

The Educational Awareness of the Future¹

Introduction

English-speaking educationalists interested in Schleiermacher's educational ideas are faced with a problem: a lack of English translations.² Consequently, Schleiermacher's educational theories are not widely known by Anglo-American theorists of education,³ something that this translated lecture goes some way to remedy (perhaps delete). The following discussion centres on one particular element of the lecture, the relation to the future, by focusing on the section: 'Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?' (27-31). Firstly, I ask *What does it mean to be oriented to the future?*, distinguishing between any generally pedagogical influence that prepares for the future, and pedagogical influences designed specifically to raise awareness of the future. In section two, *Are we all interested in the future?*, I discuss the transition from immersion in the present to thinking about the future, and the extent to which this transition is part of growing up. Section three, *Becoming Concerned*, considers how this transition is practically achieved and ethically justified by discussing some practical illustrations in the form of vignettes. The fourth section then relates the foregoing discussions to more contemporary practices that encourage us to *Be in the now*, practices that are justified by criticisms of the tendency to habitually focus on the future. The overall discussion is framed by Schleiermacher's ethical concern: whether sacrificing the present for the future in the life of the child is justified. I argue that, in Schleiermacher's view, the question presupposes a false opposition of present and future and that, in the end, no sacrifice is necessary.

¹ I am grateful to Norm Friesen and Karsten Kenklies for reading and commenting on versions of this chapter.

² There is currently no English translation of Schleiermacher's educational works collected in the following 2 volume text: *Friedrich Schleiermacher: Texte zur Pädagogik. Kommentierte Studienausgabe*, 2 vols., Michael Winkler and Jens Brachmann (eds.), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000.

³ The sole reference to Schleiermacher's educational theory in the otherwise authoritative *Cambridge Companion to Schleiermacher* reads: "[i]n Germany Schleiermacher is renowned for his lectures on education, for they inspired major progressive moves in that arena" (Mariña 2005, 315). Elsewhere, work on Schleiermacher in the English-speaking world is said to be "confined... to a kind of theological ghetto of seminaries and divinity schools" (Vial 2013, 1). Notable exceptions to this lacuna include Kenklies (2012) and Friesen (2020). This situation reflects a cleavage between the Anglo-American traditions of educational theory, and the systematic pedagogy of the Continent, a fuller discussion of which is beyond the scope of the present chapter (see Friesen 2020).

What does it mean to be oriented to the future?

‘Please get on with your homework!’ calls the mother to her twelve-year-old. The child is absorbed in playing a computer game and ignores the mother’s call. What should the mother say or do next? Should she offer some incentive (‘I will raise your pocket money if you complete all your work this week’), appeal to the child’s sympathy (‘it worries me that you will fall behind’), encourage the child to think about a further future (‘if you don’t do your maths you will regret it later because you won’t be able to get into college’), switch off the computer, or maintain a dignified silence? Every parent or educator faces this kind of question all the time, and though the answers and their rationalisations may vary, the questions endure. They are questions very much of our time, as well as being questions at the forefront of Schleiermacher’s concerns in this lecture. Almost all responses of the mother share one feature: they attempt to remove the child from her/his absorption in the present moment. Schleiermacher’s reflections here begin with the disarmingly simple observation that every pedagogical influence entails an inhibition of the child’s desire: “every predominantly pedagogical moment would be an inhibiting one” (28). Pedagogical influence entails an external influence inhibiting what is otherwise inherent in the child, namely, immediate satisfaction in the present moment.

In this chapter I want to show that this observation, and the questions that follow, are distinctively educational. Such educational considerations do not, of course, belong only to Schleiermacher, and can be found in more recent educational theory.⁴ But the widespread concern for educational optimisation results in a tendency to overlook the significance of the notion of time, and particularly the future, for education. Neil Postman, for instance, argued that a concern for the future was increasingly absent in our educational thinking:

To Rousseau, education was essentially a subtraction process; to Locke an addition process. But whatever the differences between the two metaphors, they do have in common a concern for the future. Locke wanted education to result in a rich, varied and copious book; Rousseau wanted education to

⁴ There is a vast literature that considers various aspects of the temporal and future-oriented nature of education: e.g. time and emancipation in education (Alhadef-Jones 2017); futurism and the child (Greteman & Wojcikiewicz 2014); the phenomenology of time-consciousness (Hayman and Huebner 2019); Heidegger and educational temporality (Kakkori 2013); educational time and otiosity (Kenklies 2020); historical and comparative views of time and schooling (Rappleye and Komatsu 2016).

result in a healthy flower...a concern for the future is increasingly missing from the metaphors of childhood in the present day. Neither Locke nor Rousseau ever doubted that childhood could exist without the future-oriented guidance of adults (Postman 1994, 60).

