

1 **Quantitative assessment of the probability of introducing bovine brucellosis into English cattle**
2 **herds by imported live cattle**

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4 **Running title:** Probability of introducing bovine brucellosis into English cattle herds by imported cattle

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22 **Abstract**

23 A stochastic simulation model was developed to estimate the quarterly probability (P_{Intro}) of introducing
24 bovine brucellosis into English cattle herds, by at least one imported live cattle (potential carrier of *Brucella*
25 *abortus*). The probability of spread after introduction was not included and imports from several countries
26 were considered. Information used to parameterise model's inputs was obtained from the literature,
27 legislation and analysis of several national datasets (2013 to 2016), which contained information on
28 imported cattle and testing schemes used in the English cattle population. Exporting countries were divided
29 according to official brucellosis status "J" into: Officially Brucellosis Free (OBF), Non-Officially Brucellosis
30 Free (Non-OBF) and in OBF-Validation (during the first five years of OBF status). The entire English cattle
31 population was divided into eight strata "S" by combination of laboratory testing data and herd type. The
32 only risk mitigation measure considered was the testing for antibodies on animals older than one year and
33 imported from Non-OBF countries. Probabilities of introduction at herd and stratum level were combined
34 into the overall national P_{Intro} . Two scenarios were run. In the baseline scenario, the between herds
35 prevalence $BHP(OBF)$ in OBF countries was set according to information from EFSA and from the EU
36 legislation. In the alternative scenario only the former was used and $BHP(OBF)$ was set very low/negligible.
37 For Non-OBF and OBF-Validation countries, the BHP was set with distributions based on the literature. In
38 the baseline scenario, between 2013 and 2016, the quarterly median P_{Intro} ranged from 1.3% to 5.5%. For
39 the last year considered, the median of the quarterly medians P_{Intro} was 2.8% (median of 5th percentiles =
40 0.4%; median of 95th percentiles =10.7%). Therefore, on average, at least one introduction could be
41 expected each (approximated) 36 surveillance periods (9, 281), so each \approx 9 years (2; 70). According to the
42 alternative scenario, the P_{Intro} was very low and on average at least one introduction could be expected
43 each \approx 125 years.

44

45 *Key words: Bovine brucellosis, imported cattle, quantitative assessment, probability of introduction*

46

47 **Introduction**

48 England, as part of Great Britain (GB)¹, has been Officially Brucellosis Free (OBF) since 1985 (Hesterberg
49 et al., 2009), although two re-introductions of bovine brucellosis occurred by imported cattle in 1993 and
50 2003, while in 2004 a third outbreak of unknown origin occurred in Cornwall.

51 Bovine brucellosis is mainly caused by the bacterium *Brucella abortus*, less frequently by *B. melitensis* and
52 *B. suis* (OIE, 2009). For the latter, the extent to which this species can cause disease in bovines is less
53 clear. From a general point of view, abortion, retained placenta, orchitis, and infertility are the main
54 symptoms of cattle infected with *B. abortus*. Large numbers of organisms are excreted in abortion and birth
55 material in the uterine discharges. Organisms can also be shed in milk. Transmission among cattle can
56 occur by contact with contaminated material, venereal (not common in cattle other than by artificial
57 insemination) and oral route (e.g. due to ingestion of milk from infected cows, or feed/water contaminated
58 with birth products or excreta from infected animals) (Akhtar and Mirza, 1995; CFSPH, 2009). Moreover,
59 brucellosis is a notifiable zoonotic disease, which can be transmitted from cattle to humans through abraded
60 skin and by oral (e.g. unpasteurized milk), respiratory or conjunctival pathways, causing the debilitating
61 disease known as “undulant fever” (CFSPH, 2009; OIE, 2009).

62 The epidemiology of brucellosis in cattle can be affected by several factors such as: the environment (e.g.
63 temperature, humidity, etc.), the herd structure, the herd type and management (Bercovich, 1998; CFSPH,
64 2009, Matope et al., 2010; Godfroid et al., 2011; Makita et al., 2011; Mai et al., 2012; Assenga et al., 2015).
65 Uncertainty persists on the actual epidemiological significance of the potential pathways of disease spread
66 within and between herds. For instance, it is known that infected animals can remain latent carriers (Dolan,
67 1980; Priyantha, 2011) and in some review papers it is mentioned that, as well as in aborted material and
68 milk, *B. abortus* can also be found in urine and semen (CFSPH, 2009). Some other authors have argued
69 that calves fed with colostrum from infected dams could constitute a risk to *Brucella* free herds and that
70 those calves may be responsible for the spread of infection to other calves (within the same pen) (Akhtar

¹ N.B. A list of abbreviations is provided at the end of this article in the Appendix (Table 1).

71 and Mirza, 1995; Bercovich, 1998). Regarding the spread of disease by infected bulls, it is usually assumed
72 that this depends on how those animals are used. Makita et al. (2011) found that, the use of bulls was not
73 a significant risk factor for brucellosis at the herd level. The herd prevalence was similar between herds
74 using artificial insemination and herds with natural mating, but animal prevalence was higher using bull/s
75 (5.5%) than using artificial insemination (3.2%). Bercovich (1998) stated that “if the bull is used for natural
76 service, it *may fail* to spread the infection since the infected semen is not deposited in the uterus”. In
77 contrast, in a more recent study, the prevalence of brucellosis was found higher in naturally inseminated
78 cattle and buffalos than in artificially inseminated animals, though such a difference was not statistically
79 significant (Basit et al., 2015). Thus, if infected young animals and/or infected bulls can not be excluded (a
80 priori) as potential shedders of *B. abortus*, then movement of infected cattle (including latent carriers of any
81 age and sex) could be considered as a potential source of disease spread between countries.

82 In GB, between 2004 and 2009, three studies were carried out to evaluate: i) the risk of disease
83 reintroduction from abroad (Jones et al., 2004), ii) the rate of disease spread under a variety of testing
84 regimes (England et al., 2004), and iii) the performance of the local surveillance system (Hesterberg et al.,
85 2009). Jones et al. (2004) estimated that on average brucellosis-infected cattle could be imported into GB
86 every 2.63 years from Northern Ireland (NI) and every 3.23 years from the Republic of Ireland (ROI).
87 England et al. (2004) suggested that abortions notifications are an important mean of surveillance to limit
88 the probability of between-herds disease spread before detection. Hesterberg et al. (2009) found that the
89 surveillance system sensitivity (*SSe*) and the confidence in OBF status (*PFree*) (Martin et al., 2007a-b)
90 could be maintained as high (> 95%) if monthly bulk tank milk (BTM) testing was used in dairy herds, and
91 if abortion notifications were continued to be used, especially in beef herds.

92 During recent years, the status of cattle herds in NI and ROI has changed. Currently (beginning-2020) ROI
93 is OBF, while NI is in the “OBF-Validation”² period (since October 2015 until the same month of 2020).

² For the purpose of this paper, countries that have been OBF for more than five years (as ROI since August 2014)
were referred to as OBF, while those that had been OBF for less than five years were referred to as OBF- Validation.
See sections below about assumptions and between-herds prevalence.

94 Furthermore, since April 2011 BTM is tested quarterly in all three GB countries: England, Scotland and
95 Wales. Additionally, during the last decade (2010 onwards), the number of statutory submissions of
96 samples from aborted cows has steadily decreased (unpublished data, personal communication by Dr.
97 Martyn Blissitt, Veterinary Adviser - Notifiable Diseases - Animal Health and Welfare Division, Agriculture
98 and Rural Economy Directorate, Scottish Government).

