



**COHESIFY**

The impact of EU Cohesion Policy  
on European Identification

# European Identity and Citizen Attitudes to Cohesion Policy: What do we know?

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## COHESIFY RESEARCH PAPER 1

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**Summary:** This paper provides a state-of-the art review of the literature on European identity and on citizens' attitudes to Cohesion policy. It is the first research paper in the COHESIFY project, which aims to assess the impact of Cohesion policy on citizens' support for and identification with the European Union. The paper begins by examining the European identity literature distinguishing conceptual perspectives, methodological approaches, controversies and explanations. It then reviews the literature on the impact of EU Cohesion policy on citizens' attitudes to the EU and related studies of Cohesion policy communication. Building on these different strands of literature, the final section sets out the analytical framework for the COHESIFY project including the conceptual approach, research design, case selection rationale and methodology.



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## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The European Union (EU) requires citizens' support and identification to enhance its legitimacy. The question of whether and how much European identity is necessary for European integration is highly contested, largely because it is connected to controversial normative debates about the nature of the EU as a polity. What is clear is that the politics of European identity in Europe has become more salient following the recent economic and migration crises which have fuelled a rise in nationalist and anti-EU sentiment across Europe and exposed deep divisions among governments and citizens about the value, purpose and future of the EU – most strikingly evident in the Brexit referendum vote in the United Kingdom. EU institutions have made it a priority to reconnect with European citizens (Juncker 2014) through participatory, decentralised and creative communication about the EU (Committee of the Regions 2014). But this is a challenging task given the EU's territorial diversity and the lack of systematic and robust knowledge about how specific EU policies impact on citizens' attitudes and identity and what communication mechanisms would best serve the re-connection with citizens.

This is the context for the COHESIFY research project which aims to assess the contribution of EU Cohesion policy to a positive identification with the European integration project in terms of a valued, popular sense of European identity and to determine the implications for EU strategies for communicating EU Cohesion policy to citizens. EU Cohesion policy can be considered a 'most-likely case' for developing a 'sense of community' because it is the EU's most explicit and visible expression of solidarity and has a direct impact on people's daily lives. It provides funding to all European regions, especially less developed regions and countries, through investments that aim to raise economic and social prosperity and improve citizens' quality of life. Its multi-level governance model is meant to have a key role in mainstreaming EU policy agendas to national and regional levels bringing the EU closer to citizens through programmes that reflect regional and local development needs and challenges, and which are designed and implemented in 'partnership' with local authorities, non-governmental organisations, socio-economic partners and other bodies representing civic society.

Yet, there are basic questions about the extent of knowledge and awareness of the policy among citizens across the EU, whether it is perceived to impact on their daily lives, which factors are influential in shaping perceptions and how this translated into attitudes to and identification with the EU in different regions and localities. Further, it is unclear to what extent the strategies of EU institutions, Member States and Managing Authorities for communicating Cohesion policy are effective in increasing awareness or influencing perceptions and identity.

The central purpose of this paper is to set out an analytical framework for investigating the impact of Cohesion policy on European identity. It proceeds in three steps. The starting point is a review of the literature on European identity in terms of the key conceptual perspectives, methodological approaches, controversies and explanations. The second section reviews the literature on the impact of EU Cohesion policy on citizens' attitudes to the EU and evaluations of the communication of Cohesion policy. Building on these different strands of literature, the final section sets out the analytical framework for the COHESIFY project including the conceptual approach, research design, case selection rationale and methodology.

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<sup>1</sup> We acknowledge helpful comments and contributions by Viktoriya Dozhdeva and Dr Arno Van der Zwet, both of EPRC.

<sup>2</sup> Cohesion policy is used as an abbreviation for EU cohesion, regional and urban policies.

## 2. The state-of-the-art

### 2.1 European identity research: a growth field in EU studies

The relationship between European integration and identity has been a central theme in European studies scholarship since its foundation in the late 1950s. However, it was not until the 1990s that it became the object of sustained and rigorous theoretical and empirical research in the context of the relaunch of European integration, increasing politicisation of European affairs, and a new scholarly interest on the impact of the EU on political attitudes and identity. The following section reviews the state-of-the-art of European identity research beginning with the concept of European identity and then turning to measures, explanations and methodological issues.

#### *Conceptualising European identity*

European identity is a contested and fluid concept that has been central to EU integration scholarship since its very foundation (Risse 2001; 2005). In Karl Deutsch's 'transactionalism' theory on political integration, the attainment of a "sense of community" among the public in terms of mutual loyalties and "we-feelings" was conceived to be a critical precondition for European and international integration in "security communities" in the post-war era (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). Key to the strengthening of this sense of community, according to Deutsch and his colleagues, was intensified communication through personal contacts and social interactions among citizens across different countries. The neofunctionalist theory of European integration by Ernst Haas (1958) took a more top-down view insofar as the formation of a collective European identity was conceived to be an outcome of European integration. Haas (1958) even defined integration as a 'shift' in 'loyalties' from nation-states to the European level of decision-making, although the empirical focus of his work was primarily on political actors (governments, parties and interest groups) rather than societal actors (citizens).

More refined conceptualisations of European attitudes and identity emerged in the 70s informed by wider developments in political science. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) put forward a typology of support for Europe's 'would-be polity' distinguishing between levels of interaction and types of support. Drawing heavily of David Easton's political systems framework, the two main types of support were 'utilitarian' and 'affective'. While utilitarian support for the community was based on perceived and objective benefits of Europe, affective support was based on diffuse and emotional responses to European ideals. The second theoretical distinction in terms of levels of interaction was between an 'identitive' dimension referring to horizontal interactions among citizens from different countries, in line with Karl Deutsch's transactionalist perspective; and the 'systemic' level relating to vertical interactions between the European system and the public, as stressed in Haas' neo-functional theory.

Conceptually, European identity was therefore understood to be a component of more general attitudes towards European integration. However, research on European citizens' attitudes during the 1970s and 1980s using Eurobarometer data (notably by Ronald Inglehart) tended to conflate political support for the European Community with European identity despite being distinct concepts (Green 2000; Bellucci *et al.* 2012). Moreover, most of the empirical research on European attitudes and identity-related issues in the 1970s and 1980s focused on socialisation dynamics among European elites working in Brussels rather than citizens in the Member States (reviewed in Pollack 1998).

European identity research expanded rapidly in the 1990s drawing on more diverse conceptual and methodological approaches from across the social sciences (e.g. Smith 1992; Soledad Garcia 1993; Meehan 1993; Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Delanty 1995; Laffan 1996; Risse *et al.* 1999; Risse and Maier 2003; Brewer *et al.* 2004; Bruter 2005; Sanders *et al.* 2012, amongst others). This surge in scholarly interest was largely a response to the increased salience of the EU after the re-launch of European integration through the Single European Market programme and Treaty reforms that greatly increased EU decision-making power and codified provisions on EU citizenship. These developments provided EU institutions with stronger potential to Europeanise Member State policies, politics and political, while increasing the politicisation of European affairs and ending the so-called permissive consensus of passive support for the EU among citizens. As a consequence, European public opinion and identity research placed greater attention on how Europe reshapes identity within Member States, the extent to which individuals identify themselves as Europeans, and their attitudes towards the EU and the integration process.

Conceptual advances have been facilitated by the cross-fertilisation and mainstreaming of European identity scholarship in wider social science theories, particularly from sociology but also anthropology, history and philosophy. Social identity and self-categorisation theories from social psychology (Turner 1975; Tajfel and Turner 1982; Tajfel 1982) provide the conceptual building blocks for much of the contemporary literature on European identity (e.g. Risse *et al.* 1999; Medrano 2001, Risse 2001; 2010, Hermann *et al.* 2004; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011; Bellucci *et al.* 2012; Fligstein 2009a/b; Kuhn 2015). Social identity research has been especially influential in developing understanding: of the key dimensions of identity (cognitive, affective and evaluative); of how identities are derived (from perceived membership qualities of groups and their comparison against other out-groups); and of the prevalence of multiple identities.

Distinguishing between the cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions of identity is useful to avoid some of the pitfalls of conceptual overstretching found in much of the identity literature (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The cognitive dimension refers to whether people categorise themselves (identify) as European or not. The evaluative dimension relates to the defining content that underpins this categorisation - the civic and cultural/ethnic distinctions being the most prevalent in EU identity research (discussed further below). The affective dimension relates to the emotional significance (the 'we-feeling') attached to collective identity. This does not imply that all identity dimensions need to be simultaneously present to qualify as a collective identity. For instance, a German or Italian may recognise that they are European (cognitively) without having an emotional (affective) attachment to Europe or the EU.

Another conceptual theme derived from social identity theory is the recognition of the multiplicity of territorial identities and their interactions, as reflected in the distinction between crosscutting, nested and separate identity models (Hermann and Brewer 2004). In the latter model, identities can be separate if the individuals in different identity groups do not overlap. By contrast, the crosscutting model foresees overlaps in the members of identity groups but not for all individuals, e.g. not all members of an ethnic group may identify with their nation and/or Europe. In the nested (or 'Russian dolls') model, smaller collective identities are part of larger ones, e.g. local identities are subsumed in national identities, and national identities within European identities. A further blended (or "marble cake") model has been added suggesting that different identities can be intertwined so much that it would be difficult to separate them as implied by the nested and crosscutting models (Risse 2004).

