperation arrangement with the ruling United Socialist Party of Germany (SED). The socialist countries were also the most important providers of higher education training. Until 1984 more than seven hundred students from the islands had been sent for technical and university courses abroad, predominantly to Cuba, the USSR, GDR, Romania and other socialist countries.[31] When they returned home, they were provided with jobs in the expanding state apparatus and state-owned enterprises. Particularly the students who departed during the first years after independence could advance considerably after their return. Many would become government ministers and high officeholders in the state administration or occupied key positions in the state-run economy.[32]

The USSR and Cuba supported the country less economically and more on a technical level (health, education, security, etc.). The USSR provided mainly military aid, advisors and training. In 1981, São Tomé and Moscow signed a fishing agreement that allowed the Soviets to fish and do maritime scientific research in the archipelago's waters. Also included in the agreement was assistance in training national cadres and feasibility studies for the establishment of a joint Soviet-Santomean fisheries enterprise.[33] Furthermore, it was reported in the Portuguese press that Soviet technicians would be setting up a radar station near the Monte Café property.[34] The ties with socialist Cuba were more central. The MLSTP looked to Cuba, a tropical island with a plantation economy which had successfully constructed a socialist society and economy, as an example. Still in 1975 the first group of Santomean students left for Cuba and in July the following year eighteen soldiers were sent there for military training. When Trovoada visited Cuba in October 1976 he told his hosts that he was convinced that Cuba would succeed in constructing a communist society.[35]

During a one-week visit to Cuba in November 1978 Pinto da Costa was bestowed by Fidel Castro with the highest National Order 'José Martí'. In his acceptance speech Pinto da Costa assured his host that his own country was also 'determined to advance on the luminous path of constructing a society without exploited or exploiters'.[36] At that time some 140 Cuban experts had already moved to São Tomé, creating a parallel administration on all decision-making levels.

Among the PALOP, Angola was the most important ally. It provided São Tomé with fuel supplies at preferential prices that were significantly below world market prices. In addition, for years Angola's national airline Transportes Aéreos de Angola (TAAG) maintained the only regular flight connection to and from São Tomé. In 1978, at the MLSTP regime's request, Angola sent troops to São Tomé to protect the local regime against a supposed external imperialist threat.[37] Contrary to the times of colonialism, when the Portuguese were practically the only foreigners in the islands, the independent nation became increasingly internationalized, in the first fifteen years predominantly with people from the then-socialist countries.

In spite of a prevalence of political and diplomatic ties with the socialist bloc and the Portuguese and French-speaking African countries, São Tomé's foreign economic trade was strongly engaged with Western capitalist countries (in particular with Portugal, but also with the Netherlands, the main destinations of national exports, among others).[38] If in July 1975, São Tomé and Príncipe joined the OAU and implemented its resolution that prohibited South African Airways and other airlines flying to or from South Africa to enter its national airspace, in August that year São Tomé submitted its application for membership of the Lomé Convention, a trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). In September 1975 the archipelago became the 140th member state of the UN. São Tomé's first foreign embassy was opened August 1975 in Lisbon, while the first bilateral cooperation agreement with Portugal was signed in December that year. As part of this agreement, in early 1976 the first seventeen of a group of thirty-two Portuguese teachers arrived in São Tomé.[39]

Regarding nation-state-building processes, 'without openly espousing Marxism-Leninism as an iderology', the one-party regime adopted 'the design of "social revolution" and anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist unity'.[40] The newly independent country's political Constitution and its successive amendments reflect this commitment. At independence the Constituent Assembly authorized the MLSTP Political Bureau to approve a provisional Fundamental Law of twenty-two articles. Under this law São Tomé and Príncipe became a one-party state where the seven-member MLSTP Political Bureau exercised the sovereign powers of the state.[41] In November 1975 the Political Bureau and the Constituent Assembly approved the political constitution. The preamble defined the construction of a society free from exploitation of man by man as the outcome of a democratic and popular revolution guided by the MLSTP.

Under this constitution the MLSTP had the duty to determine the state's political orientation. Private property was not abolished, but state property was considered the preponderant driving force of the national economy. The legislative power was vested in a thirty-three-member Popular National Assembly (ANP) with a four-year term that held two sessions per year. Its members were not elected but composed of the seven members of the Political Bureau, four government members, thirteen local party

committee delegates, two representatives of the women's organization and the party youth, and five capable citizens appointed by the MLSTP. The ANP elected the head of state for a four-year term and appointed the members of the Supreme Court proposed by the MLSTP. In its inaugural session in December 1975 the ANP duly elected Pinto da Costa as president.[42]

By then, almost all Portuguese settlers had left the islands, depriving the country's administration and economy of trained and experienced personnel. Since Portuguese colonialism had prevented adequate school education and professional training for Africans, at the time of independence there were very few nationals with a university education. Many of the locals who replaced the departed Portuguese in the public administration, the plantation economy and trade were inadequately prepared for their jobs. The plantation economy based on cocoa monoculture remained the dominant sector of the national economy, since it employed about half of the wage earners and provided the bulk of the country's export income. The MLSTP regime aimed to use the export income generated by the cocoa plantations to diversify the economy and to finance social programmes. Already in a message in February 1975, the MLSTP leadership announced that 'with cocoa money we shall be able to create hospitals, crèches, schools, and contribute to the establishment of certain industries, which will not have any other objective than to serve the people, and consequently the workers themselves'.[43]

After independence most Angolan and Mozambican plantation workers returned to their home countries, whereas the about nine thousand Cabo Verdeans did not leave.[44] They remained in the estates due to a tacit agreement between the governments in Praia and São Tomé, since at the time the former was not in the condition to receive thousands of returnees, while the latter needed their labour for the plantation economy. As during colonialism, despite changed ownership after independence the local population did not accept plantation work and therefore refused to replace the repatriated *contratados* on the agricultural estates.[45]

Two months after independence, President Manuel Pinto da Costa had announced the nationalization of the plantations, perceived as the symbol of colonial oppression. On 30 September 1975, at a mass meeting in the capital, Pinto da Costa proclaimed the nationalization without compensation of the twenty-three largest Portuguese-owned plantations that were placed under the management of so-called Provisional Administrative Commissions. In October 1978 another twenty-seven privately owned plantations were nationalized and in March the following year the nationalized estates were reorganized into fifteen large State Agriculture and Livestock Enterprises (EEA), whose total area ranged from 2,370 ha to 17,054 ha. The area of the newly created agricultural state companies, including two in Príncipe, covered 92 per cent of the archipelago's total land area. The MLSTP praised the nationalization of the Portuguese-owned plantations as 'a great victory of the forces of popular emancipation over the greatest symbol of colonial oppression'[46] and declared 30 September a national holiday (initially called 'Anniversary of the opening of the New Front in the Struggle for Economic Independence', then in 1980 renamed 'Agricultural Reform Day').

While their social status remained practically unchanged, plantation workers had thirty days of annual leave and could leave the estates outside working hours.

The state also nationalized a few existing companies in the hotel, beverages, energy, fuel, construction, insurance and telecommunication sectors and established new companies in the fishing, poultry, clothing, pharmaceutical and ceramics sectors. The regime also set up a retail trade network of so-called *Lojas do Povo* (People's Shops) in abandoned buildings, which sold essential goods at subsidized prices. Consequently, the state legally controlled all economic activities by fixing prices and salaries, handling imports and exports and marketing consumer goods.

However, because of various constraints, including poor management and a lack of a sufficient number of national cadres during first years of independence, the planned socioeconomic transformations did not achieve the desired results. The Ministry of Agriculture, in charge of the management of state-owned estates, appointed directors from the capital without agricultural or management experience. It soon became evident that neither the ministry nor the directors were prepared to efficiently allocate labour, inputs and equipment to the large estates. At the same time, despite the regime's socialist rhetoric, the status of plantation workers did not improve after independence since they were still widely perceived as second-class citizens, thus mirroring the sociocultural and spatial segregation between Santomeans (*forros*) and the African plantation workers during colonialism.[47]

Despite the *roças*' nationalization, little had changed within their hierarchy: most positions of responsibility were occupied by members of the MLSTP; more technical intermediate positions, such as foremen, as well as more administrative positions, were left with those who already held them before independence, and the former *contratados* continued to have the same place as agricultural labourers of the plantations, that is, the same symbolic and structural place of social invisibility.[48]

As a result, the number of plantation workers steadily declined since they abandoned the ailing estates and migrated to the capital. In addition, the state failed to provide adequate investments for nationalized plantations. Thus, instead of the announced rupture, what existed was a system of continuity with the colonial years, where the *roça* remained a structure that hierarchized society and its various segments, assigning agricultural workers the space at the base of the pyramid, even though their presence was understood as fundamental for the islands' economic sustenance.[49] In addition, the agricultural sector was underfunded. In fact, between 1975 and 1987 only 22 per cent of total investments were allocated to the agricultural sector.[50] As a result, the country's cocoa production began to drop when productivity decreased, and the original infrastructure had been run down. Consequently, São Tomé's export revenue fell from $27 million in 1979 to $9 million in 1981. In 1985, in his official address on Independence Day, President Pinto da Costa admitted that his regime had lacked both adequate structures and technical means to transform the plantations into an instrument of socioeconomic development of the new society.[51]

Despite the poor performance of cocoa production – due to a combination of various factors, including a lack of qualified personnel, mismanagement and a severe drought in 1982 that exacerbated the problem – Santomean officials used Cold War alliances to assert some material claims, as Immanuel Rafael Harisch demonstrates. For example, they secured a barter agreement with the GDR, from 1982 to 1987, fixing prices on cocoa that were approximately 10 per cent higher than the global market

price.[52] It is, however, difficult to ascertain how the actual implementation of this barter agreement took place and whether cocoa exports were actually redirected to the GDR. For example, Vogt claims that the GDR did not import the cocoa shipments, but sold them in Rotterdam to satisfy its foreign exchange needs.[53] Nevertheless, in the context of rapid declining prices of cocoa and 'insinuating "socialist solidarity" against a devastating capitalist system', in 1982 São Tomé would still appeal to its socialist allies as natural partners, a role that they soon proved to be unprepared (or unwilling) to play.[54]

Other sectors of the economy suffered from the same problems as the agriculture, namely a lack of adequately trained personnel, maladministration and clientelism. Moreover, many state-owned companies were damaged by corruption and fraud by their own management. As a result, none of the economic sectors accomplished the objectives established in the regime's consecutive economic plans. Most public enterprises became loss making, further worsening the state finances that were already negatively affected by the increasing debts of the large agricultural enterprises. The precarious economic situation led the MLSTP regime to review its foreign policy in search of aid, which the socialist countries were not able or inclined to provide. In turn, the political price for the aid was a rapprochement with the Western countries and the abandonment of the Soviet model.

In the meantime, Pinto da Costa progressively removed his opponents and rivals after independence, while the MLSTP claimed to have discovered several alleged attempted coups to topple the Santomean president. The Special Court for Counter-Revolutionary Actions (TEACR) – established in December 1975[55] – tried and sentenced several alleged coup plotters to prison terms ranging from a few months to twenty-four years. At the same time, his regime set up militias, called Grupos de Vigilância e Defesa Popular (GVDP), to defend the country against an alleged external imperialist aggression allied with internal reactionaries. In 1979, the erstwhile close personal relationship between Pinto da Costa and Trovoada became increasingly affected by the power struggles within the regime. In April, Pinto da Costa demoted Trovoada from prime minister to minister of economy, cooperation and tourism. In September, Trovoada was arrested under the accusation of complicity in the so-called census riots of the previous month. For two days, people demonstrated against the MLSTP regime since they had perceived the population census as the regime's attempt to force the local population to work on the nationalized plantations.

In addition, people feared that the state intended to confiscate their domestic animals and other private properties. More than a hundred demonstrators were detained by the security forces. The MLSTP leadership explained the cause of the anti-government demonstrations by two intertwined factors: the poor living conditions of the population and their lack of information and deficient political and ideological education. Upon the removal of Trovoada, the regime became more repressive, while Pinto da Costa gained greater personal power. Trovoada remained in prison without charge or trial until July 1981 when he was allowed to leave for Paris into exile.[56]

The MLSTP's second extraordinary assembly held in December 1981 reflected the increasing political and economic problems. The delegates regretted that not all party members were the most conscious, most decisive, and most responsible people who

were truly engaged in constructing a dynamic and prosperous society without the exploitation of man by man. Nevertheless, given the existing antagonist interests within society, it was decided to create the conditions for the progressive transformation of the MLSTP into a vanguard party of the working class.[57] At the party's third extraordinary assembly in December 1982 Pinto da Costa accused the local petty bourgeoisie of exploiting its privileged positions within the administration and the state companies and of infiltrating the MLSTP to seize political power. He criticized a low educational and ideological level of most party members and a prevalent mentality that only valued gaining a position within the state administration as advancement. Concerning the economy, Pinto da Costa admitted that the production costs of the state-run companies were higher than the value of their output, while they were plagued by theft, fraud, misappropriation of public property, hoarding and speculation. Despite the problems denounced, the delegates approved that the ultimate political goal still was to end the exploitation of man by man by constructing socialism.[58]

At that time, Pinto da Costa had reached the height of his personal power. He was simultaneously head of state and government, party leader and commander of the armed forces. Only exiled opponents challenged Pinto da Costa's autocracy. The most important exiled opposition group was the Frente de Resistência Nacional de São Tomé e Príncipe (FRNSTP), based in Libreville, where it was supported by President Omar Bongo.[59] However, while his personal dictatorship had become uncontested, the worsening economic crisis forced his regime to abandon Soviet-style socialism as an adequate model for national development. One of the first signs of political change appeared on Independence Day 1984 when Pinto da Costa publicly admitted the severe problems in the economy. He confessed that the regime's domestic and foreign policy options had not always corresponded to the country's realities.[60]

As the socialist countries were unable and unwilling to provide adequate support to overcome the crisis, the MLSTP regime approached Western countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In December 1984 São Tomé accepted the so-called Berlin Clause, according to which West Berlin was an integral part of West Germany. São Tomé's new foreign policy was rewarded by two round-table conferences held in December 1985 and May 1986 where Western donors promised the country development aid totalling almost $75 million. In turn in 1986 Pinto da Costa consecutively visited France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, the United States and the UN in New York. At the UN General Assembly São Tomé embarrassed its former allies by voting in favour of a motion in demand of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.[61] In 1987 the MLSTP regime signed an agreement with the IMF on a Structural Adjustment Programme.

Another proof of political reorientation was the MLSTP's renouncement of Marxism and the regime's reconciliation with former dissidents. At the MLSTP's 2nd Ordinary Assembly in September 1985 the party was redefined as a broad front open to all citizens and dissociated itself from Marxist ideology. In 1986, Pinto da Costa even declared that most people, including the MLSTP leadership, knew nothing about Marxism and that the association with it was more an opportunist attitude than anything else.[62] At a meeting of the MLSTP Central Committee in October 1987 various resolutions were adopted that explicitly sought to add political reform measures to

the so-called structural adjustment of the economy. In the following years, Pinto da Costa made several government reshuffles in line with his new political orientation. In 1988, he appointed Carlos Graça (who had returned from exile in Gabon) as foreign minister of the newly formed government, which was led by a prime minister for the first time since 1979, when Trovoada had been deposed. At the same time Pinto da Costa reconciled with the pro-Western Omar Bongo. Finally in early December 1989, less than a month after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the MLSTP held a national conference with the participation of non-members and local opponents that pioneered the introduction of multiparty democracy and a market economy.

This far-reaching decision came as a surprise since initially the MLSTP only intended to change the ideological orientation of the one-party system but not to abolish it. At the PALOP summit in Praia later that month the other four countries unanimously disapproved the MLSTP's decisions as unsuitable in the African context. In contrast, Portugal, France and the United States explicitly welcomed the MLSTP's decisions. Despite fellow PALOP reluctance, political and economic liberalization seemed inevitable after the end of the Cold War. In August 1990 a popular referendum was held to ratify a new democratic constitution elaborated by the MLSTP with Portuguese assistance. A large majority of 81 per cent of the 42,000 voters approved the new democratic multiparty constitution.

Conclusion

From the beginning, São Tomé and Príncipe's small group of nationalists in exile shared the dominant political thoughts of the main liberation movements of Portugal's other African colonies (since 1961 organized in the CONCP). The members of CONCP had not only a common enemy, but also a common objective: the construction of a socialist society. While the MLSTP's ultimate goal was to build a society without the exploration of man by man, it would never claim to be Marxist. It is important to note that while the MLSTP was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Santomean people by both the UN and the OAU, the small group remained largely unknown in the archipelago. The Carnation Revolution quickly shifted the landscape, creating an opportunity for political action towards the islands' formal independence. A group of left-wing students who had returned from Lisbon successfully waged the struggle on behalf of the MLSTP, whose leadership remained in Libreville. Alternative projects of a federation with Portugal that initially existed in Lisbon and São Tomé became quickly unfeasible given the international and domestic context of Portugal's decolonization at the time.

However, soon after the transitional government formed by the MLSTP had assumed office, the question of the dissolution of the local colonial troops opposed the different factions within the party. With the assistance of Portugal's High Commissioner, the moderate faction was able to settle the conflict in their favour. Ironically, after attaining independence, this moderate faction embraced increasingly the socialist rhetoric and implemented policies that would appease their allies from the socialist countries, who provided most of the development aid.

Due to a number of shortcomings and despite its ideological commitment to socialism, the MLSTP was mainly driven by pragmatism. The result was that socialist ideology could not be implemented socially and politically in a more consolidated manner. Consequently, when the regime's economic policies failed, it was easier for Pinto da Costa to instrumentalize socialist rhetoric to legitimize his growing power. Afterward, when his regime was no longer sustainable economically, he decided to drop the socialist option and replace the socialist one-party state by liberal democracy. The MLSTP regime's shift away from the socialist model was a gradual and peaceful process largely pursued by the party leadership that lasted about five years. The political transition started years before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the decision to introduce multiparty democracy was opposed by the other PALOP countries at a summit in Praia in December 1989. The decline of the Soviet Bloc in the 1980s and external and domestic pressures did not initiate the process of political change but had given it its final direction.

Notes

Inês Nascimento Rodrigues's work on this chapter was supported by the Foundation for Science and Technology under contract 2022.08058.CEECIND/CP1754/CT0004.

