

The Secret Struggle for the Global South: Espionage, Military Assistance and State Security in the Cold War

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Introduction

The post-World War II era was a moment of profound transformation of the international order. There emerged rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. The competition embodied a global confrontation between socialism and capitalism, which was in itself rooted in the ideas and transformations of the nineteenth century.¹ In parallel, European colonial empires began to buckle under economic and political pressures. In 1947, the British exited the Indian subcontinent and, in 1954, the French gave up control of Indochina. However, it took until the mid-1960s for European colonial powers to relinquish control of the African continent. The rise of Mao's China and the outbreak of the Korean War marked another key moment that brought the Global South into the orbit of superpower competition. In Latin America, the post-war period saw a surge of revolutionary movements demanding social justice, epitomised by the victory of the Cuban revolution in 1959. Accordingly, from the 1950s onwards, the 'Global South' increasingly became a target of bitter rivalry between the superpowers as well as the former colonial powers struggling to retain a modicum of influence.

Since Arne Westad's seminal *Global Cold War* directed attention of Cold War historians beyond Europe, there has emerged rich scholarship that has incorporated struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America into the Cold War narrative.² A number of studies focused on the power and agency of the so-called 'peripheral actors', both in the 'North' and 'South'.³ In fact, many of these studies have confirmed Tony Smith's assertion that the 'junior members of the international system' were often key to 'expanding, intensifying, and prolonging the struggle between East and West.'⁴ In a parallel development, there has emerged substantial literature that has aspired to follow Matthew Connelly's call to 'take off the Cold War lens' and showcase how actors in the Global South contributed to the international order.⁵ We now know that the Global South not only mattered, but that it played a key role in shaping

¹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (London: Allen Lane, 2017), 17-41.

² Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

³ The volumes include Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012; Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Piero Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Radoslav A. Yordanov, *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa During the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2016); Jamie Miller, *An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival* (New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2016); Thomas C. Field Jr., Stella Krepp, Vanni Pettinà (eds), *Latin America and the Global Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

⁴ Tony Smith, 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (2000), 567-591.

⁵ Matthew Connelly, 'Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence', *American Historical Review*, 105, no. 3 (May 2000): 739-69. For a sample of literature in this tradition, see: Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Alanna O'Malley, *The diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo crisis 1960-1964* (Manchester University Press, 2018); and contributions to 'Beyond and Between the Cold War Blocs': Special Issue of *The International History Review* 37:5 (December 2015), 901-1013.

international politics after World War II. However, the role played by espionage, military assistance and state security in this battle for the Global South still remains obscure.

This special issue aims to place the history of secret intelligence within the broader literature on the Cold War and decolonisation.⁶ Literature on Western secret intelligence first emerged in the 1950s - when former intelligence officers began publishing memoirs detailing their service. Whether to gain prestige, boost their financial status or express dissent with policies and activities of their former employers, these works – for the first time – unveiled the intelligence world to the public.⁷ These memoirs were soon complemented by journalistic literature on espionage predominantly based on information from closed sources.⁸ Two decades after the end of the Cold War, histories of secret services in the Anglosphere based on increasingly available archival documents began to emerge.⁹ Gradually, intelligence historians and journalists in the US and the UK have explored a rich variety of themes pertinent to the practice of intelligence – including the role of intelligence in waging the ‘Cultural Cold War’¹⁰, the relationship between intelligence, cover action and diplomacy¹¹, or the role of clandestine agencies in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.¹² In parallel, academics have also begun investigating how key Western governments utilised security and intelligence to pursue their

⁶ Christopher Andrew and David Dills, *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (London: Urbana, 1984).

⁷ For instance, Eddie Chapman, *The Eddie Chapman Story* (New York, NY: Messner, 1953); John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton and Company, 1978); Peter Wright and Paul Greengrass, *Spycatcher - AT LAST! The Spy Book of the Century* (Australia: William Heinemann, 1987); Frank Snepp, *Irreparable Harm: A Firsthand Account of How One Agent Took on the CIA in a Epic Battle over Free Speech* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999); Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960–67* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

⁸ For instance: Nigel West, *MI5, British security service operations, 1909-1945* (Bodley Head, 1981); Nigel West, *A matter of trust: MI5 1945-72* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982); Chapman Pincher, *Too secret too long: the great betrayal of Britain's crucial secrets and the cover-up* (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984). For more on the evolution of Anglospheric espionage history see: Christopher R. Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity. The Pursuit of Intelligence History: Methods, Sources, and Trajectories in the United Kingdom’, *Studies in Intelligence*, 55:2 (June 2011): 33-55; and Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy, ‘Intelligence Studies Now and Then’ in: Christopher R. Moran and Christopher J. Murphy (eds.), *Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 1-18.