The possible responses of the mother to the child who is reluctant to switch off the computer game and get on with homework share something with the educational views of Rousseau and Locke: they are future-oriented, whether or not the specification of that future is precise. Alongside the practical issues of how one might encourage future-orientation, we might consider this to be an issue of philosophical anthropology: does being future-oriented fulfil important criteria of being human? Is an awareness of the future something essential to achieving mature adulthood, or can human beings live quite well without this? Can activities that involve mere delight in the present be educational? What justifications ought to be given for bringing children out of delight in the present and into the future? It is this last question that is central to Schleiermacher: “Every pedagogical influence presents itself as the sacrifice of a present moment for a future one; and it raises the question whether or not we are justified in making this sacrifice” (28). It appears, at first, to be a matter of sacrifice because pedagogical influence begins without the explicit consent of the child.

Schleiermacher takes for granted that the child’s orientation to the future can be subject to educational influence. I will discuss two different ways of interpreting this idea. On the one hand, the concept of education depends upon a future-oriented intention: in its most general sense, education entails an intention to improve someone, an intention that imagines a future condition. This first notion is expressed by Kenklies (2020, 3) as follows: “[t]here is no education without ἔσχατον (eschaton: a final end) as education is what we intentionally do in order to arrive at a different, in some respect better state of being.” Teaching someone a skill is related to such an end inasmuch as the person being taught (i.e. the student) learns to be able to do something tomorrow that they could not do yesterday. In this sense, all education, like any form of intentional activity, is future-oriented. Thus, education is here called *preparation* (for the future). However, there is a more specific sense in which students can be oriented to the future by education: where educational influences seek to *raise awareness* of the future. In this second case the student is not just prepared for, but encouraged to think about possible futures, to become oriented toward the future. This idea that has recently been popularised through the notion of future-mindedness (Allen 2019; Seligman et. al. 2016). Here the educational content is less the knowledge, skill or disposition that prepares, than it is

the awareness of the future itself. The mother who encourages the child to get on with their homework might well discuss the consequences of various actions and decisions with the child, thereby encouraging the child to become aware of their own future.

We can elaborate these different notions of future-relatedness by considering who it is that imagines the future of the student: in the first case, the parent or teacher imagines some change to be good for the student, and so teaches them how to tie their shoelaces, for instance; in the second case, the students themselves think about their own future, and realise that being able to tie shoelaces will result in a better future. Whether or not the student would ‘spontaneously’ begin imagining possible futures, it seems that adults (e.g. parents and teachers) are often inclined to encourage this future awareness in children by presenting various possible consequences as inducements to act: ‘if you don’t put your shoes on, we can’t go to the park and we will be stuck in doors all day!’ As the above example of the mother and the child suggests, in practice these two ways of becoming future-oriented are often hard to distinguish shading almost imperceptibly into each other.

Schleiermacher claims that “it is truly the nature of the pedagogical influence to be oriented towards the future” (29). I interpret this being ‘oriented towards the future’ as the first form of *preparation*. Where the adult, the parent or educator (influencer) intends to prepare the child (influencee) for the future, they see certain influences as being beneficial to the influencee.⁵ This raises the important issue of justification: is the influencer right that such influence is beneficial, and, even if we agree that it is, on what basis is the influencer justified in determining this on behalf of the influencee. In other words, what happens if the influencee disagrees, or otherwise resists the influence? Before attempting to answer this question, it is worth noting something about the question itself: that justification for educational influence is of central importance for Schleiermacher.

Why is justification for educational influence considered to be so important? The pedagogical relation could be regarded as one in which the adult simply knows better than the child, especially a very young one, what is good for them. Such a view does not satisfy Schleiermacher. But for many English readers education is understood as something that does not require explicit justification because the concept of education is thought to refer only to

⁵ In this section I discuss the pedagogical relation in terms of a general relation between someone who attempts to influence (influencer) and someone who is on the receiving end of those attempts (influencee). However, in the context of Schleiermacher’s discussion of the preparation for the future, Schleiermacher explicitly refers to the adult and the child. Although influence is a term that Schleiermacher uses, the intergenerational dimension of influence here is elaborated in terms of the relation between the adult and the child. Despite Schleiermacher’s intergenerational focus, I wish to draw attention to a wider and more systematic consideration of the relation between one that influences and one being influenced that is not restricted to the adult-child relation.