1. Pablo Eyzaguirre, 'Small Farmers and Estates in Säo Tomé' (PhD diss., Yale University, 1986).
2. See Catherine Higgs, *Chocolate Islands: Cocoa, Slavery, and Colonial Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); Marta Macedo, 'Coffee on the Move: Technology, Labour and Race in the Making of a Transatlantic Plantation System', *Mobilities* 16, no. 2 (2021): 262–72.
3. Marina Berthet, 'São Tomé e Príncipe: reflexões sobre alguns aspetos da sua história agrícola no pós-independência', *Estudos Ibero-Americanos* 42, no. 3 (2016): 968.
4. Patrick Chabal, David Birmingham, Joshua Forrest, Malyn Newitt, Gerhard Seibert and Elisa Silva Andrade, *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa* (London: Hurst, 2002), 59.
5. Patrick Chabal, 'The Postcolonial State in Portuguese-Speaking Africa', *Portuguese Studies* 8 (1992): 191.
6. Michel Cahen, 'Arquipélagos da alternância: a vitória da oposição nas ilhas de Cabo Verde e São Tomé e Príncipe', *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* 14–15 (1991): 113–54.
7. As recalled by the MLSTP's leader at the time, thirty-five years after independence: Manuel Pinto da Costa, *Terra Firme* (Porto: Afrontamento, 2011).
8. Gerhard Seibert, *Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 89; Carlos Espírito Santo, *O Nacionalismo Político São-Tomense* (Lisbon: Colibri, 2012), 222.
9. *História da República Democrática de São Tomé e Príncipe: Esboço do desenvolvimento social, económico, político e cultural* (S. Tomé: 1985), 308.
10. Ronald H. Chilcote, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 511. For ILO as a site of imperial resilience, which was used by the *Estado Novo* to restrain juridical demands and defend its imperial legitimacy, see Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, 'Colonial Labour

Internationalised: Portugal and the Decolonization Momentum (1945–1975)', *International History Review* 42, no. 3 (2020): 485–504.

11. Ibid., 325.
12. Arquivo Nacional, Torre do Tombo (ANTT), PIDE subdelegation in São Tomé, report no. 21, 1–15 November 1965.
13. His PhD thesis is on the utilization of foreign capital in planned industrialization.
14. Augusto Nascimento, 'A inelutável independência ou os (in)esperados ventos de mudança em São Tomé e Príncipe', in *O adeus ao Império: 40 anos de descolonização portuguesa*, ed. Fernando Rosas, Mário Machaqueiro and Pedro Aires Oliveira (Lisbon: Nova Vega, 2015), 181.
15. ANTT, DGS subdelegation in São Tomé, report no. 23, 1–15 December 1973.
16. Hilda Varela, '"¡Nnoche de gran luna y destino ignorado!" La historia política de la República de São Tomé y Príncipe (1975–1996)', *Studios de Asia y Africa* 32, no. 3 (1997): 479.
17. Nascimento, 'A inelutável independência', 182.
18. Gerhard Seibert, 'A Política num Micro-Estado. São Tomé e Príncipe, ou os conflitos pessoais e políticos na génese dos partidos políticos', *Lusotopie* 2 (1995): 243.
19. Cruz, *S. Tomé*, 86–9.
20. Seibert, 'A Política', 242; Nascimento, 'A inelutável independência', 182. Pires Veloso arrived in July 1974 as governor. In the Algiers Agreement, his function was renamed high commissioner.
21. Nascimento, 'A inelutável independência', 187. See also Augusto Nascimento, 'A *Farsa* da Tropa Nativa na Transição para a Independência em São Tomê e Príncipe', *Revista Tempo, Espaço, Linguagem* 7, no. 2 (2016): 230–73.
22. On Batepá, see Gerhard Seibert, 'The February 1953 Massacre in São Tomé: Crack in the Salazarist Image of Multiracial Harmony and Impetus for Nationalist Demands for Independence', *Portuguese Studies Review* 10, no. 2 (2002): 53–80; Inês Nascimento Rodrigues, *Espectros de Batepá. Memórias e narrativas do 'Massacre de 1953' em São Tomé e Príncipe* (Porto: Afrontamento, 2018).
23. Inês Nascimento Rodrigues and Miguel Cardina, 'Who Is the Combatant? A Diachronic Reading Based on Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe', in *The Portuguese Colonial War and the African Liberation Struggles: Memory, Politics, and Uses of the Past*, ed. Miguel Cardina (London: Routledge, 2023), 177–91.
24. Chabal et al., *A History*, 26.
25. Gerhard Seibert, 'São Tomé e Príncipe', in *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa* (London: Hurst, 2002), 291.
26. Law no. 2/76, 22 December.
27. E.g., Law Decree no. 14/76, 15 April, and Resolution no. 2/87, 31 July.
28. *Revolução* no. 28, 15 October 1976.
29. *Revolução*, special number, 21 December 1976.
30. Espírito Santo, *A Primeira*, 189–91.
31. Seibert, *Comrades*, 132.
32. Ibid.
33. *Revolução* no. 124, 12 December 1981.
34. Alexander Sloop, 'Soviet Military Presence Reported in African Archipelago', *United Press International*, 20 March 1984, www.upi.com/Archives/1984/03/20/Soviet-military-presence-reported-in-African-archipelago/2545448606800/.
35. *Revolução* no. 28, 15 October 1976.
36. *Revolução* no. 46, 23 February 1979.

37. They would remain in São Tomé until the first multiparty elections in 1991. Cf. Seibert, *Comrades*, 145.
38. Tony Hodges and Malyn Newitt, *São Tomé and Príncipe: From Plantation Colony to Microstate* (Boulder: Westview, 1988).
39. *Revolução*, no. 14, 16 January 1976.
40. Nascimento, 'A inelutável independência', 189.
41. Seibert, *Comrades*, 137.
42. Ibid., 138.
43. Ceita, *Memórias*, 249.
44. Eyzaguirre, 'Small Farmers', 350.
45. Cahen, 'Arquipélagos', 125–6.
46. Seibert, *Comrades*, 161.
47. Eyzaguirre, 'Small Farmers', 363. 'Forros' is a category that refers to the offspring of freed enslaved people, and it also includes the 'children of the land' and their successors, that is, the descendants from a creole elite of the first European and African settlers of the islands. As such, the latter would come to occupy intermediate social positions during Portuguese colonialism, holding posts in the colony's public administration and/or owning plantations.
48. Berthet, 'S. Tomé', 971.
49. Ibid.
50. Seibert, *Comrades*, 166.
51. Ibid., 169.
52. E.g., Immanuel Rafael Harisch, 'Bartering Coffee, Cocoa and W50 Trucks: The Trade Relationships of the GDR, Angola and São Tomé in a Comparative Perspective', *Global Histories* 3, no. 2 (2017): 43–60. See also *Revolução* no. 126, 6 February 1982.
53. Ina Vogt, *Wege im Schatten der Kakaobäume. Meine Zeit auf São Tomé und Príncipe 1986/89* (Berlin: Verlag am Park, 2022), 113.
54. Harisch, 'Bartering', 56–7. It was announced in 1982 that a hydroelectric dam would be constructed by the URSS, as was the construction of the People's Palace by China, a country that had also granted credit to the islands in 1975. A clay factory (pottery) was also inaugurated in cooperation with the GDR the following year. Cf. *Revolução* no. 181, 21 July 1982; *Revolução*, no. 257, 25 November 1982; and *Revolução*, no. 357, 16 April 1983.
55. Law-decree, no. 32, 29 December 1975.
56. He did not return to São Tomé before 1990 when the democratic transition had already begun.
57. Seibert, *Comrades*, 176.
58. Ibid., 178.
59. Seibert, 'São Tomé', 299.
60. *Revolução*, no. 425, 28 July 1984.
61. Seibert, *Comrades*, 187.
62. Interview, *Africa Report*, January–February 1986.

12

The making of independent Cabo Verde: Militant non-alignment, active neutrality and fading anti-imperialism

Víctor Barros, Francisco Osvaldino Nascimento Monteiro and Suzano Costa

As the ideological rivalry spearheaded by the United States and the Soviet Union envisioned a world divided in two camps, the African continent became a disputed site in the Cold War. However, 1955's Bandung conference and, in its aftermath, the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) encouraged the adoption of diverse, flexible and complex positionings, especially throughout the Third World.[1] Scholarship has come to recognize how, under Amílcar Cabral's leadership, the PAIGC – the movement fighting for Guinea-Bissau's and Cabo Verde's independence from Portuguese colonial rule – connected struggles and combined anti-imperialism with non-alignment.[2] On the one hand, Cabral acknowledged that Portugal was but a middleman in the exploitation of Africa fuelled by the West's – and, particularly, the United States' – capitalist interests, so the PAIGC's struggle was ultimately opposed to Western imperialism. On the other hand, he differentiated this struggle from the East/West conflict, steadily refusing to subsume the PAIGC into any of the superpowers' geopolitical blocs and military alliances while searching for support across the globe. Although this strategy was not enough to isolate Portugal from its political and economic partners, it did garner the PAIGC valuable connections and aid not only from the Eastern Bloc and the Third World but also from within the West (particularly from Western European grassroot activists).[3] This chapter looks at the next stage in this story. It examines how – after Cabral's death in 1973 and, crucially, after Cabo Verde achieved sovereignty on 5 July 1975 – the PAIGC reinterpreted this mix of anti-imperialism and non-alignment, adjusting it to the agenda of ruling over a new nation-state.

An archipelago consisting of ten islands and some islets, located on the West African coast, Cabo Verde had the peculiarity of gaining independence without war in its territory but being ruled by a party that had engaged in lengthy armed struggle in another colony, Guinea-Bissau. Although Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde were geographically and culturally different, the PAIGC had conceived of them as part of a

single independence project from the start and the war was waged by both Guinean and Cabo Verdean fighters. They ultimately became two independent states, even if the branches of the PAIGC in each country continued to pay lip service to the idea of eventual political unity until a coup in Guinea-Bissau in November 1980, which led to a reformulation of the Cabo Verdean party (thereafter Partido da Independência de Cabo Verde – PAICV).

While Cabo Verde's political evolution has been the object of academic research,[4] the ways in which independence transformed the nature of inherited notions of anti-imperialism and non-alignment still merits closer attention. In terms of how they were expressed and practised, those concepts proved to be neither linear nor monolithic (as dictated by the binary vision of the Cold War mindset), but rather subjected to gradual readjustment depending on contextual approaches to national independence, development policies, peace and international cooperation. By analysing the discourses and actions of Cabo Verdean political actors in this regard, this chapter uncovers some of the Praia-based governments' options and choices as they navigated between colonial legacies, the responsibilities of state-building, economic interests and Cold War dynamics.

The chapter is organized in three sections. The first one contextualizes the inherited weight of both colonialism and the liberation struggle at the outset of independent Cabo Verde's foreign policy. The second section scrutinizes how foundational Cabo Verdean politicians refined the logic of non-alignment according to new political and economic priorities. A third section sketches out how the Cabo Verdean leaders reached out to various international actors across the Cold War divide as part of their state-building strategy, which led to a set of instances when the government's approaches to neutrality and anti-imperialism were put to the test, including divided loyalties brought about by a growing proximity to – and dependence on – the United States. The chapter concludes that, if during the liberation struggle the PAIGC had combined non-alignment with a sharp opposition to Western imperialism, its necessities after independence created a rising tension between those two principles, with Cabo Verde's governments ultimately choosing a version of the former over the latter.

This chapter draws on primary sources from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs preserved at Cabo Verde's National Archive; printed documents of the time, namely official Cabo Verdean and Guinean newspapers published after national independence; memoirs and statements from Cabo Verdean leaders; and, finally, documents from the PAIGC archive available online at Mário Soares Foundation–Casa Comum.

Colonial and anticolonial legacies

The African Development Bank has described Cabo Verde as belonging to the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), characterized by isolation, vulnerability to natural disasters, scarce soil and subsoil resources, recurrence of drought and a fairly small – and territorially discontinuous – domestic market.[5] At the onset of national independence, Cabo Verde was faced with other major challenges, including scarce educational provision[6] and limited infrastructure (there were only two high schools

in the whole country and only one hotel, with twelve rooms, in the capital city). To aggravate matters, the state had no money in the treasury, and it was through personal relationships with Portugal's government that Cabo Verde secured a US$300,000 loan.[7]

The lack of natural resources rendered the country particularly vulnerable to the whims of the world economy, while chronic shortages of rainfall and a specific insular geography made agriculture even more difficult. During the colonial period, the combination of droughts and colonial neglect had led to famines that escalated into serious humanitarian crises, with thousands of deaths. These famines had increased the economic exploitation of the local population, as Cabo Verdeans were deported as forced labourers to other Portuguese colonies in Africa.[8] They had also fuelled migration to various countries in Africa as well as in Europe and North America.[9] At the time of independence, according to some journalistic accounts, Cabo Verde had about 280,000 inhabitants.[10]

The new leadership was well aware of the harsh starting point set up by the colonial era. According to the first prime minister, Pedro Pires, they had inherited a fully 'bankrupt state', with high rates of poverty and a series of economic, financial, humanitarian, food procurement, social and ecological crises.[11] The government's key priorities were fighting unemployment, renewing economic activity and, crucially, ensuring food security for the population, as in 1975 famine was still a recent memory. To achieve these goals, however, Pires found it necessary to come up with urgent solutions for a variety of interconnected difficulties, including, among others, the cultural effects of colonialism, widespread illiteracy, absent industry and lack of trained professionals.[12] In the meantime, the Cabo Verdean economy was to remain heavily reliant on the former colonizer: in 1975, Portugal accounted for 62.7 per cent of Cabo Verde's imports and 88.8 per cent of its exports. These numbers decreased to 46.6 per cent and 44.3 per cent, respectively, until the end of 1977.[13]

Along with material goals, the newly independent state sought to instil the idea of national unity across the archipelago. In a country where most people had not witnessed or participated in the independence struggle, the PAIGC aimed to convince the local population that independence was not only essential but also sustainable. Pedro Pires argued that it was crucial to explain to the people that the revolution – from colonial rule to independence – represented new perspectives, that is, that national liberation was the best political, cultural and economic alternative to the centuries of imperial domination, colonial violence, forced labour, exploitation, misery and famine.[14] Notably, he was up against the renitence of local intellectuals who had worked in the colonial administration, whose sceptical views on Cabo Verde's integration within an African context were profoundly influenced by the culture and ideology of the colonial period.[15] This colonial influence and political repression, as argued by José Augusto Pereira and other researchers, had limited the political expansion of the PAIGC's actions and ideas in the islands, particularly in terms of mobilizing Cabo Verdean militants to the cause of liberation struggle.[16] Furthermore, the party faced the task of disseminating the idea of national independence among the diaspora, since many critics of the PAIGC abroad opposed self-government and the newly established government in Praia.[17]

As the Republic of Cabo Verde achieved formal independence against the backdrop of the Cold War, its foreign policy required a keen positioning from the start, leveraging the PAIGC's previous networks and reputation while safeguarding its autonomy. During the armed struggle, the PAIGC had participated in NAM's conferences as a liberation movement. In 1975, after independence, the Cabo Verdean authorities formally joined NAM as representatives of a state during the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held in Lima (Peru), between 25 and 30 August.[18] Foreign Minister Abílio Duarte tried to capitalize on his presence in Lima to publicize Cabo Verde's new status as a sovereign nation, establishing contacts with all the countries that were likely to assist them, whether or not they had previous relations with the PAIGC during the struggle.[19] Henceforth, non-alignment remained a centrepiece of official policy. From 1981 onwards, as the PAIGC morphed into the PAICV, Foreign Minister Silvino da Luz continued to stress the centrality of Cabo Verde's adherence to the principles and objectives of non-alignment: in 1983, for instance, he advocated the training of Cabo Verdean diplomats to engage with the protection of peace, national development and concrete solutions for independence of smaller nations.[20] The connection between these guiding principles, besides evoking Cabral's link of non-alignment with anti-imperialism, updated the notion that freedom from Cold War trappings was a requirement to get freedom from colonialism (now neocolonialism).

One of Cabo Verde's key political and intellectual figures of that time, Renato Cardoso, summed up the country's foreign policy doctrine in a 1986 book. Between 1975 and 1982, Cardoso held several functions at the Foreign Ministry, having attended some of NAM's meetings. He argued that Cabo Verde should follow two main principles: the concept of 'option' and the ideal of 'vocation'. The relations with the superpowers must follow the concept of 'option': rather than choosing any one side in the Cold War, the government should act in the best interests of its state, thus privileging the agency of local actors, particularly the political leaders and the diplomatic corps. In turn, the ideal of 'vocation' was informed by economic and geographic criteria: as a small country with few natural resources, dependent on international aid, Cabo Verde had to benefit from using its strategic position as a nation to promote peace.[21] According to Cardoso, Cabo Verde had made a clear commitment to peace in the early years of independence by virtue of remaining non-aligned, declaring that its territory would not be used as a foreign military base and avoiding involvement in regional or international conflicts.[22]

This stance remained the official line since Abílio Duarte's trip to Lima in 1975. On the one hand, just like before, the PAIGC saw non-alignment as a way to pursue material benefits from multiple supporters in order to further its state-building agenda. On the other hand, as will be shown, this was an essentially discursive stance, as the PAIGC ended up making important concessions. The contradiction reveals an overlap between the PAIGC as a movement (with an historical background embedded in ideas of non-alignment) and as a party ruling the government of a nation-state. The next section discusses how the Cabo Verdean authorities fashioned an approach to non-alignment based on this duality.

Refining non-alignment

On 25 September 1975, the Cabo Verdean newspaper *Voz di Povo* published an article in which President Aristides Pereira addressed the new state's foreign policy:

> With the achievement of national independence, the doors of the world opened to us. International activity is carried out with the aim of establishing, consolidating and developing ties of friendship and cooperation with all states, defending the interests of the people of Cabo Verde at the international level, representing our state with other states and international organisations. We have effectively said that all the doors have been opened. The problem is therefore that before entering, we must know where to enter, that is, the definition of a foreign policy orientation in our state that allows and promotes the development of Cabo Verde.[23]

Pereira's message was intended to challenge the rigid binary categorization of alignment and non-alignment. His metaphor subtly invoked the distinction between two temporalities closely linked to the PAIGC's two modes of political existence. When the PAIGC had been a liberation movement, its choices were limited, as it did not have legitimacy to interact in mutual terms with other countries' governments. However, after attaining national independence, under the PAIGC government, the Cabo Verdean authorities were now able to decide on the 'doors they wanted to enter'.

After all, Amílcar Cabral himself had posited that the very existence of Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau as independent states was meant to foster a policy of peaceful coexistence, friendship, peace and cooperation with all peoples and all states, adding: 'To co-exist one must first of all exist.'[24] Non-alignment served to open rather than close options: according to Cabral, it meant not committing to any of the military blocs or to any decisions made by others, reserving the right to decide for oneself, but it did not mean that one's decision could never coincide with that of others.[25] Similarly, Pereira's 'door' metaphor should be understood as a clear (anticipated) justification according to which the polices of Cabo Verde would follow multidirectional paths towards 'different doors' present within the Cold War context, entering wherever Cabo Verdean interests would lead.

As foreign relations grew more varied, wide-ranging and potentially contradictory, Praia's government went to greater extents to refine its conceptualization of non-alignment, translating and adapting it through a national lens. Just a couple of days after independence, Abílio Duarte (who was both foreign minister and president of the National Assembly) and Aristides Pereira began toying with wording. In *Voz di Povo* and in the Guinean newspaper *Nô Pintcha*, they emphasized Cabo Verde's strategic appeal to the world, given its strategic geographic location, and Cabo Verdean universalist concerns with peace, progress, harmony and cooperation between peoples. This is why, Duarte argued, non-alignment was the most 'realistic policy' to defend domestic needs, quipping that his government was non-aligned in 'relations with other states', but domestically it was 'profoundly aligned with our people's interests'.[26] Duarte thus established a link between non-alignment and protecting national independence,

anticipating the later writings of Renato Cardoso (who worked closely with him at the Foreign Ministry).

