

East is East? Beyond the Global North and Global South in Criminology

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This paper identifies an absence in currently constituted criminological discourse on the Global North and Global South. This absence is the Global East. The Global East is not a defined region but a relation of betweenness, geographically and geo-politically, within and between the South and North, representing peoples from countries and societies which fit imperfectly into a North/South binary. We focus on the Eastern European and Eurasian regions to demonstrate this point, concentrating specifically on its omission in punishment and society studies. Our paper makes a positive argument for the Global East concept, disrupting the assumed categories of North and South and producing a strategic essentialism to help better represent peoples thus far overlooked in southern criminology.

KEY WORDS: Global South, Global East, southern criminology, Russia, colonization, punishment

INTRODUCTION: DOUBLE SILENCE, DUAL EXCLUSION

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a war of aggression against Ukraine, an escalation of ongoing hostilities initiated by Russia in 2014. Cities and towns have been destroyed, war crimes have been committed including the murder of civilians and prisoners of war, mass rape and sexual violence ([International Criminal Court 2022](#)). Russia has repurposed regular penal colonies as filtration and torture camps to manage prisoners of war and those fleeing the conflict zone. The Russian army and police units planned to deport undesirable Ukrainians into the Russian hinterland ([Zabrodskiy et al. 2022](#)), an echo of the historical deportations of whole peoples to Central Asia, Siberia and the camps of the Gulag. As the failed attempt on Kyiv turned into a grinding war, the Russian army and private militias—including the Wagner group designated a transnational criminal organization by the United States—began openly recruiting prisoners from Russia's huge prison population, for most of the last century the biggest in the world. These recruits formed penal battalions and were sent to the areas of heaviest fighting. Inferring from the Russian Ministry of Defence and Prison Service reports, as many as 50,000 prisoners may have been sent to war since September 2022 ([Latavrin and Golubev 2022](#)) though the exact figures remain murky ([Pallot 2023](#)). Meanwhile, Russia was ejected from the Council of Europe.

In a petulant response, former Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev called for the reinstatement of the death penalty, a sanction that had previously been annulled in order to join the Council.

Russia's war on Ukraine poses important criminological questions—the political, economic and societal dimensions of the application of extreme violence in the commission of a nakedly neo-colonial state crime, and the extraordinary place of prison and punishment in Russian politics, society and way of war. However, criminologists in Western metropolises have paid 'scant attention' to the geographic region of Eastern Europe (Aas 2012: 9). Even vibrant movements that seek to understand relations between the Global North and Global South have largely overlooked the Eastern European and Eurasian region. The Global South is Africa, Latin America and Asia (Carrington *et al.* 2016; 2018). This definition locks out local knowledge and indigenous voices in places such as Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia, let alone autonomous regions within Russia such as Buryatia, Dagestan, Tatarstan or Komi Republic. These are regions whose histories are often tightly intertwined with colonial systems of exile, confinement and convict settlement as well as, in the case of Chechnya, the brutal wars prosecuted by the Russian metropole since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Criminology is not alone in this oversight. Just over 20 years ago, it was observed that a 'double silence' reigned regarding colonialism in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Post-colonial studies had engaged in an 'enormous' geographic and geopolitical omission of the region (Chioni Moore 2001). Similarly, area studies scholars from within and outside that region had, for a variety of reasons, conceptualized those societies as anything but post-colonial. Scholars from the post-socialist world have recently raised the question whether post-socialism might have anything in common with post-colonialism (Tlostanova 2018). On top of the silence concerning coloniality, the Eastern European region also became subject to a dual exclusion as the concepts of a Global North and Global South gained in academic usage with the end of the Cold War (Mignolo 2011a, 2014). The North/South binary excludes 'all those societies that fall somewhere between North and South ... those societies that took part in what was the most momentous global experiment of the twentieth century: to create communism' (Müller 2020: 743). The difficulty in situating the East in the Global North and Global South relational context, has led to its passing over, 'not out of spite, but because the East does not fit the frame through which we think the global' (Müller 2020: 741).

This paper will highlight the relative absence of Eastern Europe and Eurasia both as a geographic place and as a part of the global imaginary—a Global East—between the Global North and South within the authors' main field of research: punishment and society studies. Eastern Europe and Eurasia here refer geographically to countries in the continents of Europe and Asia that were subordinated to Russia and the Soviet Union's colonial power, engaged in forms of a command economy, and were constituted as one-party communist states for much of the second half of the twentieth century. By contrast, the Global East describes a distinct ideological, epistemological and geopolitical relationship towards the projection of colonial power and global capital. This relationship is marked by its ambiguity and interstitiality. As such, the Global East can be located between and within the categories of the Global North and Global South. The Global East allows us to think through power relations that are not purely that of colonized and colonizer; to integrate subaltern imperialists and imperial subalterns into the framework of global power relations and knowledge production (Morozov 2015).

To argue for the utility of the Global East concept, we focus on Russia and the countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union. We do so partly out of convenience—this is the region that we study—and partly as a call to attention. These jurisdictions have been notably overlooked by criminological scholarship. The relative lack of criminological engagement with Eastern Europe and Eurasia is most curious in the punishment and society field given

that the region produced, by some demonstrable distance, the most expansive systems of convict settler colonialism and mass incarceration in world history—Tsarist exile and the Soviet Gulag. While Russia is occasionally included in Western and global histories of the prison, research on its Asian regions and colonies that held much of the Gulag infrastructure, such as Qazaqstan (Kazakhstan), are left out. Moreover, in recent writing on penal order and prisoner governance it has been forgotten that theories of correctional collectivism that grounded penal order in Soviet prison camps have impacted the management of prisons across the world, both in the South and North.

