Fifty Years of *Representative and Responsible Government*:
Contemporary Relevance, Theoretical Revisions and Conceptual Reflection

Matthew Flinders and David Judge

Abstract

This article uses A. H. Birch’s *Representative and Responsible Government* (1964) as an analytical lens through which to understand not just the evolution of representative democracy in the intervening fifty years but also to trace and reflect upon the evolution (and future) of the study of representative democracy. This is demonstrated by highlighting how ideational and empirical challenges have resulted in claims that representative and responsible government has now been displaced by representative versus responsible government, or to more extreme interpretations that suggest contemporary electoral processes and institutions now provide for neither representative nor responsible government. This reveals how political analysis has built-upon and evolved away from Birch’s initial focus in significant ways while possibly suggesting that a neo-Birchian might profitably refocus on the linkage or nexus between modes of representation and manifestations of responsible government. Recognising the importance of this nexus in the context of ‘declinist’ narratives concerning the ‘death’, ‘suicide’ or ‘end’ of democracy remains the lasting legacy bequeathed by Birch.

Introduction

Over half a century has passed since the publication of A. H. Birch’s *Representative and Responsible Government* (1964), yet it still continues as a seminal source for leading contemporary political scientists (see for example Rhodes 2011:280-1). Along the way it has been identified as one of the classic analyses of UK constitutional politics (Flinders 2010:73) and more broadly as one of the ‘best analytical surveys of representation’ (Wahlke 1971:271) as well as offering exceptional insights into notions of responsibility (Mair 2009:11). Birch’s (1964:21) initial linkage of representation and responsibility – ‘a representative system enables a government to be responsible’ in a number of different ways – has come under sustained and critical reflection by subsequent scholars of both government and governance. This critical political analysis complements Birch’s own recognition of the complexities and ambiguities in his conceptualisation of both representation and responsibility (plus the practical vagaries, tensions and contradictions inherent in their systemic interconnectedness as ‘representative and responsible government’). In the intervening five decades these complexities and ambiguities have multiplied and this is reflected through increased conceptual sophistication, in a ‘rethinking’ of notions of representation and responsibility, and through increased complexity and indeterminacy of government itself, to the extent that the term ‘governance’, with all of its associated adjectives – decentred, multi-level, global, meta – is now seen as a more accurate descriptor of governing practice. In turn, these ideational and empirical challenges have resulted in claims that representative and responsible government has now been displaced by representative versus responsible government (Mair 2009, 2011); or, more dramatically still, that there has been an ‘end to representative politics’ (Tormey 2015) and, simultaneously, the displacement of ‘standard model’ linear forms of responsibility in more complex models reflecting the expansion of lateral or horizontal modes of accountability, captured most vividly in Keane’s (2009, 2011) notion of ‘monitory democracy’. From this perspective electoral processes and institutions in themselves provide for neither representative nor responsible government.

The aim of this article is, therefore, to use Birch’s *Representative and Responsible Government* (hereafter RARG) as the central intellectual reference point from which to analyse: (1) the contemporary relevance and meaning of a conjunction of the concepts of representation and responsibility; (2) the state of the discipline today in terms of understanding the relationship between these concepts; and (3) the distance the discipline of political studies has actually travelled from Birch’s initial landmark study. Our core argument is that although the discipline has travelled a great distance in terms of empirical breadth and analytical complexity the roots of much of
this scholarship owe a great deal (implicitly or explicitly) to Birch’s scholarship, and specifically due to his focus on the nexus between notions of representation and responsibility. The focus on this nexus (and the inevitable governing tensions that come with it) and the practical achievement of specific normative concepts is arguably more important today as a focus of scholarly inquiry (in the United Kingdom and far beyond) than when Birch’s work was first published. Moreover, Birch’s death in December 2014 makes this a fitting point to both recognise and further interrogate that set of ideas and themes that he crafted some fifty years ago.

In order to make this argument this article is divided into five interconnected sections that offer the findings of a large synthetic research project (i.e. an approach that focuses on integrating, connecting and reflecting upon existing research contributions) that has been based at Strathclyde University and the University of Sheffield. The first section offers a very brief account of Birch’s thesis regarding representative and responsible government as the foundation for subsequent debates. The second section looks ‘beyond Birch’ through the analysis of a seam of scholarship, largely derived from the field of party politics, that suggested a quite different conceptual relationship in the sense of representative versus responsible government. This flows into the third section’s focus on the broadening out of conceptualisations of both representation and responsibility in a number of strands of theorising that broadly emerged out of the ‘governance turn’ in political studies and political science. This includes a focus on network governance, fuzzy accountability, meta-governance and global governance as indicative topics of analysis that can be traced back to Birch’s R-ARG. And yet what is arguably as interesting but less recognised is the manner in which Birch’s focus on ‘the nexus’ flows out across a broader range of debates and sub-fields, and notably those concerned with ‘the end’ or ‘future’ of representative politics. It is for this reason that the fourth part of this article draws upon the work of scholars such as John Keane and Simon Tormey and their quite different interpretations of the representative-responsible linkage(s). The final fifth section focuses on the ‘so what?’ question in the sense of reflecting on not only how Birch’s analysis has resonated with subsequent developments in political analysis over fifty years, but also how his central insights may be of value for the next fifty years of political analysis.

I. REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIBLE

What is the core thesis or intellectual seed that was sown in Birch’s R-ARG half a century ago? At one level the answer is quite simple, the argument is that a government must somehow balance being representative (i.e. being freely and openly elected, reflective of public opinion, and sustaining a legitimate claim to authority,) while also being responsible (i.e. responsive, prudent and accountable). ‘[E]veryone knows that the British constitution provides a system of representative and responsible government. These characteristics are almost universally regarded as both desirable and important’, Birch states (1964:13). At a deeper level, however, his thesis raises questions about the incompatibility, or at the very least the potential tension or grating that the parallel quest for these concepts may generate. In this sense his analysis reached far beyond the terrain of British politics and held the potential to expose a set of governing paradoxes that were to some extent inevitable within democratic governance and could not be dismissed in simplistic terms. (From this perspective Birch’s R-ARG has echoes of Bernard Crick’s In Defence of Politics that was published just two years before.)

