Fear might motivate secure password choices in the short term, but at what cost?

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Abstract

Fear has been used to convince people to behave securely in a variety of cyber security domains. In this study, we tested the use of fear appeals, with the threat appraisal and coping appraisal components separately and together, on password hygiene behaviors. Fear did indeed elicit the anticipated response - people had higher levels of behavioral intention to have better password hygiene. Unfortunately, we also detected a largely negative affective response to the appeals. Fear, as a short lived emotion, can indeed be effective in the short term and snapshot-like studies like the one reported here might lead us to conclude that fear is indeed indicated and efficacious. Yet, it might well backfire in the long term, due to the negative affects that it triggers.

1. Introduction

Passwords have been used to authenticate humans since we started using computers, but fear appeals have been around for centuries. Fear has been used by religions, in public health messaging, and latterly in cybersecurity to persuade people to change their behaviors [1]. All of these efforts take the efficacy of fear for granted. This might be because people often *do* respond to fear, visibly taking the actions they are coerced into taking.

Even so, it is rare for anyone to consider the empirical evidence attesting to the long-term power or limitations of the use of fear. Might fear merely *appear* to work, being a palliative instead of an intervention, and leading to permanent changes in behaviors in the long run? Might the short-term changes in behavior subsequent to fear appeals be misleading us as to their efficacy? These are questions that beg to be answered.

An example of the negative consequences of fear appeals are manifesting in the United Kingdom (UK). The UK government's Behavioural Insights Unit actively advised the them to utilize fear in order to persuade the British public to comply with lockdown and other pandemic regulations [2]. This use of fear achieved its aims: the British public accepted the initial lockdown, and the many extensions that occurred over the following 15 months. Vaccine uptake has been exemplary. Yet, a number of negative consequences are now emerging. Dodsworth highlights an emergent mental health crisis, preventable deaths from cancer and an unacceptable increase in domestic violence. Moreover, the UK public are the most frightened of COVID in the world[1] - such levels of anxiety cannot be healthy or desirable. Dodsworth makes a strong argument that fear "should not be weaponised" arguing that this particular emotion, when weaponized, creates collateral damage.

We set out to determine whether Dodsworth's admonition also applies to the use of fear in the cyber domain. We focus on the use of fear in encouraging stronger password choices. This is to help us to know how, when, where, why, and in what context fear appeals may be most effective, desirable and ethical [3, 4]. In this study, we employed a randomized controlled between-subjects design with three treatment groups to test the efficacy of fear appeals in changing behavioral intentions with respect to three password hygiene target behaviors.

We found that fear did indeed lead to stronger passwords. However, it also led to higher levels of negative types of state affect for the two groups that were exposed to the fear component, as compared to the two groups that did not receive the fear appeal.

Section 2 reviews related research. Section 3 describes the methods we used with Section 4 identifying the materials employed. Section 5 reports on the findings with Section 6 discussing them and acknowledging limitations. Section 7 concludes and suggests future work.

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[1] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/05/05/britons-scared-coronavirus-infection-rest-world/

2. Related Research

2.1. Affect

Throughout the literature, affect has been defined and articulated in a number of ways. It has often been used interchangeably with mood and emotion [5, 6, 7, 8]. Although this is understandable, to a certain extent, given their interdependence, it can make it challenging when one study may mean something quite different than another with respect to these terms.

In the current study, emotion can be viewed as a short-lived and relatively intense reaction to an event or stimulus. Emotion may vary significantly over relatively short time periods and may eventually become mood. This transformation will depend on the frequency, intensity, and context of the experienced emotion(s). In contrast, mood is viewed as longer-lasting and milder in intensity [6].

Both emotion and mood are considered affective states [8, 9]. Examples of affective states include: guilt, hostility, fear, fatigue, surprise, sadness, attentiveness, serenity, shyness, joviality, and self-assurance [10]. However, in addition to affective states, there is also trait affect, which represents a generally more stable and life-long type of affect that changes very little over time, similar to personality in many respects [11, 12, 9].

Differences in persistence is one way in which different types of affect may vary from one another. However, affect may also vary in the extent to which it is related to the decision at hand or in response to a specific stimulus. Incidental affect is a type of affect that is not related to the current judgment, stimulus, or choice, but can still influence it [13, 7]. While trait affect is always an incidental type of affect, emotion and mood may or may not be incidental, depending on the particular circumstances.