A year later, Pedro Pires would elaborate on this link. The prime minister characterized Cabo Verde's policy as 'militant non-alignment', that is, a committed attempt to promote solidarity and cooperation among non-aligned – and mostly postcolonial – countries, thus collectively challenging the unequal relations with the great powers and, ultimately, breaking with political and economic dependence. It was just the sort of posture that reflected the PAIGC's anti-imperialist roots. At the same time, however, Pires admitted that independence was itself a condition in order to be able to choose non-alignment in the first place because a country that was not independent politically and economically could hardly be a non-aligned country: political and economic independence was at the core of 'militant non-alignment'.[27] Therefore, in order to pursue a policy of 'militant non-alignment' that united the Third World against the global economic order, Cabo Verde had to simultaneously search for more immediate donors. Neither straightforward nor unyielding, non-alignment became both a method and a justification to pursue as broader economic partnerships as possible. Aristides Pereira underlined this malleable interpretation of non-alignment by arguing for Cabo Verde's multiform cooperation with different countries. As he declared in 1978, their policy did not divide the world into watertight compartments, nor did it differentiate between Socialist and Western countries.[28]

Feeding the economy

Under the banner of non-alignment, the representatives of the Praia-based government searched for partnerships not only among the fellow non-aligned, but also across the Cold War divide. The aim was to strengthen national independence both by improving economic conditions at home and by positioning Cabo Verde as an active international player. If the former required obtaining technical, financial, material and humanitarian aid for the domestic state-building process, the latter entailed developing a vast network of productive relationships with former allies, like the Soviet Union, as well as with former adversaries (i.e. with the former backers of the Portuguese dictatorship and colonialism), like France, West Germany and the United States.[29]

As explained above, professing non-alignment did not necessarily prevent forging profitable ties to the superpowers and their closest allies. For one thing, the PAIGC had an interest in cultivating relations with longtime partners and sympathizers with greater means than those of other small nations similarly rebuilding themselves after anticolonial revolution. First among its contact list was the USSR, which had been the movement's largest backer in the war and which opened an embassy in Cabo Verde in September 1975.[30] Like during the armed struggle, the PAIGC (and later the PAICV) once again relied on the Soviet Bloc's support in terms of armament and training of cadres for civil, technical and military corps. As the diplomat Manuel Amante da Rosa put it, 'Options and alternatives were limited for the new government, thus the first alternatives regarding defence and security were found in the Eastern Bloc countries.'[31]

In addition to military aid, from the date of independence until the end of the Cold War the state of Cabo Verde received Soviet development aid, including, among other items, food, medicine, scholarships, administrative training and funds to improve electrification and to construct infrastructures. The relationship was strengthened through exchanges and mutual trips by politicians, writers, technical cadres and other representatives.[32] Despite prominent interactions, however, Cabo Verde's officials found this aid slow to arrive. According to archival sources, from 1975 to 1987 approximately 46.8 per cent of Soviet engagements in Cabo Verde were related to the granting of credits for the construction of small ports; 33.4 per cent to training expenses and 11.8 per cent to the maintenance of a team of 11–12 doctors per year since 1981.[33]

It is symptomatic of the government's undogmatic, 'wide net' attitude towards the Cold War framework that within the space of one week, between 5 and 12 December 1975, Cabo Verde welcomed the ambassadors of both West Germany and its Eastern counterpart, the German Democratic Republic (GDR).[34] Besides engaging in internationalist solidarity, the GDR embraced the chance to expand its soft power in Africa (having been virtually locked out of the continent until the early 1970s by West Germany's aggressive diplomacy) through cooperation in sectors as diverse as education, science, medicine, fishing and agriculture, in addition to the perennial issue of food supply.[35]

Meanwhile, West Germany too provided food, along with financial assistance, means to improve fishing transports and protection of stored products, and assorted didactic material (globes, megaphones, loudspeakers, slide and film projectors, etc.). Several German professionals were dispatched to work across various domains in Cabo Verde, among them engineering, development of water supply systems, and the implementation of wind and solar energy solutions.[36] If those sympathetic with the PAIGC's anticolonial cause had previously strained to push Bonn's social-democratic governments to support the liberation struggle, they now took the opportunity to affirm West Germany's progressive credentials, tarnished by decades of collaboration with the *Estado Novo*.[37] According to the press reports from that time, from 1976 to 1986, West Germany invested hundreds of millions of marks in technical and financial cooperation with Cabo Verde.[38]

Besides continuing pre-independence cooperation with Sweden, the Cabo Verdean government also looked for further funding in Western Europe's former colonial powers, namely the Netherlands, which financed an agricultural development project in the island of Santo Antão, and France, which financed projects on water catchment in the island of São Nicolau.[39] Again, this seemed like a logical development of the PAIGC's historical path. Back in the armed struggle, while the bulk of material and technical aid had come from socialist countries (most notably Cuba and the USSR),[40] Cabral had clearly told his cadres about the potential value of working with the capitalist world: 'Within capitalist countries there are forces which are anticolonialist, these are our allies, these are our friends, our comrades in the struggle, be they workers, intellectuals or any social group. We must develop unity with them, develop our friendship more every day and we must also push the capitalist states, themselves, to support our struggle.'[41] Yet fighting for formal political independence proved quite different from fighting for de facto economic independence.

The PAIGC's – and later the PAICV's – flexibility was pushed to the limit in the case of the United Sates, which became a major sponsor of Cabo Verde from 1975 onwards. Pedro Pires made an approach shortly before independence, having travelled to the United States in April 1975 in search of economic aid. This episode is confirmed by Aristides Pereira, who later recalled that one of the 'most significant contributions we received at the very beginning' was from the administration of President Gerald Ford, 'who put at our disposal a staggering aid of three million dollars'.[42] The United States was one of the first countries to recognize Cabo Verde's independence, with congratulatory missives not only from Ford, but also from Ted Kennedy, senator of Massachusetts, a key hub of the Cabo Verdean diaspora.[43] Notably, Ford's letter set the tone for how this relationship would develop, addressing the issue of drought affecting the archipelago at that time, offering his support and hinting at the Cold War themes that would come to play a role later on:

> I am aware of the serious drought which has affected the islands for the past eight years. I know that this situation must be a matter of great concern as your government assumes the responsibilities for the well-being of your people. I am hopeful that the steps already taken by the United States to provide humanitarian aid and technical assistance to Cape Verde will help alleviate the current hardship and provide a base for economic development and future prosperity. As the historic ties of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the United States and Cape Verde grow and strengthen, I look forward to the opportunity for our two nations to work together in the cause of peace, freedom and the welfare of mankind.[44]

Following Cabo Verde's independence celebrations on 5 July 1975, Aristides Pereira engaged in discussions with American officials, highlighting that his government aimed to move beyond the bitter history of American support for colonial Portugal and instead establish new relationships with the United States. Notably, he pointed out that Amílcar Cabral had been a 'great admirer of American people and institutions', and the substantial Cabo Verdean community in the United States provided a robust foundation for potential future relations. Pereira also countered allegations that the PAIGC was 'communist' or 'pro-Soviet'. He asserted that his government was 'not interested in ideology' and that their primary concern was the development of the archipelago, which had long been neglected by the Portuguese.[45]

Cabo Verde established an embassy in the United States in 1976.[46] Since the beginning, food and economic programmes became the foundational core of the relationship with the United States. According to Pedro Pires, the struggle against hunger and the issue of feeding poor populations became the focus of the international agenda at the time, so Cabo Verde received humanitarian contributions from the World Food Program and food aid from several European and Asian countries, but above all from the United States.[47]

According to Abel Djassi Amado, before the declaration of independence, the US Congress had already defined that a portion of its international aid budget would go to the former Portuguese colonies in Africa: 'In 1975, Cabo Verde received

$1,100,000 dollars from the U.S. government (of which $100,000 was allocated to food aid and the rest from programs and projects administered by USAID, the agency that coordinates and implements the US foreign aid). From 1975 until the mid-1990s, the US aid essentially fell into two broad categories: food aid (or what the Americans call *PL 480 Title II*, *Non-emergency Programs*) and projects managed by USAID.'[48]

In March 1977, Cabo Verde announced an agreement with the US government to increase the irrigated area in the island of Santiago in order to improve agricultural production. Two months later, Washington provided Cabo Verde with about 10,000 tonnes of maize and 1,500 tonnes of rice, valued at approximately US$2,800,000.[49] The impact of such assistance was crucial. In November 1982, seven years after independence, President Aristides Pereira met with US vice-president George Bush in Sal island to discuss cooperation between the United States and Cabo Verde, along with other crucial issues of international politics. Pereira acknowledged the United States' pivotal role as one of Cabo Verde's most significant, if not the most prominent, partners in the nation's development process.[50]

The yearly amount of economic aid offered to Cabo Verde until the 1990s was, as Amado describes, almost always identical (with the exception of 1978 when it had an increase). One of the hypotheses that explains the maintenance of this support during that period is related to 'the fact that Cabo Verdean diplomacy did not enter into any area of confrontation with US interests. On the contrary, the argument is extended, as US economic aid was applied in order to prevent Cabo Verde from falling into the Soviet realm. It is no accident that the program was suddenly ended in Cabo Verde in the mid-1990s, after the end of the Cold War'.[51] However, the political and diplomatic relations between these two countries did not end with the bipolar period. Official visits from US representatives to Cabo Verde since the early 1990s, starting with Democratic Congressman Barney Frank, demonstrate this.[52]

The assistance provided by the US government played a significant role not only in alleviating the immediate impact of droughts and relieving and addressing the spectre of famine, but also in the development of the Cabo Verdean state. The Cabo Verdean officials transformed food aid into concrete financial resources and instruments of national governance: rather than distributing the food for free, the government opted to generate profits through the United States' assistance and through other donations from friendly nations. Monetizing the assistance, the state company Empresa Pública de Abastecimento sold the food products within the archipelago. The income from the sales was applied in rural development projects, construction of public works and agricultural infrastructure, soil erosion control and programmes to generate employment, among other initiatives.[53]

Over the years, the Cabo Verdean authorities continued to maintain a close relationship with the United States. In October 1983, Aristides Pereira was officially received by US president Ronald Reagan. The visit conveyed, domestically as well as externally, a persuasive political image: Cabo Verde's government benefited from the international recognition of this superpower. According to Pereira, the visit also generated positive enthusiasm in the political imagination of the Cabo Verdean diaspora in the United States while at the same time challenging opponents in that

country who criticized independence and attacked its government among Portugal's Western allies.

Pereira's local reputation was further enhanced as he was bestowed with two honorary doctorate degrees from Rhode Island College, in Providence, and the Sacred Heart University, in Connecticut. Notably, the visit occurred at a moment when the government of the (recently renamed) PAICV was building its political credibility as an independent and distinct entity after a coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau had terminated the project of binational unity between the two countries.[54] Having helped build the economy, the United States now played a role in rebuilding Cabo Verde's political identity.

In theory, this was the basis on which to build independence. But in practice Cabo Verde was entrenched into different potential forms of dependence. Indeed, aid gave leverage to the donors, which they soon proved willing to exercise. The United States' influence and international conflicts challenged Cabo Verde's non-aligned stance on various fronts and situations. For instance, the British sought to establish a logistical airbase in Cabo Verde to use in the context of the Falklands War. The fact that the Cabo Verdean authorities rejected this plan can help explain, according to scholars, why the country did not benefit from help or close bilateral relations with the UK during that period.[55] In turn, at a time when South African troops were fighting the MPLA forces in Angola, Cabo Verde maintained the Sal airport open to the South African airplanes travelling to the United States. This decision, which ostensibly contradicted the anticolonial solidarity nourished between the PAIGC and the MPLA during the independence struggle, was justified by the Cabo Verdean leaders based on economic needs, as will be discussed below.

Acknowledging the archipelago's strategic location, as well as the historical relations with Angola and economic partnership with South Africa, the United States considered Cabo Verde an important political actor for its African and global policies. In 1989, according to Amado, the United States' authorities underlined their excellent bilateral relations with Cabo Verde.[56] The latter's reliance on the superpowers would repeatedly test its commitment to both non-alignment and anti-imperialism. From the outset, the government of Cabo Verde was eager to convey their vision of neutrality and non-alignment to the United States. Pereira emphasized to his American interlocutors that the archipelago would adopt a principle of 'active neutrality' in its foreign policy. This principle essentially meant that, while Cabo Verde sought international integration, it would not permit any foreign military bases on its territory.

To underscore his pragmatic approach, Pereira referred to the issue of the international airport at island of Sal. This airport had been built during the colonial era using funds from South Africa and had been initially intended to function as an air naval base for NATO and as a transportation hub during the colonial war. Its construction also aimed to aid South Africa in bypassing international sanctions. Despite the PAIGC's opposition to white minority rule in South Africa, they chose to maintain their agreement with South African Airways due to the significant economic profits it generated.[57]

In the instant after independence, Cabo Verde's government had started conversations with South Africa Airways regarding the Sal international airport. Cabo

Verde had interests in continuing to receive flights of South Africa Airways because those flights were important resources in a post-independence moment characterized by scarce financial and material provisions. As Pereira underlined to US officials in multiple subsequent communications, the Organization of African Unity had voiced criticism against permitting South African Airways flights over or stopover on African territory. He wanted to make it clear that, while Cabo Verde opposed the idea of foreign bases on its soil, they intended to pursue their own interests and had no plans to suspend or reduce these commercial stopovers.[58]

The economic benefits provided through Sal airport since the 1976 were, according to Pereira, vital for the survival of Cabo Verdean populations and the making of independent Cabo Verde. According to archival sources, that airport was at the time Cabo Verde's sole open door to the world and the only means of survival of seven thousand inhabitants of the Sal Island. Despite the OAU's criticism of this cooperation between Sal and South Africa Airways, the Cabo Verdean authorities argued that the country inherited plenty of austerity imposed by the colonial regime, and the government was committed to getting rid of it. In order to do this, Cabo Verde had appealed to the OAU for development aid. According to the sources, 'apart from the few African countries that have bilaterally shown themselves to be sensitive to our appeals, we can say that the overwhelming majority of OAU member countries have not made a single gesture of aid towards our country, which is only a year into its independence and is facing enormous difficulties'.[59] This is why in face of international criticism, Cabo Verde's government argued that the agreement concerning the Sal airport was with an airline company and not with South Africa's regime. This issue was explained always through its economic dimension and never on political perspective.

Conclusion

Following independence, the PAIGC had to forge a path between nature's obstacles, the lingering trauma of colonial famines, and the genetic traces of anti-imperial ideology. The new state joined the NAM, assuming its place alongside other Third World revolutions and anticolonial projects while championing solidarity through the formula of 'militant non-alignment'. Yet the representatives of Cabo Verde's government managed their discourse on non-alignment as a fruitful political instrument to justify profitable relationships with countries of the Cold War's three worlds, including previously maligned NATO members like France and West Germany. The utilitarian pursuit of material benefits deemed fundamental for the state-building process extended the outreach to the two superpowers, finding particular resonance in the United States, which obtained significant leverage and influence over Cabo Verde's evolution.

The pursuit of anticolonial solidarity clashed with the economic reality of the post-independent archipelago, which was now dependant on international aid for survival and development. Thus, although the government sought to follow its anti-imperial stance, this was complicated by economic hardship, coupled with Washington's pressure. Although Praia justified both in terms of its non-alignment, Cabo Verde's immediate economic concerns prevailed over anti-imperialism.

The practices of Cabo Verdean leaders prioritized profitable relationships with countries from different sides of the Cold War. The authorities of Cabo Verde interpreted and deployed the concept of non-alignment in a malleable political way in order to generate networks of concrete material benefits for the Cabo Verdean state-building process. The local historical context of Cabo Verde's governments (characterized by many material difficulties) also influenced the way in which they approached the definition of non-alignment. All these aspects challenge, among others, the dominant trend to interpret the Cold War narrative as top-down interactions imposed directly by the main superpowers without any agency of the small political actors.

Cabo Verdean authorities were not inactive within Cold War rivalries. Their agency proved that the concepts of non-alignment or alignment did not always translate into a monolithic political practice, according to the binary vision of the Cold War ideology. Their actions also reveal how political actors emerging from national liberation managed the concepts of peace, non-involvement in global military conflicts, economic dependence, respect for national sovereignty, suitable political relation with all the peoples and states of the world, in order to place the Cabo Verdean nation-state-building process into the global history of that time.

The discourse on Cabo Verde's non-alignment cannot be understood as merely ambiguous. Cabo Verde's government and its representatives acted in order to interact with different actors and political scenarios of that time. Cabo Verde received different support from countries placed in distinct fronts. Cabo Verde's approach to non-alignment was more utilitarian than ideological, allowing the Cabo Verdean state to obtain foreign aid from powers on both sides of the Cold War. Likewise, the political movement to court allies from different sides of the Cold War competition can help to understand, in part, how the legacies generated in the beginning of the state-building process influenced Cabo Verde's official discourse on foreign diplomacy. In other words, how this founded the postcolonial matrix of the Cabo Verdean discourse on external policy, principally in a context marked by legacies of colonialism, underdevelopment, poverty, lack of natural resources, economic dependency, territorial smallness and the significant weight of diaspora.

Notes

This chapter contributes to the Research Project 2022.08337.CEECIND funded by the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT).

1. Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927–1992)* (Boston: Brill, 2019); Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl and Marco Wyss, eds, *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Cold War: Between or within the Blocs?* (New York: Routledge, 2016); Guy Arnold, *The A to Z of the Non-Aligned Movement and Third World* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010).
2. Víctor Barros, 'Connected Struggles: Networks of Anticolonial Solidarity and the Liberation Movements of the Portuguese Colonies in Africa', in *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties*, ed. Zeina Maasri, Cathy Bergin and Francesca Burke (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022), 131–53.