By offering this focus on the nexus between representation and responsibility Birch was making a very strong and direct critique of the traditional descriptive and institutionally focused studies of British government. For Birch, these tended to adopt over-simplistic principal-agent assumptions whereby ‘political power flowed exclusively in one direction from electors to parliament and from parliament to government’ (1964:74) without acknowledging reverse flows, pushback or spillovers (see 1964:74, 138, 164). ‘[C]onventional ways of portraying the political system’ Birch argued (1964:239) implied that ‘political power can be clearly and precisely located and therefore provide ‘a misleading picture of the distribution of political power and influence’ (1964:240).
Governing was, for Birch, far more complex and multi-dimensional than existing analyses had sufficiently captured or exposed. A focus on the relationship between representation and responsibility therefore provided a simple intellectual tool through which to start articulating, exploring and exposing some of these complexities. Put slightly differently, Birch (like Crick) was concerned with the relationship between ‘politics as theory’ and ‘politics as practice’ and this allowed him to expand his analysis beyond the internal realms of governing and into broader questions of democratic legitimacy. He wrote, for example, that although ‘[i]n western democracies representation by election has come to be regarded as the most important form of representation, and indeed the only proper basis of a political system … it would not be right either in principle or practice simply to equate representation with election’ (1964:17) and thereby presaged the debate concerning the nature and meaning of legitimacy which has grown in prominence in recent years (e.g. Wood 2016).

But in many ways Birch’s classic text was a work of conceptual political analysis in which he dissected the concepts of both representation and responsibility to reveal their inherent ambiguities and uses. ‘Responsible government’, for example, was a term that could suggest a focus on ‘responsiveness’ (i.e. where political and bureaucratic executives were expected to be responsive to public demands) or to invoke notions of ‘duty and moral responsibility’ to behave in a certain manner or against a certain set of principles (1964:18). It might even be used in a third sense to convey some sense of ‘accountability’ in terms of answerability by providing information, a capacity for amending behaviours and practices, and ultimately accepting culpability (both collectively and individually). The simple act of dissecting the possible interpretations of ‘responsible government’ was therefore critical for Birch’s thesis due to the manner in which it challenges over-simplistic assumptions, revealed the existence of certain potential conceptual incompatibilities and related to the historical shift in power between the executive and legislature (i.e. the parliamentary decline thesis) which had affected the capacity of actors to externally enforce specific assumptions about behaviour. And yet at its core Birch offered an analytical frame that focused on the nexus or complementarity between responsibility and representation. The next section reveals how this initial focus was challenged and developed in subsequent analyses that adopted a more agonistic approach couched around the notion of responsibility versus representation.

II. REPRESENTATIVE VERSUS RESPONSIBLE

The aim of this section is to look ‘beyond Birch’ in the sense of how the arguments set out in R-ARG prefigured subsequent studies and analyses in a process that is analogous to a form of intellectual path dependency. For Birch (see 1964:17-22) the link or nexus between representative government, on the one hand, and responsible government, on the other, flowed from the manner in which the representative process allowed for the aggregation and articulation of public preferences through political parties, and for those preferences, through the electoral process, to be reflected in the policies of government (i.e. for there to be responsiveness). Moreover, where a gap existed between popular preferences and government policies the processes and mechanisms of responsibility required political parties to account for such incongruence. This was therefore an unashamedly orthodox lens that correlated with Birch’s view (see 1964:245) that not only did the UK enjoy a ‘system of disciplined party government’ but that is was also this system that secured a proportionate balance of representation and responsibility. It was therefore for parties to occupy, navigate and manage the mediating political space surrounding the representative/responsible nexus.

In recent decades a number of studies of representative government in western liberal democracies (e.g. Katz 1987, 2014; Jones and McDermott 2004; Dalton et al. 2011; Hill et al. 2015; Bardi et al. 2014; van Biezen 2014) have questioned the capacity of parties to fulfil this role in ways that contest Birch’s initial position. Nadia Urbinati’s Representative Democracy (2006), for example, highlights the problematic space occupied by political parties in fulfilling this role due to their status as ‘partial-yet-communal associations’ in which they must translate a myriad of
partial and often incompatible preferences and demands into a set of homogenous policies that are framed as being in ‘the general interest’. This, once again, resonates with Crick’s focus on the role of political institutions, in general, and political parties, in particular, as mechanisms of conflict resolution – ‘the tough squeezing of collective decisions out of multiple and competing interests and opinions’ (Stoker 2006). As Farrell emphasises (2014), political parties occupy a position in which the distinction between representative parties and governing parties veils the existence of potentially far-reaching tensions or trade-offs. To some extent therefore, and linking back to Birch’s R-ARG as a key articulation point, the tension between responsiveness and responsibility has been a constant theme in the field of party politics, but without necessarily being posited as a contradictory or incompatible relationship (for a discussion see Bardi et al. 2014:238, 241).

A significant shift in approach (i.e. from ‘representative and responsible government’ to assumptions concerning ‘responsiveness versus responsibility’) emerged largely from the analyses of modern party dynamics and representative processes by Peter Mair (2009; 2011). These would, in time, be crystallised into Mair’s *Ruling the Void* (2013) and would offer a powerful argument concerning the supposedly benign linkage of ‘responsiveness’ and ‘responsibility’ and instead posit ‘a growing gap *between* representation and government’ (Mair 2011:1 emphasis added). Moreover, not only had the twin *representative* and *responsible* components of party politics become disentangled but the position had been reached where parties had now moved ‘their centre of gravities from civil society to the state’ with a concomitant shift from ‘combining representative and governmental roles (or combining representative and procedural or institutional roles) to building on their governmental role alone’ (Mair 2011:8 original emphasis). With this perceived separation of roles came a new division of labour ‘whereby the mainstream parties would govern, or primarily govern, while other agencies [including organised groups, social movements, self-authorised representatives, the media, and ‘niche’ or ‘challenger’ parties] would look after the citizens’ representative needs’ (Mair 2011:8). Simple serial principal-agent conceptions of representation were therefore rejected in a manner that connects with Birch’s earlier position; whereas Mair’s focus on the emergence of complex organisational networks within civil society above and beyond ‘traditional’ political parties dovetails with the arguments of Keane regarding monitory democracy (discussed below). The core insight for the purposes of this article, however, was Mair’s contention regarding the emergence of legitimation problems ‘unless parties can represent as well as govern’ (Katz and Mair 2009:760). The conceptual presumption being that governing and representing can be disentangled in both theory and practice.

