

The Rise Predicts the Fall: How the Method of Leader Entry Affects the Method of Leader Removal in Dictatorships*

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Abstract

How does the way a non-democratic leader takes power affect the stability of her government? Prior research identifies irregular leader entries—those violating the regime’s norms for leader selection—to be especially likely to foreshadow subsequent unconstitutional transitions. This paper shows how some forms of irregular leader entry can actually *protect* leaders from most threats of forced removal from power. When leaders use a strong and loyal coalition of supporters to overthrow their predecessors and their entire ruling regimes, as they do in successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime-changing coups, they explicitly prove their strength to any potential rivals. These leaders are substantially *less* likely to be ousted than leaders who take power in ways that do not convey strength so convincingly, such as normal succession and elite reshuffling. We analyze an original dataset of non-democratic leader transitions and show that accounting for the strength demonstrated during a leader’s entry to power substantially improves our ability to predict how and when the leader will eventually leave office.

***NOTE:** The data and all computer code necessary to replicate the results and figures in this analysis will be made publicly available at the authors’ homepage on publication. R and Stata 14 were used for all statistical analyses.

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How does the way a non-democratic leader takes power affect the stability of her government? Previous research shows irregular¹ transitions can undermine governance by increasing the likelihood of political violence, slowing economic growth, and perpetuating cycles of unconstitutional regime change (Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1991; Campos and Nugent, 2002; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Collier et al., 2003; Feng, 1997; Fosu, 2002; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010; Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009; Gupta, 1990; Igbal and Zorn, 2008; Jones and Olken, 2005, 2009; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Londregan and Poole, 1990; Lehoucq and Pérez-Linán, 2014; Miller, 2012; Thyne et al., 2014). This link between irregular leader change and regime fragility is well-established. Some researchers even approximate a state's capacity to govern with the way its leader claimed power, with regular entries marking strong states and irregular entries defining especially weak ones (Huntington, 1968; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010).

But by amalgamating many different forms of irregular entry, this literature overlooks how more specific transition types can influence the kinds of threats a leader will face during her time in power. Irregular entry is a broad concept that includes significant and disruptive transitions like rebellions and foreign invasions as well as less consequential internal reshuffles and succession disputes. This inclusive concept does not differentiate contentious transitions between rivals within the same ruling clique from transitions that completely oust the ruling elite and overturn the political structures that kept them in power. We draw on work on opposition coordination in dictatorships (Casper and Tyson, 2014; Edmond, 2013; Geddes, 1999; Kuran, 1989; Karklins and Peterson, 1993; Lohmann, 1993; Little, 2015) to argue that we can learn much more about the political consequences of leader entry by disaggregating these irregular transitions into two substantively important types: *irregular regime replacement* and *irregular regime reorganization*.

Foundational research on leader survival in dictatorships suggests all non-democratic leaders should be very interested in conveying strength and invulnerability. Doing so convincingly increases one's chances of keeping power, while doing so unconvincingly invites challenges and compels dictators to make concessions, share power, and accept constraints (Boix

¹Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009: 272) define *regular* leader transitions as those that occur "according to the prevailing rules, provisions, conventions, and norms of the country."

and Svobik, 2013; Svobik, 2009; Magaloni, 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Smith, 2005). This pressure to appear strong gives rise to a classic signaling problem: all dictators, strong and weak alike, do what they can to *appear* invulnerable while their challengers must attempt to discern which claims of strength are actually credible. We contend that some leaders *prove* the strength and loyalty of their supporting coalitions by forcibly overthrowing their predecessors and overhauling their political systems. These forms of *irregular regime replacement* include successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime-changing coups d'état. In each of these entry types a sufficiently strong coalition accepted considerable risks and costs to install their chosen leader. This credible show-of-strength can deter aspiring rivals from plotting their own attempts to dislodge the new leader from office.

Other forms of irregular leader entry do not convincingly convey the strength of a new leader's coalition of supporters. There is much more ambiguity around leader strength when they enter by *irregular regime reorganization*, as in reshuffles among the ruling elite, extraordinary appointments during political crises, or unestablished election or selection processes. These leaders *may* have very strong support underlying their claims to power—and most leaders in this position work very hard to persuade their new constituents of their invulnerability—but their claims of strength cannot be as credible as those made by new leaders who proved the strength of their supporting coalitions while forcibly ousting a predecessor's regime. Following regime reorganizations, new leaders can only attempt to persuade potential rivals of their strength with propaganda, public demonstrations, and repression. There is much less ambiguity around the strength of a leader's hold on power when that leader forced her way in with a strong coalition that would presumably rise up to the leader's defense. Below, we estimate non-democratic leaders who entered office through regime replacement to be *three to five times less likely* to be forced from power relative to those who entered by irregular regime reorganization.

Non-democratic leaders who take power through irregular regime replacement are unlikely to suffer similar challenges relative to other dictators, but there are two notable caveats to this argument: this stabilizing effect is short-lived and limited to only a few types of threats. Strong supporting coalitions deter challenges that would require a rival to compete with and

overcome a leader's coalition (i.e. direct confrontation through war, street protests, and other forms of complete regime change), but they may encourage tactics that circumvent direct engagement with a new leader's coalition, such as assassination. Furthermore, political allegiances shift while new leaders consolidate power and develop new alliances. Over time a leader's entry coalition can become decreasingly representative of the support she enjoys in the present. Thus, the more time a leader has been in power, the less reliably her method of entry predicts the threats she will face while in office.

The paper makes three contributions to the literature on political instability in dictatorships. First, the distinction between irregular regime replacement and irregular regime reorganization greatly improves our ability to forecast different threats to non-democratic rulers. Second, the paper introduces new data that describe eleven forms of leader exit and eight forms of leader entry. These data will allow for more nuanced cross-national studies of authoritarian breakdowns and transitions. Finally, we refine the established wisdom about the "coup traps" (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Lehoucq and Pérez-Lián, 2014) and "conflict traps" (Collier et al., 2003) that purportedly condemn dictatorships to long cycles of instability. Some leaders are ensnared in these traps and suffer short-lived and tumultuous tenures, but those who forcefully take power with strong coalitions credibly signal their strength, deter rivals, and earn a short reprieve from these kinds of challenges.

The Argument

We derive our argument about how specific forms of entry predict the threats leaders will face from four claims. First, a leader's political survival relies upon her ability to maintain a strong supporting coalition, but in non-democracies allegiances are private and therefore prone to misperception. Second, leader entry by forced regime replacement reveals valuable information about the *true* strength of the leader's coalition, and this information cannot be signaled as convincingly by other forms of entry. Third, political rivals use this information to form their estimates of a leader's coalition strength and their chances of success should they try to seize

power. And fourth, the value of any information about leader coalition strength to be gleaned from the leader's entry into power depreciates quickly, as does the influence this information has on those looking to challenge the leader.

Political Allegiances and Uncertainty in Non-Democratic States

Leaders stay in power by maintaining a strong and loyal coalition of supporters (Ames, 1987; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Svobik, 2012; Sudduth, 2017). Leaders of democracies do this by attracting a bloc of voters that is large enough to defeat rival voting coalitions at the polls. Political competition is less transparent in non-democratic states, but leader coalitions in these systems are typically comprised of adequate shares of the public, the military, and the political elite.² Non-democratic leaders stay in power by ensuring that their coalition remains strong enough to overcome any rival coalitions. They do this by simultaneously incentivizing loyalty among their supporters with private goods provisions while obstructing rivals with repression and the threat or use of political violence (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Bell, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2015; Conrad, 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svobik, 2008, 2012).

A defining characteristic of non-democratic politics is the absence of regular, transparent, and competitive contests for power that reveal the true size and strength of a leader's coalition of supporters. This is certainly true where there are no elections to allow opposition leaders to vie for power against the incumbent, though it is also true where election results are manipulated so as to obscure a leader's true level of support (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009; Daxecker, 2014; Levitsky and Way, 2010; González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2015). Even in the increasing share of non-democratic regimes with multi-party elections, these contests are usually superficial and the results typically favor the incumbent due to outright distortion of the vote tallies or by policies that place challengers at an insurmountable structural disadvantage (Gandhi, 2008; Schedler, 2006, 2013).³

²For more on how a leader's specific sources of support vary in different styles of dictatorship, see, among others: Gandhi (2008); Geddes (1999, 2003); Svobik (2012).

³For a more thorough exploration of electoral manipulation in dictatorships than space allows, see Schedler's

Non-democratic leaders intensify uncertainty about the size of their supporting coalitions by exaggerating their support and exacerbating opposition coordination problems (Edmond, 2013; Lohmann, 1993; Kuran, 1989). These efforts suppress movements to remove non-democratic leaders from office because regime opponents cannot accurately juxtapose the strength of the opposition movement against that of the leader's supporting coalition. Lohmann's 1994 study of East Germany describes a country that could have democratized much earlier had the opposition understood its relative strength. Of the uncertainty before the eventual collapse of the German Democratic Republic, she writes:

“While elections were held regularly, there was no opposition party, and election outcomes were manipulated. Periodic intraparty purges effectively eliminated any opposition within the ruling party. The freedom of press, radio, and television guaranteed in Article 27 of the GDR constitution was a farce... public opinion polls that indicated a dramatic decrease in public support for the regime in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s were classified and not accessible to anyone but high-level functionaries” (pg. 44).

The uncertainty around leader coalitions is worsened by strong incentives to misrepresent allegiances in non-democratic systems. In democracies, leaders provide their large electorates with public goods that are largely non-excludable, meaning the goods one receives from the government are minimally influenced by one's political affiliations (Boix, 2003; Brown and Mobarak, 2009; Deacon, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lake and Baum, 2001; Olson, 1993).⁴ The same cannot be said of non-democratic states. Where opposition leaders and their followers are repressed, there are strong incentives to publicly voice support for an incumbent whom one may not support privately—known political opponents can face lower levels of goods provision or even state-sponsored violence (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Kuran, 1989, 1991).⁵ For these two reasons—(1) the absence of mechanisms that force public declarations of support for competing candidates for executive office and (2) the strong incentives to feign

The Politics of Uncertainty (2013), *Competitive Authoritarianism* by Levitsky and Way (2010), and *Political Institutions under Dictatorship* by Gandhi (2008).

⁴Goods distribution is not perfectly equal in democracies (Bell, 2011; Keefer, 2007; Min, 2015; Ross, 2006), though disparities are smaller than what is observed in non-democracies.

⁵Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) call this the “loyalty norm” that helps to preserve non-democratic winning coalitions.

support for the incumbent—political allegiances in non-democracies are private and prone to miscalculation. This increases the value of events that reveal a leader’s *true* level of support.

Leader Transitions as Information-Revealing Events

The problem described above resembles a classic signaling game. Non-democratic leaders hold private information about the strength of the coalitions keeping them in power. They also have incentives to exaggerate their strength to any potential rivals, all of whom possess less information about the leader’s true strength. The likely outcome of this signaling problem is what formal theorists call a *pooling strategy*; all dictators do what they can to convey strength. Whether strong or weak, these leaders have incentives to hold sham elections, make examples of political rivals, glorify their successes, control state media, hold militaristic celebrations and parades, and create new holidays and national myths. Any potential challengers must attempt to discern credible signals of strength from empty bluffs, but guessing incorrectly can have devastating consequences. So how can the opposition determine which leaders are truly strong and which ones are feigning support?⁶

The central argument of this paper is that some, though not all, forms of leader entry provide a credible snapshot of the support a new leader enjoys when she takes power. Forms of entry that unequivocally advertise a strong supporting coalition provide the most unambiguous signal of strength. Leaders achieve this by forcibly seizing power and replacing the preceding political system. When a new leader takes power at the head of a rebel army or popular protest movement, the strength and loyalty of her coalition is evinced by their victory over the previous government. Potential opponents can have no doubt that the new leader has the support of a loyal and risk-acceptant bloc of supporters. Major coups that overturn the entire ruling regime (rather than less consequential reshuffling coups) also demonstrate that the new leader’s coalition is strong and loyal enough to resist threats to the new government. When popular protests overwhelm a government and place a chosen leader in power, observers can infer that public opposition to subsequent regime change would be great enough to discourage efforts to remove

⁶See, among others, the foundational “beer-quiche” game in which both beer-drinkers and quiche-eaters opt for beer so as to signal their toughness to a nearby bully (Cho and Kreps, 1987).

the new incumbent by force. In this way, coming to power through irregular regime replacement can be a boon to new leaders hoping to avoid counter-coups and reactionary uprisings.

ENTRY TYPE	DEFINITION	UNCERTAINTY ABOUT LEADER STRENGTH
<i>Regular Entry</i>	Entry consistent with constitutional or established rules for leader selection, such as normal succession, selection by party/junta elites, or popular election.	<i>Moderate.</i> New leader has no chance to display her strength when she inherits the status quo regime. Entry does not reveal whether she is strongly supported or passively accepted by those beyond the ruling inner circle.
<i>Irregular Reorganization</i>	Entry either violates rules/norms or occurs where there are no established rules/norms AND leader rose without forcefully ousting the old regime, as in reshuffles or unestablished election, succession, or selection processes.	<i>High.</i> A reshuffle between insiders in the governing clique may reveal a new leader's popularity among the ruling elite, but it can also advertise the weakness of the regime to political rivals outside the ruling clique.
<i>Irregular Replacement</i>	Entry violates established rules or norms for leader change AND change results from the coordinated use of force, as in rebellions, major regime changing coups, and protest movements.	<i>Low.</i> The new leader took power with a sufficiently strong and loyal coalition of supporters. The new leader's strength is made credible by her success in forcing the previous leader from office against the will of the ruling elite.

When leaders enter power in other ways they cannot convey strength so persuasively. For example, leaders who take power during intra-junta/party reshuffles demonstrate that they have the support of a critical share of the divided ruling elites, but these entries do nothing to deter outsiders who hope to overturn the entire political system. Rather, these regime reorganizations only show that the new leader is the strongest member of an increasingly fractured government. Even when these leadership disputes turn violent, as in many “palace coups” or “reshuffling coups,” new leaders only prove that they can force the allegiances of regime insiders. These irregular regime reorganizations allow leaders to arise from internal discord and do not credibly demonstrate that the new coalition is strong enough to take control of the state and thwart threats from regime outsiders.

Regular entries that follow a regime's established norms for leader transition are a hall-

mark of stable dictatorships, but these transitions reveal relatively little about the size and loyalty of a new leader's coalition. Loyalties do not automatically transfer from a monarch to an heir or from a president to a vice president, and this is why new leaders are so frequently challenged shortly after succeeding their predecessors. Historical studies of Europe's hereditary monarchies suggest succession mechanisms provide stability by dissuading intra-regime infighting, (Kokkonen and Sundell, 2014; Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2000), but family monarchies are increasingly rare (Brownlee, 2007) and these norms may not dissuade regime outsiders. Isabel Perón of Argentina was the clear chosen successor of Juan Perón—she was his wife and vice president—yet she suffered multiple coup attempts and was deposed less than two years after taking power. Kim Jong Un continues to serve as the North Korean President, but his succession was followed by numerous purges, executions, and other demonstrations of strength. International observers continue to question the strength of his coalition, warning that a potential rival could emerge. He did not force his way into office in a complete regime replacement, so we can only speculate about his true level of support within the North Korean military elite.

Which Threats Are Deterred By Credible Signals of Strength?

