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'Ambassador Brawls with Minister': Emotions and Internal and External Crisis at the French Embassy to the Holy See

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The five months of Count Wladimir d'Ormesson's term as French ambassador to the Holy See between 28 May and 1 November 1940 witnessed multiple crises at multiple levels. On one level was the international crisis as Europe was once again torn apart by war; on another was the political crisis as the Third Republic collapsed under the Axis invasions; on another was the diplomatic crisis as the embassy became France's only representation inside Italy; and on another level was the personal crisis experienced by d'Ormesson. With no civilian population to represent, no strategic, military or economic interests to defend, and being assigned to a neutral state, the French Embassy to the Holy See may not have faced the humanitarian or political emergencies that were overwhelming diplomatic missions elsewhere. It was, however, compelled to deal with a set of extraordinary circumstances that saw its staff reduced to just two, having to share accommodation with hostile missions, cut off from communicating with the outside world and confined within the walls of Vatican City. Scarcely a few weeks in, conditions had so deteriorated that newspapers in France, Italy and Germany reported that d'Ormesson had abandoned diplomacy altogether, exchanging physical blows with his British counterpart on the steps of a Vatican hostel for pilgrims.¹

By proposing an understanding of embassy crises as being at once external and internal, this chapter takes its cue from the 'cultural turn' in international history that has seen scholars explore the significance of beliefs, environments and representations.² It suggests that the

international and domestic challenges of war and invasion resulted in the removal of the infrastructure and support upon which the French Embassy to the Holy See normally depended. This exposed the roles played by a small number of actors and created a space into which their visions, beliefs and emotions came to prevail. In his work analysing the influences that shape the actions of decision-makers, Frank Costigliola has advocated a shift in the way that scholars understand the cultural and emotional dimensions of international relations, arguing: ‘At a time when historians increasingly focus on the transnational interactions of nonstate actors it merits looking also at how the personalities, emotions, cultural perspectives, intimacies, friendships, and animosities of diplomats and other top officials affected their political reporting and negotiations.’³ This chapter aims to take this a step further by proposing an approach by which embassies’ management of crises are analysed through the actions of protagonists and their often improvised decisions. It suggests that by their very nature, decisions taken in response to crises may be subject to intensified pressures and may be more vulnerable to being shaped by personal beliefs and emotions.

The study of emotions within international relations has been a growing field of enquiry in recent years. It has led political scientists to question rational actor theories and indeed the ‘rational-irrational dichotomy’ in international relations.⁴ Historians have also begun re-examining familiar episodes such as the peace negotiations at the end of the First World War, exploring how actors’ attempts to portray their actions as rational often mask the more complex ways in which decision-making is affected by the interrelationship between emotion and reason.⁵ The ethos among diplomats has traditionally been one of prizing calmness over emotionality, associating the latter with mistakes and misjudgements. However, as new research on cognition highlights, the brain does not sharply delineate between emotion and reason.⁶ These arguments have particular pertinence for the themes explored in this chapter

because at times of crisis, emotions may become heightened, affecting decisions and perceptions. They raise questions about what place emotions might have in embassies' management of crises and how diplomats respond to the challenges with which they are confronted.

While the crises facing the French Embassy to the Holy See in 1940 were external in their causes, they manifested themselves internally, creating challenges for the embassy and for d'Ormesson as ambassador in particular. The circumstances of late May to early November 1940 severely reduced the capacity and resources of the embassy and left it isolated from the French government and the wider world. Operating from within the confines of Vatican City and unable to communicate regularly or directly with anyone outside, the continued survival of the embassy placed exceptional pressure upon the ambassador. Indeed, as d'Ormesson later testified: 'The situation in which I found myself was so special that it could in no way be compared to that of a traditional embassy, even in a country at war.'⁷

At the same time, as ambassador d'Ormesson found himself grappling with multiple crises of conscience. On the one hand, he faced having to work for a regime that he increasingly opposed. On the other, he believed that he had a duty to serve his country. Charged with the seemingly impossible task of gaining Vatican support for the Vichy government's domestic and foreign policies, d'Ormesson grew increasingly frustrated by the tensions between the Catholic faith that led him to look to the Pope for moral leadership and the dawning realisation that Pius XII was unwilling to take the actions he sought of him. D'Ormesson's conflicting loyalties raised questions about whom and whose vision of France the embassy was there to represent. It left d'Ormesson struggling between believing that it was his

patriotic duty to remain in post and grappling with his conscience as he did so. In exploring d'Ormesson's conflicting emotions, this chapter therefore suggests that embassies' management of crises concerns more than tangible external challenges or internal operational tasks. The crises that d'Ormesson had to deal with were diplomatic, international and professional, but they were also personal. The relationship between reason and emotion, the rational and irrational, which have been explored by scholars elsewhere, was thus further complicated by the interplay between individually-held views and religious beliefs.

The period covered in this chapter is often seen as standing at a nexus between the new and old diplomacy and moves towards the professionalisation of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Quai d'Orsay.⁸ Historical accounts of the roles played by embassies in the early to mid-twentieth century have typically painted a picture of their declining significance. During this period, the desire to avoid the misunderstandings that had aggravated international tensions before the outbreak of the First World War combined with demands for greater transparency and democratic accountability. Politicians therefore increasingly favoured direct diplomacy over relying upon ambassadors and embassies.⁹ When Europe found itself once more at war in 1939, the role of resident embassies changed again.¹⁰ The conflict impeded the ability of politicians to move freely and to engage in direct dialogue in the conferences that had characterised interwar international relations. Governments needed information, while communication with foreign governments and their people became more crucial than ever.¹¹

The history of embassies in wartime often ends with the withdrawal of staff and the closure of embassy buildings.¹² As a consequence, the scholarship on how embassies have

confronted the associated challenges has remained largely focused upon their handling of diplomatic emergencies and their humanitarian work at the outbreak of hostilities, as well as their efforts to help rebuild on the cessation of conflict.¹³ In the case of the French Embassy to the Holy See, however, the neutrality of the Vatican City State served as a cover for Vichy's attempts at diplomatic engagement with Italy after Mussolini's declaration of war against France forced the closure of the French Embassy to Rome. The French Embassy to the Holy See therefore represents a distinct and significant case study of an embassy's handling of war and its management of the challenges that resulted from it.

