Designing Versailles: landscapes and the perspectival peace

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Dedicated to the memory of Frederick Arthur Farrell (29 November 1882 – 22 April 1935)

Abstract: This article analyses the 1919 peace treaty’s signing at Versailles, and what the magnificent staging signalled about the peace terms, notably regarding power and emerging notions of self-determination. In 1919, international society appeared to be on the threshold of a new era. However, a dissonance emerged between the peacemakers’ proclamations and the operationalisation of new principles of openness and emancipation. Certain royal houses and empires may have vanished but the remaining power-holders were not about to relinquish their dominance. While the familiar, blunt-edged tools of brazen colonialism were no longer available, some finer instruments and skilled professional expertise would finesse the details of an unequal hegemonic future. In all senses, this was a design project and in acknowledgement of Versailles’s backdrop and the peacemakers’ cartographic approach, landscape architecture’s specialist principles offer a lens for comprehending and critiquing the legal-political practices of Versailles 1919.

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This article analyses the importance of the 1919 peace treaty’s signing at Versailles and the consequent signalling (both explicit and implicit) of its terms, particularly regarding then emerging notions of self-determination, one of US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.¹ Given the treaty’s enduring significance as a site for testing the possibilities of international law, particular attention is paid to the troubling negotiations concerning the Middle East. In acknowledgement of the backdrop’s grandeur and the Council of Four’s cartographic approach, the design discipline of landscape architecture is employed to estimate how far self-determination was (or was not) realised.² For Louis XIV, Versailles’s landscaping represented Culture’s triumph over Nature.³ Equally, for the 1919 peacemakers the treaty symbolised law’s triumphant return after the unequalled annihilation evident on the Western Front and Dardanelles beaches. Both grand projects suggested a Cartesian spirit. More compellingly, both Louis XIV and the Four (and in particular Clemenceau and Lloyd George)


fetishized an avaricious hegemonic order. ‘Landscape’ embraces aesthetic, pictorial meanings in the visual arts, and tellingly, ‘limited section[s], administrative area[s], territory’. Although the treaty-artefact was a matter of fact, it was also a historically situated aesthetics, framed and presented in a particular interior, to situate the global gaze and imply certain political associations. Like many design ideals devised to dazzle passive onlookers, attractions were firmly located in the creators’ eyes. Versailles’s construction emphasised an all-authoritative French territorial state. In 1919 Versailles was also a cultural practice and its landscape had value ‘as a process by which social and subjective identities’ were formed. In June 1919, just as in the curve of the 17th into the 18th century, power’s material realisation was confirmed at Versailles.

For international lawyers, Versailles is principally a treaty but ‘Versailles’ itself operates in multiple registers. It is equally an allegory, an architectural location, a design innovation, a dream, an emotion, a history, an icon, an idea, a landscape, a legacy, a memory, a metaphor, a museum, a myth, an opportunity, a palace, a park, a portent, ritual, a stage, a town and a totem of European civilisation. Versailles simultaneously inhabits all of these co-existing identities, performing related functions. Versailles’s shape-shifting nature, and the plastic inter-connectivity of the multiple dimensions in which it operates, make nearly impossible individual disentanglement of the various identities being attributed to, or projected upon, Versailles at any one time. However, these roles and functions do not clash. They seamlessly blend and alter easily, with the merest touch on the kaleidoscope, to present complementary, but radically alternative, representations and interpretations of the component parts. With one twist, Versailles clearly bestows upon its namesake treaty majesty and authority, with another, the treaty-association communicates Versailles’s modernity and relevance.

6 B Latour, What is the Style of Matters of Concern (Van Gorcum, 2008) 32-34.
7 C Mukerji, Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles (Cambridge UP, 2010).
In material terms, the Treaty of Versailles sought to develop a radically new principle of self-determination. Following in the site’s finest tradition, Versailles 1919 was also a venue of power that witnessed an enormous gathering of state representatives. However, four men dominated proceedings, with the treaty representing an opportunity for a retrograde, retrenching of power separation between the core and the periphery. Thus, the opportunity for Versailles’s social agency to operate as scenography, or a venue and moment in time to develop rich communicative networks, was not optimised.

Just as a spider’s web appears organically and beautifully into the human world, yet is in fact the product of intricate weaving with a fatal purpose, so there was little that was ‘natural’ or inevitable in the treaty’s terms. Here is analysed what might be considered the treaty of Versailles’s modus operandi—the practice of land surveying and re-design. However, while the peacemakers remade the political globe they principally served their own political and aesthetic imperatives, adhering little to key design principles of good planning and partnered decision-making.

Versailles’s representational mode and its employment in 1919, will also be analysed throughout. The Versailles signing location was non-negotiable for the French Prime Minister Clemenceau and he ably enlisted his co-Council members’ support. Associating Louis XIV’s magnificence and might with dynamic innovative legal concepts meant the treaty represented absolute German defeat and complete Allied victory (with a French bias) and signposted where power in modern international relations did (or did not) lie. It was a didactic landscape. All of this together (recalling Richard Joyce’s critique of aetiological understandings of the Treaty of Westphalia) grounded the treaty, ‘in a distant past but also in its own affirmation of what it currently is and what it might become’. However, even then and true to form, Versailles operated in two different tones. While in 1919 the peace treaty was both a beneficiary of aesthetic association and itself an artefact of technical beauty, its powerful ambition meant it was no ‘foster-child of silence and slow time’.

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10 For the possibilities, see B Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford UP, 2005).
13 J Keats, ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’ [1820], in Odes (Spruce Alley, 2016) 15.
Finally, and beyond the peacemakers’ realm, the treaty’s locational associations allegorically communicate the centrality and lordliness of the peacemakers’ ambition in a supposedly international enterprise. Just as Versailles’s fabric essentialised the Sun King’s self-identity as the centre-point of an orbiting universe, so too the Hall of Mirrors’ chandeliers’ glowed in June 1919 with images that radiated out in all directions, and displayed in multiple ways, the reflections of four men who had re-sculpted the world.

**JUST ONE DAY IN JUNE 1919?**

*What is one to say about June - the time of perfect young summer, the fulfilment of the promise of the earlier months, and with as yet no sign to remind one that its fresh young beauty will ever fade.*

Gertrude Jekyll

Ostensibly, in World War I history, Versailles’s role is confined to one day of ceremonial pomp. The real business of negotiation occurred in various Parisian locations over the preceding six months. However, as the historian Colin Jones notes, few buildings are as freighted with historical symbolism as the Palace of Versailles. Struck by childhood memories of his father’s hunting lodge in a mosquito ridden marsh, Louis XIV set upon making Versailles the focus of his centralized power. Just as he remains an utterly captivating historical figure, so Louis’ masterpiece exercises enduring influence and enjoys ‘a continuing legacy as an epochal and world-historic site of cultural memory’.

The peace treaty’s signing location was not coincidental. When Clemenceau insisted, with Wilson’s support, on stamping the royal imprimatur on proceedings in the fabled Hall of Mirrors, he did so in the knowledge that Versailles was no grand lady, no irrelevant relic, no cosmetic frivolity but the very materiality of power: its representational powers were considerable. Having transcended its humble origins and survived revolutionary storms, its majesty inspired the foreign revolutionaries making new capital cities and re-builders of disaster-struck metropoles. Versailles’s adaptability allowed it to become a republican icon, a symbol of hope and modern understandings of authority. Its scale and beauty operated in

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17 E.g., Lisbon: ibid 10-13.
tandem ‘to compel respectful awe from all who encountered it. . . . not just a power-building: [Versailles] comprised a whole landscape of power’. It was a shrine to political and military strength, to which pilgrims had flocked for three hundred years (including Germans in 1871). Concluding peace is a significant performative act and Clemenceau stage-managed for a global audience.

No doubt Clemenceau’s Council of Four peers were captivated by Versailles’s competing and contrasting attractions. Few statesmen could resist Versailles’s dominance and mystery, its history and relevance, its classicism and modernity, its combination of the divine and material. Louis famously proclaimed ‘L’etat c’est moi’ while obsessively conniving at war and politics. However, alongside his energy for more fatal pursuits, Louis loved life fully, richly and almost compulsively with life seemingly loving him as much in return. If ever there is a place which reflects the creator’s personality, it is Versailles. Lush, verdant, rich, glorious, eternal, imperious, imposing, unique, unforgettable, perfumed, seductive . . . it is as if Louis never left. Its majesty provided an irresistible mise en scène for the peacemakers upon which to arrange their props of tables and documents, and thereby render unassailable their lofty claims to international authority in that ‘flashbulb moment’ of June 1919.

Louis’ invocation of cosmic imagery and allegorical motifs, famously the Sun, were legendary and repeated throughout the palace’s fabric. As le Roi soleil, Louis ‘benignly radiate[ed] the warmth of his influence over his subjects, as the universe revolved around him’. Similarly, the pre-eminent historian of Paris 1919 Margaret MacMillan notes, the peace conference witnessed critical business conducted by the world’s most powerful people: ‘In 1919 Paris was the capital of the world. . . . the focus of its fears and hopes’. The Four placed themselves, representationally, physically and somewhat deterministically, in Louis’ direct lineage. In so doing they betrayed their egotistical centrality and dominance over the fates of millions. The peace process did not culminate in June 1919, but rather endured well beyond it. For example, the mandates concerning Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, as determined at the 1920 Allied Supreme Council’s conference at San Remo, were legal aftergrowths of Versailles.

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18 Ibid (emphasis added).
21 P Mansel, King of the World: the Life of Louis XIV (Allen Lane, 2019).
Versailles was not the end: it was the end of the beginning. The Treaty of Versailles formed the blueprint for all the subsequent peace treaties, and those at Sèvres and Lausanne undeviatingly followed in Versailles’s footsteps.