The unambiguous signal of strength that occurs when a new leader forcibly replaces her predecessor should deter challengers, though some forms of leader removal should be more sensitive to leader coalition strength than others. Specifically, strong coalitions should deter *coalition competition* that pits a leader's supporters against an opposition coalition in a direct contest for state control. These forms of removal include civil wars where rebel groups directly engage with forces defending the incumbent's government, coup attempts that seek to overthrow (rather than reshuffle) the government, and popular movements where opposition groups confront the incumbent's supporters in the streets. Coalition-competing threats should be deterred by reliable information about leader coalition strength because the viability of these challenges crucially depends upon opponents' beliefs about the relative strength of the leader's coalition.⁷

⁷Little 2015 and Casper and Tyson 2014 similarly argue political rivals can make inferences about non-democratic leader strength following elections and protests, respectively, though perceptions of both events may be prone to government manipulation and state-controlled media.

Table 2: How Involuntary Leader Exits Are Affected By Signals of Leader Strength

REMOVAL TYPE	DEFINITION	SENSITIVITY TO LEADER STRENGTH
<i>Coalition Competing</i>	Unconstitutional removal in which a coalition of regime outsiders overthrows the ruling government in a direct competition for power.	<i>High.</i> The viability of the attempt depends upon the relative strength of the incumbent’s supporters vis-à-vis the opposition coalition.
<i>Coalition Circumventing</i>	Unconstitutional removal where regime outsiders evade direct competition with the incumbent’s coalition by using assassins or turning to foreign superpowers.	<i>Low.</i> The viability of the challenge is minimally influenced by leader strength because challengers avoid direct coalition competition or use substantially stronger foreign allies.
<i>Coalition Collapsing</i>	The leader is forced from power involuntarily during reshuffling among members of the regime, usually in “palace coups d’état” or pseudo-legal impeachments.	<i>Low.</i> The viability of the challenge is minimally influenced by leader strength because challengers emerge from within the regime and convince others to reallocate political power.

Other threats to leaders eschew direct competition between the coalitions of the leader and an opposition movement and, therefore, should not be similarly deterred by demonstrations of leader coalition strength. We call these forms of removal *coalition circumvention*. Assassins, for example, remove a leader from power with no intention of overcoming the leader’s supporters and placing an opposition member in power. When the ruler of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laurent Kabila, was assassinated by a child soldier in 1999, the young assassin surely was not attempting to place himself or another regime outsider in office. This threat to Kabila occurred despite the strength of his supporting coalition. Kabila’s formidable coalition—his son is now approaching two decades in power—could have been a primary motivation for using a removal tactic that would intentionally circumvent coalition competition. Opponents also circumvent competition with they enlist global or regional superpowers to remove the incumbent from office. Non-democratic leaders suffer foreign overthrows relatively infrequently (we count only 24 since 1950), but when they do they are typically overthrown by states that are far too strong to be meaningfully deterred by the way in which a leader came

to power. American actions against Mohammad Mossadeg (Iran, 1953) and Mullah Omar (Afghanistan, 2001) typify the overwhelming strength of the foreign country during these transitions, as do French actions against Bokassa (C.A.R., 1979) and Soviet moves against Nagy (Hungary, 1956), Karmal (Afghanistan, 1986), and Tsedenbal (Mongolia, 1984).

Having had a strong coalition at the time of entry does little to protect leaders from threats emerging from within the coalition. These kinds of threats do not force challengers to overcome the coalition that put the leader in power. Rather, they constitute reshuffles among coalition members that demote the incumbent leader. We call these internal realignments and reshuffles *coalition collapse*. This form of removal includes two ways that leaders are involuntarily replaced by members of their own governments: reshuffling coups and legal processes like impeachment. Because these forms of removal do not require challengers to overcome the leader's united coalition, these threats should be minimally affected by any signals sent by a leader's method of entry into office.

It follows from this argument that the irregular regime replacements that send the most unambiguous signals of leader coalition strength should dissuade the coalition competing threats that are most sensitive to the strength of an incumbent's supporting coalition. Forms of removal that are minimally affected by coalition strength vis-à-vis outsiders should *not* be similarly deterred by irregular regime replacement. Accordingly:

H1: Non-democratic leaders coming to power via irregular regime replacement are less likely to suffer removal by coalition competition.

H2: Non-democratic leaders coming to power via irregular regime replacement are no less likely to suffer removal by coalition circumvention or collapse.

Signals of Strength Will Fade Over Time

The argument requires a final caveat. The importance of any signal fades with time, both because the information conveyed by the signal is less recent and, in this context, because political realities often force dictators to reconstitute their supporting coalitions. Work on the institutionalization of non-democratic governments highlights both of these time-sensitive mechanisms. When necessary, dictators rebuild their coalitions using strategies like purging, ideological re-

alignment, and political party formation (Sudduth, 2017; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for example, famously rose to power in a coup supported by fundamentalist Islamists like the theocrat Hassan al-Turabi. Islamism was prominent in the early years of his regime, but al-Bashir severed his ties to this movement once he consolidated power and gained the ability to personalize his regime. Over the course of al-Bashir's 25 years in office his government has gone from courting al Qaeda and aggressively pursuing Islamization to jailing Hassan al-Turabi and calling the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. This is a clear example of how the way a leader entered power becomes less relevant as political conditions change with time.

Even where leaders are somewhat less intentional about reshaping their supporting coalitions, we would argue that the passage of time depreciates the value of the information provided by a leader's entry and therefore weakens any deterrent effect that an irregular regime replacement might have on subsequent political challenges. Fidel Castro's successful revolution in Cuba provided opponents with a much better understanding of Fidel's military strength in the early 1960s than it did in the early 2000s. Thus, we posit an additional conditional hypothesis:

H3: The magnitude of any relationship between leader entry type and leader exit type will fade with a leader's time in office.

Data

Our dataset of non-democratic leader transitions consists of leader-year panels for the 773 individuals who took control of a non-democratic government between 1950 and 2016 and then held power for at least one week.⁸ To generate this leader list, we first used the data and coding rules produced by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) to identify periods of non-democratic rule in every sovereign state. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) use a

⁸The "one-week rule" is standard practice in this research literature because many contested leader transitions see power change hands several times over the course of the conflict. Without an arbitrary threshold for time-in-power, many failed coups would produce temporary "leaders" who served for a few hours and never emerged from the initial conflict for power with any real capacity to govern. See, for example, the failed coup in Sudan that occurred 19-23 July 1971.

procedural definition of democracy that labels governments non-democratic if executive offices are not filled through legitimate and contested elections. According to this definition, 141 countries were non-democratic at some point between 1950 and 2016.

Next, we consulted several datasets and codebooks (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010; Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009; Svobik and Akcinaroglu, 2007) to create a list of leaders serving during these non-democratic periods, taking special care to correctly assign leaders to regimes during years that experienced major regime change. These sources occasionally disagree about the identity of a country's chief leader because some favor nominal heads-of-government while others list the de facto or "effective" leader. We resolved these differences by doing case research to identify de facto leaders. Finally, we excluded the short-lived tenures of "leaders" who merely served as placeholders (i.e. Kebreau in Haiti). We recoded 93 (out of 773) leaders in our dataset as placeholders and excluded them from our analyses. Our main findings do not substantially change when they are included, though including them increases the estimated probability of a voluntary resignation and decreases estimated likelihoods of all irregular forms of leader removal. We provide a complete list of our leaders, placeholders, and transition types in a supplementary appendix.⁹

Leader Entry Types

We assign each leader one of eight entry types. Most non-democratic leader transitions are regular and voluntary, meaning that they are not forced by a major crisis and they occur with the consent of the outgoing regime. If such transitions occur as part of a *precedented* process for leader selection, as in regular elections, succession structures, and normal selection by the party/junta, then we label these ***Regular Selection/Election***. Leaders entering this way include most heirs in monarchies, rising party members, and winners of precededented elections. If the entry was *unprecedented* but otherwise peaceful and voluntary, as in first-time transi-

⁹Using two independent coders, we were able to achieve an inter-coder reliability of 97% after the first attempt to construct the data. Additional sources were consulted to classify the more ambiguous cases, many of which involved uncertainty about the role of foreign actors or whether assassinations were part of larger coup or rebel conspiracies. We identified placeholders using the LEAD data and coding rules from Ellis, Horowitz and Stam (2015). All decisions and a leader-by-leader comparison to *Archigos* (4.1) are included in a supplementary appendix.

tions between regime founders and their heirs (e.g. Fidel to Raul Castro in Cuba) or initial appointments at state independence (e.g. Sékou Touré in Guinea), we code the entry as *First Selection/Election*. We make this distinction so we can determine whether regular forms of leader entry better insulate leaders from challenges if those regular entries are legitimized by historical precedent. These two types of leader entry describe about half of the 773 leaders in the dataset, with 259 entering by Regular Election/Selection (33.5%) and 172 (22.3%) rising through First Election/Selection.

Nearly half of all non-democratic leaders entered in more tumultuous “irregular” transitions, but we differentiate between six different forms of irregular entry. When governments are compelled to choose a new leader during a major crisis, such as a popular protest or assassination, we call this *Forced Election/Selection*. These entries are different from other irregular entries in that the outgoing government chooses the new leader during the crisis. These entries are not common (88 of 773, or 11.4%), but high-profile examples include Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak following the killing of Anwar Sadat and Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, who first entered office when a botched coup attempt failed to oust the ruling regime but succeeded in killing the leader of the junta in which Obasanjo served. These entries can also occur during war if a war forces the old leader out, yet does not put a rebel leader in power. The rebellion against Charles Taylor in Liberia’s second civil war (1999-2003) removed Taylor, but when he vacated office his position transferred to a regime insider, Vice President Moses Blah, rather than someone affiliated with the rebel movement. This ascent, despite being triggered by war, is a Forced Election/Selection.

All other forms of entry occur without the consent of the government. *Foreign Installation* (20 leaders, 2.6%) occurs when new leaders are put in place by the governments of other countries. These transitions require more than foreign assistance (as in some coups and rebellions). Instead, the foreign government must be the main armed force that selects the new leader. *Successful Rebellion* (27 leaders, 3.5%) and *Successful Protest* (4 leaders, 0.5%) occur when governments are forced from power and the leaders of the rebel or protest movements claim power for themselves. Finally, we follow Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2015) by making

a distinction between two types of coups: the *Reshuffling Coup* that puts a new individual in charge of the extant political regime and the *Regime-Changing Coup* in which the new leader significantly and immediately changes political institutions and/or the nature of executive power.¹⁰ Taken together, Reshuffling Coups (95 leaders, 12.3%) and Regime-Changing Coups (108 leaders, 14.0%) account for one in four non-democratic leader entries.

Next, we classify these eight types into the broader theoretically-relevant categories discussed above (also see Table 3 below). The only regular methods are Regular Election/Selection and First Election/Selection. In both cases power is transferred voluntarily by the previous government. Irregular regime reorganizations occur when the change is involuntary, yet the ruling regime is minimally changed, as in a Forced Election/Selection or Reshuffling Coup. Irregular regime replacements occur during a Regime-Changing Coup, Successful Protest, or Successful Rebellion. Foreign Installation is a distinct category.

Leader Exit Types

Because we theorize that strong leader coalitions dissuade some strategies for leader removal but not others, we also classify leader exits into several types. *Voluntary Resignation* occurs when leader exit is completely voluntary (378 leaders, 48.9%) or forced only by failing health (8 leaders, 1.0%). An additional 53 leaders (6.9%) exited through *Natural Death*. Rumors surround leader deaths and resignations in dictatorships, but we code these events as health-induced unless there is very strong evidence that false health reports were used as a pretext for a more nefarious plot to force the leader from power.

We code two kinds of involuntary removal from within the regime (coalition collapse). A *Reshuffling Coup* occurs when a leader is forcibly removed by a secret internal faction that splits her coalition. These coups do not overthrow the entire government, but instead change the leadership structure among the ruling elite. 83 of the non-democratic leaders who entered power after 1950 (10.7%) lost power this way. Leaders can also be forced out under legal pretenses. These instances of *Legal Removal* are involuntary and undermine the internal cohesion

¹⁰We expand their dataset to include more coups and a longer time period. We also recoded some coups. All of these decisions are included in the online appendix.

of the regime, but they use available legal structures for removal rather than subversive coup conspiracies. We count only 19 cases (2.5%), including Razak's faction of Malaysia's UMNO party successfully overcoming Tunku Abdul Rahman, the country's first prime minister. These forms of coalition collapse similarly pit one faction of the ruling coalition against the other, though the former is usually a secret conspiracy while the latter is often a prolonged and public legal battle.

We divide threats emerging from outside the ruling coalition into two broad categories: coalition competition and coalition circumvention (refer to Table 2). Coalition-competing methods of leader removal are most likely to be deterred by a strong leader because they require a challenger to forcibly remove the governing coalition. The three types of coalition-competing removal are: **Regime-Changing Coup** (66 leaders, 8.5%), **Protest** (31 leaders, 4.0%), and **Rebellion** (28 leaders, 3.6%). Note that the number of leaders to leave power in these ways will not perfectly align with the number of leaders to enter in these ways. For example, 31 leaders were forced out by protests but only 4 leaders entered through protest. A primary cause for this is democratization; those who enter after successful protests often democratize and this is a dataset of non-democratic leaders.

Our last two forms of leader removal are **Assassination** (19 leaders, 2.5%) and **Foreign Overthrow** (24 leaders, 3.1%). We consider both of these exit types to be different from the coalition-competing challenges listed above because neither is particularly deterred by leader strength. Assassination attempts that are not linked to larger conspiracies and are not deterred by a leader's coalition strength because "lone-wolf" assassins have no intention of combating a leader's coalition of supporters. Foreign governments with the capacity to overthrow other states' incumbents are much stronger than their targets.

Control Variables

We anticipate any consequences of leader entry type to be tempered by the amount of time a leader has held power, so the models also include *Leader Tenure* measured in logged years and some models also include multiplicative interactions of tenure with specific entry types.

Table 3: A Typology of Leader Entry and Exit

LEADER ENTRY				
REGULAR ENTRY	IRREGULAR REPLACEMENT	IRREGULAR REORGANIZATION	FOREIGN INSTALLATION	
Regular Selection First Selection	Rebellion Protest Regime Coup	Reshuffle Coup Forced Selection	Installation	
LEADER EXIT				
VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION	NATURAL DEATH	COALITION COMPETITION	COALITION CIRCUMVENTION	COALITION COLLAPSE
Election/Selection Health Reasons	Death	Rebellion Regime Coup Protest	Foreign Action Assassination	Reshuffle Coup Legal Removal

Age is included so we can better separate the effects of tenure longevity from other time trends like waning health and perceptions of leader frailty. We include *Logged pcGDP* to capture a state's level of economic development, anticipating that states with a lower per capita gross domestic product will be more prone to irregular forms of leader change. *Economic Growth* is measured as the annual change in per capita gross domestic product and we expect higher rates of economic growth to decrease the risk of irregular forms of leader change. Both economic variables are drawn from The Maddison Project (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014). Different non-democratic political systems are likely to suffer different kinds of challenges. Using the data by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), we account for whether the regime is a monarchic, military, or civilian dictatorship. *Monarch* and *Military Dictator* are dichotomous variables indicating whether the regime's decision-making relies on family and kin networks, or the armed forces within juntas. The base category in our analyses is a civilian dictatorship. In addition, we control for *Party* which is a dichotomous variable indicating whether there is any de facto party ruling the regime.