An important implication is that European identity should not necessarily be conceived as being in competition with national identity as part of a zero-sum identity game (Smith 1992; Waever 1995;

Marks 1999; Marcussen et al 1999; Risse *et al.* 1999; Castano 2004; Citrin and Sides 2004; Risse 2010; cf. Carey 2002). Rather, multiple identities can co-exist in harmony and even mutually reinforce each other. It is increasingly recognised that European identity can be seen as complementing rather than replacing or conflicting with national and regional identities.

Identifying the content of European identity is not straightforward. The common identity reference points that have been critical to identity formation within nation states are absent or less salient in Europe - a common language, cultural geography and territorial symbolism, historical memories, myths and traditions, religion, ethnicity or outsider groups (Smith 1992). While there is no commonly agreed definition or conceptualisation of European or national identity, there is a broad consensus that the presence of an "other" is an indispensable part of the identity concept (Kaina 2013). Just as out-groups are central to identification in social identity theory, classic texts on nationalism and territorial identities have long been concerned with notions of 'othering' (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1996; Smith 1986). All identities are 'based on the similarity to some people and difference (perceived or actual) from others' (Hjerm 1998: 357), but the extent to which identities are able to accommodate differences varies. Despite critiques of oversimplification (Kuzio 2002; Nieguth 1999; van der Zwet 2015; Guibernau 2007), the standard binary model first developed by Kohn (1944), which distinguishes between civic (inclusive) and ethnic (exclusive) identities, remains influential (Ignatieff 1993; Keating 1996; Greenfeld 1992; Brubaker 1996).

In the European context, European identity is often presented as having a strong civic component in terms of shared political rights, but lacking an ethnic dimension that defines itself against others (Garcia 1993; Meehan 1993; Howe 1994). In a similar vein, Habermas argues that a European identity must rest on 'constitutional patriotism', a form of civic identity emphasising democratic citizenship as the integrative force. By contrast, Smith (1992) emphasises the cultural foundations of European identity. His notion of a 'family of cultures' accepts cultural variations in identity reference points across Europe, but points to partially shared and overlapping cultural and political traditions (e.g. romanticism, roman law, parliamentary democracy, humanism and classicism) that could provide the basis for the formation of a trans-European identity in the long-term, although he is sceptical of the prospect.

There is increasing recognition that multi-dimensional conceptualisations of European identity are more useful and accurate on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Bruter 1995; Segatti 2016). For instance, Bruter (1995) incorporates both the civic and cultural components. The civic component concerns citizens' identification with the EU as a relevant institutional framework in their lives - which defines some of their rights, obligations and liberties - and is measured through questions relating to identification with state-like symbols of the EU (EU flag, anthem, passport). By contrast, the cultural component of European identity concerns citizens' perceptions of how close they feel to Europeans compared to non-Europeans and whether there is a shared European heritage. In a similar vein, Checkel and Katsenstein (2009) distinguish an outward-looking and cosmopolitan European identity focused on citizenship rights versus an inward-looking, national-populist European identity with cultural and ethnic content.

### *European identity measures and levels*

Empirical evidence on the identification of citizens with Europe is largely based on European and international surveys, which have included a range of questions to measure citizens' identification with Europe (Box 1).

One of the most commonly used questions since 1992 is the so-called 'Moreno' question: 'Do you in the near future see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality) or European only?' In terms of the conceptual discussion earlier, this indicator can be considered a self-identification (cognitive) measure as opposed to an affective measure of attachment. Reviewing previous analyses of this indicator (e.g. Green 2000; Citrin and Sides 2004; Citrin 2009; Risse 2010; 2014; Sanders *et al.* 2012) and more recent trends in the data points to several conclusions.

First, a majority of citizens identify themselves as European to some extent, compared to a minority that consider themselves exclusively national. However, this majority consider themselves national first and then European, which has been termed 'inclusive nationalism' (Hooghe and Marks 2005) or European 'identity lite' (Risse 2010). Few citizens consider themselves European first then national, and fewer still European exclusively.

Second, levels of dual (national and European) identity overall do not vary dramatically over time. However, it is striking that following a dip after the crisis in 2007/8 the level of European identity overall recovered to pre-crisis levels in 2010 and reached a historical high in 2015 with more than half of citizens (52 percent) feeling national and European for the very first time (Figure 1). Political support for the EU in terms of positive perceptions of membership and associated benefits has also increased in recent years, although citizens' trust in the EU remains significantly below pre-crisis levels (EPRS 2016).

Third, there are significant variations in European identity across Member States. Historically, citizens of the founding Member States and Southern European Member States have greater levels of European identity than citizens in Scandinavian countries or the in UK (Citrin and Sides 2004). The UK has the lowest level of European identity historically, no doubt being part of the explanation for the negative referendum result on continued membership of the EU in June 2016. Levels of identity in the new Member States are generally lower than in the older Member States (Ceka and Sokja 2016). The most recent Eurobarometer data reveals marked increases in European identity from 2010 to 2015 in many countries (notably in Germany, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands and Sweden), while only Cyprus has witnessed a significant fall.



### Box 1: European identity survey questions

#### Geographical belonging

To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all? And the next?

- (a) Locality or town where you live, Region or country where you live Your country as a whole, Europe,
- (b) Europe 1st choice; Europe 2nd choice; Europe not

#### Thinking of self as European

- (a) Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe?  
often, sometimes, never, (don't know)
- (b) Do you ever think of yourself not only as a (nationality) citizen but also as a citizen of Europe?  
often, sometimes, never, (don't know)
- (c) Does the thought ever occur to you that you are not only (nationality) but also European?  
Does this happen often, sometimes, never, (don't know)
- d) Do you ever think of yourself as not only (nationality), but also European? Does this happen  
often, sometimes, never, (don't know) [1990, 1991, 2005, 2006]
- (e) Does the thought ever occur to you that you are not only (nationality) but also a European?  
10-point scale: not at all also European....very much also European (don't know)

#### Attachment to Europe/European Union

- (a) How attached (or: close/emotionally attached/identifying with) do you feel to Europe?
- (b) How attached (or: close/emotionally attached/identifying with) do you feel to the European Union?
- (a and b): very attached/very close, fairly attached/close, not very attached/not very close, not at all attached/not close at all, (don't know)

#### National versus European

In the near future do you see yourself as...?

- (a) (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), European only, (don't know)
- (b) EB: 61.0–2004 (b) (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European only, (don't know) [split ballot with version a) in EB 61.0 2004]
- (c) EB: 62.0–2004 (c) (nationality) only, firstly (nationality) and then European, firstly European and then (nationality), European only, as (nationality) as European (spontaneous), (don't know) [split ballot with version a) in EB 62.0, 2004]


#### Proud to be European

And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?

- (a) very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud, (don't know)
- (b) additionally: I do not feel European (spontaneous)

Source: Isernia *et al.* (2012)

Figure 1: Trends in European identity



Source: EPRS (2016)

It is important to note that the accuracy of European identity measures is open to criticism for methodological reasons. Limitations in the questionnaires designs and assumptions include (Diez-Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Bruter 2005):

- questionable validity of some of the measures of identity;
- the conflation of distinct concepts unrelated to identity in some questions;
- awkward wording which is interpreted differently in different languages;
- a failure to tap into the different contents and meanings of identity; and
- the inability to undertake systematic time series analysis because of changes to identity questions over time and gaps in the frequency of use

These limitations have led some researchers to favour more qualitative and indirect measures of European identity based on in-depth interviews about citizens' experiences and senses of living in Europe that tap into identity meanings and narratives (Meinhof 2003; Favell et al. 2011). Studies employing qualitative approaches generally find that the level of European identity is much lower than reported in surveys, suggesting that the direct prompts and requests for self-categorisation used in mass surveys lead to biased responses; and that identity constructions are often fluid, contradictory and context-dependent (e.g. Armbruster *et al.* 2003; Diez-Medrano 2010). By contrast, Cram (2012) theorises that implicit European identity manifested in everyday interactions between citizens and the EU is implicit, often unconscious and, therefore, likely to be more widespread than is reported in surveys.

### *Explaining European identity*

Explanations of European identity tend to distinguish between individual-level factors and macro-institutional and contextual factors (for recent reviews, see Favell et al. 2011; Kaina and Karolewski 2013). The key individual-level determinants of European identity include:

- **instrumental/functionalist calculations** about the costs and benefits from European integration, as the winners are more likely to identify positively with the EU than the losers (Laffan 2004; Fligstein 2009; Fligstein et al. 2012; Bellucci et al 2012);
- **transnational experiences and social interactions**, which can increase collective identification in line with socialisation theories (Fligstein 2009; Bellucci et al 2012);
- **the strength of pre-existing territorial identities** at national or sub-national level, which can reinforce or challenge European identification (Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Bruter 2005; Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Marks 1999; Marks and Hooghe 2003; Chaca 2013);
- **trust in national political institutions**, with low trust encouraging more loyalty and identification with the supranational EU-level institutions, which has been labelled a 'substitution cueing' effect based on dissatisfaction (Bellucci et al 2012);

- **socio-demographic characteristics**, with higher income, occupational status and educational levels being associated with higher levels of European identification in line with 'cognitive mobilisation' theory, which suggests that this group is more likely to identify with their own political community and consequently be able to commit to other political communities (Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Citrin and Sides 2004; Fligstein, 2009).