As befits its mythical fairy tale quality, Versailles’s rose has thorns. Versailles’s petit Trianon is where Queen Marie Antoinette was fatally associated with her pastoral fantasies and tableaux, while starving French farmwives buried their children. Parisian women marched to Versailles in autumn 1789 to protest rocketing bread prices, sparking the lit match for all that followed. Communards were imprisoned and executed in the Orangerie and Grand Petit Écuries. Versailles enchants but perhaps the 1919 peacemakers ought to have pondered its darker history: a glow casts shadows.

DESIGN: ORDER AND THE LINE

_Invention, it must be humbly admitted, does not consist in creating out of void, but out of chaos._

Mary Shelley

Beyond the obvious triumphal associations which Clemenceau invoked in June 1919, where was the commonality between the peace treaty and Versailles? The royal estate was the material of legend, inspiring both awe and emulation. While ostensibly more prosaic, the peace treaty was one the likes of which the world had never seen with high stakes and seismic potential. Design’s realm expands beyond the details of daily objects to cities, landscapes, nations and cultures. As products of the human imagination possessing important functional and presentational dimensions, both the Versailles site and the peace treaty were design projects. Analysing the design of any artefacts, including treaties, is a matter of interpretation.

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26 MW Shelley, Introduction to Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus, rev. ed. (H Colburn & R Bentey, 1831).
and ascertaining meaning. A century later, treaty design, and that of peace agreements in particular, remains extremely complex and calls for the use of detailed matrices.

The noun ‘design’ commonly refers to patterns, models, drawings, methods, forms, composition and layouts, however, it can also refer to ‘artful conceptions’, devices, constructions, configurations, depictions, dramatisations and games. Furthermore, ‘design’ embraces projects, plans, schemes, setups, aims and contrivances. As Michael Feher notes of the age of the international community, it is possible to be, or to render others, powerless by design. Whatever else it can be, design is never accidental.

Traditionally, design embodies a profession and discipline concerned with creating products, systems, communications and services that satisfy human needs and improve people’s lives while respecting the wider environment. With the line between form and function increasingly blurring, designers are engaged and rewarded for producing and actualising visions of better futures. However, contemporary design theory and training developments in world-leading design schools reveal that the pre-eminence of the commercial output is being displaced by inquiries into a practice which is ‘interrogative, discursive and experimental’. This has penetrated training with many advocating for radical and unorthodox practices that respond to an age of crisis. Landscape planning itself is re-embarking its original

31 P Rand, Design, Form and Chaos (Yale UP, 2013) 3.
33 B Leurs, https://www.slideshare.net/Leursism/design-theory-lecture01, B Leurs, I Mulder, P van Waar ‘Developing A Human-Centered Attitude Through Experiential Learning’ in N F M Roozenburg, L L. Chen & P J Stappers, Proceedings of IASDR 2011, the 4th World Conference on Design Research, 31 October - 4 November, Delft, the Netherlands, 1. If you don’t wish to include this new reference then that’s no problem.
35 E.g., the Innovation School at the Glasgow School of Art, http://www.gsainnovationschool.co.uk/about/school-philosophy.
transdisciplinarity by involving multiple experts, stakeholders and decision-makers in participatory processes to facilitate deliberation and social learning, as well as moves towards landscape governance. The themes of innovation, improvement, opportunity, future-gazing, change and optimism, and the multi-prismed lenses through which ‘design’ is conceived, resonates with historical analyses of 1919 and how the peacemakers conceived of the conundrums, or opportunities, facing them. Further, in studies on design elements and principles, the characterisation of the most basic element, ‘the line’ is striking. As Maryam Taheri puts it: ‘In drawing, a line is the stroke of the pen or pencil but in graphic design, it’s any two connected points. Lines are useful for dividing space and drawing the eye to a specific location.’

Drawing lines is also an entirely familiar practice in international law. For example, drawing of baselines is key for the law of the sea and lines are intrinsic to the principle of uti possidetis. More pertinent for the purpose of this article, and by virtue of the 1494 treaty, the Tordesillas Line divided lands far beyond Europe for the benefit of two major European powers. The line also performs a key conceptual role in international law. Debates over the very existence of prescriptions for certain international crimes and models of transitional justice often declare the necessity of ‘drawing a line’ under a particular period.

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41 Balance, contrast, emphasis, movement, pattern, rhythm, unity/variety.
There seems a certain geographical determinism in locating the ceremony celebrating the fruits of the peacemakers’ enterprise within a shrine to design and power. After all, Louis XIV and his head gardener Andre Le Nôtre showed Nature as a mini-kingdom under Bourbon control. The peacemakers’ desire to imbue their project with the reflected glory of Versailles’s power is unarguable. Versailles’s beauty had a spellbinding, disarming quality brooking no argument, and its awesome scale emphasised the reversal of German fortunes from 1871. However, there was also a certain locational irony in the treaty’s signing at Versailles. The name derives from the Old French versail, meaning ‘ploughed field’, an unfortunate etymology in the trench warfare context. Versailles’s magnificence itself owed much to war given its re-embellishment following each of Louis’ military victories. The signing ceremony was staged in a grand, but glorified, corridor somewhat prefiguring arrangements over Poland. The final latent irony lay in its garden design. Although the geometrical Versailles gardens seem the apotheosis of controlled formality, they envisaged more than fixed viewers in static situations. Versailles’s gardens instead intended to provide a complex, dynamic spatial experience which drove courtly behaviour and was part of emerging patterns of material consumption. However, Le Nôtre also favoured sections of untamed groves and irregularly spaced fountains and created space for independent play. This ‘little bit of chaos’ undermined the ordered oasis, and recalls Foucault’s heteroptia: simultaneously part of, and apart from, the hegemonic space that it challenges from within. In 1919 the peacemakers sought order but, having had little regard to the complexity of these created spaces, they would be presented with more direct and radical challenges, particularly regarding the Middle East. The ‘fact’ of such new geographical distinctions obscured local realities and preferences. In the process of being remade, these landscapes produced their own narratives. While the use of international process

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maintained understandings of ‘a manifestly different world’ it revealed much, perhaps more, about the creators of those new national boundaries.\textsuperscript{57}

Design fields have been increasingly used to explain complex historical moments following conflict and law’s role therein. Indeed, Utrecht’s Centraal Museum staged an exhibition entitled ‘Peace was made Here’ commemorating the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht’s tri-centenary with a view to designing an informed and engaging experience for a modern-day public regarding a complicated historical narrative.\textsuperscript{58} The particular conceptual meeting point between the principles of design and the Versailles treaty lies in the field of landscape architecture and design and can be seen in representational, allegorical and methodological terms. Invoking this particular lens allows us to reconsider the peacemakers’ endeavours beyond the familiar discourse of power-play and competing demands. Adjusting the optic permits an analysis of what united the peacemakers, and to conclude that in varying degrees, they possessed distant, disengaged, discriminatory, dishonest, dismissive approaches to local self-government. Nevertheless, self-determination meant that the peacemakers had to countenance contemporary and future landscapes in unfamiliar terrain with entirely novel design elements. Such imaginative and material re-alignment entailed epic project management. Re-imagining the future of the defeated powers’ former imperial territories through the mode and mechanics of international law, drew the Council of Four to cartography. Although technically-focussed, land-charting recalled hitherto traditional hegemonic practices of map line drawings. Wilson’s Fourteen Points (discussed below) however called for an outcome with a quality of emancipation. Novel, but vague, notions of self-determination presented the peacemakers with unprecedented challenges in deciding where to draw the ‘best’ lines. In methodological terms, committed landscape architects embrace imagination, creativity, empathy, co-operation and, most of all, are guided by their sites. Although the language of ‘taming’ or ‘ordering’ may be used, people and places are never separate. In its sympathy for growth in human and environmental terms, this discipline’s principles therefore offer effective yardsticks for measuring how the Four’s global re-moulding facilitated and promoted the proclaimed goal of self-determination.


As with every landscaping project, time was of the essence and presented a serious pressure for the peacemakers. They had to draw new lines on the European map and, unlike their predecessors in Vienna, were required to consider Asia, Africa and the Middle East. As well as the demands of resource-commitment and the need to end the war in technical terms, time’s pressure also encompassed new anxieties. While the 1789 revolution was a distant memory to the 1815 peacemakers at Vienna, the 1917 Russian revolution was still contemporary two years later and its ripples were unclear. With revolutionary fervour evident in Glasgow, San Francisco, Winnipeg and throughout France, ‘home’ public opinion and its volatility preoccupied the peacemakers. Louis’s ambition was to create a stately Eden. The 1919 peacemakers were landscaping and designing a future international society. Although in 1919 self-determination was a political claim, rather than a legal principle, the Four could not ignore it and the future society’s components of new states, mandated territories and peoples had to be fitted within the tricky word, if not deed, of this new principle.

Examining self-determination’s incipient cartographic aspects chimes with recent research examining international law’s engagement with geography. Notable examples include Nicola Graham’s poignantly titled Lawscape which interrogates land’s shifting characterisations from supportive cultural environment to commodified object. After exploring property law’s abstractions and the physical materiality of place, Graham concludes that law was not adapted for land, but land adapted for law, thereby enabling and empowering an entirely self-referential regime. Similarly, the Versailles-driven peace arrangements offered assurances regarding self-determination. However, the principle’s actualisation resembled self-government less than the fruits of treaty-drafting ambition. Even contemporary intellectuals fundamentally misunderstood self-determination when they relished the opportunities of a perceived tabula rasa.