French Relations with the Holy See

The size and economic and military power of Vatican City belie its wider political and cultural authority across the globe. Its anomalous status is rooted in the seizure of the Papal States by Italian nationalists in 1870. However, the 1929 Lateran Treaty sought to settle the Vatican's relationship with unified Italy once and for all by establishing Vatican City as an independent enclave state within Italy. As the world's smallest sovereign state with just a few hundred residents, only a ceremonial army and no real economy, the post of ambassador to the Holy See has sometimes been seen as little more than a 'well-paid sinecure'.¹⁴ Yet the Vatican's notions of spiritual and temporal pre-eminence, its historical influence within many states and its transnational leadership over millions of Catholics have meant that embassies to the Holy See have often found themselves engaged in particularly sensitive and complex diplomacy. In the midst of genocide and persecution during the Second World War, many people looked to the Vatican for moral leadership in the struggle against Nazism and Fascism. If Pope Pius XII was reluctant to intervene, his position as pontiff nonetheless gave

him an authority that transcended ordinary political power and reached across nations and empires.

Despite being a secular state, the Third Republic considered diplomatic representation at the Vatican to be critical to French interests. Its embassy to the Holy See was one of only fifteen embassies representing France abroad at the outbreak of war in September 1939. The first permanent papal nuncios to France dated back to the early sixteenth century. Diplomatic relations survived the upheavals of the Revolution of 1789 and were even maintained informally during the period of official rupture between 1904 and 1920 following the separation of Church and State. Even the election of the left-wing Popular Front government in 1936 did nothing to dent the improvement of relations between France and the Holy See, largely because of François Charles-Roux who was appointed as ambassador in 1932.¹⁵

Charles-Roux used his position to seek to persuade the Pope to take a leading role in international affairs. However, the death of Pius XI on 10 February 1939 dealt a blow to such aspirations. The new pontiff, Pius XII, refused to condemn the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, fearing harmful repercussions for Polish Catholics. Only with the *Summi Pontificatus* encyclical on 20 October 1939 did Pius XII denounce Hitler's actions and appeal for a just peace.¹⁶ Nevertheless, he declined the French government's request to condemn the German invasion of France on 10 May 1940.¹⁷ From the start of his papacy, there were therefore sharp divergences between what the French government wanted and envisaged of the Vatican's role in the war and what Pius XII was willing to do. The opposing visions grew more acute with the French collapse, leaving the Embassy to the Holy See with the

increasingly intractable problem of having to deal with a recalcitrant pontiff on whose shoulders the French government placed ever more unrealistic expectations.

The rapid German advance into French territory threw the country and its government into chaos. With the Quai d'Orsay significantly under-resourced and criticised by ministers over its handling of the international crisis, Foreign Minister Paul Reynaud resolved that he urgently needed the best, most experienced diplomats to return to France.¹⁸ He therefore recalled a number of senior ambassadors, including Charles-Roux, whom he nominated Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The appointment of Charles-Roux's successor as ambassador to the Holy See may have been a consequence of the disasters of May 1940 but the choice of d'Ormesson was part of a wider effort by the French government to pursue a different kind of diplomacy. In response to the ideological challenges to the international order from Fascism, Nazism and Communism, the French government looked to new ways of conducting its foreign relations.¹⁹ By nominating non-professionals to the post of ambassador and by using unofficial emissaries, Paris sought to circumvent anti-liberal regimes' suspicion of traditional diplomatic practices.²⁰ Thus in March 1939, despite having no previous experience in international affairs, Marshal Philippe Pétain was appointed ambassador to Madrid in an attempt to repair the damage caused by the French government's support for the republicans during the Spanish Civil War.²¹

It was precisely because d'Ormesson was both a diplomatic novice and accustomed to the diplomatic milieu that Reynaud decided to appoint him as ambassador to the Holy See.²² As

the son and brother of ambassadors, d'Ormesson was well-connected within diplomatic and government circles, having spent his childhood in the French embassies to St Petersburg, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Athens and Brussels. He was, however, a journalist with no direct experience of conducting international diplomacy. During the 1930s, he had worked as an editorialist for *Le Figaro*, being known for his conservative views and criticism of the Third Republic. When he arrived at Taverna Palace in Rome on 28 May 1940, d'Ormesson may thus not have experienced his new position as a cultural upheaval, but having been sent to undertake a difficult mission in the midst of war and international crisis, he quickly experienced his posting as a professional and personal trial.

Within days, as a consequence of Mussolini's declaration of war on 10 June 1940, all French diplomats were ordered to leave Italian territory. The French ambassador to Italy, André François-Poncet, departed two days later, along with all but a handful of staff left to guard the embassy building. Despite Article 12 of the Lateran Treaty guaranteeing the right of embassies to the Holy See to continue to operate from Italian territory in the case of war, the French Embassy was obliged to move from Taverna Palace to the sovereign territory of Vatican City.²³ Permitted to retain only two members of staff, the embassy found itself reduced to d'Ormesson and embassy counsellor Jean Rivière.²⁴ Thereafter, neither they, nor their wives who accompanied them, were permitted to leave Vatican City without special permission from the Italian government and a police escort.