influences that are good, as R. S. Peters (1966, 25) put it, “[i]t would be a logical contradiction to say that a man [sic] had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better.” Peters represents an Anglo-American tradition of educational theory which often interprets the concept of education normatively, a context in which education requires no ethical justification. This is in contrast to the concept of influence, where no such normative sense is implied. Influence can be good or bad and so deliberate influence is generally in need of justification.⁶ We might accept some concepts of bad education, but on the whole, we reserve other terms for this: from excessively paternalistic forms of influence (instilling and inculcating) to outright imposition (indoctrinating and brainwashing). To the ears of English speakers, the concepts of brainwashing or indoctrination describe forms of intrinsically unjustified influence just as education often describes intrinsically justified influence. The fact that Schleiermacher concerns himself so much with justification leads to certain considerations that seem somewhat removed to English speakers: namely the justifications for interrupting the state of being immersed in present satisfaction. In what follows I use the term *education* in this more descriptive sense and often refer to *educational influence* to keep this in mind.

The notion of educational influence suggests that something is perceived to be in need of change/improvement, something that the influencee may not (yet) perceive. Thus, educational influence “appears at every single moment in opposition to the desire of the person to be educated” (28) and therefore requires some justification. In seeking justification, we could say that an *educational* influence, unlike the influence of an advertisement, is intended to benefit the influencee, while an advertiser might be indifferent to the good of the influencee, thinking only of their business. Even where there is an intention to benefit the influencee, it is not uncommon that the influencee does not perceive this. This does not mean that Schleiermacher needs to define ‘the good’ in his lecture. Indeed, it is important to note that he leaves the good undefined. On what basis, then, should the influencee accept, or consent to influence? Why should it matter if the influencee consents or not, as long as the influence is *for their own good*? Consent cannot be the sole criterion here because, as Schleiermacher acknowledges, consent cannot reasonably be expected from some influencees (e.g. very young children). These questions are important partly because they point to

⁶ This is one additional reason why I prefer the term *influence* in this essay, and speak of an influencer and influencee rather than, more paternalistically (at least to our ears) of the adult and the child. I note, however, that the intergenerational implication of the adult-child relation is central to Schleiermacher’s argument (see previous footnote).

practical educational problems that many of us (as parents and educators) regularly deal with, but also because they elaborate the central ethical problem of education that underpins Schleiermacher's lecture. This ethical problem is most directly raised by the question "Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another?" It is not just that we sacrifice the present for the future, but that, as *educational* influencers, we appear to do so on behalf of others: influencees. We see in Schleiermacher a dialectical argument that seeks to reconcile the opposition between living in the present moment and being encouraged to think about the future, such that "at the end, there will be no opposition [...] to overcome" (29). To be sure, this begins with the general recognition that *any* pedagogical influence appears to entail sacrificing the present, not just those that encourage the child to think about their own future. Indeed, that is why I have distinguished the general future-orientation of all forms of educational influence, from influences that are concerned with developing awareness of the future. Becoming aware of the future takes on a particular significance here because it is partly in this awareness that justification is found, but it is only a partial answer since there are cases where such awareness cannot reasonably be expected.

It is worth noting that Schleiermacher's discussion can be related to diverse debates by considering how our educational orientation to the future tends to be interpreted in variously psychological and instrumental terms. It is not hard to find relevant psychological discussion of forms of motivation (Deci and Ryan 2000), of delayed gratification (Carducci 2009), or of developmental stages where future-mindedness is thought to be a developmental achievement (Seligman et. al. 2016). Future-mindedness seems to be fundamental to any notion of instrumentalism which is defined in terms of the relation between means and ends, and provides the general structures for thinking about the means through which children are, or can be, prepared for the future and for useful employment (where awareness of the future may or may not be important). Despite these diverse approaches, systematic pedagogical consideration of how, why, and on what justification we influence children with respect to the future are not as common as one might imagine, partly because as just argued, the conception of education is taken to be 'good'. In contrast to these approaches, I take Schleiermacher's approach to be distinctively *educational* inasmuch as Schleiermacher sees pedagogy, by its nature, as oriented to the future. The most interesting and pressing cases of justification here are where the influencee cannot give explicit consent to external influence. In this sense Schleiermacher presents a set of specifically educational observations and concerns that arise out of the pedagogical relations between those who educate and those who

are educated: it is of the nature of *educational* influence that it cannot be fully consented to in advance.

Are we all interested in the future?