99 Due to the changes in the health status of the main trading partners of GB (NI and ROI) and due to the
100 changes in the local testing frequency and coverage, a review of the three national GB surveillance systems
101 was considered necessary by the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Scottish
102 and the Welsh Governments. Such a review, had two objectives for each GB country: I) assessing the
103 probability of disease introduction (*PIntro*) from abroad and II) assessing the *SSE* and the *PFree* at the
104 between herds design prevalence ($Ph \leq 0.2\%$) set in the EU legislation (Council Directive, 64/432/EEC).

105 The main aim of this article was to estimate the *PIntro* (objective I above). England was used as example
106 GB country, because according to the four years data (2013 to 2016) used for this study, approximately 66-
107 68 % of the GB herds are located in this country.

108

109 **Materials and methods**

110 A stochastic simulation model was developed in @Risk-6 (Palisade Corporation). Model's inputs,
111 assumptions and structure were based on information from the literature, legislation and analysis of national
112 data.

113 The model was run with 20,000 iterations and Latin Hypercube sampling. For deciding how many iterations
114 to use, the convergence of the model was checked every 100 iterations, on any combination of mean,
115 standard deviation, and percentile for the main output (*PIntro*). The convergence tolerance was specified
116 at 3% and the confidence level at 95% (Palisade Corporation, 2019).

117 The stochasticity of the model was set by using probability distributions in some of the inputs e.g. for the
118 within (*WHP*) and between-herds (*BHP*) prevalence abroad, for the test sensitivity (*Se*) and for the number
119 of animals (*N_anim*) imported per consignment into English herds.

120

121 **General assumptions**

122 The probability of disease spread and consequences after eventual introduction of at least one infected
123 animal from abroad were not considered, and thus, the term “probability of introduction or *PIIntro*” (Martin
124 et al., 2007a-b) is used throughout the paper.

125 *B. abortus* was considered as the main disease agent of bovine brucellosis. The probability of introduction
126 of other types of *Brucella* (e.g. *melitensis*) was not investigated. Therefore, the main (potential) source of
127 disease introduction from abroad was considered to be the imports of cattle of any sex and age, which
128 could be carriers of *B. abortus* (Dolan 1980, Akhtar and Mirza, 1995, CFSPH, 2009, Priyantha, 2011; Basit
129 et al., 2015). In GB, if an animal is found to be seropositive it is put under restrictions. Thus, from a technical
130 point of view, antibody positive cattle would be considered as positive carriers by the risk mitigation
131 measures and in the local surveillance system.

132 Imports of embryos and semen were considered during the literature review, but were not included in the
133 model, because their actual role for disease introduction was assumed marginal due to the high biosecurity
134 measures that need to be implemented before international trade (Council Directive, 89/556/EEC; Council
135 Directive 2003/43/EC; Council Directive, 64/432/EEC).

136 Countries from which animals were imported were divided into OBF, Non-OBF and in OBF-Validation.
137 European Member States may be declared OBF if no case of abortion due to *Brucella* infection and no
138 isolation of *B. abortus*, has been recorded for at least three years and if at least 99,8% of herds have
139 achieved OBF status each year for five consecutive years (Council Directive 64/432/EEC, Annex A, art.
140 7a). Thereafter, the OBF status can be retained if “every year for the first five years after attaining status,
141 all bovine animals over 24 months of age in not less than 20 % of herds have been tested and have reacted

142 negatively to a serological test” (Council Directive 64/432/EEC, Annex A, art. 8b). After five years of OBF
143 status, the level of surveillance could be reduced. For the purpose of this paper, countries that had been
144 OBF for more than five years were referred to as OBF, while those that had been OBF for less than five
145 years were referred to as OBF- Validation.

146 This distinction was used because according to the Operational Manual (OM) of APHA (not published),
147 animals older than one year and imported from Non-OBF countries, should be tested at arrival and
148 (eventually) at their first post import calving (PIC) in GB, with an antibody indirect Enzyme-Linked
149 Immunosorbent Assay (iELISA) (McGiven et al., 2003; McGiven et al., 2008a-b; Thomson et al., 2009). If
150 applicable, animals from OBF-Validation countries are subjected to PIC testing, while animals from OBF
151 countries are not required to be tested. The PIC testing was considered as a surveillance component of the
152 local cattle population and was disregarded as risk mitigation measure here in this model, because animals
153 could calve several months after import.

154

155 ***Data used***

156 Data were extracted from different national databases and were combined by the investigated surveillance
157 period (Q) and by the County Parish Holding (CPH) number, which is the herd identification number. The
158 data files were handled and analysed using the free statistical software R (R Core Team 2013-04-03, R-
159 3.0.0). Results of data analysis were used to inform the model and are reported in the Appendix (Tables 2
160 to 4, Figures A-B).

161 The overall population of English cattle herds considered for each Q-period was defined according to
162 monthly data obtained from the Cattle Tracing System (CTS) and from the Rapid Analysis and Detection
163 of Animal Related Risks (RADAR). All datasets were extracted for years 2013 to 2016 (corresponding to
164 16 quarterly surveillance periods), because the SAM database, which was used to complete the list of
165 milking herds (see below), was stabilized in 2013. Herds with CPHs of more than 10 digits (including

166 separation bars) were considered as the population of interest (production herds), while herds with four
167 digits were considered as non-producing herds (e.g. slaughterhouses).

168 Data on imported live cattle (from CTS) included: the ear tag of the imported animal, its country of origin,
169 the CPH of arrival in England, and the date of arrival.

170 According to surveillance testing data from the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS), all
171 tested herds and animals were classified as negative. Datasets on abortion and PIC testing contained
172 information on: CPH, date of testing, and test/s used per cow.

173 Datasets on quarterly BTM testing (LIMS) contained records for England and Wales. Information was
174 available on: the CPH of the tested herds (for approximately 75% of the data lines, depending on year),
175 their address, the date when the BTM sample was received by the National Milk Laboratories (NML) and
176 the date of testing at the APHA laboratories. For records where the CPH was not entered, this was found
177 in other databases such as CTS and SAM (which contains records of testing for bovine tuberculosis) by
178 matching the postcode of the herd.

179

180 ***Population stratification***

181 The model was structured in a way that, probabilities of disease introduction from abroad could be related
182 to herd type and local surveillance components. In this way, the model could be used in other studies to
183 inform surveillance system evaluation, as shown in Foddai et al. (2020). Thus, Q-periods of three months
184 each were considered because, as explained above, BTM is tested quarterly.

185 For each Q-period, herds were classified as “M” (for milk) if tested at least in the BTM, while all the others
186 were classified as “B” (for beef, non-dairy). Each combination of herd type (M or B) and local surveillance
187 component represented an independent population stratum.

188 Accordingly, dairy herds were divided into four strata: herds BTM tested only (M), herds tested in BTM and
189 abortion/s (M-Abo), herds tested in BTM and PIC (M-PIC), and herds tested in BTM, abortion/s and PIC
190 (M-A-PIC) on the same Q-period.

191 Beef herds (B) were divided as: herds tested in abortion/s (B-Abo), herds tested in PIC (B-PIC), herds
192 tested in abortion/s and PIC (B-A-PIC), and herds not tested at all at the APHA laboratories (B-NoTest)
193 during the investigated Q-period. The latter were still considered as a stratum, though not tested at the
194 APHA, because they could still import animals and introduce disease.

195

196 ***Between-herds prevalence in OBF countries.***

197 In the baseline simulation scenario, for the OBF countries, the annual between-herds prevalence
198 *BHP(OBF)* was set as a Pert distribution ranging from 0 (no infected herds in the sending country) to 0.2%,
199 which is the design prevalence (*Ph*) from the EU legislation (Council Directive 64/432/EEC). This
200 represented a large value because, apart from Belgium, OBF countries sending cattle to England
201 (Appendix, Table 2) did not report any case during the investigated years (2013-2016). Thus, the *BHP(OBF)*
202 distribution represented the uncertainty on the potential “true” *BHP* value for OBF herds, at which disease
203 could be present abroad before detection.