The paper examines and attempts to explain the omission of the Eastern European and Eurasian regions in punishment and society scholarship. Focusing on the development of criminology in the metropole of Moscow, we argue that there are both internal and external drivers for this omission, not least the ambiguous position of Russia in Europe—an empire, but a sub-altern one. In the last section, the paper discusses the plurality of locations where the Global East can be identified and argues that criminologists engaging in ‘thinking the global’ (Müller 2020) should break the dual exclusion in the North/South binary and embrace this concept for two reasons. Firstly, the Global East can be used as shorthand for relationships within, between and beyond North and South; for intersectional geopolitical power relationships that are not easily categorized into colonizer and colonized. These relationships impacted and impact on, the production of criminological knowledge: in the past, Eastern European nations, first among them the Soviet Union, actively framed themselves as anti-colonial, finding common cause with countries in what was known as the Second and Third Worlds and engaging in knowledge exchange that including the export and application of Marxist theories of crime, crime control and corrections. Those countries of the Second and Third World realized that, whilst presenting as emancipators, some of these Eastern states were often dealing with their own histories of subjugation to imperial powers and had themselves dispossessed, colonized, imprisoned and killed millions of people in the name of liberation from capitalism and colonialism (Mignolo 2011b; Mark and Betts 2022).

These interstitial dynamics and porous categories that emerge within and beyond the North/South dichotomy have pressing relevance, as the war on Ukraine reveals. Thus, secondly, the paper allies itself with Müller’s (2020) call for a ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak 1988) that deliberately mobilizes marginalized but heterogenous groups, extending decolonizing and southernizing movements in criminology. We focus on Eastern Europe and Eurasia again here arguing for the need to shift the focus towards Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans, Chechens, Dagestanis, Circassians, Tuvans, Buryatians, Karelians, Kalmyks, Crimean Tartars as well as the multitude of other groups and societies around the world colonized by powers not fully of the North. We note the Global Eastern dynamics in places as diverse as Nicaragua, Vietnam and Angola, for example.

We couch these arguments in an acknowledgement of our status as Global North researchers in the countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union. We recognize our own Western orientaling gaze that has governed the languages we speak, the questions we ask and the methods we employ, and the structurally unequal partnerships we have participated in with funding from academic institutions of the Global North. We advocate for the concept of the Global East in part, therefore, to resolve some of the tensions and contradictions we have felt ourselves in doing research in these jurisdictions. We further acknowledge in our conclusion the ongoing need to autocritique our own positionality as punishment and society specialists of the region and suggest how the concept of the Global East has helped us to understand this positionality within global structural inequalities of knowledge production that amplify the risks of epistemological ‘Western assessment’ biases (Malia 1999: 9, see also Morozov 2015).

THE CURIOUS ECLIPSE OF THE EAST IN PRISON STUDIES

In their call for a Southern Criminology, Carrington *et al.* (2016: 2) begin by writing that ‘the North/South divide refers to the divide between the metropolitan states of Western Europe and North America, on the one hand, and the countries of Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania, on the other’. Eastern Europe and the countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union are excluded from the North and the South in this definition. This is perfectly understandable given that Southern Criminology builds on the insights of Southern Theory which originally placed the South in Africa, Latin America, India and Iran (Connell 2007; 2014; 2015; Migolo 2011a; 2011b; Müller 2020). The elision of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, as defined in the introduction above, is evident in *The Palgrave Handbook of Criminology and the Global South* (Carrington *et al.* 2016), a collection which contains 50 chapters that ‘embark on a shift towards the South’. It is an important collection, yet none of the chapters is dedicated to countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe or to the global influences on South and North that emanated from such places throughout much of the twentieth century up to the present day.

This geographic and intellectual exclusion of the Eastern European and Eurasian region from the southernizing movement in criminology is perhaps most curious in the subfield of punishment and society given Russia’s and the Soviet Union’s significant place in the history of the prison and convict settler colonialism. As Melossi and Pavarini (1981) and Foucault (1979) have noted, prisons emerged alongside capitalism and became a key site of capitalist power through their provision of cheaper labor power, raw materials and low-cost land. Russia’s early penal development follows some of the ideational and material trends in the Western history of the prison (Piacentini 1995). Similarly, the Soviet Union founded itself on an ideology which required that European economic development be surpassed by imitating Europe and compressing ‘the centuries of history of European modernization ... into a few decades’ (Snyder 2014: 24). Unable to rely on overseas colonies to this end, the Soviet penal system became a tool of internal colonization of Soviet territories, subjugating the peasantry (Viola 2014). Internal colonization is defined as ‘the use of the practices of colonial administration and knowledge within the state’s political boundaries’ (Etkind 2013: 12). The Soviet penal system that subsequently developed as a mechanism of this internal colonization was distinct in size, scale and brutality from other convict settler colonization projects. The Gulag was an enormous penal-political turbine operating as a cog in the machinery of nation-building and industrial growth framed in an internationalist and globally aspirational political ideology.

Recent scholarship on this topic reveals the comparative scale of Russian and particularly Soviet penal practices of convict settlement. Table 1 shows estimates collated by historians (Anderson 2018: 2) on the numbers of convict settlers exploited for labor in different global empires (see Morrison 2019 for queries about how these figures were reached).