If Birch offers a lens based around interconnected processes of ‘representation and responsibility’ and Mair offers a bifurcated prism of ‘representation versus responsibility’ then the work of Enroth (2015) offers a forceful critique of the latter and shifts the focus of attention back towards the former. Enroth’s basic argument is that Mair’s analysis of the ‘cartel party’ and contemporary party-state relationships too easily assumes that the representative functions of parties have been eroded or, as Enroth puts it, ‘[e]nter the cartel party, exit party representation’ (2015:4). The focus of mainstream parties may well have shifted in recent years, Enroth concedes, through the emergence of ‘valence politics’ and a focus on demonstrating governing competence but it remains too simplistic to suggest that the representative link between voters and parties has been severed. Parties, as Saward (2010) has shown in detail, still have to make claims to represent the interests and opinions of their collective constituencies, and these claims have to be accepted by those constituencies. In this manner it is not a case that different typologies of parties (cadre, mass, catch-all, or cartel) can be used to differentiate some types of party that represent and some that do not, instead it is more accurate to distinguish between different party types according to different claims to represent. In the end, therefore, the changes and developments in party government mapped by Mair and others has not resulted in ‘representative versus responsible government’ but rather, according to a separate strand of scholarship, point to more complex and expansive interactions between processes of representation and responsibility in twenty-first century liberal democratic states.

But what this section has shown is the ongoing and contemporary relevance of the representative/responsible nexus that was brought to the fore by Birch in his 1964 book. It has
presented this argument through recourse to the field of party politics and it would be possible to
drill down further into this seam of scholarship in order to further demonstrate the shadow of
Birch’s scholarship. The emergence and role of ‘insurgent’ and often populist parties across
Western Europe, for example, can be, and has been, set explicitly within the
representative/responsible debate with the danger interpreted as being that party systems may
become increasingly bifurcated ‘with the established parties acting responsibly, but not very
responsively, and the populist parties and other outside challengers acting responsively, but not
very responsibly’ (van Biezen 2014:189). The representative/responsible nexus has also been
challenged by the shift towards the politics of depoliticisation (see Flinders and Buller 2006:298;
Pettit 2004:58; Flinders and Wood, 2015) whereby elected politicians and political parties support
the widespread delegation of powers, responsibilities and governing competencies away from the
direct control of electoral representative actors or processes in an attempt to demonstrate
governing competence, reduce democratic pressures, overcome well-known credible
commitment dilemmas, etc. The result being interpretations of the ‘hollowing out of democracy’
that locate debates concerning the representative/responsible nexus within broader concerns
regarding the emergence of fuzzy governance and fuzzy accountability and force anyone tracing
the broader contemporary relevance of Birch’s RARG to move from the field of party politics to
the sphere of governance and public policy.

III. GOVERNANCE, REPRESENTATION & RESPONSIBILITY

The central argument of this article is that Birch’s RARG remains a valuable text for scholars
with an interest in contemporary democratic governance due to the manner in which it focuses
attention on the interconnectedness of notions of representation and responsibility that must
somehow be navigated by political actors and institutions. Fifty years have passed since the first
publication of Birch’s most renowned book and the changes in relation to social, economic,
political, cultural and technological processes have been far-reaching and are captured in
Bauman’s (2000) concept of ‘liquid modernity’ in which traditional social anchorage points have,
to a great extent, been eroded. The aim of this section is to locate Birch’s RARG at the
confluence of a set of debates concerning the transition from government to governance and the
impact of this transition for notions of both representation and responsibility. This then
facilitates an assessment of the distance the discipline of political studies has actually travelled
since Birch’s initial landmark study and why his analysis remains germane. In this regard it is
essential to recognise that in many ways Birch’s work prefigured the rise of governance as
arguably the ‘uber concept’ of the final decades of the twentieth century. His critique of the
artificialities of ‘accepted ways’ of describing British government and the ‘misleading picture of
the distribution of political power and influence’ (1964:240) focused on the rejection of simple
principal-agent models or zero-sum assumptions about the position of power (see
(1964:113,131,138,140,207,211). Governing, for Birch, was not the preserve simply of ministers
and their officials but also encompassed a broad range of non-elected and non-governmental
organisations that often challenged dominant assumptions regarding centralised and hierarchical
structures. In this respect, and with the benefit of hindsight, Birch was beginning to prospect the
terrain of what later came to be termed ‘governance’ before the development and analytical
implications of the concept had actually been conceived. This can be illustrated by setting Birch’s
focus on the representative/responsible nexus within the context of three specific sub-fields of
governance-theoretic research – network governance, meta-governance and global governance.

i. Network Governance

Although the term ‘governance’ can be traced back several centuries it is sufficient for the
purposes of this article to locate ‘the governance turn’ of the late twentieth century squarely
against the publication of Rhodes’ Understanding Governance (1997) with its emphasis on the
transition from traditional hierarchies to complex networks and markets and how this
complicated traditional conceptions of governing. This ‘shift from a hierarchic state to governance in and by networks’ – in the words of Bevir (2010:81) – posed distinctive questions for notions of representation and representativeness with distant echoes of the earlier arguments of Birch. The emergence of what Flinders (2008:3) describes as a ‘dense sphere of independent agencies, non-majoritarian institutions, “parastatal” or “satellite” bodies, extra-governmental organizations, hybrids [fringe bodies, quangos]’ in which governmental bodies are but one (admittedly core) actor within an increasingly fluid network directly challenged conventional notions of what constituted representative and responsible government (see Hendricks 2009:709).