204 The most likely value was set as uniform distribution ranging from 0% to [Beta (1+1, 1,375,934 – 1+1)]. The
205 latter was a Beta distribution with $\alpha = n+1$ and $\beta = N - n+1$, where n = number infected herds out of the
206 total population of herds (N) considered. According to EFSA (2015), only one herd out of 1,375,934 OBF
207 cattle herds (from 16 OBF Member States) was classified positive in Belgium, during 2013. Hence, in line
208 with official reporting from OBF Member States (EFSA, 2015), the most likely annual *BHP(OBF)* was
209 assumed ranging from 0% to negligible, if a cut-off = 10^{-4} was considered (EFSA, 2012; WHO and FAO,
210 2009).

211 Moreover, the annual reported herds prevalence was divided by four, to obtain an average incidence
212 estimate per quarter of a year (Q-1 to Q-4). Thus, the eventual herd incidence and herd prevalence were
213 assumed to be similar (maximum a few infected herds per Q-period).

214

215 ***Between-herds prevalence in Non-OBF countries***

216 The quarterly between-herds prevalence for Non-OBF countries *BHP(Non-OBF)* was also set as a Pert
217 distribution (0.0%, \approx 0.07%; 0.4%). In that case, the minimum was 0.0% (no infected herds present in the
218 Non-OBF country) while the maximum was the *BHP* from Italy (EFSA, 2016). The most likely value (\approx
219 0.07%) was the median simulated from all *BHP* inputs assigned to the single Non-OBF countries, which
220 sent animals to England.

221 The quarterly *BHP* inputs for Italy and Spain were calculated as $(598/40,025)/4 = 0.4\%$ and $(47/120,329)/4$
222 $= 0.01\%$, respectively (EFSA, 2016).

223 For Canada, Jersey, Guernsey and Hungary the quarterly *BHP* was set as described above for the OBF
224 countries, because those four Non-OBF countries were supposed to have a similar *BHP* to OBF Member
225 States. In fact, according to Pare' et al. (2012) Canada had no infected cattle herds ($< 0.02\%$ with 95%
226 confidence), while Jersey, Guernsey and Hungary (EFSA, 2007) should also have had herd prevalence
227 around 0%.

228 Only four animals were imported from Greece into English cattle herds during the investigated period
229 (Appendix, Table 2). Thus, a *BHP* value for this country was not included to calculate the (median) most
230 likely *BHP(Non-OBF)*, which was considered as sufficiently represented by the other mentioned Non-OBF
231 countries.

232

233 ***Between-herds prevalence in OBF-Validation countries***

234 ROI and NI changed their brucellosis status during the four considered years. Those changes were taken
235 into account in the model. For instance, ROI was simulated in OBF-Validation until the end of 2014, but the
236 *BHP* for this country was set equal to that of OBF countries, because no cases have been reported during
237 the investigated years.

238 NI was Non-OBF between 2013 and the last quarter of 2015 (Q-4-15) when it started the validation period.
239 The *BHP* used for this country, was based on values reported by the Department of Agriculture,
240 Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA; 2016) during years 2013-2016, when the overall annual herd
241 incidence was 0.13%, 0.04%, 0.00% and 0.03% in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016; respectively.

242 Moreover, because the incidence ranged between 0.0% and 0.17% (Armagh in 2013) depending on
243 regions, the *BHP* of NI was set as a Pert distribution, where the most likely value was the annual herd
244 incidence mentioned above. The minimum was 0.0% while the maximum was the value reported in the
245 region with the highest incidence in the country during the investigated year. For example, in 2013, the
246 annual herd incidence was 0.13% and ranged from 0.0% in Londonderry to 0.17% in Armagh. Accordingly,
247 for each surveillance period (Q-1, 2, 3 and 4) of that year, the average quarterly *BHP(OBF-Validation)* was
248 set as: RiskPert (0.0%, 0.13%, 0.17%) / 4.

249

250 ***Within-herd prevalence abroad (WHP).***

251 The uncertainty about within herd prevalence (*WHP*) in infected herds of countries exporting cattle to
252 England (before their detection), was described by a Uniform distribution (from 1% to 10%), and using
253 estimates by Pehlivanoğlu et al. (2011) from Turkey (country with endemic disease status at the time of
254 that study). This distribution was used for all the countries exporting cattle to England, due to lack of data
255 on the main trading partners, where the disease has been eradicated for a long time, or is present in a few
256 regions at low prevalence (Commission Decision 2003/467/EC; EFSA, 2016).

257 Moreover, Pehlivanoğlu et al. (2011), quoted another study by Çelebi and Otlu (2011) (in Turkish), where
258 a similar prevalence of cows carrying *B. abortus* in milk and uterine infections was observed. Therefore,

259 the *WHP* used in this assessment could be considered representative of antibody positive cows, but also
260 of potential carriers and shedders of *Brucella abortus*.

261 Furthermore, a similar *WHP* input has been used to evaluate the surveillance system in France (Hénaux
262 and Calavas, 2017), which is an example of OBF countries exporting cattle to England during 2013-2016
263 (Appendix, Table 2).

264

265 ***Test sensitivity***

266 For Non-OBF consignments, it was assumed that the (eventually) infected, imported and tested animal
267 could have resulted false negative to the test, with probability 1-*Se*. The *Se* was the sensitivity of the serum
268 antibody iELISA used on animals older than one year and imported from Non-OBF countries. Uncertainty
269 around this input was set after consultation of experts from the APHA laboratories (Weybridge, UK) and
270 according to literature.

271 Firstly, a sensitivity input was set for each estimate from each considered study (McGiven et al., 2003;
272 McGiven et al., 2008a-b; Thomson et al., 2009). When a range or a confidence interval was available, a
273 Pert distribution was used to represent uncertainty within study. For instance, in McGiven et al. (2003) the
274 mean sensitivity was estimated to 97.2% (95% confidence interval: 94.6%; 99.9%) and this input was set
275 as Pert (94.6%; 97.2%, 99.9%). For McGiven et al. (2008b) and for Thomson et al. (2009) the sensitivity
276 distributions were set as Pert (89.2%; 96.3%, 100%) and (89.1%; 100%, 100%), respectively.

277 Secondly, to represent uncertainty between studies, an overall Pert distribution was set for the final *Se* input
278 used. Then, *Se* = Pert distribution ranging from 86.7% (McGiven et al., 2008a) to 100% (McGiven et al.,
279 2008b; Thomson et al., 2009), whereas the most likely value was 95.5% (overall median across 20,000
280 iterations, by using all individual sensitivity distributions).

281

282 ***Probability that the consignment imported from an infected herd was infected***

283 A consignment was defined as the delivery to a specific English herd during a single day of one or more
284 animals from a single country status “J”. It was assumed that an imported consignment arrived from a single
285 herd abroad.

286 Furthermore, since animals arrived into England during the investigated periods (Appendix, Tables 2 to 4)
287 it was assumed that their herd of origin abroad was classified as OBF and was not under restriction on the
288 day of export (Council Directive 64/432/EEC).

