

Trigger-happy? Military regimes and the timing of conflict

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Abstract

The proclivity of military regimes and their leaders for more frequent involvement in international conflict than other autocracies has been shown in several studies. The question raised here is not whether they participate in more conflicts and disputes, but rather whether after the leaders of military regimes enter office they initiate these acts more quickly than the leaders of other types of autocracies. Drawing on three authoritarian regime typologies and examining the time to the initiation of any dispute and the initiation of violent disputes, our results show that in comparison to other authoritarian leaders a subset of military leaders is distinctly trigger-happy.

In December 1981, Leopoldo Galtieri assumed leadership of the junta that in 1976 had overthrown Argentina's president, Isabel Peron. Less than four months later Argentina initiated its invasion of the Falklands Islands, a dependency of the United Kingdom. This, of course, became the Falklands War, which ended disastrously for Argentina. While some of the events that precipitated the Argentine invasion of the islands may have been out of the hands of Galtieri and his colleagues in the junta, there were several points at which they had choices and at each of these the path they took involved the use of force. Given the proclivity for military regimes to participate in conflict at a higher rate than other authoritarian regimes—see the discussion below—perhaps the Argentine junta's move should not have been a surprise, but what is striking about the policy choices is the rapidity with which a new leader engaged his nation in events that escalated so quickly. Was the haste with which Galtieri initiated the conflict an aberration or was it part of a pattern in which the leaders of military regimes not only participate disproportionately in disputes but also act more quickly than the leaders of other authoritarian states? The research reported below is directed at exploring this question. Our interest in this springs from a body of research on the general proclivity of military regimes to participate in conflict, a subject to which we now turn.

Over the past decade a body of evidence has accumulated indicating that among authoritarian regimes those controlled by the military are the most belligerent and conflict prone when measured by the frequency of their initiation of varying measures of militarized international disputes (MIDs) or participation in war. In a foundational paper Lai and Slater (2006) identified four types of authoritarian regimes – junta, strongman, machine and boss – the first two of which represent variations on military regimes. Using as their measure of conflict

the number of initiations of (1) any *MID* and (2) *violent MID*s, their results clearly support the conclusion that military regimes are more belligerent than civilian autocracies. Subsequently, Debs and Goemans (2010), using a set of regime categories originally advanced by Cheibub and Gandhi (2004), investigated the propensity for *war* participation by leaders in royalist, civilian and military governments. Their results also are consistent with military regimes being more belligerent than civilian autocracies or monarchies. Most recently, Weeks (2012, 2014), using the same government categories as Lai and Slater, but data she coded into the categories, identified strongmen (i.e., regimes with individual leaders who have a military background) as the most belligerent of authoritarian regimes by their propensity to initiate *MID*s, when the disputes are aggregated into a dichotomous variable similar to the first *MID* variable of Lai and Slater.³

To be sure, the literature on autocratic regimes is not unanimous with respect to military governments and conflict. For example, Peceny and Butler (2004) argued that among authoritarian regimes it is the personalist strain dominated by a small winning coalition that is most responsible for conflict. More recently, Kim (2014), using many of the same categories as the above cited works, reports results that are inconsistent with an observed belligerence on the part of military governments. Those negative results notwithstanding, the evidence for the three studies cited above is compelling. Their results emerge from rigorous analyses and are based on three different, albeit related, types of conflict, as the italics above indicate.

While their results converge, there are subtle differences across these studies. First, both Lai and Slater and Weeks use the state-year as their unit of analysis, while Debs and Goemans rely upon the leader-year. Second, the key theoretical assumptions driving each differ. Lai and

³ In another analysis Weeks focuses on the effects of defeats in wars (Weeks, 2014: 54-81.)

Slater trace the propensity of the military for conflict to diversionary motives that flow from a basic inability of military governments to generate the meaningful institutions that would provide stability. Debs and Goemans motivate their research by a set of assumptions about the cost of leadership removal and the fate meted out to leaders who are deposed. The argument set forward by Weeks relies on assumptions about the extent to which leaders face institutional constraints and attendant audience costs and when those constraints are either weak or absent the effect on the preferences of individual leaders. Hence, military leaders, being versed in the uses of violence, when unconstrained are more likely to adopt violent policies. Although the explanations differ, each is plausible and supported by its respective data.

It is also important to note that these explanations are not mutually exclusive. For example, Lai and Slater's assumption that military leaders engage in conflict as a diversionary ploy does not mean that the same leaders do not fear what will happen to their position if they lose a conflict as argued by Debs and Goemans. Similarly, Weeks assumptions about institutional constraints link with Lai and Slater's assumption about the lack of institutions while her audience cost issues link with Debs and Goemans's assumption on the groups that can remove leaders from power.