Despite Vatican City being a neutral sovereign state, the Italian government nevertheless contrived to impose restrictions upon its foreign embassies, much as if they had remained on Italian soil. As an enclave within Italy, on which it was dependent for almost all of its material needs, the very existence of the Vatican City state was contingent upon the Fascist

government continuing to respect international law.²⁵ Ambassadors to the Holy See were therefore acutely aware of the Vatican's precarious position and of the implications for its relations with the Italian government. They also knew that they had to modify their behaviour in order not to risk jeopardising their embassies' continuing existence. Ambassadors therefore tacitly accepted Italian encroachments upon the sovereignty of the Vatican and upon the sovereignty of their own embassies.²⁶ Indeed, despite ascertaining that the Italian government had placed a spy posing as a footman into his embassy, d'Ormesson made no official complaint and did nothing to try to bring about his removal.²⁷

Isolation and 'Imprisonment'

The ambassadors and diplomatic staff compelled to operate from within the walls of Vatican City soon found that confinement caused isolation, claustrophobia and a climate of intense pressure.²⁸ With no hot water and only the most basic facilities, the temporary accommodation into which the French embassy relocated in the first few weeks was more like prison life than the splendour and comfort more usually associated with embassy buildings. Yet as he prepared to move, d'Ormesson welcomed the 'rudimentary' conditions, seeing it as an opportunity to share in some of the privations being endured by the French people.²⁹ He was even willing to accept 'captivity' as an act of suffering for the good of his country.³⁰ However, d'Ormesson's final correspondence before entering Vatican City suggested that he had little real sense of the difficulties that awaited him. The isolation of the French embassy combined with the feverish atmosphere within the walls of Vatican City turned an external crisis into an internal one as well.

Relocation to Vatican City caused the embassy to become cut off from the outside world and meant that d'Ormesson was effectively left to conduct French policy alone. When he had begun his tenure, the embassy had had a full cohort of staff working closely with the larger French Embassy to Rome at Farnese Palace and with officials at the Quai d'Orsay.

D'Ormesson had therefore been supported by teams of experienced staff and would normally have expected to work within clearly defined policy objectives laid out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the extreme circumstances of June 1940, however, the embassy's support networks fell away, leaving d'Ormesson and Rivière having to fend for themselves.

At the heart of the problems facing the embassy was its inability to communicate freely with the French government. The terms of the Lateran Treaty stated that the Italian state would not interfere with postal and telegraph communications between the Vatican and foreign states. That was not the case in practice, however. The embassy therefore had to rely on the Holy See allowing foreign diplomats to transmit a limited number of words to their governments once a week via short wave radio and to use the diplomatic bags the Holy See sent to Berne.³¹ All correspondence had to go through Vatican censorship and d'Ormesson was obliged to restrict his communications solely to France's relations with the Holy See. Correspondence became very slow, taking at best a week for letters to reach Vichy, and often longer. One of d'Ormesson's telegrams sent on 1 July 1940 only arrived in Vichy on 9 September, by which time it had long been superseded by events.³²

There is little evidence of any regular correspondence from Vichy to the French Embassy to the Holy See between mid-June and early August 1940. The records might be incomplete, but the most likely explanation is that the gaps were a consequence of the chaos of the defeat and

the establishment of the Vichy government. With the abandonment of Paris on 10 June, some foreign ministry officials relocated to Langeais near Tours, but many were placed on leave. On being recalled in early July, they discovered that just ten boxes of files had made it to Vichy, the rest having been burned in Paris or seized by German forces.³³ With only a relatively small staff at the best of times, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found itself overwhelmed by the tasks it now faced and deprived of the resources it needed to accomplish them. Restrictions imposed by the German authorities served to compound the difficulties. Throughout July, few ambassadors had any regular communication from Vichy, with only seven out of the fifty-five telegrams sent to Washington reaching their destination.³⁴ Over the course of June and July 1940, almost all of d'Ormesson's correspondence with Vichy went unanswered.

In normal circumstances, communication difficulties might have been mitigated by experienced embassy staff providing advice based on their knowledge and understanding of government policy. In the circumstances that confronted the embassy from June 1940, however, not only were the staff no longer there, but the government had fallen and with it the entire constitutional structure of the Third Republic. Having been dispatched to Rome armed only with Foreign Minister Edouard Daladier's request to secure the Pope's condemnation of the Nazis' bombardment of civilians, d'Ormesson had little to guide him.³⁵ Without any specific instructions, and certainly none that corresponded with the changing government position, and lacking the professional training and experience of his predecessors, d'Ormesson allowed personal convictions to guide his actions instead.

Believing his lack of formal training to be a virtue, d'Ormesson later described his *modus operandi* as one that deliberately eschewed the traditional modes of diplomacy and was suspicious of the 'ridiculous' nature of diplomatic protocol.³⁶ The conventional 'scholastic' diplomacy led, he argued, to diplomats losing touch with reality, using arcane language and behaving in absurd ways.³⁷ He believed instead that it should be a more instinctive process, not driven by 'abstract formulae' but by following one's 'intuition'.³⁸ But while d'Ormesson maintained that his upbringing had enabled him to develop a deep understanding of international affairs, in practice his inexperience was to cloud his judgement and impair his ability to manage the challenges with which he was confronted.

It began as early as his first audience with the Pope on 9 June 1940. Despite representing the secular Third Republic, d'Ormesson embarked upon a strategy of seeking to appeal to the Holy See by presenting France as a 'martyr' for Christian civilisation.³⁹ The day after the Italian declaration of war, d'Ormesson repeated his claims at an audience with the cardinal secretary, appealing to the Pope on behalf not just of the French government and but of all French Catholics.⁴⁰ Perhaps most remarkably, on 21 June, he followed his efforts with a letter beseeching the Pope's clemency. Painting a picture of national repentance for the sins of the Third Republic, he stated that France was 'at Calvary', but was on a path to redemption, putting its 'faith in the renewal of religious and spiritual values'.⁴¹

Despite having no instructions from the new government that was being hastily formed under Pétain's leadership, d'Ormesson's letter to the Pope was remarkably consistent with what would become the Vichy regime's ideological representation of the causes of the defeat. Interpretations of the military collapse as a moral and political failing were already swirling

around government and those who had been critical of the Third Republic. However, the consistency between d'Ormesson's approach and that desired by the new regime under Pétain was not to last long. As Vichy's policy developed away from the conservative outlook that d'Ormesson shared with many of those entering Pétain's government towards active collaboration with the Nazis, d'Ormesson began to encounter a conflict between the ideas that he was supposed to convey as ambassador and those that he personally endorsed.