289 Then, if the herd abroad was infected and was undetected (so exported); the probability $Plnf_Con(J)$ that
290 the imported consignment from country status “J” included at least one infected animal was calculated. For
291 consignments arriving from Non-OBF countries the $Plnf_Con(J)$ was calculated as:

292

$$293 \quad Plnf_{Con(Non-OBF)} = 1 - [1 - (WHP * Prop_{Test} * (1 - Se) + WHP * (1 - Prop_{Test}))]^{N_{anim}} \quad (Eq. 1)$$

294

295 In Figure 1 are shown the inputs and the conditional steps used within Eq. 1 as: $P1 = WHP * Prop_Test * (1 - Se)$
296 and $P2 = WHP * (1 - Prop_Test)$. For consignments arriving from OBF or OBF-Validation countries,
297 Eq. 1 was modified and only WHP was kept within the squared brackets, because testing was not needed.

298 $Prop_Test$ was the probability that the animal imported from a Non-OBF country was older than 12 months
299 and was tested. From the data analysis it was known that between 0.0% (e.g. in Q-4-16) and 27.8% (Q-2-
300 14) of the animals imported quarterly from Non-OBF trading partners were older than one year. Thus,
301 $Prop_Test$ was set according to actual data for each surveillance period.

302 N_{anim} was the number of animals present in the consignment. Variability on this input was set as Pert
303 distribution according to results of data analysis (Appendix, Tables 3 and 4).

304

305 ***Probability that the importing herd became infected***

306 A local English herd was considered as infected if it received at least one infected consignment containing
307 at least one positive animal (potential carrier) which entered in the herd because: I) it was missed at testing
308 if older than one year and arriving from a Non-OBF country, or II) it was not tested.

309 The probability $Plnf_Herd(S,J)$ that an importing English herd located within a specific stratum “S” became
310 infected by one or more consignments from country status “J”, during period Q, was estimated as:

311

$$312 \quad Plnf_{Herd(S,J)} = 1 - [1 - BHP_{(J)} * Plnf_{Con(J)}]^{N_{con(S,J)}} \quad (\text{Eq. 2})$$

313

314 Where, $N_con(S,J)$ was the quarterly median number of consignments from country status “J” received per
315 English herd located within stratum “S”. According to data analysis the median $N_con(S,J)$ was = 1 in 14
316 out of 16 Q-periods, while in Q-2-15 and Q-4-16 the median $N_cons(S,J)$ was = 2. Those values were used
317 in Eq. 2, to simulate $N_con(S,J)$ in the respective Q-periods.

318

319 ***Probability of infection per population stratum and at national level***

320 A stratum “S” was considered infected, if at least one of its importing herds introduced at least one infected
321 animal/consignment from any country status “J”. Then the probability of disease introduction per stratum
322 $Plnf(S,J)$ was calculated as:

323

$$324 \quad Plnf_{(S,J)} = 1 - [1 - Plnf_{Herd(S,J)}]^{N_{herds(S,J)}} \quad (\text{Eq. 3})$$

325

326 In this case, $Plnf(S,J)$ was the quarterly probability that at least one of the herds $N_herds(S,J)$
327 within the stratum “S” (M, or M-Abo, or M-PIC, or M-A-PIC, or B-Abo, or B-PIC, or B-A-PIC, or B-NoTest)

328 which imported consignment(s) from country status “J” (OBF, or Non-OBF or OBF-Validation) became
329 infected. Therefore, $PInf(S,J)$ was calculated in each Q-period, for 24 combinations resulting from eight
330 strata “S” times three country statuses “J” .

331 The overall quarterly national $PIntro$ was estimated combining the quarterly probabilities of introduction of
332 the eight strata altogether as:

333

$$334 \quad PIntro = 1 - \prod_{S,J=1}^{24} [1 - PInf_{(S,J)}] \quad (\text{Eq. 4})$$

335

336 **Sensitivity analysis**

337 The sensitivity analysis was carried out consulting in @Risk the tornado graph of the Spearman Rank
338 correlation coefficients. The last quarter of 2016 was used as reference surveillance Q-period, because it
339 was the most recent considered in the study and because the brucellosis status of the trading partners
340 (Appendix, Table 2) was similar at the date of writing.

341

342 **Alternative scenario analysis**

343 According to the output of the sensitivity analysis (see results) an alternative scenario was investigated. For
344 this purpose the model was run after reducing the herd prevalence of OBF countries (namely $BHP(OBF)$).
345 A Uniform distribution ranging from 0 to [Beta (1+1; 1,375,934 – 1+1)] was set to represent uncertainty on
346 $BHP(OBF)$. Accordingly, the large value (0.2% from Council Directive 64/432/EEC) used in the initial
347 $BHP(OBF)$, was disregarded.

348

349 **Results**

350 ***English cattle population and general import patterns***

351 From a general point of view, during the four investigated years, the overall number of English cattle herds
352 reduced from 48,733 (Q-1-13) to 47,193 (Q-1-16).

353 In each surveillance period, the dairy herds tested at least in the BTM represented 12-14% of the English
354 cattle population, while the remaining 86-88% were beef herds (B, non-dairy herds).

355 Considering the four years altogether, most of the live animals imported into production cattle herds arrived
356 from: countries which were always OBF (The Netherlands 17.6%; Germany 16.5%, Denmark 8.8%, Isle
357 Of Man 7.6%, and France 6.5%), from ROI (23.0%), and from NI (16.7%). The latter two changed their
358 status during the four years. Then, a very small percentage of animals arrived from other countries
359 (Appendix, Table 2).

360

361 ***Number of importing herds and number of imported consignments***

362 The quarterly median number of herds importing animals was higher for the M and for the B-NoTest strata,
363 which received imports mainly from OBF countries. Whereas the quarterly median number of dairy and
364 beef herds located in other population strata and importing from other country statuses (Non-OBF and OBF-
365 Validation) was very low (Appendix, Tables 3-4; Figures, A-B).

366 Regarding the total quarterly number of imported consignments, it was higher from OBF countries than
367 from Non-OBF or OBF-Validation countries, especially in the M stratum within the dairy sector (Appendix,
368 Fig. A) and in the B-NoTest stratum within the beef sector (Appendix, Fig. B).

369 The peak of imports from OBF countries in the M stratum was registered in Q-3-14, and in the following
370 surveillance period for the B-NoTest herds (Appendix, Fig. A-B). The latter and beef herds in general,
371 imported also a higher total number of consignments from Non-OBF and OBF-Validation countries. Those
372 consignments arrived mainly from NI. In fact, the consignments from NI were counted as Non-OBF before
373 the last quarter of 2015 (Q-4-15) and as consignments from OBF-Validation countries thereafter.

374 The number of animals per consignment used to set the N_{anim} distribution in Eq. 1, is shown in Tables 3
375 and 4 of the Appendix, for each stratum and Q-period.

376

377 ***Probability of disease introduction at national level. Baseline scenario***

378 The quarterly median baseline PI_{intro} ranged from 1.3% (5th percentile = 0.2%; 95th percentile = 4.9%) in
379 the first quarter of 2016, to 5.5% (0.6%; 20.1%) in the third quarter of 2014 (Fig. 2). During the 16
380 surveillance periods, the median of the medians PI_{intro} was 3.5% (median of 5th p.= 0.5%; median of 95th
381 p. =13.5%).

382 In the four surveillance periods of 2016, the median of the medians PI_{intro} was \approx 2.8% (median of 5th p.=
383 0.4%; median of 95th p.=10.7%).

384 Therefore, on average, at least one introduction could be expected each (approximated) 36 surveillance
385 periods (9, 281), so each 9 years (2; 70).

386

387 ***Output of sensitivity analysis.***

388 In the sensitivity analysis, the ranking of inputs was checked according to the tornado graph of the
389 Spearman Rank correlation coefficients.