More specifically, the perceived ‘hollowing out of the state’ appeared to emphasise a certain market-based understanding of responsible government that prized efficiency, delivery and outputs above the more representative and process-based considerations associated with scrutiny, openness, etc. To some extent this development was not surprising given that much of post-war British political studies had been dedicated to charting the decline of parliament and the dominance of the executive, the analysis of governance arguably charted little more than the latest stage in this process and the gradual evisceration of the direct capacity of elected politicians and their officials. But when located against Birch’s thesis the transition was arguably far deeper than this historical account suggests. As Saward (2005:180) emphasises, ‘We are not dealing here with a simple transfer of “representative” politics from one type of domain to another, but rather a significant shift in the primary political sense of representation as a practice and concept’.

The question then focuses on understanding the nature of this ‘significant shift’ in terms of its institutional, ideational and normative dimensions. At a structural or institutional level there is no doubt that the architecture of the modern state has been transformed and this has been captured in a burgeoning literature on the ‘unbundling’ (Pollitt and Talbot 2004) or ‘unravelling’ (Hooghe and Marks 2003) of the state. The centrifugal delegation of powers, responsibilities and functions away from governmental structures combined with the fragmentary impact of market logic have created two core challenges that speak directly to the emphasis on ‘representative and responsible government’ offered by Birch. The ‘problem of many hands’ (Thompson 1980) identifies the inefficiencies and risks created by the creation of numerous links in the chain of delegation through which public policies are implemented and regulated. The core insight, simply put, being that the ‘more hands’ or institutions that play a role within any delivery chain then the harder it becomes to identify exactly who is responsible for what. Fuzzy governance, to put the same point slightly differently, leads to fuzzy accountability. And yet to counter this dilemma through the creation of ever tighter accountability networks risks producing the ‘problem of many eyes’ whereby organisational and systemic efficiencies become reduced by the need of actors to constantly account for their behaviour to numerous account-demanding bodies rather than concentrating on their core tasks. This focus on what Koppell (2005) terms ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’ (MAD) takes us straight back to the core focus of Birch’s RARG on how to balance the need to offset governing capacity or competence with some degree of representative engagement or scrutiny.

And yet to take this forward, Hendricks (2009:693) observes, ‘representative claims are rarely explicit in governance networks’, and ‘meanings of … representation tend to be celebrated in the abstract but are difficult to pin down in the concrete’. Where empirical network studies have examined representation, however, the traditional claims of electoral representatives and associated notions of political legitimacy are often found to stand in an uneasy relationship to claims to non-electoral legitimacy that are frequently deployed or invoked by network actors on the basis of identity, function, expertise or some notion of non-territorial or ‘constructed’ communities (as seen in the work of Sorensen and Torfing 2007; Hendricks 2009; Nissen 2014; Chapman and Lowndes 2014). This research also reveals the way in which multiple meanings are attached to ‘representation’ in the practice of governance, not all of which are inclusionary in a democratic sense (see Nissen 2014:44; Hendricks 2009:707-8). Placed within the context of Birch’s work it could be argued that the ‘essentially contested’ nature of the concepts of representation and responsibility – a complexity that Birch attempted to unravel – has been augmented exactly as a result of broader socio-economic and technological shifts in society. To suggest that an ‘accountability gap’ or ‘democratic deficit’ (see Papadopoulos 2014) has been
created by the government-governance transition may well have some validity when viewed through the lens of traditional governmental or democratic assumptions. But does this remain valid? Hendricks (2009:710) suggests that it may be 'unrealistic to expect that governance networks replicate the kind of representation and accountability we associate with electoral democracy'. The challenge for Birch when viewed through a modern lens is that, as Hooghe and Marks (2003) have emphasized in relation to distributed public governance (or what they call 'Type II' governance), a large amount of public governance now rests upon a quite different set of almost post-democratic market-based assumptions.

The link, however, from Hooghe and Marks back into Birch's analysis is provided by his dissection of the 'ambiguous' concept of responsibility and, more specifically, his focus on the idea that 'to be responsible' could be correlated with 'wise policy, whether or not what they do meets with immediate approval of the public' (1964:18; discussion in Part I above). Paradoxically, being 'responsible' from this specific interpretation might actually reject populist pressures or short-term demands in favour of a more 'evidence based' long-term strategy achievable within a democracy through a process of depoliticization (discussed above). As such, the analysis of network governance, as this sub-section has illustrated, can be directly related to a set of core arguments and themes that were sketched in outline in Birch's RARG. It was a book about network governance that did not use the term network governance and yet, to push the analysis to a deeper level, the danger of this review of network governance is that it risks over-emphasizing the ‘hollowing out’ or evisceration of the state and under-emphasizing the continuing role and capacity of the state (see Jacobsson et al. 2015). Indeed, it is possible to trace the emergence of a ‘counter-governance’ phase of scholarship that emphasizes not only the ‘filling in of the hollowing out’ through the creation of new tools, methods or strategies but more fundamentally acknowledges the manner in which governance takes place ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1994). This leads into a discussion of meta-governance and how it connects with Birch’s work.

**ii. Meta-Governance**

Just as political representation and responsibility are expected to co-exist in parallel within Birch’s thesis so the concept of meta-governance has evolved as part of a wider recognition that there has been no simple unidirectional shift from government to governance, instead government and governance coexist. In this sense both the representative/responsible nexus and the government/governance nexus reflect the existence of a situation of mutual dependency (i.e. representative processes legitimate and sustain the exercise of power, just as the institutions of government shape, direct and sustain the architecture of governance). It is for this reason that Fawcett and Daugbjerg (2012:202) state that effective meta-governance is ‘about generating governance arrangements that deliver adequate levels of input and output legitimacy’. The notions of ‘effective’ and ‘adequate’ levels of legitimacy take us back to Birch’s initial emphasis on the multi-dimensional nature of representation and responsibility within a political context but the key insight here is that whether viewed as ‘the government of governance’ or ‘the governance of governance’ meta-governance ‘heralds the return of the state by reinventing the governing role’ (Bevir 2014:31). Meta-governance therefore focuses on the manner in which elected politicians and governmental structures still wield significant resources in terms of setting the ground rules and parameters within which network governance emerges and operates. The ultimate display of this residual capacity is revealed when governments respond to specific crises or failures by pulling functions, powers and responsibilities back into governmental structures.