3. Rui Lopes, 'Conflicting Winds: The Liberation Struggle in Guinea-Bissau and the Quest to Decolonize the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies* (forthcoming).
4. Suzano Costa, *Estado e Qualidade de Democracia em África: Entre a Letargia Cívica e a Omnipresença do Leviatã* (Parede: Principia, 2023); António Leão Correia e Silva, 'O Nascimento do Leviatã Crioulo. Esboço de uma Sociologia Política', *Caderno de Estudos Africanos* 1 (2001): 1–13.
5. African Development Bank, 'Cape Verde: A Success Story', November 2012, www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/cape-verde-a-success-story-30161. Accessed 5 July 2023.
6. Francisco Osvaldino Nascimento Monteiro, 'O Ensino Secundário em Cabo Verde: Trajectória Histórica, Desafios e Formação (Pedagógica) Docente' (PhD Diss., Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2014), 51–4.
7. African Development Bank, 'Cape Verde', 4.
8. 'Emigração: os males de um "mal necessário" ', *Voz Di Povo*, 23 April 1981.
9. 'It is estimated that currently the number of Cape Verdean emigrants, mainly in the USA, Portugal, Angola, France, Netherlands, and Senegal exceeds the country's population, and the country's economy remains dependent upon remittances from this Diaspora.' See African Development Bank, 'Cape Verde', 5.
10. José Vicente Lopes, *Cabo Verde: Os Bastidores da Independência* (Praia: Spleen Edições, 2002), 470.
11. Diana Sichel Celso, Corrêa Pinto De Castro and Thais Blank, *Comandante Pedro Pires: Memórias da Luta Anticolonial em Guiné-Bissau e da Construção da República de Cabo Verde* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2021), 151–2.
12. Ibid., 146–8.
13. Arquivo Histórico de Cabo Verde, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (hereafter AHCV, MNE), *Portugal*, CX. 896, Peça 372 – *2ª Reunião da Comissão Mista Luso-Caboverdiana*, 3 a 8 de Junho de 1978, 1.
14. Celso et al., *Comandante*, 148–9.
15. Víctor Barros, 'As "Sombras" da *Claridade*: Entre o Discurso de Integração Regional e a Retórica Nacionalista', in *Comunidades Imaginadas: Nação e Nacionalismos em África*, ed. Luís Reis Torgal, Fernando Tavares Pimenta and Julião Soares Sousa (Coimbra: IUC, 2008), 193–217.
16. José Augusto Pereira, 'A Luta de Libertação Nacional nas Ilhas de Cabo Verde na Encruzilhada das Memórias', *Lusotopie* 19 (2020): 76–100; Francisco Osvaldino Nascimento Monteiro, 'Exílio Forçado, Desterro Colonial e Deportação Política Durante o Estado Novo Salazarista: Um Olhar a Partir de uma Publicação Situada', *Projeto História*, no. 53 (2015): 286–97.
17. Celso et al., *Comandante*, 136–8; José Vicente Lopes, *Aristides Pereira: Minha Vida, Nossa História* (Praia: Spleen Edições, 2012), 245.
18. 'Projeto de Resolução da Cimeira de Colombo. Desenvolver a cooperação entre os Não-Alinhados', *Nô Pintcha*, 19 August 1976; 'Reforço da Solidariedade dos Países Não-Alinhados', *Nô Pintcha*, 2 September 1975; 'A Guiné e Cabo Verde deverão ser admitidos no grupo dos não-alinhados', *Nô Pintcha*, 23 August 1975; 'Cabo Verde e Guiné-Bissau na Conferência dos Não-Alinhados', *Voz di Povo*, 21 August 1975; 'Lima: Guiné e Cabo Verde Presentes na Conferência dos Países Não-Alinhados', *Nô Pintcha*, 21 August 1975.
19. 'Cabo Verde e Guiné-Bissau na Conferência', *Voz di Povo*, 21 August 1975; 'A Guiné e Cabo Verde deverão', *Nô Pintcha*, 23 August 1975.
20. 'Aberto o Curso de Aperfeiçoamento Diplomático', *Voz di Povo*, 10 February 1983.

21. Renato Cardoso, *Cabo Verde, Opção por uma Política de Paz* (Praia: Instituto Cabo-verdiano do Livro, 1986), 29.
22. Ibid., 34.
23. 'A Política Externa do Nosso Estado', *Voz di Povo*, 25 September 1975.
24. Fundação Mário Soares, Casa Comum (hereafter FMS-CC), 04343.001.006, 'Le PAIGC à la Conférence des Chefs d'État et de Gouvernement des Pays non-alignés', Cairo, Octobre 1964, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=04343.001.006. Accessed 1 August 2023.
25. FMS-CC, 04602.038, 'A unidade política e moral – força principal da nossa luta comum', 3–8 October 1965, 9–10, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=04602.038. Accessed 18 August 2023.
26. '5 de Julho que foi 7 de Julho em São Vicente', *Voz di Povo*, 10 July 1975; 'Não-alinhamento externo alinhamento profundo com os interesses do nosso povo', *Nô Pintcha*, 19 July 1975.
27. 'Pedro Pires à Imprensa: A política de não-alinhamento corresponde ao nosso interesse', *Nô Pintcha*, 21 August 1976.
28. 'No 3.º aniversário da independência Cabo Verde refirma o seu não-alinhamento', *No Pintcha*, 11 July 1978; 'Mais um ano se passou na nossa história, como povo independente e senhor do seu destino – Mensagem do Chefe do Estado pela passagem do 3.º aniversário da independência', *Voz di Povo*, 15 July 1978.
29. *Boletim Oficial de Cabo Verde* no. 17, 29 April 1978.
30. 'A Política Externa', *Voz di Povo*, 25 September 1975.
31. *Direito e Cidadania*, 2006/7, 187.
32. Arquivo Histórico de Cabo Verde, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (hereafter AHCV, MNE), *Relações Diplomáticas e de Cooperação entre o PAICV e a URSS (Memorando, Protocolo, Correspondência)*, Cx.935, Peça 764, Ano de 1989; AHCV, MNE, *Correspondências Recebidas da URSS*, Cx.940, Peça 808; AHCV, MNE, *Correspondências Trocadas entre a Embaixada da URSS na Praia e o MNE*, Cx.940, Peça 807; AHCV, MNE, *Relações com a URSS*, Cx.932, Peça 743; *Boletim Oficial* no. 21, 21 May 1977.
33. AHCV, MNE, *Relações Diplomáticas*, Cx.935, Peça 764, Ano de 1989.
34. 'Relação Diplomática entre RFA e Cabo Verde', *Voz di Povo*, 12 December 1975; 'A RDA estabelece relação com Cabo Verde', *Voz di Povo*, 5 December 1975.
35. AHNCV, MNE, *Portugal*, Cx.875.
36. AHCV, MNE, Portugal, Cx.875, Peça 133 – Negociações Intergovernamentais entre CV e RFA, 7 a 10 de Junho de 1983 (Bona, Alemanha); Cx.875, Peça 124; Cx.875, Peça 132.
37. Rui Lopes, *West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship 1968–1974: Between Cold Ward and Colonialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 219–27.
38. *Voz di Povo*, 30 January 1986.
39. Celso et al., *Comandante*, 150.
40. Julião Soares Sousa, *Amílcar Cabral (1924–1973): Vida e morte de um revolucionário africano* (Coimbra: Author's Edition, 2016), 473.
41. FMS-CC, 04340.002.005, 'PAIGC – Para a melhoria do nosso trabalho no plano exterior: 3 – No plano internacional', 19–24 November 1969, 14–16, http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=04340.002.005. Accessed 18 August 2023.
42. Lopes, *Cabo Verde*, 474.
43. Gerald R. Ford, 'Letter to President Aristides Pereira on United States Recognition of the Republic of Cape Verde', *American Presidency Project*, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

node/256104. Accessed 5 July 2023; 'Telegramas de saudações e reconhecimento', *Voz di Povo*, 10 July 1975.

44. Ford, 'Letter to President'.
45. Carlucci to Secretary of State, July 11, 1975, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 1975LISBON03930, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975LISBON03930_b.html. Accessed 5 July 2023.
46. *Boletim Oficial*, no. 34, 16 October 1976.
47. Celso et al., *Comandante*, 150–1.
48. Abel Djassi Amado, 'Dôs Pezôd ou o Liliputiano e o Colosso? As Relações Internacionais entre Cabo Verde e os EUA', in *As Relações Externas de Cabo Verde: (Re)leituras Contemporâneas*, ed. José Pina Delgado, Odair Barros Varela and Suzano Cost (Praia: Edições ISCJS, 2014), 487–8.
49. 'Ajuda Alimentar dos EUA', *Voz di Povo*, 28 May 1977; 'Acordo de Cooperação com Estados Unidos no Domínio da Agricultura', *Voz di Povo*, 26 March 1977.
50. 'Vice-Presidente dos EUA visita Cabo Verde', *Voz di Povo*, 8 November 1982.
51. Amado, 'Dôs Pezôd', 488.
52. Lopes, *Aristides Pereira*, 313.
53. Celso et al., *Comandante*, 151–4.
54. Lopes, *Aristides Pereira*, 307–12.
55. Camilo Querido Leitão da Graça, 'A Noção de "Pragmatismo" na Política Externa de Cabo Verde: Interesse Nacional e Opções Identitárias', in *As Relações Externas de Cabo Verde*, 273–8.
56. Amado, *Dôs Pezôd*, 492–9; Lopes, *Cabo Verde*, 477.
57. AHCV, MNE, Caixa 953, Peça 862; MNE, Caixa 955, Peça 873.
58. Ibid.; Carlucci to Secretary of State, NARA, 11 July 1975, 1975LISBON03930, Aggrey (Dakar) to Secretary of State, 1976DAKAR00394, NARA, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973–12/31/1979.
59. AHCV, MNE, Caixa 953, Peça 862; AHCV, MNE, Caixa 955, Peça 873.

13

(Re)framing independence: The battle for Guinea-Bissau's film culture, 1975–80

Paulo Cunha, Catarina Laranjeiro and Rui Lopes

Since their conception at the height of the age of empires, cinema's content, production and intercontinental circulation were closely articulated with an imperial imaginary. By the 1960s–70s, however, activists sought to appropriate the medium for anticolonial revolution.[1] In particular, scholars have increasingly acknowledged cinema's importance in the struggles against Portuguese colonialism. African, Caribbean and European filmmakers fostered transnational connections, projected the liberation cause abroad and participated in post-independence nation-building, as the new ruling parties in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde all recognized cinema's political potential.[2] Yet, for the most part, the focus has been on the production of anticolonial images as a revolutionary gesture in itself, rather than as part of the parties' wider, conflictual efforts to reshape film culture in line with the rest of society.

As argued by Thomas Elsaesser, although 'national cinema' tends to be regarded and studied through the prism of production, a 'national film culture' revolves more broadly around consumption: while the former consists of the expressions of the minority with access to professional means, the latter makes up the cultural references of a larger portion of the population.[3] This chapter therefore proposes a more integrated view of the deployment of cinema in the process of so-called national reconstruction, examining the PAIGC's policies and public discourse towards film consumption and production in Guinea-Bissau. Drawing on original interviews as well as a series of articles in the state-run newspaper *Nô Pintcha* (Guinea-Bissau's leading printed publication since its founding in 1975), we explore how film culture became a battlefield where the liberation struggle continued to be fought years after the formal recognition of independence, in September 1974.

If conjuring up a new mental image of the nation required new physical images, then reels and screens became material weapons in the PAIGC's cultural battle. With that in mind, this chapter is less focused on films' actual content than on their place in the political economy of independence. It begins by tracing the history of colonial screenings, revealing how the 1963–74 war contributed to increase film exhibition, particularly of certain genres. It then addresses how, simultaneously, international partnerships during the struggle triggered expectations about which type of cinema

might best contribute to the new national project. Moving to the post-independence period, a third section focuses on the way *Nô Pintcha* voiced a confrontation between these coexisting tastes and understandings of cinema. Finally, the chapter discusses the state's ambitions and obstacles in creating its own filmic representation of the nation, mapping a network of contacts established between local agents and foreign partners while analysing the way audiovisual works were designed to build a 'national identity'.

We identify a running tension between, on the one hand, the legacy of colonial images and distribution structures and, on the other, the desire to weaponize cinema as an extension of the liberation struggle. The ensuing battle for Guinea-Bissau's film culture entailed the clash and convergence of state and non-state forces from around the world, ranging from the United States, USSR and Cuba to France, Sweden and Hong Kong. The study of cinema, therefore, further demonstrates that, as argued throughout this book, decolonization and postcolonial nation-building were profoundly transnational processes.

Tarzan in Bissau: Colonial consumption

Guinea-Bissau's relation with cinema expanded near the very end of Portuguese rule. Historically, this comparatively small colony received little investment from the metropole. Without a significant settlement policy, the few 'white Europeans' had administrative jobs, although much of the administration was run by Cabo Verdeans, who occupied a privileged position in the Portuguese colonial structure. Yet the war brough not only a growing Portuguese military contingent but also, in its final years, a campaign of public works, service provision and socioeconomic investment designed to win the 'hearts and minds' of the population.[4] Although approximate, the numbers of Portugal's *Statistical Yearbook of the Colonies* convey a correlation between this process and booming film consumption. From 1942 to 1947, there was only one cinema screen in the entire territory of what was then called 'Portuguese Guinea', located in the capital of Bissau, with an average of sixty screenings and 18,000 tickets sold per year. Between 1948–9 and 1957–67, the yearbooks list two movie theatres, with the last couple of those years registering an average of 170 screenings and the sale of around 60,000 tickets. In the ensuing years, however, the numbers changed drastically: four theatres in 1968 (with the sale of *c.*310,000 tickets), five theatres in 1969 (365,000 tickets), eight theatres in 1970 (albeit with an unexplained drop to 124,000 tickets) and seven theatres in 1971 (305,000 tickets sold).[5]

Contrary to what happened in Angola and Mozambique, the growth of Guinean film exhibition market was not boosted by significant investment by Portuguese business groups.[6] Rather, it was spearheaded by local clubs, whose movie theatres provided entertainment aimed at enlivening community life along with sports (especially football) and socializing activities such as swimming, concerts and parties. In the capital, screenings took place on the premises of União Desportiva Internacional de Bissau (UDIB), founded in 1929. In the eastern city of Nova Lamego (now Gabú), Clube Desportivo e Recreativo de Gabú organized cinema sessions since at least the mid-1960s; and in the north of the country, in Farim, sessions were

hosted by Clube Desportivo e Recreativo de Farim, founded in the 1950s. In Bafatá, films were presented at Sporting Clube de Bafatá, a collective established by a group of local merchants in 1937 which began screenings in the 1950s, initially in a small hall at their headquarters and, later in the decade, at new and still existing facilities. During the war, with the increase of the white population, this club reached over five hundred members.[7] Indeed, the arrival of thousands of soldiers from metropolitan Portugal led to an intensification in the recreational activities put on for the white population, which further spread across the land. In 1971 alone, three more film theatres opened: Cine Canchungo, in the north (in what was then called Teixeira Pinto); Cine Bolama, in the former colonial capital located on the Bijagós archipelago; and another one in Mansoa, in the Oio region. Theatres were also concerned with expanding potential audiences: according to the settler newspaper *Voz da Guiné*, since May 1973 the earlier showtimes in Bissau were delayed to 6:20 p.m. specifically to enable greater attendance by the city's commerce employees, who finished work at 6 p.m.[8]

In Eastern Guinea's rural areas, the driving force behind film exhibition was Manuel Joaquim dos Prazeres. 'Manel Djoquim', as he was better known by the local population, was a white Portuguese who, in his Ford van, devoted his life to travelling cinema projections between 1943 and 1972, showing 'movies as innocuous as possible (swashbucklers, westerns, musicals, comedies, dramas)'.[9] Guinean filmmaker Sana Na N'Hada identifies Manuel Joaquim's projections as his earliest film memories, having watched them in his village, before the war.[10] Further oral testimonies confirm Joaquim did similar sessions for rural populations and for Portuguese soldiers in various locations in the east, namely Bambadinca, Contuboel, Fanjonquito, Buba, Bafatá and Gabú.[11] This cinematographic circuit, relying on irregular and informal exhibitions, aligns with the general lack of public and private investment in the colony, which extended to the film sector.

Because the movies came from Portugal's distribution market, they channelled the preferences of metropolitan mainstream cinemas, having already been subjected to the *Estado Novo*'s censorship services that determined which films were banned, cut and/or authorized. As in Portugal, most movies were foreign imports, retaining the original languages, with Portuguese subtitles. Since few Guineans spoke or knew how to read Portuguese, it was difficult for the vast majority of the local population to follow the narratives, a limitation that was potentially counterbalanced by the emphasis on productions with visually driven action and spectacle. An overview of film schedules in Bissau throughout 1973 reveals a clear predominance of westerns, followed by swashbucklers and spy thrillers.[12] The selection appears driven by commercial rather than political concerns, which is not to say that films could not acquire additional implications in their new context. Announcing the screening of *Tarzan Escapes* (a 1936 American feature with a pronounced colonial gaze and rhetoric), *Voz da Guiné* implicitly suggested the appealing parallels with the current state of war by presenting the story as a 'violent and emotional struggle fought in the always imposing and fascinating scenery of the African jungle' before reassuring the readers: 'And once again justice and truth end up reasserting themselves in definite fashion.'[13]

The weapon of film theory: Anticolonial production

In what the PAIGC called the 'liberated zones', viewers were exposed to a very different type of cinema. Former combatants recalled watching military films in the barracks, to 'learn how to march like the Chinese and the Russians'.[14] *Madina de Boé*, directed by the Cuban Jose Massip, shows a group of war-wounded, in a PAIGC military hospital, watching a documentary about the Cuban Revolution. By establishing a relationship between that Cuban film and the struggle they were themselves participating in, the future promised by these images ultimately justified their suffering and sacrifice.[15]

For the most part, however, rather than watching movies, those living in the liberated zones were invited to participate in them. The production of militant documentaries became an important propaganda weapon, naturalizing the significance of cameras and microphones as instruments of the struggle. The first European to visit the liberated zones was the French Mario Marret, who directed *A Nossa Terra* (Our Land) (1966).[16] Before the war was over, nine more films were made by British, Cuban, French, Italian and Swedish sympathizers.[17] Although shot in different places and stages of the conflict, these productions had very similar structures and subjects, sharing a common 'liberation script'.[18] They displayed how the PAIGC was developing a successful military action against the Portuguese troops while building a new society in the liberated zones, precursor of the nation to come.[19] Their techniques and general approach to this narrative would inspire the PAIGC's own post-independence productions.

Cuba had a particularly strong influence, dating back to 1966's Tricontinental conference in Havana. Culture was high on the conference's agenda: in one resolution, delegates pledged to combat 'the cultural and ideological influence of US imperialism', denouncing the 'imperialist domination' of mass culture that 'deforms the truth and tries to introduce false political, moral and aesthetic values' or that 'imposes information schemes, tastes and ways of life that do not correspond in some way to our countries'.[20] The PAIGC's founding leader, Amílcar Cabral, closely followed the discussions around cultural domination. His famous speech at the Tricontinental, known as 'The Weapon of Theory', praised the role of culture in the war against Portuguese colonial rule, a point he subsequently developed in 'National Liberation and Culture' (as discussed by Rita Narra earlier in this book). For Cabral, culture represented a key form of resistance, ensuring the continuity of the histories of peoples who lived under colonial rule as well as determining the opportunities for their progress and regression.[21]

At a seminar for the PAIGC's cadres in 1969, Cabral stressed that culture should be dynamic, emancipating from both colonial and precolonial legacies, like the belief in the supernatural. He posited this not as a criticism of specific local traditions but as an engagement with a global phenomenon, pointing out that many other resistance fighters around the world had their own superstitions (the Franks, 'the ancient English and the American Indians') and that even current leaders in China and Vietnam had to cope with followers of sorcery. To illustrate his point, Cabral brought up films' ability to open one's mind: 'One day when we were in Cuba, Osvaldo [Vieira] and I were sitting down to watch a film about Vikings on television; I enjoy seeing films about

Vikings and Osvaldo was up for it. Suddenly, warriors appeared, and Osvaldo said, "Hey, comrade, they have their own period for wearing amulets!" '[22]

Cabral's trip to the Tricontinental marked the beginning of a crucial partnership with the Cuban authorities. For one thing, Cuba's military became the only foreign force to directly participate in Guinea-Bissau's armed struggle.[23] Yet the collaboration also proved impactful on the cinematographic front. Cinema was a core cultural demand of the Cuban Revolution. In 1959, the government had founded a film institute (Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematográficos – ICAIC) on the proposition that film production might serve as an avant-garde means of political education. Translated into images, revolutionary ideals could reach the illiterate. Simultaneously, cinema consolidated a shared imaginary about the nation.[24] In Havana, Cabral seems to have understood how cinema could be an instrument for mobilization, playing a role in the construction of a new Guinea-Bissau. In 1968, he dispatched four young Guineans (Florentino Flora Gomes, José Columba Bolama, Josefina Lopes Crato, Sana Na N'Hada) to Havana to complete high school and study film. At that time, there were no film schools in Cuba, so they trained with the crews at the ICAIC, especially with the news team of Noticiero Latino-americano ICAIC, led by Santiago Álvarez.