⁹ Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5* (Penguin, 2010); Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The history of the secret intelligence service 1909-1949* (A&C Black, 2010); Richard J. Aldrich, *GCHQ* (HarperCollins UK, 2010); Michael S. Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: volume 1: from the approach of the Second World War to the Suez crisis* (Routledge, 2014).

¹⁰ Francis Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta 1999). For a follow-up on the domestic impact, see: Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53: The Information Research Department* (Routledge, 2004); Richard J. Aldrich, ‘OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1949-1960’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 8/1 (March 1997), 184-227; Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Postwar American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002).

¹¹ Len Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, *Intelligence and National Security* 19/2 (2004), 322-34; Andrew Mumford, ‘Covert Peacemaking: Clandestine Negotiations and Backchannels with the Provisional IRA during the Early “Troubles”, 1972-76’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39/4 (2011), 633-648; Shlomo Shpiro, ‘The CIA as Middle East Peace Broker?’, *Survival*, 45/2, (2003), 91-112; Walter A. Dorn and David J.H. Bell, ‘Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960-64’, *International Peacekeeping*, 2 no 1 (1995), 11-33.

¹² The conflict in Northern Ireland remains the best-studied case of counterterrorism intelligence: Gaetano J. Iardi, ‘Irish Republican Army counterintelligence’, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 23/1 (2009): 1-26; Michael Kirk-Smith and James Dingley, ‘Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: the role of intelligence’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 20/3-4 (2009); Jon Moran, ‘Evaluating Special Branch and the use of informant intelligence in Northern Ireland’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 25, no 1 (2010).

foreign policy goals. While the Americans employed intelligence to fight the Cold War, the former colonial powers often did so to try to control the process of decolonisation and retain influence in the process.¹³

While scholarship on Western intelligence services has expanded in terms of sources as well as themes, literature on Soviet-Bloc intelligence and security remains limited. To date, our understanding of Soviet intelligence services has relied almost entirely on memoirs of defectors and retired intelligence officers from the Soviet Union and state socialist Eastern Europe.¹⁴ Among the most popular sources in the West has been a series of volumes authored by Cambridge historian Christopher Andrew and former KGB archivist Vasilii Mitrokhin, who had defected to Britain with handwritten notes on KGB operations secretly collected over the years. These volumes detail Soviet intelligence and security operations across a number of theatres – from the US, through Europe, to the Global South. Their work continues to serve as a roadmap for any new research within the realm of Soviet espionage. In the volume *The World was Going our Way*, which covers Soviet intelligence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Andrew and Mitrokhin argue that the KGB was one of the key drivers of Soviet expansionism in the Global South. Nevertheless, they conclude, that although the KGB were optimistic about advances of socialism in the Third World, their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.¹⁵ Recently, further attempts have been made to assess the role and impact of Soviet intelligence during the Cold War. In his detailed history of the KGB and GRU (Soviet military intelligence), Jonathan Haslam argues that the Soviets were quite successful in human intelligence (HUMINT), whilst Signals intelligence (SIGINT) lagged behind. However, Haslam focuses mainly on the European theatre and says little about the Global South.¹⁶ The unavailability of sources still remains a major problem for scholars of Soviet security and intelligence, and as a result, much current literature still relies on anecdotal evidence.

The role of intelligence and security services of Central-Eastern European countries in the Global South remains the ‘black box’ of Cold War espionage studies. Thus far, most literature on intelligence and security activities of ‘Moscow’s satellites’ has focused on the domestic - detailing human rights abuses and reconstructing the organisational structure of

¹³ On Britain, see: Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley, eds. *The clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western intelligence, propaganda and special operations*. (Psychology Press, 2000); Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (John Murray, 2006); Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire* (London: Harper Press, 2013); Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2013). On France, see: Nathaniel Powell, ‘Experts in Decolonization? French Statebuilding and Counterinsurgency in Chad, 1969–1972’, *The International History Review*, 42, no 2 (2020): 318-335. On Belgium, amongst others, see: Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

¹⁴ For memoirs and accounts of Soviet officers, see: Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (HarperCollins Publishers, 1990); Oleg Gordievsky, *Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky* (London: Macmillan, 1995); Vadim Kirpichenko, *Razvedka: Litsa i Lichnosti* (Moscow: Geya, 1998); Leonid Shebarshin, *Ruka Moskvy* [The Hand of Moscow] (Moscow: Tsentr100, 1992); Nikolai Leonov, *Likholetye* [The Wild Years] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994); Viktor Cherkashin and Gregory Feifer, *Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer—The True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames* (New York: Basic Books, 2005). On East Germany, see: Markus Wolf and Anne McElvoy, *The Man Without a Face* (New York: Public Affairs, 1997). On Czechoslovakia, see: Josef Frolik, *The Frolik Defection: The Memoirs of a Czech Intelligence Agent* (Leo Cooper Ltd: London, 1975); Jan Sejna, *We will bury you* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982); Ladislav Bittman, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985). On Romania see: Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief* (Gateway Books, 1987).