There is some scholarly consensus that approximately 18 million prisoners and 6 million special settlers (deported communities and class enemies) passed through the Gulag between 1928 and 1953 (Applebaum 2004). On these figures, the Soviet Union surpassed the combined total of convicts transported and exploited for labor by major European empires over four centuries in 25 years. Moreover, the number of those convicts who were political prisoners in the Gulag suggests ‘repression on a scale perhaps never known in human history’ (Neier 1995: 362). While European polities had moved away from the use of convict transportation by the twentieth century, in Russia and the Soviet Union ‘the selection of remote places as sites of punishment and exclusion endured’ (Badcock and Pallot 2018: 945). Even after the large-scale reduction of the Gulag in the post-Stalin era (1953 onwards), the Soviet Union held more prisoners than anywhere else in the world per capita for most of the later twentieth century (Hardy 2016). By the early 1980s, the Soviet prison rate was again increasing. It reached three times that of the United States in 1984, the year before Gorbachev came to power.

Table 1. Table to show estimates of numbers of convicts used in colonial projects of forced labour and settlement across empires.

Empire/polity	Dates	Convict numbers
Portuguese Empire	1415–1961	100,000
French Empire	1542–1976	700,000
Spanish Empire	1550–1950	110,000
Dutch Empire	1595–1942	202,000
British Empire	1615–1940	376,000
China	1644–1912	134,000
European Penal Labor	1750–1950	5,000,000
Russian Empire	1590–1917	1,900,000
Soviet Union	1928–1953	10,000,000–25,000,000

Source: adapted from [Anderson \(2018: 2\)](#).

These are orders of magnitude such that some scholars have argued that the Gulag marks a break with the other empires' configuring of the relationship between punishment, economy and society ([Kotkin 1995](#)). Consequently, while Tsarist Russia's penal practices were apparently too much of a facsimile of those in the West to be of particular interest to historians of the Western prison, the Soviet Union's prisons and colonies diverged too far from the central concern of those historians: the relationship between capitalist exploitation, discipline and punishment. Thus, Foucault, for example, struggled to make sense of the Gulag in part because his theories were applied through an 'underhistoricized dichotomy' of the Orient and the West that could not incorporate liminal cases such as the Soviet Union ([Plamper 2002: 256](#)). The Stalinist Gulag is more commonly compared with the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. Despite some similarities, [Viola \(2014\)](#) maintains that a key distinction between these cases remains the use of the Gulag as a direct means of the territorial expansion and colonization of the Soviet interior. Moreover, [Barnes \(2011\)](#) argues that, in contrast to Nazi Germany, most prisoners in the Soviet Union had passed through some form of legal process that proclaimed, however ridiculously, the resocialisation of the offender as its goal.

If Western histories of the prison tend to neglect the Russian and Soviet cases of penal development, global histories of the prison overlook the Russian and Soviet cases of convict colonization, focusing mainly on Western imperial influences on the use of prison in Asia, Latin America and Africa ([Gibson 2011](#); [Dikötter 2018](#)). In such histories, Asia mainly refers to the Indian subcontinent, China and South-East Asia. Russian and Soviet Asia is missing. Yet, as [Snyder \(2014: 28\)](#) writes: 'Stalinist modernization followed a European model and was applied chiefly in Asia, in the simple sense that most of the USSR was Asian.' While the Soviet Union and Russia is included in [Anderson's \(2018\)](#) global study of convict settler colonialism, [Badcock and Pallot's](#) chapter focuses mainly on Russia's history of prison and exile. Aside from Russia, Qazaqstan hosted the greatest number of convict settlers and some of the biggest and most enduring camp complexes of the Gulag ([Bastemiev 2009](#)).

One such camp was Karlag near Karaganda, in central Qazaqstan, a penal complex that existed from 1931 to 1959. Karlag was spread over a steppe territory roughly half the size of Belgium and held upwards of 60,000 prisoners by 1950 as well as thousands of special settlers. Of all Gulag camp complexes, Karlag was one of the longest lasting and had one of the biggest prisoner populations ([Barnes 2011](#)). Prior to the establishment of Karlag, these regions of

Central and Northern Qazaqstan had been populated largely, but not exclusively, by nomadic herdsmen. Around the time of the establishment of Karlag, the Soviet Union collectivized agricultural production. This policy all but destroyed the nomadic way of life in the Central Asian steppe and produced a famine that many nomads fled from into Xinjiang in China. Of those that stayed two million people, almost half the Kazakh population at the time, perished (Cameron 2018). Karlag was then part of a long process of the colonization of the Kazakh steppe that began during the Russian Empire. By the 1930s, the process was cloaked in the rhetoric of communist ideals and the elimination of class enemies, but nonetheless produced mass incarceration and deadly famine.

Up until the Russian conquest of Central Asia, imprisonment had played almost no role in the history of the peoples of the Kazakh steppe. A historian of prisons in Qazaqstan writes that historically ‘corporeal punishment, incarceration or the death penalty as a rule were not used [by Kazakh nomads], in general fines would be applied ... On the territory of Kazakhstan, prisons began to be built during the era of Tsarist Russian colonialism’ (Bastemiev 2009: 35–36). A prison was built in Semey (Semipalatinsk) in 1773 and Oral (Uralsk) in 1858. Such towns and their prisons had started out as fortified strongholds, growing with Russian military expansion into Central Asia along the rivers that today mark the border between Russia and Qazaqstan. From these beginnings through the Soviet project of mass incarceration and convict settlement, Qazaqstan emerged as an independent nation in 1991 with the third-highest prison rate in the world (Slade et al. 2023). Yet, the practice of incarceration on Kazakh lands had been a relatively recent, imported, and colonial enterprise. The history of the prison and convict settlement in Qazaqstan deserves separate treatment to that of Siberia and Russia. Given the destruction of the nomadic, rather than peasant way of life, Qazaqstan’s place in the global history of the prison stands comparison with that of Australia.