Turning to macro-institutional explanations, EU exposure and persuasion are conceived as a top-down driver of European identity in much of the identity literature (European Commission 2012b). EU institutions can act as identity agents through the promotion of identity-building policies and political symbols such as the European flag, the Euro bank note and Europe Day (Bruter 2003, 2005; Cram 2012, 2013; Risse 2003; Laffan 2004). The mechanism at play is 'socialisation through persuasion', and can be distinguished from 'incremental socialisation' whereby individuals gradually internalise EU norms and rules over time (Risse 2010). Both mechanisms chime with Cram's notion of 'banal Europeanism', which maintains that 'European Union identity is underpinned by an implicit and incremental process, which is banal, contingent and contextual' based on Billig's (1995) concept of 'banal nationalism', and driven by everyday exposure to the European Union. Similarly, social-psychological research on European identity suggests that identification with the EU is dependent on the psychological existence of the EU as a real entity in citizens' minds based on the concept of 'entiativity' (Castano 2004).

National institutions and norms also matter. Country-level variations in European identity can be partly explained by differences in the 'fit' or 'resonance' between European and national identity constructions and political norms, such as state-centred republicanism in France, parliamentary democracy and external sovereignty in the UK, and federalism, democracy and social market economy in Germany (Marcussen et al. 1999; Risse et al 1999; Risse 2001; 2010). Domestic actors (political elites, parties and the media) in turn can shape public opinion and identification with the EU through the adoption of pro or anti-European messages and platforms (Bruter 2003, 2005; Fligstein 2009; Medrano 2003). The impact of such framing on collective identification is becoming more important given the increasing politicisation of Europe in national public spheres (Risse 2010; 2015).

The significance of these factors for the development of European identity is contested. On the one hand, various studies conclude that the EU has contributed to European identification through: European symbols and the Euro (Bruter 2005; 2008; Risse 2003; 2014); media campaigns (Bruter 2005; Stoeckel 2011; Harrison and Bruter 2014); elite discourses and narratives (Risse 2010); and the promotion of transnational interactions among citizens (Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2012) and university students (Mitchell 2014; Stoeckel 2016).

On the other hand, quantitative studies of European identity among the mass public based on aggregate-level measures show limited change (or an absence of dramatic shifts changes) in identity over long periods of time (Green 2000; Sanders et al. 2012; cf. Bruter 2005). This contrasts with the expectations of neo-functional theories of European integration that predicted a transfer of loyalties to Europe in response to advances in European integration. The similarity in levels and trends in European identification with regional identification measures in other continents - that have not witnessed such pronounced economic and political integration - suggests that the EU effect is rather limited (Green 2000; Roose 2013).

Qualitative studies cast doubt on the level of European identification found in mass surveys and on the positive effects of transnational interactions and exposure to EU symbols on identity.

Ethnographic research on the 'everyday life narratives' of ordinary citizens living in border areas where cross-border interactions are common found an absence of European and EU identity markers, even when the citizens were exposed to EU-related images (Meinhof 2003; Armbruster *et al.* 2003). Similarly, Diez-Medrano (2003; 2010) found that citizens rarely internalised an emotional sense of being European, based on in-depth interviews with citizens in Germany, Spain and the UK. Favell's (2008) study of arguably the most representative of 'Europeans' – young, mobile and well-educated professionals that migrate to live and work in cosmopolitan European cities outside of their country of origin – found many practical obstacles to the assimilation of these 'eurostars' in the receiving cultures and concluded that a truly 'post-national' life was difficult to achieve in practice.

Several reasons for the questionable success of identity-building efforts by EU institutions have been suggested. National institutions have firm control over cultural and educational policies and the media, limiting the ability of European institutions to use them to foster identity (Shore 1993, 2000; Gillespie and Laffan 2006). EU identity-building discourses are usually subordinated to national identity-building discourses about the nation-state by political elites (Schmidt 2011). The impact of cross-national exchange policies such as ERASMUS is contested, and the programme is poorly targeted given that participation is skewed towards well-educated individuals that are more likely to identify with the EU anyway (Kuhn 2012). More generally, there are well-known deficits in the EU approach to communicating with citizens (Valentini and Nesti 2010; Raube *et al.* 2013). Communication initiatives are mainly geared towards specialist audiences rather than the public and the messages are often complex, distant, unappealing, perceived as 'propaganda', and lacking information about the value of the EU. The governance and implementation of EU communication initiatives are inhibited by limited resources, coordination challenges within and across EU institutions, the difficulties in tailoring messages to local contexts, and poor connections with national media. Finally, mechanisms for gathering information from the public are weak, and the potential of online tools (e.g. social media, blogs) remains largely untapped.

### *Methodological approaches*

The methodological approaches and assumptions underpinning existing European identity research are diverse, which partly explains the disparate and sometimes conflicting findings across studies (Risse 2010). Quantitative studies employing statistical techniques have drawn mainly on Eurobarometer survey data to investigate individual and mass level European identity across the EU (Isernia *et al.* 2012; Belluci *et al.* 2012). These data have provided a rich source of information for assessing European identity patterns and determinants across Member States and over time. As noted earlier, they also suffer from methodological limitations relating to their questionnaire designs and assumptions.

Experimental techniques have been deployed less frequently to study European identity, taking one of two forms: before and after tests and control group tests (or combinations of both). The first involves measuring levels of identity in a sample before and after an experimental manipulation, such as a video with European identity-related images that is expected to increase identification scores in the post-manipulation measure of identity (e.g. Catano 2004). The second technique involves undertaking control-group tests by exposing one group of participants to the experimental manipulation (EU-related images and messages) and comparing the results to another group that have not been exposed to the images and messages (Catano 2004; Bruter 2003; Patriokis and Cram 2015). The main advantage of experimental techniques is the strong control by the experimenter in manipulating the variables of interest while holding other variables constant, which provides confidence in identifying causal effects. A common weakness in these studies is the use of student

respondents that are not representative of the general population, which reduce the generalizability of the findings. Nor are they able to measure the long-term temporal effects of exposure to EU symbols that are considered important to identity construction dynamics in much of the literature. By contrast, Bruter (2009) has undertaken an experimental study of the effects of symbols and news messages on citizens' identity using a diversified (but still not representative) sample, while taking the temporal dimension more seriously through a three-wave panel survey methodology (rather than a one-shot experiment).

In contrast to the positivist epistemology of statistical and experimental techniques, discourse analytic and ethnographic studies of European identity are rooted in constructivist and interpretivist assumptions emphasising human perception and interpretation of complex concepts such as identity (Meinhoff 2003; Wodak 2004; Holmes 2009). In a similar vein, qualitative approaches employing focus groups and in-depth interviews have been used to study citizens' understandings of the meaning of European identity (Medrano 2003; Bruter 2005; Duchesne *et al.* 2013; for a review, see European Commission 2012b). While these approaches can provide deeper insights into the complexity, fluidity and contradictory nature of European identity feelings and understandings, the conclusions are difficult to generalise beyond the specific cases and restricted samples.

Mixed-method approaches combining qualitative and quantitative methods systematically are rare. A frequently cited study is Diez-Medrano's *Framing Europe* (2003), which combined ethnographic, interpretive, historical, and statistical methods including analysis of press publications, public speeches, in-depth interviews with citizens and elites and Eurobarometer data. Despite being regularly cited in the European identity literature, the primary focus of the study was on analysing and explaining differences in the framing and political support for the EU rather than collective identification, although qualitative findings relating to European identity were subsequently reported in Diez-Medrano (2010). By contrast, Bruter's (2005) mixed-methods study focused squarely on European identity combining statistical analysis of Eurobarometer data, an original survey and focus groups with university students (the latter raising problems of bias and generalizability to a wider population) in three countries. Strikingly, there are no mixed-method and comparative studies investigating the impact of specific EU expenditure policies on citizens' identity.

## 2.2 EU Cohesion policy and European identity: uncharted territory

### *The impact of Cohesion policy on EU attitudes and identity*

While scholarship on European identity has grown rapidly over recent decades, research on the role of EU Cohesion policy in promoting European identity remains uncharted academic terrain. There are several quantitative studies assessing the impact of Cohesion policy funding on citizens' support for the EU but not on European identity directly. Nor are there any qualitative studies explicitly assessing the impact of Cohesion policy on territorial identity, although there are some relevant insights from research on EU-funded cross-border initiatives.

Beginning with the available quantitative research, a frequently-cited study on European identity employing ethnographic and linguistic methods used photos of EU-funded cross-border infrastructure investments (e.g. buildings, roads, waste treatment plants with the EU plaque) as visual triggers for discussing the life experiences of families living in European border areas (Armbruster *et al.* 2003; Meinhoff 2003; 2004). The expectation was that the photos would prompt awareness, discussions of attitudes and emotions about the role of Europe in their daily lives.

Contrary to expectations, the key finding was that images of EU-funded projects did not generally trigger European identity narratives. Rather, the photos were unrecognized, ignored or interpreted as local-regional (rather than European) issues. Sometimes they even triggered resentment against the bordering communities and suspicion about the motivation for the projects owing to a lack of knowledge about their purpose and/or insensitivity to local needs.

The key policy conclusion was that cross-border EU investments needed to be much more sensitive to local people's concerns, attitudes, and grievances if they are to be successful in bringing communities together. Although not stated explicitly, a logical implication is that better communication about the rationale and benefits of EU-funded investments could support this policy prescription. A cautionary remark is worth noting about the research design of this study with potentially important implications for the findings. The fieldwork took place in 2000 before the accession of some of the (Eastern countries) covered in the research. It is therefore possible that European attitudes and identities have changed in the borderland areas in the interim period, not least because of major increases in investment to the Eastern side of the border and because of the need for a long-term perspective to measure collective identification processes between new and old Member States. Related, it is arguable that some of the cases selected represent hard tests for collective identity formation (e.g. on the German-Polish border) because of historically high levels of territorial conflict and wide socio-economic disparities that militate against collective identity formation, at least in the short term.