¹⁵ Christopher Andrew and Vasilii Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York, Basic Books, 2005).

¹⁶ Jonathan Haslam, *Near and Distant Neighbours: A New History of Soviet Intelligence* (Oxford: OUP, 2015).

these complex security bureaucracies.¹⁷ This has been a mammoth task pioneered by hundreds of archivists, historians and social scientists often employed by specialised national memory institutions set up in the early 2000s to study the security and intelligence apparatus of the state socialist regimes.¹⁸ These detail-oriented and largely descriptive accounts have enabled scholars to move beyond the domestic and discuss issues such as that of the ‘agency’ of state security and intelligence organisations across the Soviet Bloc. While early observers often considered state socialist regimes in Central-Eastern Europe to be Soviet proxies, new scholarship has highlighted their independent agency, as well as disagreement and rivalry within the Soviet Bloc.¹⁹

Nevertheless, the international legacy and impact of Central-Eastern European security and intelligence organisations has thus far not received enough attention. We continue to be largely unaware of how Prague, Bucharest or Warsaw used their intelligence services to pursue their foreign policies. The Global South is no exception. Scholars have recently begun exploring the general history of economic, cultural, and personal ties between the Soviet Bloc and the Global South, often underpinned by the rhetoric of ‘socialist internationalism’.²⁰ Nevertheless, these studies largely evade the role of intelligence and security services.²¹ This is all the more surprising, since records of state security agencies in most Central-Eastern European countries are increasingly open to researchers. Despite varying degrees of end-of-regime document destruction in the period of transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s, these records provide invaluable insights into the workings of intelligence and security services across the globe.

Overall, the literature on the Cold War as well as intelligence and security remains centred on the Anglosphere and is overwhelmingly Eurocentric. We know a lot about methods of intelligence collection and recruitment used by both sides, the key ‘successes and failures’, and are learning more about intelligence organisations and cultures in both ‘East’ and ‘West’. We also now know much more about the impact of intelligence and threat perception upon policy-making, especially during key moments of crisis over the Congo, Cuba and

¹⁷ Jonathan R. Adelman (ed.), *Terror and Communist politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984); Karel Kaplan and Pavel Paleček, *Komunistický režim a politické procesy v Československu* (Brno: Barrister & Principal, 2001); Jens Gieseke, *The History of the Stasi: East Germany's Secret Police, 1945-1990* (Berghahn Books, 2014).

¹⁸ For instance: the Czech Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů); the Slovak Nation's Memory Institute (Ústavu pamäti národa); the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej); Hungary's Historical Archives of the State Security Services (Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történelvi Levéltára).

¹⁹ For an overview of the literature, see ‘introduction’ in Natalia Telepneva (eds), *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the ‘Third World’: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: IB Tauris, 2018), 1-5.

²⁰ For examples, see: James Mark, Artemy Kalinovsky and Stefii Marung (eds), *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2020); Patryk Babiracki and Austin Jersild, (ed), *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War. Exploring the Second World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017); James Mark and Peter Apor, ‘Socialism Goes Global: Decolonization and the Making of a New Culture of Internationalism in Socialist Hungary, 1956–1989’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 87, no. 4 (December 2015): 852-891.

²¹ Although few exceptions do exist: On the GDR, see: Lutz Maeke, *DDR und PLO. Die Palästinalpolitik des SED-Staates* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017). On Czechoslovakia, see: Danila Richterova, ‘The anxious host: Czechoslovakia and Carlos the Jackal 1978-1986’, *The International History Review*, 40, no. 1 (2018), 108-32; Natalia Telepneva, ‘Code Name SEKRETÁŘ’: Amílcar Cabral, Czechoslovakia and the Role of Human Intelligence during the Cold War, *The International History Review* (2019). On Poland, see: Przemysław Gasztold, *Zabójcze układy. Służby PRL i międzynarodowy terroryzm* (Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2017).