If Russian and Soviet carceral colonialism in Qazaqstan, today the ninth biggest country by territory in the world, is largely missing from global histories of the prison, then Russia’s and the Soviet Union’s penal influence outside their immediate colonies is also overlooked. This omission is curious given that communist states globalized their role in the penal development of the Global South as Western influences waned and decolonization occurred in the later twentieth century. One article on the global history of the prison, for example, notes that ‘decolonization led not to [prison] abolition [in the Global South] but to the appropriation and sometimes exaggeration of the most repressive features of the Western model of disciplinary institutions’ (Gibson 2011: 1061–2). Gibson provides the example of communist Vietnam as support for this claim. By ascribing forms of penalty in Vietnam to excessive versions of Western models, any reference to the influence of the Soviet Union—a punitive colossus in global terms at the time—on Vietnam is excluded. However, under French rule, Vietnamese political prisoners on Con Dao island ‘covered [prison] walls with “portraits of Lenin and Stalin and maps of the Soviet Union”’ (Demariaux 1956: 95 quoted in Zinoman 2001: 263). As the country gained independence, penal reform was influenced by years of prior interaction between Vietnamese communists and the Soviet Union (Pike 1986). So too in China: during the 1950s, Soviet advisors provided guidance on the relationship between labor and correction in a collectivist camp system (Dikötter 2018). Soviet influences can be similarly identified in the processes of penal development from North Korea (Hawk 2012) to Cuba (Neier 1988) and Nicaragua (Weegels 2018; 2022). Communist revolutionaries had spent significant time in colonial prisons in such countries. They subsequently came to power open to ideas about penal reform that, on the face of it, stood in opposition to the colonial prison regimes they had experienced.

Soviet influences on penal development outside the Soviet Union involved advocacy of collectivist philosophies of punishment. These philosophies reimaged the relationship

between penal labor and re-education, informed by the work of the pedagogue Anton Makarenko. In the 1920s, Makarenko established colonies in the Soviet Union for orphans and juvenile delinquents, self-consciously developing a collectivist philosophy of education in these institutions that contrasted with individualist theories current at the time in the West. Makarenko aimed at re-education through collective living and working. He believed that correctional colonies should be self-governing. Such self-governance included courts and councils where disciplinary procedures were handled by the residents, whether orphans, juvenile delinquents or adult prisoners (Bowen 1962). Self-governing collectives (the *kollektiv*) were a building block of Soviet society not just in juvenile and correctional colonies but at factories and collective farms throughout the country. Kharkhordin (1999: 110) writes that these productive and residential collectives were founded on a system of mutual surveillance that was ‘the bedrock of Soviet power’.

This bedrock was the foundation for carceral collectivism in the prison system. This form of penal order was constituted by three elements: collective working and living arrangements, the dispersal of the responsibility for social organization and order onto prisoners, and mutual monitoring—a polyopticon—of all watching all (Piacentini and Slade 2015; Symkovych 2022). Prisoners worked and lived in brigades founded on principles of collective responsibility. An all pervasive system of informants provided information to formal authorities. These forms of collectivism, based on Makarenko’s theories, solidified as the Soviet Union matured past the Stalinist era and the prison system was reoriented towards correction over the extraction of resources in the interior. Subsequently, there was a ‘massive expansion’ of formalized prisoner self-governance: formal procedures for the election of prisoner representatives who ran comrades’ courts, activist councils and sanitary and disciplinary ‘sectors’ in the Soviet penal system in the late 1950s and 1960s (Hardy 2016: 82). An informal system of prisoner self-governance operated in constant competition with the formal one, eventually producing a negotiated form of penal order with prison guards (Vincent 2020).

Makarenko’s theories became orthodox in the Soviet Union, particularly after 1937. Yet, they also took on global significance. The renowned American educationalist John Dewey visited Makarenko at one of his juvenile colonies outside Leningrad in 1928. Dewey wrote glowingly about what he saw and helped make a film based on Makarenko’s magnum opus *The Road to Life*. In part through his engagement with Dewey and other Western educationalists, Makarenko’s work was directly recognized in the West: a department in his name was established at the University of Marburg, West Germany in 1968 (Gehring et al. 2005). In Canada, educational policies in the 1960s were informed by Makarenko’s theories (Cole 2013). Moreover, Makarenko’s ideas indirectly found a global audience through the Soviet government’s promotion of collectivist correctional theories within the framework of a socialist human rights agenda (Betts 2022).

Despite producing and applying some of the most important theories on the role of prisoners in the production of penal order, and instituting these ideas in the biggest system of punishment in world history, the globalized influences of the Soviet Union and other communist states is largely missing from the growing literature on the subject of governance in prison and the role that prisoners themselves play in producing this governance both historically and presently (Skarbek 2014; 2020; Sozzo 2022). In a much-cited article, Birkbeck (2011) compares the ‘assiduous’ prison regimes of the Global North with the ‘perfunctory’ governance of prisons in the Global South. The prisons of countries such as the United States have been reformed towards an assiduous control model which emphasizes administrative power over prisoners (DiIulio 1990; Birkbeck 2011). Penal governance in the countries of the Global South, by contrast, relies on forms of prisoner self-organization and co-governance with formal prison administrations. Prisoners in the Global South in this way are ‘warehoused’, with the prison regime representing a disinterested non-opticon (Alford 2000).