In Subversive Property, Sarah Keenan invokes legal geography to re-examine conceptions of space. Rather than property representing exclusion and ‘something to be planned over, built

59 K McAskill, Glasgow 1919: the Rise of Red Clydeside (Biteback, 2019).
61 ‘Memorandum circulated by the Prime Minister on March 25th 1919’, Cmd. 1614 (HMSO, 1922) (‘PM Memorandum’).
63 N Graham, Lawscape (Routledge, 2010) xiii.
64 ‘The Tabula Rasa in Central Europe’ 9 New Europe (1918) 98.
on, cultivated’,\textsuperscript{65} she convincingly calls for re-understandings of it in terms of space and belonging. This chimes with more dialectical, revelatory approaches in landscape architecture which prioritise a site’s existing elements over composition. A location’s ‘traces’ are pursued: looking to past and existing practices of places, considering hidden natural processes of territories and making geographical connections to bring ‘here and there’ closer.\textsuperscript{66} In the 1919 Middle Eastern context, a key focus for this article, Peter Wien describes the oft-invoked term ‘Arab nationalism’ as being best understood as a framework of cultural references, circumscribing an ‘imaginary space’ in particular geographic terms.\textsuperscript{67} Properly understanding this demands enquiries into when individuals ‘imagined themselves to constitute a deep, horizontal solidarity deserving of political recognition’.\textsuperscript{68} It demands consideration of contemporary realities as well as an understanding of living and dead people’s ‘real and imaginary movements’ and ‘their words and ideas in this space, between locations and in time’.\textsuperscript{69} However, in its proprietorial focus, Paris 1919 illustrated a ‘failed imagination’\textsuperscript{70} and the folly of the peacemakers’ traditional interventionist approach makes compelling Keenan’s appeal for more malleable future characterisations allowing place to be seen as process, and space as dynamic and heterogeneous. This spatial turn in international law, taken in tandem with established historical analyses of international law,\textsuperscript{71} calls for a re-examination of the Versailles treaty and process and all it prompted in re-drawing the globe. The line remains a rich seam 100 years after Versailles.

**A TREATY OF PRINCIPLED DESIGN?**

World War I had shaken Europe’s supreme self-confidence to its core\textsuperscript{72} and ‘four years of unexampled slaughter’\textsuperscript{73} stripped the antagonists of the global civilizer mantle. However, the

\textsuperscript{65} S Keenan, *Subversive Property: Law and the Production of Spaces of Belonging* (Routledge, 2014).
\textsuperscript{68} A Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (2002) 15-16 citing the work of Ernest Renan and Benedict Anderson.
\textsuperscript{69} Wien (2016) 2-3.
\textsuperscript{72} MacMillan (2019) 2.
\textsuperscript{73} ‘PM Memorandum’.
peacemakers were not simply the undertakers of dying empires, they were also the resurrectionists of old nations (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), the midwives of entirely new ones like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and the confessors for petitioners seeking the benediction of future statehood. Despite having long shed the clerical overtones cloaking colonisation, the peacemakers were still going to draw the new European and Middle Eastern borders. The skills of geographers, surveyors and architects came to the fore. Seemingly less hegemonic than the divinely sanctimonious practices of previous centuries, the instrumentalisation of newly-empowered, middle-class, professional expertise was nevertheless formidable. Underpinned by science and reason, it was enthusiastically operationalised by impressive secretariats possessing few anxieties regarding notions of connectedness and ‘simultaneity of stories’. The following section analyses the territorial terms of the peace and the questionable observance and conceptualisation of self-determination. This lays the ground for subsequent theoretical analysis of the realpolitik which confronted the legal landscaping.

**The territorial terms of Versailles—terra firma?**

As noted, while the treaty’s 440 Articles exhibited a scale and ambition that would have impressed Louis, its territorial terms were ostensibly straightforward and focussed upon Germany. Germany lost 13 per cent of its territory (more than 27,000 square miles), including 10 per cent of its population (between 6.5 and 7 million people). Extensive provisions (Articles 51-79 and associated annex) concerned the German return of Alsace-Lorraine to France which had been ‘wrongfully’ seized during the Franco-Prussian War. Belgium received Eupen and Malmedy (Article 34) and Germany renounced certain rights and title over the Western part of Prussian Moresent (Article 33). It also renounced certain benefits received under previous treaties between 1847 and 1902 regarding Luxembourg, and recognised that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg no longer formed part of the German Zollverein (Article 40). Articles 45-50 (and associated annex) concerned the industrial Saar region which was under League administration for 15 years. The Rhineland was demilitarized and no German military forces or fortifications were permitted there (Articles 42-44 and 180). Germany renounced all rights and title over the portion of Silesian territory (Article 83) with Czechoslovakia receiving the

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75 MacMillan (2019) 2-4
76 Keenan (2014) chs 1 & 3 citing D Massey, For Space (Sage, 2005).
77 Paraphrasing Section V’s opening.
Hlučín district. Under Article 84, German nationals habitually resident in any of the territories recognised as forming part of the Czecho-Slovak state obtained Czecho-Slovak nationality *ipso facto* and lost their German nationality. While Article 85 allowed for the exercise of some autonomy by these individuals to choose their preferred nationality after two years, such recognition of fluid identity was not this treaty’s hallmark. In the east, Germany conceded Poznan, parts of West Prussia, and Upper Silesia to Poland (Articles 87–98 and associated annexes). Germany renounced all rights in relation to Memel, a small strip of territory in East Prussia along the Baltic Sea (Article 99) which was ultimately placed under Lithuanian control. Articles 100–108 converted the largely German city of Danzig into a free city under League of Nations’ protection. By the operation of Articles 109–114, Denmark received Northern Schleswig.

Although late to the colonial party with *Weltpolitik* and Wilhelm II’s demands for a ‘place in the Sun’, Germany was nevertheless an imperial power. By virtue of Articles 118–127, Germany renounced all rights and privileges in relation to her colonies.78 Notably Article 127 provided that ‘The native inhabitants of the former German overseas possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories’. This seemed not to countenance any possibility of early independence for those particular territories (notwithstanding Wilson’s commitment to self-determination). Indeed, the victorious powers thought Germany should not regain its colonies because its wartime conduct had demonstrated is unfitness ‘to rule other peoples’.79 However, other powerful states considered themselves entirely fit to rule peoples judged still unfit to govern themselves.80 This trend of dispossessing the defeated imperial powers would ripple out to the subsequent peace treaties and the practice of mandates (embodied in Article 22 and operationalised by the League) will be considered subsequently. However, it is useful first to examine Wilson’s Fourteen Points which re-imagined the fates of millions and ostensibly found embrace in the treaty. Despite changing times, international law emerged as reassuringly familiar yet agile and capable of providing a state-of-the-art regulatory framework. All would be well surely.

**Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and green shoots**

*If this belief from heaven be sent,*

78 China (Articles 128–134), Siam (Articles 135–137), Liberia (Articles 138–140), Morocco (Articles 141–146), Egypt (Articles 147–154), Turkey and Bulgaria (Article 155), Shantung (Articles 156–158).


If such be Nature’s holy plan,
Have I not reason to lament
What man has made of man?

William Wordsworth

President Wilson outlined his Fourteen Points to the US Congress in January 1918. Their role in guiding the peace process is contentious, but ostensibly they heralded a new world order. The principles varyingly called for free navigation of the seas,\(^\text{82}\) the removal of all economic barriers\(^\text{83}\) and the reduction of national armaments.\(^\text{84}\) However, it was their ambition as regards open diplomacy and self-determination which caught the global imagination. They demanded frank and public diplomacy and ‘open covenants of peace . . . [with] no private international understandings’.\(^\text{85}\) In terms of existing states, Russia was to independently determine its national and political destiny\(^\text{86}\) and the ‘healing act’ of restoring Belgian sovereignty was equally prioritised.\(^\text{87}\) There was to be a resurrected independent Polish state enjoying guarantees of ‘political and economic independence and territorial integrity’ with ‘assured free and secure’ sea access.\(^\text{88}\) Restoring Alsace-Lorraine to France would secure a peace ‘unsettled’ since 1871\(^\text{89}\) and Italy’s borders were to be adjusted along ‘clearly recognized lines of nationality’.\(^\text{90}\) Casting nationality in containable terms left little room for complex identities that defied management such as diasporas and displaced populations. Nationality was being disciplined by the line. However, as Harold Nicolson, the British diplomat, would lament,\(^\text{91}\) that line would display infidelity to its own restrictions, falling prey to ignorance and political caprice.\(^\text{92}\)

As noted earlier, collapsing empires brought consequences. Adjustments of all colonial claims were to be ‘free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial’ with the concerned populations’ interests having ‘equal weight with the equitable government whose title is to be determined’.\(^\text{93}\) Austria-Hungary’s peoples were to be accorded full opportunities for autonomous

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82 Principle II.
83 Principle III.
84 Principle IV.
85 Principle I.
86 Principle VI.
87 Principle VII.
88 Principle XIII.
89 Principle VIII.
90 Principle IX.
91 H Nicolson, Peacemaking (Faber & Faber, 2009) 144-48.
93 Principle V.
development. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro were to enjoy restored territory (including Serbian sea access) and Balkan states’ inter-relations were to be ‘determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality’; with international guarantees of ‘political and economic independence and territorial integrity’. While Wilson promised the Ottoman Empire’s Turkish portion its sovereignty, other nationalities ‘now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development’, with open and free shipping access to the Dardanelles. The operationalisation and fulfilment of these grand aims was addressed by Wilson’s institutional ambitions which took form in his final, 14th point which called for the establishment of a League of Nations that would afford ‘mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike’. The general assumption was that Wilson’s Fourteen Points would influentially shape the peace settlement, giving great hopes to both colonial peoples and Germans who ‘clutched the Fourteen Points like a life-raft’. However, for both constituencies, failing to grasp fully the victors’ perspectives, disappointments followed.