Conflict involvement is also linked to leader survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Goemans, 2008; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Debs and Goemans, 2010), so we use several

control variables to indicate the presence of conflict, a leader's role in the conflict, and recent performance in conflict. We include a dichotomous *Civil War* variable that is equal to 1 when states are presently involved in a civil war, drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2012 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012). We expect that ongoing war increases the risk of an irregular leader replacement. We also include *Logged Military Personnel* to capture an additional aspect of state militarization (Singer, 1987). Leaders are rewarded for success in international conflicts and may be punished for defeat (Debs and Goemans, 2010), so we also include three measures of recent *Victory*, *Defeat*, and *Draw* in prior conflicts. Following this work, we expect these effects to depreciate with time and capture this with a decay function.¹¹ The original source of this data on qualifying crises and results is the International Crisis Behavior dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000).

Analysis

Leaders confront simultaneous threats of many different forms of removal, and consequently the risk of one type must be evaluated relative to the risk of any others. Statistical models that predict the risk of only one form of leader exit are insufficient because they cannot provide adequate information about these competing threats. For example, a model that estimates the risk of removal by coalition competition could not differentiate between one leader who faces a low risk because she is very likely to stay in power and another leader who faces a low risk because she is much more likely to voluntarily resign, die in office, or be overthrown by a foreign power. Understanding leader exit requires an estimation strategy that is more sensitive to the simultaneous threats leaders suffer.

We overcome this problem by using multinomial logit models that predict the relative likelihoods of six possible outcomes each year a leader is in power: (1) staying in power, (2) removal by coalition competition, (3) removal by coalition circumvention, (4) removal by coalition collapse, (5) voluntary resignation, or (6) natural death.¹² This method produces a

¹¹These variables are equal to $\frac{1}{t-t_R+1}$ where t_R is the year of the outcome and t is the year observed.

¹²As a robustness check, we ran multinomial logit models by coding the natural death as censored cases. The

unique prediction for each of the six possible outcomes for each year of a leader's tenure and these predictions always sum to 1 (or 100%). We use "staying in power" as the base category and present the results for each of the five exit types.

In Table 4 we interact each entry category with the $\log(\textit{Tenure})$ variable to see how each form of entry influences the risk of each form of exit during a leader's time in power. We use *Irregular Replacement Entry* as our base category so that all estimates are relative to leaders who entered power in this way. A *positive* coefficient on another entry type means those leaders are *more likely* than a leader who entered through irregular regime replacement to experience that kind of leader exit in their first year in power. Our hypotheses would therefore expect strong positive relationships between the other entry types and coalition-competing removal with negative interactions between the other entry types and time in power (H1 and H3). Meanwhile, we would expect there is *no* statistically significant relationships between each entry type and coalition-circumventing or coalition-collapsing removal (H2). As many implications of interaction terms can be difficult to diagnose from these coefficients alone, we graphically illustrate the effect of leader entry type on each exit type calculated as the first difference in Figures 1 and 2.

The first column of results in Table 4 shows how leader entry influences the risk of a coalition-*competing* exit (removal by rebellion, protest, or regime-changing coup). The positive and significant coefficients for *Regular Entry* and *Irregular Reorganization Entry* show that, as predicted, leaders coming to power in these ways are significantly more likely than leaders who entered in regime replacements to suffer these kinds of challenges early in their tenures. Furthermore, in accordance with the third hypothesis, the negative coefficients on the interaction terms between these entry categories and leader tenure indicate this effect diminishes over a leader's time in power.

To visualize this, we plot the effect of irregular regime replacement entry on the risk of a coalition-competing exit across leader tenure in Figure 1. The effect of *irregular regime replacement* entry is calculated as the first difference, a change in the risk of a coalition-

results are reported in the online appendix and are consistent with the results shown in the main text.


Table 4: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Manner of Losing Office in Dictatorships

<i>Dependent Variable</i>	Model 1				
	<i>Coalition</i> <i>Competing</i>	<i>Coalition</i> <i>Circumventing</i>	<i>Coalition</i> <i>Collapsing</i>	<i>Voluntary</i> <i>Resignation</i>	<i>Natural</i> <i>Death</i>
<i>Base Category</i>					
<i>Entry Manner</i>	<i>Irregular Replacement Entry</i>				
<i>Independent Variables</i>					
Regular Entry	1.885*** (.660)	-1.823 (1.247)	.306 (.446)	-.198 (.505)	-1.055 (1.223)
Regular × log(Tenure)	-.510* (.273)	.868 (.627)	-.358 (.265)	.379* (.224)	.360 (.435)
Irregular Reorganization Entry	2.575*** (.535)	.425 (1.021)	.352 (.533)	.483 (.466)	-.743 (.954)
Reorganization × log(Tenure)	-.776*** (.287)	.209 (.720)	.424 (.311)	.108 (.267)	.334 (.429)
Foreign Entry	.741 (1.806)	-.045 (.955)	-14.380*** (.745)	-2.638 (2.301)	-13.132*** (1.498)
Foreign × log(Tenure)	.349 (.851)	.840 (.672)	.771* (.422)	1.104* (.664)	-.399 (.485)
Log(Tenure)	.632*** (.204)	-.591 (.441)	-.507** (.222)	-.453** (.213)	.090 (.347)
<i>Controls</i>					
ln(GDP/capita)	-.354*** (.136)	.025 (.150)	-.209 (.129)	.116 (.138)	-.329 (.217)
GDP Growth	-3.235*** (.867)	-1.80 (1.686)	-.172 (.600)	-.544 (.777)	-.030 (.224)
Military Dictatorship	-.082 (.300)	.252 (.501)	.714** (.340)	.657*** (.251)	.056 (.527)
Monarchy	-2.082*** (.796)	-.497 (.583)	-.373 (.591)	-.777 (.608)	1.476** (.618)
Party	-2.057*** (.399)	-.428 (.547)	-.739** (.339)	1.058** (.429)	-.284 (.672)
Ln(Military Personnel)	-.166* (.096)	.078 (.151)	-.074 (.075)	.048 (.061)	.135 (.118)
Civil War	1.861*** (.274)	.899* (.473)	.392 (.347)	.250 (.232)	-.647 (.562)
War Victory	-2.383* (1.243)	-7.184** (2.946)	-5.272 (3.693)	-2.305 (1.462)	1.180** (.583)
War Defeat	.962* (.513)	3.095*** (.587)	.533 (.725)	-.010 (.689)	.710 (.565)
War Draw	-.569 (.489)	-1.251 (1.032)	-.813 (.627)	-.846 (.658)	.484 (.656)
Age	.041*** (.013)	.048** (.021)	.025** (.011)	.045*** (.010)	.061*** (.012)
Constant	-3.682*** (.943)	-7.130*** (1.332)	-2.565*** (.901)	-7.388*** (.942)	-6.529*** (1.532)
Log Likelihood	-1459.863				
Observations	3613				

Note: Robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. We provide the first differences predicted from this model in Figures 1 and 2.

competing exit a leader would suffer when her entry type is switched from either regular or irregular reorganization to irregular replacement when all other variables in the model are held constant at their means or medians. We used Model 1 in Table 4 to estimate the first differences. As predicted by our first hypothesis, Figure 1 shows that leaders who enter through irregular regime replacements are less likely to suffer removal by coalition competition than

Figure 1: Effect of Irregular *Replacement* Entry on Coalition-Competing Removal



Note: We show the change in predicted probabilities of coalition-competing removal when we change entry manner from either regular (the left panel) or irregular reorganization (the right panel) to irregular *replacement*. We use Model 1 in Table 4 to estimate the first difference.

either leaders who enter through regular (the left panel) or irregular reorganizations (the right panel) early in their tenure. This advantage, however, gradually wanes and irregular replacement entry stops having a significantly negative effect after approximately 9 (v.s. regular entry) or 8 (v.s. irregular reorganization entry) years in power. This is congruent with our expectation that the way a leader entered office should become less relevant the longer the leader stays in power. Regarding the control variables, the results of the first column in Table 4 corroborate previous research that finds these kinds of threats to be less likely when states enjoy greater economic prosperity, more success in foreign armed conflicts, and either party-based or monarchical political institutions (Debs and Goemans, 2010; Magaloni, 2008; Kokkonen and Sundell, 2014; Londregan and Poole, 1990).

The method of leader entry does not have a similar effect on irregular removal by coalition circumvention (assassinations and overthrows) and coalition collapse (internal reshuffles and legal removals), as evinced by the statistically insignificant effects provided in the sec-


ond and third columns in Table 4. The first differences reported in Figure 2 also confirm this point.¹³ Leaders coming to power via irregular regime replacement are no less likely to suffer removal by coalition circumvention (the top row) or collapse (the bottom row) than leaders coming to power via regular processes (the left panel) or irregular reorganizations (the right panel). Though the difference of the risk of coalition-collapsing exit between irregular regime replacement and irregular reorganization entry is statistically significant after 3 years in power (see the bottom-right panel), the effect of irregular replacement entry is insignificant at the very beginning of a leader's tenure when the value of the information provided by a leader's entry should be the strongest. These results thus show that the insulating effects of leader entry by complete regime replacement are limited to coalition-competing forms of removal, and this is congruent with our expectations (H2). Assassins, foreign powers, and internal factions are not deterred by leaders who force their way into office with a credible show-of-strength. Instead, leaders who prove strength through irregular regime replacement are only insulated from extra-coalition threats that would require rivals to compete with and overcome the leader's strong coalition.

Our initial test collapsed many forms of leader entry into four theoretically-relevant categories: regular entry, irregular regime replacement, irregular regime reorganization, and foreign installation. However, there could be important variation within these broader categories. Table 5 presents two models in which we disaggregate these entry types to examine whether our findings are driven by anomalous results for a more specific means of taking power. Most importantly, we separate irregular replacements into two groups: regime-changing coups and successful protests/rebellions. Model 2 shows the effects of these specific entry types relative to regular forms of entry. Model 3 does the same but uses forms of irregular regime reorganization as the base category for comparison.¹⁴

¹³The first differences in Figure 2 are calculated as the changes in predicted probabilities of coalition circumvention removal or coalition collapse removal when we change entry manner from either regular or irregular reorganization to irregular regime *replacement*. We use Model 1 in Table 4 for the estimation.

¹⁴Due to the extremely low number of leaders entering through successful protests, it is not feasible for us to further disaggregate this category.

Figure 2: Effect of Irregular *Replacement* Entry on Coalition-Circumventing and Collapsing Removal



Note: We show the changes in predicted probabilities of coalition circumvention removal (the top panel) and coalition collapse removal (the bottom panel) when we change entry manner from either regular (the left panel) or irregular reorganization (the right panel) to irregular regime *replacement*. We use Model 1 in Table 4 to estimate the first difference.


The results of these tests provide very strong justification for categorizing these entry types according to the strength they convey to potential challengers. Beginning with the results for coalition-competing removal, we see very similar results for the two disaggregated forms of irregular regime replacement, and importantly, coalition-competing challenges are least likely to occur against leaders who took power in these ways. There is no meaningful difference between leaders entering through successful rebellions or protests and those entering through major regime-changing coups (the respective coefficients are -2.14 and -1.84 in Model 2, -2.80 and -2.52 in Model 3). In Figure 3, we chart the near-identical effects of these two forms of irregular regime replacement on coalition-competing leader removal.

Table 5: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Manner of Losing Office in Dictatorships

Dependent Variable	Model 2					Model 3				
	Coalition Competing	Coalition Circumventing	Coalition Collapsing	Voluntary Resignation	Natural Death	Coalition Competing	Coalition Circumventing	Coalition Collapsing	Voluntary Resignation	Natural Death
<i>Base Category</i>										
<i>Entry Manner</i>	Regular Entry					Irregular Reorganization Entry				
<i>Irregular Replacement Entry</i>										
Rebel Entry	-2.135*** (.646)	-.319 (1.422)	-2.288* (1.227)	1.837** (.763)	2.495** (1.037)	-2.797*** (.576)	-2.421** (1.174)	-2.410** (1.210)	1.223 (.798)	2.406** (1.173)
Rebel × log(Tenure)	.470 (.388)	.038 (.634)	1.100*** (.353)	-1.262** (.564)	-.423 (.479)	.727* (.416)	.584 (.673)	.312 (.347)	-.988* (.579)	-.428 (.497)
Regime-Change Coup Entry	-1.836** (.782)	2.511* (1.395)	-.193 (.455)	-.376 (.577)	-.165 (1.683)	-2.524*** (.613)	.159 (1.081)	-.221 (.535)	-1.054** (.517)	-.073 (1.515)
Regime-Change Coup × log(Tenure)	.518* (.291)	-1.120 (.692)	.329 (.273)	-.138 (.244)	-.429 (.650)	.774*** (.296)	-.446 (.766)	-.470 (.312)	.122 (.284)	-.482 (.626)
<i>Irregular Reorganization Entry</i>										
Reshuffling Coup Entry	.131 (.833)	1.844 (1.296)	.134 (.557)	.816** (.378)	-.469 (1.371)					
Reshuffling Coup × log(Tenure)	.158 (.369)	-.054 (.629)	.632** (.314)	-.425* (.258)	.064 (.515)					
Forced Selection Entry	1.462** (.706)	3.594*** (1.296)	-.205 (.512)	.463 (.459)	.408 (1.381)					
Forced Selection × log(Tenure)	-1.194* (.676)	-20.681*** (1.466)	1.148*** (.300)	-.094 (.313)	-.008 (.482)					
<i>Regular Entry</i>										
Regular First-Election Entry						-.594 (.727)	-1.654 (1.221)	.172 (.529)	-.321 (.409)	-.670 (2.178)
Regular First-Election × log(Tenure)						.153 (.356)	.305 (.714)	-1.071*** (.308)	-.015 (.250)	.189 (.762)
Regular Election Entry						-.916 (.764)	-3.021 (2.132)	-.320 (.469)	-.839** (.368)	.437 (1.099)
Regular Election × log(Tenure)						.452 (.411)	.966 (1.019)	-.509* (.303)	.520** (.248)	-.186 (.392)
Foreign Entry	-1.120 (1.686)	1.887 (1.362)	-16.387*** (.760)	-2.397 (2.223)	-13.576*** (1.509)	-1.880 (1.757)	-.564 (.837)	-14.837*** (.816)	-3.070 (2.168)	-11.955*** (1.420)
Foreign × log(Tenure)	.847 (.829)	-.028 (.744)	1.154*** (.402)	.714 (.643)	-.715 (.503)	1.137 (.876)	.613 (.662)	.361 (.415)	1.037* (.620)	-.750 (.519)
Log(Tenure)	.125 (.192)	.299 (.473)	-.866*** (.191)	-.069 (.129)	.459 (.326)	-.141 (.265)	-.362 (.576)	-.083 (.197)	-.337* (.192)	.504 (.317)
<i>Controls</i>										
ln(GDP/capita)	-.354** (.138)	-.014 (.159)	-.204 (.127)	.122 (.139)	-.325 (.219)	-.372*** (.135)	.022 (.163)	-.224* (.130)	.070 (.141)	-.369 (.226)
GDP Growth	-3.064*** (.850)	-1.291 (1.755)	-.153 (.633)	-.522 (.775)	-.005 (.181)	-3.176*** (.866)	-1.556 (1.733)	-.152 (.584)	-.504 (.770)	-.013 (.194)
Military Dictatorship	-.147 (.399)	.032 (.661)	.688* (.351)	.730*** (.257)	.745* (.431)	-.116 (.327)	-.007 (.603)	.609* (.361)	.818*** (.249)	.689 (.510)
Monarchy	-2.176*** (.815)	-.616 (.623)	-.287 (.585)	-.800 (.595)	1.435** (.671)	-2.078*** (.792)	-.503 (.579)	-.360 (.581)	-.832 (.549)	1.527** (.735)
Party	-2.108*** (.409)	-.444 (.572)	-.688* (.351)	.993** (.427)	-.604 (.751)	-2.042*** (.417)	-.334 (.566)	-.684** (.332)	.925** (.395)	-.528 (.835)
Ln(Military Personnel)	-.152 (.095)	.085 (.154)	-.078 (.076)	.046 (.062)	.116 (.131)	-.178* (.096)	.055 (.156)	-.080 (.077)	.006 (.062)	.109 (.149)
Civil War	1.857*** (.272)	.999** (.473)	.425 (.347)	.215 (.232)	-.716 (.536)	1.867*** (.275)	.951** (.483)	.425 (.350)	.244 (.232)	-.691 (.539)
War Victory	-2.311* (1.219)	-7.464** (3.261)	-6.110 (4.083)	-2.456 (1.539)	1.080* (.619)	-2.359* (1.206)	-7.292** (3.162)	-5.213 (3.701)	-2.174 (1.330)	1.153** (.577)
War Defeat	1.011** (.482)	3.608*** (.647)	.491 (.733)	-.178 (.675)	.679 (.568)	.943* (.515)	3.310*** (.626)	.656 (.730)	-.108 (.660)	.757 (.528)
War Draw	-.539 (.496)	-1.625 (1.241)	-.787 (.626)	-.801 (.651)	.463 (.605)	-.538 (.483)	-1.330 (1.100)	-.800 (.640)	-.806 (.659)	.445 (.626)
Age	.039*** (.013)	.049** (.024)	.022** (.010)	.045*** (.010)	.067*** (.014)	.041*** (.013)	.048** (.022)	.024** (.011)	.049*** (.011)	.068*** (.014)
Constant	-1.716* (.947)	-8.879*** (1.942)	-2.148** (.988)	-7.600*** (1.118)	-7.795*** (1.608)	-.969 (1.002)	-6.596*** (1.659)	-2.025* (1.081)	-6.702*** (.994)	-7.637*** (1.662)
Log Likelihood	-1441.7293					-1445.123				
Observations	3613					3613				

Note: Robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. We provide the first differences predicted from these models in Figure 2 and Table 7.