Tensions with Vichy

The early weeks of the Vichy regime misled many conservatives and Catholics such as d'Ormesson into believing that it represented an antidote to the Third Republic's secularisation measures. The regime's National Revolution sought to return Christianity to the core of national values and to revive notions of France as 'eldest daughter of the Catholic Church'. Yet while prominent Catholics assumed key positions in government, neither the Church nor Christianity shaped policy.⁴² Above all, however, it was Vichy's purely temporal vision of the Holy See that signalled a fundamentally different outlook from that held by d'Ormesson. Viewing France as being defined by its Catholicism, d'Ormesson looked to the Vatican as a natural and 'precious base of support'.⁴³ The policy advanced by Vichy, by contrast, saw the Pope in political terms as an intermediary to Mussolini, disregarding the Vatican's spiritual authority and its ability to challenge the Fascist regime from a moral standpoint. This fundamental divergence with Vichy on both a policy and a spiritual level represented a growing moral dilemma for d'Ormesson. Over the course of his tenure, he increasingly struggled to balance duty to his country as ambassador with a rejection of the ideas being advanced by Vichy.

From his earliest encounter with the Pope, d'Ormesson found himself torn between the conflicting imperatives of duty, faith and patriotism. He was far from being the first or the last ambassador to oppose the policies of the government he was tasked with representing. However, the first few weeks of his tenure had seen not merely a change of policy or of government but a change of regime. Like almost all his contemporaries, he believed that he had a duty to remain in his post despite the dissolution of the Third Republic. His later attempts to justify his decision by claiming that he had felt a responsibility to represent not Vichy but the 'eternal France, momentarily paralysed' may have borne the hallmarks of *post facto* Gaullist influence, but it hinted at the moral dilemmas he faced while ambassador.⁴⁴ Knowing that Charles-Roux shared many of his concerns about Vichy, he turned to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a pressure valve through whom he could let off steam.⁴⁵ In a private letter to Charles-Roux on 1 October, he revealed that he drew comfort from knowing that his friend was also 'suffering from this awful situation' and confessed that his continued presence in Vichy was a 'guarantee of conscience'.⁴⁶

Being France's only remaining diplomatic representation inside Italy after 10 June 1940, Vichy looked to turn the Embassy to the Holy See into a proxy for the Embassy to Italy.⁴⁷ Its continuing presence in Vatican City therefore became critical to Vichy's foreign policy. For although most accounts of this period focus upon French officials' attempts to develop closer relations with the Nazis, during the summer and autumn of 1940, Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin and Charles-Roux were actively engaged in pursuing an alternative policy of using the Holy See to develop rapprochement with Italy.⁴⁸ Seeking to turn Italy into a counterweight to German domination, they saw the Holy See as a conduit to Mussolini and the Vatican as a conduit to the Italian people.⁴⁹ Above all, officials wanted to use the Holy See to help bring an end to the anti-French propaganda being pumped out by the Fascist

regime which was serving to thwart their attempts to orientate Vichy's policy towards Rome rather than Berlin.⁵⁰

However, it was immediately apparent to d'Ormesson that the Pope was ill-suited and ill-inclined to play any active role in international affairs and still less to act as France's intermediary to Mussolini. On meeting Pius XII for the first time, he noted that the Pope approached the cataclysmic events befalling Europe as theological rather than temporal issues.⁵¹ While acknowledging the Pope's 'ardent piety', d'Ormesson's observation that it belonged in spheres that were 'a bit too distant from the miserable earthly happenings in which we are obliged to live and suffer' was witheringly critical.⁵² In the months that followed, d'Ormesson repeatedly warned Baudouin against counting on the Pope or the Holy See to bring any significant intervention. On 18 July, he described the Pope as being 'crushed' and 'dominated' by events, and claimed that he lacked the strength of character to confront the dangers that Europe was facing.⁵³ On 19 August, he wrote: 'The Holy See moans and resigns itself to its fate, whereas it should be protesting and reacting.'⁵⁴ In his personal correspondence with Charles-Roux, d'Ormesson expressed his exasperation with the Pope in still more vivid terms, stating: 'his passivity despairs me!'⁵⁵ However, it was in his final report as ambassador that d'Ormesson issued his most damning assessment, describing the Vatican's inaction as 'unilateral abdication' to the Fascist government.⁵⁶ Far from being able to effect any change in Italian policy towards France, d'Ormesson concluded that Pius XII was dismissed with 'indifference' by Mussolini.⁵⁷

Isolation from Vichy and the outside world, combined with the heterogeneous and evolving nature of the regime's ideology, served to create a growing gap between what d'Ormesson

thought French policy was and should be and its trajectory in reality. While d'Ormesson supported the conservative and even reactionary visions of the National Revolution, he did not support collaboration with Nazi Germany. Writing to Pierre Laval at the end of his tenure, d'Ormesson expounded a vision of the Holy See's usefulness as being predicated on Vichy as an opponent, rather than a partner, of Nazi Germany. Despite coming only a week after the Montoire meetings with Hitler and the same day as Pétain's radio broadcast announcing the new policy of collaboration with Nazi Germany, the tone and substance of d'Ormesson's letter suggested that he did not appreciate the inconsistencies between the Holy See's view of Hitler as the enemy of Christianity and Vichy's political vision.⁵⁸ A few weeks earlier, d'Ormesson had written to Charles-Roux explaining that whereas Vichy claimed that cooperation with the German government enabled it to introduce reforms to remedy France's ills, the Holy See regarded sympathy with the Nazis as one of the causes of France's moral collapse.⁵⁹ It might be that d'Ormesson was simply being selective in his representation of Vichy's ideology, focusing on the National Revolution's domestic reforms, rather than on broader conceptions that connected the regime's internal and external policies. It might also be the case that being cut off from Vichy, d'Ormesson did not fully understand the policy divergences between Laval and Baudouin in relation to the Holy See and Nazi Germany. Either way, the letter revealed the gulf that had developed between the vision being pursued by the French Embassy to the Holy See and the policy being pursued by the Vichy government.