Birkbeck does not consider a third option which belongs to neither North nor South but, we argue, to a third category: the Global East. Carceral collectivism in the Global East does not involve a 'Northern' panopticon whose gaze atomized and disciplined prisoners, nor a 'Southern' non-opticon where the penal institution was uninterested in life inside the prison. Instead, the polyopticon of mutual and intrusive surveillance was instantiated in collectivist architectural forms which shaped the rhythms of life in prisoner residential and work units and informant networks (Piacentini and Slade 2015). In recent literature on prisoner self-governance and co-governance, collective living is theorized as one of the preconditions for such forms of governance to emerge, yet when discussed in Northern and Southern contexts it is often treated as an unintended consequence of prison overcrowding (Butler et al. 2018; Skarbek 2020; Sozzo 2022). Overcrowding notwithstanding, Global East penal philosophies insisted on collectivism as an intentional, immersive basis for order as well as for achieving the rehabilitative and productive goals of imprisonment.

A recent edited collection (Sozzo 2022), brings together case studies of inmate governance from across South and Central America. The collection argues convincingly for the continued utility of some 'Northern' theoretical concepts while finding a use for 'Southern' notions such as penal co-governance. The collection also considers South to North and South to South knowledge transfer in this field. Transfers from and to the Global East are not considered. Consequently, the comparative distinctiveness of a case such as Nicaragua remains hidden, a jurisdiction influenced in part by Eastern European and Cuban revolutionary thinking about penal order and prisoner re-education (Weegels 2018).

Recent global comparative analyses of prison order around the world also neglect to consider the prisons of Eastern Europe or the countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union (Skarbek 2014; 2020). This is explained by the apparent exceptionality of the Gulag as an 'oppressive governance regime' that does not fit easily into any typology. 'Like many Latin American prisons ... gulags were places of desperate poverty. However, unlike Latin American prisons, captives there were not free to respond to their extreme deprivation' (Skarbek 2020: 155–156). To the contrary, oppression in the Gulag was produced and managed through formal prisoner co-governance, the inefficiencies of which gave rise to complex and well-developed forms of informal prisoner self-governance, in parallel. This model and its inefficiencies were promoted in other jurisdictions, including in some parts of Latin America.

The eclipse of Eastern Europe and Eurasia in prison studies is curious: the Soviet Union, not the United States, was the world's biggest incarcerator over the course of most of the twentieth century. The use of convict labor for colonization during the Gulag occurred on a scale not seen in the imperial projects of other European empires, yet global histories of the prison tend to focus on imperialisms emanating from northwestern and southwestern Europe. Soviet prisons, colonies and camps were managed through a distinct penal philosophy of carceral collectivism and prisoner self-governance. Prisons throughout the countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and beyond still display the legacies of the practical application of Makarenko's theories (Piacentini and Slade 2015; Symkovich 2022). Yet, the comparative insights that the history and sociology of prisons of this region provide have been elided. Moreover, any global influence, which we will claim would be best captured by the concept of the Global East, has been largely passed over. But why? In the next section, we try to provide an explanation.

THE RISE, GLOBALIZATION AND DISAPPEARANCE OF CRIMINOLOGY'S EAST

The previous section argued that the Global East has been neglected in punishment and society studies in terms of Western and global histories of penal development, including in recent global and comparative work on forms of penal order and prisoner-led governance. The re-emergence

of Southern Criminology has seemingly only reinforced this omission. But what explains the oversight? In this section, we identify both internal and external constraints on the development of an Eastern criminology, focusing on a crisis of the discipline in the metropole, Russia. Criminology in Russia went into a funding crunch after 1991, dependent on an attachment to law enforcement institutions, isolated linguistically from English, Spanish and French audiences in the Global North and South, and dissuaded from international collaboration politically. Moreover, Russia represents both a peripheral and an imperial position in the geopolitics of knowledge production; it does not fit into easy categories when thinking the global in terms of North/South binaries. Its awkward position means it is easily overlooked, and with it its colonies and former colonies.

Despite its current eclipse, there has been a long history of East European, Eurasian and Soviet engagement with, and contribution to, the development of criminology. The establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922 brought about a 'golden age' in Soviet criminology that lasted until 1929 (Gurinskaya 2017). Soviet criminological output at this time was empirically driven and sophisticated, matching anything produced contemporaneously in the West (Shelley 1979; Solomon 1980). With the rise of Stalin, criminologists were persecuted. Marxist thought held that crime would disappear once capitalist exploitation was overcome in a communist society. Thus, criminology was, for Stalinists, a bourgeois science whose study was redundant (Solomon 1974). From the mid-1950s to 1991, Soviet criminology re-emerged. As crime rates and social disorder increased in Soviet urban centres in the post-war period, police investigators and prosecutors were required to study and understand the causes of crime (Dobson 2009; LaPierre 2012). To this end, new criminology courses were created that employed Marxist theory to explain crime as emerging out of material and economic contradictions that remained in the Soviet Union as the last vestiges of capitalism. To teach these courses, new institutes such as the All-Union Institute of Criminology in Moscow were established in the 1960s. These institutes were linked to law enforcement agencies so that they could provide support to crime control policies (Gurinskaya 2017).