The concept of the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ has been invoked in governance studies to acknowledge the capacity of the state (in its electoral representative, governmental institutional form) to effect, explicitly or implicitly, a legislative or regulatory framework for network activity. This ‘shadow’ hangs over network participants to the extent that structures exist that are consciously designed to emphasise the common good above forms of self-interest. As such, ‘a functioning shadow of hierarchy not only serves to increase the effectiveness of governance
involving non-state actors’ (Borzel and Risse 2010:116) but also provides a ‘horizon of legitimacy’. It was exactly this chain of delegation running from the public through to elected politicians and through them to the outer tentacles of the state (and back again) that Birch’s R-IRG sought to expose and explore in both empirical and theoretical ways (1964:235-6, 238). Democratic legitimacy flowed from the nexus between representative and responsible governance and this basic assumption remains crucial in contemporary analyses of democratic governance. What has changed in the intervening fifty years is not so much the centrality of Birch’s focus but the size, shape and fragmentation of the modern state in terms of both breadth and depth (examined in the literature on network governance) and this has led to a growing recognition, reflecting Birch’s argument in R-IRG, of the importance of legitimation afforded by electoral representative processes in the practice of network governance (for a longer-term perspective see Judge 1990, 1993, 2005, 2014). Indeed, there are now calls for a ‘new democratic governance model’ in which ‘traditional forms of representative government are [more explicitly] linked to collaborative arenas of governance and innovation through the meta-governance exercised by elected politicians and public managers’ (Torfing 2014:64). What this ‘new democratic governance model’ might look like and how it would deal with the representative/responsible nexus that Birch focused upon is discussed in Part IV (below) but to some extent this discussion can only begin by recognising the interconnected and embedded nature of contemporary governance. It is for this reason that the next section focuses on global governance.

**iii. Global Governance**

Notions of multi-level governance have been deemed to ‘represent a transnational version of the familiar network ideas employed to understand the domestic level of governance’ (Peters and Pierre 2004:81). In this version, sub-national, national, transnational and global governance networks are intermeshed in interactive matrices, increasingly propelled by instantaneous digital communication, which challenge traditional models of state-delimited representative democracy. Certainly, a complex pattern of transnational institutional interconnectedness is evident in the activities of international policy-making forums such as the United Nations, World Trade Organisation, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Group of Eight (G8) or Group of Twenty (G20), and international regulatory agencies; the informal deliberative forum of international elites of the World Economic Forum; and the emergence of international legal institutions associated with ‘cosmopolitan law’ (on human rights, the environment, and the conduct of war). Moreover, the emergence of a global or transnational civil society has been discerned in the rapid spread of international non-governmental organisations (sometimes referred to as social movement organisations, and international social movements). These interrelated developments, of exponential increases in socio-economic transactions across state borders and associated transnational governance responses, leads to ‘an increasing incongruence between social and political spaces’ (Lavenex 2013:107).

Out of this spatial incongruence arises a further political incongruence that as network governance at supra-state levels comes to replicate the ‘post-representative’ tendencies at state level (i.e. the privileging of non-electoral representation, non-majoritarian institutions and output legitimation over electoral representation, majoritarian institutions and input legitimacy) there is an amplification of calls for the ‘democratisation’ of global governance. Put in the context of Birch’s R-IRG, the architecture of transnational and global governance has predominantly been constructed on the logic of responsible governance (i.e. strong, stable, insulated, distant, elite, etc.) rather than representative governance. This presents at least three dilemmas. First, calls for the democratisation of global governance are to some extent undermined by the rise in anti-politics and democratic disengagement at the national level. And yet (and secondly) while governance has become increasingly multi-layered and transnational, political representation and democratic legitimation have remained rooted in the practice of nation-states. This flows into a discursive and ideational deficiency in the sense of the design and promotion of alternative visions or structures for securing democracy, in general, and an appropriate balance between
representation and responsibility, in particular. Even if such a ‘vision’ could be agreed (thirdly) the up-scaling or implementation of any new ‘model of democracy’ would be difficult in the absence of any system of ‘meta-governance of multi-level governance’ (Torfing et al. 2012:96). Global representative assemblies could, for example, recognise the importance of non-territorially bounded political communities composed of individuals with common interests’ as Archibugi and Held have suggested (2011:448). They might also reflect the growing importance of a global civil society above and beyond national civil societies (see Kuper 2004:122-7) and draw-upon non-electoral forms of political legitimacy. But as Judge (2014:180-3) has argued, even if established, these institutions of global democracy would, in all likelihood, stand in an incongruous and deficient position to the electoral legitimation claims of state-based institutions.

There is, however, a more basic element at play here that once again re-focuses our attention on Birch’s R-ARG and that is the politics of democratisation within global governance. As Roberts’ The Logic of Discipline (2010) illustrates, the architecture of global governance has become infused with what he terms ‘the logic of discipline’. This ‘logic’ promotes a very technocratic and narrow view of politics and wherever possible the depoliticisation of democracy in order to maximise economic efficiency and the role of markets (a ‘logic’ often claimed to be at the heart of the development of the European Union). This ‘hands off’ approach to public policy helps explain (returning to notions of network governance) not just the emergence of fuzzy governance but also fuzzy accountability and when viewed through the lens of Birch’s framework the ‘logic of discipline’ is synonymous with an almost complete focus on ‘responsibility’ rather than representation. This leads into some of the broader ‘end of politics’ narratives that are associated with the work of Boggs (2000) (and others) and will be discussed below.

IV. DEMOCRACY, REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

The main argument of this article is that Birch’s focus on the relationship between notions of representation and responsibility remains arguably the dominant fault-line within modern political analyses and within public debates. Clearly both the governmental terrain and intellectual landscape has changed significantly in the intervening decades since the publication of R-ARG but one of the main ambitions of this article is to trace the manner in which its insights have enjoyed an ‘echo-effect’ – like a whisper transmitted on whispering gallery-waves - as they have infused a broader range of sub-disciplines and academic fields. It is for this reason that Part II focused broadly on party politics, Part III on the transition from government to governance and this section explores the current debate on the future of democracy. Once again, it is neither possible nor necessary to review this burgeoning seam of scholarship in any detail and instead Keane’s The Life and Death of Democracy (2011) and Tormey’s The End of Representative Politics (2015) are discussed as critical reference points within this sphere with the aim being to demonstrate how the representative/responsible nexus continues to infuse this field of analysis.