The embassy's proximity to other foreign missions in Vatican City served to make its deviation from the policy of the French government still more pronounced. At times of war, contact with enemy missions normally ends, so that diplomats cannot be accused of collusion. However, the particular circumstances faced by foreign diplomats in Vatican City

created a shared experience that overrode diplomatic protocol. The French embassy was located on the second floor of the Santa Marta hostel; the first floor was occupied by the Polish ambassador, the third by the Belgian ambassador and the fourth by the British Minister, D'Arcy Osborne. When d'Ormesson had arrived at his posting, Britain and France were allies and he quickly struck up a friendship with Osborne. A few weeks later, however, the French surrender and the fallout over the British attack on the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir brought tensions and then a rupture in diplomatic relations between the two states. Outside Vatican City, rumours started to circle that the breach had rendered the physical proximity of the French and British embassies intolerable. *Le Matin* claimed that d'Ormesson and Osborne no longer greeted each other as they passed on the stairs, while other newspapers reported that they had exchanged physical blows.⁶⁰ However, the reality was that their common suffering and isolation from the outside world served to forge a bond that was stronger than any sense of loyalty the French ambassador might have felt to the Vichy regime. Indeed, d'Ormesson continued to have lunch with Osborne almost every day. Although Vichy unofficially kept the door open to Britain through its embassy in neutral Spain after the formal rupture of diplomatic relations, d'Ormesson's actions were not part of this initiative and were not sanctioned by the French government.⁶¹

Crises of Conscience

All of this served to heighten the pressure upon d'Ormesson professionally and personally. When comparing his experiences as ambassador to the Holy See in 1940 with those in his second term between 1948 and 1956, the contrast could hardly have been greater. While the end of the war was undoubtedly the most significant factor in alleviating many of the pressures d'Ormesson had endured in 1940, being properly supported by a full embassy staff

in more suitable accommodation, able to communicate freely with the Quai d'Orsay and the outside world and being more experienced in the role also served to transform the nature of ambassador's role. However, the difficulties faced by d'Ormesson in 1940 were not merely of a professional nature. Nor was the crisis just one that affected the operations of the embassy. During his term as ambassador in 1940, d'Ormesson suffered a personal crisis that manifested itself in his religious faith, as well as his emotional and mental wellbeing. The particular character of the position of ambassador to the Holy See was one which was shaped by the often difficult combination of the Vatican's spiritual and temporal roles. The circumstances of the war meant that d'Ormesson felt the contrast particularly acutely. On the one side were the grandeur and sanctity of the Vatican, while on the other were the violent conflict and atrocities being committed against millions of people. In the middle was the mundane nature of his daily existence.⁶²

In his memoirs, d'Ormesson strikingly evoked the contrast between being swept up in spiritual awe by the Vatican and the crushing realities of the world outside as France faced defeat by Nazi Germany. After presenting his credentials to the Pope, d'Ormesson went to St Peter's Basilica. As he entered, he found himself witnessing the beatification of the French founder of the Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family, Emilie de Rodat. Viewing a painting of Emilie de Rodat with her arms raised towards the sky, d'Ormesson was overcome with emotion:

At the moment when it seemed that our nation was going to collapse into ruin, when everything seemed to come together to cause this fall, here a humble daughter of France was being honoured in the most august basilicas of Christianity, that which symbolises eternal promise. [...] Was it mockery? Or evidence of a promise? Faltering with emotion and hope, I asked myself this question while entering St Peter's on that harrowing morning of 9 June 1940.⁶³

The answer, he claimed, came precisely four years later. On 9 June 1944, at the very hour that the beatification had taken place in 1940, General Juin and the French general staff arrived at the Vatican as allied forces advanced into Normandy to liberate mainland France.

The representation of such incidents was undoubtedly shaped by d'Ormesson's literary pretensions, being quite unlike the more neutral tones of Charles-Roux's memoirs as a professional diplomat. Yet the difference was more than one of language. The weight of responsibility placed upon d'Ormesson's shoulders went beyond the normal expectations of ambassadors. For some French Catholics, his assignment was an act of sacrifice imbued with symbolic Christian meaning, the newspaper *La Croix* reporting that, 'like an apostle, he rushed, *relictis omnibus*, to represent France'.⁶⁴ However, the extraordinary nature of d'Ormesson's tenure as ambassador in 1940 and his lack of experience in handling international and diplomatic crises combined to mean that he found himself ill-equipped to deal with the pressures of the situation.

While scholars have explored the physical and mental strains suffered by diplomats confined to the Vatican City State during the Second World War, little attention has been paid to the emotional strains. Owen Chadwick paints a vivid picture of the damaging impact Osborne's tenure as British minister to the Holy See had upon his physical health and how long periods of isolation and monotony brought on bouts of depression.⁶⁵ Osborne was not alone in his suffering; the Belgian ambassador, Adrien Nieuwenhuys, was diagnosed with neurasthenia, triggered by his apartment's proximity to the bells of St Peter's Basilica. While Osborne served a much longer term than d'Ormesson, the two men experienced similar working and living conditions and suffered similar mental strains. Drawing upon Osborne's papers,

Chadwick hints at the emotional toll upon the two men, stating that d'Ormesson was 'liable to weep in Osborne's arms at the tragedy of France'.⁶⁶ Yet while Chadwick's account is supported by d'Ormesson's claim that he and the British envoy 'cried together with one heart', he does not take the analysis any further.⁶⁷ D'Ormesson did not seek to hide the emotional pressure he felt during his tenure as ambassador at the time or in his post-war memoirs. Likening the experience to 'torture', he compared his recall to France with being thrown a lifejacket while drowning.⁶⁸