Figure 3: Effect of Rebel and Regime-Change Coup Entry on Coalition-Competing Removal



Note: We show the changes in predicted probabilities of coalition-competing removal when we change entry manner from regular or irregular reorganization entry to rebel or regime-change coup entry. We use Models 2 and 3 in Table 5 to estimate these first differences.

Figure 3 shows the changes in predicted probabilities of coalition-competing removal when we change entry manner from regular (the top panel) or irregular reorganization (the bottom panel) to rebel (the left panel) or regime-changing coup (the right panel). The effects of rebel entry and regime-changing coup entry look very similar and, as predicted by our first hypothesis, they are negative and significant during the first few years of a new leader's time in power. In other words, the coalition-competing removals are least likely to occur against leaders who took power through successful rebellions or major regime-changing coups. These stabilizing effects of the disaggregated forms of irregular regime replacement entry, though, gradually diminish and leader entry has no statistically significant effect on the risk of a coalition-competing exit once a leader has spent approximately 6-8 years in office.

The results for the two forms of regular entry are also statistically indistinguishable from each other (coefficients of -.59 and -.92 in Model 3). There is a larger difference between the two forms of regime reorganization, but this is not surprising. Leaders entering through forced election/selection (coefficient of 1.46, Model 2) have a greater risk of a coalition-competing removal than those entering through a reshuffling coup (coefficient of 0.13, Model 2) because reshuffles are responses to internal divisions while forced election/selection typically occurs when regimes are already threatened by burgeoning popular protests or insurgencies. Since many of these forced selections are desperate attempts to stave off an impending crisis, the very high risk of a subsequent coalition-competing challenge is to be expected.

The results also show that most leaders who enter through irregular regime replacement generally do not enjoy a similarly low risk of removal by coalition collapse or coalition circumvention. Leaders rising through rebellion are slightly less likely to suffer coalition collapse in their first year in power, though the statistical significance of this effect is relatively weak and derived from a small sample of leaders. Leaders entering through regime-changing coups are somewhat more likely than regular entry leaders to suffer coalition-circumventing forms of removal early in their tenures, but there is no similar effect vis-à-vis leaders who came to power through irregular reorganizations.

Coup Entry and Coup Exit

Our findings seemingly challenge the well-known “coup trap” hypothesis, which is the idea that a coup greatly increases the chances of a subsequent coup attempt (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012). This argument implies that leaders who enter office via coup are more likely to be removed via coup. In contrast, our analysis shows that leaders who come to power by a regime-changing coup are significantly *less likely* to fall in another regime-changing coup, especially in the first few years after they take power. Here, we show that we can reconcile these complementary findings.

Table 6 present the results from four slightly different logit models. Models 4 and 5

Table 6: Logit Analysis of Coup Exit in Dictatorships


	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Dependent Variable:</i>				
<i>Exit Manner</i>	Regime-Change Coup		Reshuffling-Coup	
<i>Base Category:</i>				
<i>Entry Manner</i>	Non-Coup			
<i>Independent Variables</i>				
Regime-Change Coup Entry	-2.375** (.924)	-1.767** (.792)	-.065 (.556)	.099 (.416)
Regime-Change Coup × log(Tenure)	.394 (.406)		.150 (.308)	
Reshuffling Coup Entry	-.082 (.785)	.186 (.609)	.275 (.505)	.795** (.363)
Reshuffling Coup × log(Tenure)	.215 (.389)		.478 (.293)	
Log(Tenure)	.178 (.220)	.265 (.194)	-.576*** (.174)	-.417*** (.115)
<i>Controls</i>				
ln(GDP/capita)	-.509*** (.188)	-.520*** (.190)	-.225 (.151)	-.207 (.158)
GDP Growth	-.319 (1.088)	-.372 (1.129)	-.365 (.852)	-.365 (.953)
Military Dictatorship	-.169 (.530)	-.110 (.529)	.612 (.388)	.675* (.393)
Monarchy	-2.443*** (.832)	-2.429*** (.829)	-.240 (.635)	-.205 (.630)
Party	-2.866*** (.479)	-2.860*** (.488)	-.823** (.389)	-.803** (.373)
Ln(Military Personnel)	-.223* (.126)	-.220* (.126)	-.073 (.088)	-.075 (.087)
Civil War	1.537*** (.387)	1.544*** (.386)	.483 (.333)	.474 (.327)
War Victory	-2.124 (1.536)	-2.196 (1.540)	-4.991 (4.808)	-4.943 (4.600)
War Defeat	.065 (.972)	.181 (.905)	.111 (1.017)	.091 (1.013)
War Draw	-2.139** (1.012)	-2.107** (1.011)	-1.199 (.769)	-1.196 (.777)
Age	.040** (.019)	.040** (.018)	.018 (.011)	.017 (.011)
Constant	-.613 (1.247)	-.728 (1.234)	-2.239** (1.081)	-2.538** (1.105)
Log Likelihood	-189.0286	-189.41068	-271.83226	-272.8182
Observations	3613	3613	3613	3613

Parentheses contain robust country-clustered errors. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

examine whether leaders entering through regime-changing and reshuffling coups face different risks of being overthrown in a regime-changing coup. Models 6 and 7 instead examine the effects of two types of coup entry on the risk of being overthrown in a reshuffling coup. To evaluate the substantive effect of each type of coup entry, we also calculate the first difference of the risk of being ousted via each type of coup when we change entry manner from *non-coup* entry to either regime-changing coup or reshuffling coup entry in Figures 4 and 5.

The results in Table 6 show leaders who enter in a regime-changing coup are *exceptionally unlikely* to lose power in a regime-changing coup; the coefficients on *Regime-Change Coup Entry* (Models 4 and 5) are negative and significant. We illustrate this result in Figure 4). Meanwhile, leaders who enter in reshuffling coups are neither more nor less likely to suffer a regime-changing coup relative to leaders who entered in other ways (right panel of Figure 4). This finding rebukes the established wisdom regarding coup traps, at least as it applies to regime-changing coups.

Figure 4: Effect of Different Types of Coup Entry on Regime-Change Coup Exit




Note: We show the changes in predicted probabilities of regime-change coup removal when we change entry manner from *non-* coup entry to regime-change coup or reshuffling-coup entry. We use Models 4 in Table 6 to estimate the first difference.

But the same is not true of reshuffling coups (Models 6 and 7). Here, we see that while leaders entering in regime-changing coups are no more likely to fall in a reshuffling coup than leaders entering in a non-coup manner (See Figure 5, left), leaders who come to power in reshuffling coups are significantly *more* likely to suffer this type of threat (See Figure 5, right). Though the effect of reshuffling coup entry is insignificant in the first two years of leader tenure, it becomes positive and significant for the remainder of a leader's time in power (Figure 5, right).

Taken together, the results reported in this section reveal that while regime-changing coups *deter* subsequent regime-changing coups as our theory predicts, reshuffling coups *encourage* subsequent reshuffling coups. In accordance with prior literature, leaders who come to power via a reshuffling coup are significantly more likely to be overthrown via a reshuffling coup. By disaggregating coups by type, we find that the coup trap is the result of successive waves of reshuffling coups. Our argument is thus consistent with the coup trap argument; leaders who enter in major regime-changing coups are much less likely to be overthrown, yet the “coup trap” greatly increases the chances that leaders rising in reshuffling coups will be targeted by subsequent reshuffling coups.

Figure 5: Effect of Different Types of Coup Entry on Reshuffling Coup Exit



Note: We show the changes in predicted probabilities of reshuffling coup removal when we change entry manner from *non-* coup entry to regime-change coup or reshuffling-coup entry (Model 6, Table 6).

The Rise Predicts the Fall

About 60% of the non-democratic leaders who come to power via coup, civil war, or protest are still in power three years later, and this rate is not significantly different than that for non-democratic leaders who were elected or selected in regular constitutional processes. Yet, this similarity obscures an important difference: leaders with regular entries are more likely to be removed by rival coalitions while those who took power by removing their predecessor's entire governments were more likely to voluntarily resign. This provides some support for Machiavelli's observation that those who overcome the greatest difficulty in coming to power are those who have the least trouble keeping it. We show that this classical insight is consistent with the modern literatures on coordination and signaling; leaders who convey the strength of their supporting coalitions at the dawn of their tenures prove to be more resilient against similar challenges once in power.

Our analysis shows that after controlling for relevant political and economic factors, leaders who rise to power by coup, civil war, or protest are several times less likely to suffer these kinds of irregular regime changes compared to non-democratic leaders who came to power by other means. We claim the relative invulnerability enjoyed by these leaders is attributable to the show-of-strength that occurs when a new leader takes office with the explicit support of a strong, loyal, and risk-acceptant coalition of supporters. This demonstration of support helps leaders deter potential threats more effectively than leaders who came to power in ways that do not convey a strong coalition.

Beyond our core finding linking coordinated irregular entry to a *lower* risk of similar types of leader removal, the paper highlights what we can learn by looking beyond the constitutionality of non-democratic leader transitions and focusing more on the causes and consequences of specific forms of transition. We show that some forms of entry more explicitly convey the level of support a new incumbent enjoys, and we have also shown that some types of challenges are more sensitive to this kind of information. These insights should allow for more accurate predictions of war and coup in at-risk states, and they should also improve our

understanding of how dictators choose to placate or repress political opposition. Future work could continue to refine this argument and consider factors that were not included in this study, such as how ethnic cleavages or the level of violence in a previous transition might affect subsequent political stability. If some entry types deter challenges, then leader entry could also affect levels of repression and concessions including public goods provision and political reform.

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Supporting Appendix A: Our Dataset and Coding Criteria

This dataset codes eight forms of leader entry according to the following coding tree:

1. Did the ruling political regime choose the new leader or agree to the process for leader selection?

YES 1a. Was this decision a response to an unexpected political crisis brought on by regime opponents, such as an assassination, protest, or war?

YES Code as **Forced Election/Selection**. Leaders here should include those entering after assassinations, those appointed by the regime in response to protests, etc. but should not include leaders that were not explicitly chosen by the predecessor or the appropriate officials within the predecessor's ruling regime.

NO 1b. Was this the first transition between individual leaders within the predecessor's regime (unprecedented), or was the predecessor the most recent of multiple leaders to have served under the existing ruling order (unprecedented)?

PRECEDENTED Code as **Regular Election/Selection**. Leaders here should include those were (s)elected under long-established dominant party systems, successors in established hereditary monarchies, etc. This code should not be applied to leaders who took power in systems that did not have established patterns/norms of leader transition.

UNPRECEDENTED Code as **First Regular Transition**. This category encompasses the leaders who come to power within a regime that has not yet established precedented patterns for leader transition. The first leaders to succeed regime founders (e.g. Raul Castro) or those who come to power in a regime's first elections (e.g. Francois Duvalier) belong in this category.

NO 2. The new leader was forced upon the predecessor's government by:

A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT Code as **Foreign Installation**. Leaders belong in this category if foreign governments were the most important actors in the leader transition. Foreign support for rebel groups or coup plotters is not sufficient. Typically, the foreign role will be much greater in these cases (e.g. Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1957 or Harmid Karzai in Afghanistan, 2001).

COUP CONSPIRATORS 2a. Did the coup plotters seek to replace the leader while mostly preserving existing regime norms and institutions?

YES Code as **Reshuffle Coup**. Sometimes called "shuffling coups," these are transitions in which conspirators put a new *individual* in charge of the existing order. These are less likely to bloody coups.

NO Code as **Regime-Change Coup**. These transitions occur when entire political regimes are removed and replaced. In addition to leader replacement, the successful coup plotters significantly change institutions and the nature of executive power in the country.

A MASS MOVEMENT 2b. Did the movement achieve a military victory over the government?

YES Code as **Successful Rebellion**. This category should include *only* leaders who were chosen by successful rebels after a military campaign against the government. Leaders chosen by the ruling regime in response to an increasingly threatening rebellion should be coded as *Irregular Election/Selection* because the predecessor's government selected the new leader.

NO Code as **Successful Protest**. This category should include *only* leaders who were chosen by successful protesters/strikers after a non-militarized campaign against the government. Leaders chosen by the ruling regime in response to an increasingly threatening protest should be coded as *Irregular Election/Selection* because the predecessor's government selected the new leader.

This dataset codes eight forms of leader exit according to the following coding tree:

1. Did the leader die a natural death in office?

YES Code as **Natural Death**.

NO See Question 2.

2 Was the leader assassinated outside the context of a larger coup conspiracy or political conflict?

YES Code as **Assassination**. Note that killings that occur as a result of bloody coups or rebel victories should be coded elsewhere.

NO See Question 3.

3. Was the leader forced out by an immediate political crisis, or did the leader resign voluntarily?

RESIGNED Code as **Voluntary Resignation**. These usually occur with elections, successions, and abdications that are not immediate responses to major political crises.

FORCED 4. The leader was forced out primarily by:

A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT Code as **Foreign Overthrow**. Leaders belong in this category if foreign governments were the most important actors in the leader transition. Foreign support for rebel groups or coup plotters is not sufficient. Typically, the foreign role will be much greater in these cases (e.g. Hussein in Iraq, 2003).

COUP CONSPIRATORS 4a. Did the coup plotters seek to replace the leader while mostly preserving existing regime norms and institutions?

YES Code as **Reshuffle Coup**. Sometimes called “shuffling coups,” these are transitions in which conspirators put a new *individual* in charge of the existing order. These are less likely to be bloody coups.

NO Code as **Regime-Change Coup**. These transitions occur when entire political regimes are removed and replaced. In addition to leader replacement, the successful coup plotters significantly change institutions and the nature of executive power in the country.

A MASS MOVEMENT 4b. Did the movement coerce the government through military force?

YES Code as **Rebellion**. This category should include *only* leaders who were forced out during a rebel campaign against the government.