In contrast to incidental affect, integral affect is relevant to the current choice, judgment, or stimulus [13, 8]. This is seen when someone anticipates regretting a decision, such as betting on a team. This may result in a change in their betting behavior, influencing the size of the wager [14, 15]. Loewenstein et al (2001) has termed this 'anticipated emotions'. Anticipatory emotions, on the other hand, include immediate visceral reactions to threats (e.g., fear) [16]. Both anticipatory and anticipated emotions are considered types of integral affect as they are directly related to, and triggered by, the current judgment, choice, or stimulus.

2.2. Fear Appeals

Fear is invoked when a threat exhibits a number of characteristics: it is important to the person, it is negatively valenced, the threat is impending, and it requires the person to engage in some kind of effort to offset the threat with the recommended action [1]. Fear, as an emotion, undoubtedly exerts an influence on humans [17], hence its appropriation as a behavioral change intervention.

Fear is used in behavioral change interventions in the belief that the elicited fear will convince people to do what the fear appeal deployer wants them to do [17, 18]. The idea is that they will take action in order to reduce levels of fear.

Renaud and Dupuis [1] reviewed the use of fear appeals in the cyber security domain. They reported that the majority of the studies take a snapshot, presenting participants with a fear appeal and then asking a number of questions. Some observed subsequent behaviors. Very few studies returned to the participants after a significant period of time to determine the whether the impact of the fear appeal endured. None checked that the recommended behavior was feasible of the behavior the fear appeal was trying to trigger.

A number of the studies reviewed by Renaud and Dupuis [1] used fear to strengthen passwords [19, 20, 21, 22]. These generally reported that the fear appeals were effective, but most measured behavioral *intention* via a survey question or via self-report. Likewise, very few measured the level of fear that may have been induced, let alone other emotions.

2.3. Protection Motivation Theory

Fear appeals have been used for centuries and have been examined using a range of theoretical approaches designed to better understand human behavior, including Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [23]. PMT helps explain why some individuals may engage in a recommended action with the purpose of reducing the threat, while others may be more concerned with reducing the level of fear they may feel.

Rogers developed PMT in 1975 as an extension of expectancy-value theory [24]. Self-efficacy was later added to the theory, given its role in successfully accounting for one's willingness to engage in a specific behavior [25, 24]. PMT consists of threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Threat appraisal consists of the constructs: 'perceived threat severity', 'perceived threat vulnerability', and 'rewards', the latter of which has rarely been used in practice [26]. Coping appraisal consists of the constructs 'self-efficacy', 'response efficacy', and 'response costs' [27]. The threat appraisal and coping appraisal components are examined separately and then together in this study. The context in which this is done is by examining the threat

of having one's passwords compromised.

2.4. Passwords

Most users prefer passwords over other kinds of authentication mechanisms, probably due to their familiarity and the ubiquity of text entry mechanisms [28]. Other authentication types, such as biometrics or tokens, often involve extra expense or additional hardware, and are often error-prone.

Hence, passwords are the most popular authentication mechanism for both end users and developers. While other authentication mechanisms may also be able to provide a high level of security and convenience, passwords remain the primary form of authentication used on websites and computer systems [29, 30].

The rules related to the format of the password are generally simple, but vary considerably in their implementation from one program or application being used to another. For example, some authentication systems may allow for the use of special characters and numbers, while others may limit the user to only alpha-numeric characters. In other cases, what exactly is meant by *special characters* may vary without any clear explanation being provided as to why.

These authentication systems usually specify a minimum length the user must have for their password. As authentication systems began to become more widespread for everyday people, this minimum was often just six characters in length. More recently, minimums generally range from eight to 10 characters long. This change in the lower limit has followed the continued increases in computing power, which makes it increasingly trivial to crack shorter passwords. While many have advocated for longer minimums, such as 15-20 characters, usability and adaptability for such requirements remains a significant hurdle [31]. Current approaches that have been advanced by experts include combining several (e.g., six or more) unrelated words together or using a password manager to generate a long password of 20 characters or more.