The trash movie masterpiece *Plan 9 from Outer Space* opens with the following pronouncement: “*We are all interested in the future, for that is where you and I are going to spend the rest of our lives*” (Wood 2011, 0:0:20). Although the logic here seems hard to fault - it describes the future as the place (or time) where, indeed, we all will live – it seems that such a statement reflects a broadly ‘Western’ linear temporality in which priority is given to the future because of a unidirectional view of time in which the past is gone. It has been argued that only since the Enlightenment did the Western tradition take the future to be something open to us to form and shape, and thus it became possible to speak of our ‘discovery of the future’.⁷ Furthermore, it is suggested that medieval European societies did not have a concept of an open future, and that the very idea of the future as full of possibility is a product of modernity (Hölscher 1999; Zirfas 2014). Thus, we should be cautious: where contemporary discourses around future-mindedness present this as a central, even essential, human virtue,⁸ we might wonder how this notion operates, where it comes from, and whose interests it serves. It might be naïve to imagine that, at least as adults, we can just ‘be in the moment,’ or entirely suspend our habitual future-mindedness. Any such suspension would seem to be short-lived, and probably illusory. It seems almost impossible to imagine human life in general without planning, hoping, anticipating and ultimately building the future. Yet we might be equally suspicious of a view in which the present moment only achieves substantial meaning in relation to the future that is to come. Do we continually sacrifice our present for the future? Is there any value in the present moment if it is not directed towards some anticipated future? I take one of Schleiermacher’s interests to be the fact that children appear not to begin with any awareness of the future, and that such an awareness must be formed because it is in this emerging awareness that part of the justification for pedagogical influence arises.

⁷ In 1902 Wells (1913) gave a lecture titled ‘Discovery of the Future.’

⁸ The interest in the idea of future-mindedness as a human virtue is evidenced in recent publications (Allen 2018; Seligman et. al. 2016).

There certainly does seem to be a time in children's lives when they are absorbed in being in the present moment. For Schleiermacher the activity of childhood is firstly characterised by 'play' which "offers satisfaction in the very moment rather than being attuned to the future." He describes play in contrast to 'exercise' "the activity that is directed towards the future" (30). The more exercise and play can be aligned or united (i.e. educational toys), the less the child would experience being directed towards the future as a sacrifice. The predominance of play in early years education suggests that this is well understood. Educators should, as far as possible, seek activities which require no sacrifice of the present because "all of our life activity manifests consistent opposition to such practice" (28), that is, of sacrificing the present for the future. While children are especially oriented to play and the 'presentism' that characterises it, Schleiermacher's point is also that all human beings share this orientation to some extent. Schleiermacher points out that we don't just nourish ourselves "by mere ingestion" (28) with food, we occupy ourselves with enjoyable and sociable meals. While adults exist in both present and future orientation, it seems that the young child can only exist in the present moment and has to learn that future orientation. If children do not want to do their homework, eat their vegetables, or practice scales on the piano why should they; why should they abandon present satisfaction for some unknown future that they are told will be better?

Of course, any unknown future may never be realised. In *Emile*, Rousseau warns also against sacrificing the present for the future:

Of all children born, half, at the most, reach adolescence... What, then, must be thought of that barbarous education which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, which burdens the child with chains of every sort and begins by making him miserable in order to prepare him from afar for I know not what pretended happiness which it is to be believed he will never enjoy! (Rousseau 1979, 79)

Without explicitly referencing Rousseau, Schleiermacher similarly states that "the time of education is characterized by the highest level of mortality, making the sacrifice of an early moment for a later one lose any relevance for those who die early" (28-29). The subsequent reduction of infant/child mortality since then should not lead us to suppose that we are now justified in sacrificing the present because the future is more likely to be realised. It seems for Schleiermacher we cannot 'play' for all of our lives, and that we must engage in exercises