390 The five most important inputs were in the order: 1) the $BHP(OBF)$, 2) the WHP , 3) the $BHP(Non-OBF)$, 4)
391 the N_{anim} imported from OBF countries into B-NoTest herds, and 5) the N_{anim} imported from OBF
392 countries into M herds. In the tornado graph, those inputs showed Spearman Rank correlation coefficients
393 (bars) up to 90%, 27%, 26%, 20% and 9%, respectively. Other inputs had coefficients \leq 5%.

394

395 ***Output of alternative scenario analysis.***

396 In the alternative scenario, the quarterly median *PIntro* reduced remarkably compared to estimates from
397 the baseline scenario, and ranged from 0.002% (5th p. = 0.0001%; 95th p. = 0.008%) in Q-4-15 to 0.3%
398 (0.02%; 1.6%) in Q-1-13.

399 Considering periods Q-1 to Q-4-16, the median of the medians *PIntro* was 0.2% (median of 5th p. = 0.03%;
400 median of 95th p.= 0.7%).

401 Therefore, according to the alternative scenario and the last considered year (2016), on average at least
402 one introduction could be expected each \approx 500 surveillance periods, so each \approx 125 years.

403

404 **Discussion**

405 The output of this study represents important information for policy makers and risk managers, because it
406 gives an insight into the probability of introducing bovine brucellosis into the English cattle population
407 (*PIntro*) by imported live cattle.

408 The relationship between import patterns and surveillance components across herd types was included in
409 the model, and it can be considered when the national surveillance system for bovine brucellosis is
410 evaluated (Foddai et al., 2020).

411 Furthermore, the simulation model is very flexible and can be used in the future if the brucellosis status of
412 trading partners changes. It combines the information from literature and from national/international
413 legislation, with information from real data collection and descriptive data analysis. In this way, the
414 assessment could be carried out from the single herd level to the population stratum level, and then to the
415 national level (*PIntro*). Thus, although with some simplifications, uncertainty on the inputs as well as
416 variability between surveillance periods, farms, sectors, and population strata were taken into account
417 altogether for the simulation process.

418

419 ***Main results: Information from the quantitative assessment***

420 According to the baseline scenario, at least an introduction could be expected on average each 9 years (2;
421 70). Nevertheless, in the alternative scenario where the *BHP(OBF)* was reduced, the *PIntro* reduced as
422 well to at least an average introduction each \approx 125 years. In this case, the impact of OBF consignments
423 was lower, and the *PIntro* depended more by Non-OBF and OBF-Validation countries, which anyway
424 contributed with fewer deliveries than OBF countries (Appendix, Tables 2 to 4, Fig. A-B).

425 According to the data analysis, most of the imported consignments arrived from OBF countries into herds
426 tested in milk only (M stratum) or to beef herds which were not tested at the APHA in the same surveillance
427 period (B-NoTest stratum) (Appendix, Table 3-4, Fig. A-B). This information is important to consider
428 because, eventual disease introduction due to imports of animals into the latter stratum could be more
429 difficult to detect compared to dairy herds that are actively tested quarterly at least on BTM (Foddai et al.,
430 2020).

431 Especially in Q-1 and Q-2-16, the *PIntro* of the baseline scenario lowered compared to previous Q-periods,
432 because total imports reduced and because none of the most frequent trading partners (ROI and NI) was
433 Non-OBF (Appendix, Table 2, Fig. A-B). The increased *PIntro* observed in Q-3 and Q-4-16, compared to
434 Q-1 and Q-2 of the same year (Fig. 2), was mainly related to the increased imports from OBF countries into
435 both sectors (Appendix, Fig. A-B).

436 The baseline scenario could be considered as more conservative (risk averse), but allowed incorporating
437 uncertainty relating to OBF countries. In those countries the level of surveillance could be relaxed after the
438 first five years of OBF status, though new outbreaks can still occur in OBF countries (Fretin et al., 2015;
439 EFSA, 2015). For example, OBF countries could rely completely on voluntary abortion submission and, as
440 observed by Bronner et al. (2014), farmers could be reluctant or not aware to submit abortion samples for
441 surveillance of bovine brucellosis. Accordingly, the passive surveillance components could take some time
442 before new disease introductions are detected, especially in beef herds where active BTM testing is not
443 carried out. Meanwhile, infected animals could be exported during the high risk period, between infection
444 and detection in the source country. For these reasons, the baseline scenario was considered as the main
445 scenario.

446 **Information from sensitivity analysis**

447 In the sensitivity analysis the between-herds prevalence used for the OBF countries (namely *BHP(OBF)*)
448 appeared as the most important input affecting the *PIntro*. This was due to two main reasons: i) most of the
449 consignments arrived from OBF countries (Appendix, Fig. A-B), and thus, this input was sampled for most
450 of the deliveries; and ii) in the baseline scenario a relatively large range was used in the Pert distribution,
451 which caused most of the uncertainty associated with the *PIntro*.

452 Moreover, the most likely annual *BHP(OBF)*, was set in a complex way, as a Uniform distribution from 0 to
453 [Beta (1+1, 1,375,934 – 1+1)], for different reasons. If it had been set as single value (1/1,375,934), it would
454 have disregarded that in 2014-2015 and 2016 no cases were reported in OBF countries (EFSA, 2015). In
455 contrast, if it had been fixed to 0%, it would have assumed 100% confidence in freedom for OBF countries,
456 but absolute proof of freedom cannot be reached (Cameron et al., 2014). Therefore, the most likely value
457 was set in a way, which was considered as the best compromise between the two options.

458 It could be argued that in theory Beta distributions can range between 0 and 100%, and that in some
459 iteration the most likely value could have exceeded 0.2% (which was set as maximum in the Pert
460 *BHP(OBF)*). This was excluded, at least for most of the iterations, because the simulated *BHP(OBF)* had
461 median 0.03% and 99th percentile = 0.12%. Therefore, as expected, the simulated *BHP(OBF)* was unlikely
462 to exceed the design prevalence (0.2%) set in the EU legislation (Council Directive, 64/432/EEC).

463 The *BHP* of Non-OBF countries had a large range (0.0% to 0.4%) as well, but it appeared in 3rd position
464 according to the tornado graph. Hence, the relatively “lower” importance of the *BHP(Non-OBF)* was
465 captured in the sensitivity analysis. During the last investigated year, only 0.5% of the imported animals
466 arrived from Non-OBF countries (Appendix, Table 2). Hence, those kind of consignments contributed less
467 to the variation on *PIntro* of the baseline scenario compared to OBF consignments.

468 The within herd prevalence (*WHP*) used for infected herds abroad, was the second most important
469 parameter. During the literature review, it was difficult to find estimates of *WHP* for all the trading partners
470 from where animals were imported into England, because most of those countries (Appendix, Table 2)
471 achieved the OBF status since a long time and/or because even in most of the Non-OBF countries the

472 between herds prevalence was reported to be around 0%. Therefore, the *WHP* was set according to a
473 single study (Pehlivanoğlu et al., 2011) from Turkey and some uncertainty remains on the used distribution.
474 The *WHP* is related to the cattle management and to the herd structure (Mai et al., 2012), which can vary
475 remarkably between countries, continents and their respective environmental factors. Thus, *WHP* is rather
476 unpredictable, and it depends from the time elapsed between disease introduction in the herd of origin and
477 day of export. This uncertainty was flagged in the sensitivity analysis. The maximum *WHP* used in this
478 study was set as relatively low (10%), because if the export from the herd was allowed, the disease could
479 have been present at undetectable level only (low *WHP*). For instance, if there was suspicion that the
480 disease was present in the herd due to high abortion rates, then the export was unlikely to occur.

481 The number of animals per consignment (N_{anim} in Eq. 1) imported from OBF countries into B-NoTest or
482 into M herds were the other most important inputs. Those were based on the results of the data analysis
483 (Appendix, Tables 3-4) and represented the variability of imported animals per consignment. Other inputs
484 played a less important role.