The Fourteen Points were supplemented by ‘Four Principles’ and ‘Five Particulars’. The Four Principles stressed the importance of the final settlement’s ‘essential justice’ with Principle Two maintaining that peoples and provinces were not to ‘be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty’ like ‘chattels or pawns in a game’. Territorial settlements were not to be ‘mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states’ but should reflect concerned populations’ interests. All ‘well-defined national elements’ were to be accorded the utmost satisfaction’ possible without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of discord and antagonism’. Notably, the second of the Five Particulars urged that ‘no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations’ could form the basis of any settlement component which was inconsistent with common interests. No flower was to overgrow in this garden, with balance and harmony seemingly the order of the day. The fifth

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94 Principle X.  
95 Principle XI.  
96 Principle XII.  
97 Principle XIV. See N White’s contribution in this issue.  
100 W Wilson, Address at New York Metropolitan Opera House, 27 September 1918, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/d258.  
101 The first stressed impartial justice. The third rejected ‘special alliances’. The fourth prohibited ‘special, selfish economic combinations within the League’. The fifth re-stressed the importance of public treaties and agreements.
Particular complemented this by reaffirmed a prohibition on secret treaties. As will be seen, this interdiction was apparently ignored by the peacemakers, an approach subject to intimate criticism from within the British delegation to Paris.

Not yet the venerable political figure, author and gardener of 20th-century renown he would become, Nicolson (who had delivered Britain’s revised declaration of war to the German Ambassador in London) kept an illuminating, and very human, diary account of his participation in the 1919 British delegation. In later published form, it offered both a first-hand account and a reflective critique of the peace conference.102 Perhaps because of his natural ‘gift for sympathy’,103 now called empathy, Nicolson, much like colonial peoples and the Germans, was committed to self-determination’s realisation and assumed that the Four Principles would underpin the peace treaties. Notwithstanding a century’s worth of hindsight, his account of dimming hopes remains painful reading: ‘in fact we suffered, as the weeks passed, a loss of confidence, a decline in idealism, a change of heart. . . . [T]his memoir record[s], and . . . explain[s], that change of heart. . . . It is in order to warn future civil servants that I have written this book.”104

The discussion will now turn to the design innovation of the mandate system which was an aftergrowth of the Versailles system. This development in taxonomizing identity in international law ostensibly sought to bridge the gap between the old world of states and the new world of ‘peoples’. However, its implementation revealed much that was familiar.

**Mandates**

The Covenant of the League of Nations constituted Part I of the treaty that therefore performed a key role105 in creating the legal basis of an organisation which would administer the post-war arrangements,106 including the mandate model of self-determination. Established for those peoples deemed (as yet) unready to govern themselves, the scheme’s protective tone resonated familiarly with the colonial civilising mission.107 Indeed this assumption of responsibility by

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103 Seymour (1934) 119.
104 Nicolson (2009) 34.
victorious powers was posed as a counterpoint to the aforementioned construction of German colonisers’ negative treatment of their colonial peoples. Article 22 advised that mandatory powers, as ‘advanced nations’, were entrusted with the ‘tutelage’ of such peoples (without their consultation) on the League’s behalf. The three classes of mandates ranged from ‘A’ class for those territories nearly ready to self-govern (Palestine, Syria/Lebanon and Mesopotamia), ‘B’ class for those run by mandatory powers (Central Africa) and ‘C’ territories run by mandatory powers as their own (South-West Africa and certain South Pacific islands).

In promoting its noble, benevolent ambition, the scheme, unusually kinetic in this regard, ostensibly anticipated progress through the categories. However, the system was skewed before the ink was dry. Mid-drafting political machinations in the Council of Four conclave\(^\text{108}\) ensured the endurance of old social/racial stratifications regardless of high-minded public proclamations. Wilson was clear that mandates should not apply to European peoples and General Smuts of the British Empire delegation distinguished between Poles and the ‘barbarians’ of the Pacific and Middle East.\(^\text{109}\) Further, notions of certain mandatory peoples ascending to categories of greater autonomy appeared entirely hypothetical, a point undoubtedly aided by the treaty’s imprecision.\(^\text{110}\) Versailles’s design kept such peoples enveloped during supposedly emancipatory processes,\(^\text{111}\) and various scandals\(^\text{112}\) ultimately led one reviewer to align local white administration with European colonial power.\(^\text{113}\) Denied even the inadequate status of unequal sovereignty, such peoples simply possessed no sovereignty at all.\(^\text{114}\) Further, even the Class A territories such as Mesopotamia enjoyed little privilege despite being supposedly independent and meant only to be in receipt of ‘administrative advice and assistance . . . until such time as [being] . . . able to stand alone’. While the League’s Permanent Mandates Commission may have contributed to spreading nascent ideas of independence,\(^\text{115}\) it was clear in 1919/1920 that the proclaimed commitment to equality of peoples and their rights to determine their own destiny, was unsteady to say the least.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND DREAMS OF HANGING GARDENS

\(^{108}\) Crozier (1979) 485-86.
\(^{111}\) Latour, ‘A Cautious Prometheus?’ 8 discussing Peter Sloterdijk.
Although they would comprise the essence of the 1920 San Remo Conference, and the subsequent Sèvres and Lausanne treaties, Middle East issues were already foregrounded in 1919 by stirrings of Arab nationalism, the claims of Zionists and the various interests of the peacemakers. Their resolution represented a particularly brazen example of hegemonic landscaping. Indeed, the self-determination principle only seemingly flourished when realised by powerful state fiat. For example, the 1917 Balfour Declaration, unilaterally expressing British support for ‘a national home for the Jewish people’ without prejudice to ‘the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’, found virtually unaltered reflection in Article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres. However, as will become clear, while such behaviour hardly accords with the spirit of the Fourteen Points, it was a rare example of transparency.

MacMillan recounts a British adviser named Arnold Toynbee happening upon Lloyd George whose self-musings over the collective fates of Middle Eastern populations reveal ‘calm’ assumptions that ex-Ottoman territories could be re-aligned with the peacemakers’ wishes. Lloyd George’s musings saw Mesopotamia in terms of oil and irrigation and the Holy Land as politically key for the British. As for Syria? ‘Let the French have that’. Lloyd George’s unembarrassed ambition is clear from conversations with Clemenceau.

‘Well’ said Clemenceau ‘what are we to discuss?’ Lloyd George replied, ‘Mesopotamia and Palestine’. Clemenceau: ‘Tell me what you want?’ Lloyd George: ‘I want Mosul’. Clemenceau: ‘You shall have it. Anything else?’ Lloyd George: ‘Yes I want Jerusalem too.’ Clemenceau: ‘You shall have it but Pichon will make difficulties about Mosul’. Despite Wilson’s imprecation against secret covenants, these Lloyd-Clemenceau negotiations reflected the earlier 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement and, like their ill-starred prototype, poisoned both the political waters of the Middle East and Franco-British relations for some time thereafter. As well as being high-handed and far-reaching, these artful arrangements were also

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116 ‘. . . or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country’.
118 Ibid 392-93.
driven by these powerbrokers’ own cultural apprehensions and inclinations. MacMillan puts it well:

Like Napoleon, [Lloyd George] was intoxicated by the possibilities of the Middle East: a restored Hellenic world in Asia Minor; a new Jewish civilization in Palestine; Suez and all the links to India safe from threat; loyal and obedient Arab states along the Fertile Crescent and the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates; protection for British oil supplies from Persia and the possibility of new sources under direct British control; the Americans obligingly taking mandates here and there; the French doing what they were told.\(^\text{119}\)

Such preferences, when taken together with the extremely favourable San Remo Conference-drafted Anglo-French oil agreement (granting an oil concession to the British-controlled Turkish Petroleum Company with a 25 per cent share awarded to France for Mosul’s inclusion) lays bare this cartography’s covetousness. Notwithstanding the Napoleonic comparisons, Lloyd George’s benignly despotic rearrangement and repositioning of states and peoples to fulfil his (somewhat narcissistic) fantasy of a quiescent yet productive constituency, inhabiting a fecund landscape with an exquisite panorama, much more resembles an artistically-inclined, managerial, 20th-century Louis XIV. In fact, the scene would make a lovely painting for a royal palace.\(^\text{120}\) Such bureaucratically organised land surveying and property speculation was geared towards very self-interested outcomes. However, the Fourteen Points’ high profile and European dependence on the US for the ‘sinews of peace’,\(^\text{121}\) meant that distinctly national interests had to find accommodation within Wilsonian internationalism, and self-determination in particular.