Afghanistan.²² However, our knowledge is still focused on the ‘Global North’ and East-West rivalry, as seen from Moscow, Berlin, London and Washington. In the past years, intelligence studies scholars have started to pay greater attention to ‘cultures of intelligence’ beyond the Anglosphere.²³ However, the dearth of evidence-based literature that explores the agency of Global South intelligence and security services continues to be a problem.²⁴ We know regrettably little about how the East and West went about establishing intelligence, security and military relations across the Global South. We know even less about the dynamic, structure, costs and benefits of these complex arrangements. Furthermore, we often see sensationalist accounts of famous leaders from Africa or Asia being on the payroll of the CIA or the KGB. Nevertheless, we pay little attention to the actual nature of these relationships, how much they mattered and the power dynamics involved. Finally, our knowledge of the role technology has played within Global North-South relations remains insufficient.

Historians have used both ‘Third World’ and ‘Global South’ to refer to former colonial or semi-colonial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, often interchangeably. During the Cold War, the ‘Third World’ was not only a geographical concept, but rather a political project, which envisioned a ‘third way’ beyond the Cold War. We have used the more politically neutral term ‘the Global South’. We have also chosen to highlight similarities in the ways that ‘East’ and ‘West’ engaged with the ‘South’ during the Cold War. By using the term, we wanted to emphasise the importance of North-South dynamics, rather than East-West division.

The ‘not-so-secret struggle’ for the special issue

When academics get together, they often lament the tough workload, mischievous students or the lack of digits on their latest pay cheque. But there are also those rare moments, when scholars from across disciplines meet over a pint, discuss the boundaries of their respective disciplines, and then proceed to actually do something about filling the often-cited ‘gap’. One afternoon in early 2018, crammed around a small table in *The Varsity* – a popular and by far the most respectable of Warwick University’s campus bars – we ended up doing just that. While sipping drinks with Richard J. Aldrich and Christopher Moran, we complained about the lack of literature on Cold War intelligence in the Global South. By the time we ordered the second round of drinks, we were drawing plans for a workshop which would bring together historians, area studies specialists, economists, and intelligence scholars for a discussion that could be enriched by multiple perspectives.

Fast forward to September 2018: over thirty scholars came together at Warwick’s Institute for Advanced Studies to participate at the ‘Secret Struggle for the Global South’ workshop. A collaboration of the Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS) and the History Department at the University of Warwick – the workshop would not have been possible without the support from Professor Richard J. Aldrich and Professor David Anderson, as well as our generous sponsors.²⁵ This special issue is the outcome of discussions at the

²² For useful, albeit dated overviews, see: Raymond Garthoff, ‘Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War’, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6:2 (2004), 21–56; Richard J. Aldrich, ‘“Grow your own”: cold war intelligence and history supermarkets’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 17:1 (2002), 135–152.

²³ Philip Davies and Kristian Gustafson, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage outside the Anglosphere* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).

²⁴ This is evident from even fairly new volumes that deal with the topic. See, for example: Michael Herman and Gwilym Hughes, *Intelligence in the Cold war: What difference did it make?* (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013). One notable exception has been a number of studies on the South African intelligence service. See: Kevin O’Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Hennie van Vuuren, *Apartheid Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit* (Hurst & Company: London, 2018).

²⁵ We thank the Institute for Advanced Studies, the Humanities Research Council and the Global History and Culture Centre at the University of Warwick for supporting the event.

workshop. Finally, we would like to thank Professor Alan Dobson and his team for their timely management of the peer review process and publication of this special issue.

This special issue of the *International History Review* presents eleven papers written by fifteen authors. The wide range of sources utilised in this special issue allows us to contribute insights in three main areas: ‘Britain, the US, and the End of Empire’; ‘The Soviet Union, Central-Eastern Europe and the Search for Profits’; and the ‘Global South Agency and Alliance Politics’. The authors in this collection aim to illuminate the following themes. First, they highlight the ambiguous role of secret intelligence as a source of both cooperation and conflict for alliances on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Second, they shed light on the role of security and military assistance as a key ‘export commodity’ in the Cold War. Third, they investigate how actors in the Global South reacted, exploited, and redefined the use of secret intelligence for their own goals. Overall, this special issue focuses on the perspectives of select ‘junior members of the international system’ - Britain, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Bulgaria, India, Tanzania, Cuba, Vietnam, and Morocco, as they employed espionage, military assistance, and state security for their own goals. As such, it aims to bring new research on intelligence into conversation with the new history of the Global Cold War. The contributors to this special issue have used recently declassified or neglected files from British, American, and Central-Eastern European archives, often employing a multi-archival approach to shed light on one of the most secretive aspects of the Global Cold War.