which are directed towards the future. How does Schleiermacher overcome the apparent contradiction between the present and the future? Where we encourage awareness of the future in the child, we introduce a gradual separation of the practices that achieve an immediate satisfaction in the present from practices that are directed towards the future (30). In order for the educator to be justified in separating the child from immanent satisfaction, Schleiermacher says any separation must be gradual; justification requires the satisfaction in one thing to be replaced by satisfaction in another. The source of satisfaction may change, but the satisfaction itself is constant, and so it is possible to avoid the sacrifice of satisfaction itself. A different kind of satisfaction is derived by the child when they become aware that their future will be better than the present. This is, in fact, rather complex. While children are often impatient to become grown up, to become a ‘big boy or girl’ we would probably resist identifying this desire for the future with the kinds of abstract or instrumental forms of future orientation implied in the appreciation that knowing how to tie shoelaces or pass exams will be of future benefit. The adult will appreciate the future benefit of acquiring certain knowledges, skills, and dispositions, that the child probably does not. Still, we encourage children to acquire these things and do so by the use of various forms of persuasion known to the art of the parent. Such persuasion mostly seeks some form of consent. Thus, a kind of consent for the educational influence of the child can be obtained (30). But this consent is not the complete answer to justifying the apparent sacrifice of the present since, as Schleiermacher acknowledges, such future awareness and consent is unlikely to be present in the younger child: “the [young] child lives entirely in the present, not for the future, and they therefore cannot participate in this purpose, and cannot have an interest in it for the development of their own individual character” (28). And yet Schleiermacher later says that “the child develops an appreciation for the exercise and rejoices in it for what it is” (30). By exercise Schleiermacher means activities which are directed towards the future. Even play through repeating certain actions goes some way to prepare the child, and so “play activities are already exercises” (31). But, it seems that not all exercises are play because some activities that direct children to the future require them to cease what we are currently doing. There is a complex dialectic here between the satisfaction that can be derived through the pedagogical relation (i.e. trusting the parent or teacher) and developing an appreciation of the exercise for what it is. Clearly this does not happen overnight, but the gap (and how it is traversed) is worth discussing in more detail: the gap between the younger child who is not aware of their future and cannot give consent to influence, and the older child who is aware and can give (or may not need to give) consent because they learn to appreciate the apparent

sacrifice of the present. As suggested earlier, for Schleiermacher it is not sufficient to simply assert that the educator knows what is in the interest of the child and leave it at that. We can now see why this is the case: because such an assertion would not offer the ongoing satisfaction to the child necessary for influence to be justified. In order to explore how this gap is bridged, I will elaborate the transition from play to exercise through 3 vignettes.

Becoming concerned

If it is true that education is firstly future oriented in a general sense and secondly that it encourages an awareness of the future in the child, then it can be said to follow a temporo-educational logic. According to this logic, the awareness of the future does not exist in the young child, or does so only in nascent form, as a potential to be realised. How is that potential realised? The everyday activities of parents and educators (that encourage children to think about the future) testify to the fact that we generally act *as if* awareness of the future exists *in potentia*: it can be formed within the child because children are generally capable of developing this. But with Schleiermacher we ask how such influence is achieved and justified. How does this justification depend upon the consent of the influencee? It is inevitable that the child does not begin consenting to the separation of play and exercise. Let us try and focus on the separation by moving through 3 stages: 3 vignettes that illustrate the formation of future-orientation and that suggest certain justifications.

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Vignette 1: the child at play:

“Daddy, look at my train track!”

“That’s great. Can you make an even bigger one?”

“Yes. But I am going to play with this.”

Vignette 2: exercise through trust:

“Miss, why do we have to do this trigonometry stuff? It’s really boring!”

“I know this may not seem useful right now, but you will thank me one day, I promise.”

Vignette 3: exercise through insight:

After learning piano for 2 years, Laura says to her herself, “I am starting to realise that learning those scales is paying off. I will practice more!”

* * *

Here a relation between present and future is framed within three different educational contexts: namely parenting, schooling, and (self-)education. Recall that Schleiermacher distinguishes play and exercise in the following way:

We call ‘play’/ ‘game’⁹ in the broadest sense that which, in the life of the child, offers satisfaction in the very moment rather than being attuned to the future. On the other hand, we call ‘exercise’ the activity that is directed towards the future (30).

In the first case, the state of play can be characterised as embodying an immanent relation between present and future: play is its own pleasure, and requires nothing additional for justification. Note, however, that the adult says, probably without too much thought, “can you make a bigger train track?” encouraging a sense of aspiration and development which, in this case, the child seems content to ignore. As the child grows up, parents and educators find themselves encouraging the child with greater urgency to consider future possibilities that are opened up or closed down by present activities. Typically, educators will encourage children not only to engage in play, but also in exercises. Initially, parents and educators might encourage exercises through fun – exercise and play being, then, practically indistinguishable. But as education goes on and becomes more abstract, normally within institutions we call schools, educators find themselves presenting exercises not always

⁹ The original German is “Spiel” which means both the activity of play and the structure of a game at the same time, while not excluding the idea of “free” play.

framed in the forms of play.¹⁰ Trigonometry may be fun if well taught, but after some time the educator will probably refer to more abstract ideas requiring a certain discipline and application: what Schleiermacher calls exercise. These exercises may be justified in terms of future payoffs. Here we see the space between play and exercise starts to become opened up.