A more recent post-accession study on a Polish-German border region after the abolition of border checks in 2007 examined the impact of an EU-funded cross-border initiative (the small projects fund) on building trust and the development of cross-border networks between residents (rather than European identity) (Płoszaj and Sarmiento-Mirwaldt 2014). Based on interviews with 51 participants before and after the cross-border projects (mainly teenagers participating in cultural, creative and sporting events), it found that the exchanges were generally very positive experiences but did not change opinions in the majority of cases. However, this was mainly because the participants' perceptions of their neighbors were positive before the projects began and involvement in previous projects may have impacted on opinions. Attitudinal change was only found in five (out of 51) participants, with two of these reporting negative opinions and a positive change in perceptions in the other three cases. Nevertheless, the study found that EU-funded cross-border contacts did promote a sense of familiarity with neighboring people, a feeling of trust and helped to breakdown crude national stereotypes.

Another relevant EU-funded research project examined the impact of regional economic development trends on collective identities in six European countries, based on case studies drawing on documentary analysis, interviews with citizens and focus groups (Kirk et al. 2011; Wodz and Gnieciak 2012; Revilla et al. 2013). However, the main focus was on changing social identities (in terms of social class and gender) instead of European identity, and the contribution of EU Cohesion policy was not explicitly investigated, notwithstanding cursory acknowledgements of the EU's financial contribution to domestic regeneration initiatives in a limited number of the case studies (Meier and Promberger 2011; Wódz et al. 2011).

Turning to quantitative studies on Cohesion policy and European attitudes, there are several statistical analyses of the effects of Structural Fund transfers on public support for the EU using data on public opinion survey and financial allocations at regional level, albeit providing conflicting conclusions. Contrary to expectations, a study by Duch and Taylor (1997) found that Cohesion policy funding transfers did not generate significant political goodwill in term of support for European integration. In fact, regions that benefited most from EU Cohesion policy were less

enthusiastic about economic integration than richer regions receiving less support. However, the study used regional allocations data from 1983 and 1986, prior to the landmark 1988 reforms that doubled the budget for Cohesion policy.

By contrast, studies of the impact of Structural Funds on public support for the EU in the late 90s, following a sizeable increase in the structural funds budget, found a statistically significant and positive effect (Brinegar et al. 2004; Osterloh 2008). In addition, Osterloh (2008) found that citizens' awareness of being a beneficiary was conditional on socio-economic background (particularly level of education) and that awareness translated into higher public support for the EU. A sizeable effect was mainly detected for those citizens who were direct recipients of EU funds, while publicity and information sources (such as TV, information signs) had a positive but smaller effect.

A more recent analysis by Chalmers and Dellmuth (2016) using data on ERDF allocations for 2007-2010 found that the Cohesion policy funding did not have a direct effect on public support for the EU, but rather a conditional effect mediated by the level of citizens' European identity and education. Moreover, the study also found that political party attitudes towards European redistribution did not mediate the effect of Cohesion funding transfer on support for the EU, implying that Cohesion policy is not politicised at the national level.

#### *Survey findings of citizens' awareness and attitudes to Cohesion policy*

Citizens' awareness and attitudes to Cohesion policy have been measured in four periodic Eurobarometer surveys between 2008 and 2015. Overall, around half of EU citizens have heard of the ERDF or Cohesion Fund (in 2013 and 2015), but only a third of citizens were aware of local EU-funded projects in their region or city (2010, 2013 and 2015) (Table 1).



**Table 1: Citizens' awareness of Cohesion policy (% of respondents)**

MS	Awareness of ERDF or Cohesion Fund*				Awareness of local EU-funded projects **			
	2015	2013	2010	2008	2015	2013	2010	2008
AT	52	52	16	na	17	16	22	64
BE	31	34	10	na	21	17	15	40
BG	79	76	19	na	43	62	45	35
CY	44	35	21	na	28	24	41	35
CZ	69	70	38	na	73	67	58	55
DE	36	36	27	na	26	15	19	46
DK	32	30	16	na	16	13	16	23
EE	71	69	43	na	50	53	57	62
EL	60	60	40	na	41	38	45	47
ES	56	60	39	na	28	33	43	62
FI	54	64	24	na	22	24	34	38
FR	35	37	10	na	26	28	25	45
HR	81	79	na	na	57	39	na	na
HU	69	66	36	na	67	62	59	43
IE	61	67	59	na	24	27	17	64
IT	47	54	10	na	43	48	33	56
LT	66	64	37	na	69	67	66	65
LU	44	43	23	na	32	27	26	49
LV	71	76	35	na	64	65	68	59
MT	58	52	26	na	59	35	39	64
NL	29	32	24	na	21	15	19	30
PL	80	84	59	na	76	80	69	65
PT	65	65	21	na	29	51	50	40
RO	72	75	20	na	45	46	64	61
SE	38	42	21	na	21	23	28	24
SI	77	81	33	na	52	60	59	66
SK	78	77	34	na	63	65	71	56
UK	36	40	25	na	9	10	13	38
<b>EU</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>49</b>

**Notes:** \*Question: 'Have you heard about any EU co-financed projects to improve the area where you live?' \*\*Question: 'Have you heard of the European Regional Development Fund or Cohesion Funds?' (Responses: 'yes', 'no')

**Source:** Eurobarometer

Three quarters of citizens that have heard of EU-funded projects believe that the impact has been positive (Table 2), but only around a fifth of citizens that have heard of the ERDF or Cohesion Fund feel that they have personally benefitted in their daily life from an EU-funded project (Table 3).

The surveys reveal significant variations across Member States in both awareness and perceived impacts/benefits of the policy. A strong link was found between awareness and the relative scale of financial allocations, and positive perceptions of impact are strongly linked to benefiting from the funds. The main sources of communication driving awareness about EU co-funded projects are television and newspapers.

**Table 2: Citizens' perceptions of the impact of EU-funded projects (% of respondents)\***

MS	2015				2013				2010			
	Pos.	Neg.	None	DK	Pos.	Neg.	None	DK	Pos.	Neg.	None	DK
AT	73	11	8	8	85	7	5	3	77	8	na	15
BE	74	10	7	9	77	8	7	8	82	9	na	9
BG	83	6	4	7	83	7	4	6	72	14	na	14
CY	83	7	7	3	83	3	10	4	82	7	na	11
CZ	85	7	1	7	85	7	2	6	84	7	na	9
DE	73	10	8	9	88	3	7	2	80	6	na	14
DK	67	4	14	15	65	0	19	16	60	8	na	32
EE	90	1	4	5	91	2	3	4	89	4	na	7
EL	79	12	7	2	75	11	11	3	74	17	na	9
ES	80	8	7	5	76	12	8	4	79	11	na	10
FI	87	2	6	5	84	3	6	7	86	4	na	10
FR	71	12	7	10	75	7	11	7	71	10	na	19
HR	78	4	11	7	76	6	14	4	na	na	na	na
HU	88	3	4	5	92	2	3	3	86	6	na	9
IE	91	3	4	2	96	3	1	0	90	3	na	7
IT	41	22	23	14	51	20	16	13	56	15	na	29
LT	92	1	2	5	87	4	5	4	90	3	na	7
LU	82	6	7	5	90	4	2	4	86	5	na	9
LV	93	2	2	3	90	4	2	4	79	12	na	9
MT	89	2	5	4	91	2	5	2	80	5	na	15
NL	81	8	4	7	69	12	10	9	80	8	na	12
PL	90	4	1	5	93	3	1	3	90	4	na	6
PT	80	5	8	7	63	14	13	10	70	15	na	15
RO	83	7	5	5	85	6	4	5	73	15	na	12
SE	77	2	10	11	71	3	10	16	61	6	na	32
SI	82	5	8	5	84	5	8	3	81	7	na	12
SK	81	7	4	8	80	7	5	8	84	6	na	11
UK	66	9	15	10	72	5	10	13	70	9	na	21
<b>EU</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>14</b>

**Notes:** \*Question: 'Taking into consideration all the projects you have heard about, would you say that this support has had a positive or negative impact on the development of your city or region?' (Responses: 'positive', 'negative', 'none', 'don't know')

**Source:** Eurobarometer

**Table 3: Citizens' perceived benefits of EU-funded projects (% of respondents)\***

MS	2015			2013			2010			2008		
	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK
AT	16	81	3	12	81	7	8	88	4	74	20	5
BE	9	88	3	8	89	3	4	96	1	59	30	11
BG	44	53	3	18	77	5	10	85	5	58	37	5
CY	18	79	3	24	66	10	13	83	4	69	26	6
CZ	53	39	8	42	49	9	25	69	6	73	16	11
DE	8	87	5	14	84	2	9	87	3	74	18	9
DK	6	78	16	8	80	12	6	85	9	67	16	18
EE	30	54	16	34	52	14	29	62	10	67	23	10
EL	30	67	3	23	73	4	24	71	6	70	27	3
ES	15	80	5	20	75	5	21	75	3	84	10	6
FI	13	72	13	14	84	2	12	84	5	73	11	17
FR	7	90	3	7	91	2	4	94	2	53	42	6
HR	9	87	4	8	90	2	na	na	na	na	na	na
HU	43	51	6	33	61	6	24	71	5	63	33	4
IE	28	59	13	34	58	8	23	70	7	89	8	4
IT	5	94	1	9	88	3	5	95	1	68	23	9
LT	30	64	6	27	70	3	28	65	6	90	7	3
LU	13	85	2	11	83	6	11	88	1	70	21	9
LV	44	51	5	37	58	5	26	70	5	62	29	9
MT	14	82	4	21	75	4	17	79	5	77	15	8
NL	15	77	8	6	88	6	7	89	4	63	17	21
PL	59	36	5	59	38	3	44	54	3	82	15	3
PT	9	88	3	11	87	2	12	85	3	70	25	6
RO	17	81	2	14	74	12	15	81	4	60	36	4
SE	8	76	16	11	78	11	9	77	14	71	12	16
SK	33	58	9	31	60	9	25	68	7	72	16	11
SL	33	62	5	32	64	4	23	71	6	46	50	5
UK	10	78	12	12	77	11	5	90	5	65	22	13
<b>EU</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>8</b>