485

486 ***Considerations on model's assumptions, structure, and limitations***

487 During the data handling and analysis, the overall number of herds was calculated as the sum of all CPHs
488 appearing in at least one of the datasets. The CPH was not found for 5.8 (2016) to 6.8% (2013) of the data
489 lines from the original BTM list of England and Wales (LIMS data). Therefore, part of the dairy herds could
490 have been misclassified as B-NoTest herds when testing of bulk milk had in fact occurred, but the CPH
491 was available only on the CTS/RADAR data and not in the BTM list. The impact of this misclassification
492 was likely to have been marginal, because some of those records were from Wales (not used here), and
493 some herds could appear in more data lines during the same period. For example, if more than one milk
494 tank was tested in large herds. These would have contributed more than once to the 5.8-6.8%.

495 Regarding the mathematical formulas, it must be noted that the combination of Equations 1 and 2 allowed
496 accounting for the clustering effect within the consignments imported from the same country status and

497 from the same sending herd. Unfortunately, detailed information on the source herd abroad about structure,
498 size and type of management, was not available for this study. Thus, it could not be checked if all animals
499 in the consignment arrived from a single farm. Nevertheless, it seems a reasonable assumption because,
500 according to the median N_{anim} per consignment (Appendix, Tables 3 and 4), it could be the case that all
501 animals of the consignment arrived in 1-2 trucks from the same herd.

502 Moreover, Equations 1 to 3 were based on the binomial distribution. Hence, it was assumed that the
503 sampled units represented a small proportion (e.g. <10% Martin et al., 2007b; Cameron 2014) of the
504 population from which they were taken. For Equations 1 and 2, this assumption could not be checked
505 because there was not data about the overall denominators abroad. Anyway, it seems possible that less
506 than 10% of the animals present in the exporting herd contributed to the consignment (N_{anim}) and that
507 less than 10% of the consignments abroad were imported into a single English herd. For Equation 3 the
508 assumption was valid in most of the situations according to the data analysis. The only exceptions
509 happened when strata such as M-A-PIC and B-A-PIC, were composed by a very small number of herds,
510 and thus between these, a percentage higher than 10% could import cattle. The probability of introduction
511 posed by these herds contributed marginally to P_{Intro} , because very few of these properties (or none)
512 imported cattle. In future studies the M-A-PIC and B-A-PIC herds could be included within the M-PIC and
513 B-PIC strata, also because no herds belonged to those strata in most of the surveillance periods (Appendix,
514 Tables 3-4).

515 Considering Equation 4, the two main assumptions were: i) independence between strata and ii)
516 independence between import events. These were both confirmed in the data analysis. Herds appearing in
517 one stratum did not appear in the other strata, and during a single surveillance period, it was assumed that
518 a herd could import animals from OBF, or from Non-OBF, or from Validation countries, but not from different
519 country statuses at the same time. Usually, herds imported a single (median) consignment per surveillance
520 period and if more consignments arrived, they were mostly from the same country status. In fact, from
521 previous analysis (data 2011 to 2016) we knew that at GB level, when the sending countries were divided
522 into the three statuses (OBF, Non-OBF and Validation) the number of consignments was 13,520. Whereas
523 the number of consignments counted per single country name was 13,815. Therefore, only for 2.1%

524 (295/13,815) of the GB consignments, a single herd could import animals from more than one country on
525 the same date, and we generalized those as consignments from the same country status.

526 Uncertainty and variability were both captured in the used inputs and affected the final *PIntro*. It is usually
527 preferred to separate the two kinds of variation of the inputs, but from a pragmatic point of view, the policy
528 makers also need an overall picture output (still stochastic). Hence, a simplification was used to avoid
529 complex answers by splitting uncertainty and variability into several separated inputs/outputs. For example
530 the model's ability of reflecting the variability between importing herds of the same stratum (during the same
531 Q-period), was simplified. On one hand, simulating each single herd and consignment within each stratum
532 could have made the model more precise from a technical point of view. On the other hand, simplifying to
533 24 combinations of stratum "S" and status "J" of country of origin, allowed a fast running time and several
534 surveillance periods could be investigated. The model structure was discussed through meetings and
535 workshops during the study, within an ad-hoc steering committee. The committee was composed of several
536 professional figures: cattle experts, veterinarians, risk assessors, risk managers and data providers. It was
537 agreed that the distributions used for the number of animals imported per herd (N_{anim}) within each stratum
538 were representative enough, because based on actual data and because they related to relatively small
539 periods of three months each. Additionally, 20,000 iterations were used and in each iteration a different
540 input was taken from the defined distributions of *BHP*, *WHP* and N_{anim} . Therefore, the structure of the
541 model was considered informative enough for the purposes of the study. Moreover, with the simplification
542 used, the model could be adapted easily for other countries with similar data, e.g. Scotland and Wales
543 (Foddai et al., 2018)

544 In GB, some consignments from traders or farmers considered at risk (e.g. for previous non compliances)
545 could also be tested according to the APHA Operational Manual (OM). Data regarding these situations
546 were not included and those eventual further tests were disregarded in this study. Hence, from that point
547 of view, the actual *PIntro* could be lower than the estimates reported here.

548 Furthermore, in this assessment, all animals imported from Italy and Spain were considered as Non-OBF
549 despite some regions are recognised as OBF. Unfortunately, information on the region of origin was not

550 available and the impact of those imports on *PIntro* could have been overestimated. Nevertheless, such
551 overestimation should be marginal, because only a very small proportion of the animals arrived from those
552 countries during the investigated periods (Appendix, Table 2). This assumption was confirmed in the
553 alternative scenario, where the *PIntro* was very low and the contribution of Non-OBF and OBF-Validation
554 countries became clearer than in the baseline scenario.

555 Regarding the impact of follow up tests on suspicious imports, it must be said that further serial testing on
556 positives could reduce the overall sensitivity if the used tests have $Se < 100\%$ and the last test/s override/s
557 the result/s of the previous one/s. If in reality several follow ups are carried out, the *PIntro* would be
558 underestimated.

559 Finally, as a conservative approach, it was assumed that all (potential) “truly” positive animals of any sex
560 and age could be potential sources of introduction, because it is unclear to what extent antibody positives
561 could spread the pathogen through their excreta (e.g. in what amount). In the data used, information on the
562 pregnancy status of the imported animals was not available. Neither was it known if the imported males
563 could go to artificial insemination centres producing semen for commercial sale, where all bulls undergo
564 frequent testing and are kept in high biosecurity. Thus, due to these uncertainties, the conservative
565 approach was preferred and the *PIntro* could have been overestimated. Estimates could become more
566 precise in the future, if studies are carried out to investigate the epidemiological importance of age, sex,
567 faeces, urines and natural mating, for disease spread.

568

569 **Conclusion**

- 570 • In the baseline scenario, which assumed a more conservative approach towards OBF
571 consignments, it appeared that on average at least one introduction could occur each 9 years (2;
572 70).
- 573 • When the between-herds prevalence in OBF countries was reduced, the probability of introduction
574 at national level also reduced remarkably for the most recent considered year (2016) due to the
575 large number of imported animals from those countries.

- 576 • Future studies on the role of latent carriers of different age and sex and on the presence of *Brucella*
577 *abortus* in excreta from antibody positive animals, could reduce the uncertainty on the *Pintra*
578 estimates.