Beyond the length requirements imposed by many authentication systems, complexity requirements must also be met. For example, the system may require the user to have a mix of characters that are upper- and lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters. While combining length with complexity does achieve the increased levels of entropy sought by system administrators, they also make passwords much more difficult to remember. As a result, users often feel like they are left with very few options. They may write their passwords down in obvious places, store them

in an insecure document on their phone or computer, or reuse the same *complex* password for multiple websites and systems. It is likely for this reason that ample disagreement remains with respect to the level of emphasis that should be placed on complexity requirements for passwords [32].

An individual may be forced into the length and complexity requirements previously mentioned. However, there is no real tangible way to force them to use a unique password for every website and system they use. As a result, the reuse of passwords is a significant problem [33]. Such reuse is even more problematic when the passwords lack complexity and length or have been stored in plain text on one or more of the systems for which the password has been used.

Finally, a password that is long, complex, and unique is not nearly as effective in protecting an individual if it is not kept safe and secure from others. This includes keeping it private from friends or would-be attackers [34].

2.5. Research Model

The research undertaken here focuses on two objectives. *First*, to assess the degree to which different conditions presented to participants may impact the efficacy of the target behaviors within a PMT model. *Second*, to determine whether it is fear by itself that is elicited or one or more other emotions.

For the *first* objective, and consistent with other research that has employed PMT within the information security domain (e.g., [35]), we propose the following five hypotheses:

H1: Higher levels of perceived threat *severity* related to having one's passwords compromised will be associated with higher levels of intent to perform the target password hygiene behaviors.

H2: Higher levels of perceived threat *vulnerability* related to having one's passwords compromised will be associated with higher levels of intent to perform the target password hygiene behaviors.

H3: Higher levels of *self-efficacy* related to performing the target password hygiene behaviors will be associated with higher levels of intent to perform the target password hygiene behaviors.

H4: Higher levels of *response efficacy* related to one's belief in the effectiveness the target password hygiene behaviors will be associated with higher levels of intent to perform the target password hygiene behaviors.

H5: Higher levels of *perceived response costs* related to performing the target password hygiene behaviors will be associated with lower levels of intent

to perform the target password hygiene behaviors.

The *second* objective will be evaluated by comparing the mean values of the different groups for each of the higher order and lower order dimensions of state affect measured.

3. Methods

The current study measures self-reports of behavior before the treatment (or control) and then behavioral intentions after the treatment (or control) has been completed. Although this study does not address all of the issues raised by Renaud and Dupuis [1], an important contribution of this study is to separate the core components of a fear appeal into two distinct elements, threat appraisal components (perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability) and coping appraisal components (self-efficacy, response efficacy, and response costs). Another important contribution is the examination of the specific types of state affect elicited within each of the four groups and how they compare to one another in this regard.

3.1. Participants

Prior to collecting data from participants, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was sought and obtained. Participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and the survey was hosted on the Qualtrics survey platform. Compared to other recruitment methods, MTurk has been shown to be both efficient and reliable with respect to participant recruitment so long as quality control measures are used, such as attention check questions [36, 37].

In the current study, two automated quality control questions were used. If a participant failed either of them then the survey would end with a message explaining that they had failed a quality control question. Additionally, toward the end of the survey we had an open-ended question that was also used as a *de facto* quality control measure. By sorting them in alphabetical order and reading through the responses provided, we are able to detect cases in which automation was likely used. Since each version of the survey required the participant to watch one of four different videos, we used a timing option within the Qualtrics survey platform to prevent individuals from advancing to the next question before a time equivalent to the length of the video had elapsed. Finally, we limited eligibility to participate in the survey to MTurk workers that had an approval rate of 98% or greater and had previously completed at least 1,000 HITs (human intelligence tasks).

A pilot study with 107 participants was used to

reveal any problems with question wording and survey flow, as well as to ensure fair compensation for participants. No significant issues were detected and compensation for participants was set at $2.50. The compensation provided was considered fair given the responses provided to a compensation question included at the end of the survey with 91.2% of participants believing that the compensation provided was either comparable (69.9%) or easier for the money (21.3%) when compared to similar projects they had previously completed on MTurk. A small number of participants (8.8%) felt that more effort was required in comparison to similar projects.