Both physically and intellectually, Keane’s Life and Death is a ‘big’ book. Throughout its almost 1,000 pages the historical evolution of democratic life and space is charted with incredible breadth and depth. The core argument is that the latest stage of democracy – ‘monitory democracy’ – represents the most energetic and diverse phase of societal development and as a result (qua, Birch) there is a need for ‘fundamental revision of the way we think about representation and democracy in our times’ (2011:212). More specifically, the emergence of a post-parliamentary democratic phase has led to an explosion in organisations that not only make specific representative claims to those holding elected office but also demand that those holding office increasingly account for their behaviour through a myriad of scrutiny systems, ‘the way all fields of social and political life come to be scrutinised, not just by the standard machinery of representative democracy but a whole host of non-party, extra-parliamentary and often unelected bodies, operating within and underneath and beyond the boundaries of territorial states’ (2009:695 original emphasis). Placed within the language of governance-theoretic insights, Keane traces not so much the simple ‘hollowing-out’ or ‘filling-in’ but also what might be termed the ‘broadening’
and ‘deepening’ of democracy, largely due to the impact of the internet, social media, access to information and public frustration. In stark contrast to much of the ‘endism’ or ‘declinist’ literature on this topic, Keane’s is an incredibly positive and optimistic analysis that asks questions not just of the last fifty years of representative and responsible government but also of the next fifty years.

Indeed, focusing on the representative/responsible nexus through Keane’s ‘monitory democracy’ lens pushes the debate into new intellectual territory in a number of ways. The first is through a fundamental re-questioning of the democratic modes through which notions of representation and responsibility are secured. The role of traditional forms of political engagement have, Keane suggests, waned whereas new forms that have little relationship to traditional institutions or electoral cycles have emerged. The new ‘monitory’ bodies (sleaze busters, audit bodies, scrutiny commissions, citizens groups, etc.) operate ‘regardless of the outcome of elections’ (Keane 2009:693; 2011:216) and ‘operate in ways greatly at variance with textbook accounts of “representative”, “liberal” or “parliamentary democracy”’ (Keane 2009:706; 2011:221). This questioning of conventional, ‘textbook’ accounts is very Birchian (1964:164, 239-40) as is Keane’s rejection of simple zero-sum assumptions that might view new modes of representation as replacing older ones. In reality what Keane illustrates is the manner in which ‘conventional party-centred forms of representation do not wither away’ (2011:220) but now exist within an increasingly dense web of non-traditional and often direct representative demands. Keane’s insights therefore open debates concerning the representative/responsible nexus in both an institutional and normative sense.

From an institutional position Keane’s arguments chime with the liquid modernity of Bauman (2000) and a broader sense that the business of governing is growing in intensity – possibly even brutality - as the number of account-demanding institutions and mechanisms increase. It is this intensification of the representative/responsible nexus that comes to the fore from Keane’s work. Delivering those notions of distance, insulation and stability that underpin notions of ‘responsible government’ are therefore more difficult in a ‘monitory democracy’ for the simple reason that the context is more demanding and unpredictable, plus the risks of going ‘MAD’ are so much higher. ‘MAD’, in this case, relating to the well-known institutional and psychological pathology within organisational studies called Multiple Accountabilities Disorder (discussed above) in which the requirement of an organisation to provide multiple and on-going accounts to a range of external actors makes it risk averse and also unable to focus on its core tasks. This notion of ‘MAD-ness’ flows into the normative arguments of Flinders (2011) and his challenge to Keane’s interpretation of ‘monitory democracy’ on the basis that it offers little appreciation of the importance of proportionality to facilitate a workable balance between ‘accountable government’, on the one hand, and ‘capacity to govern’, on the other. By raising this issue of proportionality or balance Flinders is essentially pushing Keane back towards the crux of Birch’s argument in RA4G.

In this context – and at first glance – Tormey’s The End of Representative Politics (2015) appears to challenge Keane’s rather triumphant interpretation of the history of democratic governance. And yet beneath this bold title lies a far more subtle and sophisticated argument that is less concerned with ‘endism’ and more concerned with exactly the balance or nexus between representation and responsibility that Birch initially promotes. Indeed, Tormey shares far more with Keane than might initially be expected through a focus on the waning of the ‘paradigm of representative politics’ and the ‘aura of representation’. Just as Keane isolates the emergence of ‘post-parliamentary politics’ to capture the decline of traditional forms of representation and responsibility and the emergence of new forms so Tormey explores a similar analytical terrain via the notion of ‘post-representation’. ‘Post’ in this sense providing ‘a useful marker, that is, as indicating not the redundancy of the object in question, so much as its querying. … less a passing of representation, and more an incipient problematization that evinces dissatisfaction but without presupposing the acceptance of a clear break or alternative’ (2015:9). The question this presents vis-à-vis the core ambition of this article is how this argument allows for the unpacking and development of our understanding of the representative/responsible nexus.
The answer lies in Tormey’s distinctions between (1) political representation, (2) representative politics and (3) anti-representative representation. The starting point for Tormey is a recognition of the disjuncture between traditional forms of vertical top-down modes of politics and the emergence of far flatter, bottom-up, horizontal modes of politics. This latter category is reflected in the growth of ‘pop up’, ‘DIY’ and ‘flat pack’ democracy and even the emergence of ‘leaderless’ structures. This distinction is refracted against a second distinction between political representation and representative politics. The former denotes the dominant idiom of ‘modernity’, the rise of the nation state and a chain of delegation that ran from the public, through representatives to the political elite. Political representation ‘implied above all else that those doing the representing were now accountable in some direct fashion to the populace’ (2015:46). Representative politics, by contrast, is the preserve of political parties and is still the dominant form that representative politics takes in most contemporary democracies (2015:54) which, Tormey suggests, leaves both representation and ‘representative politics’ tied to a crude division of political labour in the sense that ‘some will rule or govern, and others will follow’ (2015:57). This division between the governors and the governed provides the root of the contemporary democratic challenge in the sense that ‘governing, and even less ruling, is not the same as representing’ (2015:79). Moreover, the metanarrative of representation is embedded in ‘structures and practices built on a “vertical” basis’ (2015:77).