The dissonance between how d'Ormesson envisioned the Pope's response to the French collapse and the reality of Pius XII's reaction became a growing source of professional frustration, but it was one that was rooted in a deeply personal sense of emotional disillusionment. As a practising Catholic, d'Ormesson looked to the Pope and the Vatican for moral and spiritual leadership. His realisation not only that this would not be the case but that the Pope viewed the theological significance of the French collapse in very different terms therefore came as a bitter disappointment. At his first audience with the Pope, d'Ormesson was taken aback by the pontiff's decision to use France's hour of need as an occasion to moralise.⁶⁹ The Pope questioned the resilience and moral fibre of the French people, comparing it unfavourably to the stoicism they had shown in the First World War.⁷⁰ Criticising the Third Republic's secularisation measures, the Pope asserted that the country's internal crisis was so profound that it had simply given up the struggle to save Christian civilisation from the Nazis.⁷¹ While Pius XII did not see the war in expiatory terms and stopped short of the rhetoric of divine retribution that had been the Catholic Church's diagnosis of France's military defeat in 1871, his words nonetheless implied that the country's troubles were a consequence of its own actions.⁷²

Ultimately, the problem came down to the unique character of diplomatic relations with the Holy See. The hybrid nature of the Holy See, combining conventional secular practices with faith-based diplomacy, involves its agents balancing multiple and sometimes conflicting roles.⁷³ In turn, embassies to the Holy See have to navigate the complexities of the Vatican's international and transnational missions. While it might not be uncommon for diplomatic staff to have personal affiliations with their host country, the Vatican's significance for Roman Catholics creates a very particular potential for conflicts of loyalty and conscience. Indeed, to avoid any such issues, the British government appointed a Protestant as minister to the Holy See in 1940. Similar considerations determined Roosevelt's decision to nominate Myron Taylor, an 'unfervent' Episcopalian, as the American representative.⁷⁴ While embassy staff might admire their host country's head of state or government, they do not normally view them with quite the same veneration as d'Ormesson viewed the head of the Catholic Church. And as trained diplomats, they would be expected to retain a professional distance from the officials and other representatives of their host state. This was not the case with d'Ormesson.

In his memoirs, d'Ormesson articulated a visceral, faith-driven reverence for Pius XII and the papacy as an institution, writing: 'I never approached him without emotion. Above all, it was because he was the Pope, because he emanated such ethereal grandeur'.⁷⁵ His entreaty to the Pope as ambassador on 21 June was especially personal in character, carrying the weight of d'Ormesson's faith as he appealed for papal blessing on behalf of his country.⁷⁶ However, the nature of d'Ormesson's character and his spiritual and emotional investment in the Vatican meant that he wanted more than merely the Pope's sympathetic words. The problem was that

while he often noted that the Pope listened with ‘emotion’ and ‘close attention’, there was a striking contrast between his impassioned and heartfelt pleas for intervention and his perceptions of Pius XII’s ‘passivity’.⁷⁷ Within weeks, d’Ormesson had become so disheartened by the Pope’s inaction that even when the Holy See promised to issue a statement to the French people, he dismissed it on the grounds that Pius XII’s ‘convoluted and flowery’ style was likely to render it ineffectual.⁷⁸ Reflecting upon the nature of his Catholic faith in 1943, d’Ormesson described it as having become ‘reasoned’, eschewing mere conformism to be driven by a desire to reconcile his Christian conscience with his daily life.⁷⁹ It was a conflict he increasingly struggled to resolve as ambassador in 1940.

The strain d’Ormesson suffered as an inexperienced, non-professional diplomat operating in virtual isolation and battling with his Christian conscience is brought into sharp relief by the more philosophical approach he adopted when writing about Pius XII over twenty years later. His post-war memoirs, written after his second term as ambassador to the Holy See, featured none of the criticisms of Pius XII that he had made in 1940. Instead, having gained greater experience and having worked in calmer times, he argued that the Vatican needed to be understood not through any temporal logic but in its own terms as a religious authority. Whereas other states were driven by their own interests, the Holy See’s approach was ‘transcendent’.⁸⁰ Its concerns operated at a different level and rhythm to those of the rest of the world. While modern international politics demanded immediate responses and solutions to crises, the Holy See viewed all matters in a timeframe that spanned eternity.⁸¹ The defeat of the Axis in 1945 revealed the full magnitude of the genocide that had taken place in Europe, opening up a wave of condemnation of the Pope for not having done more to help those suffering persecution and for failing to take a public moral stance against those responsible.⁸² Writing in the late 1960s, however, d’Ormesson vigorously defended Pius

XII's wartime record. In contrast with the exasperation he had felt at the Pope's inaction in 1940, d'Ormesson defended Pius XII, arguing that he was merely the unwitting product of an esoteric institution ill-equipped to deal with the violent forces of modern politics.⁸³ Having been thrown in at the deep end of diplomacy amidst the disasters of the war and invasion, d'Ormesson had found himself unable to adapt to the Vatican's outlook in 1940. It was only years later, and in very different circumstances, that he was able to comprehend the Pope's approach during the war.

Conclusion

D'Ormesson's term as ambassador abruptly ended on his recall by Laval in early October 1940. He left the Vatican on 1 November and, despite his divergences with Vichy's moves towards collaboration, was hailed in the French press as 'heroic', 'a great diplomat' and having 'fulfilled his duty' in the midst of 'anguish'.⁸⁴ The unique status of the Vatican City State made the experiences of the French Embassy to the Holy See in 1940 highly unusual. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to capitalise on its position as a neutral state located within an enemy state to turn it into a proxy embassy to Italy. While the new Vichy regime's ideological reforms compelled elements within government to seek legitimacy from Vatican support, it was the Holy See's perceived usefulness in relation to the Italian Fascist regime that drove its attempts at rapprochement with the Pope. This policy thrust the newly-appointed d'Ormesson to the forefront, having to manage a role for which he was not adequately prepared. Reduced to two men, the embassy found itself navigating with little direction from Vichy and little of the support essential to the task.

