The role of Responsibilised Non-Policing Agencies (RNPAs) in improving cybercrime reporting in Scotland

Cambridge Cybercrime Centre: Sixth Annual Cybercrime Conference

22 June 2023

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Introduction

a) Initial aim: Research on victims of cybercrime.

b) Problems with victim recruitment.

c) Attempt to recruit victims via supporting organisations.

d) Heureka moment!

e) Happy accident was the solution to the problem.

f) Supporting organisations collect information on victims.

g) Researching supporting organisations tightly connected to “responsibilisation.”

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Responsibilisation in general

a) Shifting of responsibility from the state onto community and private agencies, mainly in areas of policing[1].

b) In the UK this is clearly observable in policing, but also the public health arena.

c) A responsibilised society will enlist and generate agencies which take on the responsibility of the Police[1].

1 Garland, D. (2002). *103Policy Predicament: Adaptation, Denial, and Acting Out*, in: Garland, D. (Ed.), The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford University Press, pp. 103-138.

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Responsibilisation in cybercrime

a) **Cybercrime responsibilisation** = state educates about cybercrime but does not intervene[2].

b) Comparing Italy vs. Scotland illustrates responsibilisation.

c) Scots state prefers to educate rather than intervene[2], but some intervention is present[3].

d) Italian state does not educate nor intervene but victims risk prosecution[4].

e) Italians vs. Scots are made to feel more responsible for their online safety.

f) Responsibilisation in Italy vs. Scotland is higher.

2 Renaud, K., Flowerday, S., Warkentin, M., Cockshott, P. and Orgeron, C. (2018). Is the responsibilization of the cyber security risk reasonable and judicious? *Computers & Security* 78, 198–211.
3 Sikra, J. (2023). *Improving cybercrime reporting in Scotland: the victims' perspective*. 103-104. Abstract from The Doctoral School Multidisciplinary Symposium DSMS 2023, Glasgow, United Kingdom.
4 Sikra, J. (2022). *SICSA Saltire Emerging Researcher Scheme – Visit at the University of Pisa.* Available at: https://www.sicsa.ac.uk/blog/sicsa-saltire-emerging-researcher-scheme-visit-at-the-university-of-pisa/

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Responsibilisation and community policing

a) Shift from "government to governance" as seen via **Dutch** security networks[5].

b) Collaboration and emergence of boundaries between organisations as seen in **Norway.**[6]

c) Fusion centres are a physical manifestation of knowledge generating networks in **Australia.**[7]

d) Cautionary note from **Canadian** "Situation Tables" where policing erodes partnership.[8]

e) In **South Korea** PPPs were supported by younger, crime-exposed and IT savvy officers.[9]

5 Terpstra, J. (2008). Research Article: Police, local government, and citizens as participants in local security networks. *Police Practice and Research 9*, 213–225.
6 Bjelland, H.F. and Vestby, A. (2017). "It's about using the full sanction catalogue": on boundary negotiations in a multi-agency organised crime investigation. *Policing & Society* 27, 655–670.
7 Bright, D. and Whelan, C. (2019). On the relationship between goals, membership and network design in multi-agency "fusion" centres. *Policing* 42, 441–454.
8 Sanders, C.B. and Langan, D. (2019). New public management and the extension of police control: community safety and security networks in Canada. *Policing & Societ*y 29, 566–578.
9 Paek, S.Y., Nalla, M.K. and Lee, J. (2020). Determinants of police officers' support for the public-private partnerships (PPPs) in policing cyberspace. *Policing* 43, 877–892

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RNPAs: What are they?

- RNPAs = Responsibilised Non-Policing Agencies.
- Classification of all organisations that unnaturally substitute the Police in the community.
- Commonly a mixture of charity-flavoured organisations and banks.
- Mostly funded directly by the state or competing in tenders for funding, exc. banks.

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RNPAs: What do they do?

- Keep cybervictimised citizens at arm's length from the state and police.
- Protect the state via a buffer zone which allows for semi-permeable communication.
- Pass on cybercrime intelligence in the form of reports and receive selective funding.


Organised crime and Cybercriminals
Private institutions and Individuals
OAP Charity ¹
Private institution
Bank
University
Regulator of commerce
Cyber charity
Consultation charity
Legal charity
Police
Imports intelligence and evidence
Exports responsibility
NCA
UK and Scottish government
Imports intelligence and evidence
Exports funding and responsibility
Cybercrime zone
Civil life zone
RNPAs zone
Government zone
Propagation of cybercrime from the perpetuation of the offence to reporting via RNPAs and conversion into state intelligence
¹ OAP Charity is the only RNPA who, at the time of the research, did not forward cybercrime reports to the Police or the NCA.

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The content of RNPAs cybercrime intelligence

1. Fluid trends in cybercrime that reflect real world changes.
2. Current cybercrime victim profiles, which may be non-stereotypical.
3. Cybercrime modus operandi affecting varied types of victims.
4. Examples of cases collected by RNPAs: Glasgow Cyber-Gang, Energy Efficiency Cyber-Enabled Fraud, Chinese Government Impersonation Cybercrimes, etc.

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RNPAs' expertise for improved cybercrime reporting

Improves reporting to the Police:

Non-technical: Nationwide advertisement campaign, Considerate approach towards victims, Opportunity to access training.

Technical: Centralised reporting system, Option to report online, Shared access for different stakeholders, Automated triaging of information, Transparent.

Impedes reporting to the Police:

Non-technical: Government scrapped funding, Lack of awareness of victims, Concerns over phoning 101, Police inadequately resourced.

Technical: Cybercrime mutations, Cost of new technology.

Weighing up the opportunity cost dilemma of Scottish RNPAs

Using RNPAs for policing:

a) RNPAs are experts by experience.
b) RNPAs can function within a "flexible practices approach".
c) RNPAs are cheaper.
d) "*Higher volume of lower quality work will get done.*"

Using specialised policing:

a) Victims favour specialised policing[3].
b) Specialists are embedded within a "best practices approach".
c) Specialists are more expensive.
d) "*Lower volume of higher quality work will get done*."

3 Sikra, J. (2023). *Improving cybercrime reporting in Scotland: the victims' perspective*. 103-104. Abstract from The Doctoral School Multidisciplinary Symposium DSMS 2023, Glasgow, United Kingdom.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisory team Dr D R Thomas, Prof K V Renaud and Dr B Collier for their valuable input throughout my PhD.

I also thank the University of Strathclyde, SICSA and SIPR for their support and funding.

Importantly, I thank Prof S Chessa and Dr F Casarosa from the University of Pisa for our collaboration into cybercrime reporting in Italy as well as the University of Cambridge for the opportunity to attend this prestigious event.