Despite re-emerging as a response to social disorganization at home, Soviet criminology also went global in the post-war period, influencing the newly formed Eastern bloc of countries where the Soviet Union had installed and propped up socialist governments after 1945 (Gurinskaya 2017: 48). The communist regimes that came to power in these states in the post-Second World War period styled themselves as victors over attempted colonization by Nazi Germany and prior extinct empires—Hapsburg, Ottoman, German and Russian—that had collapsed after the First World War. Given this history, communist Eastern Europe believed it had something to teach the Global South and North during a time when large parts of Africa and Asia were throwing off their Western subjugators (Mark and Betts 2022). In the South, just as much as in the North, Eastern European states' rhetoric and promotion of decolonization was often viewed with suspicion, merely a vehicle to spread communism (Mark and Betts 2022). Colonialism, including in its Marxist manifestations, was condemned at the 1955 Bandung conference of 29 Asian and African states. The Soviet Union and Eastern bloc states nevertheless vigorously competed with each other, as well as with the West, in signing military assistance deals and trade agreements as well as investments in technology, education, health, housing and cultural development projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Migolo 2011b).

Communist understandings of crime and its control as well as the empirical methods of Soviet socio-legal studies and criminology travelled alongside such projects. Moscow's All-Union Institute of Criminology had a unit dedicated to cooperation with similar institutes abroad and produced a journal that included studies from foreign scholars (Dowling 2013). Soviet criminologists critiqued their Western counterparts as a way of surreptitiously pointing to identical problems at home. Thus, a professional 'transnational identity' emerged through

‘not only reading the work of their bourgeois counterparts and commenting on common problems but also conducting collaborative research projects and participating in international conferences’ (Dowling 2013: 19). In these international exchanges, the Soviets and Eastern Europeans fully embraced the concept of human rights (albeit social and economic rights, not political or civil rights). From the 1950s to the 1980s, human rights became a ‘language of convergence for Eastern European and African representatives at the UN ... by the end of the 1960s, legal theorists in Eastern Europe had rewritten the history of human rights to portray revolutionary socialism as its mainspring’ (Betts 2022: 449–457).

In part due to the overreach of maintaining this global influence, between 1989 and 1991 the Eastern bloc dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed. Subsequently, the influence of Eastern criminology went into steep decline: ‘crime flourished, but criminology did not’ (Gurinskaya 2017: 58). According to the President of the Russian Criminological Association ‘criminology is again being consigned to oblivion as an independent science and a teaching discipline’ (quoted in Gurinskaya 2017: 59). Criminological research from the former Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe became detached both from scholarship in the Global North and from any influence it may once have had in the Global South.

The process of withdrawal from networks of global knowledge production was to some degree internally induced (Cheskin and Jasina-Schaefer 2022). Research budgets were cut with the economic shocks of the 1990s. Due to the Soviet-legacy, criminologists in countries such as Russia, Belarus or Qazaqstan continued to work in academic institutions that remained tied to law enforcement academies and the ministries of interior and defence. Today, scholars are still incentivised to produce criminological output that is perceived to be of benefit to these institutions. Therefore, a lot of published criminological research is desk-based legal and procedural analysis. Given increasing authoritarianism in Russia, there has been an inexorable rise in political control over academics. This control has increased the likelihood of politicized research. Foreign Agent laws in Russia have been used against those claiming any funding from abroad, making international collaboration fraught with risk. These processes have significantly intensified since the war on Ukraine began (Zavadskaya and Gerber 2023). In isolation, Russian social science has been criticized for a lack of empirical grounding, ignorance of international developments and an introspective focus on Russia’s exceptionalism (Makarychev and Morozov 2013; Gel’man 2015; Cheskin and Jašina-Schäfer 2022). Thus, scholars working in Russia have strong institutional incentives to retreat from globalizing trends in criminology.

Moreover, scholars using Russian as a lingua franca face linguistic isolation within ‘architectures of knowledge in a mostly Anglophone world’ (Tlostanova 2015; Müller 2020: 742). Remaining outside British, French and Spanish colonialism has led to exclusion for those educated in Russian-speaking areas (Müller 2020: 742). The rare use of the Russian language outside countries colonised by Russia reveals that though Russia remains an imperial power, it is a subaltern or peripheral one (Tlostanova 2011; 2015; 2018; Morozov 2015). In Morozov’s (2015) terms Russia’s subaltern empire status means that it cannot easily exert its will within the international global capitalist order, but its subjects are also silenced and spoken for by the authoritarian Russian state. Russia, as a subaltern empire, cannot be considered a part of the Global North ‘no matter how hard it attempts to imitate or adapt to western epistemological hegemony’ nor can it be ‘included into the project of theorising from the South that pushes for decolonial knowledge’ (Cheskin and Jašina-Schäfer 2022: 1046). Russia, and many of the states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, are too rich to be in the South, too poor to be in the North; these states are too powerful to occupy a periphery but also too weak to be a centre. The region makes up an ‘internal periphery’ within the core, not distant enough to develop alternative yardsticks of evaluation (Zarycki 2014: 5). The Russian state is the most obvious example of a coloniser and aggressor in the region, yet it is also subject to colonising influences from the Global North

(Cavanagh 2004). In penal policy, this was, up until Russia's 2022 renewed invasion of Ukraine, manifested in Council of Europe membership where Russia had become a norm-taker rather than the norm-maker the Soviet Union had aspired to be.

The epistemological elision in criminology of Russia extends to and is amplified for those countries and regions who were and are subject to Russian colonialization. The elision is in part due to intellectual and political contestation over whether the Soviet Union was indeed an empire. The global liberation movements of the mid-twentieth century, spurred and supported by the Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe mean that 'it still remains difficult, evidently, for three-worlds-raised postcolonial theorists to recognise within the Second World its [colonial and] postcolonial dynamic' (Chioni Moore 2001: 117). The barriers that exist for researchers from Russia in accessing networks of global knowledge production and transfer are thus even higher for those from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and ethnic regions within Russia.