The question we address here is whether military regimes are not only more inclined toward more frequent conflicts, but whether that inclination carries over to the rapidity with which new leaders in military regimes initiate conflict in comparison to other authoritarian regimes. Put simply, are the leaders of military governments trigger-happy? This is not one of the traditional measures of conflict, such as the number of events of a particular type in a year, but it is not unprecedented (Ireland and Gartner, 2001). Importantly, the time it takes a leader to initiate the first dispute speaks directly to a leader's inclination to aggressiveness and, depending

upon the target, perhaps to risk-taking, as well. For any leader to militarize a dispute with another nation is a serious matter. The commitment of lives and treasure cannot be dismissed lightly, nor can leaders be unmindful of what their fate may be as a consequence of a conflict that turns out badly, as shown by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) and Debs and Goemans (2010). Thus focusing on the time to dispute initiation informs us of the aggressiveness of a leader.

It may also tell us something about the effect of the constraints under which leaders make decisions. It is one thing to be aggressive and constrained and it another to be aggressive and unconstrained. The former case would tend to slow the decision-making process in the initiation of a dispute since it would presumably encourage deliberation, but the circumstances of the latter would be such as to release the leader to act on his preferences to use the military forces of the state to solve the issue: “Military officers’ training leads them to view the use of force as a routine and appropriate policy option, to be wary of diplomacy and to fear the consequences if they do not act” (Weeks, 2012: 334).

We also account for the implications of each data sets’ assumptions for categorization of regimes with the timing of dispute initiation. If Lai and Slater’s assumption of military regimes engaging in conflict for diversionary purposes is correct then we would not expect a military based regime to initiate a conflict quickly. New leaders – including military ones – may have a window of opportunity to create or change institutions; thus, they do not need to immediately create a diversion. Similarly, support for Debs and Goemans’s assumption on the fate of the leader driving action would also see leaders as being restrained in action as they would want to consolidate their position before initiating. This would occur with military leaders because they do not have other areas of society to fall back onto for support. In consideration of audience

costs in Weeks's arguments, the audience for the leader of a military regime is the military and not acting out the preferences of that group may have deleterious consequences for the leader. The implication is that military leaders will engage in conflict at a faster pace.

Our consideration of whether the leaders of military governments are quicker to enter disputes than other types of regimes is straightforward. We first discuss the regime typologies used in the three studies. We next report our data, research design and statistical model. We then present a comparative analysis of the ability of the three typologies to capture the speed with which new leaders initiate (a) any dispute or (b) one in which reaches the level of violence or war, the same types of disputes used by Lai and Slater. Because capabilities have long been the center of research on international conflict we explore their effect on the speed to initiation by examining them as a factor that may condition the choices of leaders rather than as a control variable, as has usually been the case in the consideration of the domestic political effects of regimes.

Typologies of authoritarian regimes

Table 1 contains an enumeration of the categories in three regime typologies discussed above, their years covered, the identification of the types each proposes and the number of cases in each of their respective category by the leader-spell as drawn from Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009).⁴ This is discussed more fully below. A word of explanation is needed as to why two

⁴ The regime data we use are organized by national leader-spell. Hence, if there are two leaders in a state in one year, a not unusual event, there will be two cases in that one year. This will inflate the number of cases over what it would be if the regime year was used as the organizing basis of the data, but using the leader-year is necessary for the analytic methods used below. By the same token, if a leader is in office

typologies using the same categories are included. Although Weeks (2012) uses the same categories as Lai and Slater (2006), for well justified theoretical reasons, different criteria were used to assign regimes to categories. Weeks describes in painstaking detail the steps taken to derive the data by drawing on the prior work of Geddes (2003) and Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) and then assigning the regimes to the Lai and Slater categories (Weeks, 2012: 336-7; 2014: 179-183). Consequently, while the names on the categories are the same, as shown by the tabulated numbers in Table 1, the empirical differences between the two, and indeed across all three, are significant, a subject to which we now turn.

-----Table 1 goes here-----

There are a few points worth noting about the array in Table 1. First, the granularity of the categories is different, with the number of regime categories varying slightly. Second, there is broad nominal agreement on several of the categories. Every typology recognizes a regime dominated by the military, and Weeks and Lai and Slater each have two categories for the military: junta and strongman. One also contains a category for monarchs, but with few cases. Third, the total number of autocratic regimes differs significantly across the typologies, ranging from 624 (Debs and Goemans) to 299 (Weeks). It is tempting to think these differences reflect variation in the length of the time periods covered. To some extent this probably is the case, but there is more to it than that, since although Lai and Slater locate 526 leaders of autocratic regimes over 42 years, Weeks identifies 299 over 50 years. Fourth, there is significant variation in the proportion of the regimes across the categories, particularly with respect to the military

over several years, the number of observations would be decreased by that number in comparison to an analysis based on country-years.

regimes. For example, Weeks' junta and strongmen represent two categories of military governments and are 58.5 per cent of her cases, while in Lai and Slater's data the military constitutes only 35.2 per cent.