Of the 811 participants that began the survey, 1.5% failed one of the quality control measures. As a result, there were 799 valid responses that were used for subsequent analysis. Participants were mostly evenly divided between the four groups based on a random assignment feature within Qualtrics: (1) Control (N=202); (2) Threat appraisal components only (N=201); (3) Coping appraisal components only (N=195), and (4) Combined threat and coping appraisal components (N=201).

Most participants stated they were White (77.2%), followed by Asian / Pacific Islander (8.4%), Black / African American (8.1%), Hispanic (4.3%), Other / Multi-Racial (1.6%), and Native American / Alaskan Native / Indigenous (0.4%). Approximately half of our participants identified as male (51.2%), followed by female (47.8%), non-binary or third gender (0.6%), or preferred not to say (0.4%). Most of the participants (54.9%) were 40 or older with the remaining participants (45.1%) between the ages of 18 and 39.

4. Materials

Existing instrumentation was used when possible. If this was not feasible, then previously developed and validated items were used and adapted for the current study. This included the questions related to the PMT constructs [38, 39, 40]. When this was not possible, measurement tools were developed and validated. This included the videos and the target password hygiene behaviors.

4.1. Objective 1: Password Hygiene Behaviors

As noted earlier, there is significant disagreement on the specific behaviors and practices one should engage in related to performing good password hygiene. Thus, the Delphi technique was employed with a group of 11 subject matter experts (SMEs) that engage in cybersecurity a majority of their time through a typical workday. The Delphi technique has been employed in

information systems and cybersecurity based research before (e.g., [41, 42] and is a common technique employed to reach consensus. Three rounds were performed with the first round being the most open. SMEs were able to provide their own ideas related to measures necessary for good password hygiene during the first round. The second round included these responses along with other measures found in the literature and from organizations, such as NIST.

Consensus became important during the second and third rounds. Significant disagreement was found for most of the items. Consensus was considered achieved if 75% or more of the SMEs were in agreement. This was based on both historical precedence and also finding a balance between some agreement (i.e., 50%) and complete agreement (i.e., 100%) [43]. Wording changes were made and clarity sought after the second round. The third round contained five remaining items: (1) Length; (2) Complexity; (3) Kept secure; (4) Unique, and (5) Changing passwords. Although most SMEs preferred passwords of significant length (15 or more characters), they also recognized the need to balance that with the usability challenge it may cause for the average consumer. Consensus was obtained with respect to length (10 characters long or longer), uniqueness, and the importance of keeping passwords safe and secure.

4.2. Objective 2: State Affect

There are advantages and disadvantages to measuring different types of affect in the context of a study. For the current study, our interest lies in how the condition presented to the participants resulted in specific emotional states. We are not interested in how they think from an affective perspective about the specific stimulus (i.e., the treatment), but rather how they feel in the immediate aftermath of having received the stimulus. Thus, we measured incidental state affect rather than integral state affect or trait affect. The PANAS-X scale was used with specific instructions provided to measure incidental state affect [10].

4.3. Embedded Videos

As part of the survey, participants were required to watch one of four different videos depending on the group to which they had been randomly assigned by the Qualtrics survey platform. These videos were developed and iterated upon based on feedback from undergraduate and graduate students as well as the pilot study. The lengths of the videos were kept short so as to maximize attention to the content. They varied in length from 2:05 (control, coping appraisal only) to 2:29 (threat appraisal only) and then 4:34 (combined threat

and coping appraisal video). The videos can be accessed from [blinded for review].

For the **control group**, the goal was to develop a video that was neutral in tone and without a specific message. Instrumental music was combined with various short video clips, such as cars driving, scenery, sand in the desert, vegetation blowing in the wind, etc.

The **threat appraisal only** group received messaging that emphasized the severity of their passwords being compromised and their level of vulnerability. Several data breaches were presented, including the number of accounts impacted and how that may lead to passwords being compromised as a result. Other possible ways their passwords could be compromised was also presented, such as having their passwords cracked easily because they were too short in length.

The **coping appraisal only** group focused on the three target password hygiene behaviors: 1) length (10 characters long or longer); 2) Unique passwords for different websites and systems, and 3) Secure: the password should be kept safe and secure from others. A mnemonic was developed so that these three components would be easier for participants to remember. P-L-U-S: **P**asswords should be **L**ong, **U**nique, and **S**ecure. The three constructs from coping appraisal in PMT were emphasized: the steps an individual can take and how to take them (i.e., self-efficacy), the effectiveness of those steps (i.e., response efficacy), and the time, energy, and effort involved in taking those steps (i.e., response costs).