**Notes:** Question: 'Have you benefitted in your daily life from a project funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) or the Cohesion Fund?' (responses: 'yes', 'no', 'don't know')

**Source:** Eurobarometer

Limitations in the questionnaire designs and sampling hinder the use of these surveys to investigate European identity and Cohesion policy – the main aim of the COHESIFY project. As the surveys did not include questions about European identity or general EU support, it is not possible to analyse the relationship between perceptions of Cohesion policy and support for/identification with the EU at the individual level. The potential reasons for negative perceptions of Cohesion policy are not elaborated in the questionnaires (e.g. mismanagement, fraud, institutional capacity, the socio-economic context, impact of the crisis, media-reporting etc.) hindering analysis of the motivations for citizens' perceptions. Nor do the survey questions elaborate on the meaning of impact or distinguish impact from other types of added value that Cohesion policy may bring to the region such as multi-level and participatory governance. Lastly, the sample populations in these surveys are representative at the national level (not at the regional level), which prevents a robust regional-level analysis being conducted of attitudes to Cohesion policy and the EU. This issue has been recognised by the Committee of the Regions, which is now calling for more regional and local level Eurobarometer surveys to be undertaken as part of its efforts to reconnect Europe with citizens (Committee of the Regions 2014).

### *The effectiveness of communication strategies*

Another relevant strand of literature is evaluation research and applied policy analysis on EU Cohesion policy communication. Of particular relevance are studies of the implementation and effectiveness of Cohesion policy communication strategies, which aim to promote the image of the EU among beneficiaries and citizens (e.g. Taylor and Raines 2003). A cross-national review of programme communication plans for 2007-13 found that communication with the public was a key strategic priority and that the most commonly used tools were television and radio media (Technopolis 2009). A key strategic weakness in most cases was a lack of differentiation in the communication plans according to target groups and civil society. Further, the strategic rationale for communicating with the public was often vaguely formulated hindering the assessment of expected impacts. However, as the study was conducted during the early stages of the launch of EU co-funded programmes (in 2008), it was unable to assess the implementation, results and impacts of the publicity and communication strategies over the lifetime of the 2007-13 cycle.

A more recent study has identified and assessed good practices in regional policy communication targeting the public, based on case studies in eight Member States and an assessment of communication activities by DG Regio (Coffey 2013; Wrona 2014). More than 50 approaches, activities and tools were identified as good practice within the Member States for various reasons, such as their design, content, the language used, outreach, novelty effects, visibility of the EU and the extent to which key messages defined by the EU are reflected. Significant challenges in communicating with the public were also highlighted, relating to the complexity of regional policy coupled with low levels of awareness, a lack of media interest and a deterioration of public opinion towards the EU following the crisis. With respect to the role of the European Commission, the study found that communication has not been a key priority for DG Regio and that its approach to communication has been rather conservative, risk averse and detached from issues that are of concern to the general public. While there have been improvements in media relations, and some outreach activities are viewed very positively by stakeholders, the focus has been mainly on specialist audiences rather than reaching the general public. Further, coverage of EU Cohesion policy has been relatively low in much of the media and there has been a tendency to report negative stories. Subnational media are more likely to report regional policy-related stories, but seldom emphasise the EU dimension. Key recommendations include the need for a more strategic

approach to communication, underpinned by a digital strategy and a stronger focus on story-telling to communicate the benefits and impact of regional policy to citizens. Greater efforts are also needed to help MAs communicate more effectively with the general public.

### *Multi-level governance and Europeanisation*

Despite the limited research on the impact of EU Cohesion policy on EU attitudes and identity, there is a substantial body of relevant research on its territorial governance and wider impacts on domestic polities under the conceptual frameworks of Multi-Level Governance (MLG) and Europeanisation research (for a review, see Bache 2008; Bachtler et al. 2013). According to the early MLG literature, Cohesion policy and its partnership-based model of implementation were expected to mobilise sub-national actors' demands for political influence in decision-making and even to transform constitutional arrangements for territorial governance (Marks 1992; 1993; Hooghe 1996; Marks and Hooghe 2001). The implication is that Cohesion policy has transformative effects on territorial structures of governance as well as identities embedded in these structures.

However, most empirical studies credit Cohesion policy with playing a supportive or minor role in territorial governance rescaling processes, and none of these has directly examined the impact on territorial identities. Moreover, empirical studies usually conceptualise identity as a domestic intervening variable mediating the impact of Cohesion policy on territorial governance rather than a dependent variable to investigate or explain. Yet, even if EU identification has not been the primary object of analysis, there is evidence that Cohesion policy can stimulate learning and socialisation dynamics among actors and alter domestic beliefs, values and norms among policy elites and practitioners (e.g. Bachtler et al. 2014; Cartwright and Batory 2012; Dabrowski 2011; Scherpereel 2010) implying that similar effects on citizens are possible.

## **3. A framework for analysis**

COHESIFY aims to make a conceptual, methodological and analytical contribution towards a better understanding of the relationship between EU Cohesion policy and EU identity. While there is a scarcity of academic research on the contribution of specific expenditure policies to citizens' identification with the EU (beyond the ERASMUS programme), there is extensive research on many of the component parts of the project – European identity, Cohesion policy implementation, performance and communication. A novel aspect of the analytical framework underpinning COHESIFY will be to investigate the interplay between these components.

Cohesion policy can be considered a 'most likely case' for impacting on European identity formation for several reasons. First, Cohesion policy is the EU's most visible expression of solidarity between Member States and regions providing transfers from richer Member States to poorer countries and regions to support economic and social development. The policy's solidarity rationale explicitly aims to foster a common sense of community across Member States and regions by contributing to territorial development and EU citizens' wellbeing. The establishment of Cohesion policy was partly motivated by the view that collective loyalties and the sustainability of the European integration project itself were dependent on the existence of a policy for tackling inequalities in citizens' living

standards across the community. As stated in the European Commission's Thomson Report, which set out the case for creating the European regional development fund (Thomson 1973: 4):

No Community could maintain itself nor have a meaning for the people which belong to it so long as some have very different standards of living and have to doubt the common will of all to help each Member State to better the conditions of its people

Indeed, regional development and equalisation policies have been important components of state-building strategies across the globe and are often part of the constitutional commitments of the state (e.g. in Germany, Italy and Spain) or central to a wide range of government economic development policies with a direct impact on people's daily lives.

Second and related, Cohesion policy is recognised to be one of the most visible EU policies, particularly at the regional and local levels. This is not only because of the visibility of Cohesion policy investments (especially transport infrastructure labelled with the European plaque) but also because of its multi-level governance model of implementation involving shared decision-making between EU, national and sub-national actors. The policy's partnership principle requires direct engagement with societal actors in programme design and delivery through consultation processes, structures and policy networks. In this way, Cohesion policy is intended to increase sub-national 'ownership' of EU goals including the Europe 2020 strategy – although how the principle is implemented varies significantly between and within countries. Moreover, each Cohesion policy programme (there are currently more than 450 programmes across the EU28) has an explicit publicity and communication strategy – strengthened in the 2013 reform to promote the image of the EU supported by communication officers and networks at EU and national levels.

Third, Cohesion policy commands substantial public support among citizens. Successive Eurobarometer surveys show that there is widespread awareness of Cohesion policy and that among those citizens who are aware of the policy a significant majority consider that it has been beneficial for the development of their region, albeit with significant variations across Member States. However, the effectiveness of the policy in addressing its goals is disputed, and there is strong criticism of the bureaucracy of administration amongst stakeholders as well as common reports of irregular and fraudulent spending in the media.

### **3.1 Conceptual approach**

COHESIFY will assess how and to what extent EU Cohesion policy affects citizens' perceptions of and identification with the European Union. The research design conceptualises Cohesion policy as an independent variable, while citizens' perceptions of, and identification with, the EU are the dependent variable(s) following a classic 'Europeanisation' research design (Risse et al. 2001). Assessing the degree of impact, the underlying causal mechanisms and the intervening variables mediating the effects of Cohesion policy on EU perceptions and identity are the core research tasks for COHESIFY.

Cohesion policy is not assumed to be the only factor shaping citizens' perceptions and identification with the EU. In this respect, a key goal and outcome of COHESIFY will be to specify and delimit the role and scope conditions of Cohesion policy influence on citizens' attitudes. Nor can the null hypothesis be discounted, namely that Cohesion policy will have no impact on European attitudes and identity. This is a real possibility, at the very least in countries and regions where the financial

scale of support is limited and the policy's visibility and political salience are low. That said, these are ultimately empirical questions for the project to investigate against new data.

To investigate the impact of Cohesion policy on European identity, the project focuses on four inter-related issues:

- (a) how European identity and perceptions of the EU vary at national, regional and local levels;
- (b) the influence of Cohesion policy on citizens' perceptions of the policy and identification with the EU;
- (c) whether and how communication about Cohesion policy affects perceptions and identification; and
- (d) what is needed to make Cohesion policy more effective in terms of people's perceptions of the policy and the EU more generally.