The dilemma for democracy, according to Tormey, is less about the introduction of new forms of representation or governmental responsiveness and more about the need to recognise that large sections of the public no longer believe that ‘our interests are best served if some represent and everyone else is represented. We are becoming unrepresentable’ (2015:82 original emphasis). It is the rejection of notions of representative and responsible government and the emergence of a citizenry that is increasingly resistant to being represented and yet want to be included within the institutions and processes of democratic governance. The problem, however, with notions of a politics of the unrepresentable and of anti-representative representation is that they are defined in contradistinction to exactly that politics of hierarchy and linearity (2015:131-2), which for Tormey characterises representative politics. In essence, what this leaves us with is a neo-Birchian line of analysis that still focuses on the representative/responsible nexus but from a more oblique angle. It is the reconceptualisation of representation via the recognition of an economy of non-linear, non-hierarchical, non-electoral, and often non-state based, representative claims that run in parallel to established and formalised representative processes. One way of placing Tormey (and Keane) squarely within the original framework of Birch is to draw upon the notion of ‘governance existing in the shadow of government’ (i.e. in the sense that governmental structures set the meta-governance framework) to suggest that Tormey’s ‘immediate or non-mediated politics’ must at some point connect with the less immediate and mediated infrastructure of established politics. Keane’s (2015) critique of Tormey’s analysis therefore rests on the observation that ‘Their [new forms of democratic politics] reliance upon mechanisms of representation is too often disguised, or denied. Truth is they rely upon mechanisms of representation, if by that word is meant what the earliest champions of representative democracy meant: acting on behalf of others, in their name, subject to their consent.’

Explosions of democratic energy must at some point be earthed and just as conceptualisations of modern governance frequently employ the language of ‘Type I’ and ‘Type II’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2003 discussed above) to capture various formal/informal, traditional/non-traditional structures then so too does the literature on the future of democracy tend to imply the existence of similarly ‘Type I’ and ‘Type II’ modes of representation. ‘Type I’ representation in this analysis would capture Birch’s focus on theories and mechanisms of traditional representative government (i.e. electoral, vertical, formalised, possibly deferential, etc.); ‘Type II’ on the emergence of non-traditional representative claims and response demands (i.e. non-electoral, horizontal, informal, post-party, post-parliamentary, non-deferential, etc.) that form the focus of both Keane’s and Tormey’s works. In this sense ‘Type II’ representation takes place and occurs in the shadow of ‘Type I’ representation structures and must generally at some point connect (i.e. Keane’s critique of Tormey). As a result Birch’s binary nexus is usefully updated and developed towards a more
sophisticated and arguably accurate account of contemporary democratic politics. Birch was focused on the democratic equilibrium within a polity and specifically the balance between input-output notions of representativeness and scrutiny, on the one hand, and process or performance-related notions of stability and capacity, on the other. In relation to the British constitutional configuration Birch maintained that this governing balance was broadly maintained and that public demands could be expressed, modified and conveyed to government (including the ‘opinions of inarticulate and unorganised citizens’), while at the same time this system provided ‘a way of bridging the gulf between the policies a government would follow if it responded to the varying day-to-day expressions of public opinion and those it must follow if its policies are to be coherent and mutually consistent’ (1964:21).

The subsequent literature on the evolution of democracy, in general, and on British democracy, in particular, suggests that Birch’s positive ‘standard account’ evaluation was overly optimistic in the sense that concerns regarding an ‘over-mighty executive’ and ‘the decline of parliament’ throughout the second half of the twentieth century suggested that responsible government had trumped representative government. (The Trilateral Commission’s The Crisis of Democracy (Crozier et al. 1975) offered a similar set of concerns set out across a larger global canvas.) At root, however, Birch’s core intellectual contribution in the form of a laser-like focus on the potential tension and grating between notions of representation and responsibility continued to form a key democratic challenge for those interested in either ‘democracy in theory’ or ‘democracy in practice’ (or both). Furthermore, what this section has attempted to display is not only the contemporary relevance of Birch’s conjoining of representation and responsibility but also its value as a unifying lens through which to understand and pull together the wide variety of competing strands of contemporary democratic thought and analysis. In this regard the value of ‘Birch + Keane + Tormey’ is the manner in which it offers a new or dual focus. There is the traditional Birchian focus on the representative/responsible nexus that must now be analysed in parallel with what might be termed a neo-Birchian focus on the nexus between ‘Type I’ and ‘Type II’ modes of representation and their subsequent nexus between each other (i.e. the vertical/horizontal matrix of representative claims within increasingly an increasingly complex architecture of multi-level governance) and with countervailing notions of responsible government (or governance). Our task now is to decide whether the conceptual and practical conjunction of representation with responsibility still holds looking forward into the 21st century.

V. FIFTY MORE YEARS OF REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT?

Tony Birch was a major figure within the field of political studies and political science for over sixty years. His professional contribution is reflected in the fact that he was Chair of the United Kingdom’s Political Studies Association (1972-75) and Vice-President of the International Political Science Association (1973-76). In 2002 he was awarded the prestigious Sir Isaiah Berlin Prize for Lifetime Achievement in Political Studies. ‘His publications were pioneering’ as Lord Trevor Smith (2014) wrote in his obituary of Birch but ‘[A]lthough widely read and respected, he never quite received the recognition he merited’. It is in this context that this article has sought to both recognize and emphasise the value of Birch’s R-4RG as a core reference point through which to analyse:

1) The contemporary relevance and meaning of the concepts of representation and responsibility;
2) The state of the discipline today in terms of understanding the relationship between these concepts; and
3) the distance the discipline of political studies has actually travelled from Birch’s initial landmark study.

