How competition ideals are emasculated in key industries in China, and pathways to reform

Cahill, Dermot and Wang, Jing (2021) How competition ideals are emasculated in key industries in China, and pathways to reform. Fordham International Law Journal, 44 (3). pp. 609-670.

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    Abstract

    China’s adoption of its European Union-style Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 was heralded with great fanfare. However, some thirteen years following adoption, the 2007 Law’s aims appear neutered by the 2007 Law’s so-called “public interest” feature: normal competition protection objectives appear to be sidelined in the pursuit of wider industrial policy goals, even to the extent that obviously anti-competitive market practices are tolerated across the industrial and services landscape. Via a series of original case studies, the Authors demonstrate how China’s approach markedly diverges from European Union competition ideals, in turn raising the significant question of whether competition philosophy has been accepted in China. The Authors address the current unsatisfactory situation, setting out detailed proposals for substantive and structural reform, aimed at enhancing the regulatory institutions so that their enforcement competence is not compromised. Drawing on European Union judicial architecture and practice, the Article also makes proposals designed to enhance the capacity of the enforcement institutions, all with a view towards enhancing the acceptance of universally understood competition norms in China’s political and administrative-dominated business culture.

    ORCID iDs

    Cahill, Dermot and Wang, Jing ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9180-7525;