In short, Russian and Soviet colonialism has produced a world region today that has been misrecognized as either a rich South or a poor North (Tlostanova 2011). Due to the globally peripheral nature of Russian and Soviet imperialism and Soviet imperialism's apparent emancipatory and anti-colonial mission, this region is largely unrecognized by southern criminology and more widely within the criminological discipline. To address these oversights, the next section argues for disrupting the North/South binary and adopting the concept of the Global East.

ADVOCATING FOR THE GLOBAL EAST

In advocating for the use of the term Global East in criminology, the aim of this section is not to balkanize the discipline further into geographic blocs. Indeed, we do not argue for the Global East as a defined geographic region, just as the Global North and South are also not regions but geopolitical relations within and across countries and regions (see Trajber Waisbach *et al.* 2021). We do not wish to add to regional criminologies that already exist such as Asian criminology (Liu 2009). We argue more broadly here for utilizing the concept of a Global East for two reasons that have been articulated in other disciplinary debates (Spivak 1988, 2007; Waley 2016; Müller 2020). Firstly, the concept can help us to better think through what we mean by 'the global' in criminology, beyond the binary of North/South, embracing interstitial identities that are neither of the North or the South. Secondly, the concept can be employed as a tool of 'strategic essentialism' (Spivak 1988) that recognizes and holds space for the voices of those peoples who have been subjugated less by Western empires, or the spread of Northern neo-liberal market hegemony, and more by those regimes and their successors that stood in opposition to the West, espoused emancipatory ideologies, while dispossessing, executing and incarcerating millions of people globally in the name of those ideologies. The Global East suggests an intersectionality across the categories of North and South, raising questions on the lines drawn and the assumptions made, within and about this binary.

If the Global East is not a region, then how can we identify it? Müller (2020) argues that the Global East is interstitial. It is within and between the North and the South, just as the North and the South are in the East. Simply put, the Global East is a shorthand for power relationships that are not easily categorized into binaries of dominated and subjugated, aggressor and victim, colonizer and colonized. If the Global East is a 'polysemic, malleable term', and therein lies its use-value (Müller 2020: 743), so the Global East constitutes both North and South as well as being constituted by them. The term, therefore, enables us to deconstruct 'the dominant dualism of global North and global South' (Waley 2016: 620).

In punishment and society studies, the Global East concept enables a more thorough understanding of the development of 'southern' penal policy and prison order in Nicaragua, China,

Cuba and Vietnam, among others, as well as informing recent ‘northern’ discussions about collectivism and campus-style prisons in jurisdictions such as the Netherlands. The Global East is present in the crimes of Stalinism and Maoism. Yet it is also present within the perceived threats of communist revolution in response to which right-wing repression came to be justified in, for example, ‘southern’ Chile and ‘northern’ Greece. Eastern European migrants may be argued to belong to the Global East—they are at once subject to restrictive mobility regimes in ‘northern’ countries while at the same time being discursively stigmatized as belonging to mobile organized crime groups whether Albanian, Russian or Romanian. The Global East was present in the US elections of 2016, disrupted by assorted delinquents in Eastern Europe from those running Russian bot-farms to North Macedonian tech-savvy teenagers (Harris 2017). The public–private Wagner mercenary group represented the Global East through its presence in the Central African Republic, Mali, Syria and Ukraine. Central Asia’s communist officials turned-billionaire politicians buy the complicity of Global North corporations, governments and banking structures to clean their dirty assets stolen from countries of the Global South; they too occupy the interstitial realm of the Global East. Georgia’s anti-corruption policy-makers promote their Soviet-legacy-busting bureaucratic reforms from the UK in the North to Guatemala in the South. They also belong to the Global East.

Southern criminology itself might, finally, be thought of as part of the Global East. On one definition, doing southern criminology means to produce a ‘rupture with the static view of the international order, [southern criminology] moves away from the nation-state and stress[es] the contradictions in wealth, living standards and patterns of oppression across national boundaries’ (Fonseca 2018: 709). The Global East haunts this definition; it is remarkably similar to the Marxist worldview which Soviet and Eastern European criminologists proselytized. The echo is not surprising: as Chioni Moore (2001) argued, this worldview has influenced many of the proponents of the southernizing movement, yet that influence did not spread on its own. The existence of a semi-peripheral Second World, largely made up of decolonizing states but including an imperial power, the Soviet Union, helped to produce understandings of the Third World—the South—exactly in the terms used in Fonseca’s (2018) definition. The Second World then helped to produce the very way of thinking of the global as a relationship beyond nation states between global colonizers and colonized.

This last point leads to the second rationale for the adoption of the concept of the Global East: the need to overcome criminology’s strange oversight of the people oppressed by states which espoused emancipatory ideals, often in Marxist terms. We focus once again on the Soviet Union to make the argument, though the argument is not intended to apply only to people from the geographic location of Eastern Europe and the countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union. We follow Müller’s (2020) and Spivak’s (1988; 2007) call for a strategic essentialism that would recognize similar patterns and experiences of oppression and argue for giving voice to places and people who had otherwise been silenced or overlooked. Müller (2020: 744) defines strategic essentialism as ‘a political practice to mobilise heterogeneous marginalised groups to band together under a common banner for an emancipatory project’. Russia’s war on Ukraine has strengthened incentives for such banding together among many groups, most obviously Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Georgians and Ukrainians but a decolonizing moment is also apparent in Qazaqstan and across Central Asia. Data on Russian military mobilization shows how the war is disproportionately affecting those in ethnic minority areas within Russia. Fighting age males living in Buryatia in Siberia, including ethnic Russians that reside there, are 100 times more likely to die in Ukraine than men from Moscow (Bessudnov 2022). Protests against mobilization have been the largest and loudest in the ethnic republics of Russia’s North Caucasus, particularly in Dagestan. Academically, the imperial gaze in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, has manifested itself through the primacy of the study

of Russian language and Russian politics in Area Studies and Political Science departments in the Global North. That primacy is being acknowledged and critically reassessed in light of the war on Ukraine.