NO Code as **Protest**. This category should include *only* leaders who were forced out by protesters/strikers after a non-militarized campaign against the government.

A LEGAL PROCESS Code as **Legal Removal**. Constitutional impeachments, involuntary removals by juntas or politburos (via legal deliberations rather than secretive coups), etc. qualify here. For these to not be counted as Voluntary Resignations, there needs to be strong evidence that the leader was removed by an unusual and legal process (i.e. not a Leader Coup) against her wishes.

leadercode	ccode	smonth	syear	leader	emonth	eyear	entry	exit	archigosentry	archigosexit	puppet
40001	40	3	1952	Batista	1	1959	Regime-Change Coup	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
40002	40	1	1959	Castro	2	2008	Successful Rebellion	Resignation, Health	Irregular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
40003	40	2	2008	Raul Castro			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
41001	41	5	1950	Magloire	12	1956	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
41002	41	12	1956	Pierre-Louis	2	1957	Reshuffle Coup	Protest	Regular	Military Coup	0
41003	41	2	1957	Sylvain	4	1957	Forced Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
41004	41	4	1957	Executive Council	5	1957	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Regular	0
41005	41	5	1957	Cantave	5	1957	Reshuffle Coup	Protest	Irregular	Military Coup	1
41006	41	5	1957	Fignole	6	1957	Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
41007	41	6	1957	Kebreau	10	1957	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
41008	41	10	1957	Duvalier, Francois	4	1971	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
41009	41	4	1971	Duvalier, Jean-	2	1986	Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
41010	41	2	1986	Namphy	2	1988	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
41011	41	2	1988	Manigat	6	1988	First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
41012	41	6	1988	Namphy	9	1988	Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
41013	41	9	1988	Avril	3	1990	Regime-Change Coup	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
41014	41	3	1990	Pascal-Troillet	2	1991	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
41015	41	9	1991	Cedras	10	1994	Regime-Change Coup	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Foreign	0
41016	41	2	2001	Aristide	2	2004	First Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
41017	41	2	2004	Boniface Alexandre	5	2006	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
42001	42	5	1961	Balaguer	1	1962	Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	1
42002	42	1	1962	Filiberto Bonnelly	2	1963	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
42003	42	9	1963	de los Santos	12	1963	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
42004	42	12	1963	Cabral	4	1965	First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	1
42005	42	4	1965	Bartolome Benoit	5	1965	Regime-Change Coup	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Regular	0
42006	42	5	1965	Imbert	8	1965	Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
42007	42	9	1965	Godoy	7	1966	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
42008	42	7	1966	Balaguer	7	1978	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
55001	55	3	1979	Maurice Bishop	10	1983	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	NA	NA	0
55002	55	10	1983	Hudson Austin	10	1983	Reshuffle Coup	Foreign Overthrow	NA	NA	0
55003	55	12	1983	Nicholas Brathwaite	12	1984	Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
70001	70	12	1952	Ruiz Cortines	12	1958	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
70002	70	12	1958	Lopez Mateos	12	1964	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
70003	70	12	1964	Diaz Ordaz	12	1970	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
70004	70	12	1970	Echeverria Alvarez	12	1976	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
70005	70	12	1976	Lopez Portillo	12	1982	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
70006	70	12	1982	de La Madrid	12	1988	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
70007	70	12	1988	Salinas	11	1994	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
70008	70	12	1994	Zedillo	11	2000	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
90001	90	6	1954	Monzon	7	1954	Regime-Change Coup	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
90002	90	7	1954	Castillo Armas	7	1957	Foreign Installation	Assassination	Irregular	Assassination by Unsupported Individual	0
90003	90	7	1957	Gonzalez Lopez	10	1957	Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
90004	90	10	1957	Flores Avendano	3	1958	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
90005	90	3	1958	Ydigoras Fuente	3	1963	First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
90006	90	3	1963	Peralta Azurdia	7	1966	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
90007	90	7	1966	Mendez Montenegro	7	1970	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
90008	90	7	1970	Arana Osorio	7	1974	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
90009	90	7	1974	Laugerud Garcia	7	1978	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
90010	90	7	1978	Lucas Garcia	3	1982	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
90011	90	3	1982	Rios Montt	8	1983	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
90012	90	8	1983	Mejia Victores	1	1986	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
90013	90	1	1986	Cerezo	1	1991	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
90014	90	1	1991	Serrano Elias	5	1993	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
90015	90	6	1993	Leon Carpio	1	1996	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0

91001	91	11	1954	Lozano Diaz	10	1956	Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
91002	91	10	1956	Hector Caraccioli	12	1957	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
91003	91	10	1963	Lopez Arellano	6	1971	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
91004	91	12	1972	Lopez Arellano	4	1975	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
91005	91	4	1975	Melgar Castro	8	1978	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
91006	91	8	1978	Paz Garcia	1	1982	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
92001	92	9	1950	Osorio	9	1956	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
92002	92	9	1956	Lemus	10	1960	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
92003	92	10	1960	Castillo	1	1961	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
92004	92	1	1961	Portillo	1	1962	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
92005	92	1	1962	Rodolfo Cordon	7	1962	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
92006	92	7	1962	Rivera	7	1967	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
92007	92	7	1967	Sanchez Hernandez	7	1972	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
92008	92	7	1972	Molina	7	1977	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
92009	92	7	1977	Romero Mena	10	1979	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
92010	92	10	1979	Majano Ramos	12	1980	Reshuffle Coup	Legal Removal	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
92011	92	12	1980	Duarte	5	1982	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
92012	92	5	1982	Magana Borjo	6	1984	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
93001	93	9	1956	Luis Somoza Debayle	5	1963	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
93002	93	5	1963	Shick Gutierrez	8	1966	Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	1
93003	93	8	1966	Guerrero Gutierrez	5	1967	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
93004	93	5	1967	Anastasio Somoza Debayle	7	1979	Regular Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
93005	93	7	1979	Daniel Ortega	4	1990	Successful Rebellion	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
95001	95	5	1951	Arosomena, A.	10	1952	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
95002	95	10	1952	Remon Cantero	1	1955	Regular Election/Selection	Assassination	Regular	Assassination by Unsupported Individual	0
95003	95	1	1955	Guizado	1	1955	Forced Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Regular	Regular	0
95004	95	1	1955	Arias Espinosa	10	1956	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
95005	95	10	1956	Guardia Jr., E.	10	1960	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
95006	95	10	1968	Torrijos Herrera	7	1981	Regime-Change Coup	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
95007	95	7	1981	Florez Aguilar	3	1982	Forced Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
95008	95	3	1982	Dario Paredes	8	1983	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
95009	95	8	1983	Noriega	1	1990	First Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Foreign	0
100001	100	8	1950	Laureanco Gomez	11	1951	Regular Election/Selection	Resignation, Health	Regular	Regular	0
100002	100	11	1951	Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez	6	1953	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
100003	100	6	1953	Rojas Pinilla	5	1957	Reshuffle Coup	Protest	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
100004	100	5	1957	Paris	8	1958	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
101001	101	11	1950	Perez Jimenez	1	1958	Forced Election/Selection	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
101002	101	3	2013	Nicolas Maduro			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
110001	110	5	1966	Burnham	8	1985	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
110002	110	8	1985	Hoyte	10	1992	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
115001	115	11	1975	Ferrier	2	1980	First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
115002	115	2	1980	Bouterse	1	1988	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
115003	115	12	1990	Kraag	9	1991	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
130001	130	7	1963	Castro	3	1966	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Protest	1
130002	130	3	1966	Yerovi Indaburu	11	1966	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
130003	130	11	1966	Arosomena Gomez	9	1968	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
130004	130	2	1972	Rodriguez Lara	1	1976	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
130005	130	1	1976	Poveda Burbano	8	1979	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
135001	135	6	1950	Noriega	7	1950	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
135002	135	7	1950	Odría	7	1956	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
135003	135	7	1962	Perez Godoy	3	1963	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
135004	135	3	1963	Lindley Lopez	7	1963	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
135005	135	10	1968	Velasco Alvarado	8	1975	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
135006	135	8	1975	Morales Bermudez	7	1980	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
135007	135	11	2000	Valentin Paniagua	7	2001	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0

140001	140	4	1964	Castello Branco	3	1967	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
140002	140	3	1967	Costa de Silva	9	1969	First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
140003	140	9	1969	Military Junta	10	1969	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
140004	140	10	1969	Medici	3	1974	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
140005	140	3	1974	Geisel	3	1979	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
140006	140	3	1979	Figueiredo	3	1985	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
145001	145	5	1951	Ballvian Rojas	4	1952	Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Rebellion	0
145002	145	4	1952	Paz Estenssoro	6	1956	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
145003	145	6	1956	Siles Zuazo	8	1960	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
145004	145	8	1960	Paz Estenssoro	11	1964	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
145005	145	11	1964	Barrientos Ortuna	1	1966	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
145006	145	1	1966	Ovando Candia	8	1966	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
145007	145	8	1966	Barrientos Ortuna	4	1969	Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
145008	145	4	1969	Siles Salinas	9	1969	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
145009	145	9	1969	Ovando Candia	10	1970	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
145010	145	10	1970	Torres	8	1971	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
145011	145	8	1971	Banzer Suarez	7	1978	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
145012	145	7	1978	Pereda Asbun	11	1978	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
145013	145	11	1978	Padilla Aranciba	8	1979	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
145014	145	8	1979	Guevara Arze	11	1979	Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
145015	145	11	1979	Natusch Busch	11	1979	Regime-Change Coup	Protest	Irregular	Regular	0
145016	145	11	1979	Gueiler Tejada	7	1980	Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
145017	145	7	1980	García Meza Tejada	8	1981	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
145018	145	8	1981	Torrelío Villa	7	1982	Reshuffle Coup	Legal Removal	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
145019	145	7	1982	Vildoso Calderon	10	1982	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
150001	150	5	1954	Pareira	7	1954	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
150002	150	7	1954	Stroessner	2	1989	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Military Coup	0
150003	150	2	1989	Rodriguez Pedotti	8	1993	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
155001	155	9	1973	Pinochet	3	1990	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
160001	160	9	1955	Lonardi	11	1955	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
160002	160	11	1955	Aramburu	5	1958	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
160003	160	5	1958	Fronidzi	3	1962	First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
160004	160	3	1962	Guido	10	1963	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
160005	160	10	1963	Arturo Illia	6	1966	First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	1
160006	160	6	1966	Ongania	6	1970	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
160007	160	6	1970	Lanusse	6	1970	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
160008	160	6	1970	Levingston	3	1971	First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
160009	160	3	1971	Lanusse	5	1973	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
160010	160	3	1976	Videla	3	1981	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
160011	160	3	1981	Viola	11	1981	First Election/Selection	Resignation, Health	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
160012	160	11	1981	Liendo	12	1981	Regular Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Regular	Military Coup	0
160013	160	12	1981	Galtieri	6	1982	Forced Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Irregular	Military Coup	0
160014	160	6	1982	Saint-Jean	7	1982	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
160015	160	7	1982	Bignone	12	1983	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
165001	165	6	1976	Demichelli	9	1976	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Military Coup	1
165002	165	9	1976	Mendez Manfredini	9	1981	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
165003	165	9	1981	Alvarez Armalino	3	1985	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
221001	221	4	2005	Albert			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	NA	NA	0
223001	223	11	1989	Hans-Adam II			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	NA	NA	0
230001	230	11	1975	Juan Carlos	11	1975	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
230002	230	11	1975	Arias Navarro	7	1976	Regular Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Regular	Regular	0
235001	235	9	1968	Caetano	4	1974	First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
235002	235	4	1974	Spinola	9	1974	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
235003	235	9	1974	Costa Gomes	7	1976	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
265001	265	7	1950	Ulbricht	5	1971	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0

265002	265	5	1971 Honecker	10	1989 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
265003	265	10	1989 Krenz	12	1989 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
265004	265	12	1989 Gysi	10	1990 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Foreign	0
290001	290	3	1956 Ochab	10	1956 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
290002	290	10	1956 Gomulka	12	1970 Regular Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Protest	0
290003	290	12	1970 Gierek	9	1980 Regular Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Natural Death	0
290004	290	9	1980 Kania	10	1981 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
290005	290	10	1981 Jaruzelski	12	1990 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
305001	305	4	1953 Raab	4	1961 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
310001	310	7	1956 Gero	10	1956 Forced Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Protest	0
310002	310	10	1956 Nagy	11	1956 Forced Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Foreign	0
310003	310	11	1956 Kadar	5	1988 Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Foreign	Regular	0
310004	310	5	1988 Grosz	10	1989 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
310005	310	10	1989 Szuros	5	1990 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
315001	315	3	1953 Zapotocky	11	1957 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Natural Death	0
315002	315	11	1957 Novotny	1	1968 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
315003	315	1	1968 Dubcek	8	1968 Regular Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Regular	Foreign	0
315004	315	8	1968 Svoboda	8	1968 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Foreign	1
315005	315	8	1968 Husak	12	1989 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Foreign	Regular	0
339001	339	4	1985 Alia	4	1992 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
344001	344	5	1991 Tudjman	11	1999 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
344002	344	11	1999 Pavletic	2	2000 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
344003	344	2	2000 Tomcic	2	2000 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
344004	344	2	2000 Mesic	11	2000 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345001	345	5	1980 Kolisevski	5	1980 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
345002	345	5	1980 Mijatovic	5	1981 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345003	345	5	1981 Kraigher	5	1982 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345004	345	5	1982 Stambolic	5	1983 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345005	345	5	1983 Spiljac	5	1984 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345006	345	5	1984 Djuranovic	5	1985 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345007	345	5	1985 Vlajkovic	5	1986 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345008	345	5	1986 Hasani	5	1987 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345009	345	5	1987 Mojsovic	5	1988 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345010	345	5	1988 Dizarevic	5	1989 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
345011	345	5	1989 Milosevic	10	2000 Regular Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Regular	0
346001	346	12	1990 Izetbegovic	10	1998 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346002	346	10	1998 Radisic	6	1999 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346003	346	6	1999 Jelavic	2	2000 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346004	346	2	2000 Izetbegovic	10	2000 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
346005	346	10	2000 Radisic	6	2001 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346006	346	6	2001 Krizanovic	2	2002 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346007	346	2	2002 Belkic	10	2002 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346008	346	10	2002 Sarovic	4	2003 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346009	346	4	2003 Borislav Paravac	6	2003 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
346010	346	6	2003 Dragan Covic	2	2004 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346011	346	2	2004 Sulejman Tihic	10	2004 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346012	346	10	2004 Borislav Paravac	6	2005 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346013	346	6	2005 Miro Jovic	2	2006 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346014	346	2	2006 Sulejman Tihic	11	2006 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346015	346	11	2006 Radmanovic	7	2007 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346016	346	7	2007 Zeljko Komsic	3	2008 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346017	346	3	2008 Silajdzic	11	2008 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346018	346	11	2008 Radmanovic	7	2009 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346019	346	7	2009 Zeljko Komsic	3	2010 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346020	346	3	2010 Silajdzic	11	2010 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0