This group went back to Guinea to film the liberated zones, Portuguese napalm bombings, and military actions against colonial army barracks (having been strategically split between the different battlefronts) as well as diplomatic initiatives (like the PAIGC's participation in 1972's Information Week, in Conakry, and in the Tenth World Festival of Youth and Students, in East Berlin). Some travelled through Algeria, Tunisia and Senegal, where they met acclaimed Senegalese directors Ousmane Sembène and Paulin Soumanou Vieyra, and joined the international crews behind the Swedish documentary *En Nations Födelse* (The Birth of a Nation) (1973) and the Cuban *Republica en Armas* (Republic in Arms) (1973).[25] Informed by a worldly cinematic knowledge, this contingent would continue to play a role after independence, but they were hardly alone in shaping the ensuing film culture.

Imperial kicks: Postcolonial consumption

Following Guinea-Bissau's independence, the PAIGC targeted the links to colonialism in the recreational clubs' film activities. The initial plan was to show Cuban films instead, but this partnership failed over a disagreement with the Cuban authorities, which requested the nationalization of all popular clubs, whereas the Guinea-Bissau government dismissed the clubs' political purpose.[26] In March 1975, an article in *Nô Pintcha* with the lead 'Our State Liquidates Colonialism's Cinematographic Heritage' announced that the state would seize control of all film imports and distribution for every cinema in the country, although the exhibition sector remained a private commercial enterprise, taking advantage of the existing expertise. The PAIGC closed a deal with a Portuguese distributor to secure the curated weekly supply of one newsreel documentary and four 'high quality' feature films. Each film was expected to travel around the country, with the article stressing the importance of linking rural population (the ones 'who sweated and committed to the liberation struggle') with

the wider world. Thus, in every batch, one film was to immediately circulate in the countryside while the remaining ones would initially rotate between Bissau's three cinemas: the aforementioned UDIB, Cine-Ajuda and Aviação. Further breaking away with the colonial past, the article also promised an absence of censorship: 'The films will be projected as completed by their authors and creators.'[27]

Party members expressed ambiguity about cinema's significance. In April 1975, at a rally staged by the PAIGC's youth wing, Carmen Pereira, a senior party cadre, criticized those young people who thought only about dancing, football or going to the movies but ignored the 'great tasks of our land'.[28] Conversely, Bafatá deputy Jorge Barai recognized the potential for the consolidation of rural communities. In a speech at the Popular National Assembly, he demanded the supply of film projectors 'so that our youth can have an interesting life in the villages [*tabancas*], avoiding their frequent escapes to the cities'.[29]

In *Nô Pintcha*, an organ of the Ministry for Information and Tourism whose articles were unsigned, a faction assigned cinema a prominent place in the 'grandiose task' of 'national reconstruction' shaped by revolutionary values and internationalist solidarity. Shortly before the new film distribution policy took effect, an article defended the measure against sceptics. The paper claimed Bissau's theatres should provide the population with 'an authentic mass culture' through which they could learn about 'the aspirations of workers around the world for social justice and fraternity among men'. Likewise, it postulated that ticket prices should be affordable to the underprivileged. As in Cuba, cinema should be seen as 'not a "luxury" but an instrument to combat ignorance and the poisonous conceptions of the people's exploiters'. The latter metaphor was central to the critique of previously imported escapist genres, with abundant references to theatres 'intoxicating our people', especially the youth, through movies that were like a 'drug' distracting them 'from the harsh reality that is the struggle for dignity and justice'. Echoing Marx's dictum about the opium of the people, international capital was charged with spreading 'poison', 'infesting' Bissau with 'political irresponsibility, disinterest for the people's fate, and cult of petty personal ambitions'.[30]

Regardless of the government's plans, for the first three years UDIB remained Bissau's only active cinema and it filled much of its program with (mostly Italian/Spanish) westerns and martial arts movies, along with crime thrillers, comedies, romantic dramas, war adventures, horror and the occasional art house film.[31] A private sport club still run by Portuguese and Cabo Verdeans, UDIB's cultural preferences and commercial interests were not aligned with the PAIGC's plans to educate the masses for socialism. This situation was aggravated by the club's dire financial needs, due to poor management, and by the state's lack of foreign currency, which made it difficult to afford alternatives to the distributors' packages of cheap B-movies.[32] As a result, *Nô Pintcha* became uncharacteristically critical of the government, recurrently demanding the regulation of the exhibition sector.

The main target were martial arts pictures from Hong Kong, derogatorily labelled as 'karate films'. Recently interviewed, the then director of *Nô Pintcha* acknowledged his concern that onscreen violence might encourage the semi-organized crime gangs who were emerging in Bissau.[33] Yet the newspaper phrased the criticism politically. On one level, it considered the production context, describing those films as

'designed to further enrich the multimillionaires of that British colony' (obfuscating the fact that Hong Kong's main production companies, like the Shaw Brothers Studio, were founded and run by Chinese locals rather than settlers). On another level, it offered a critical reading of the narratives' counter-revolutionary subtext, charged with promoting 'individualism, the solitary hero and opportunism, values diametrically opposed to those … that must guide our people in the conquest of authentic independence'. These films were thus linked to an old enemy, namely 'an ideology contrary to the interests of the working masses all over the world, based on the systematic falsification of the struggle between exploiters and exploited and on fascist militarism'.[34]

This association stands out for its dissonance with contemporary engagements with Hong Kong action films. Although Portugal had imported at least twenty-five such films during the *Estado Novo*, they had generated much condemnation among Portuguese censors, who, rather than identify with the genre's values, had themselves accused those films of 'deteriorating' young people through their intense violence.[35] In turn, May Joseph persuasively argues that young fans in 1970s Tanzania integrated kung fu narratives' emphasis on frugality and forbearance with communal ideas of *ujamaa* socialism.[36] The movies also proved quite popular among South Africa's black population, which can be explained by the way they replaced Hollywood westerns' white supremacist structure with non-white heroes and an explicitly anticolonial slant, thus providing a subversive counternarrative to apartheid.[37]

Conversely, *Nô Pintcha* combined anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist jargon with references to Guinea-Bissau's specific history, warning against a larger sense of purpose getting sidetracked by entertainment. The newspaper insisted that Cabral's designs for a new nation and a 'new man' were being challenged by role models such as the 'heroes of kung fu, karate, fascist violence, American imperialism's trampoline-like west, decadent European petty bourgeoisie with metaphysical anguish, cheap eroticism'. In recreating a 'consumption society' like those 'that history has already condemned', the 'many years of hard struggle' could be endangered by a handful of movies with 'obscene horror' and 'exaltation of bourgeois values of the so-called Western, Judeo-Christian civilisation'.[38] Outside of screenings organized by neighbourhood committees, cinema mostly reproduced the film culture of the colonial era and propagated vice in search of easy profit.[39] The proposed solution, in part, was to replace the products of large multinational companies with works from contexts associated with socialist paths to modernity.[40]

In practice, it was possible to watch such works, albeit mostly in special sessions and only in Bissau.[41] *Nô Pintcha* publicized those initiatives, whether they were parallel screenings at high schools or embassy-curated events at UDIB, like Cuban Film Week and Soviet Film Week.[42] The latter's first edition, in June 1975, consisted of movies set in the Second World War – four of them internationally acclaimed dramas from the 'thaw' period of de-Stalinization (which emphasized the war's tragic side) and the recent epic *Liberation* (a Brezhnev-era throwback to more ennobling accounts of the war). In the opening ceremony, covered on *Nô Pintcha*'s front page, Minister for Information and Tourism Manuel 'Manecas' Santos recalled the colonial authorities had barred access to these films to prevent Guineans from developing their own national consciousness

and resistance. Similarly, Soviet Ambassador Viatchesla Semenov placed Guinea-Bissau's struggle in line with the USSR's victory over fascist armies.[43]

It is not clear, however, how these films resonated with general audiences. Carlos Vaz, who was in his early twenties at the time (and who much later came to head the national film institute), recalls these sessions as praised only by a small intellectual elite.[44] In an interview to *Nô Pintcha*, Manecas Santos acknowledged that 'good films' tended to attract less spectators, causing financial losses to both the state (the importer) and sport clubs (the exhibitors), which created a dilemma: conveying a desire to move on from Guinea-Bissau's recent bloodshed, the minister condemned what he called violence-driven 'cowboy' and 'karate' movies, but their success was effectively subsidizing sport activities. In search of a compromise, Santos announced that the import of twenty Soviet films included some action movies, whose content was deemed less infused with 'gratuitous violence' (although admitting that he aimed to gradually introduce films that corresponded not only to the PAIGC's political convictions, but also to desirable 'social and moral norms').[45] Accordingly, Semenov's follow-up initiatives suggest an effort to compete more directly with Western entertainment: in commemorative screenings and in 1976's edition of Soviet Film Week, the selection privileged espionage, comedy, and adventure, including 'osterns' (a Soviet variation of westerns).[46] Later that year, the Soviet sci-fi romance *Amphibian Man* entered the commercial circuit.[47]

Yet *Nô Pintcha*'s demands were not exclusively concerned with Cold War fault lines. Individual reviews praised Western European movies critical of their own societies, by Jean Renoir, Luis Buñuel and Federico Fellini.[48] The most forceful op ed piece, however, argued that even this branch was not enough to counter 'the lack of culture and information', framing a focus (even if critical) on those societies as a continuation of centuries of 'violently imposed Western culture' and silencing of native voices. Going back to Cabral, the article posited culture as a 'weapon' to reclaim one's place in history.[49] Such rhetoric implicitly evoked *Tercer Cine* (Third Cinema), a movement originated in Argentina which advocated a reinvention of cinema to express Third World revolution and to combat neocolonialism, pursuing 'the decolonisation of culture'.[50]

Along the same lines, *Nô Pintcha* campaigned for postcolonial film identities. It publicized international festivals and publications devoted to Third World cinema.[51] An article titled 'Cinema: A Battlefront for the Emancipation of African Culture' (once again linking film with an imagery of struggle) drew a genealogy of African film entailing Sembène's pioneering works and recent productions spurned by a new 'awareness of African reality' and by the creation of the Pan-African Federation of Filmmakers. The focus was also on exhibition: this article stressed the Federation's combat against foreign companies who controlled the continent's commercial circuit, pitting 'the African Man, without financial means, with technical shortcomings', against the big money of Western producers and distributors, that is, 'the arrogant cultural dictatorship of colonialist and imperialist countries'. In particular, *Nô Pintcha* praised the stronger protectionist measures of states like Algeria and Guinea-Conakry.[52] It also covered pan-African efforts to coordinate coproduction and distribution strategies, like 1977's African Conference on Film Cooperation, in Maputo.[53] Its editorial line

was encapsulated by a quote from Upper Volta's (now Burkina Faso) information minister: 'If we don't want [our peoples] to cheer tomorrow for the massacre of their African brothers, like they cheer today for the massacres of Indians [in westerns], we need to act here and now.'[54]

Suitably, the paper was enthusiastic about special events that brought Third World cinema to Bissau, underlining their anti-imperialist focus. For instance, in April 1976, UDIB showed six touring Algerian productions as part of the successful Algerian Film Week, five of which addressed the resistance against French colonialism.[55] Six months later, the Chinese Embassy organized a cycle 'about the struggle of the People's Liberation Army against the Kuomintang and the Japanese invasion during World War II'.[56] When young cinephiles derided the latter's 'naïve' filmic language, *Nô Pintcha* published a response by José Carlos Schwartz, head of the government's Arts and Culture Department. Schwartz defended Chinese cinema's simplicity as a way to politicize the masses whose lack of sophistication was evidenced by the fact that spaghetti westerns and martial arts pictures consistently filled theatres while 'films of higher ideological and artistic level' yielded empty seats. Considering both offscreen and onscreen politics, he exalted the PRC's cinema's 'collective heroes', 'correct historical interpretation', and 'revolutionary violence' as an antidote to the products of the Hong Kong and Taiwan-based film industries whose technical and financial resources were backed by 'international imperialism'.[57]

The newspaper duly concluded that global business forces conditioned Guinea-Bissau's access to cinema. Yet it struggled to explain why viewers in a postwar society, drenched in revolutionary politics, might be aesthetically drawn to – and/or thematically identify with – Italian products like *Compañeros* (screened in December 1975), part of the 'Zapata western' subgenre, which visualized the Mexican Revolution through exhilarating violence, dark comedy, and a caustic tension between political idealism and cynicism (reflecting Italy's post-1968 leftist disillusionment).[58] As argued in Marissa Moorman's analysis of Angolan audiences, westerns did not exclusively presuppose a colonial perspective, as they provided an alternative to the Portuguese point of reference where Africans could 'recognise an alterity to Europe'.[59]

In turn, there was a tinge of desperation in *Nô Pintcha*'s attempts to challenge those movies' popularity. It published readers' letters criticizing onscreen violence.[60] It also recurrently did small surveys where practically every respondent complained about UDIB's 'alienating' film selection – of these, three asked for an outright ban on westerns and martial arts movies, with only a couple admitting to having fun (while still highlighting the general low quality).[61] In February 1977, when the PAIGC's branch in Cabo Verde assigned all film programming to its National Information Directorate, spectatorship numbers immediately collapsed.[62] Conversely, the following month, in Bissau, the action thriller *The Hong Kong Connection* (whose Portuguese title translates as 'Karate in Hong Kong') reached a record of fifteen consecutive screenings (as opposed to the usual three).[63]

Such a losing battle inspired a more forceful commitment. In November 1977, the Third Congress of the PAIGC, which set the guidelines for the next four years, determined a more interventionist take on cinema's 'political, ideological, pedagogical and cultural' role.[64] The following month, Guinea-Bissau's National Council of Culture tightened

control over film imports, finally enacting the goals stated in 1975 by replacing lowbrow movies with what *Nô Pintcha* called 'good quality' pictures to 'detoxify our amateur public'.[65] Its criteria privileged content over national origin, leading to an extended run of *State of Siege* (a French-Italian-West German exposé of the CIA's repressive history in Latin America), much praised as a step in 'mental decolonisation'.[66] Following Charlie Chaplin's death, in January 1978 Bissau's House of Culture showed children a series of his short films, with *Nô Pintcha* professing the dawn of a new era: a younger generation 'would say that in Bissau there is no longer room for cowboy stuff and karate', preferring films that 'criticise something and can be discussed in schools'.[67]

Yet change was still restrained by structural dependency. Unable to pay for its own subtitling or for transatlantic imports from Portuguese-speaking Brazil, the PAIGC continued to rely on Portuguese distributors, often neglectful about the reels' material quality.[68] The latter's catalogue reflected Portugal's own film culture, itself increasingly dominated by US imports (despite the exponential rise of imports from socialist countries since the Carnation Revolution, which allowed for a certain variety). Thus, negotiations to purge critically reviled movies and obtain more prestigious works ironically ended up reinforcing a hegemonic Western film canon. UDIB's general programming became more Hollywood-centric, with an emphasis on renowned classics (including westerns),[69] a shift that was partly compensated by the occasional embassy-organized cycles (which expanded to include Brazilian, African, North Korean, French, Swedish and Portuguese film weeks).[70] The frustration with such neocolonial trappings brought further urgency to a parallel front of the struggle to project the new nation's ideals: film production.

The INC counter-offensive: Postcolonial production

Film production benefitted from the know-how, experience and international contacts inherited from the war. Following independence, Sana Na N'Hada and Flora Gomes worked as journalists for the Ministry for Information and Tourism, including at *Nô Pintcha*'s editorial team.[71] In May 1975, they gave an interview explaining that the Cuba-trained group remained active, having shot the independence ceremony, the first official visits of foreign leaders, and scattered documentaries about the new nation which, along with material filmed in the war, were being processed in Sweden. This interview was strategically placed next to the abovementioned article on the emergent African cinema, underlining that Guinea-Bissau had its own filmmakers.[72] They thus represented the wider project of valuing cultural production over the mere consumption of the former colonizers' culture, that is, actively constructing independence rather than passively reproducing old power dynamics. Accordingly, in January 1976, these four Guineans integrated the ministry's newly created Cinema Department, headed by Djalma Martins Fetterman, a Brazilian with film and TV experience in East Germany. As Fetterman told *Nô Pintcha*, the priority was to produce documentaries, followed by scientific/educational films, uncovering all the folklore culture that had been repressed, but not destroyed, by colonialism.[73]

Such an ideologically driven project resulted in little creative control, with the few films produced in this period geared towards the reproduction of official discourse and images. The leading production was *O Regresso de Cabral* (The Return of Cabral) (1976), documenting the funeral ceremonies in honour of Amílcar Cabral as his body was transferred from Conakry, where he had been murdered, to Bissau, where he was now buried. This film, funded by the Swedish government, circulated internationally (including at the Leipzig Documentary Film Festival).[74] It was followed by *A Reconstrução* (The Reconstruction) (1977) and *Anos no Oça Luta* (We Who Dare to Fight) (1978), which likewise primarily focused on remembering and celebrating the national liberation struggle and its leader. The obsession with the struggle's memorialization reflects the perceived need to propagate anticolonial values in territories where part of the population had been recruited by the Portuguese army and among those living in urban areas with little contact with the PAIGC's ideals during the conflict. The aim was to extend the PAIGC's experience to the entire population, turning the memory of the liberation struggle into a widespread national memory.[75]

Again, the turning point was the Third Congress, which led to the creation, in early 1978, of Instituto Nacional de Cinema (INC), a national film institute inspired by the Cuban ICAIC. This state organism sought to fully rethink cinema in Guinea-Bissau, purging its colonial past once and for all by centralizing the coordination of all film-related activities (even if preserving a commercial exhibition sector) and dynamizing a popular engagement with what was considered 'the most efficient medium of mass ideological dissemination'. This entailed expanding exhibition by, among other things, fostering local clubs and a travelling cinema for the regions without theatres, and cofunding further screening facilities (to be exploited by public or mixed companies). The other key priority was the development of national film production.[76]

The INC was founded by the Cuban-trained group, together with the Angola-born Mário Pinto de Andrade. Following an internal dispute in the MPLA, Andrade had moved to Guinea-Bissau, where he headed the National Council of Culture (1976–8) and would become Minister of Information and Culture (1978–80). A renowned intellectual, writer and activist, in the 1950s Andrade had been exiled in Paris, where he had edited the influential magazine *Présence Africaine*. His background facilitated a close relationship between the INC and France, where Andrade maintained several personal and professional connections. Thus, a number of remarkable French directors worked in coproductions with the INC. Footage from Chris Marker's *Sans Soleil* (1983) was partly shot in Guinea-Bissau by Sana Na N'Hada. Sarah Maldoror (Andrade's wife), Anita Fernandez and Tobias Engel directed, respectively, *À Bissau, le Carnaval* (1980), *Un balcon en Afrique* (1980) and *Carnival in Guinea-Bissau* (1982). Fernandez went on to collaborate in the country's first fiction film, Flora Gomes's *Refused by Death* (1988). These coproductions provided important training for Guinean filmmakers and paved the way for their films' international visibility.