The child, now in school, is not engaged in play but in future oriented exercises: maths exercises directed towards a future good. The educator uses perhaps a familiar, though not necessarily persuasive justification: “I know this may not seem useful right now, but you will thank me one day, I promise.” Whether the child is persuaded will depend in part on the relationship between the educator and child. By reference to a promise the principle of trust grounds the relationship between the educator and student. It seems that stronger bonds make the commitment of trust easier to make. Following practice of certain exercises, it is hoped that the child will become aware of the formative value the exercises. The initial attitude of trust (a kind of leap of faith (see Lewin 2014a)) allows a certain satisfaction in the present to come from something that initially appears to be an exercise, because the trust in the educator is experienced as a kind of “immediate satisfaction of the present” (30). Play and exercise seem to merge and, as Schleiermacher puts it, “[t]he more these two merge, the more ethically perfect the pedagogical activity becomes” (29). This form of trust gradually develops into something like consent which, later, gives way to an intrinsic insight on the part of the child herself who now seeks out the work of practice and exercise, recognising the value therein, even though it is not directly ‘play’. This brings us to the 3rd vignette.

Now the child reflects on the piano exercises that contribute to her development as a pianist: the developing child sees for herself that the exercises done in the present will result in a future payoff, and so play and exercise are shown again to merge. At first sight this might appear to be the sacrifice of the present for the future, but in fact, because the child sees the value in their practice, there is an immediate satisfaction in the moment of this insight that need not be postponed. The student no longer needs to trust the educator for she derives sufficient satisfaction in her piano exercises simply from the knowledge that those exercises are developing her playing ability. The basis for the unity between play and exercise is no longer trust in the educator, but a “consciousness of human capacities as being under development” (31). The child’s orientation to the future is grounded in insight that

¹⁰ Vlieghe (2015) has spoken of the utmost importance of schooling in reference to the need for literacy initiation. He argues that the meaning of language is necessarily disconnected from the process of literacy initiation so that children can effectively learn to read and write. The parallel here is that the separation of meaning from the process is analogous to the entry into exercise: where satisfaction is not derived directly from the thing studied.

makes the present efforts intrinsically satisfying, even though they are simultaneously future oriented. This elaboration of the formation of a relation to the future gives an impression of something more linear and systematic than is likely to actually take place, so must be understood as only a theoretical outline of a complex set of practical processes.

These vignettes show a familiar progressive path from (1) having no awareness of the future, though an adult seeking to inculcate one, to (2) having a relation to the future encouraged by someone else, and gradually accepted (or perhaps rejected) on trust, to (3) realising an awareness of the future by and for oneself. The educational trajectory can be seen in the shift from the child for whom only play is desirable (and for its own sake), to being convinced or motivated to accept that sometimes it is worthwhile postponing present fun for a future benefit (which is a form of present satisfaction), though relying on the promise of the adult (or perhaps rewards and punishments), to a third more ‘developed’ understanding, in which the child now sees exercise as worth undertaking in relation to their own future projects and developing self. Note the principle here that the projects now belong to the child herself. Although I use the term *developed* with caution, it signals that the commitment has become internalised. This internalisation may be interpreted in terms of the idea that the heteronomous awareness of the future payoff has become absorbed and integrated in the child, and so that awareness has become established as autonomous and robust. Where this autonomy is the goal, it can be (and has been) used to justify all sorts of sacrifices of the present. But this is not quite Schleiermacher’s view. Schleiermacher does not allow this sacrifice, even for the future payoff of the autonomous subject.

This linear account leaves a good deal more to explore. One problem for educational theorists is how the transition from trust in, and recognition from, an educator to autonomous insight (from 2 to 3) is to be practically achieved and ethically justified. If the student relies on, and trusts in, the educator to turn to something that (without the proffered recognition of the educator) is not immediately appealing, what process or shift is necessary for the student to see for herself the value in the exercises over fun? How does the student shift from a state of dependency, of having future projects defined by parents, educators, and wider society, to one of independence? Does such a shift spontaneously happen, through ongoing maturation, or does it require particular conditions, circumstances or interventions? In the terms of Schleiermacher’s lecture, this question concerns the child’s consciousness of human development since it is through the emergent consciousness of the value of the exercises that they become immanently worthwhile “[i]nasmuch therefore as play in its design is exercise as well, it is nothing but the complete satisfaction of the consciousness of the child in the

present, because while playing, children are conscious of their powers and of the development of their capacities” (31). For Schleiermacher, satisfaction needs to be sustained throughout the different stages of education, from play to exercise, if that education is to be ethically justified. Trust, or love for the teacher can be an ethical bridge if the student experiences the interruption of play as a new form of satisfaction derived from the relationship of trust or love. Without the constant satisfaction we have an unjustified sacrifice of the present for the future that may never come, or that may be other than hoped for. We could also say that an embryonic form of consent is present as the trust that the young child places in the educator, trust that provides some kind of satisfaction.