As noted, Nicolson found the Four Principles to be generally unreflected in the treaties. Not only were open covenants of peace not concluded, but unlike the relative transparency of the 1907 Hague Conference,\(^\text{122}\) ‘seldom ha[d] such secrecy been maintained in any diplomatic gathering’. The German Colonies were ‘distributed’ in ways which were neither free, open-

\(^{119}\) Ibid 393.
\(^{121}\) Nicolson (2009) 32-33.
minded, nor impartial, with the populations’ wishes, much less interests, being ‘flagrantly disregarded’. Nicolson was also appalled (given his direct advice to Wilson123) that Italian frontiers were not adjusted along the lines of nationality, that the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire were not assured a secure sovereignty and that Polish territory comprised many people who were ‘indisputably not Polish’. In time, many would be disappointed at the League’s inability to assure political independence to great and small nations alike, given that territorial settlements were nearly always based on ‘mere adjustments and compromises’ between rival states’ claims. As Nicolson noted, provinces and peoples were treated as pawns and chattels, with ‘discord and antagonism’ in fact being perpetuated.124

Nicolson’s memoirs, and various accounts of the peacemakers’ meetings, highlight how Europe’s civilising mission was very deftly re-branded via the American language of self-determination. This supposedly key treaty principle was shrewdly redeployed by Lord Curzon as an exploitable negotiating opportunity open to those who knew ‘in the bottom of our hearts that we are more likely to benefit from it than is anybody else’.125 Inevitably, the peacemakers’ one-sided conception of the Middle East did not reflect strong identities and allegiances prevailing in the region. Making Basra, Baghdad and Mosul into a solitary entity under British control served mainly mandatory administration. Both Iraqi nationalism’s existence in 1919 and a desire for separate states was questionable compared to interest in a greater Arabia.126 In actualising particular interests via the language of universality, it was a hegemonic masterstroke.127 A particularly unpalatable dimension of this contorted ideal of self-determination lay in its co-opting of local Arab institutions to fulfil an appearance of the liberal ideal while business-as-usual operated.128 This clever design mismatch129 facilitated exclusion from real power. While Gertrude Bell (a leading female adventurer of her day130 and associate of TE Lawrence) saw Mesopotamia and a newly-created centre of Arab civilisation and

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123 About whom he was unflattering. Nicolson (2009) 152.
124 Ibid 35.
prosperity as the radiant centrepiece of the Middle Eastern garden, this perspective carried orientalist, incidentalist baggage. Self-determination became the ‘new’ internationalism’s by-product or instrument rather than its raison d’être. Unlike the fertile oasis of Bell’s imagination, the 1919 Middle East peace arrangement was, ironically, a mirage. Aside from the familiar flashpoints of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel and Palestine, even the position of Egypt displayed an appropriated and enduringly confused approach to self-determination. Despite declarations proclaiming self-determination, the British promptly imposed martial law in March 1919 and, while conceding Egyptian independence in 1922, the contradictory relationship lasted four decades. For many other parts of this envisaged Arab paradise, the consequences have endured well into the 21st century. In all senses, it was clearly possible to be ‘ruined by design’.

Disappointment had toxic consequences for the negotiations, with demoralization spreading ‘through Paris like a disease’. Nicolson contrasts this disillusioned perspective with the ‘Latin’ clear-eyed view. Having unforgivingly reviewed the imperialistic (and thus hypocritical) nature of its history, these states had few expectations of US-promulgated self-determination. Marginalised US communities’ rights went unrecognised and ‘innumerable’ treaties with indigenous peoples were shamelessly, and precipitously, violated. Rather than the uncertainty that is inevitable and ubiquitous in spatial planning projects, this was a fundamental scepticism about the good faith of the designers. The doubtful sincerity and applicability of Wilsonian gospel within the US led to many preferring the old system’s ‘precisions’ to the new system’s ‘vague’, and clearly unpractised, idealism.

The ‘highly irregular business’ of self-determination’s realisation in 1919 had one final and seriously ironic consequence: new European states were among the few states actually burdened with duties towards their minorities. Self-determination’s realisation had thus simply

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133 MacMillan (2019) 413.
134 M Monteiro, Ruined by Design (Blurb, 2020).
136 Nicolson (2009) 159-60.
produced ‘a new form of hierarchy in the relations of states’. Transformed from its metaphorical and aesthetic promise of facilitating a global wild garden (with all of the attendant unbounded possibilities) the self-determination principle, via a process of legal and political topiary, was instead reduced to a system of multiple high hedges which geometrically allured but actually bounded, screened and confounded. As with any system of mazes, only an aerial view allowed their full appreciation, with the means of their navigation being known only unto their creators.

**LANDSCAPES OF POWER AND THE 1815 PREQUEL—CONSTANTLY GARDENING**

In 1919, the 1815 Congress of Vienna was the peacemakers’ main reference point for a large-scale post-war settlement. However, international society had changed considerably in the intervening century. The peacemakers at Versailles needed to reflect modern times to retain their centrality. The next section analyses this tension and how this was resolved to their satisfaction.

Gerry Simpson identifies the Congress of Vienna as a tipping point in diplomatic relations. The post-Westphalian tradition of equality that prevailed in diplomatic dealings between Europe and non-European states changed after 1815. Although the regal, ritualistic system of diplomacy was declining, the ascendant conceptions of pluralism, liberalism and civilisation facilitated a ‘legalised hegemony’ and radiating circles of power allowed European states to gaze askance at non-liberal, non-European, particularly Far Eastern, Asian states. This contouring of an insider/outsider or core/periphery version of international law and society, called for stratified classifications of states, and inevitably, exclusions from certain sites of power. However, this demarcation itself became increasingly unsustainable as many ‘uncivilised’ societies over time changed governance systems. In 1815, Thailand, China and Japan were remote and mysterious. However, when ‘in 1919, their diplomats appeared in Paris

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in pin-striped trousers and frock coats’\textsuperscript{143} these now apparently familiar territories became trickier to dismiss. Indeed, these ‘semi-peripheral worldmakers’\textsuperscript{144} comprising non-Western lawyers, politicians, and activists were appropriating and transforming international law discourse by penetrating international institutions, articulating claims for self-government and rejecting ‘civilization’ standards.\textsuperscript{145}

This diplomatic homogenisation, combined with complementary desires of some international lawyers to emphasise their discipline’s progressive, scientific, secular credentials (and its capacity for tolerance and cosmopolitanism) necessitated further tactical turns. This came with functional testing of formal capacity demonstrated via expanding conference participation.\textsuperscript{146} This potentially explained 1919’s ostensible pluralism. As one contemporary observer at Versailles commented in archaic language ‘[o]nly Indians and Australian aborigines were absent among the races of the earth’ with all skin shades represented except for ‘the palest ivory, yellow, coffee-coloured brown, deep black’\textsuperscript{147} Such self-serving and culturally situated proclamations inevitably suggested a newly-equalised world but any illusions that expanded conference attendance entailed meaningful participation, equal opportunities, influence, transparency or fairness were undone by the mendacious operationalisation of self-determination, and revealed by the peacemakers’ negotiating intentions described in Nicolson’s damning chronicle.

Tensions between sovereign equality and legalised hegemony were evident in the pre-Versailles debates and found expression within the Covenant. Instead of a brave new world, the League’s organisational balance of power sought an accommodation between the realist, legal hegemony of major European and North American powers still managing international affairs,\textsuperscript{148} and their challengers, cosmopolitan liberals, who pointed to the war’s horrors as demonstrating precisely the ancien régime’s failings and the undesirability of a tweaked status quo.\textsuperscript{149} This compromise and illusion of participative openness, however, left unremedied the unfortunate position of peoples existing outwith the state system. More problematically, the

\textsuperscript{143} MacMillan (2019) 5-6.
\textsuperscript{144} A Getachew, \textit{Worldmaking after Empire: the Rise and Fall of Self-Determination} (Princeton, 2019) 4.
\textsuperscript{147} MacMillan (2019) 474 quoting Schiff (1930) 67.
\textsuperscript{148} See Article 23 and the Monroe Doctrine.
\textsuperscript{149} Simpson (2004) 154. See also his referencing of Schwarzenberger’s thoughts: ibid 156-57.
system’s apparent overall fairness and benevolent motivation in recognising the progressive principle of self-determination made its critique more difficult than the old, explicitly discriminatory, regime. The Council of Four had undeniably set in train an ‘imperialistic peace’.\textsuperscript{150}

However, as anticipated, nothing is forever. While Versailles in June 1919 dazzled, its brightness simultaneously clarified the vision of certain youthful delegates observing the diplomatic landscape. Harold Nicolson, John Maynard Keynes,\textsuperscript{151} John Foster Dulles\textsuperscript{152} and the worldmaking semi-peripherals were indubitably affected by 1919. Their searing perspectives would have enduring influence throughout the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{153} Nicolson in particular opined, that he and like-minded colleagues had arrived in Paris as fervent apprentices of Wilsonianism, confident that a new order was to be established, but left as disillusioned ‘renegades’.\textsuperscript{154} Meanwhile, the Four proceeded in their grand designs.

SURVEYING THE LANDSCAPE

The Versailles treaty arrangements had to be operationalised. Design methodology, particularly that of landscape design, offers a lens and a benchmark for comprehending the legal-political practices of Versailles 1919. Landscape designers actualise a design vision (via the application of disciplinary principles analysed below). However, such enterprises necessitate the establishment of proprietorial rights to, or authority over, particular terrain. While the trifles of competing property claims were beneath Louis XIV, by 1919 there were, at the very least, niceties of process to be observed. The peacemakers had textually massaged the differences in political topography between the old and new orders. The next stage involved the granularity of arrangements. Drawing actual borderlines required surveys.

A landscape architect usually undertakes a site inventory and analysis: reviewing the terrain, evaluating environmental factors and visiting the \textit{environs}, so as to understand local areas and

\textsuperscript{150} MacMillan (2019) 477.
\textsuperscript{151} JM Keynes, \textit{The Economic Consequences of the Peace} (MacMillan, 1920).
\textsuperscript{152} Dulles had helped draft Article 231. He later contributed to the UN Charter's preamble.
\textsuperscript{154} Nicolson (2009) 153.
A surveyor, however, provides an underpinning plan: as the British Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors’ motto observes, *Est modus in rebus* (‘There is measure in all things’). Despite being ostensibly disinterested and factual, the practice of land surveying is open to elite appropriation and preferences. The post-1745 mapping of the Scottish Highlands (which led to the Principal Triangulation of Great Britain) had clear military and political imperatives. The 1919 *magnis terrarum* project followed in the same historical track.