Given Guinea-Bissau's sparse resources, filmmaking could not be approached as purely domestic enterprise. Rather, it became an extension of the PAIGC's support networks during the liberation struggle. Like before, the Swedish government was a key player, donating two arriflex 16 mm cameras, a sound recording device, a Steinbeck moviola, a lighting kit and a 9 mm to 16 mm sound converter. This

equipment effectively provided the means for local filmmakers to produce their own images, the main goal of the next INC director, Sana Na N'Hada. However, given the paltry budgets allocated to the institute, activities were largely dependent on foreign embassies' cultural programmes. Through these embassies, Sana Na N'Hada was able to visit longstanding allied countries (Cuba, USSR, Algeria, China, Sweden) in an effort to recover scattered reels he had filmed alongside Flora Gomes during the war.[77] Their films had to be develop and edited in Europe, which was both expensive and impractical: a whole documentary about the banks' nationalization got lost on the way to Sweden for the final cut.[78] One project the INC did complete was *Os dias de Ancono* (Ancono's Days) (1979), a UNICEF-funded Paris-based production documenting the titular child's everyday life in the Bijagós. Yet Sana Na N'Hada practically apologized for the latter's poor execution to *Nô Pintcha*, explaining that various technical problems had truncated the film from fifty-three to twenty-six minutes.[79]

According to Sana Na N'Hada, while Guinea-Bissau's first government, led by Luís Cabral, was exclusively interested in the production of newsreels (*Actualidades*), the INC convinced it to fund a more ambitious project. Inspired by Santiago Álvarez's *Año 7* (Year 7) (1966), *Guiné-Bissau: Seis anos depois* (Guinea-Bissau: Six Years Later) sought to document the successes achieved since independence, thereby contributing to the national unity of a country divided by both war and ethnolinguistic differences:

> Filming the Guineans, as they were, that was our idea. Allow Guineans to see themselves in a movie theatre. We had the perception that Guineans did not know each other well. For example, a Felupe in the North did not know a Nalu in the South. I had never seen a Nalu or a Felupe. I only met them during the struggle. The ethnic groups even began getting to know each other during the struggle but they did not interact with each other.[80]

This project was interrupted, as were all INC activities, by the military coup d'état on 14 November 1980, led by João Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira. Justified by Vieira as a necessary 'readjustment' against Luis Cabral's authoritarian rule and the 'Cape Verdean domination' of the PAIGC, the coup drastically switched the state's priorities.[81] Although Sana Na N'Hada continued to lead the INC until the late 1980s, most of the institute's original plans remained unfulfilled. There were never mobile cinema infrastructures to exhibit films to rural areas, nor were there film development laboratories built in Guinea-Bissau. As a result, most images produced by the INC were never exploited as vehicles for internal propaganda.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of independence, *Nô Pintcha* framed the battle for Guinea-Bissau's film culture as a continuation of the liberation struggle. On one side, the old colonial sport clubs of Bissau, Farim, Bafatá and Gabú, along with a dependence on Portugal (tied to Western multinational distribution companies), ostensibly continued to promote gratuitous violence, political alienation and Eurocentric cultural influence.

On the opposite camp, a government lacking in funds and technical means struggled to mobilize cinema for the construction of an educated, socialist, unified, independent nation that could move beyond the violence of war, retaliations and crime. Such linear perspective would render this as a lost battle that reflected the new state's powerlessness against the overwhelming challenges of decolonization. The PAIGC's appreciation of film's propagandistic potential (inherited from the armed struggle) was countered by a fragile economy and the reliance on profitable crowd-pleasers (i.e. catering to tastes inherited from colonial times) to fund sports.

However, as with other fronts of Lusophone Africa's liberation struggles, the quest to affirm a national identity also fostered creative forms of transnational imagination and hybridity. For all its limitations, UDIB showed films from over thirty countries, including not only European westerns (often mocking the United States) and Asian action movies, but also Mexican melodramas, Italian peplums, British vampire tales, and works of the French New Wave, in addition to American productions ranging from classic comedies to New Hollywood cinema. Through the government's diplomatic ties, these were complemented by recurrent 'film weeks' spotlighting Soviet and Third World cinema. Rather than merely assuming that spectators passively related to these films' values, it is worth considering that Guineans accessed a variety of genres, styles and filmic traditions whose imagery enabled them to either escape from or engage with their new reality in multiple ways. Duco Castro Fernandes, then head of the House of Culture, recalls with irony that they were screening the influential Italian-Algerian revolutionary docudrama *The Battle of Algiers* on the day of Nino Vieira's coup.[82]

Likewise, Guinea-Bissau's early film productions are less remarkable for their limited impact in uniting the nation than for their role in extending solidarity networks. Besides the training of four foundational filmmakers, Cuba had an influential role in inspiring the state's attitude towards cinema, channelled both into *Nô Pintcha*'s editorial line (which also echoed the principles of *Tercer Cine*) and into the creation of a national film institute in 1978. Moreover, INC's productions drew on the repertoire of documentaries made by foreign directors during the war as well as on the continuous support of French militants and the Swedish government. International collaboration became a key modus operandi: even after all the institute's productions were interrupted, following the 1980 coup, the INC continued to cooperate with foreign productions until its extinction in 1989. These various partnerships proved fundamental for Flora Gomes and Sana Na N'Hada to eventually be able to make their own films, which have been acclaimed in festivals worldwide. Paradoxically, as their works gained an international audience, in Guinea-Bissau there are currently no formal film distribution channels – and even Bissau no longer has any movie theatre with regular programming.

In 2003, the INC was relaunched as Instituto Nacional do Cinema e do Audiovisual (INCA). Eight years later, the project *Luta Ca Caba Inda* (The Struggle Is Not Over Yet), led by Portuguese artist Filipa César in collaboration with Sana Na N´Hada, Flora Gomes and the INCA, began the process of digitizing what was left of the footage produced by the Guineans trained in Cuba, originally shot between 1972 and 1980. This project has digitized those images at Berlin's Arsenal Institute for Film and Video Art and screened them in European capitals as well as in small villages of Guinea-Bissau.[83]

Now, as then, Guinea-Bissau remains part of an enduring – and often contradictory – global history of decolonization, one that encompassed not only armed conflict on the ground, but also the gunfire of colonial soldiers, revolutionary guerrillas and fictional cowboys up on the screen.

Notes

This work was funded by Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia via the projects 2020.00202.CEECIND and 10.54499/2021.04264.CEECIND/CP1657/CT0030.

1. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 100–36.
2. Marissa Moorman, 'Of Westerns, Women, and War: Re-situating Angolan Cinema and the Nation', *Research in African Literatures* 32, no. 3 (2001): 103–22; Ros Gray, 'Cinema on the Cultural Front: Film-Making and the Mozambican Revolution', *Journal of African Cinemas* 3, no. 2 (2011): 139–60; Mahomed Bamba, 'In the Name of "Cinema Action" and Third World: The Intervention of Foreign Film-Makers in Mozambican Cinema in the 1970s and 1980s', *Journal of African Cinemas* 3, no. 2 (2012): 173–85; Carolin Overhoff Ferreira, 'O drama da descolonização em imagens em movimento – a propos do "nascimento" dos cinemas luso-africanos', *Estudos Linguísticos e Literários* 53 (2016): 177–221; Maria do Carmo Piçarra and Teresa Castro, eds, *(Re)imagining African Independence: Film, Visual Arts and the Fall of the Portuguese Empire* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2017).
3. Thomas Elsaesser, *European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005), 37–8.
4. António de Spínola, *Por Uma Guiné Melhor* (Lisboa: Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1970).
5. Anuários Estatísticos Das Províncias Ultramarinas.
6. Paulo Cunha, 'A Arquitetura Da Instituição Cinema Em Angola E Moçambique (1932–1974)' and 'Culturas Cinematográficas Em Luanda, 1960–1970', in *Cultura Popular E Império: As Lutas Pela Conquista Do Consumo Cultural Em Portugal E Nas Suas Colónias*, ed. Nuno Domingos (Lisbon: ICS. Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2021), 185–210, 211–40.
7. *Bafatá Film Clube* (dir. Silas Tiny, Portugal, 2012).
8. 'Cinema', *Voz da Guiné*, 24 May 1973.
9. Luis Graça, 'Guiné 61/74 – P19302: (Ex)Citações (348): O "Cinema Paraíso" … De Fajonquito E De Nova Lamego. Recordações De Nhô Manel Djoquim, O Homem Do Cinema Ambulante (Cherno Baldé / Vital Sauane)', in *Luís Graça & Camaradas da Guiné* (2018), https://blogueforanadaevaotres.blogspot.com/2018/12/guine-6174-p19302-excitacoes-348-o.html.
10. Interview with Sana Na N´Hada by Catarina Laranjeiro (Berlin, 15 May 2015).
11. Graça, *Luís Graça*.
12. The schedules can be found in *Voz da Guiné*.
13. 'Cinema', *Voz da Guiné*, 14 July 1973.
14. Interview with Victor Bor by Catarina Laranjeiro (Unal, 18 January 2016).
15. Catarina Laranjeiro, 'The Cuban Revolution and the Liberation Struggle in Guinea-Bissau: Images, Imaginings, Expectations and Experiences', *International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 9; Alexsandro Silva Sousa, 'Os Esboços Da Nação Guineense

Em Madina Boé (1968), De José Massip', *Significação: Revista de Cultura Audiovisual* 45, no. 50 (2018): 107.

16. Luís Cabral, *Crónica Da Libertação* (Lisbon: O Jornal, 1984), 202.
17. Catarina Laranjeiro, *Dos Sonhos E Das Imagens: A Guerra De Libertação Na Guiné-Bissau* (Lisbon: Outro Modo, 2021), 132–5.
18. João Paulo Borges Coelho, 'Politics and Contemporary History in Mozambique: A Set of Epistemological Notes', *Kronos* 39, no. 1 (2013): 10–19.
19. Laranjeiro, *Dos Sonhos E Das Imagens*, 15–16.
20. La Organización Latinaomericana de Solidaridad (OLAS), *Primera Conferencia De La Organización Latinoamericana De Solidaridad* (Havana: OLAS, 1967), 48–50.
21. Amílcar Cabral, 'National Liberation and Culture', in *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral*, ed. Africa Information Service (London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 39–56.
22. Amílcar Cabral, 'Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance', in *Resistance and Decolonization*, ed. Dan Wood and Reiland Rabaka (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 119–20.
23. Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 89–107.
24. Joshua Malitsky, *Post-Revolution Nonfiction Film: Building the Soviet and Cuban Nations* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013).
25. 'Dois cineastas da nossa terra entrevistados pelo Nô Pintcha', *Nô Pintcha*, 3 May 1975. See also Catarina Laranjeiro, 'Quantas Nações Somos Capazes De Imaginar?' *Comunicação & Sociedade* 29 (2016): 79–92.
26. Interview with Sana Na N'Hada by Catarina Laranjeiro (Berlin, 15 May 2015). Besides having ties stretching back to the war in Guinea-Bissau, Cuba was an active supporter of the various new Lusophone states. See, for example, Seibert's and Rodrigues' chapter in this book.
27. 'O Povo de todo o país vai poder ver bons filmes', *Nô Pintcha*, 27 March 1975.
28. 'A Conferência De Carmen Pereira', *Nô Pintcha*, 22 April 1975.
29. 'Assembleia Nacional Popular', *Nô Pintcha*, 1 May 1975.
30. 'Os Filmes de Karaté', *Nô Pintcha*, 3 April 1975.
31. Since the autumn of 1975, *Nô Pintcha* regularly printed film schedules. Of the 787 identified sessions between October 1975 and November 1977, 128 featured westerns and 57 featured martial arts movies, adding up to 23.5 per cent.
32. Interview with Carlos Vaz by Catarina Laranjeiro (Lisbon, 8 July 2023).
33. Interview with Toni Tcheca by Catarina Laranjeiro (Lisbon, 11 July 2023).
34. 'Os Filmes de Karaté', *Nô Pintcha*, 3 April 1975.
35. The one exception took place in January 1974, when a censor clashed with his colleagues by defending that young Portuguese should 'get used to a certain type of violence, without which we cannot defeat those who, in those same ways, attack us overseas'. PT/TT/SNI-DGE/3/24, Direcção Geral dos Serviços de Espectáculos liv. 30, Acta Nº 3/74.
36. May Joseph, 'Kung Fu Cinema, Frugality and Tanzanian Asian Youth Culture: Ujamaa and Tanzanian Youth in the Seventies', in *SportCult*, ed. Randy Martin and Toby Miller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 41–63.
37. Cobus Van Staden, 'Watching Hong Kong Martial Arts Film under Apartheid', *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 29, no. 1 (2017): 46–62.
38. 'Cinema: Uma Arte, Uma Arma', *Nô Pintcha*, 19 July 1975.
39. 'Que cinema temos?' *Nô Pintcha*, 27 July 1976.

40. 'Cinema: Uma Arte, Uma Arma', *Nô Pintcha*, 19 July 1975.
41. 'Semanas de filmes só em Bissau?', *Nô Pintcha*, 20 December 1977.
42. 'Uma Semana do Cinema Soviético', 'Bons Filmes no Ginásio do Liceu Nacional', 'Quando Passam as Cegonhas', 'Semana de filmes cubanos', *Nô Pintcha*, 20 May 1975, 19 August 1976, 26 February and 26 March 1977.
43. 'Semana do Filme Soviético', 'Primeira semana do filme soviético', *Nô Pintcha*, 3 and 5 June 1975.
44. Interview with Carlos Vaz by Catarina Laranjeiro (Lisbon, 8 July 2023).
45. 'A lnformação ao serviço do Povo e do Partido', *Nô Pintcha*, 27 November 1975.
46. 'Relações Diplomáticas Guiné-Bissau-URSS', 'Filme soviético', 'Semana do Filme Soviético', *Nô Pintcha*, 7 October and 6 November 1975, 18 March 1976.
47. 'Cinema', *Nô Pintcha*, 22 and 24 June 1976.
48. 'Crítica de Cinema', 'Em exibição no Cine-Udib "Bela de Um Dia" um filme de Luís Buñuel', 'Cinema "Os Palhaços" de Fellini', *Nô Pintcha*, 5 and 15 April, 14 June 1975.
49. 'Cinema: Uma Arte, Uma Arma', *Nô Pintcha*, 19 July 1975.
50. Octavio Getino and Fernando Solanas, 'Hacia Un Tercer Cine: Apuntes Y Experiencias Para El Desarrollo De Un Cine De LiberacióN En El Tercer Mundo', *Movies and Methods* 1 (1969): 60.
51. 'O Cinema da África', 'Tachkent: Festival de Cinema da Ásia, África e América Latina', *Nô Pintcha*, 2 December 1975, 17 April 1976.
52. 'Cinema: Uma Frente de Batalha Pela emancipação da Cultura Africana', *Nô Pintcha*, 3 May 1975.
53. 'Criada a Associação Africana de Cooperação Cinematográfica', *Nô Pintcha*, 26 February 1977.
54. 'Países africanos criam estruturas cinematográficas', *Nô Pintcha*, 26 January 1978.
55. 'I Semana do Filme Argelino Será Inaugurada Esta Noite', *Nô Pintcha*, 6 April 1976.
56. 'Filmes chineses na UDIB', *Nô Pintcha*, 9 October 1976.
57. 'Dos Leitores', *Nô Pintcha*, 18 November 1976.
58. Austin Fisher, *Radical Frontiers in the Spaghetti Western* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 117–21.
59. Moorman, 'Of Westerns, Women and War', 108–9.
60. 'Vamos brincar também no cinema?', 'A quem serve os filmes de "karaté" ', *Nô Pintcha*, 18 November 1975, 6 September 1977.
61. 'Costuma ir ao cinema?', 'Que cinema gostaria de ver?', 'Que cinema temos?', *Nô Pintcha*, 20 November 1975, 8 May, 27, 29 and 31 July 1976, 7 May 1977.
62. 'Um importante passo para a dignificação do cinema em Cabo Verde', 'Do equilíbrio que é preciso manter', *Nô Pintcha*, 1 and 8 February 1977. See also Victor Andrade de Melo, 'O combate ao mau cinema: propostas para a exibição de filmes em Cabo Verde dos primeiros anos de independência (1974–1980)', *Africana Studia* 34 (2020): 61–72.
63. Between 15 and 25 March 1977.
64. 'Resolução Geral do III Congresso', *Nô Pintcha*, 24 November 1977.
65. 'A UDIB já em funcionamento', *Nô Pintcha*, 7 March 1978.
66. 'O cinema e a cultura', 'Repetição do filme é uma feliz iniciativa', *Nô Pintcha*, 3 and 17 December 1977.
67. 'Charlot esteve em Bissau', *Nô Pintcha*, 28 January 1978.
68. '67 Dias menos uma hora', 'Um longo caminho a percorrer', *Nô Pintcha*, 22 December 1977, 30 September 1978.
69. Based on *Nô Pintcha*'s available schedules, less than a fifth of the 272 different films screened at UDIB from October 1975 until November 1977 were produced in the

United States. In 1978, the proportion rose to 40 per cent (out of eighty different films).