Thus far, I have examined firstly the fundamentally future-related nature of pedagogical influence, and secondly the influence towards becoming aware of the future. I have been particularly interested in the latter partly because it is the development of this future-awareness that provides one obvious justification for pedagogical influence but the most challenging ethical issues arise with those unable to consent the pedagogical influence. Nevertheless, the movement towards consent is important and is evident when it is expressed in terms of the enhanced self-activity of the ‘influencee’: becoming aware of one’s future entails the formation of agency, itself a key justification for pedagogical influence. However, a critical reading might view this process of becoming future aware as an internalisation of ‘future-mindedness’ which reflects a kind of post subjectivation in which the self is constructed to service the instrumental needs of social order, needs which require subjects to take up an awareness of the future in order to serve it. In other words, there might be limits to how far into the future our awareness should be encouraged to go (Kenklies 2020) or how much our awareness ought to be absorbed by thoughts of tomorrow. Here I can only acknowledge these critical concerns in general, though I now turn to consider efforts to mitigate the imperative to the future through practices that encourage us to be in the present.

Be in the now

Having children sitting ‘mindfully’ for short periods is said to improve children in all sorts of ways: from concentration to anger management, from reading and math scores to general stress and anxiety (Albrecht et. al. 2012). While practices of mindfulness are quite ancient, often related to Buddhist meditative traditions (Ergas 2014; Vetter 1988; Gethin 2011), the most influential definition of contemporary secular mindfulness that has been adopted by

programmes of mindfulness in schools, is probably that of Jon Kabat-Zinn who, though trained in Buddhist meditation, prefers to define his programme of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) in scientific rather than religious terms (Wilson 2014, 35). Zinn defines mindfulness as “the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (Kabat-Zinn 2003, 145). It is little wonder that this kind of antidote to the malaise of late modernity, where stress and anxiety seem to make us incapable of enjoying the present moment, has wide appeal. Indeed, mindfulness is enthusiastically embraced by educational institutions and governments seeking a corrective to the mental health crises that attend modern educational practices (Meiklejohn 2012). But clearly such efforts to put mindfulness to use are in danger of instrumentalising the very activity designed (at least in some contexts) to suspend, resist or subvert the totalising influence of instrumentalisation. In any case, Zinn’s definition of mindfulness is interesting since it should immediately strike the educator as addressing something very practical and educational, namely paying attention on purpose. Educators are in the business of purposefully drawing the attention of students to certain things. Although a complex idea, a great deal of what we call teaching could be boiled down to the arts of directing and shaping attention (Lewin 2014b). It can appear that the practice of paying attention in mindfulness is not the same as the educator demanding that the children *pay attention*, but systematically distinguishing these forms of directing attention is no easy task (Lewin 2018; Ergas 2018).

Zinn’s definition highlights not only paying attention on purpose, but also refers to the object or referent of attention: “the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (Kabat-Zinn 2003, 145). The directive to be in the present moment, and to practice ‘being here,’ addresses a problem that some say is made more acute by the pace of the modern world, and the ubiquitous presence of media and entertainment taking us out of the present moment (Stiegler 2011; Lewin 2016). In the instrumental, neoliberal conditions of our culture, our relation to the present is almost always shaped by an orientation to the future. It is a general incapacity to be in the present as the present that many practitioners of mindfulness regard as a danger to our mental and spiritual health.

The encouragement to be in the moment and to think about the future appear to be opposed. There are, however, different ways of reconciling them. First, the instrumentalism that structures modern Western forms of secular mindfulness suggests that, whatever else mindfulness is, it is also very much oriented to, and by, the future. Any activity directed at improvements of the self are teleological in the sense outlined earlier. However, it is this very

instrumentalist ‘appropriation’ of Eastern spiritual traditions that worries so many who are interested in the place of mindfulness in contemporary educational discourse (Hyland 2009; O’Donnell 2015). Leaving that debate to one side, there is a more interesting sense in which these encouragements to be in the present for the future, can be reconciled, a sense which is implied in Schleiermacher’s analysis: to be mindful is not to be disconnected from time in a timeless now, but to be very much located in the temporality of the present moment: the present is only present by virtue of its integration of past and future. Equally, satisfaction in the present does not mean never giving thought to the future. Awareness of the future, at least in some measure, seems to be an essential component of present satisfaction.