In addressing these issues, the core assumptions of the project, which will be tested in the research, are that:

- there is mutual interrelationship between Cohesion policy performance, communication and policy perceptions;
- perceptions of Cohesion policy performance impact on perceptions of the European Union and on identification with the EU; and
- improvement of Cohesion policy performance and communication of achievements can improve the perception of the EU and identification with the EU

Assessing the relationship between European regions, the EU framework for Cohesion policy and the impact of Cohesion policy on a positive identification with the European construction is fundamental to the research. This will require an assessment of territorial variations in citizens' perceptions of the EU and identities as well as analysis of perceptions of Cohesion policy and how this influences support for and identification with the EU.

A comparative and mixed-method case study approach is at the heart of the methodology incorporating original surveys (of decision-makers, stakeholders and citizens) and focus groups, to examine: (i) the historical background of identity formation in the respective countries; (ii) the implementation and performance of Cohesion policy, including a policymaker survey and in-depth interviews; (iii) the communication aspects in terms of the media and the effectiveness of communication strategies, based on the framing analysis, surveys and interviews; and (iv) public perceptions of Cohesion policy and the impact of Cohesion policy on identification with the EU, drawing on the citizens survey and focus groups' tasks.


The methodology for the EU-wide comparative research and the selection criteria for the regional case studies will provide for variation in key dimensions of theoretical interest related to Cohesion policy, including eligibility, financial allocations, strategic objectives and priorities, territorial governance, implementation arrangements, and policy history (discussed below).

The project is designed around four substantive research work packages (WP2-5) beginning with a contextual mapping of EU territorial challenges, attitudes and identities (WP2). The implementation, performance and communication of EU Cohesion policy is then examined in WP3 and WP4, feeding into the core substantive questions on citizens' perceptions of Cohesion policy and the impact on citizens' attitudes to the EU and drawing conclusions and recommendations (WP5).

- WP2 'Regional context, challenges and identities' will provide a review of conceptual and methodological knowledge on European identities to inform the detailed analytical approach of all other project activities. Moreover, it will establish a territorial typology, identifying clusters of countries/regions according to identity, political culture, territorial and institutional characteristics, receptiveness vulnerability and desirability of EU Cohesion policy as a basis for the selection of the case studies for in-depth analysis in WPs 3-5. The final task of WP2 will investigate the role of political parties and how parties frame European integration and EU Cohesion policy through content analysis of election manifestos, coalition agreements and government statements at the regional level in the case study Member States over time.
- WP3 'Cohesion policy implementation and performance' will provide a comparative analysis of Cohesion policy implementation and performance at regional level across the EU and how implementation and performance is perceived among key stakeholder groups involved in the case study regions. A combination of secondary data analysis and fieldwork interview research will gather data on Cohesion policy implementation/performance that can be related – at regional level – with other work packages examining perceptions of Europe, the communication of the policy and citizens' awareness and perceptions of the policy.
- WP4 'Communication of Cohesion policy' will analyse the communication aspects of Cohesion policy building on the European identity literature and its emphasis on the role of exposure and persuasion in European identity constructions. An innovative, mixed methodological schema will be implemented that involves: framing analysis to investigate how Cohesion policy is framed and interpreted by selected mainstream (offline and online) media; a multilevel analysis of Cohesion policy's communication strategy (regional/national/EU), which includes a survey of Cohesion policy stakeholders; the application of computer science techniques (data-mining and sentiment analysis) to collect and analyse Cohesion policy material that is available online; and the development of a web platform that will be used for data collection and analysis.
- WP5 'Perceptions of Cohesion policy and attitudes to the EU' will bring together the results of WPs 2-4 and will address the central question of whether and to what extent perceptions of Cohesion policy impact on attitudes to the EU. An original survey of citizens' attitudes to Cohesion policy and the EU will be undertaken in a sample of regions/countries, complemented by focus-group discussions in a subset of countries/regions. The survey and focus groups will inform national/regional reports drawing also on research from the other work packages, which will in turn be used to draw out key conclusions and lessons to promote learning about how to improve civic appreciation of Cohesion policy and the EU.



Figure 2: Structure of the Work Packages



The conceptualisation of EU identity and support, policy performance, governance and actors, and communication is as follows.

*(i) European identity and support*

The project adopts a multi-dimensional approach to conceptualising citizens' attitudes to the EU, distinguishing between the distinct concepts of identification with the EU and support for the regime. In line with mass opinion surveys, key sub-dimensions and questions that will be used to capture European identity and support for the EU are:

- **EU identity:** geographical belonging to the EU, thinking of oneself as European, sense of attachment to Europe, European vs. national identification, and pride in Europe; the nature and content of European identification (civic, cultural, ethnic, etc.) and
- **regime support:** whether membership of the EU is perceived positively (or negatively), and whether people perceive their country/region to have benefited from being a member of the EU.

### *(ii) Policy performance*

Cohesion policy performance is understood to have several distinct dimensions, based on the applied policy analysis and evaluation literature on Cohesion policy:

- **effectiveness:** the achievement of the policy's formal goals in terms of economic, social and territorial development;
- **utility:** the extent to which the policy impacts on society's needs and resolves socio-economic problems;
- **added value:** a broader concept that relates not only to impacts on developmental outcomes, but also to governance/administrative, learning, and visibility effects as well as spill-overs into domestic systems and related innovation and efficiency improvements; and
- **regularity-legality:** compliance with rules on the probity of spending and legal requirements.

### *(iii) Governance and actors*

A defining feature of Cohesion policy is its multi-level governance model involving EU, national and sub-national actors in the design and delivery of economic, social and territorial strategies, programmes and projects in partnership. The term multi-level governance was coined and popularised through the study of Cohesion policy in the early 1990s, following the landmark reform of 1988 and the formal introduction of the partnership principle (Marks 1992, 1993), closely linked to the already-established idea of the subsidiarity principle in terms of sharing powers between several levels of authority and ensuring that decisions are taken at the most effective level. There are differences across and within Member States in the balance of decision-making powers relating to different functional tasks (programming, implementation, audit and control, monitoring, evaluation, communication etc.), reflecting differences in domestic political systems, models of interest intermediation, the type and scale of funding, historical practices and capacities (Hooghe 1996; Bache 2004).

Accordingly, COHESIFY will adopt a multi-level and multi-actor perspective to study the relationship between Cohesion policy and attitudes to the EU distinguishing between different levels of governance and types of actors from those involved in programme design and implementation to the final beneficiaries of funding and the wider public:

- *Managing Authorities:* formally responsible for programme formulation, coordination and delivery, managing authorities are integrated into government Ministries or agencies at national or regional level;
- *Intermediate bodies/implementing bodies:* public or private bodies that act under the responsibility of the managing authority carrying out tasks in relation to the management/implementation of projects;
- *partners/stakeholders:* involved in the programme partnership to oversee delivery and monitor performance comprising (i) national/regional, local, urban and other public authorities, (ii) economic and social partners, and (iii) other bodies representing civil society, environmental partners, NGOs, and gender equality bodies – and brought together formally in the Programme Monitoring Committee, which meets periodically to review implementation and agree on programme revisions;
- *beneficiaries:* private or public bodies that are recipients of funding and are responsible for initiating and implementing projects; and

- *citizens*: the broader public who are not direct beneficiaries or involved in decision-making, but who are ultimately intended to benefit from the economic, social and territorial impact of the policy.

COHESIFY will examine perceptions of the policy among political and policy elites, practitioners and wider stakeholders at both EU and national/sub-national levels. This multi-actor perspective will allow variations in attitudes across different types of actors to be explored and empirical examination of whether the attitudes of political and policy elites and stakeholders are consistent with citizens' perceptions of the policy and attitudes towards the EU.

#### *(iv) Communication channels*

Communication plays a central role in the building of European identity according to political and social psychological and discursive perspectives (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010). In examining the communication channels of Cohesion policy influence, COHESIFY will distinguish between public communication, on the one hand, and political and social communication on the other.

Public communication refers to the direct publicity and promotion activities that all programmes and projects are obliged to undertake. Communication strategies must be implemented to raise awareness about funding opportunities among beneficiaries and to promote the image of the EU among citizens, obligations which have developed over time and whose components will form the basis for the analysis of communication (Table 4).

**Table 4: Communication Cohesion policy – evolution since 1989**

Programme period	Evolution of requirements to inform the public
1989-1993	Commission to be 'informed' by Managing Authorities (MAs) about information towards beneficiaries and general public.
1994-99	Publicity must be in 'development plans'. Commission Decision laid down arrangements for 'a coherent set of measure' to be implemented by 'competent national, regional and local authorities in co-operation with the Commission'.
2000-06	Specific regulation on 'information and publicity measure' contains requirements for billboards, communication plans, including strategy and budget, persons in charge at national and MA levels for monitoring and co-ordinating the plans: an informal network of communications officers, the Structural Funds Information Team (SFIT) established. In 2002, European Transparency Initiative (2005) requires access to funding data.
2007-13	Implementing regulation defines minimum requirement for MAs and beneficiaries to inform the general public and the publication of a list of final beneficiaries. INFORM (DG Regio) and INIO (DG Empl) become formal networks of communication officers including annual meetings.
2014-20	A seven-year communication strategy to be accompanied by annual action plans adapted by the Monitoring Committee, single website for all EU Cohesion policy programmes at national level; definition of lists of beneficiaries more detailed and

updated every six months.
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At the EU level, the European Commission has its own communication strategy for Cohesion policy, focusing on events, press and media relations, publications and outreach activities including the use of social media. Communication networks have also been set up at EU level (e.g. INFORM and INIO, managed by DG Regio and DG Empl respectively) and within Member States to improve the visibility of EU-funded projects, the quality of communication actions and to increase awareness among the wider public about the benefits of Cohesion policy. The effectiveness of communication strategies at both EU and domestic levels will be investigated to provide a comprehensive multi-level analysis.