70. ‘Semana de Filmes Brasileiros’, ‘Semana do filme coreano’, ‘Semana do Cinema Africano’, ‘Semana do Cinema Português’, ‘Semana do Filme Francês’, ‘Começa 2ª feira em Bissau a Semana do Filme Sueco’, *Nô Pintcha*, 18 March and 26 October 1978, 19 February, 24 February and 27 March 1979, 15 October 1980.
71. Jusciele Oliveira, ‘“Que a Luz Negra Ilumine Meu Rosto!” a Grandeza E O Mistério Do Cinema De Flora Gomes’, in *África(S). Cinema E Revolução*, ed. Lúcia Ramos Monteiro (São Paulo: Buena Onda Produções Artísticas e Culturais, 2016), 87.
72. ‘Dois cineastas da nossa terra’.
73. ‘Vai nascer o Departamento de Cinema do Comissariado de Informação’, *Nô Pintcha*, 3 January 1976.
74. ‘Guiné-Bissau no Festival de Filmes de Documentário’, *Nô Pintcha*, 10 January 1978.
75. Catarina Laranjeiro, ‘(In)visble Dialogues between Death and Nation-State’, in *The Struggle Is Not over Yet: An Archive in Relation*, ed. Nuno Faria, Filipa César and Tobias Hering (Berlin: Archive Books, 2018).
76. ‘Decreto governamental cria Instituto Nacional de Cinema’, ‘Instituto Nacional de Cinema’, *Nô Pintcha*, 7 and 9 February 1978. A second cinema soon started operating in Bissau: ‘Já temos cinema no bairro de Ajuda’, *Nô Pintcha*, 18 February 1978.
77. Interview with Sana Na N´Hada by Catarina Laranjeiro (Berlin, 15 May 2015).
78. ‘Um longo caminho’.
79. ‘Os dias de Ancono’, *Nô Pintcha*, 27 January 1979.
80. Interview with Sana Na N´Hada by Catarina Laranjeiro (Berlin, 15 May 2015).
81. Peter Karibe Mendy and Richard A. Lobban Jr., *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau*, 4th ed. (Toronto: Scarecrow Press, 2013), 280–1.
82. Interview with Duco Castro Fernandes by Catarina Laranjeiro (Lisbon, 12 July 2023).
83. Filipa César, Tobias Hering and Carolina Rito, eds, *Luta Ca Caba Inda* (Berlin: Archives Books, 2017).

Further reading

Alexander, Jocelyn, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi, eds. Transnational Histories of Southern Africa's Liberation Movements. London: Routledge, 2020.

Allina, Eric. *Slavery by Any Other Name: African Life under Company Rule in Colonial Mozambique*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012.

Ball, Jeremy. *Angola's Colossal Lie: Forced Labor on a Sugar Plantation, 1913–1977*. London: Brill, 2015.

Banks, Elizabeth. Socialist Internationalism between the Soviet Union and Mozambique, 1962–91. PhD diss., New York University, 2019.

Birmingham, David. *A Short History of Modern Angola*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Borges, Sońia Vaz. *Militant Education, Liberation Struggle, Consciousness: The PAIGC Education in Guinea Bissau 1963–1978*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2019.

Bowen, Merle L. *The State against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000.

Brinkman, Inge. *A War for People: Civilians, Mobility, and Legitimacy in South-East Angola during the MPLA's War for Independence*. Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe, 2005.

Cabrita, João M. *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000.

Cann, John P. *Counterinsurgency in Africa. The Portuguese Way of War 1961–1974*. Westport: Greenwood, 1997.

Chabal, Patrick, with David Birmingham, Joshua Forrest, Malyn Newitt, Gerhard Seibert and Elisa Silva Andrade. *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.

Clarence-Smith, William Gervase. *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825–1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985.

Corrado, Jacopo. *The Creole Elite and the Rise of Angolan Protonationalism: 1870–1920*. New York: Cambria Press, 2008.

Dallywater, Lena, Chris Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca, eds. *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism, 1960–1990*. Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2019.

Dallywater, Lena, Chris Saunders and Helder Adegar Fonseca, eds. *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Africa: New Perspectives on the Era of Decolonization, 1950s to 1990s*. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023.

Dhada, Mustafah. *Warriors at Work: How Guinea Was Really Set Free*. Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1993.

Dhada, Mustafah. *The Portuguese Massacre of Wiriyamu in Colonial Mozambique, 1964–2013*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

Dinerman, Alice. *Revolution, Counter-revolution and Revisionism in Post-colonial Africa: The Case of Mozambique, 1975–1994*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Emerson. Stephen A. *The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle (1977–1992)*. West Midlands: Helion, 2014.

Finnegan, William. *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
Friedman, Jeremy. *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.
Friedman, Jeremy. *Ripe for Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2021.
Funada-Classe, Sayaka. *The Origins of War in Mozambique: A History of Unity and Division*. Translated by Masako Osada. Oxford: African Minds, 2013.
Gerits, Frank. *Ideological Scramble for Africa: How the Pursuit of Anticolonial Modernity Shaped a Postcolonial Order, 1945–1966*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023.
Getachew, Adom. *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.
Gleijeses, Piero. *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
Gleijeses, Piero. *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.
Gray, Ros. *Cinemas of the Mozambican Revolution: Anti-colonialism, Independence and Internationalism in Filmmaking, 1968–1991*. Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2020.
Green, Toby. *Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution*. London: Penguin, 2020.
Hall, Margaret, and Tom Young. *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997.
Hatzky, Christine. *Cubans in Angola: South-South Cooperation and Transfer of Knowledge, 1976–1991*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015.
Heywood, Linda Marinda. *Contested Power in Angola, 1840s to the Present*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000.
Higgs, Catherine. *Chocolate Islands: Cocoa, Slavery and Colonial Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013.
Hodges, Tony. *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State*. Oxford: James Currey, 2015.
Isaacman, Allen, and Barbara Isaacman. *Dams, Displacement, and the Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa and Its Legacies in Mozambique, 1965–2007*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013.
Isaacman, Allen, and Barbara Isaacman. *Mozambique's Samora Machel: A Life Cut Short*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2020.
Kalter, Christoph. *Postcolonial People. The Return from Africa and the Remaking of Portugal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
Kohl, Christoph. *A Creole Nation: National Integration in Guinea-Bissau*. New York: Berghahn, 2018.
Lopes, Rui. *West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship 1968–1974: Between Cold Ward and Colonialism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
Maasri, Zeina, Cathy Bergin and Francesca Burke, eds. *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022.
MacQueen, Norrie. *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*. London: Longman, 1997.
Marcum, John A. *Conceiving Mozambique*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
Marino, Alexander Joseph. America's War in Angola, 1961–1976. PhD diss., University of Arkansas, 2015.
Martins, Vasco. *Colonialism, Ethnicity and War in Angola*. London: Routledge, 2021.

Mendy, Peter Karibe. *Amilcar Cabral: Nationalist and Pan-Africanist Revolutionary*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2019.

Meneses, Filipe Ribeiro, and Robert McNamara, *The White Redoubt, the Great Powers and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1960–1980*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Miller, Jamie. *An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Minter, William. *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*. London: Zed, 1994.

Moorman, Marissa. *Intonations: A Social History of Luanda, Angola, from 1945 to Recent Times*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008.

Moorman, Marissa. *Powerful Frequencies: Radio, State Power, and the Cold War in Angola, 1933–2002*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2019.

Morier-Genoud, Eric. ed. *Sure Road? Nationalisms in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.

Morier-Genoud, Eric. *Catholicism and the Making of Politics in Central Mozambique, 1940–1986*. Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2019.

Morier-Genoud, Eric. *Towards Jihad? Muslims and Politics in Postcolonial Mozambique*. London: Hurst, 2023.

Morier-Genoud, Eric, Michel Cahen and Domingos Manuel do Rosário, eds. *The War Within: New Perspectives on the Civil War in Mozambique, 1976–1992*. Suffolk: James Currey, 2018.

Muehlenbeck, Philip E., and Natalia Telepneva, eds. *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2018.

Newitt, Malyn. *A Short History of Mozambique*. London: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Oliveira, Ricardo Soares. *Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola since the Civil War*. London: Hurst, 2015.

Parrott, R. Joseph, and Mark Atwood Lawrence, eds. *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022

Pearce, Justin. *Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola, 1975–2002*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Pitcher, Anne. *Politics in the Portuguese Empire: The State, Industry, and Cotton, 1926–1974*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Pitcher, Anne M. *Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975–2000*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Saucier, Khalil, ed. *A Luta Continua: (Re)introducing Amilcar Cabral to a New Generation of Thinkers*. Trenton: Africa World Press, 2017.

Schenck, Marcia. *Remembering African Labor Migration to the Second World: Socialist Mobilities between Angola, Mozambique, and East Germany*. Cham: Springer, 2022.

Schneidman, Witney W. *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire*. Lanham: University Press of America, 2004.

Schubert, Jon. *Working the System: A Political Ethnography of the New Angola*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018.

Seibert, Gerhard. *Comrades, Clients and Cousins. Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Sheldon, Kathleen E. *Pounders of Grain: A History of Women, Work, and Politics in Mozambique*. Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002.

Shubin, Vladimir. *The Hot 'Cold War': The U.S.S.R in Southern Africa*. London: Pluto, 2008.

Telepneva, Natalia. *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021.

Tomás, António. *Amílcar Cabral: The Life of a Reluctant Nationalist*. London: Hurst, 2021.

Weigert, Stephen L. *Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961–2002*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

West, Harry G. *Kupilikula: Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Index

Note: Tables are indicated by page number followed by 't'. Endnotes are indicated by the page number followed by 'n' and the endnote number e.g., 20 n.1 refers to endnote 1 on page 20.

AAM (Anti-Apartheid Movement) 112, 113
AAPSO (Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization) 42, 47, 107, 108, 121, 123, 131
  China withdrawal from 126, 127
  conferences 121–2, 124, 125–6
  council meetings 122, 125, 127, 129
  Executive Committee meetings 124, 125
  USSR role in 122, 123–7, 129–30
ABAKO (Alliance des Bakongo) party 25, 33
ACOA (American Committee on Africa) 25, 27–8, 30, 31, 86, 105, 176
Adoula, Cyrille 24, 32, 34
AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) 24, 27, 30, 31
African National Congress, *see* ANC (African National Congress)
African nationalism 3–7, 25–6, 44–9, 54, 55, 86
African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde, *see* PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)
African socialism 11, 66–7, 144
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, *see* AAPSO (Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization)
Albania 53
Algeria 8, 11, 27, 30, 71, 85, 104, 122, 125, 157, 159, 161, 215, 247, 250, 251, 254
Algerian War (1954–62) 8, 86, 158
Allard, Jacques 157, 159
Allende, Salvador 155, 156, 160, 165, 166, 179
Al-Sibai, Yusuf 121
Álvarez, Santiago 247, 254
Alvor Agreement 192
American Committee on Africa, *see* ACOA (American Committee on Africa)
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, *see* AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations)
ANC (African National Congress) 104, 105, 107, 109
Andrade, Mário Pinto de 22, 122, 128, 253
Angola 1, 3, 4, 5–7, 12, 22, 28, 86, 105, 110, 118 n.51, 129, 139, 155, 159, 162, 173, 200, 203, 213, 217, 243, 244
  debts 197, 199, 200
  economic relation with Poland 196–201
  Emergency Relief to Angola (ERA) 30–1
  export and import 197, 198t
  independence 6, 155, 191, 192
  and invasion of Goa 84, 91, 92, 94, 95
  political relation with Poland 191–6
  UN and decolonization, limits of 84–8, 185
Angolan Democratic Party (PDA) 29
Angolan National Liberation Army, *see* ELNA (Angolan National Liberation Army)
Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile, *see* GRAE (Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio)
Anti-Apartheid Movement, *see* AAM (Anti-Apartheid Movement)
anticolonialism 2, 10–11, 44–9, 69, 73–5, 110, 143

anti-communism 8, 21, 24, 28, 30, 31–2, 34, 167
in Africa 24, 28, 31–2, 158, 161, 167, 180–1
in Belgium 24
in Brazil 157, 159–61
in Latin America 159–61
in US 24, 28, 30, 34, 156
see also communism
anti-imperialism 44, 84, 89, 92, 96, 98, 127, 227, 228, 236, 237, 249, 250
Third World movement 84, 92, 125–6
apartheid regime 89, 106, 112–13, 157, 158, 165, 167, 178, 249
condemnation of 141, 156
Argentina 156, 159–60, 161, 165–6, 250
Australia 139, 141, 158, 177–8, 180, 181, 183
Azikiwe, Nnamdi 10
Azores Islands 5, 32, 178

Baixa do Cassange massacre, 5, 6, 118 n.51
Bakongo 6, 33, 86
ethnic identity 25–6
refugees 27
Ball, George 32
Bandung conference 89, 121, 122, 227
Baptista, João 29, 32
Batepá massacre, 6, 216
Bazanov, Nicolai I. 129–30
Belgian Congo 4, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28
see also Democratic Republic of Congo
Belgium 24, 141, 176, 222
Bella, Ahmed Ben 125
Bissau, *see* Guinea-Bissau
Bolivia 156, 159, 160
Boneschi, José Paulo 162–3, 170 n.33
Bongo, Omar 222, 223
Botha, P. W. 158
Bourguiba, Habib 21, 31
Brazil 3–4, 155–6, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162–8, 179, 199, 252
Brezhnev, Leonid 125
British American Oil Company 146
Brown, Irving 24, 27, 30, 31
Bulgaria 178, 193, 198t, 206 n.48
Burundi 119 n.59
Bush, George H.W. 235
Cabo Verde 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 63, 65, 71, 72, 129, 211, 212, 219, 227, 231, 243
foreign policy 229–30, 231–2, 236–7
political evolution 236
post-independence challenges 228–9
United States economic aid to 232–7
USSR economic aid to 232–3
Cabora Bassa, *see* Cahora Bassa dam
Cabral, Amílcar 6, 8, 12, 85–8, 113, 128, 131, 132, 227, 234, 246, 253
concept of class 64, 66–75
concept of culture 73–74, 246–7, 250
early life 65
and Marxism 64–6
on national liberation 63, 66–72
see also PAIGC
Cabral, João 91–2, 97
Cabral, Luís 254
Caetano, Marcelo 5, 16 n.38, 181, 184
Cahora Bassa dam 11, 53, 112, 174, 182–5
Canada 10, 139, 150, 158, 183
anticolonial movements in 139–40
foreign policy 141–3, 148–9
oil industry in 146–7
relationship with Africa 140–3
Canadian University Service Overseas, *see* CUSO (Canadian University Service Overseas)
capitalism 12, 27, 53, 54, 124, 126, 145, 146, 148
Cardoso, Renato 230, 232
Carnation Revolution 5, 6, 130, 149, 155, 160, 163, 192, 214, 223, 252
Carrero, Eloy Méndez 164
Castro, Fidel 156, 166–7, 218
Central African Republic 119 n.59
Central Intelligence Agency, *see* CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)
CFMAG (Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea) 112, 113
Chad 119, n.59
Cheng-Chi, Liao 125
Chile 155–6, 159, 160, 165–7, 178, 179, 180
China, People's Republic of (PRC) 3, 4, 9, 31, 41–2, 43, 51, 54, 108, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127–31, 132, 157, 159, 217, 246, 251, 254
and USSR, *see* Sino-Soviet split

Chinese Communist Party 123
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 8, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 161, 162
cinema
in anticolonial struggle 147, 243, 246–7
in colonial Guinea-Bissau 244–5
in independent Guinea-Bissau 247–55
civil war
in Angola 7, 11, 21, 150, 166, 192, 201
in Mozambique 7, 11, 150, 166
CLSTP (Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe) 212, 213–14
CODECO (Commandos for the Defence of Western Civilization) 165
Cold War 3, 5–9, 10, 11–12, 28, 42, 43, 47, 53–5, 63, 66, 103–4, 108–11, 114, 121, 122, 132, 139, 143, 145, 155–8, 163, 166, 167, 174, 175, 178, 185, 199, 211, 212, 220, 223, 227, 228, 230–5, 238, 250
colonialism 3–5, 23–4, 68–70, 74, 84–8, 140–1, 173–4, 176–7, 181–2, 211, 244–5
COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 196
Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe, *see* CLSTP (Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe)
Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique, *see* COREMO (Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique)
Commandos for the Defence of Western Civilization, *see* CODECO (Commandos for the Defence of Western Civilization)
Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, *see* CFMAG (Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea)
Commonwealth of Nations 93, 141
communism, *see* anti-communism; Marxism
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *see* CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)
CONCP (Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas) 52, 91–2, 104–5, 108, 109, 122, 213, 215, 223
Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas, *see* CONCP (Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas)
Congo-Brazzaville 119 n.59, 193
Congo-Kinshasa, *see* Democratic Republic of Congo
Congo-Lépoldville, *see* Belgian Congo
COREMO (Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique) 8, 41–2
and African liberation 50–2
and global liberation 52–5
and Mozambican liberation 44–9
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, *see* COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)
CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) 122, 123, 124, 126
Cruz, Viriato da 31, 121, 128, 130
Cuba 9, 63, 66–72, 75, 98, 124–6, 131, 156, 160–1, 163, 165–6, 191, 194, 195, 201, 206 n.48, 212, 217–18, 233, 244, 246–7, 248, 252, 253, 254, 255
Cuban Revolution (1959) 159, 212, 246–7
Cunene Hydroelectric 182–5
CUSO (Canadian University Service Overseas) 146
Cyprus 108, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130
Czapla, Jan 193
Czechoslovakia 145, 193, 197, 198t, 206 n.48

Daman 3, 4, 5, 83, 88–97
Dean, Patrick Sir 96
decolonization 1, 2, 5–8, 10, 13, 27, 32, 42, 46, 47, 49, 50, 94, 95, 103–4, 121, 139, 140, 155, 156, 157, 159, 167, 175, 178, 203, 211–12, 223, 244, 255
UN role in 83–4, 88–9
Democratic Republic of Congo 6, 10–11, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32–3, 34, 51, 86–7, 119 n.59, 128, 162, 165, 193
see also Belgian Congo
Denmark 9, 131, 176, 177, 178, 180
DGS (Direcção-Geral de Segurança) 4, 214
Dickinson, Margareth 147
Diefenbaker, John 141

Direcção-Geral de Segurança, *see* DGS (Direcção-Geral de Segurança)
Diu 3, 4, 5, 83, 88–97
Dondi Mission 142
Drummond, Roscoe 96
Du Bois, W. E. B. 10
Duarte, Abílio 230, 231
Dun, Mao 124
Dzonzi, Julius 53

East Germany, *see* German Democratic Republic (GDR)
East Timor, *see* Timor
Eastern Bloc 8–9, 26, 103, 106–8, 129, 191, 196, 199, 200, 218, 227, 232
EEC (European Economic Community) 218
Egypt 34, 41–2, 51, 52, 87, 121, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 139
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, *see* ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional)
Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo, *see* ERP (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo)
ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) 160
ELNA (Angolan National Liberation Army) 32
ERP (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo) 160
Estado Novo 6, 46, 83, 85, 86, 162, 173, 184, 224 n.10, 233, 249
  censorship services 245, 249, 257 n.35
  political police forces 4, 129, 213, 214
  postwar era 4–5
Ethiopia 119 n.59, 176, 178, 180, 217
European Economic Community, *see* EEC (European Economic Community)