A brief demo of a password manager was given to demonstrate the efficacy and ease with which such a tool can address the three components presented to them. An additional measure was also included in this video: combining at least six or more unrelated words together as an approach to developing long passwords.

The **combined** group saw a merged version of the video from groups two and three. The threat appraisal components was followed by the coping appraisal components.

5. Results and Analysis

Analysis was conducted using IBM's Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 19.0 and SmartPLS version 3.3.2. The focus of our analysis is two-fold. First, we want to determine the extent to which the videos may have influenced our participants' behavioral intention to engage in creating long, unique, and secure passwords through an examination of four different PMT measurement model results. Second, we are interested in understanding to what extent the

emotions elicited in the four groups compare with one another.

5.1. Pre-Treatment Analyses

Prior to the treatment condition (or control) being presented to the participant, we asked them about their level of confidence that they currently perform the three target password hygiene behaviors. A one-way between subjects ANOVA was performed to assess whether there was a statistically significant difference between any of the four experimental groups in this study. None were found. This suggests that any effect found post-treatment was most likely due to the treatment itself.

5.2. Measurement Models

A single research method was used in this study: surveys. Common method bias (CMB) may result in such cases and should be tested for to determine if it is a significant issue or not. A test often used to screen for CMB is the Harman's single-factor test. While this test does have some shortcomings [44], it is helpful in identifying if CMB is an issue within a data set. Less than 16.1% of the total variance was explained by a single factor; this is below the maximum threshold of 50%. Although it is important to test for CMB after data has been collected, it is also important to design the study in such a way as to minimize the likelihood of it becoming a problem. In the current study, this was done by providing instructions to the participants that there are no right or wrong answers—to just answer honestly, as well as the use of Amazon's Mechanical Turk, which provides a high level of anonymity for research participants.

Cronbach's Alpha and composite reliability values were over the 0.700 minimum threshold, which suggests that reliability is acceptable for the reflective constructs used in the measurement models [45]. Additionally, convergent validity was also found acceptable with the composite reliability values greater than the AVE for all of the constructs and greater than the 0.500 minimum [45]. The measures also demonstrated discriminant validity as the AVE of the constructs were greater than the square of the correlations with other constructs; the cross-loading method of assessing discriminant validity was also done and was consistent with adequate discriminant validity [46]. Loading was greater for all of the indicators for their intended construct than any other construct. Discriminant validity was also assessed and supported by using The Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) method [47].

The approach outlined in [48, 49] was used to measure and model the multiple dimensions involved in the research model, which consists of reflective first-order, formative second-order constructs (self-efficacy, response efficacy, and response costs). Since there were three target behaviors in this study, it was important to assess the coping appraisal components for each of them. For example, self-efficacy had three dimensions to it—one for each of the target behaviors. Each of these dimensions were formative for the construct of self-efficacy and were measured individually using three reflective indicators that were adapted from the literature.

The five hypotheses were assessed using SmartPLS 3.3.2. In Table 1, we present the individual results for each of the four measurement models. Three of the four models only had two out of five hypotheses supported, while the combined fear and efficacy group had three out of five hypotheses supported. However, the amount of variance explained was the highest for the threat appraisal only group at 53%. Similar to other research [26], self-efficacy was consistently the best predictor of behavioral intent in these PMT models.

5.3. State Affect

In addition to evaluating the results to assess support for or against the hypotheses, we also evaluated state affect elicited from each of the four groups. Incidental state affect was measured using the PANAS-X [10, 12]. In Table 2, we provide the results of a one-way ANOVA test with Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis. The state affect dimensions that did not yield a statistically significant result were not included in the subsequent post-hoc analysis.

Several interesting observations may be made from these results. *First*, there is a clear delineation in the types of state affect elicited in the groups that included a fear component versus those that did not. In each and every case in which the one-way ANOVA test showed significantly different results between these two types of groups, the groups that used fear (i.e., threat appraisal) always elicited greater levels of negative affect and/or lower levels of positive affect.