Political and social communication concerns the wider political and social framing of Cohesion policy by political elites/parties, the media and interest groups. Key issues to be investigated in the project include the usage of Cohesion policy as a tool for pursuing political interests; the salience and tone of media coverage on Cohesion policy and of social media campaigns and platforms; and citizens' narratives of projects co-funded by EU Cohesion policy.

#### **(v) Factors influencing the contribution of Cohesion policy to EU identification**

The academic literature on EU identity highlights a range of channels through which EU institutions and policies can impact on citizens' attitudes and identity based on different theoretical perspectives and mechanisms. Drawing on this literature, the project's assessment of the contribution of Cohesion policy to a positive identification with the EU will take account of the following crucial factors.

- (a) **Policy objectives:** a distinction can be made between the policy's core cohesion objectives and values (e.g. regional development and solidarity) and wider EU thematic, macro-economic and stabilisation objectives relating to the Europe 2020 strategy and economic governance, which have become embedded in the policy in recent years and that may have different implications for policy perceptions and identification with the EU.
- (b) **Programme type:** an important distinction is between the mainstream (national or regional) programmes that operate *within* countries to promote development, and European territorial cooperation (INTERREG) programmes that aim to facilitate territorial cooperation *across* different Member States and regions through joint strategies, projects and exchange of experiences, sometimes with the explicit goal of fostering cross-national interaction among citizens from different countries and supporting collective identity formation.
- (c) **Scale and scope of funding:** the scale, intensity and geographical allocation of Cohesion policy vary widely across the EU (e.g. as a share of the population, GDP or capital expenditure), implying significant differences in the salience and potential impact of EU funding on economic development and identity formation. The scope of expenditure and types of instruments supported also vary greatly. In 2014-20, thematic concentration on 11 objectives (including R&I/smart specialisation, SME competitiveness, sustainable transport etc.) is required, but there are variations across countries and regions. For example, large and highly visible infrastructure projects are mainly funded in Less-Developed Regions,

whereas More-Developed Regions spend a higher share (in some cases, virtually all allocations) on R&I and SME competitiveness. An important factor is not just how funding is allocated but whether it is actually spent. The relative allocations to localities and regions, and the levels of absorption, are often important media narratives.

- (d) **Effectiveness:** the extent to which programme objectives are achieved and resolve socio-economic problems. A positive contribution to identification with the EU assumes that citizens perceive that Cohesion policy has been beneficial and/or has effectively addressed the economic development objectives that the funds target.
- (e) **Regularity-legality:** the improper use of EU Cohesion policy funds and high-profile cases of fraud are likely to impact negatively on citizens' perceptions of the policy. Perceptions are likely to be partly conditioned by EU-level issues (lack of approval of EU accounts, reports on budget approval procedure, error rates), national-level issues (e.g. national audit reports), programme-level factors (e.g. payment interruptions, suspensions, recoveries), and project-level experience.
- (f) **Communication:** knowledge and awareness of EU Cohesion policy among citizens are likely to depend on the effectiveness of publicity and communication strategies in different countries and regions as well as exposure to media-framing and political discourses, and direct experience. It will also depend on whether Cohesion policy provides an effective deliberative political space (a 'public sphere') in which civil society actors can communicate deliberatively with governmental actors to shape outcomes in line with the spirit of the partnership principle.
- (g) **Governance:** the subsidiarity aspects of decentralised decision-making and the partnership-based delivery model are assumed to increase awareness and appreciation of the EU. However, there are variations in governance models across and within countries. These have a *vertical governance* dimension, in terms of the balance between national and sub-national governance of Cohesion policy, encompassing: highly centralised models with single, multi-fund programmes (as in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); decentralised within a strong national framework (as in Finland, Sweden); a combination of national and regional governance (as in Italy, Poland) to largely regionalised and federal models (Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom). There is also a *horizontal governance* dimension, with respect to the degree of coordination within government and the involvement of other partners, particularly at sub-national level – local authorities, voluntary bodies, NGOs, environmental organisations, economic and social partners and other representatives of regional and local civil society.
- (h) **Implementation:** it is crucial to incorporate the interplay with policy implementation experiences, both positive and negative, and to consider the implications of different implementation models that exist across countries. For example, in some countries/regions, the allocation of Structural Funds is subsumed within domestic systems (with co-financing at institutional or programme level) and the contribution of EU funding is less visible; in others, a separate and specific implementation system for allocating Structural Funds is used (with co-financing at project level), giving Cohesion policy a higher political and public

profile (Bachtler et al. 2009). Models of project generation, appraisal and selection (e.g. use of strategic projects, restricted calls, open calls for projects) are also influential in determining access to programmes and the coverage of spending and awareness of the funds.

- (i) **Territorial diversity:** Cohesion policy is implemented in European countries and regions with highly different administrative systems, civil participation, development paths, history, culture and identity. This diversity has been compounded by EU enlargements over the last decade. EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe have had relatively fewer opportunities and incentives for interacting with their counterparts in other European countries until relatively recently in identity formation terms.
  
- (j) **Critical junctures:** the succession of economic, migration and political crises affecting the EU have had varied impacts across EU Member States and regions with differential implications for citizens' perceptions of and attitudes to the EU. The degree to which EU responses have influenced public perceptions needs to take account of broader, macro-level policies (such as stabilisation programmes) as well as the specific role of Cohesion policy as part of crisis-response and recovery policies, which varies significantly across and within countries (Healey and Bristow 2013). More recently, the UK's referendum on EU membership has raised the salience and politicisation of European integration with contrasting effects on public opinion and domestic politics across EU Member States (Eichhorn *et al.* 2016)

### 3.2 Research design and methodology

The methodological approach multidisciplinary, theoretically informed, policy-relevant and comparative to explore the interplay between:

- European regions with highly different administrative roles, civil participation, history, culture, creativity and identity;
- the implementation and communication of cohesion policy; and
- the contribution of Cohesion policy to citizens EU attitudes and identification with the European integration project.

First, a multidisciplinary approach will be adopted to examine these relationships. Conceptual insights and techniques from political-science, regional economics, sociological, psychological, historical theories and concepts of collective identity formation will be used to provide a comprehensive understanding and assessment of the interaction between Cohesion policy and EU identification at national and sub-national levels. A pluralist methodological approach will be employed to address the research objectives drawing on various quantitative and qualitative research techniques (discussed below).

Second, the methodological approach has been designed to combine theory and practice, reflected in the composition of the consortium – with academic experts from a range of countries and disciplines as well as SMEs specialising in communication, branding and citizen engagement. This is intended to ensure that the empirical research is theoretically informed and academically rigorous

in advancing the state of knowledge, as well as delivering conclusions and recommendations that are relevant to policy (at different levels) and creative communication practice

Third, a geographically balanced and comparative set of case studies will be undertaken from Member States with different territorial administrative frameworks, levels of economic development, intensity of Cohesion policy support and identities in order to identify the channels by which European regional policies impact on the perception of Europe by its citizens. The selection criteria for case studies include geographical balance, Cohesion policy eligibility and financial intensity, programme type, governance system and European identity. The geographical coverage of the research will include the EU28 and a selected number of regional and national (small state) case studies within the countries set out in Table 5.

**Table 5: Country case studies and selection criteria**

MS	No. of case studies	Pop. (mill)	Eligibility	Funding intensity	Programme types	Governance system	European identity
CY	1 (national)	0.9	MDR	Low	National	Centralised	Low
DE	2 (regions)	80.7	Mainly MDR	Low	Regional	Federal	High
EL	2 (regions)	10.9	Mixed	Med	Mainly regional	Centralised	Low
HU	1 (national)	9.9	LDR	High	National	Centralised	Med
IE	1 (national)	4.6	MDR	Low	Mainly regional	Centralised	Low
IT	1-2 (regions)	60.8	Mixed	Low-Med	National & regional	Regionalised	Med
NL	2 regions	16.8	MDR	Low	Mainly regional	Decentralised	High
PL	2 (regions)	38	Mainly LDR	High	National & regional	Decentralised	Med
RO	1 (national)	19.9	LDR	High	National	Centralised	Med
SI	1 (national)	2.1	Mixed	Med	National	Centralised	Med
ES	2 (regions)	46.5	Mainly MDR	Low-Med	Mainly regional	Regionalised	High
UK	2 (regions)	64.3	Mixed	Low	National and regional	Regionalised	Low

**Notes:** Cohesion policy criteria relate to 2014-20 period; codes for OP architecture: MDR (more-developed regions) and LDR (less-developed regions). The European identity measure is based on a Eurobarometer survey question asking whether respondents define themselves as European (that is, by one of the following four options: "Nationality only", "nationality and European", "European and nationality" and "European only"). The level is determined on the basis of the percentage sum of the last three categories/options (which include a European identity dimension) averaged over 2013-15 (Annex 1).

Lastly, the case studies will be based on a common and innovative mixed-method design, employing a range of quantitative and qualitative techniques that have not previously been used to investigate the effects of Cohesion policy on attitudes to the EU (Table 6).