Not shown in Table 1 is the extent to which the typologies do not agree on where to place a particular government in a regime category. For example, even when using categories of the same name, the differing coding criteria of Weeks and Lai and Slater produce a number of different assignments across the same nominal categories. In the time periods in which their data overlap, Weeks reports 105 juntas, Lai and Slater report 50, but they agree on only 16. If you combine their respective junta and strongman categories into a single military government type the results improve; Weeks identifies 165 military governments, Lai and Slater 185, and they agree on 121, but still differ on 92. A priori a reasonable person might anticipate military regimes would be the easiest to identify and agree upon. Despite the likely prevalence of uniforms among government officials, such apparently is not the case. However, the lack of agreement will raise both issues and opportunities in the analysis below.

Whatever their differences, the typologies described above will allow an examination of the effect of the different types of autocratic regimes on the time it takes leaders after they enter office to initiate any militarized interstate dispute (MID) or a dispute minimally involving the use of force. In fact, it is the case that the differences in regime categorization across the three data sets may provide insight into how broadly various types of military regimes have an effect on the timing of a leader's state embarking on a path to conflict with another state. Put differently, just as there are demonstrated differences across the conflict initiation of different types of autocratic regimes, varying characteristics of military regimes may have effects on the calculations and behavior of their leaders.

Data and tests

Using the Archigos data on political leaders (Goemans et al., 2009), we identified all leaders of states recognized by the Correlates of War who entered office between 1946 and 1999, inclusive. Using Eugene (Bennett and Stam, 2000), it was then possible to associate each leader with their first participation, if any, in any dispute initiation or the initiation of a dispute involving the use of force or was a war (i.e., COW hostility levels 4 and 5). We call the former variable *Initiate Any Level*, based on the COW data set variable *DSidea*, and the latter *Initiate Level 4/5*. The categories then are not mutually exclusive, since any dispute in the latter is also in the former. However, below we will explore the utility of treating them as mutually exclusive by dividing them into two such groups. As noted above, similar dispute groupings were used in previous research on MID events by Lai and Slater (2006). We then recorded the time in days elapsing from a leader's entry to office until the *first* of either of these MID events took place. We consider only the leaders' choice to initiate because it speaks directly to their own inclination to engage in conflict. Over the period 1945-1999, our data record 509 leaders of who initiated a first dispute and 329 who initiated a first dispute in which force was used. After identifying the leaders, we assigned each to his (they are almost entirely males) appropriate regime type in the three typologies. To make this clear, because of the differences in regime assignment across the typologies – as discussed above – Leader X may be assigned to different regime types across the categories.

The standard way to analyze data in which the dependent variable is the elapsed time to an event—in this case the initiation of one or the other of the two types of disputes we use—is a survival model, where the critical outcome measure is the hazard leaders face at any moment of

becoming engaged in one of our two dispute types.⁵ Importantly, the calculation of the hazard includes information on all those who left office without engaging in a dispute as well as those still in office in 2002; these observations are censored. Because of its generality we used Weibull regression, but equivalent results are obtained using Cox regression.

Results

First, we present the results of examining the time of dispute participation for national leaders in the period between 1946 and 1999, using as the independent variables the regime categories given in the typologies in Table 1. Second, we will also consider an alternative procedure for assigning leaders and disputes to different categories. Third, we will assess the effects of three control variables on the main results.

Our initial results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 for each of the three categorizations of authoritarian leaders with the baseline category being all other states. In the first table we examine the leader choosing to initiate a conflict at any level, and in the second we examine the leader choosing to initiate a conflict that involves the use of force or war. An inspection of the results reported in Table 2 makes abundantly evident it is the leaders of military governments who initiate disputes more quickly than the other types of autocratic regimes. In fact, of the 11 hazard ratios reported in Table 2, the four statistically significant coefficients associated with early entry into disputes are associated with military regimes; only the Lai and Slater Junta category fails to be significant. One speculative explanation for the lack of significance of the Junta coefficient is that they are groups of leaders, which implies that discussions may be

⁵ The hazard ratio is derived from the exponentiation of the coefficient. We will report both, but the hazard ratio has an immediate, intuitively easy to grasp interpretation.

necessary before a conflict can be initiated and that these discussions take time for a consensus to be reached. Note that the coefficients and hazard ratios associated with the Strongman regimes—presumably based on an individual—are the largest compared to the other significant coefficients.