Britain, the US and the End of Empire

The global reach of the British Empire gave London many advantages in the ‘intelligence Cold War’. Due to its status as an imperial power, Britain ran an extensive network of intelligence and security officers who reported on local developments and managed the often-turbulent transitions to independence. The MI5 also built up new security and intelligence apparatus in states nearing independence in an effort to develop a ‘Commonwealth intelligence culture’.²⁶ The British also possessed a tremendous SIGINT capacity, with a network of listening stations stretching across the Empire. In 1947-48, London’s capability was fostered by an intelligence sharing agreement with the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. In the following years, the GCHQ, Britain’s signals intelligence agency, established a close ‘special relationship’ with their American counterpart - the National Security Agency.²⁷ According to Louis and Robinson, following decolonisation, a close alliance between London and Washington enabled the Americans to pursue their own ‘informal empire’ to fight the Cold War.²⁸

However, the status of a former colonial power also had its own disadvantages. Many newly independent governments with history of colonial rule were keen to disassociate themselves with former colonial powers, especially after the Congo crisis heightened fears of ‘neo-colonialism’. As a consequence, many Global South leaders pursued a policy of ‘neutralism’ and ‘non-alignment’, which went hand-in-hand with attempts to diversify sources of foreign assistance, including within the intelligence, security and defence sectors. The authors in this cluster – McGarr, Maguire and Franklin, Aldrich and Mainwaring – highlight how Britain faced up and adapted to these new realities.

We begin with **Thomas Maguire and Hannah Franklin** who investigate British security and intelligence assistance to Tanzania. The authors remind us that London was very much taken over by local developments, as it expected a much slower transition to independence and thus failed to ‘indigenize’ the local special branch. Once Tanzania became

²⁶ Philip Murphy, ‘Creating a Commonwealth intelligence culture: the view from Central Africa 1945-1965’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 17 (2002), 131-162.

²⁷ Richard Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence*

²⁸ W.M. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonisation’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 22, no. 3 (1994).

independent, leading politicians opted to diversify sources of security providers, employing Israel, Canada, China, the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia to provide security and intelligence training in the name of non-alignment. In reality, the Tanzanians cast aside the British security sector 'blueprint' in favour of new approaches tailored to local conditions and shifting priorities of the ruling elites. Although the Tanzanian government relied on British support at times of crisis, such as during the 1964 East African mutiny, intelligence-sharing never materialised. Moreover, the British tried to instill a 'common intelligence culture' in Tanzania but ultimately failed.

Paul McGarr's investigation of British and American responses to the Soviet disinformation campaign in India turns our attention to the role of espionage and covert operations in the Cold War. We already know that India was very important for the Soviet Union, and thus represented a key target for the KGB's disinformation campaigns, which used genuine documents, but also a stream of forgeries to discredit the West among the Indian public and policymakers. McGarr shows that the Soviets were not the only culprits. The British have used bribery, forgery, and covert funding of political parties in India since the 19th century. The British were keenly aware that intelligence scandals would be damaging to UK-Indian relations and urged their American counterparts against overreacting to Soviet forgeries. However, their advice was not always heeded. When in 1967, the British High Commissioner in New Delhi, John Freeman, found himself at the center of a disinformation scandal involving the CIA, Washington went into overdrive, trying to pressure the Indian government to curb the stream of forgeries. The 'intelligence Cold War' in India, concludes McGarr, subverted the country's attempts at non-alignment.

Richard J. Aldrich and Sarah Mainwaring also explore how the British tried to adapt to the new post-imperial environment by investigating the GCHQ's 'secret empire'. The authors show that London was desperate to safeguard its listening stations across the globe. As British influence waned, this was no easy task, as installations and bases were threatened by local conflicts and hostile nationalist governments. Rather than secret intelligence serving to extend empire by other means, Aldrich and Mainwaring argue 'empire was often sustained in the service of intelligence'. The quintessence of the British endeavour to maintain their signals intelligence was a plan to convert the Chagos islands into the British Indian Overseas Territory (BIOT). The focus was the small island of Diego Garcia, which became the location of an Anglo-American base, whilst the small local population was forcibly removed. The Americans bankrolled BIOT out of strategic reasons, as they had recently lost the Kagnew listening station in Eritrea (formerly Ethiopia), which covered an area of crucial importance for Cold War concerns. Publicly, the British and Americans agreed they would make a joint decision on the use of Diego Garcia in crisis, yet, in private, London acceded to a mere 'consultation'. The 'special relationship' was not an alliance of equals.

These authors confirm that the Anglo-American alliance was key to maintaining Western intelligence capability in the Global South. However, they also highlight the limitations of British power, since London fundamentally relied on Washington to bankroll its initiatives. The British employed intelligence and security assistance as a way to continue influence after the end of Empire. However, it also worked the other way: Empire served to maintain access to intelligence. The response to these initiatives in the Global South was neither uniform nor one-dimensional. Although Cold War competition allowed for actors in the Global South to avoid over-reliance on former colonial powers, the intelligence rivalry also complicated attempts to create alternatives to the Cold War order.