Second, one of the most noteworthy issues raised in Renaud and Dupuis was the assumption that fear is elicited through fear appeals. This is assumed without attempting confirmation by measuring either fear or other emotions taking place [1]. These results demonstrate why we cannot take the elicitation of fear, and only fear, for granted. In the fear only group, hostility was elevated at significantly higher levels than either the control or coping appraisal only groups. Joviality is significantly lower for both groups that used

Table 1. PLS-SEM Results for the Four Groups

Group 1: Control			
	T statistic	*P value*	*Supported?*
H1: TS	2.121	0.017	*Yes*
H2: TV	1.198	0.116	No
H3: SE	4.63	p <.001	*Yes*
H4: RE	0.17	0.433	No
H5: RC	0.914	0.180	No
R^2*: 35.10%*			

Group 2: Threat Appraisal Only			
	T statistic	*P value*	*Supported?*
H1: TS	1.621	0.053	No
H2: TV	0.734	0.231	No
H3: SE	4.189	p <.001	*Yes*
H4: RE	3.479	p <.001	*Yes*
H5: RC	1.323	0.093	No
R^2*: 53%*			

Group 3: Coping Appraisal Only			
	T statistic	*P value*	*Supported?*
H1: TS	1.45	0.073	No
H2: TV	0.033	0.487	No
H3: SE	3.29	0.001	*Yes*
H4: RE	0.076	0.47	No
H5: RC	2.75	0.003	*Yes*
R^2*: 37.30%*			

Group 4: Combined			
	T statistic	*P value*	*Supported?*
H1: TS	1.701	0.044	*Yes*
H2: TV	1.388	0.083	No
H3: SE	3.189	0.001	*Yes*
H4: RE	1.906	0.028	*Yes*
H5: RC	1.198	0.083	No
R^2*: 39.10%*			

fear as compared to the two groups that did not receive the threat appraisal messaging of a fear appeal. This pattern is also observed for state serenity.

Third, the differences noted here in the types and nature of the affect elicited were the likely result of watching very short videos of approximately two to less than five minutes in duration, depending on the specific video. However, even from that short encounter with fear used in two of the four groups, we see several instances of a variety of negative types of state affect elicited. What does this suggest for more pronounced fear appeal efforts, including repeated negative messaging by an employer or the government?

6. Discussion

Dodsworth [2] argues that "happy endings are not written in the language of coercive control". We discovered that the use of fear caused our participants to create stronger passwords. Yet, they also led to negative affect. When people experience negativity towards something, they are likely to avoid it: to be reluctant to engage enthusiastically with the password creation process in the future [50]. We have to wonder what the consequences of this negative affect will be in a week, a month or a year. Moreover, what will the impact be on their general well-being [51]?

6.1. Implications

This study provides important insights into the use of fear appeals within the cybersecurity domain. It demonstrated that providing messaging on the nature of a threat (i.e., threat appraisal) and what can be done to address the threat (i.e., coping appraisal) may help engender behavioral change toward the targeted behavior(s). However, the extent to which this messaging is delivered (or not) influences the manner in which PMT may help explain their behavioral intentions. Other than perceived threat vulnerability, which has been problematic in much of the PMT literature, all of the hypotheses received at least some support in one or more of the four models.

Additionally, the results on state affect suggest that affect needs to be measured on a more regular basis when fear is employed. Fear is rarely measured despite it being a *fear appeal* that is used. To the extent that fear and fear alone is measured, these results indicate that we may be missing a significant amount of the complicated picture on how other affective components are elicited from a fear appeal, whether positive or negative types of affect.

6.2. Ethical Considerations

In deploying fear in any cyber security context, it is important not to ignore ethical considerations. Dupuis and Renaud [3] proposed six ethical principles to guide cybersecurity fear appeal experiments and deployment. These are: (1) obtain IRB approval, (2) make the benefits of cybersecurity salient, (3) only use deception if it can be rigorously justified, (4) provide a feasible recommended action (with the implication that feasibility will be verified), (5) calibrate during deployment (with the implication that the option to cease and desist will be considered if undue negative consequences are evident), and (6) debrief targets of fear appeals. If the fear appeal cannot be used within

Table 2. Differences in Dimensions of State Affect in Fear and Non-Fear Conditions