579

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1 **Appendix: Table 1. List of Abbreviations**

Abbreviation	Meaning
<i>APHA</i>	Animal and Plant Health Agency
<i>B-Abo</i>	Beef herds (non-dairy) tested in abortion/s in the investigated surveillance period
<i>B-A-PIC</i>	Beef herds (non-dairy) tested in abortion/s and PIC in the investigated surveillance period
<i>BHP(J)</i>	Probability that the herd abroad (from where the consignment/s was/were picked up in country status "J") was infected.
<i>BHP(OBF)</i>	Probability that the exporting herd located in an OBF country was infected
<i>BHP(Non-OBF)</i>	Probability that the exporting herd located in a Non-OBF country was infected
<i>BHP(OBF-Validation)</i>	Probability that the exporting herd located in a Validation country was infected
<i>B-NoTest</i>	Beef herds not tested at the APHA laboratories in the investigated surveillance period
<i>B-PIC</i>	Beef herds (non-dairy) tested in Post Import Calving/s in the investigated surveillance period
<i>BTM</i>	Bulk tank milk
<i>CPH</i>	County Parish Holding number (herd ID in GB)
<i>CTS</i>	Cattle Tracing System database
<i>Defra</i>	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (United Kingdom)
<i>DES</i>	Department of Epidemiological Sciences (APHA, Weybridge)
<i>EFSA</i>	European Food Safety Authority
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>GB</i>	Great Britain
<i>iELISA</i>	Serum indirect Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay
<i>LIMS</i>	Laboratory Information Management System
<i>M</i>	Dairy herds only tested in the bulk tank milk in the investigated surveillance period
<i>M-Abo</i>	Dairy herds only tested in the bulk tank milk and abortion/s in the investigated surveillance period
<i>M-A-PIC</i>	Dairy herds tested in milk, abortion/s and post import calved cows in the investigated surveillance period
<i>M-PIC</i>	Dairy herds only tested in the bulk tank milk and post import calved cows in the investigated surveillance period
<i>N_anim</i>	Number of animals per imported consignment
<i>N_con(S,J)</i>	Median number of consignments from country status "J" received per English herd within stratum "S" in the investigated surveillance period.
<i>N_herds(S,J)</i>	Number of herds within stratum "S" importing cattle from country status "J" in the investigated surveillance period
<i>NI</i>	Northern Ireland
<i>NML</i>	National Milk Laboratories
<i>Non-OBF</i>	Non-Officially Brucellosis Free country status
<i>OBF</i>	Official Brucellosis Free country status

<i>OBF-Validation</i>	Official Brucellosis Free country status during the first five years after attaining the status and when serology is still applied according to Council Directive 64/432/EEC (called as validation period in this study)
<i>OM</i>	APHA Operational Manual
<i>Ph</i>	Design herd prevalence from the European Legislation (Council Directive 64/432/EEC), below which (after five consecutive years) European countries can be recognised OBF
<i>PFree</i>	Confidence in freedom from disease based on the epidemiological concept of negative predictive value given test-negative surveillance results from a given surveillance period
<i>PIC</i>	Post Import Calving testing
<i>PInf_{Con(Non-OBF)}</i>	Probability that the consignment imported from a Non-OBF country contained and introduced at least one infected animal
<i>PInf_{Con(S,J)}</i>	Probability that the consignment imported from an infected herd from country status "J" contained at least one infected animal
<i>PInf_{Herd(S,J)}</i>	Probability that an importing English herd located within a specific stratum "S", became infected by one or more consignments from country status "J" (during surveillance period Q)
<i>PInf(S,J)</i>	Probability that at least one of the herds of the stratum S (M, or M-Abo, or M-PIC, or M-AboPIC, or B-Abo, or B-PIC, or B-A-PIC, or B-NoTest), which imported consignment(s) from country status "J" (OBF, or Non-OBF or Validation), became infected.
<i>PIntro</i>	National level probability of disease introduction into the investigated cattle population during a surveillance period Q
<i>Prop_Test</i>	Probability that the animal imported from a Non-OBF country was older than 12 months and was tested.
<i>RADAR</i>	Rapid Analysis and Detection of Animal-Related Risks database
<i>RiskPert</i>	Pert distribution set in @Risk
<i>ROI</i>	Republic of Ireland
<i>Se</i>	Sensitivity of the serum antibody indirect ELISA (iELISA) used on animals (older than 12 months) imported from Non-OBF countries
<i>SSe</i>	Surveillance system sensitivity
<i>WHP</i>	Within-herd prevalence abroad

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8 **Table, 2.** Number of animals imported by English production cattle herds, per sending country (period 2013-2016).

Country	Animals 2013	Percentage	Animals 2014	Percentage	Animals 2015	Percentage	Animals 2016	Percentage
AUSTRIA	27	0.1%	15	0.0%	12	0.0%	83	0.4%
BELGIUM	114	0.4%	280	0.7%	242	0.9%	442	1.9%
CZECH REPUBLIC	0	0.0%	2	0.0%	166	0.6%	0	0.0%
DENMARK	2059	6.6%	4095	10.6%	3061	10.8%	1415	6.2%
FINLAND	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	4	0.0%
FRANCE	1503	4.9%	1244	3.2%	2398	8.5%	2630	11.6%
GERMANY	4880	15.8%	7254	18.9%	4035	14.3%	3703	16.3%
IRELAND ^a	6993	22.6%	9993	26.0%	6675	23.7%	4084	18.0%
ISLE OF MAN	1702	5.5%	2201	5.7%	1934	6.9%	3283	14.4%
LUXEMBOURG	0	0.0%	587	1.5%	687	2.4%	408	1.8%
NETHERLANDS	6481	20.9%	7602	19.8%	3981	14.1%	3108	13.7%
NORWAY	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	0.0%	3	0.0%
POLAND	0	0.0%	5	0.0%	2	0.0%	3	0.0%
ROMANIA	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
SLOVAKIA	0	0.0%	48	0.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
SWEDEN	0	0.0%	3	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
SWITZERLAND	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.0%	17	0.1%
NORTHERN IRELAND ^b	7087	22.9%	4816	12.5%	4798	17.0%	3434	15.1%
CANADA ^c	0	0.0%	10	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
GUERNSEY ^c	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
HUNGARY ^c	14	0.0%	143	0.4%	100	0.4%	0	0.0%
ITALY ^c	33	0.1%	128	0.3%	20	0.1%	21	0.1%
JERSEY ^c	74	0.2%	47	0.1%	93	0.3%	93	0.4%
SPAIN ^c	0	0.0%	2	0.0%	9	0.0%	6	0.0%
GREECE ^c	4	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Overall total	30,972	100.0%	38,475	100.0%	28,216	100.0%	22,737	100.0%


9 ^a From OBF-Validation to OBF in August 2014. ^b From Non-OBF to OBF-Validation in October 2015. ^c Always Non-OBF during the considered period.

10 **Table 3.** Quarterly median (minimum and maximum) number of herds ($N_{herds}(S,J)$) within each population stratum “S”; and importing from the different country
 11 statuses “J” (OBF, Non-OBF, and OBF-Validation). In columns Q-1-2013 to Q-4-2014, is the quarterly median number (N_{anim}) of imported animals (minimum and
 12 maximum) per consignment, during years 2013 and 2014.