346021	346	11	2010 Radmanovic	7	2011 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346022	346	7	2011 Zeljko Komsic	3	2012 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0
346023	346	3	2012 Izetbegovic	11	2012 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0
346024	346	11	2012 Radmanovic	7	2013 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0
346025	346	7	2013 Komsic	3	2014 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346026	346	3	2014 Izetbegovic	11	2014 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346027	346	11	2014 Ivanic	7	2015 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
346028	346	7	2015 Covic	3	2016 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Still in Office	0
346029	346	3	2016 Izetbegovic		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	NA	NA	0
347001	347	2	2008 Thaci	12	2014 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
350001	350	4	1967 Kollias	12	1967 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Military Coup	0
350002	350	12	1967 Papadopoulos	11	1973 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
350003	350	11	1973 Ionannides	7	1974 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
352001	352	8	1960 Makarios	7	1974 First Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Regular	Military Coup	0
352002	352	7	1974 Sampson	7	1974 Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Irregular, Other	1
352003	352	7	1974 Clerides	12	1974 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
352004	352	12	1974 Makarios	8	1977 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
352005	352	8	1977 Kyprianou	2	1988 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
352006	352	2	1988 Vassiliou	2	1993 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
352007	352	2	1993 Clerides	2	2003 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
352008	352	2	2003 Tassos Nikolaou Papadopoulos	2	2008 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
352009	352	2	2008 Dimitris Christofias	2	2013 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
352010	352	2	2013 Nikos Anastasiadis		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
355001	355	2	1950 Chervenkov	4	1956 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
355002	355	4	1956 Zhivkov	11	1989 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
355003	355	11	1989 Mladenov	7	1990 Regular Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Regular	0
355004	355	7	1990 Lukanov	12	1990 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
360001	360	3	1965 Ceausescu	12	1989 First Election/Selection	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
360002	360	12	1989 Roman	10	1991 Successful Protest	Protest	Regular	Regular	0
365001	365	3	1953 Malenkov	3	1953 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
365002	365	3	1953 Khrushchev	10	1964 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
365003	365	10	1964 Brezhnev	11	1982 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
365004	365	11	1982 Andropov	2	1984 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
365005	365	2	1984 Chernenko	3	1985 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
365006	365	3	1985 Gorbachev	8	1991 Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
365007	365	1	2000 Putin		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
370001	370	9	1991 Shushkevich	1	1994 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
370002	370	1	1994 Hryb	7	1994 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
370003	370	7	1994 Lukashenko		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
371001	371	10	1991 Ter-Petrosyan	2	1998 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
372001	372	4	1991 Gamsakhurdia	1	1992 First Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
372002	372	1	1992 Ioseliani	3	1992 Successful Rebellion	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
372003	372	3	1992 Shevardnadze	11	2003 First Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Protest	0
372004	372	11	2003 Burdjanadze	1	2004 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
373001	373	9	1991 Mutalibov	3	1992 First Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Regular	0
373002	373	3	1992 Mamedov	5	1992 Forced Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Regular	0
373003	373	6	1993 H. Aliyev	8	2003 Forced Election/Selection	Resignation, Health	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
373004	373	8	2003 Ilhma Aliyev		First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
402001	402	7	1975 Pires	4	1991 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
403001	403	6	1975 da Costa	3	1991 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0
404001	404	9	1974 Cabral	11	1980 Successful Rebellion	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
404002	404	11	1980 Vieira	5	1999 Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
404003	404	5	1999 Mane	5	1999 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
404004	404	5	1999 Sanha	2	2000 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
404005	404	9	2003 Henrique Pereira Rosa	10	2005 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0

404006	404	3	2009 Raimundo Perreira	9	2009 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
404007	404	9	2009 Sanha	1	2012 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
404008	404	1	2012 Pereira	4	2012 Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
404009	404	4	2012 Kuruma	5	2012 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
404010	404	5	2012 Nhamadjo	6	2014 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
411001	411	8	1979 Nguema Mbasogo		Reshuffle Coup	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
420001	420	2	1965 Jawara	7	1994 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
420002	420	7	1994 Jammeh		Regime-Change Coup	Still in Power	Irregular	Still in Office	0
432001	432	9	1960 Keita	11	1968 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
432002	432	11	1968 Traore	3	1991 Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
432003	432	3	1991 Amadou Toure	6	1992 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
432004	432	3	2012 Sanogo	4	2012 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
432005	432	4	2012 Traore	9	2013 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
433001	433	8	1960 Senghor	12	1980 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
433002	433	1	1981 Diouf	4	2000 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
434001	434	1	1960 Maga	10	1963 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
434002	434	10	1963 Soglo	1	1964 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
434003	434	1	1964 Apithy	11	1965 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
434004	434	11	1965 Congacou	12	1965 Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	1
434005	434	12	1965 Soglo	12	1967 Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
434006	434	12	1967 Alley	8	1968 Regime-Change Coup	Legal Removal	Irregular	Regular	0
434007	434	8	1968 Zinsou	12	1969 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
434008	434	12	1969 Paul-Emile de Souza	5	1970 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
434009	434	5	1970 Maga	4	1972 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
434010	434	4	1972 Ahomadegbe	10	1972 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
434011	434	10	1972 Kerekou	4	1991 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
435001	435	11	1960 Ould Daddah	7	1978 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
435002	435	7	1978 Ould Mohamed Salek	4	1979 Regime-Change Coup	Legal Removal	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
435003	435	4	1979 Ould Bouceif	5	1979 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
435004	435	6	1979 Ould Ahmed Louly	1	1980 Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
435005	435	1	1980 Ould Haidalla	12	1984 Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
435006	435	12	1984 Sidi Ahmed Taya	8	2005 Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
435007	435	8	2005 Ould Mohamed Vall	4	2007 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
435008	435	8	2008 Ould Abdel Aziz	4	2009 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
435009	435	4	2009 dit M'Bare	8	2009 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
435010	435	8	2009 Ould Abdel Aziz		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
436001	436	10	1960 Diori	4	1974 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
436002	436	4	1974 Kountche	11	1987 Regime-Change Coup	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
436003	436	11	1987 Seibou	4	1993 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
436004	436	1	1996 Mainassara	4	1999 Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
436005	436	4	1999 Wanke	12	1999 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
436006	436	2	2010 Djibo	4	2011 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
437001	437	8	1960 Houphouet-Boigny	12	1993 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
437002	437	12	1993 Konan Bedie	12	1999 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
437003	437	12	1999 Guei	10	2000 Regime-Change Coup	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
437004	437	10	2000 Laurent Gbagbo	4	2011 Forced Election/Selection	Rebellion	Irregular	Military Coup	0
438001	438	10	1958 Toure	3	1984 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
438002	438	3	1984 Beavogui	4	1984 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
438003	438	4	1984 Conte	12	2008 Regime-Change Coup	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
438004	438	12	2008 Dadis Camara	12	2009 Regime-Change Coup	Resignation, Health	Irregular	Military Coup	0
438005	438	12	2009 Sekouba Konate	12	2010 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
439001	439	8	1960 Yameogo	1	1966 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
439002	439	1	1966 Lamizana	11	1980 Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
439003	439	11	1980 Zerbo	11	1982 Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
439004	439	11	1982 J. P. Ouedraogo	8	1983 Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0

439005	439	8	1983 Sankara	10	1987 Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
439006	439	10	1987 Campaore	10	2014 Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Regular	0
439007	439	11	2014 Zida	11	2014 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
439008	439	11	2014 Kafando	12	2015 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
450001	450	7	1971 Tolbert	4	1980 Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
450002	450	4	1980 Doe	9	1990 Regime-Change Coup	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
450003	450	11	1990 Sawyer	3	1994 Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Foreign	Regular	0
450004	450	3	1994 Kpormapkor	9	1995 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
450005	450	9	1995 Sankawulo	9	1996 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
450006	450	9	1996 Perry	8	1997 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
450007	450	8	1997 Taylor	8	2003 Regular Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Regular	0
450008	450	8	2003 Moses Zeh Blah	10	2003 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
450009	450	10	2003 Bryant	1	2006 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
451001	451	3	1967 Luxon-Smith	4	1968 Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
451002	451	4	1968 Stevens	11	1985 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
451003	451	11	1985 Momoh	4	1992 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
451004	451	5	1992 Strasser	1	1996 Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
451005	451	1	1996 Bio	3	1996 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
451006	451	5	1997 Koroma	2	1998 Regime-Change Coup	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Foreign	0
452001	452	2	1966 Ankrah	4	1969 Regime-Change Coup	Legal Removal	Irregular	Regular	0
452002	452	4	1969 Afrifa	9	1969 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
452003	452	9	1969 Busia	1	1972 Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
452004	452	1	1972 Acheampong	7	1978 Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
452005	452	7	1978 Akuffo	6	1979 Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
452006	452	6	1979 Rawlings	9	1979 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
452007	452	12	1981 Rawlings	1	2001 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
461001	461	1	1963 Grunitzky	1	1967 Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
461002	461	1	1967 Daajo	4	1967 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	1
461003	461	4	1967 Eyadema	2	2005 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
461004	461	2	2005 Faure Gnassingbe	2	2005 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
461005	461	2	2005 Bonfoh	5	2005 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
461006	461	5	2005 Faure Gnassingbe		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
471001	471	1	1960 Ahidjo	11	1982 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
471002	471	11	1982 Biya		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
475001	475	1	1966 Ironsi	7	1966 Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
475002	475	7	1966 Gowon	7	1975 Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
475003	475	7	1975 Ramat Mohammed	2	1976 Reshuffle Coup	Assassination	Irregular	Military Coup	0
475004	475	2	1976 Obasanjo	10	1979 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
475005	475	12	1983 Buhari	8	1985 Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
475006	475	8	1985 Babangida	8	1993 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
475007	475	8	1993 Shonekan	11	1993 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
475008	475	11	1993 Abacha	6	1998 Reshuffle Coup	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
475009	475	6	1998 Abubakar	5	1999 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
481001	481	8	1960 Mba	11	1967 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Irregular, Other	0
481002	481	11	1967 Bongo	6	2009 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
481003	481	6	2009 Rogombe	10	2009 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
481004	481	10	2009 Ondimba		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
482001	482	8	1960 Dacko	1	1966 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
482002	482	1	1966 Bokassa	9	1979 Regime-Change Coup	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Foreign	0
482003	482	9	1979 Dacko	9	1981 Foreign Installation	Regime-Change Coup	Foreign	Military Coup	0
482004	482	9	1981 Kolingba	10	1993 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
482005	482	3	2003 Francois Bozize	3	2013 Successful Rebellion	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
482006	482	3	2013 Djotidia	1	2014 Successful Rebellion	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
482007	482	1	2014 Nguendet	1	2014 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
482008	482	1	2014 Samba-Panza	3	2016 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Still in Office	0

483001	483	8	1960 Tombalbaye	4	1975 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
483002	483	4	1975 Malloum	3	1979 Regime-Change Coup	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
483003	483	3	1979 Oueddei	6	1982 Successful Rebellion	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
483004	483	6	1982 Habre	12	1990 Successful Rebellion	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
483005	483	12	1990 Deby		Successful Rebellion	Still in Power	Irregular	Still in Office	0
484001	484	8	1960 Youlou	8	1963 First Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Protest	0
484002	484	8	1963 Debat	9	1968 Forced Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
484003	484	9	1968 Raoul	1	1969 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
484004	484	1	1969 Nguoubi	3	1977 First Election/Selection	Assassination	Regular	Military Coup	0
484005	484	3	1977 Opango	2	1979 Forced Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Regular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
484006	484	2	1979 Nguesso	8	1992 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
484007	484	10	1997 Nguesso		Successful Rebellion	Still in Power	Irregular	Still in Office	0
490001	490	9	1960 Kasavubu	11	1965 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
490002	490	11	1965 Mobutu	5	1997 Regime-Change Coup	Rebellion	Irregular	Regular	0
490003	490	5	1997 Laurent Kabila	1	2001 Successful Rebellion	Assassination	Regular	Military Coup	0
490004	490	1	2001 Joseph Kabila		Forced Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
500001	500	10	1962 Obote	1	1971 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
500002	500	1	1971 Amin	4	1979 Regime-Change Coup	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Foreign	0
500003	500	4	1979 Yusuf Lule	6	1979 Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
500004	500	6	1979 Binaisa	5	1980 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
500005	500	5	1980 Paulo Muwanga	12	1980 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
500006	500	12	1980 Obote	7	1985 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
500007	500	7	1985 Okello	1	1986 Reshuffle Coup	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
500008	500	1	1986 Museveni		Successful Rebellion	Still in Power	Irregular	Still in Office	0
501001	501	12	1963 Kenyatta	8	1978 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
501002	501	8	1978 Moi	12	2002 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
510001	510	11	1961 Nyerere	11	1985 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
510002	510	11	1985 Mwinyi	11	1995 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
510003	510	11	1995 Mkapa	12	2005 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
510004	510	12	2005 Kikwete	11	2015 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
510005	510	11	2015 Magufuli		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
516001	516	7	1962 Mwambutsa	7	1966 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
516002	516	7	1966 Ntare	11	1966 Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
516003	516	11	1966 Micombero	11	1976 Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
516004	516	11	1976 Bagaza	9	1987 Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
516005	516	9	1987 Buyoya	7	1993 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
516006	516	7	1996 Buyoya	4	2003 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
516007	516	4	2003 Ndayizeye	8	2005 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
517001	517	10	1961 Kayibanda	7	1973 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
517002	517	7	1973 Habyarimana	4	1994 Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Irregular, Other	0
517003	517	4	1994 Sindikubwabo	7	1994 Forced Election/Selection	Rebellion	Irregular	Regular	1
517004	517	7	1994 Paul Kagame		Successful Rebellion	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
520001	520	10	1969 Siad Barre	1	1991 Regime-Change Coup	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
522001	522	6	1977 Gouled Aptidon	5	1999 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
522002	522	5	1999 Guellah		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
530001	530	9	1974 Adom	11	1974 Regime-Change Coup	Assassination	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
530002	530	11	1974 Banti	2	1977 Forced Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
530003	530	2	1977 Mengistu Marriam	5	1991 Reshuffle Coup	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
530004	530	5	1991 Gebre Kidan	5	1991 Forced Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
530005	530	5	1991 Meles Zenawi	8	2012 Successful Rebellion	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
530006	530	8	2012 Desalegn		First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
531001	531	5	1993 Afeworki		Successful Rebellion	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
540001	540	11	1975 Neto	9	1979 Successful Rebellion	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
540002	540	9	1979 Dos Santos		First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
541001	541	6	1975 Machel	10	1986 Successful Rebellion	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0