Schleiermacher’s analysis of play and exercise appears initially to create an opposition between the two where the present must be sacrificed for the future if the child is to grow up. But this is not, in the end, necessarily a kind of sacrifice. Schleiermacher considers various possibilities: the child may die before seeing any return on the “investment”; alternatively, satisfaction in the present and the future may be merged by making play of any exercise. Schleiermacher is able to mediate the apparent opposition by using an approach discussed earlier in the three stages of the development of the relation to the future. The formation of our awareness of the future can be interpreted as an arc beginning with the identity/unity of both (play and exercise), moving through a separation (defined here through trust), and returning as a transformed kind of identity/unity (insight) where play and exercise are once again indistinct. At no point is satisfaction in the present sacrificed, rather the ‘object’ from which satisfaction is derived changes. The idealised process unfolds through the continued affirmation of the child’s present satisfaction though transferred onto less immediate objects, allowing the child to experience their own relation to the future. One might say, therefore, that through play the child learns how to self-educate by becoming aware of their own future and how their present actions influence their future, or as Schleiermacher puts it: “while playing, children are conscious of their powers and of the development of their capacities” (31). In this way the child develops a capacity to see the ‘play’ in ‘exercises’ and thereby to derive an immediate satisfaction: this immediacy comes from the act of imagination that allows the future to be present. Awareness of how present actions shape the future, and how future possibilities are imminent in those actions are modes of being in the present.

Encouraging adults to interrupt their habitual orientation to the future and to embrace the present through forms of mindfulness might be justified by the idea that adults see for themselves that their focus on the future results in a poor relation to the present. But it is not

obvious that children, in general, share the problems for which mindfulness is meant to be the solution. Before the child's awareness of the future is interrupted by practices of mindfulness, that awareness must first be established. Awareness of the future must be constructed before it can be deconstructed. It seems that mindfulness may be as much about locating us in time as interrupting time. Moreover, if we consider mindfulness as being continuous with other activities which require disciplined attention (the mindfulness or attentiveness employed when learning a musical instrument, or pretty much any learning), then mindfulness is really being attentive, being aware, taking care. And consciousness of one's own development is very much part of this kind of attentiveness and care. This suggests an interpretation of mindfulness as a process of embracing relations to past and future in the present moment, or as seeing the present being constituted by the past and the future.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed Schleiermacher's ideas concerning the formation of a relation to the future. Not only must we recognise that all education prepares for the future, but more significantly that the realization of an awareness of the future within the child seems to be an important part of education, and more particularly, for the justification of educational influence. The child participates in their own formation (becoming a self-educator) through the awareness that they develop of the future and how their actions have consequences. For Schleiermacher, satisfaction needs to be sustained throughout the different stages of education, from play to exercise, if that education is to be ethically justified. Otherwise we have an unjustified sacrifice of the present for the future that may never come, or that may be other than hoped for. An embryonic form of consent could be defined as the trust that the young child's places in the influencer, trust that provides some kind of satisfaction. Even where the immediate satisfaction of play is interrupted, that satisfaction is replaced by a 'new' satisfaction derived from something else: e.g. the recognition that the child acquires in doing what the educator asks or expects. The child may delight in pleasing their teacher even when engaged in exercises that are 'in themselves' anything but delightful. Thus delight (or satisfaction) is present in exercise. How this sustained satisfaction through recognition is achieved within the complexities of modern educational contexts (e.g. large classrooms where pedagogical relations are harder to maintain) is a difficult practical problem. Where children experience little satisfaction in their day to day schooling, we must wonder whether

the influence is justified. The relation of theory and practice is itself another vital theme within the earlier sections of Schleiermacher's lecture and are beyond my scope.

In the conditions of contemporary society, the notion that we must be encouraged to think about the future looks somewhat different. Notions of future-mindedness have a pathological undercurrent where we risk losing our relation to the present moment beyond it servicing future needs, as though we live in the conditions of present satisfaction by being mortgaged for a tomorrow that never seems to arrive.

It is not clear how far a concern for the future is essential for human existence or to what extent it is a good thing. And if it is generally good, is it natural, or is it learned, and if learned, how, to what end and, crucially, with what justification? Perhaps more important than any answers we might find in Schleiermacher's texts are the educational questions that he sets for himself crystallised in the central question: how is educational influence justified?

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