The relationship between the histories of international law, colonialism and property law (and land-enclosure practices in particular) has been recently analysed by Henry Jones who sees a simultaneity between colonialism and capitalism, ‘colonies and enclosures, territory and property’. While enclosure initially enabled English estate landlords to visualise and organise their land, this mode of cartographic power gained global significance in colonialism. The surveyor’s skills and instruments (including Gunter’s ‘chain’ which measured the length of a cricket pitch and planned out the entire British empire) were crucial in this enterprise both materially and spatially, but also in terms of legitimating colonialist activities. Such processes of quantification and commodification reappeared in 1919.

While ‘vision[s] of an ordered land’ took cover in a peace project, they embodied previous centuries’ conventions by disregarding local peoples’ interests and practices. Just as enclosure had facilitated connections between colonies and metropoles (via the extraction of raw materials through experimental atrocity practices) so the peace settlements would serve the victor’s material interests, this time in the name of benevolent shepherding. In the Middle Eastern context, Lloyd George’s finely calculated arrangements were rendered irrefutable given both their proclaimed paternalism and the ‘authenticity’ derived from the ground-level

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157 Ibid 197.
mapping expertise and cultural familiarities of individuals such as Bell and Lawrence. The ongoing entwining of surveys and land-title saw an unrestrained British post-war programme of ‘modernising’ Ottoman land law administration\(^\text{162}\) (undoubtedly shaped by strategically important air routes to India and the region’s oil resources). Such initiatives were informed by the same colonial notions that saw territories in grid formation, that allowed attendant racialized characterisations of land management practices as ‘wastage’ and as warranting interventions entailing dispossession and expropriation.\(^\text{163}\) Despite self-determination’s good intentions, its realisation ultimately became a further reconfiguration of ‘land as territory’ allowing jurisdictional (over)extension.\(^\text{164}\) The Versailles treaty enabled the legal over-reach that was the material effect of land measurement practices. Self-determination and the language of ‘mandates’ provided the treaty’s alibi in denying the system’s true effects.\(^\text{165}\)

The peacemakers’ aloof and self-interested employment of surveying, geometry, planning and cartography followed a historical pattern of instrumentalization. Notions of cultural environments, space and belonging\(^\text{166}\) or genuine engagement with local peoples (as opposed to the disarray of regional game-playing and personal pleadings) seemed to be completely absent.

**GARDENS, EXPERIMENTS AND LANDSCAPE DESIGN**

**Contemplation and observation**

As Louis XIV knew, gardens are often integral to grand landscaping projects and it is striking how many of the 1919 protagonists had active gardening associations (rather than simply enjoying the social consequences of large bourgeois households with grounds). Nicolson would eventually develop the world famous Sissinghurst Castle Garden with his wife Vita Sackville-West. When Clemenceau retired to ‘The Shack’ in his native Vendée he gardened following advice from his good friend, Claude Monet, another man fabled for his horticulture and depictions of floral idylls. Wilson’s sometime home had commemorative gardens established

\(^{162}\) Enduring into the 1920s. R Home, ‘Scientific survey and land settlement in British colonialism, with particular reference to land tenure reform in the Middle East 1920-50’ 21(1) Planning Perspectives (2006) 1, 10-12, 18.


\(^{164}\) Mukerji (2010) 1-38.

\(^{165}\) Jones (2019) 203.

\(^{166}\) Keenan (2014).
in his memory. Somewhat ironically, they were recently blight-ridden. More metaphorically, in January 1917, Lloyd George formed the Prime Minister’s Secretariat called the ‘Garden Suburb’.

Such horticultural sympathies permit a more allegorical analysis of the peacemakers’ endeavours. As well as actualising visions of its keen practitioners, gardening is an intrinsically ambient and immersive pursuit. Nature’s caretakers are variously, consumed and restored by their accomplishments. Louis’ Arcadian vision was clearly a source of self-empowerment. Perhaps for those 1919 men, their attraction to gardening or gardening motifs can be explained by the suggestion that gardening invites and attracts ‘certain virtues by providing especially appropriate opportunities for their exercise’ and provides an epiphanic opportunity for understanding human relationships with mystery. Maybe in 1919 those gardening peacemakers saw themselves as Keats’ ‘adventurous knights’ taking up their dinted shields’, while roses from friends ‘Whisper’d of peace, and truth, and friendliness unquell’d’.

Such reflections call to mind Candide’s famous urging to Dr Pangloss, ‘let us cultivate our garden’ which is commonly understood (in the overall satirical context regarding philosophical optimism) as a call for focussing on reason and the local. How ironic yet apposite (depending on which locality and whose reason is considered) it seems in the 1919 context. Even in its most challenging, radical, activist manifestations, gardening persists as an optimistic pursuit and, for all but the most accomplished, a triumph of hope over experience. However, most of these creative experimentalists and risk-takers live with the consequences of their adventurous cultivations. Not so the peacemakers, who plotted and planned, only appraising their masterpieces in passing and from afar.

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**Design(ing) principles**

Landscape architects and garden designers share an ancient heritage, however, the former tend to eschew the private, for a focus on public works and common goods. Notions of shared heritages and the global commons have equally gained considerable traction in recent international law scholarship. It therefore seems particularly fitting in this examination of intellectual overlaps to make pictorial reference to recent developments in Venn design, namely ‘New Rose’.

![Figure 2. Newroz, the first simple symmetric 11-Venn diagram. Source: K Mamakani & F Ruskey, ‘New Roses: Simple Symmetric Venn Diagrams with 11 and 13 Curves’ 52 Discrete & Computational Geometry (2014) 71](image)

Landscape design possesses its own methodological reference points. However, in its focus on territorial management, and service-based spatial planning and realignment, this profession’s purpose and aims resonate with the peacemakers’ announced ambitions. This section analyses how the peace arrangements ‘measured up’ in terms of certain recognised design principles given the competing imperatives of reorientation, organisation and personal ambition.

In 1828 a Scotsman named Gilbert Laing Meason made early reference to the term landscape architecture in *Landscape Architecture of the Great Painters of Italy*. In considering public

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goods, Meason approved of the ethos that ‘no man has a right to pass himself and his own barbarous inventions as a national taste, and to hand down to posterity his own ignorance and disgrace to be a satire and a libel on the knowledge and taste of his age.’ That message, cautioning against design tyranny, clearly never reached Louis XIV, and the warning about posterity’s bequest seems particularly portentous in the 1919 context. In any event, within a century, and after semiotic disagreements among its practitioners, landscape architecture’s disciplinary distinctiveness concretised. Indeed, the preferred self-identification of ‘landscape architects’ over ‘landscape gardeners’ highlighted the field’s professional credentials and the centrality of design.

Many of the key principles governing garden design and landscape architecture seem germane given Louis’ and the peacemaker’s endeavours. In the first place, any visionary must ‘Consult the Genius of the Place’, an intangible contextual notion, which might variously demand a complementary conservation approach or a more challenging dynamic contrast. In 1919, the question of ‘place’ was contingent. Clemenceau’s showmanship clearly implied the grandness of the peace treaty and represented the ambition of its terms. However, if ‘place’ refers instead to territories and self-determination, then ‘consultation’ was clearly observed more in word than deed, despite the rich reserves available. This seems supremely ironic given that genius loci captures Roman religious notions of a location’s protective spirit.

A second conceptual design principle urges planning with layers, creating places that are good from multiple viewpoints including social, functional, artistic, spiritual, economic, hydrological, ecological and climatological ones. ‘Use can be combined with beauty,'

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181 Olmstead (2014) 211: training should be in design, not horticultural schools. See also the professional UK Landscape Institute, https://www.landscapeinstitute.org/.
184 Wien (2016).
pleasure with profit, work with contemplation” and Louis’ Versailles exemplified power and play. However, at Versailles, conceptually and explicitly, only Louis’ (albeit multi-faceted) perspective mattered. As already observed, the peacemakers, were infinitely less open regarding their dominant gaze. They could have considered how self-determination and mandates would benefit and enrich the relevant territories. Stronger treaty guarantees could have underwritten these aims. Instead, the peace arrangements, particularly as driven by the Big Three, did not focus on processes of adornment, nurturing, revelation or cultivation. Contrary to all design imperatives, the best was not brought out in the project sites in terms of their administration, economies, ecologies and societies. Instead, they were constructed as passive ‘fields’ to be harvested by a tiny set of states extracting material benefits (including monetary and mineral ones) and advantages in terms of political influence and security. These ‘gardens’ expressed the state of social relations in the 1919 context of their creation because they negotiated public status for the peacemakers in distributive regimes of power and wealth. An open season reflected how untended were the grassroots.