541002	541	11	1986	Chissano	2	2005	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
541003	541	2	2005	Guebuza	1	2015	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
541004	541	1	2015	Nyussi			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
551001	551	10	1964	Kaunda	11	1991	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
551002	551	1	2002	Levy Mwanawasa	8	2008	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
551003	551	8	2008	Banda	9	2011	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
552001	552	11	1965	Smith	5	1979	Regular Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Regular	0
552002	552	5	1979	Muzorewa	12	1979	Successful Rebellion	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
552003	552	3	1980	Mugabe			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
553001	553	7	1964	Banda	5	1994	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
560001	560	12	1954	Strijdom	8	1958	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Natural Death	0
560002	560	8	1958	Swart	9	1958	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
560003	560	9	1958	Verwoerd	9	1966	Regular Election/Selection	Assassination	Regular	Assassination by Unsupported Individual	0
560004	560	9	1966	Donges	9	1966	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
560005	560	9	1966	Vorster	9	1978	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
560006	560	9	1978	Botha	1	1989	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
560007	560	1	1989	Heunis	3	1989	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
560008	560	3	1989	Botha	8	1989	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
560009	560	8	1989	deKlerk	5	1994	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
565001	565	3	1990	Nujoma	3	2005	Successful Rebellion	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
565002	565	3	2005	Pohamba	3	2015	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
565003	565	3	2015	Geingob			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
570001	570	1	1986	Lekhanya	5	1991	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
570002	570	5	1991	Ramaema	4	1993	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
571001	571	9	1966	Khama	7	1980	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
571002	571	7	1980	Masire	3	1998	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
571003	571	3	1998	Mogae	3	2008	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
571004	571	3	2008	Ian Khama			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
572001	572	9	1968	Subhuza II	8	1982	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
572002	572	8	1982	Dzeliwe Shongwe	8	1983	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Removed by Other Government Actors	1
572003	572	8	1983	Ntombe Thwala	4	1986	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
572004	572	4	1986	Mswati			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
580001	580	6	1960	Tsiranana	10	1972	First Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Protest	0
580002	580	10	1972	Ramanantsoa	2	1975	Forced Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
580003	580	2	1975	Ratsimandrava	2	1975	Forced Election/Selection	Assassination	Irregular	Military Coup	0
580004	580	2	1975	Gilles Andriamahazo	6	1975	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
580005	580	6	1975	Ratsiraka	3	1993	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
580006	580	3	2009	Rajoelina	1	2014	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
581001	581	7	1975	Abdallah	8	1975	First Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Rebellion	0
581002	581	8	1975	Soilih	5	1978	Foreign Installation	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Military Coup	0
581003	581	5	1978	Bob Denard	12	1989	Foreign Installation	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
581004	581	12	1989	Djohar	9	1995	Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
581005	581	9	1995	Bob Denard	10	1995	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Foreign	1
581006	581	10	1995	el-Yachrouit	1	1996	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
581007	581	1	1996	Djohar	3	1996	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
581008	581	3	1996	Abdoulkarim	11	1998	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
581009	581	11	1998	Massoude	4	1999	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
581010	581	4	1999	Azali Assoumani	1	2002	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
581011	581	1	2002	Hamada Madi	5	2002	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
581012	581	5	2002	Azali Assoumani	5	2006	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
591001	591	4	2004	Michel			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	NA	NA	0
600001	600	3	1956	Mohammed V	2	1961	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
600002	600	2	1961	Hassan II	7	1999	Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
600003	600	7	1999	Muhammad VI			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
615001	615	7	1962	Ben Khedda	9	1962	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1

615002	615	9	1962	Bella	6	1965	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
615003	615	6	1965	Boumedienne	12	1978	Reshuffle Coup	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
615004	615	12	1978	Bitat	2	1979	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
615005	615	2	1979	Benjedid	1	1992	Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
615006	615	1	1992	Boudiaf	6	1992	Regime-Change Coup	Assassination	Irregular	Rebellion	0
615007	615	7	1992	Kafi	1	1994	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
615008	615	1	1994	Zeroual	4	1999	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
615009	615	4	1999	Bouteflika			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
616001	616	2	1956	Muhammad al-Amin	7	1957	First Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Regular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
616002	616	7	1957	Ben Ali Bourguiba	11	1987	Forced Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
616003	616	11	1987	Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali	1	2011	Reshuffle Coup	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
616004	616	1	2011	Mebazaa	12	2011	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
616005	616	12	2011	Marzouki	12	2014	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
620001	620	12	1951	Idris	9	1969	First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
620002	620	9	1969	Qaddafi	8	2011	Regime-Change Coup	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Rebellion	0
625001	625	11	1958	Abboud	11	1964	Regime-Change Coup	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
625002	625	11	1964	al-Khalifa	6	1965	Successful Protest	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
625003	625	5	1969	Nimeiri	4	1985	Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
625004	625	4	1985	Abdul Rahman Swaredahab	5	1986	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
625005	625	6	1989	Al-Bashir			Regime-Change Coup	Still in Power	Irregular	Still in Office	0
626001	626	7	2011	Kiir			Forced Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
630001	630	4	1951	Mohammad Mossadeg	8	1953	First Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
630002	630	8	1953	Mohammad Reza	1	1979	Foreign Installation	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
630003	630	2	1979	Ayatollah Khomeini	6	1989	Successful Protest	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	1
630004	630	6	1989	Khamenei	8	1989	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
630005	630	8	1989	Rafsanjani	8	1997	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
630006	630	8	1997	Khatami	8	2005	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
630007	630	8	2005	Ahmadinejad	8	2013	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
630008	630	8	2013	Rouhani			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
640001	640	5	1960	Gursel	11	1961	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
640002	640	9	1980	Evren	11	1983	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
645001	645	5	1953	Faisal II	7	1958	Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
645002	645	7	1958	Karrim Kassem	2	1963	Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
645003	645	2	1963	Salem Aref	4	1966	Regime-Change Coup	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
645004	645	4	1966	Rahmen Aref	7	1968	First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
645005	645	7	1968	Hassan Al-Bakr	7	1979	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
645006	645	7	1979	Saddam Hussein	4	2003	Regular Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Regular	Foreign	0
645007	645	4	2003	Tommy Ray Franks	4	2003	Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Foreign	Regular	1
645008	645	4	2003	Jay Garner	5	2003	Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Foreign	Regular	1
645009	645	5	2003	Paul Bremer	6	2004	Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Foreign	Regular	0
645010	645	6	2004	Iyad Allawi	5	2005	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
645011	645	5	2005	al-Jaafari	5	2006	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
645012	645	5	2006	al-Maliki	9	2014	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
651001	651	7	1952	Naguib	11	1954	Regime-Change Coup	Legal Removal	Irregular	Regular	0
651002	651	11	1954	Nasser	9	1970	Forced Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
651003	651	9	1970	Sadat	10	1981	First Election/Selection	Assassination	Regular	Irregular, Other	0
651004	651	10	1981	Mubarak	2	2011	Forced Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Protest	0
651005	651	2	2011	Tantawi	6	2012	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
651006	651	7	2013	Mansour	6	2014	First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Regular	0
651007	651	6	2014	al-Sisi			Regime-Change Coup	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
652001	652	2	1958	Nasser (president of UAR)	9	1961	First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
652002	652	9	1961	Al-kuzbari	12	1961	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
652003	652	12	1961	El-Kudsi	3	1962	First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
652004	652	3	1962	Zahreddin	4	1962	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Regular	0
652005	652	4	1962	El-Kudsi	3	1963	Reshuffle Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0

652006	652	3	1963 Atassi, L.	7	1963 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation		Removed by Military Power Struggle	1
652007	652	7	1963 Al-Hafiz	2	1966 Forced Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
652008	652	2	1966 El-Atassi, N.	11	1970 Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
652009	652	11	1970 Al-Khatib	2	1971 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
652010	652	2	1971 Al-Assad H.	6	2000 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
652011	652	6	2000 Bashar al-Assad		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
660001	660	9	1976 Sarkis	9	1982 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
660002	660	9	1982 Gemayel, Amin	9	1988 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
660003	660	9	1988 Aoun	11	1989 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
660004	660	11	1989 Moawad	11	1989 Regular Election/Selection	Assassination	Regular	Rebellion	0
660005	660	11	1989 Elias Hrawi	11	1998 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
660006	660	11	1998 Emile Lahoud	11	2007 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
663001	663	7	1951 Abdullah El-Hashim	9	1951 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
663002	663	9	1951 Ibn Abdullah-Hashim	8	1952 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
663003	663	8	1952 Hussein Ibn Talal El-Hashim	2	1999 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
663004	663	2	1999 Abdullah Ibn Hussein El-Hashimi		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
670001	670	11	1953 Saud	11	1964 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Regular	0
670002	670	11	1964 Faisal	3	1975 Reshuffle Coup	Assassination	Regular	Assassination by Unsupported Individual	0
670003	670	3	1975 Khalid	6	1982 Forced Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
670004	670	6	1982 Fahd	1	1996 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
670005	670	1	1996 Abdullah	1	2015 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
670006	670	1	2015 Salman		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Natural Death	0
678001	678	9	1962 Al-Badr	9	1962 Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
678002	678	9	1962 AL-Sallal	11	1967 Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
678003	678	11	1967 Al-Iryani	6	1974 Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
678004	678	6	1974 Al-Hamadi	10	1977 Regime-Change Coup	Assassination	Irregular	Irregular, Other	0
678005	678	10	1977 Al-Ghashmi	6	1978 Forced Election/Selection	Assassination	Regular	Assassination by Unsupported Individual	0
678006	678	7	1978 Saleh al-Hashidi	5	1990 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
679001	679	5	1990 Saleh al-Hashidi	2	2012 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
679002	679	2	2012 Hadi	2	2015 Regular Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Still in Office	0
679003	679	2	2015 Houthi		Successful Rebellion	Still in Power	NA	NA	0
680001	680	11	1967 Al-Shaabi	6	1969 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
680002	680	6	1969 Ali Rubayyi	6	1978 Reshuffle Coup	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
680003	680	6	1978 Ali Nassir Hassani	12	1978 Successful Rebellion	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
680004	680	12	1978 Ismail	4	1980 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
680005	680	4	1980 Ali Nassir Hassani	1	1986 Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Irregular, Other	0
680006	680	1	1986 Attas	5	1990 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
690001	690	1	1950 Abdullah As-Sabah	11	1965 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
690002	690	11	1965 Sabah As-Sabah	12	1977 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
690003	690	1	1978 Jabir As-Sabah	8	1990 Regular Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Regular	Foreign	0
690004	690	8	1990 Saddam Hussein	4	1991 Foreign Installation	Foreign Overthrow	Foreign	Foreign	0
690005	690	4	1991 Jabir As-Sabah	1	2006 Foreign Installation	Natural Death	Foreign	Natural Death	0
690006	690	1	2006 Saad Salim al Sabah	1	2006 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
690007	690	1	2006 Jabir Ahmad Al Sabah		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
692001	692	8	1971 Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah	3	1999 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
692002	692	3	1999 Hamad Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
694001	694	9	1971 Ahmed Ath-Thani	2	1972 First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
694002	694	2	1972 Khalifah Ath-Thani	6	1995 Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
694003	694	6	1995 Amad Al Thani	6	2013 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
694004	694	6	2013 Tamim Al Thani		First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
696001	696	12	1971 An-Nahayan	11	2004 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
696002	696	11	2004 Khalifa Al Nahayan		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
698001	698	7	1970 Qabus Bin Said		Reshuffle Coup	Still in Power	Irregular	Still in Office	0
700001	700	9	1953 Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan	3	1963 Forced Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Irregular	Regular	0
700002	700	3	1963 Mohammad Yusuf	11	1965 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0

700003	700	11	1965	Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal	10	1967	Regular Election/Selection	Resignation, Health	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
700004	700	10	1967	Abdallah Yakta	11	1967	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
700005	700	11	1967	Nur Ahmad Etemadi	6	1971	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
700006	700	6	1971	Abdul Zahir	12	1972	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
700007	700	12	1972	Mohammad Musa Shafiq	7	1973	Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
700008	700	7	1973	Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan	4	1978	Regime-Change Coup	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
700009	700	4	1978	Taraki	3	1979	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
700010	700	3	1979	Amin	12	1979	Reshuffle Coup	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
700011	700	12	1979	Karmal	5	1986	Foreign Installation	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Foreign	0
700012	700	5	1986	Najibullah	4	1992	Foreign Installation	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
700013	700	4	1992	Mojadidi	6	1992	Successful Rebellion	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
700014	700	6	1992	Burhanuddin Rabbani	9	1996	First Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
700015	700	9	1996	Mullah Omar	11	2001	Successful Rebellion	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Rebellion	0
700016	700	12	2001	Hamid Karzai	9	2014	Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Foreign	Regular	0
700017	700	9	2014	Ashraf Ghani			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
701001	701	10	1990	Niyazov	12	2006	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
701002	701	12	2006	Berdymukhammedov			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
702001	702	8	1991	Kadreddin Aslonov	9	1991	First Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Regular	Regular	0
702002	702	9	1991	Nabiyev	9	1992	Forced Election/Selection	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
702003	702	9	1992	Iskandrov	11	1992	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
702004	702	11	1992	Rakhmonov			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Regular	0
703001	703	10	1990	Akayev	4	2005	First Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Protest	0
703002	703	4	2005	Bakiyev	4	2010	Forced Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Protest	0
703003	703	4	2010	Otunbayeva	12	2011	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
703004	703	12	2011	Atambayev			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
704001	704	3	1990	Karimov			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
705001	705	4	1990	Nazarbaev			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
710001	710	10	1976	Hua Guofeng	9	1980	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
710002	710	9	1980	Deng Xiaoping	2	1997	Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
710003	710	2	1997	Jiang Zemin	3	2003	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
710004	710	3	2003	Hu Jintao	11	2012	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
710005	710	11	2012	Xi Jinping			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
712001	712	1	1952	Tsedenbal	8	1984	Regular Election/Selection	Foreign Overthrow	Regular	Foreign	0
712002	712	8	1984	Batmonkh	3	1990	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
712003	712	3	1990	Ochirbat	6	1997	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
731001	731	7	1994	Kim Jong-Il	12	2011	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
731002	731	12	2011	Kim Jong Un			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
732001	732	5	1961	Chang Do Yong	7	1961	Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
732002	732	7	1961	Hee Park	10	1979	Reshuffle Coup	Assassination	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
732003	732	10	1979	Choi Kuy Hay	8	1980	Forced Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Regular	0
732004	732	8	1980	Park Choong Hoon	8	1980	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
732005	732	8	1980	Chun Doo Hwan	2	1988	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760001	760	3	1952	Wangchuk, Jigme Dorji	7	1972	Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
760002	760	7	1972	Wangchuck, Jigme Singye	7	1998	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760003	760	7	1998	Lyonpo Jigme Thinley	7	1999	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760004	760	7	1999	Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup	7	2000	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760005	760	7	2000	Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba	8	2001	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760006	760	8	2001	Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk	8	2002	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760007	760	8	2002	Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji	8	2003	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760008	760	8	2003	Lyonpo Jigme Thinley	8	2004	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760009	760	8	2004	Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba	9	2005	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760010	760	9	2005	Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup	9	2006	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760011	760	9	2006	Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk	7	2007	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
760012	760	7	2007	Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji	4	2008	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
770001	770	10	1951	Nazimuddin	4	1953	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0