Construct	Group A	Group B	Mean Difference (A-B)	Std. Error	Sig.
State Negative Affect $F(3,795)=8.149, p<.001$	Threat Appraisal	Control	.29281*	.06531	.000
		Coping Appraisal	.24109*	.06589	.002
	Combined	Control	.18336*	.06531	.026
		Coping Appraisal	.13164	.06589	.190
State Fear $F(3,795)=7.881, p<.001$	Threat Appraisal	Control	.31297*	.07018	.000
		Coping Appraisal	.24877*	.07080	.003
	Combined	Control	.19689*	.07018	.026
		Coping Appraisal	.13268	.07080	.240
State Hostility $F(3,795)=4.943, p=.002$	Threat Appraisal	Control	.19764*	.06129	.007
		Coping Appraisal	.19722*	.06184	.008
	Combined	Control	.11887	.06129	.212
		Coping Appraisal	.11845	.06184	.222
State Guilt $F(3,795)=3.283, p=.020$	Threat Appraisal	Control	.19168*	.06857	.027
		Coping Appraisal	.15698	.06918	.106
	Combined	Control	.13198	.06857	.218
		Coping Appraisal	.09728	.06918	.496
State Joviality $F(3,795)=13.781, p<.001$	Threat Appraisal	Control	-.61638*	.10477	.000
		Coping Appraisal	-.44398*	.10570	.000
	Combined	Control	-.44660*	.10477	.000
		Coping Appraisal	-.27421*	.10570	.047
State Self-Assurance $F(3,795)=3.336, p=.019$	Threat Appraisal	Control	-.26753*	.09405	.024
		Coping Appraisal	-.17394	.09489	.259
	Combined	Control	-.22027	.09405	.090
		Coping Appraisal	-.12667	.09489	.541
State Serenity $F(3,795)=21.494, p<.001$	Threat Appraisal	Control	-.72639*	.10391	.000
		Coping Appraisal	-.60143*	.10484	.000
	Combined	Control	-.53734*	.10391	.000
		Coping Appraisal	-.41237*	.10484	.001
The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.					

these constraints, deployers should carefully re-consider going ahead with the use of fear appeals.

6.3. Limitations

There are several limitations worth noting. First, this was a single survey using a crowd-sourced participant pool. While compensation was considered fair by most, MTurk workers do have an incentive to complete the work as quickly as possible. Thus, some responses and their overall attention may not be optimal for the messaging being delivered.

Second, data was collected for this study via a survey and no other method. Thus, common method bias is a concern [52, 53]. Multiple quality control procedures were implemented to help address this concern. Additionally, the participant population is essentially anonymous to the research team. Thus, while certain elements of the procedures employed and participant pool used help to minimize the likelihood

that common method bias was a significant factor in the results obtained, it remains a concern nonetheless.

Third, the collected data comes from a single snapshot in time for our participants. This was not a longitudinal study and we do not know whether the difference in behavioral intentions lasted beyond the completion of the survey. Likewise, we do not know if the behavioral intentions themselves resulted in any actual change in behavior.

Finally, we do not know if any emotional harm resulted from the fear that was elicited. While this study was considered low risk and approved as exempt from a full IRB review, part of the challenge with using fear appeals is the balance between enhanced coping appraisal being offset by the possible harms that could result from being scared into doing something.

7. Conclusion

In a world in which we are constantly bombarded with fear to try and cause a change in behavior, it is important that we begin to understand the very nuanced nature of eliciting a specific emotion and how that may impact behavior and one's overall emotional state.

Is the use of fear appeals *worth it*? That is a difficult question that cannot be answered here. However, what we do know is that we should not take for granted that fear appeals work in the long-term and that something other than fear is not also being elicited. Emotions are complicated, as our results demonstrate.

The current study raises several issues and suggests three primary considerations for future research. *First*, more research is needed in examining threat and coping appraisals separately the better to understand how their associated constructs are related to behavioral intentions and changes in behavior, whether modeled using PMT or other theoretical approaches.

Second, fear should be measured when fear appeals are used, but it should not be fear alone that is measured. Other emotions must also be measured and assessed. The current study suggests that using fear may lead to higher levels of not only fear, but also higher levels of other types of negative emotions and lower levels of positive emotions.

Third, more longitudinal studies are needed to assess the long-term impact of triggering a short-term negative emotion. These studies should examine whether any long-term changes in emotional states have occurred and whether success was achieved with respect to the the targeted behavior(s) after a delay of some weeks.

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