In advocating for a Global East, we advocate for the inclusion of Russia's ethnic regions, Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia among others within the southernizing movement taking place in criminology. Such an inclusion would help to meet certain criticisms recently levelled at southern criminology scholarship, most basically that it has produced regional omissions and absented indigenous voices (Goyes *et al.* 2021). These critics further assert that southern criminology has neglected the question of whether de-colonisation of the discipline is even possible given how Western criminology was formed out of deep connections to Western coercion and colonialism. These connections produced a political economy of knowledge where theories and methods were developed and taken 'elsewhere'; the peripheries were mined for data by the metropole for theory-testing but otherwise ignored as sites of epistemological advancement. These processes produced 'asymmetries in knowledge' emerging from 'conquest, the world of colonialism and the world of neoliberal globalization in which new kinds of colonialism have appeared' (Connell and Dados 2014: 212). We have shown in this paper how southern criminology has overlooked these patterns and resulting asymmetries where it concerns the Global East in the punishment and society field—the colonialism and post-colonialism of the socialist and post-socialist world. Finally, and of particular relevance, is the criticism that the Global North and Global South divide is applied inconsistently and is contested to such a degree that seeing through this dualistic lens has diminished complex, diverse and multi-disciplinary inquiry (Goyes *et al.* 2021).

Given these critiques, we argue for the integration of the Global East within southernizing movements, not in opposition to these movements but as a complement to them. Concretely, this would include advocating for, funding and developing research in criminology, and adjacent fields such as socio-legal studies, zemiology and penology, in places that manifest Global East influences from Chechnya and Komi Republic in Russia to Ukraine and Moldova in Europe, Qazaqstan, Karakalpakstan and Tajikistan in Central Asia, and further afield from Cuba to Angola to Laos. Such a move would provide a more nuanced understanding of the history of colonialism around the world beyond a simple binary of a dominant mainly European North and subjugated mainly Asian, Latin American and African South. Moreover, it would provide a more prominent place to those countries, peoples, societies and organizations that engaged in resistance to Northern colonialism and capitalism through attempts to build communism. At the same time, it would also provide greater recognition to the victims of forms of imperialism, such as the Soviet and Chinese forms, which colonized, imprisoned and killed in the name of those emancipatory communist ideals. Finally, it would more accurately recognize the global power relations that held sway in the twentieth century that helped to produce the categories of Global South and North in the first place.

CONCLUSION

Russia's bloody, catastrophic attempt to re-colonise Ukraine, in part through the mobilization of its prison population, should provide a moment of reflection for criminologists interested in globalizing and southernizing the discipline. At such a moment, this paper trained attention on the countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and by Russia to argue that the North/South dualism in criminology has produced an ill-fitting binary that results in geographic oversights and conceptual confusion. To understand this and rectify it we have advocated for the concept of the Global East. The Global East does not represent a geographic region but refers to power relations that do not fit easily into North or South. It encompasses social and political

relations across time and space that produced agitation for, and the practical application of, global emancipatory and often communist ideologies. These ideologies historically influenced the global development of how we think about crime causation, social control and corrections. Moreover, they continue to exert influence: the Global East is a spectre that continues to haunt both the Global North and Global South.

We have tried to demonstrate this argument concretely by examining the omission of the Global East in our own field of punishment and society studies. We have argued that a repositioning and re-examination of the global influence of Russian and Soviet convict settler colonialism is required. The Soviet Gulag, as the largest system of mass imprisonment in world history that spread across almost one-third of the world's land mass, was extreme in its extent but it was not an exception from other global forms of convict colonization. Despite its overt focus on class, the Gulag's ethnically and racially discriminatory impacts require further comparative study and theorizing (see [Curro et al. 2022](#)), as do the forms of order and governance that emerged in this system.

The argument presented emerged in part from our own engagement with academia in Eastern Europe and Eurasia which has at times manifested elements of subaltern imperialism. Our colleagues from this region, including from the Russian metropole, are often dependent on partners in the Global North for funding and for publications in English-language journals. Those connections to the West can today, with the intensified crackdown on dissent in Russia, threaten the jobs and careers of academics there. Yet, beyond Russia, our ability to work in jurisdictions from Qazaqstan to Georgia and Moldova has been enabled through Russian as a lingua franca. Academic networks in these jurisdictions often flowed through Russia, though this is becoming less and less the case today. At the same time, we have noticed how the southern criminological accounts of penal dynamics in Latin America, Africa and Asia overlapped with what we observed in our research. These similarities are, of course, not coincidences. The Global East concept enables us to think through the global relations that produced these parallels. It helps us to consider the structural inequalities inherent in global knowledge production and our own position within them. Finally, the Global East concept, we hope, enables a more nuanced framework for thinking about those inequalities as well as a more inclusive framework for those voices for whom the North/South dualism is ill-fitting.

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