However, the crises encountered by the French Embassy to the Holy See were not merely political or operational; they were culturally embedded as well. Some of the gravest dilemmas ensued from the conflicts between the vision of France espoused by d'Ormesson and that advanced by the new Vichy regime. Moreover, some of the embassy's greatest frustrations arose from the cultural differences between its worldview and that of the Vatican. If the judgement, decisions and actions of d'Ormesson were influenced by emotion, the cultural nature of how emotions are construed came into sharp relief in the clashes between his and the Pope's responses to the crises that swept through the Vatican and beyond. This case study therefore not only highlights how there is no sharp dichotomy between reason and emotions in decision-making processes, but how the crises of 1940 led d'Ormesson consciously to eschew conventional diplomatic practices to embrace a conscience-driven approach instead. Adopting a cultural lens to incorporate the significance of emotions therefore facilitates a deeper understanding of embassies' responses to crises, going beyond the sensational press reports of brawling diplomats.

¹ Wladimir d'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg à Rome* (Paris: Plon, 1969), p. 194; Owen Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican during the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 133.

² David Reynolds, 'International History, the Cultural Turn and the Diplomatic Twitch', *Cultural and Social History*, 3:1 (2006), pp. 75-91; On defining international and diplomatic crises, see Michele Acuto, 'Diplomats in Crisis', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 22:3 (2011), pp. 521-539.

³ Frank Costigliola, 'Pamela Churchill, Wartime London, and the Making of the Special Relationship', *Diplomatic History*, 36:4 (2012), pp. 761-2.

⁴ Neta C. Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships', *International Security*, 24:4 (2000), pp. 116-156.

⁵ John W. Young, 'Emotions and the British Government's Decision for War in 1914', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 29:4 (2018), pp. 543-564.

⁶ Denis Clark, 'Seeking Moderation and Stability: Emotion, the British Delegation and the Polish Settlement at Paris, 1919', *The International History Review*, (2019)
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2019.1650388>.

⁷ D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg*, p. 195

⁸ Maurice Vaisse, 'L'adaption au Quai d'Orsay aux nouvelles conditions diplomatiques (1919-1939)', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 32:1 (1985), pp. 145-62; Peter Jackson, 'Tradition and Adaptation: The Social Universe of the French Foreign Affairs Ministry in the Era of the First World War', *French History*, 24:2 (2010), pp. 164-196.

⁹ Keith Hamilton and Richard Longhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration* (London: Routledge, 2002), 137-139.

¹⁰ Christopher Baxter and Andrew Stewart, 'Introduction', in Christopher Baxter and Andrew Stewart (eds.), *Diplomats at War: British and Commonwealth Diplomacy in Wartime* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 19-20.

¹¹ On the role of US ambassadors see: David Mayers, 'Neither War Nor Peace: FDR's Ambassadors in Embassy Berlin and Policy Toward Germany', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 20:1 (2009), pp. 50-68; Emmet Kennedy, 'Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes's Wartime Diplomacy: Making Spain a Haven from Hitler', *Diplomatic History*, 36:2 (2012), pp. 237-60.

¹² See, for instance, Carl E. Schorske, 'Two German Ambassadors: Dirksen and Schulenburg', in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, Vol. 2, *The Thirties* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), pp. 477-511; G. R. Berridge, *Embassies in Armed Conflict* (New York: Continuum, 2012).

¹³ See, for instance, David Mayers, *FDR's Ambassadors and the Diplomacy of Crisis: From the Rise of Hitler to the End of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹⁴ Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, p. 1.

¹⁵ Yves-Marie Hilaire, 'Le Saint-Siège et la France, 1932- 1939. Charles-Roux, un ambassadeur de politique étrangère', in Achille Ratti (ed.) *Pape Pie XI. Actes du colloque de Rome (15-18 mars 1989)* (Rome: École Française de Rom, 1996), pp. 765-773.

¹⁶ Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, pp. 79, 83.

¹⁷ Commission de Publication des Documents Diplomatiques Français, *Documents diplomatiques français 1940* Vol. 1 (*1 janvier - 10 juillet 1940*) (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004) (Hereafter DDF), Charles-Roux to Reynaud, 10 May 1940, p. 610.

¹⁸ Anthony Adamthwaite, *France and the Coming of the Second World War, 1936-1939* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 139.

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- ¹⁹ Zara Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 101-61; MacGregor Knox, *Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- ²⁰ Hamilton and Longhorne, *Practice of Diplomacy*, 168. On Baudouin's mission as unofficial emissary to Italy in 1939, see Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, 'La mission Baudouin à Rome', in Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and Enrico Serra (eds.), *Italia e Francia (1939-1945)* vol. 1 (Milan: F. Angeli, 1984).
- ²¹ Michel Catala, 'L'ambassade espagnole de Pétain (mars 1939-mai 1940)', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 55 (1997), pp. 29-42.
- ²² Wladimir d'Ormesson, *Les vraies confidences* (Paris: Plon, 1962). p. 20.
- ²³ Liliana Senesi, *La missione a Roma di Wladimir d'Ormesson: un ambasciatore francese in Vaticano, maggio-ottobre 1940* (Milano: A. Giuffrè 2004), pp. 42-3.
- ²⁴ DDF vol. 1 (1940), d'Ormesson to Reynaud, 11 June 1940, p. 804.
- ²⁵ Anthony Rhodes, *The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators 1922-1945* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), pp. 252-6.
- ²⁶ Archives Diplomatiques (hereafter AD) 10GMII 469, Arvengas to Baudouin, 19 August 1940.
- ²⁷ Commission de Publication des Documents Diplomatiques Français, *Documents diplomatiques français 1940* Vol. 2 (11 juillet – 30 décembre) (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009), d'Ormesson to Laval, 30 October 1940, pp. 780-1.
- ²⁸ AD 10GMII 553, D'Ormesson to Baudouin, 8 September 1940; DDF Vol. 2 (1940), d'Ormesson to Laval, 30 October 1940, 775; Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, p. 314.
- ²⁹ DDF Vol. I (1940), d'Ormesson to Reynaud, 11 June 1940, p. 805.
- ³⁰ Ibid.