The approach has involved the synthetic analysis of three major pools of scholarship (party politics in Part II, governance in Part III and democratic analyses in Part IV) as a way of not only demonstrating both the implicit and explicit value of Birch’s core focus on the
One of the main insights of Part IV was that there has been an explosion of representative claims which, in turn, reflects a new conceptualisation of political representation, described by Saward (2014:725; see also Urbanati and Warren, 2008), as ‘a protean phenomenon that can be formal and informal, electoral and non-electoral, national and transnational, potentially happening in multiple spaces and possessing many guises’ [i.e. Types ‘I’ and ‘II’ outlined above]. And yet, to misquote Urbanati (2006:225), this ‘surplus’ of representative politics seems at odds with the dominant narrative of a ‘crisis of democracy’. For Birch electoral representation was the lifeblood of democratic politics due to the manner in which it endowed credibility and legitimacy on the governmental process. Representation and responsibility were interpreted as complementary social constructs whereas in the twenty-first century it is possible to suggest that this link – or the logic that sustains it – has been broken or recalibrated. This reintroduces a focus on proportionality and sets it within debates concerning hyper-democracy as a way of trying to explain how ‘more’ representation can be understood in the context of the rise of ‘critical citizens’ and ‘disaffected democrats’. The suggestion here is that the perception of an imbalance that needs correcting in the democratic equilibrium may have created a vicious cycle in which the relationship between representation and responsibility is no longer complementary and mutually sustaining but is now agonistic and mutually destructive.

Although this (proto) thesis clearly demands further analysis it does sit within a Birchian logic while also resonating with, for example, Keane’s work on ‘monitory democracy’. Concerns that powers have shifted towards an increasingly insulated and narrow political elite fuel demands for the values and assumptions of the logic of democracy (here taken as synonymous with Birch’s focus on representativeness). The result is a flood of new representative claims and demands which rather than legitimating government and governance actually challenge government and governance. This explosion of democratic energy is captured in Keane’s ‘monitory democracy’ but fails to bring with it any sense of the need for proportionality or balance within governing values and the need to establish some form of equilibrium within democratic governance. The transition from democracy to hyper-democracy – as Gairdner defines it (2003; see also 2008) – provokes a negative response by officials, experts and politicians as they try and balance popular demands with the need to ensure a degree of governing capacity (here taken as synonymous with Birch’s focus on responsibility). In short, what a meta-analysis of democratic governance seems to reveal is a vicious-cycle within which hyper-democracy (see Heclo 1999) stimulates hyper-depoliticization (as a way of achieving distance and stability) which in itself leads to even more public frustration, further non-electoral representative claims, ever more ingenious forms of depoliticization, etc. etc. (see Flinders and Wood 2015). But at base Birch’s simple focus on the representative/responsible nexus remains at the core of a debate that shows no sign of abating.
Dropping the analytical lens down a level from a focus on democratic governance to a focus on governance and public policy provides further evidence that Birch's R-ARG is unlikely to lose much of its analytical value in future decades. The simple fact is that Birch’s normative and institutional arguments, designed as they were in a far simpler period of political history, offer something of an ‘ideal type’ design against which contemporary institutional structures and normative assumptions can be tested. In this context the literature on ‘the problem of many hands’ (i.e. there are so many individuals or institutions in a policy delivery chain that isolating responsibility for any one element becomes impossible) (Thompson, 1980)) and ‘the problem of many eyes’ (i.e. essentially the pathological impact of multiple-accountabilities disorder) resonate very clearly with Birch’s approach. The problem of ‘many hands’ creates particularly acute challenges for notions of responsible government; whereas the problem of ‘many eyes’ dovetails with the rise of representative claims in a number of ways. And yet the simple argument being made here is that as levels of international and global inter-connectedness increase so will the scale of both of these well-known dilemmas within the field of governance and public policy. In this context the relevance of Birch’s R-ARG may well emerge as something of a touchstone or anchorage point for the analysis of increasingly dense systems of fuzzy governance and fuzzy accountability.

The notion of an anchor point – or the erosion of traditional social anchorage points – brings us to a final focus on political parties and public attitudes as further evidence of Birch’s likely continued relevance. The notion of ‘post-tribal politics’ – with a turn away from the representative claims of organised collectivities associated primarily with class in industrial societies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, towards the representation, in ‘post-industrial’, ‘post-modern’ twenty-first century societies, of the disparate claims of ‘individualised’ citizens (who prefer personalised, atomised political action to collective action); or of activist groups with some collective, if often fleeting or pragmatic, identity; or new ‘post-industrial’ social movements – directs us back to Mair’s thesis of a growing incompatibility between the claims of new representative/responsive parties and core, governing responsible/prudent parties (Part II). Whereas Mair’s thesis was profoundly pessimistic, others see ‘post-tribal’ politics as an opportunity for political parties ‘to see outside or beyond the established way of “doing politics”’ (Flinders 2015:254), or for parties to adapt and evolve notions of intra-party democracy and internal policy development to accommodate a ‘new type of politically active citizen’ (Guaja 2015:93), or for parties of the future to adopt a ‘reflexive mode’ to ‘present themselves as a type of listening organization that forges alliances … to represent varied and shifting groups to the state and in the state’ (Saward 2010:134). Whilst these prognostications, in their complexities, seem to distance themselves from the simplicities of Birch’s analysis, they all, nonetheless, still root parties in electoral politics, and see parties contesting elections on the basis of their respective collective visions (however constituted, framed and managed). In this electoral context, internal party debates about intra-party democracy, the representativeness of party leaders of the party’s membership and supporters, and the responsibility of the former to the latter become intertwined, often in contradistinction, to wider debates about the representativeness and responsibility of party parliamentarians to their constituency and national electorates. In this process arguments about intra-party representation may come to be counterposed by arguments about extra-party responsibility to a wider electorate (Birch 1964:130). Yet, the continuing significance of Birch’s R-ARG is the normative reminder that democratic governance needs to conjoin representation and responsibility (1964:21).

The ‘take home’ message of this article, therefore, is simple. The contemporary rethinking of both representation and responsibility needs to be matched in the future with a rethinking of how representation and responsibility connect, or may reconnect, with each other, and in what respects ‘a representative system [still] enables a government to be responsible’. The importance of the conjunction ‘and’ needs both to be remembered and to be investigated rigorously. Recognising the importance of this conjunction is the lasting legacy bequeathed by Birch.
References


FLINDERS, MATTHEW (2011) “‘Daring to be Daniel’: The Pathology of Politicized Accountability in Monitory Democracy”, *Administration and Society*, vol. 43, no. 5, pp. 595-619.