The Soviet Union, Central-Eastern Europe and the Search for Profits

The transformation of relations between the 'Global North' and the 'Global South' coincided with momentous changes in the Soviet Bloc. Following the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, the

Soviet leadership launched a period of partial liberalisation known as the ‘thaw’. The Soviet opening to the world allowed its allies in Central-Eastern Europe to pursue their own policies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The authors in this cluster - Jan Koura and Robert Waters, Mikuláš Pešta, Daniela Richterova and Natalia Telepneva, Martin Grossheim, Radoslav Yordanov, and Premyslaw Gasztold - consider the agency and motivations that led Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland to engage in covert action, espionage, military and security assistance across the Global South.

Czechoslovakia is the subject of two articles. In the 1950s, the country was among the first to develop an activist policy in the Global South, as Prague quickly launched diplomatic relations with newly independent states and started providing arms and training to these clients. In the 1950s, Czechoslovakia’s intelligence presence in the Global South expanded significantly, with case officers running agents and training select counterparts. **Jan Koura** and **Robert Waters** highlight just how ambitious the Czechoslovaks were, as they launched grandiose plans to share intelligence and build-up the intelligence services of revolutionary Cuba. The driving force behind such plans was Rudolf Barák, an ambitious Minister of the Interior who geared into action after meeting Raul Castro in 1960. However, difficulties soon emerged, as Czechoslovak intelligence in Cuba was ill-equipped and under-resourced, as emerged during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. However, the biggest challenge came from the Soviets who consistently curtailed Prague’s initiatives in Cuba. Although the authors admit the reasons behind Soviet behaviour are not fully clear, these highlight the limits of Czechoslovak agency.

Mikuláš Pešta, Daniela Richterova and **Natalia Telepneva** highlight similar themes in their analysis of Czechoslovak military training for Global South clients. In the 1950s and 1960s, Prague launched an ambitious program of training military cadres across Asia, Africa and in Cuba. However, the famous arms producer and exporter soon faced multiple challenges to its ambitious training program – including lacking resources and training capacity, and difficulties in maintaining discipline among foreign trainees. After an initial surge in arms provisions and military training, by the early 1960s, Czechoslovakia experienced a sharp decline in arms sales and the number of trainees. As the authors argue, Prague’s training program was not only tested by operational challenges, but was highly contested by a ‘thug of war’ between key stakeholders who struggled to reconcile economic and political objectives of these programs.

Radoslav Yordanov’s article on Bulgaria’s economic involvement in Ethiopia also finds a complex entanglement between economic and political objectives. Bulgaria was historically considered one of Moscow’s closest allies, including in the Global South.²⁹ In Africa, Ethiopia was at the centre of East-West rivalry, and Bulgaria, argues Yordanov, was keen to support Soviet aims by engaging in a range of economic initiatives, including the Red Sea Development Company (RSDC), a Bulgarian-Ethiopian joint shipping, fishing and meatpacking venture on the Red Sea. However, a close alliance with the Soviets was problematic, since the RSDC was plagued by allegations of being a Soviet front organisation, involved in shipping arms to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and in facilitating contacts with radical Marxist student circles in Addis Ababa. Although it is not fully clear to what extent the Bulgarians wanted to use the RSDC for genuine economic profit, the RSDC was too compromised to function, and was closed down in 1966. Whenever economic activity was used for intelligence purposes, its effectiveness seemed limited, especially where there existed substantial rivalry with the West.

²⁹ Jordan Baev, ‘Bulgarian Military and Humanitarian Aid to Third World Countries: 1955-75’, in Philip Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva (eds), *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the ‘Third World’: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: IB Tauris, 2018), 298-326.

Conversely, secret intelligence was readily and effectively used in the Global South for economic gain. **Przemysław Gasztold**'s article on Poland's intelligence activities in Lebanon highlights this important point. Warsaw's intelligence outpost in Beirut was considered its most important 'window into the Middle East', as it covered operations not only in Lebanon, but also in Iraq, Syria, and Israel. Nevertheless, Polish intelligence struggled to acquire local assets, and mainly relied on open-source intelligence to understand local developments. Although HUMINT capacity gradually improved, the Polish *rezidentura* served as a middle-man between Warsaw and a host of Middle Eastern state and non-state organisations, interested in acquiring Polish weapons. In their quest for hard cash, argues Gasztold, Poland's Beirut station laid the groundwork for establishing 'long-lasting ties with various international terrorist organisations'.