A third design convention decrees that designers work with their clients. This can often be a complex constituency and in 1919 it called for particularly intricate handling. However, the Paris negotiations were flattened into bidding competitions among equals. The designers themselves were the clients, and with no external constituencies to consult, much less please, satisfaction was almost assured. The peacemakers intended no parity of relations between mandatory powers and territories. In fact, the only relevance of the term ‘client’ would seem to be the mid-twentieth century pejorative notion of ‘client states’ (whereby one state is economically or politically subordinate to another). This is unfortunate given the third design principle’s potential. Seeing the ‘factual’ treaty terms more as a matter of concern involving complex ‘assemblies’ would have implicated politics and broadened perspectives. Societal design partnerships could have been established with regional community leaders. Complete modelling at Versailles would have been impossible, but establishing durable mechanisms and consultative frameworks was possible. Establishing a culture of design ethics (with an appreciation of history, culture and politics) for colonial territories passing to self-government

might have avoided the ‘anemic, cosmetic and bereft’,\textsuperscript{189} instead establishing a garden of infinite variety. At the very least, more deliberative conceptualisation could have generated more inclusive, collaborative, user-friendly design.\textsuperscript{190}

As well as demonstrating the attention to detail which is crucial to successful design,\textsuperscript{191} key performance indicators such as consultation, design aims and the participation of relevant stakeholders, would also have fortified the fourth design principle’s aims of good planning. Louis XIV worked closely with his designers, but in 1919 the international re-carving was quickly confounded by the un-envisaged reality of politics among people of whom the peacemakers knew very little. The fiction of control in the peacemakers’ minds seems unfathomable given clear concerns about revolutionary possibilities. However, those anxieties concerned local, or at least familiar, territories. Successful project design always contemplates the unexpected but the peacemakers only saw a world in pale imitation of the one recently disappeared. Entirely new ways of governance were pressing upon them, yet newly acquired territorial management repeated the colonial model. The peacemakers planned the future with yesteryear’s model.

The fifth principle identifies the imperative of designing space before mass. A building or wall represents packaging containing that space. Accordingly, territorial borders derive from, and contain, that which exists within them and the aforementioned concept of an envelope is particularly illustrative. However, spatial considerations concern volume not emptiness. Designs are judged by the degree and quality of movement afforded to actors within the space.\textsuperscript{192} Thus, actors’ potential agency becomes key. The 1919 boundaries were not products of decisions emanating from the territories. Rather, they were off-the-shelf impositions framing coastal and mineral access, resulting from political bargains with little site sensitivity. This disengagement reinforced territorial peoples’ passivity characterising them as static masses. Cartographic mechanics actualised these spatial boundaries which configured certain

\textsuperscript{191}Latour, ‘A Cautious Prometheus?’ 3.
‘imagined communities’ and placed them before international audiences ‘in a scientifically acceptable way’ just as in previous centuries.\textsuperscript{193}

The 1919 designers may have thought that they abided by the sixth design principle of utilising the best materials and learning from their cultural antecedents. Strong cultural hinterlands undoubtedly enrich projects and, as mentioned, the Versailles negotiators called upon individuals like Lawrence and Bell. However, rather than regional expertise, these observational empiricists inevitably retained an outsider’s eye appraising the exotic while conveniently diluting its true power. Historically constructed fantasies were melded with regional ambitions. Delving deeper into what identity actually entailed as regards group membership or territorial ties in a Middle Eastern context, might have been more principled and fruitful. This clearly links with the third design principle of informed design-partnerships. Former Ottoman territories included some of the world’s most sophisticated civilisations which had enjoyed complex bureaucracies, legal systems, taxation arrangements, religious tolerance and accommodation of cultural difference. In 1919, direct contributions from this undoubtedly rich cultural and political environment were simply sidelined in favour of US-European interpretations.

The final design principle, the contemplation of time, seems particularly poignant in centennial reflections upon the treaty. Most landscape designers anticipate the afterlife of their creations,\textsuperscript{194} yet, despite recent tectonic shifts, the peacemakers, in an imperial appropriation of time,\textsuperscript{195} apparently contemplated little alteration in the future world order. This found reflection in their landscaping. Landscapes have geological groundings and continuity, and change clearly occurs in maturation and ecological terms. However, as the renowned landscape architects Sonja Duempelmann and Susan Harrington note, designed landscapes, as products of material culture, shapers of social and political conditions and lived environments, transcend traditional distinctions between objective and subjective time. They embody ‘the time and . . . changes they express’ and the perpetual challenge of anticipating agency (in plant material movement) also reveals profound ‘disquieting narratives of survival’.\textsuperscript{196} This metaphor of

persistent endeavouring agency and agility strikingly anticipates the eventual undoing of 1919 plans. The Council of Four saw world government in its previous mould and Lloyd George in particular was captivated by his authorship of a new paradise. The peacemakers’ folly was not realising that to everything there is a season\textsuperscript{197} and that, even in a terrarium, seasons change.

While the peacemakers basked in June 1919, they might have paid heed to how the unknowable impact of time also stalked Versailles’s very own fabric. Traversing from obscure hunting lodge to radiant architectural powerhouse, its history had a Cinderella-like quality.\textsuperscript{198} However, time also entrapped Versailles in the 1789 Revolution when its strength—its very embodiment of Bourbon unity—suddenly, and very fatally, made it a national bone of contention.\textsuperscript{199} Marie Antoinette’s life can never be considered without the shadow of the guillotine.\textsuperscript{200} So time’s passage reveals Versailles’s gloom: French humiliation in 1871, German humiliation in 1919 and an incurable, perhaps fallacious, aetiological myth of hosting the Third Reich’s origins.\textsuperscript{201} As they waited in Paris, the German delegation contemplated time’s march with increasing dread. One of their number kept chronicles which recalled trips to the Trianon park where they marvelled at the blooms but still felt ‘in the background of all this loveliness the shadow of fate, as if reaching out for us, grows constantly darker and comes steadily closer’.\textsuperscript{202} The next stage of the peace process lay in the conclusion of the Treaty of Sèvres which facilitated the British Mandate in Palestine and the French Mandate in Syria/Lebanon. Its signing in a porcelain factory’s exhibition room practically signposted its fragility, but the eventual cracks in the earthenware were the result of fatal design flaws.

**DESIGN DISPLAY / DISPLAYING DESIGN**

The section considers the representational and allegorical aspects of the treaty’s signing at Versailles. Designed to inspire awe, Versailles’s illustriousness was appropriated to enshrine the peacemakers as total victors having vanquished underfoot their challengers. More indirect representations associated them with Louis’ cosmological pretensions. While the famous

\textsuperscript{197} Ecclesiastes 3.
\textsuperscript{199} Jones (2018) 14.
\textsuperscript{200} A Fraser, *Marie Antoinette* (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2002).
\textsuperscript{201} See Steiner (2007) challenging the ‘Hitler prologue’.
Justus van Egmont coronation portrait of Louis XIV depicted him with the traditional symbols of sovereignty, in the 1919 snapshot, a treaty replaced the royal sceptre.

**Walking in history**

It was not enough for the Sun King to design Heaven on Earth in all its might and glory. Versailles would be shown, not independently seen. Louis even produced a guidebook entitled *How to Show the Gardens of Versailles*. Different versions exist and, unlike other guides, the comprehensive second manuscript ordains a granular and authoritative itinerary. No intimacy exists either between author and visitors or between the director, Louis, and his subordinate guides who ‘exist merely to do his command’. The following extracts highlight this detached, dictatorial tone.

1. Leaving the Château by the vestibule of the marble courtyard, go onto the terrace. You must stop at the top of the steps to consider the arrangement of the *parterres*, the pools and the fountains in the Cabinets.

   . . .

3. . . . Reaching the Sphinxes, pause to see the South *Parterre*, and then go directly above the Orangery, where you will see the *parterre* of the orange-trees, and the Lake of the Swiss Guards.

There are ‘no invitations to linger or to daydream’ or to engage in joyful carefree pursuits. Visits were to be ‘brisk, disciplined and respectful’ with expectations that guests would admire and be impressed (according to the king’s command). For Louis XIV, a man completely identified with pleasure, even enjoyment was powerful business. Clemenceau’s directorial demeanour on 28 June 1919 mirrored Louis’ stage-direction. *Le Père de la Victoire* was not only giving everyone a day to remember. His unforgettable depiction of French modern

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203 ‘La Manière de montrer les jardins de Versailles’, by Louis XIV and others, edited and translated by Christopher Thacker’ *Garden History* (1972) 49.
204 A Félibien, *Description sommaire du chateau de Versailles* (G Desprez, 1674). Considered a leading authority on Louis XIV period art and architecture, Félibien was appointed Historiographer of Royal Buildings in 1666. Some remember him unkindly as a ‘royal sycophant’. Jones (2018) 36.
205 ‘La Manière de montrer’ 63.
206 Ibid 60.
208 Hubbard & Kimball (1919) 41 note: ‘even in his private life [he] could not put aside his kingly state’.
power’s restoration would also ensure Versailles’s re-inscription into German history after the 1871 coup de théâtre.209

Paris 1919—set design

As noted throughout, Versailles was a central stage for French history both good and ill, and not all trauma came from within. In 1871, having housed hospital beds for wounded German soldiers in the Franco-Prussian war, the defeated France, in the Hall of Mirrors no less, was forced to host the birthing ceremony of the new German Empire.210 After ravaging and subjecting regions of South Western Germany, Louis XIV built triumphal arches depicting German captive prisoners at his conquering feet. For Bismarck, dramatizing Germany’s triumphal creation and the humiliation of a decisively defeated, territorially diminished,211 reparations-burdened France212 must have tasted sweet.

Five years to the day after Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, the delegations assembled, and France’s desire to repay the bitterness of the Western Front and 1871 took the spotlight at Versailles. Just like Louis, Clemenceau (a young man in 1871) dominated. He was in his element as he jovially manoeuvred delegates through the great formal rooms. Intimidating French military pride and splendour was unavoidable: from the motionless, magnificently presented, cavalry manning the mile-long drive to the palace gates, to the escort of honour formed by the elite Garde Républicaine on the Grand Staircase, up which invitees ascended. Martial display combined with centuries-old grandeur reinforced notions of order being restored. At a huge table, the old Tiger returned from 1871. Beside him in a special leather box on a small Louis XV table sat a copy of the treaty. Above him were overhead portraits of Louis XIV as a Roman emperor.213 At 3pm, in the surrounding silence, Clemenceau ordered ‘Bring in the Germans’.214

For the German delegation, enduring disgrace in the midst of such magnificence must have felt like an earthly Last Judgment. However, some were unimpressed by Clemenceau’s staging.