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- ³¹ Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, p. 181.
- ³² See AD 10GMII 559, d'Ormesson telegram to Vichy, 1 July 1940, received 9 September.
also AD 10GMII 559, D'Ormesson telegram to Vichy, 27 June 1940, received 24 August.
- ³³ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *L'Abime 1939-1944* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1986), p. 273.
- ³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 274.
- ³⁵ Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, p. 122.
- ³⁶ D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Petersbourg*, p. 149.
- ³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 152-3.
- ³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 155.
- ³⁹ AD 10GMII 553, Telegram from d'Ormesson, 9 June 1940.
- ⁴⁰ AD 10GMII 461, Telegram from d'Ormesson, 11 June 1940.
- ⁴¹ AD 10GMII 553, d'Ormesson to Baudouin, 22 June 1940.
- ⁴² John Hellman, *The Knight-Monks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940-1945* (McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal, 1993), pp. 3-17; Philippe Burrin, 'The Ideology of the National Revolution' in Edward J. Arnold (ed.), *The Development of the Radical Right in France: From Boulanger to Le Pen* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. 147.
- ⁴³ DDF Vol. 2 (1940), d'Ormesson to Laval, 30 October 1940, pp. 777-8.
- ⁴⁴ D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Petersbourg*, p. 195.
- ⁴⁵ AD 10GMII 551, d'Ormesson to Charles-Roux, 1 October 1940.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid*.
- ⁴⁷ Commission de Publication des Documents Diplomatiques Français, *Documents diplomatiques français: Vichy (1 janvier 1941-31 décembre 1941)* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2015), Bérard to Flandin, 6 January 1941, p. 13.

⁴⁸ Karine Varley, 'Entangled Enemies: Vichy, Italy and Collaboration', in Alison Carrol and Ludivine Broch (eds.), *France in an Era of Global War: Occupation, Politics, Empire and Entanglements* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 152-70.

⁴⁹ D'Ormesson to Cardinal Secretary, 19 August 1940, *Actes et documents du Saint-Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, Vol. 4 (juin 1940-juin 1941)* (Vaticana: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1967), pp. 113-14.

⁵⁰ AD 10GMII 559, d'Ormesson to Baudouin, 19 August 1940; 10GMII 559, Baudouin to Berne Embassy, 20 August 1940.

⁵¹ DDF Vol. I (1940), d'Ormesson to Reynaud, 9 June 1940, p. 791.

⁵² DDF Vol. 1 (1940), d'Ormesson to Reynaud, 11 June 1940, p. 803.

⁵³ AD 10GMII 553, d'Ormesson to Baudouin, 18 July 1940.

⁵⁴ AD 10GMII 559, d'Ormesson to Baudouin, 19 August 1940.

⁵⁵ AD 10GMII 551, d'Ormesson to Charles-Roux, 1 October 1940.

⁵⁶ DDF Vol. 2 (1940), d'Ormesson to Laval, 30 October 1940, pp. 777-8.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 779.

⁵⁸ DDF Vol. 2 (1940) d'Ormesson to Laval, 30 October 1940, pp. 785-8.

⁵⁹ AD 10GMII 469, d'Ormesson to Charles-Roux, 1 October 1940.

⁶⁰ 'Situation pénible au Vatican', *Le Matin*, 27 June 1940; D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg*, p. 194; Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, p. 133.

⁶¹ R. T. Thomas, *The Dilemma of Anglo-French Relations 1940-42* (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 56-61.

⁶² D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg*, p. 191.

⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 190.

⁶⁴ 'Le départ du Comte Wladimir d'Ormesson', *La Croix*, 1 November 1940.

⁶⁵ Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, pp. 128-9.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 132.

⁶⁷ D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg*, p. 194.

⁶⁸ D'Ormesson, *Vraies confidences*, p. 22; d'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg*, p. 204.

⁶⁹ DDF Vol. 1 (1940), d'Ormesson to Reynaud, 11 June 1940, p. 803; 'Discours du Pape Pie XII à L'ambassadeur de France près Le Saint-Siège, S.E.M. Vladimir [sic] D'Ormesson', 9 June 1940, https://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/fr/speeches/1940/documents/hf_p-xii_spe_19400609_ambasciatore-francia.html.

⁷⁰ DDF Vol. 2 (1940), d'Ormesson to Laval, 30 October 1940, pp. 786-7; AD 10GMII 469, Extracts of personal letter d'Ormesson to Charles-Roux, 1 October 1940.

⁷¹ AD 10GMII 469, d'Ormesson to Charles-Roux, 1 October 1940; 10GMII 469, d'Ormesson to Vichy 2 August 1940.

⁷² René Rémond, 'Le Saint-Siège et la guerre pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale', *Les Internationales et le problème de la guerre au XXe siècle. Actes du colloque de Rome* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1987), p. 142. On the Catholic Church's interpretation of the defeat of 1871, see Karine Varley, *Under the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870-71 in French Memory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008).

⁷³ Jodok Troy, "'The Pope's own hand outstretched": Holy See Diplomacy as a Hybrid Mode of Diplomatic Agency', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 20:3 (2018), pp. 521–539.

⁷⁴ John S. Conway, 'Myron C. Taylor's Mission to the Vatican, 1940-1950', *Church History*, 44:1 (1975), pp. 85-99, 87.

⁷⁵ D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg*, p. 196.

⁷⁶ AD 10GMII 553, d'Ormesson to Pius XII, 21 June 1940.

⁷⁷ AD 10GMII 553, d'Ormesson to Baudouin, 18 July 1940; 10GMII 553, d'Ormesson to Vichy, 13 September 1940.

⁷⁸ AD 10GMII 559, d'Ormesson to Vichy, 1 July 1940.

⁷⁹ D'Ormesson, *Vraies confidences*, pp. 89, 131.

⁸⁰ D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg*, p. 290.

⁸¹ D'Ormesson, *Vraies confidences*, p. 224.

⁸² See Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (eds.), *Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).

⁸³ D'Ormesson, *De Saint-Pétersbourg*, pp. 306, 311.

⁸⁴ 'M Léon Bérard ambassadeur de France auprès du Saint-Siège', *Le Figaro*, 9 October 1940; 'Le départ du Comte Wladimir d'Ormesson', *La Croix*, 1 November 1940.