Fanon, Frantz 8, 21, 27, 28, 31, 46, 63
Fellowship of Reconciliation, *see* FOR (Fellowship of Reconciliation)
Finland 9, 180, 181
FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) 6, 7, 11, 21, 29, 32, 33, 35 n.2, 37 n.32, 46, 51–2, 155, 157, 162–4, 192
FOR (Fellowship of Reconciliation) 25
Ford, Gerald 234
France 5, 6, 73, 74, 86, 88, 93, 107, 111, 141, 142, 146, 157, 159, 176, 182, 200, 221, 222, 223, 232, 233, 237, 239 n.9, 244, 253
Free Trade Union movement 23
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) 1, 6–7, 8, 11, 41–2, 43, 45, 49, 50, 52, 55, 95, 105, 107, 108, 109, 116 n.19, n.69, 122, 124, 126–7, 128, 129, 131, 132, 144–5, 147–9, 150, 182
Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, *see* FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, *see* FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola)
Frente de Resistência Nacional de São Tomé e Príncipe, *see* FRNSTP (Frente de Resistência Nacional de São Tomé e Príncipe)
Freyre, Gilberto 5
FRNSTP (Frente de Resistência Nacional de São Tomé e Príncipe) 222

Gafurov, Bobodjan 125
Gaitonde, P. D. 91, 92
Galarza, Ricardo 164–5, 166, 167
Gandhi, Mahatma 89
Garvey, Marcus 23
Geisel, Ernesto 163
German Democratic Republic (GDR) 106, 107, 113, 117 n.26, 191, 193, 197, 198t, 201, 206 n.48, 214, 217, 220–1, 233, 247, 252
Germany, Federal Republic of 5, 53, 88, 176, 182, 183, 222, 232, 233, 237
Ghana 2, 11, 27, 28, 30, 41, 52, 66, 71, 85, 86, 121, 213
Gilchrist, Ian 31, 33
Goa 4, 5, 9, 86, 88–94, 98, 106
Gomes, Florentino Flora 247, 252, 254, 255
Graça, Carlos 213, 214, 223
GRAE (Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio) 21, 22, 23, 29–34, 37 n.32
Grela, Kwiryn 193
guerre revolutionnaire doctrine 157–9, 163, 167
Guevara, Ernesto 'Che' 54, 143
Guinea-Bissau 1, 4, 5, 6–7, 52, 64, 65, 67–8, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 85, 95, 96, 110,

118 n.51, 126–7, 129, 139, 150, 213, 227–8, 236, 243
film theatres 244, 248, 255
filmmakers 247, 252–4, 255
guerrilla 6, 71, 73, 86, 246, 247
Guinea-Conakry (Republic of Guinea) 5, 6, 63, 65, 66, 67, 71–2, 75, 85–6, 108, 121, 124, 131, 163, 247, 250, 253
Gulf Oil 146–7, 183, 197–200
Gumane, Paulo 41, 45, 46, 51, 53
Gwambe, Adelino 41, 46, 51, 52

Hammarskjöld, Dag 86
Harriman, W. Averell 28
Hong Kong 95
films 248–9, 251
Houser, George 27, 30, 31, 105–6
Hungary 193, 198t, 206 n.48

ILO (International Labour Organization) 213
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 222
INC (Instituto Nacional de Cinema) 252–5
Independent Mozambique African National Union, *see* UNAMI (Independent Mozambique African National Union)
India 3, 84–5, 95, 97, 123, 126, 158, 159, 180
annexation of Goa 5, 88–97
Indonesia 3, 4, 54, 95, 98, 121
Instituto Nacional de Cinema, *see* INC (Instituto Nacional de Cinema)
International Labour Organization, *see* ILO (International Labour Organization)
International Monetary Fund, *see* IMF (International Monetary Fund)
Iran 180
Iraq 180
Israel 126, 131
Italy 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 251
Ivory Coast 180–1, 183

Jabłoński, Henryk 194
Jack, Homer A. 24, 25, 28
Japan 158, 251
Jaroszewicz, Piotr 193
Jaruzelski, Wojciech 195, 202
JCR (Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria) 160
Jha, C. S. 93
Johnson, Lyndon B. 33
Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria, *see* JCR (Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria)

Kalundungo, José 29
Kambeu, Arcanjo Faustino 49, 50
Kambona, Oscar 95
Kasa-Vubu, Joseph 24, 25, 33
Kaunda, Kenneth 27, 41, 45, 92
Kennedy, John F. (JFK) 21, 28, 32, 87, 97
Kenya 85, 119 n.59, 143
Khan, Shafrudine 148, 149
Khartoum conference 104, 108–11, 126–7, 130
Khrushchev, Nikita 122–5, 129
Kossyguin, Alexei 130
Kounzika, Emmanuel 29
Kuwait 199

Lenin, Vladimir 4, 54, 124, 131
Liahuca, José 31, 33
Liberia 87
Libya 200, 204 n.3
Lie, Trygve 25
Lulendo, Francisco Borralho 25
Lumumba, Patrice 21, 25, 27, 86
Lusaka Manifesto 108, 110, 111, 114, 195
Lusotropicalism 4–5

Mabote, Sebastião 145
Macao 4, 83
Machel, Samora 55, 131, 145, 150
Madagascar 180
Maksudov, Latyp 128
Malaysia 85
Malhães, Paulo 160, 163, 165, 170 n.33
Mali 11, 71, 176, 178, 180
MANC (Mozambique African National Congress) 41
Mandela, Nelson 104
MANU (Mozambique African National Union) 41
Maoism 43, 54, 144, 145, 215
Marcum, John 8, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 34, 44

Marini, Alberto 159
Marshall, Judith 24, 143, 150
Marxism 6, 8, 11, 32, 55, 63, 67, 130, 131, 143, 178, 191, 192, 197, 201, 212, 215, 218, 222, 223
  Cabral, Amílcar on 63, 64–72
  see also scientific socialism
McInnes, Murray 143
Meany, George 27, 30, 105
Médici, Emílio Garrastazu 163
Menon, Krishna 90
Mexico 189 n.77
Minter, Bill 30
MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) 160
MLSTP (Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe) 211–12, 214–16, 217–24
MLTSDP (Movimento de Libertação dos Territórios sob Dominação Portuguesa) 127
Mobe, Antoine-Marie 24
Mobutu, Joseph 33
Mogadishu Declaration 111
Mondlane, Eduardo Chivambo 6, 95, 105, 113, 127, 128, 131, 144–5, 150
Monomotapa National Democratic Union (UDENAMO-Monomatapa) 41
Monteiro, Óscar 108
Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe, *see* MLSTP (Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe)
Movimento de Libertação dos Territórios sob Dominação Portuguesa, *see* MLTSDP (Movimento de Libertação dos Territórios sob Dominação Portuguesa)
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, *see* MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, see MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria)
Mozambique 1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 41, 44, 53, 104–5, 110, 118 n.51, 129, 139, 150, 173, 213, 243, 244
  Civil War 7, 11, 150, 166
  guerrilla wars in 1, 6, 46, 105, 144–5
  independence 6, 42, 149–50
Mozambique African National Congress, *see* MANC (Mozambique African National Congress)
Mozambique African National Union, *see* MANU (Mozambique African National Union)
Mozambique Liberation Front, *see* FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)
Mozambique Revolutionary Committee, *see* COREMO (Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique)
MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) 6, 7, 9, 21, 22, 23, 28, 30, 31, 34, 43, 107, 109, 121, 124, 126, 127, 128–9, 130, 131, 147, 149, 155, 161, 163, 191–7, 200, 236, 253
Mueda massacre 6, 118 n.51

N'Hada, Sana Na 245, 247, 253, 254, 255
NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) 52, 54, 89, 90, 97, 139, 227, 230, 237
Namibia 104, 110, 113, 126, 129, 150, 161, 165, 177, 181, 183, 184
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 90, 123
National Coalition Party, *see* PCN (National Coalition Party)
National Democratic Union of Mozambique, *see* UDENAMO (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique)
National Front for the Liberation of Angola, *see* FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola)
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, *see* UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 5, 9, 24, 53, 87, 88, 93, 111, 124, 141, 177–8, 236, 237
Nehru, Jawaharlal 89–94, 97, 98
Nekaka, Manuel Barros 25, 26, 27
Nendaka, Victor 32
neocolonialism 2, 3, 10–11, 48, 53, 67, 69, 70, 73, 76, 123, 125, 215, 230, 250, 252
Netherlands 7, 9, 183, 218, 222, 233
Neto, Agostinho 22, 127–32, 149, 155, 192, 194

New Zealand 141
Nigeria 33, 200, 204 n.3
Ning-Yi, Liu 124
Nixon, Richard 141–2
Nkrumah, Kwame 2, 8, 10, 27, 45, 50, 52, 67, 71, 73, 213
Nogueira, Franco 93
Nokwe, Duma 108
Non-Aligned Movement, *see* NAM (Non-Aligned Movement)
non-alignment 9, 12, 43, 89, 122–3, 127–32, 227, 231
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *see* NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)
North Korea 202, 217, 252
Norway 9, 113, 176, 183
Nyerere, Julius 45, 67, 122, 132, 143, 144

OAU (Organisation of African Unity) 21–2, 31, 45, 106, 113, 214, 218, 223, 237
  ALC (African Liberation Committee) 42, 47, 50–1
oil 146–7, 163, 176, 183, 197–200
Operation Condor 155, 157, 159–60
Operation Rainbow 160–1
Organisation of African Unity, *see* OAU (Organisation of African Unity)
Oslo conference 113–14

PAICV (Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde) 228, 230, 232, 234, 236
PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) 6, 7, 9, 12, 63, 65–9, 71–6, 85–6, 88, 91, 95–6, 107, 109, 122–4, 126, 128–9, 131, 147, 153 n.39, 227–8, 229–30, 231–7, 243, 246–55
  see also Cabral, Amílcar
PALOP (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa) 142, 217, 218, 223, 224
pan-Africanism 2, 8, 12, 23, 43, 44, 48, 50–2, 55, 76, 124–5, 143, 212, 215, 217, 250
Papua New Guinea 95
Paraguay 156, 159, 160
Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, *see* PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)
Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde, *see* PAICV (Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde)
Paszkowski, Roman 194
PCN (National Coalition Party) 42, 47, 49
Pereira, Aristides 231, 232, 234–5
Person, Lester 141
Peru 230
Philippines 85
PIDE (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado) 4, 123, 129, 162, 164, 213–14
Pidjiguiti massacre 6, 85, 118 n.51
Pinnock, Eduardo 25–7
Pinochet, Augusto 156
Pinto da Costa, Manuel 214–24
Pires, Pedro 229, 232, 234
Pires Veloso, Antonio 215, 216
Poland 12, 178, 180, 191, 192–6
  economic cooperation with Angola 196–201, 206 n.48
  educational cooperation with Angola 196–201
  military intelligence 194, 201–2
Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado, *see* PIDE (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado)
Pondicherry (Puducherry) 89
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, *see* MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)
Portugal 1–6, 8, 22, 27, 28, 32, 33, 44, 46, 65, 71, 83–98, 110, 111, 119 n.69, 121–2, 139, 162, 173, 184, 192, 211, 212–13, 215, 216, 218, 222–3, 227, 229, 233, 244, 249
  foreign interests in 173–82
Portuguese Guinea, *see* Guinea-Bissau
Portuguese-speaking African countries, *see* PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African countries)
Pratt, Cranford 142

Quebec independence movement 10, 140, 142, 148, 151

racism 4, 5, 6, 22–3, 25, 48, 89, 105, 123–5, 128, 143, 144, 145, 147, 159, 175, 179, 194, 249

Radchenko, Sergey 123
Reagan, Ronald 235
Rebelo, Jorge 145
RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) 11
Resha, Robert 104
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, *see* RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana)
Revolutionary Coordination Junta, *see* (JCR) Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria 160
Rhodesia 4, 5, 8, 51, 52, 55, 104–5, 110, 150, 161, 165, 166, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184
Roberto, Álvaro Holden 6, 8, 21, 23, 86–7, 162, 164
  connections in Congo 6, 22, 24–5
  early life and family 24
  relationship with US 26–8, 31–4
  see also FNLA
Rodney, Walter 11, 143, 144, 145
Romania 198t, 217
Rwanda 119 n.59

Salazar, António de Oliveira 4, 5, 32, 51, 85–8, 93, 97
Santo, Alda Espírito 216
Santos, José Eduardo dos 195, 200
Santos, Manuel 'Manecas' 25, 249–50
Santos, Marcelino dos 92, 94, 98, 149
São Tomé and Príncipe 1, 4, 12, 211, 213–16
  independence 6, 214
  liberation struggle 213–16
  socialist one-party state 216–23
SARA (Serviço de Assistencia aos Refugiados de Angola) 31, 33
Saul, John S. 1, 140, 143–6, 147, 148–9, 150, 152 n.7
  see also TCLPAC
Savimbi, Jonas 29–30, 33, 92, 142
Schirmer, Gregor 107
scientific socialism 11, 43, 73, 127
  see also Marxism
Senegal 66, 67, 247
Senghor, Léopold 67
Serviço de Assistencia aos Refugiados de Angola, *see* SARA (Serviço de Assistencia aos Refugiados de Angola)
Shah, K. K. 91
Shamuyarira, Nathan 110
SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) 157
Simango, Uria 45, 128
Sino-Indian dispute 125
Sino-Soviet split 9, 51, 54, 108, 121, 123–31, 125–8, 129, 131
  reasons behind 123–7
socialist bloc, *see* Eastern bloc
solidarity committees 9, 107, 112, 122, 125, 126, 129, 130, 146–51, 150, 182, 191, 193, 227
Solodovnikov, Vasily 113
Somalia 108, 119 n.59
South Africa 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 51–2, 55, 89, 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 126, 141, 150, 156–7, 161, 164–6, 176, 177, 180, 182–4, 192, 195, 218, 236–7, 249
South African Bureau for State Security (BOSS) 161
South West Africa National Union, *see* SWANU (South West Africa National Union)
South West African People's Organisation, *see* SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation)
South-West Africa, *see* Namibia
Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee 107, 126, 129
Soviet Union, *see* USSR
Soweto massacre 141, 159
Spaak, Paul Henri 24
Spain 179, 222, 248
Spínola, António de 71
Springer, Maida 30
Sri Lanka 131
Stalin, Joseph 123
Stevenson, Adlai 32, 93
Stroessner, Alfredo 156
Sudan 108, 119 n.59, 204 n.3
Sukarno 53–4, 95
SWANU (South West Africa National Union) 126
SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) 107, 109, 126, 195
Sweden 9, 131, 182, 183, 233, 244, 252, 254
Syria 176, 178, 180

TAAG (Transportes Aéreos de Angola) 218
Tabeyev, Fikryat 125
Taiwan 249, 251
Tambo, Oliver 143
Tanzania 6, 66, 67, 95, 104, 110, 111, 119 n.59, 121, 122, 126, 143–4, 145, 149, 161, 176, 178, 180, 249
Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility, *see* TCCR (Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility)
TCCR (Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility) 142
TCLPAC (Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies) 139, 143, 146–50
  see also Saul, John S.
TCLSAC (Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa) 140, 141, 146, 150
Teixeira, Rui 31, 33
Third-Worldism 3, 8, 9, 43, 52–5, 84, 91, 92, 98, 123, 126, 132
Timor 4, 83, 95, 98
Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies, *see* TCLPAC (Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies
Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, *see* TCLSAC (Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa)
Touré, Ahmed Sékou 65, 67
Transportes Aéreos de Angola, *see* TAAG (Transportes Aéreos de Angola)
Tricontinental Conference 63, 65, 69, 75, 125–6, 246
Trovoada, Miguel 213–14, 217, 223
Trudeau, Pierre Eliot 141–2, 148
Tshombe, Moïse 32–3
Tunisia 29, 30, 31, 176, 178, 180, 247
Turbański, Stanisław 193
Turkey 124
Tursun-Zade, Mirzo 125

UCC (United Church of Canada) 142
UDENAMO (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique) 41, 46, 51, 124, 128
UDIB (União Desportiva Internacional de Bissau) 244, 248, 249, 251, 252, 255
Uganda 119 n.59
ujamaa project 144, 145, 249
ultra-colonialism 4
Ulyanovsky, Rostislav 126–7, 130
UN (United Nations) 2, 9, 11, 22, 26, 28, 32, 54, 83–4, 90, 92, 94–7, 98, 105–7, 110, 174–5, 185
  Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Peoples 84, 85, 173, 174–5, 177, 179, 180, 181
  Decolonization Committee 96, 112, 173–85, 214
  International Year for Human Rights 106
  Security Council (UNSC) 28, 83, 87, 107
  Trusteeship Council 85, 88
UNAMI (Independent Mozambique African National Union) 41
UNESCO 73, 79 n.62
União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique, *see* UDENAMO (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique)
União Desportiva Internacional de Bissau, *see* UDIB (União Desportiva Internacional de Bissau)
União das Populações de Angola, *see* UPA (União das Populações de Angola)
União dos Povos do Norte de Angola, *see* UPNA (União dos Povos do Norte de Angola)
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, *see* UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)
Union Nationale des Travailleurs Angolais, *see* UNTA (Union Nationale des Travailleurs Angolais)
Union of the Peoples of Angola, *see* UPA (União das Populações de Angola)
UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) 6, 7, 11, 109, 142, 161, 192, 195
United Arab Republic 87
United Church of Canada, *see* UCC (United Church of Canada)
United Kingdom (UK) 5, 88, 93–4, 107, 111, 112, 125, 141, 142, 146, 173, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 236

United States (US) 22, 26–8, 30, 31, 32, 33, 53, 87, 88, 93–4, 95, 96, 97, 111, 124, 125, 142, 143, 146, 156, 159, 162, 166, 176, 177–8, 179, 181, 183, 200, 228, 229, 232–7, 252
UNTA (Union Nationale des Travailleurs Angolais) 30
UPA (União das Populações de Angola) 6, 8, 27, 28–9, 30, 86, 87, 88, 92
UPNA (União dos Povos do Norte de Angola) 27
Uruguay 156, 159, 160, 161, 164, 165, 178, 180
USSR 9, 11, 26, 43, 54–5, 66, 87, 104, 107, 108, 122–3, 125–6, 127–31, 132, 157, 159, 175, 176, 178, 180, 191, 193, 195, 197, 198t, 201, 202, 206 n.48, 217, 227, 232, 233, 244, 254

Venezuela 178, 180, 183
Vietnam 53, 54, 85, 90, 98, 125, 126, 141, 202, 246
Vietnam War 25, 126, 141–2

WCC (World Council of Churches) 113
West Germany, *see* Germany, Federal Republic
Williams, G. Mennen 33
Wolniewicz, Lucjan 193
World Bank 222
World Council of Churches, *see* WCC (World Council of Churches)
World Peace Council, *see* WPC (World Peace Council)
WPC (World Peace Council) 108–9, 111, 113, 114

Xavier, Fernando Fernandes 162, 164

Yugoslavia 122, 130, 131, 175, 176, 178, 180, 198t, 202
YWCA (Young Women's Christian Association) 147

Zaire, *see* Democratic Republic of Congo
Zambezi Consortium Hydroelectric, *see* ZAMCO (Zambezi Consortium Hydroelectric)
Zambia 27, 41–2, 45, 92, 105, 106, 108, 110, 111, 119 n.59
ZAMCO (Zambezi Consortium Hydroelectric) 182
ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) 51, 110
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) 105, 107, 109, 110, 116 n.19, 126
Zedong, Mao 54, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 159
Zimbabwe, *see* Rhodesia
Zimbabwe African National Union, *see* ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union)
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, *see* ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union)