210 Ibid.
211 Alsace, excluding Belfort, and parts of Lorraine were ceded to Germany.
213 See Jones (2018) 55 regarding Le Brun’s ceiling paintings.
The disgusted French ambassador to London thought it ill-reflecting Louis XIV’s kingship. Another contemporary participant/commentator considered it archaic, unchivalrous, more akin to the brutal Roman triumph and un-modern. Clemenceau, like Louis, would probably have delighted in the classical parallels and periodical play.

As noted, contemplating time’s impact is key for any landscape design project. But time itself is elastic. Stretching and contracting, it allows for reflection, and in design terms, permits re-appropriation and re-emphasis. Indeed, although impacted by objective time, Versailles’s 17th-century gardens transcended the material, embodying an ‘apprehension of time as simultaneously eternal and historic and recurring’. Through their ‘iconographic program’, which employed figures and themes from classical mythology, Louis XIV and Le Nôtre built upon astronomical time. Their analogies between God, the sun (Apollo) and king ‘paralleled eternal, divine and historical and mundane time’. These exploitations of time’s malleability and multi-dimensionality, were capitalised upon by Clemenceau when he projected the restoration of French territorial sovereignty and authority as occurring within an immense, divine, historical lineage. Versailles’s benediction upon the treaty performed an act of re-consecration, washing away 1871-1919 stains on the French historical landscape. However, Clemenceau only temporarily harnessed Versailles’s power. The ungovernable nature of time and the importance of viewer contingency allowed Versailles’s 1871 associations to protect it during the Nazi Occupation. Versailles’s beauty: always a matter of perspective unbounded by mundane time.

While the signing ceremony bestowed lustre on the treaty and post-war arrangements, Versailles also benefited. In an estimation which only half flatters Clemenceau’s endeavours, the palace’s current tour guide charts its progress from ‘the seat of power’ to a museum of French history. Versailles had always moved with the times, particularly since its own 1789 blip. 19th-century preservationists, anxious that Versailles’s dynastic, potentially restorationist, associations might prove toxic, emphasised Versailles’s Republican credentials. After all,

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215 Louis loved ballets but ‘only as a diversion; he signed treaties in his study. Democracy is more theatrical than the great king’. Ibid 487.
France had contributed to the American War of Independence that concluded in another treaty of Versailles in 1783. Stitching gold threads between Versailles’s history and the Third Republic’s victory repackaged Versailles as both absolutist creation and republican triumph. Indeed Wilson warmly supported Clemenceau’s locus proposal. Versailles’s transition from ancient monument to marker of modernity bestowed a winning twin glow of heritage and innovation upon the peace treaty. An old world was given a decent burial and a new world of international organisations was born. The treaty’s association with one of Anglo-European culture’s most iconic markers of civilisation rendered its familiar, yet contemporary, authority unarguable. In allegorical terms, the sun rose and set at Versailles. Louis would have been proud.

A glorious vista

Louis’ Versailles witnessed earth being ‘reshaped by human heft into geometrical regularity’ where ‘Nature seemed to genuflect to the Bourbon will’. In 1919 the global genuflection (however unwilling) was to four men’s bidding. However, carefully choreographed occasions often conclude in erratic and anti-climactic fashion. The *New York Times* reported upon ‘the quickness and dispatch’ of the proceedings’ conclusion. Perhaps in homage to Louis, or desires to take air, the peacemakers adjourned to the terrace with its grandstand view of the great formal gardens and their magnificent spurting fountains. Ironically, this appreciation of physical balance ill-reflected the peacemakers’ fidelity to Great Power world order asymmetries. However, as they surveyed Versailles’s vanishing point, the leaders missed what was literally coming from behind as they were overrun by engulfing crowds. An initially dignified occasion quickly spiralled into chaotic, riotous scenes. Versailles’s landscape could never be fully harnessed.

If their gaze had been allowed to continue in detail, the Four would have seen beyond the *Grand Allée* past the famous *Bassin de Latone*, to the *Bassin d’Apollo* with that particular mythical god on his chariot marking the sun’s rise. Versailles’s gardens end is poignantly marked by the *Pillars of Hercules*. Navigationally, this term referenced the threshold route through the

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221 Enjoying UNESCO world heritage protection.
222 Jones (2018) 64.
Gibraltar straits and, in classical literature, Ulysses’ final journey to bury his dead crewman’s oar. The world was certainly on the threshold of a new era and the peacemakers would have basked in connections with the infinite.\textsuperscript{226} No doubt from the highest viewpoint a beautiful vista appeared to these heroes. However, in reality, these self-styled Olympians\textsuperscript{227} were not Gods and their realm was terra incognita. The hour of ‘splendour in the grass was gone’. Strength would have to be found by others in what remained behind.\textsuperscript{228}

**Land’s end and remembrance**

When he watched the sunset on 3 August 1914 and made his famously poignant statement that ‘The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our life-time’,\textsuperscript{229} the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey was gazing over St James Park. During James I’s reign this former marshland was also drained and landscaped. It was re-designed by Charles II upon his return from French exile (courtesy of his cousin Louis XIV) so impressed had he been by the royal formal gardens.\textsuperscript{230} For a viewer standing at the middle of Versailles’s Hall of Mirrors, the Grand Allée perfectly divides the gardens in two. Tapping into human needs for psychological harmony, Versailles’s design hallmark is its symmetry. Grey’s gaze was caught by a Louis-influenced landscape. The war’s conclusion at Versailles returned that gaze.

While in 1919 self-determination was a political claim, it is now a legal principle enabling peoples to determine their own futures and destinies. Although not perfect,\textsuperscript{231} self-determination has facilitated many former colonial peoples’ emancipation and has evolved to progress sub-state entities’ autonomy. At its core, it rejects the idea of freedom’s ‘bestowal’. Freedom instead is achieved through a people standing in solidarity, who share a broadly common view of their past and more importantly, their future and who ‘belong together’.\textsuperscript{232} Unlike the 1919 peacemakers, such peoples are clear that there is much unknown about the new world they seek. They countenance time in very real terms, because they are focussed on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{227} EJ Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (Harper, 1920) ch. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{228} W Wordsworth, *Ode: Intimations on Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*, in *Poems*, vol. 1 (Longman et al., 1807).
\item \textsuperscript{229} E Grey, *Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916* (FA Stokes, 1925); JA Spender, *Life, Journalism and Politics*, vol. 2 (Stokes, 1927) ch. 20, 14-15.
\item \textsuperscript{230} He likely used André and Gabriel Mollet. G Stedman, *Cultural Exchange in Seventeenth-Century France and England* (Ashgate, 2013) 69.
\item \textsuperscript{231} M Weller, *Escaping the Self-Determination Trap* (Brill, 2009) and the Western Sahara situation.
\item \textsuperscript{232} Keenan (2014).
\end{itemize}
Tomorrow. Often endowed with strong cultural bonds and shared heritage, they appreciate the need to accommodate and respect a variety of traditions and perspectives to maintain future peace. They recognise design as only ever redesign. Unlike the 1919 project, these change-agents consciously challenge the prevailing order and usually do so in carefully detailed design plans. They understand leaps are being taken. By openly acknowledging risks entailed and the trust placed within them, self-determination movements act as communities of fate. As such individuals will live (together) with their designs. This humility of hope and acceptance of responsibility, is the enduring strength of self-determining peoples who survey their condition and still dare to redraw the line a century after Versailles.

PANORAMA & POSTSCRIPTS: IN MEMORIAM FREDERICK ARTHUR FARRELL (2 NOVEMBER 1882 – 22 APRIL 1935)

Fred Farrell was the only World War I artist in Britain who received his appointment from a city, namely Glasgow. On Sunday, 16 December 1917, north of Ypres, Belgium, Farrell was sketching when he noticed a particularly poignant scene of soldiers in slow procession.

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234 Rather than being commissioned by the government, the Imperial War Museum, or the armed forces. J Meacock et al., Fred A. Farrell: Glasgow’s War Artist (Glasgow Museums, 2014).
Reproduced with the kind permission of Glasgow Museums.

The figures Farrell saw were surviving soldiers from a battalion of Highland Light Infantry following a failed attack on Passchendaele Ridge a few nights earlier which sustained heavy losses. The Germans anticipated the attack. On moonlit, snow covered ground, the soldiers were fatally conspicuous and easy to target. The sketch depicts an all too familiar landscape with the survivors ‘gathered around a makeshift altar, their heads bowed as the chaplain leads a service’.

Social history arose from historians’ concerns about their tendency to become overly preoccupied with elites like Louis XIV and the Council of Four. However, Farrell’s portraits of field soldiers and female munitions workers testify to the efforts of ordinary people in common endeavour. Rather than familiar depictions of sorrow or despair, their comradeship displayed quiet ‘hope and defiance, confidence and control, strength and unity’. More than individual portraits, ‘[t]hey are the portrait of an entire city and the contributions and sacrifices it made during those fateful four years’.

War brings grief, but grief can reawaken and renew. Just as self-determination exemplifies the exceptional solidarity of ordinary people, so the selfless, resolute, efforts of nameless millions ensured the very existence of a 1919 peace project. Farrell’s panorama commemorated grassroots war efforts in the field and at home. The ordinary is extraordinary. When surveying Versailles’s cultural landscape one hundred years later, a more poignant, and more enriching, perspective rewards those who forsake elite doodles to instead revisit how my artistic great-great uncle (by marriage) honoured millions when he carefully and tenderly drew his lines.