770002	770	4	1953 Mohammed Ali	8	1955 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
770003	770	8	1955 Chaudhri M. Ali	9	1956 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
770004	770	9	1956 Shahid Suhrawardy	10	1957 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
770005	770	10	1957 Chundrigar	12	1957 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
770006	770	12	1957 Khan Noon	10	1958 Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
770007	770	10	1958 Ayub Khan	3	1969 Regime-Change Coup	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
770008	770	3	1969 Yahya Khan	12	1971 Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
770009	770	7	1977 Zia	8	1988 Regime-Change Coup	Assassination	Irregular	Irregular, Other	0
770010	770	8	1988 Ishaq Khan	12	1988 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
770011	770	10	1999 Musharraf	8	2008 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
771001	771	4	1971 Syed Nazrul Islam	1	1972 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
771002	771	1	1972 Sheikh Mujib Rahman	8	1975 Regular Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
771003	771	8	1975 Moshtaque Ahmed	11	1975 Regime-Change Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
771004	771	11	1975 Ziaur Rahman	5	1981 Reshuffle Coup	Assassination	Irregular	Military Coup	0
771005	771	5	1981 Sattar	3	1982 Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
771006	771	3	1982 Ershad	12	1990 Regime-Change Coup	Protest	Irregular	Protest	0
771007	771	1	2007 Fakhruddin	1	2009 Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Regular	0
775001	775	10	1958 Ne Win	3	1960 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
775002	775	3	1962 Ne Win	7	1988 Regime-Change Coup	Protest	Irregular	Regular	0
775003	775	7	1988 Sein Lwin	8	1988 Forced Election/Selection	Protest	Irregular	Regular	0
775004	775	8	1988 Maung Maung	9	1988 Forced Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
775005	775	9	1988 Saw Maung	4	1992 Regime-Change Coup	Resignation, Health	Irregular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
775006	775	4	1992 Than Shwe	3	2011 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
775007	775	3	2011 Thein Sein	3	2016 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Still in Office	0
775008	775	3	2016 Htin Kyaw	3	Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	NA	NA	0
780001	780	1	1989 Premadasa	5	1993 Regular Election/Selection	Assassination	Regular	Irregular, Other	0
780002	780	5	1993 Wijetunge	11	1994 Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
781001	781	7	1965 Nasir	11	1978 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
781002	781	11	1978 Gayoom	11	2008 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
790001	790	2	1951 Tribhuvan	3	1955 Successful Rebellion	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
790002	790	3	1955 Mahendra	1	1972 First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
790003	790	1	1972 Birendra	11	1990 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
790004	790	11	1990 Krishna Prasad Bhattarai	5	1991 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
790005	790	10	2002 Lokendra Bahadur Chand	6	2003 Forced Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Regular	0
790006	790	6	2003 Surya Bahadur Thapa	6	2004 Forced Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Regular	0
790007	790	6	2004 Sher Bahdur Deuba	2	2005 Forced Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Regular	Regular	0
790008	790	2	2005 Gyanendra	4	2006 Forced Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Protest	0
800001	800	9	1957 Pote Sarasin	12	1957 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
800002	800	12	1957 Thanon Kittakachorn	10	1958 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
800003	800	10	1958 Sarit	12	1963 Regular Election/Selection	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
800004	800	12	1963 Thanon Kittakachorn	10	1973 Regular Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Protest	0
800005	800	10	1973 Sanya	2	1975 Successful Protest	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
800006	800	2	1975 Seni Pramoj	3	1975 Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Regular	0
800007	800	10	1976 Thanin Kraivichien	10	1977 Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Regular	0
800008	800	10	1977 Sangad	11	1977 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
800009	800	11	1977 Kriangsak	2	1980 First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
800010	800	3	1980 Prem	8	1988 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
800011	800	3	1991 Panyarachun	4	1992 Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
800012	800	4	1992 Kraprayoon	5	1992 First Election/Selection	Protest	Regular	Regular	0
800013	800	9	2006 Chulanont	1	2008 Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
800014	800	5	2014 Prayuth Chan-ocha	3	Regime-Change Coup	Still in Power	Irregular	Still in Office	0
811001	811	11	1953 Sihanouk	3	1970 First Election/Selection	Regime-Change Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
811002	811	3	1970 Lon Nol	4	1975 Regime-Change Coup	Rebellion	Irregular	Rebellion	0
811003	811	4	1975 Pol Pot	1	1979 Successful Rebellion	Foreign Overthrow	Irregular	Foreign	0
811004	811	1	1979 Heng Samrin	1	1985 Foreign Installation	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0

811005	811	1	1985	Hun Sen	9	1993	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
811006	811	9	1993	Ranariddh	7	1997	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
811007	811	7	1997	Hun Sen			Reshuffle Coup	Still in Power	Regular	Regular	0
812001	812	12	1959	Nosavan	1	1960	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
812002	812	1	1960	Kou Abhay Og Long	5	1960	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	1
812003	812	5	1960	Somsanith	8	1960	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
812004	812	8	1960	Souvanna Phouma	12	1960	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
812005	812	12	1960	Boun Oum	6	1962	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
812006	812	6	1962	Souvanna Phouma	4	1964	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
812007	812	4	1964	Souvanna Phouma	12	1975	Forced Election/Selection	Rebellion	Regular	Rebellion	0
812008	812	12	1975	Phomivan	11	1992	Successful Rebellion	Natural Death	Irregular	Natural Death	0
812009	812	11	1992	Phounsavanh	2	1998	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
812010	812	2	1998	Siphandon	6	2006	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
812011	812	6	2006	Sayasone	4	2016	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Still in Office	0
812012	812	4	2016	Vorachith			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	NA	NA	0
816001	816	9	1969	Le Duan	7	1986	First Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
816002	816	7	1986	Truong Chinh	12	1986	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
816003	816	12	1986	Nguyen Van Linh	6	1991	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
816004	816	6	1991	Do Muoi	12	1997	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
816005	816	12	1997	Phieu	4	2001	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
816006	816	4	2001	Nong Duc Manh	1	2011	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
816007	816	1	2011	Phu Trong			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
817001	817	1	1954	Pham Buu Loc	6	1954	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
817002	817	6	1954	Quat	6	1954	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
817003	817	6	1954	Ngo Dinh Diem	11	1963	Regular Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
817004	817	11	1963	Minh	1	1964	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
817005	817	1	1964	Khanh	11	1964	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Protest	0
817006	817	11	1964	Van Huong	1	1965	First Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
817007	817	1	1965	Kahn	2	1965	Reshuffle Coup	Legal Removal	Irregular	Removed by Military Power Struggle	0
817008	817	2	1965	Quat	6	1965	Forced Election/Selection	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Military Coup	0
817009	817	6	1965	Van Thieu	4	1975	Reshuffle Coup	Reshuffle Coup	Irregular	Foreign	0
820001	820	8	1957	Rahman	4	1959	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
820002	820	4	1959	Razak	8	1959	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
820003	820	8	1959	Rahman	9	1970	Regular Election/Selection	Legal Removal	Regular	Regular	0
820004	820	9	1970	Razak	1	1976	Forced Election/Selection	Natural Death	Regular	Natural Death	0
820005	820	1	1976	Hussein Bin Onn	7	1981	Regular Election/Selection	Resignation, Health	Regular	Retired Due to Ill Health	0
820006	820	7	1981	Mahatir Bin Mohammad	10	2003	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
820007	820	10	2003	Ahmad Badawi	4	2009	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
820008	820	4	2009	Najib Tun Razak			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
830001	830	8	1965	Lee Kuan Yew	11	1990	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
830002	830	11	1990	Goh Chok Tong	8	2004	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
830003	830	8	2004	Lee Hsien Loong			Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
835001	835	10	1967	Hassanal Bolkiah			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Regular	Still in Office	0
850001	850	3	1966	Suharto	5	1998	Regime-Change Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
850002	850	5	1998	Habibie	10	1999	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
950001	950	10	1970	Mara	4	1987	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
950002	950	5	1987	Rabuka	12	1987	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Irregular	Regular	0
950003	950	12	1987	Mara	6	1992	Forced Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
950004	950	6	1992	Rabuka	5	1999	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	0
950005	950	5	2000	Bainimarama	7	2000	Reshuffle Coup	Rebellion	Irregular	Removed by Other Government Actors	0
950006	950	7	2000	Laisenia Qarase	12	2006	Successful Rebellion	Reshuffle Coup	Regular	Military Coup	0
950007	950	12	2006	Senilagakali	1	2007	Reshuffle Coup	Voluntary Resignation	Regular	Regular	1
950008	950	1	2007	Bainimarama			First Election/Selection	Still in Power	Irregular	Still in Office	0
955001	955	6	1970	Tu'ipelehake	8	1991	First Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0
955002	955	8	1991	Vaea	1	2000	Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0

955003	955	1	2000 Ulukalala Lavaka Ata (Tupou VI)	2	2006 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0
955004	955	2	2006 Sevele	12	2010 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0
955005	955	12	2010 Tu'ivakano	12	2014 Regular Election/Selection	Voluntary Resignation	NA	NA	0
955006	955	12	2014 Pohiva		Regular Election/Selection	Still in Power	NA	NA	0

Supporting Appendix B: Additional Empirics

In this section, we run multinomial logit models by recoding the natural death cases as *censored* cases as a robustness check. The results are consistent with the results reported in the main text and support our hypotheses.

Table 7: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Manner of Losing Office in Dictatorships

Model 1				
<i>Dependent Variable</i>	Coalition	Coalition	Coalition	Voluntary
<i>Exit Manner</i>	Competing	Circumventing	Collapsing	Resignation
<i>Base Category</i>				
<i>Entry Manner</i>	Irregular Replacement Entry			
<i>Independent Variables</i>				
Regular Entry	1.893*** (.661)	-1.810 (1.244)	.312 (.446)	-.188 (.504)
Regular × log(Tenure)	-.514* (.273)	.862 (.626)	-.361 (.265)	.374* (.224)
Irregular Reorganization Entry	2.580*** (.535)	.430 (1.020)	.356 (.533)	.488 (.466)
Reorganization × log(Tenure)	-.778*** (.286)	.206 (.718)	.422 (.310)	.106 (.266)
Foreign Entry	.735 (1.811)	-.051 (.955)	-13.744*** (.747)	-2.637 (2.291)
Foreign × log(Tenure)	.355 (.853)	.847 (.673)	.774* (.422)	1.109* (.661)
Log(Tenure)	.633*** (.204)	-.591 (.441)	-.508** (.221)	-.453** (.213)
<i>Controls</i>				
ln(GDP/capita)	-.352** (.136)	.028 (.150)	-.207 (.130)	.119 (.138)
GDP Growth	-3.237*** (.867)	-1.802 (1.687)	-.172 (.601)	-.542 (.777)
Military Dictatorship	-.083 (.300)	.250 (.501)	.714** (.340)	.658*** (.251)
Monarchy	-2.105*** (.797)	-.520 (.583)	-.389 (.592)	-.804 (.603)
Party	-2.055*** (.398)	-.424 (.547)	-.737** (.339)	1.060** (.428)
ln(Military Personnel)	-.167* (.096)	.077 (.150)	-.074 (.075)	.046 (.061)
Civil War	1.866*** (.274)	.906* (.473)	.395 (.346)	.255 (.232)
War Victory	-2.394* (1.244)	-7.197** (2.948)	-5.288 (3.697)	-2.333 (1.459)
War Defeat	.955* (.511)	3.088*** (.586)	.528 (.726)	-.016 (.689)
War Draw	-.574 (.489)	-1.259 (1.032)	-.818 (.627)	-.855 (.660)
Age	.040*** (.013)	.047** (.021)	.025** (.011)	.044*** (.010)
Constant	-3.673*** (.943)	-7.123*** (1.331)	-2.562*** (.902)	-7.380*** (.943)
Log Likelihood	-1287.8302			
Observations	3613			

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered with country.


Table 8: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Manner of Losing Office in Dictatorships

Dependent Variable	Model 2				Model 3			
	Coalition Competing	Coalition Circumventing	Coalition Collapsing	Voluntary Resignation	Coalition Competing	Coalition Circumventing	Coalition Collapsing	Voluntary Resignation
<i>Base Category</i>								
<i>Entry Manner</i>	Regular Entry				Irregular Reorganization Entry			
<i>Irregular Replacement Entry</i>								
Rebel Entry	-2.150*** (.644)	-.342 (1.417)	-2.302* (1.220)	1.812** (.760)	-2.810*** (.573)	-2.438** (1.171)	-2.422** (1.202)	1.202 (.796)
Rebel × log(Tenure)	.470 (.384)	.040 (.629)	1.099*** (.344)	-1.258** (.563)	.725* (.413)	.583 (.668)	.310 (.338)	-.986* (.577)
Regime-Change Coup Entry	-1.838** (.783)	2.505* (1.393)	-.194 (.457)	-.379 (.577)	-2.525*** (.613)	.157 (1.080)	-.222 (.536)	-1.056** (.518)
Regime-Change Coup × log(Tenure)	.524* (.292)	-1.112 (.691)	.334 (.273)	-.131 (.244)	.778*** (.296)	-.441 (.765)	-.466 (.312)	.127 (.284)
<i>Irregular Reorganization Entry</i>								
Reshuffling Coup Entry	.130 (.834)	1.837 (1.293)	.134 (.558)	.813** (.378)				
Reshuffling Coup × log(Tenure)	.161 (.369)	-.048 (.629)	.635** (.314)	-.421 (.258)				
Irregular Selection Entry	1.460** (.705)	3.587*** (1.294)	-.204 (.511)	.462 (.459)				
Irregular Selection × log(Tenure)	-1.194* (.675)	-20.672*** (1.465)	1.145*** (.302)	-.097 (.311)				
<i>Regular Entry</i>								
Regular First-Election Entry					-.590 (.727)	-1.642 (1.217)	.175 (.530)	-.315 (.409)
Regular First-Election × log(Tenure)					.150 (.356)	.297 (.713)	-1.073*** (.308)	-.018 (.249)
Regular Election Entry					-.919 (.763)	-3.024 (2.133)	-.323 (.469)	-.841** (.367)
Regular Election × log(Tenure)					.453 (.411)	.967 (1.018)	-.509* (.303)	.521** (.247)
Foreign Entry	-1.135 (1.690)	1.866 (1.358)	-16.383*** (.761)	-2.407 (2.217)	-1.893 (1.761)	-.578 (.835)	-14.206*** (.816)	-3.079 (2.161)
Foreign × log(Tenure)	.857 (.831)	-.015 (.743)	1.160*** (.403)	.723 (.641)	1.145 (.878)	.622 (.661)	.366 (.416)	1.045* (.617)
Log(Tenure)	.121 (.192)	.292 (.473)	-.870*** (.191)	-.074 (.129)	-.143 (.265)	-.365 (.575)	-.086 (.196)	-.339* (.191)
<i>Controls</i>								
ln(GDP/capita)	-.352** (.138)	-.011 (.159)	-.202 (.127)	.125 (.140)	-.370*** (.135)	.025 (.163)	-.222* (.130)	.073 (.141)
GDP Growth	-3.063*** (.850)	-1.290 (1.755)	-.154 (.635)	-.521 (.774)	-3.176*** (.865)	-1.552 (1.733)	-.152 (.584)	-.501 (.770)
Military Dictatorship	-.153 (.399)	.025 (.661)	.683* (.351)	.723*** (.256)	-.122 (.327)	-.013 (.603)	.605* (.361)	.812*** (.249)
Monarchy	-2.201*** (.817)	-.640 (.622)	-.304 (.586)	-.829 (.591)	-2.100*** (.794)	-.526 (.579)	-.375 (.546)	-.858 (.546)
Party	-2.104*** (.409)	-.438 (.572)	-.685* (.351)	.998** (.426)	-2.038*** (.417)	-.328 (.566)	-.681** (.332)	.929** (.395)
Ln(Military Personnel)	-.153 (.095)	.084 (.154)	-.079 (.076)	.045 (.062)	-.178* (.096)	.054 (.156)	-.081 (.077)	.005 (.062)
Civil War	1.862*** (.272)	1.005** (.474)	.429 (.346)	.222 (.232)	1.873*** (.275)	.957** (.484)	.429 (.350)	.251 (.231)
War Victory	-2.319* (1.219)	-7.467** (3.258)	-6.136 (4.100)	-2.480 (1.538)	-2.369* (1.206)	-7.310** (3.169)	-5.233 (3.708)	-2.201* (1.328)
War Defeat	1.006** (.481)	3.602*** (.647)	.486 (.734)	-.182 (.675)	.937* (.514)	3.304*** (.625)	.651 (.732)	-.113 (.660)
War Draw	-.543 (.496)	-1.628 (1.241)	-.791 (.626)	-.809 (.652)	-.542 (.482)	-1.335 (1.099)	-.805 (.640)	-.815 (.661)
Age	.039*** (.013)	.048** (.023)	.021** (.010)	.044*** (.010)	.040*** (.013)	.047** (.022)	.024** (.011)	.049*** (.011)
Constant	-1.697* (.947)	-8.855*** (1.936)	-2.137** (.988)	-7.580*** (1.121)	-.951 (1.000)	-6.578*** (1.656)	-2.016* (1.081)	-6.683*** (.996)
Log Likelihood	-1273.5628				-1276.876			
Observations	3613				3613			

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered with country.

Supporting Appendix C: Additional Figures

Figure 6: Effect of Reshuffling-Coup, Forced Selection, First-Election and Regular-Election Entry on Coalition-Competing Removal



Note: We use Model 2 in Table 5 to estimate the first difference.