The provision of state security assistance was yet another way to make profits, argues **Martin Grossheim**'s article on GDR's security assistance to Vietnam. Among all Warsaw Pact states, the GDR remains the most well-researched, partly due to the long-standing accessibility of German archives and the importance of East-West German rivalry to the Cold War. There thus exists substantial literature on East Berlin's extensive engagement with the Global South, which was a crucial component of its strategy of achieving diplomatic recognition of the GDR - to counter the Hallstine Doctrine.³⁰ Grossheim adds to this literature by investigating the Stasi's provision of state-of-the-art technology and expertise to Hanoi's Ministry of State Security – aimed at bolstering the country's system of internal control and repression, especially after the unification of Vietnam in 1975. Although initially the GDR delivered aid in the name of 'socialist internationalism', towards the late 1970s, the Stasi tried to make profits from its security assistance. Students of GDR would not be surprised to learn about the involvement of intelligence services in attempts to gain hard currency for East Germany, especially after the activities of *Kommerzielle Koordinierung* (KoKo) came to light.³¹ Grossheim's article reveals that by the 1980s, the Stasi as a whole followed a commercial agenda, albeit it is not clear whether they managed to gain profit from the Vietnamese. What is more, Grossheim charts how the Vietnamese in turn became the providers of security assistance to Laos and Cambodia, highlighting the 'circulation of ideas within the socialist world'.

The articles in this cluster highlight a number of themes. All Soviet Bloc countries eagerly used espionage, security and military assistance for 'political objectives' – to gain influence in the Global South in the context of the Cold War. 'Socialist internationalism', an euphemism denoting fraternity among socialist nations, was pronounced whenever support for socialist countries, such as Cuba and Vietnam were concerned. The Central-Eastern European countries often came up with their own, often bold, initiatives, which were not directed by Moscow. Still, they were not free to act as they pleased, and the Soviets had power to influence policy whenever their own priorities or interests were at stake. Central-Eastern European countries also had limited capacity and expertise to provide to the Global South, which often limited the effectiveness of their HUMINT operations or training programs. By the 1980s, these governments used military and security assistance to obtain hard cash for domestic economic objectives rather than to fight the Cold War. As such, these authors help understand

³⁰ William Glenn Gray, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003); Gareth Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009); Klaus Storkmann, *Geheime Solidarität: Militärbeziehungen und Militärhilfen der DDR in die 'Dritte Welt'* (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2012); Young-sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Jeffrey Herf, *Undeclared Wars Against Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left 1967-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

³¹ Matthias Judt, *Der Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung: Das DDR-Wirtschaftsimperium des Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski-Mythos und Realität* (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2013).

not only the nature of state socialism in Central-Eastern Europe, but also help explain why they ended.

Global South Agency and Alliance Politics

New Cold War scholarship no longer views the Global South simply as an arena for superpower competition. We now know that the agency of Global South states and leaders was often a decisive factor in regional as well as international politics. Moreover, playing the ‘West’ against the ‘East’ became a popular statecraft strategy for leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser or Ahmad Sukarno. In addition to their (often volatile) alliances with the superpowers, the newly-independent players in Asia, Africa and Latin America sought to find alternatives to the Cold War order. The 1955 meeting in Bandung and the Afro-Asian Movement, the rise of the Non-Alignment Movement and the calls for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) were all examples of such alternatives. The authors in the final cluster - James Brennan, James Lockhart and Farid Boussaid - shed light on the responses and strategies of actors in the Global South, highlighting how states and individuals used intelligence to pursue their own agendas and further local alliance politics.

James Brennan focuses on the life of Dennis Phombeah, a Tanganyikan nationalist, who collaborated with a host of intelligence organisations from both ‘East’ and ‘West’. As we already know from Tomas Maguire and Hannah Franklin, in East Africa, Tanganyika was at the centre of rivalry between different military and security providers. A similar rush existed among intelligence agencies, all eager to understand the complicated political landscape, made deliberately opaque as a ‘sovereignty-preserving device’. Brennan argues that Phombeah served exactly that crucial function in the service of several donors, providing valuable information and sound judgement on leading African politicians for the British Security Service (MI5) and Czechoslovak Intelligence (StB) before finally advising a nefarious Portuguese ‘businessman-spy-master’ Jorge Jardim. By adopting a ‘agent-focused approach’, Brennan has critically examined the value of HUMINT during the Cold War, and undermined the often-simplistic understanding of the ‘informant-handler’ relationship. In the end, decolonisation empowered minor figures like Phombeah who exploited Cold War rivalries for his personal goals. However, this did not negate the value of Phombeah’s ‘secret journalism’ who added ‘significant value to bare facts’ at low cost and risk.

