Multiple-aggregate Games

Dickson, Alex (2017) Multiple-aggregate Games. Preprint / Working Paper. University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.

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Abstract

Consider an environment in which individuals are organised into groups, they contribute to the collective action of their group, and are influenced by the collective actions of other groups; there are externalities between groups that are transmitted through the aggregation of groups’ actions. The theory of 'aggregative games' has been successfully applied to study games in which players' payoffs depend only on their own strategy and a single aggregation of all players' strategies, but the setting just described features multiple aggregations of actions—one for each group—in which the nature of the intra-group strategic interaction may be very different to the inter-group strategic interaction. The aim of this contribution is to establish a framework within which to consider such 'multiple aggregate games'; present a method to analyse the existence and properties of Nash equilibria; and to discuss some applications of the theory to demonstrate how useful the technique is for analysing strategic interactions involving individuals in groups.

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Item metadata

Item type:	Monograph(Preprint / Working Paper)
ID code:	68451
Dates:	Date Event 11 February 2017 Published
Notes:	Published as a paper within the Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 17-01 (2017). To appear in The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods: Essays in Memory of Richard C. Cornes, edited by Wolfgang Buchholz and Dirk Rübbelke.
Subjects:	Social Sciences > Economic Theory
Department:	Strathclyde Business School > Economics
Depositing user:	Pure Administrator
Date deposited:	18 Jun 2019 11:28
Last modified:	09 Apr 2024 04:44
URI:	https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/68451

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