Statistical analysis of the impact of Cohesion policy financial transfers on European identity will be undertaken as well as case studies that are genuinely innovative through mixed-methods designs that integrate documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and online surveys, content and framing analysis and the first representative survey at regional level of citizens' attitudes to Cohesion policy and the EU. Content, framing and sentiment analysis techniques will be used to study manifestos

and media (traditional and social) commentary on Cohesion policy. The approach is multi-disciplinary bringing together complementary expertise in political behaviour, regional economics, applied policy evaluation, computer science, and media and communication studies.

**Table 6: Methods, data sources and techniques**

Method	Data source	Techniques
Representative surveys of citizens in a sample of regions/small states	Original survey administered by a specialist company	Multi-stage random sampling; CATI interviewing
Online surveys of policy elites, managers and stakeholders	Online survey tool	Statistical analysis
In-depth interviews with policy elites, managers and stakeholders	Face-to-face and telephone interviews	In-depth semi-structured interviews
Quantitative analysis of existing datasets on political attitudes, economic variables and Cohesion policy	Eurobarometer, World values survey, Eurostat, AMECO, DG Regio datasets	Multivariate statistical techniques; multi-level modelling; econometrics
Documentary analysis of communication strategies and measures	Programming documents, communication strategies and evaluations (in-house electronic library and programme websites)	Content analysis
Content analysis of political manifestos	Comparative manifestos project (in-house dataset)	Content analysis
Data-mining, framing analysis and sentiment analysis of social and traditional media	Online material including websites, blogs, electronic news, social media, Lexis-nexis database	Web crawler; language processing; sentiment analysis tools
Focus groups with citizens in selected regions/countries	Selection of 6-10 citizens per focus group	Open-ended questions; content analysis



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## Annex 1

Table 7: Citizens' attachment to country and Europe

MS	Year	EB Survey	(1) Nationality only	(2) National and European	(3) European and National	(4) European only	(5) Total More European than National	(6) Total More National than European	Total European (2+3+4)
CY	2013	EB 79.3	51%	38%	6%	3%	9%	89%	47%
CY	2013	EB 80.1	46%	42%	6%	3%	9%	88%	51%
CY	2014	EB 81.4	52%	42%	4%	1%	5%	94%	47%
CY	2014	EB 82.3	51%	42%	4%	2%	6%	93%	48%
CY	2015	EB 83.3	57%	35%	5%	3%	8%	92%	43%
CY	2015	EB 84.3	56%	36%	4%	2%	6%	92%	42%
CY	2013-15		52%	39%	5%	2%	7%	91%	46%
DE	2013	EB 79.3	29%	58%	9%	2%	11%	87%	69%
DE	2013	EB 80.1	36%	54%	7%	2%	9%	90%	63%
DE	2014	EB 81.4	27%	59%	10%	2%	12%	86%	71%
DE	2014	EB 82.3	30%	56%	9%	2%	11%	86%	67%
DE	2015	EB 83.3	25%	58%	12%	2%	14%	83%	72%
DE	2015	EB 84.3	30%	58%	7%	2%	9%	88%	67%
DE	2013-15		30%	57%	9%	2%	11%	87%	68%
EL	2013	EB 79.3	41%	51%	4%	0%	4%	92%	55%
EL	2013	EB 80.1	55%	39%	5%	0%	5%	94%	44%
EL	2014	EB 81.4	49%	47%	3%	1%	4%	96%	51%
EL	2014	EB 82.3	53%	45%	1%	0%	1%	98%	46%
EL	2015	EB 83.3	51%	47%	1%	0%	1%	98%	48%
EL	2015	EB 84.3	48%	50%	1%	0%	1%	98%	51%
EL	2013-15		50%	47%	3%	0%	3%	96%	49%
ES	2013	EB 79.3	32%	52%	5%	4%	9%	84%	61%
ES	2013	EB 80.1	33%	51%	5%	5%	10%	84%	61%
ES	2014	EB 81.4	27%	56%	5%	5%	10%	83%	66%
ES	2014	EB 82.3	28%	56%	5%	6%	11%	84%	67%
ES	2015	EB 83.3	28%	56%	5%	6%	11%	84%	67%
ES	2015	EB 84.3	28%	57%	7%	3%	10%	85%	67%
ES	2013-15		29%	55%	5%	5%	10%	84%	65%
HU	2013	EB 79.3	43%	49%	5%	1%	6%	92%	55%
HU	2013	EB 80.1	46%	45%	5%	2%	7%	91%	52%
HU	2014	EB 81.4	46%	44%	8%	2%	10%	90%	54%
HU	2014	EB 82.3	39%	48%	10%	2%	12%	87%	60%
HU	2015	EB 83.3	37%	51%	10%	2%	12%	88%	63%
HU	2015	EB 84.3	33%	56%	9%	1%	10%	89%	66%

HU	2013-15		41%	49%	8%	2%	10%	90%	58%
IE	2013	EB 79.3	53%	31%	5%	7%	12%	84%	43%
IE	2013	EB 80.1	63%	28%	3%	3%	6%	91%	34%
IE	2014	EB 81.4	49%	46%	3%	2%	5%	95%	51%
IE	2014	EB 82.3	47%	48%	3%	1%	4%	95%	52%
IE	2015	EB 83.3	43%	52%	3%	2%	5%	95%	57%
IE	2015	EB 84.3	47%	47%	4%	1%	5%	94%	52%
IE	2013-15		50%	42%	4%	3%	6%	92%	48%
IT	2013	EB 79.3	29%	53%	10%	4%	14%	82%	67%
IT	2013	EB 80.1	42%	46%	6%	2%	8%	88%	54%
IT	2014	EB 81.4	45%	46%	5%	1%	6%	91%	52%
IT	2014	EB 82.3	44%	49%	5%	1%	6%	93%	55%
IT	2015	EB 83.3	35%	55%	5%	1%	6%	90%	61%
IT	2015	EB 84.3	45%	49%	4%	1%	5%	94%	54%
IT	2013-15		40%	50%	6%	2%	8%	90%	57%
NL	2013	EB 79.3	34%	55%	9%	1%	10%	89%	65%
NL	2013	EB 80.1	36%	56%	5%	1%	6%	92%	62%
NL	2014	EB 81.4	32%	61%	6%	1%	7%	93%	68%
NL	2014	EB 82.3	29%	61%	6%	2%	8%	90%	69%
NL	2015	EB 83.3	26%	65%	6%	2%	8%	91%	73%
NL	2015	EB 84.3	31%	60%	6%	2%	8%	91%	68%
NL	2013-15		31%	60%	6%	2%	8%	91%	68%
PL	2013	EB 79.3	33%	56%	8%	2%	10%	89%	66%
PL	2013	EB 80.1	37%	58%	4%	1%	5%	95%	63%
PL	2014	EB 81.4	36%	55%	4%	1%	5%	91%	60%
PL	2014	EB 82.3	36%	56%	4%	2%	6%	92%	62%
PL	2015	EB 83.3	42%	50%	4%	1%	5%	92%	55%
PL	2015	EB 84.3	37%	53%	5%	1%	6%	90%	59%
PL	2013-15		37%	55%	5%	1%	6%	92%	61%
RO	2013	EB 79.3	41%	32%	7%	7%	14%	73%	46%
RO	2013	EB 80.1	45%	31%	7%	8%	15%	76%	46%
RO	2014	EB 81.4	47%	46%	4%	3%	7%	93%	53%
RO	2014	EB 82.3	38%	53%	4%	2%	6%	91%	59%
RO	2015	EB 83.3	41%	53%	3%	2%	5%	94%	58%
RO	2015	EB 84.3	40%	54%	3%	1%	4%	94%	58%
RO	2013-15		42%	45%	5%	4%	9%	87%	53%
SI	2013	EB 79.3	39%	48%	6%	3%	9%	87%	57%
SI	2013	EB 80.1	42%	45%	5%	1%	6%	87%	51%
SI	2014	EB 81.4	37%	56%	3%	2%	5%	93%	61%
SI	2014	EB 82.3	39%	55%	4%	1%	5%	94%	60%
SI	2015	EB 83.3	38%	57%	3%	1%	4%	95%	61%
SI	2015	EB 84.3	39%	53%	5%	1%	6%	92%	59%

SI	2013-15		39%	52%	4%	2%	6%	91%	58%
UK	2013	EB 79.3	60%	33%	3%	2%	5%	93%	38%
UK	2013	EB 80.1	63%	29%	3%	1%	4%	92%	33%
UK	2014	EB 81.4	64%	30%	2%	1%	3%	94%	33%
UK	2014	EB 82.3	58%	33%	4%	2%	6%	91%	39%
UK	2015	EB 83.3	64%	31%	2%	1%	3%	95%	34%
UK	2015	EB 84.3	66%	29%	3%	1%	4%	95%	33%
UK	2013-15		63%	31%	3%	1%	4%	93%	35%
EU27	2013	EB 79.3	38%	49%	7%	3%	10%	87%	59%
EU28	2013	EB 80.1	42%	47%	5%	2%	7%	89%	54%
EU28	2014	EB 81.4	39%	51%	6%	2%	8%	90%	59%
EU28	2014	EB 82.3	39%	51%	6%	2%	8%	90%	59%
EU28	2015	EB 83.3	38%	52%	6%	2%	8%	90%	60%
EU28	2015	EB 84.3	41%	51%	5%	1%	6%	92%	57%
EU28	2013-15		40%	50%	6%	2%	8%	90%	58%

**Source:** EB survey question: "do you see yourself as "nationality only", "nationality and European", "European and nationality" and "European only"