James Lockhart’s article employs a more traditional agency-based approach to track the evolution of the Cuban Intelligence Service based on Maj. Juan Rodriguez. The Cubans were of course key actors in what Tanya Harmer has called an ‘intra-American Cold War’, exporting the Latin Revolution and supporting the so-called ‘national liberation movements’ across the world.³² However, Lockhart shows that Cuban intelligence was not particularly exceptional, as its service, *Direccion General de Inteligencia* (DGI), evolved from an organisation that consisted of ‘bearded, long-haired teenagers’ who focused on protecting Fidel Castro and his regime from internal enemies, towards a ‘professionalised’ service, which focused on the United States as its main adversary. As Lockhart clearly acknowledges, much remains ‘in the shadows’, especially if we are to speak about Havana’s covert operations designed to further world revolution and run by the elusive Manuel Pineiro, who reported directly to Castro. We already know that Cubans were not Soviet puppets, and their determination to keep a ‘shadow’ branch of their intelligence service beyond the purview of Moscow adds further proof that conflict and rivalry between Moscow and Havana continued after 1968.

Farid Boussaid’s exploration of Morocco’s support for the Congo (Zaire) reinforces Brennan’s and Lockhart’s emphasis on agency that went beyond the Cold War. While Morocco

³² Harmer, *Allende’s Chile*.

was a part of the Western alliance, its support for General Mobutu during the Shaba Wars in 1977 and 1978 dated back to personal links that had been established during the early 1960s. While much attention has focused on the Western role during the Congo Crisis, Boussaid suggests that it was the Moroccan General Ben Hammou Kettani who was the ‘inspiration, if not the architect’ of Mobutu’s *coup* in September 1960, which catapulted Mobutu onto the political stage. While King Hassan did try to use his role in support of Mobutu during the Shaba wars to extract an arms deal from the Americans, it was based on a genuine ‘anti-communist stance’ and the idea of maintaining territorial integrity. Boussaid also reveals Morocco’s role in the ‘Safari Club’, an informal intelligence sharing arrangement between France, Morocco, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and its role during the Shaba interventions.

Conclusion

Taken together, this special issue contributes to the polycentric history of the Cold War. First, the collection highlights an intense rivalry between intelligence agencies, with both the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ using similar clandestine methods to achieve their ends in the ‘South’. The actors in the Global South often explored these secret struggles to their own advantage. However, the ‘intelligence Cold War’ was often detrimental, at times derailing attempts to stay out of the titanic struggle. We hope that future research continues to explore the agency of Global South intelligence and security services, to discern Cold War influences, but also to go beyond that framework, to look at regional and transnational connections in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The authors in this special issue have started this endeavour, mainly by using a multi-archival approach to begin and unravel perspectives from the ‘South’. However, it will be increasingly important to find new, innovative sources, such as oral history, to further challenge the centrality of the ‘North’ in the writings about the ‘South’.

Second, the authors highlight security and military assistance as an important ‘export commodity’ in the ‘secret struggle’. Both the East and West competed to provide security and military assistance to Global South clients, in order to gain informal influence. It seems that efforts to gain direct influence proved elusive, as many, especially newly independent countries preferred to diversify their options. However, there was definitely a degree of transfer and exchange, as ideas and technologies of state security circulated from North to South and back. Further research needs to establish what were the specific features of ‘socialist’ versus ‘capitalist’ state security and how one can discern long-term influences or security cultures.

Finally, the story provides key insights into intra-block relations on both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’. We already know that intelligence cooperation was fundamental to the Anglo-American alliance. Although the Americans were key to bankrolling British imperial initiatives, Washington often held the upper hand. Meanwhile, Soviet Bloc faced similar challenges. The contributions in this collection highlight that espionage and special assistance in the Global South were a fundamental feature of the Soviet Bloc alliance, even though it was often plagued by rivalry and conflict. Moscow’s satellites proved to be enthusiastic in their clandestine activities, even though they often could not match intent to means. In comparison, the West held a comparative advantage, since the former colonial powers possessed much better networks and knowledge. However, the fundamental difference was an economic one. With the Soviet Bloc states increasingly in debt by the 1980s, state socialist countries were increasingly concerned with survival rather than victory in the Cold War. The comparison also shows we now know much more about HUMINT in the Global South, we still lack a good understanding of the role of SIGINT, especially from the perspective of the Soviet Bloc.

The contributions that follow offer fresh perspectives on the international history of intelligence. They aim to spark a conversation between area studies specialists, Cold War historians and intelligence scholars on the ways one can better understand the role of intelligence and state security in the history of the post-war world.