Stratum “S” (Status “J”)	N. Herds	Q-1-2013	Q-2-2013	Q-3-2013	Q-4-2013	Q-1-2014	Q-2-2014	Q-3-2014	Q-4-2014
M (OBF)	81 (31; 163)	16 (1, 88)	19 (1, 66)	15 (1, 105)	16 (1, 69)	16 (1, 61)	12 (1, 170)	12 (1, 82)	14 (1, 99)
M-Abo (OBF)	7 (0, 24)	17 (14, 20)	24 (1, 38)	34 (6, 68)	22 (2, 35)	17 (6, 36)	21 (1, 89)	30 (3, 141)	35 (2, 71)
M-PIC (OBF)	3 (0,8)	12 (2, 24)	12 (5, 36)	6 (1, 37)	34 (14, 36)	8 (6, 10)	4 (1, 10)	36 (5, 38)	20 (1, 37)
M-A-PIC (OBF)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	17 (17, 17)	0 (0, 0)
M (OBF-Validation)	3 (0, 30)	18 (1, 46)	24 (3, 55)	20 (1, 61)	18 (2, 44)	20 (4, 46)	16 (1, 41)	17 (5, 35)	0 (0, 0)
M-Abo (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 6)	0 (0, 0)	8 (6, 34)	17 (12, 22)	23 (9, 45)	0 (0, 0)	9 (4, 35)	20 (16, 24)	0 (0, 0)
M-PIC (OBF-Validation)	1 (0, 13)	15 (10, 36)	20 (1, 68)	31 (1, 39)	20 (5, 39)	36 (27, 37)	8 (1, 39)	19 (19, 35)	0 (0, 0)
M-A-PIC (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 0)	46 (46, 46)	0 (0, 0)	40 (40, 40)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
M (Non-OBF)	4 (0, 11)	9 (1, 17)	6 (1, 29)	11 (1, 49)	2 (1, 18)	0 (0, 0)	1 (1, 35)	14 (1, 62)	10 (1, 46)
M-Abo (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	12 (12, 12)	0 (0, 0)	15 (15, 15)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
M-PIC (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 0)	19 (19, 19)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	20 (8, 32)	0 (0, 0)
M-A-PIC (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
B-NoTest (OBF)	94 (59, 144)	7 (1, 96)	13 (1, 70)	11 (1, 59)	11 (1, 80)	10 (1, 101)	10 (1, 70)	10 (1, 80)	17 (1, 86)
B-Abo (OBF)	2 (0, 7)	28 (20, 35)	26 (6, 36)	4 (4, 4)	8 (2, 15)	30 (2, 35)	15 (15, 15)	20 (6, 69)	23 (1, 70)
B-PIC (OBF)	2 (0, 4)	12 (12, 12)	34 (34, 68)	66 (1, 131)	2 (1, 4)	1 (1, 1)	36 (36, 36)	46 (2, 106)	6 (1, 34)
B-A-PIC (OBF)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
B-NoTest (OBF-Validation)	23 (0, 47)	12 (1, 39)	24 (1, 147)	8 (1, 71)	11 (1, 103)	12 (1, 102)	31 (1, 88)	14 (1, 75)	0 (0, 0)
B-Abo (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 0)	38 (38, 38)	0 (0, 0)	20 (16, 40)	6 (6, 6)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
B-PIC (OBF-Validation)	2 (0,4)	32 (12, 37)	20 (3, 38)	8 (1, 20)	7 (6, 12)	20 (9, 44)	24 (1, 74)	53 (17, 54)	0 (0, 0)
B-A-PIC (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 1)	45 (45, 45)	0 (0, 0)	42 (42, 42)	0 (0, 0)	40 (21, 52)	0 (0, 0)	40 (40, 40)	0 (0, 0)
B-NoTest (Non-OBF)	30 (0, 52)	18 (1, 107)	19 (1, 59)	20 (1, 68)	3 (1, 62)	6 (1, 108)	1 (1, 67)	37 (1, 104)	2 (1, 81)
B-Abo (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 1)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	1 (1, 1)
B-PIC (Non-OBF)	1 (0, 3)	22 (22, 22)	0 (0, 0)	1 (1, 1)	0 (0, 0)	1 (1, 1)	0 (0, 0)	5 (1, 18)	40 (40, 40)
B-A-PIC (Non-OBF)	0 (0,0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)

14 **Table 4.** Table 3 continued. Quarterly median number (N_{anim}) of imported animals (minimum and maximum) per consignment, during years 2015 and 2016; and
 15 according to stratum "S" of importing herd and status "J" of country of origin.

Stratum "S" (Status "J")	Q-1-2015	Q-2-2015	Q-3-2015	Q-4-2015	Q-1-2016	Q-2-2016	Q-3-2016	Q-4-2016
M (OBF)	10 (1, 69)	16 (1, 178)	24 (1, 80)	18 (1, 70)	22 (1, 48)	34 (1, 70)	22 (1, 78)	15 (1, 70)
M-Abo (OBF)	29 (1, 35)	25 (2, 65)	20 (5, 70)	24 (10, 73)	0 (0, 0)	30 (19, 36)	30 (1, 34)	36 (11, 70)
M-PIC (OBF)	16 (3, 35)	20 (2, 70)	0 (0, 0)	12 (12, 12)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	12 (12, 12)	33 (33, 33)
M-A-PIC (OBF)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	26 (16, 37)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
M (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	1 (1, 1)	1 (1, 1)	1 (1, 1)	0 (0, 0)	1 (1, 1)
M-Abo (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	1 (1, 1)
M-PIC (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	11 (11, 11)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
M-A-PIC (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
M (Non-OBF)	1 (1, 1)	1 (1, 40)	3 (1, 40)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	2 (1, 17)	0 (0, 0)
M-Abo (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	50 (50, 50)	0 (0, 0)
M-PIC (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 0)	1 (1, 1)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
M-A-PIC (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
B-NoTest (OBF)	10 (1, 80)	15 (1, 106)	15 (1, 70)	14 (1, 107)	4 (1, 55)	7 (1, 82)	17 (1, 129)	6 (1, 160)
B-Abo (OBF)	35 (3, 35)	32 (2, 35)	35 (17, 35)	2 (1, 15)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	25 (15, 35)	35 (15, 35)
B-PIC (OBF)	26 (26, 27)	21 (3, 39)	14 (1, 36)	16 (3, 21)	2 (2, 2)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	45 (21, 49)
B-A-PIC (OBF)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
B-NoTest (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	4 (1, 57)	2 (1, 98)	1 (1, 99)	30 (1, 75)	1 (1, 103)
B-Abo (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	2 (2, 2)	0 (0, 0)
B-PIC (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	32 (5, 51)	2 (1, 31)	1 (1, 1)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
B-A-PIC (OBF-Validation)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	53 (53, 53)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
B-NoTest (Non-OBF)	3 (1, 55)	3 (1, 95)	37 (1, 60)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	2 (1, 5)	2 (2, 16)
B-Abo (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	2 (2, 2)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)
B-PIC (Non-OBF)	32 (9, 68)	32 (1, 38)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	2 (2, 2)	0 (0, 0)
B-A-PIC (Non-OBF)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)	0 (0, 0)




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18 **Figure A.** Number of imported consignments received within the dairy sector, within each stratum (M = milk herds only tested in bulk tank milk (BTM); M-Abo = milk
 19 herds tested in BTM and abortion/s; M-PIC = milk herds tested in BTM and post import calving; M-A-PIC = milk herds tested in BTM, abortion/s and at post import
 20 calving), according to status of country of origin (OBF = Officially Brucellosis Free, Non-OBF = Non Officially Brucellosis Free, and VAL = OBF-Validation) and per
 21 surveillance period (Q-1 to Q-4) during years 2013 (13) to 2016 (16).

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25 **Figure B.** Number of imported consignments received within the beef (B, non-dairy) sector, within each stratum (B-Abo = beef herds tested in abortion/s only; B-PIC =
 26 = beef herds tested in post import calving only; B-A-PIC = beef herds tested in abortion/s and post import calving), according to status of country of origin (OBF =
 27 Officially Brucellosis Free, Non-OBF = Non Officially Brucellosis Free, and VAL = OBF-Validation) and per surveillance period (Q-1 to Q-4), during years 2013 (13)
 28 to 2016 (16).