-----Table 2 goes here-----

Table 3 reports the results of for those disputes escalating to the use of force or war. Once again military governments emerge as the most inclined to become involved in serious disputes with all of the statistically significant coefficients being attached to military regimes, except, once again, Lai and Slater's Junta. Again the coefficients and hazard ratios for the Strongman category are substantial and the largest. Importantly, although there are discordant aspects of the results for the Juntas, none of the non-military categorizations comes close to showing an inclination for early entry into either type of dispute that is statistically significant. Military regimes stand out for their willingness to act quickly.

-----Table 3 goes here-----

As noted above, there is an aspect of the regime categorizations that is perplexing: the lack of agreement across them in terms of who belongs in which category. That is, the results above suggest regimes classified as Juntas are less inclined to enter disputes quickly than the Strongmen. However, recall Weeks and Lai and Slater agree on only 16 cases in which the leader is a member of a junta and disagree on 139 other cases. Since such differences abound across all the categorizations, it might be more revealing to examine the effects of military regimes and leaders in aggregations where there is sensitivity to the extent to who the categorizations include as leaders of military regimes. To that end, we aggregated the data into

two new variables. In the first, we categorized regimes as military if *any* one of the typologies deemed them as any form of military government. This yielded leaders of 314 leaders of military regimes. We term this *Military Any*. We also constructed a variable for military regimes if *all* of the typologies coded them as any type of military regime. We call this *Military All*. This more restrictive procedure yielded 104 leaders of military governments. Again, these are not mutually exclusive categories, since a regime included in *Military All* is included in *Military Any*. These additional categorizations along with others in later analyses are summarized in Table 4. Presently, we will consider the effect of separating the categories into exclusive categories with the baseline being all leaders not in that category.

-----Table 4 goes here-----

Table 5 displays the results of the effects of these aggregations on the inclination of leaders to enter disputes. For each of the four conditions the results are clear: military regimes of all sorts are inclined to enter disputes quickly. Note, too, that the hazard ratios increase from left to right across the bottom of the table, so that the most inclined leaders are those in regimes where there is no disagreement about the nature of the regime and the dispute involves violence at some level.

-----Table 5 goes here-----

There is, however, perhaps a problem within this analysis. Above we noted that both the classification of the disputes and military regimes were not mutually exclusive. Because of this the results reported in Table 5, with the strongest effect in the combination of two exclusive categories, suggest that perhaps the *Military All* variable in the *Initiate Level 4/5* model are, in effect, to some degree driving the results in the other analyses. This, of course, is easy to check

by making the categories mutually exclusive. Hence, we create *Military Not All* as a variable coded 1 if the leader's regime is included in *Military Any*, but not in *Military All* and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we create a variable *Initiate Level 1-3*, which is coded 1 for all the disputes in *Initiate Any Level* that do not reach the hostility 4 and 5 level – all other disputes are coded 0.

Table 6 shows the results of these changes. Of the four models, the only results that are statistically significant are those in which the disputes reach the level of violence. The difference between these cases and the others is stark, with the lowest significant hazard ratio of 1.38, which is almost one and a half times as large as the next largest ratio of 0.92. The results in the other three data configurations are either far from statistical significance (i.e., standard error either larger than or close to the size of their respective coefficient) or have the wrong sign.

Before turning to the introduction of control variables we consider the role of a state's capabilities as a factor that might condition this proclivity to initiate violence. Capability (or power) was once the prime analytic tool in the study of international politics, but recent research on the internal politics of states has largely relegated it to the status of a control variable. Since violence usually involves what we call power, it may be worth considering the extent to which the decision of the military leaders are conditioned on the capabilities of their states, a pattern that has been found in other research in which states with higher capability are found to be more readily inclined to initiate disputes (Siverson and Johnson, nd). Does this pattern hold for the military regimes? That is, does variation in the levels of capability available to leaders of military regimes incline them to behave in different ways from other leaders?

-----Table 6 goes here-----

To assess this we use the Correlates of War capability data for the year each leader entered office.⁶ Two points about the data used to examine the interaction of capability and regime type need explanation. First, because the COW capabilities data are scaled from 0 to 1, the hazard ratios we reported using the raw data would capture the effect of moving from no capabilities to having all the capabilities in the system in that year. To avoid this fanciful construction we rescaled the variable by multiplying it by 100. Because the result was skewed we added 1 and took its log.

-----Table 7 goes here-----

Table 7 displays the result of the interactions between regime type and capabilities for the specifications used in the mutually exclusive variables shown in Table 6. Because interactions cannot be interpreted directly (Brambor et al., 2006), a clearer understanding of what is going on may be seen in the graphs of the predicted margins shown in Figures 1 and 2. What is strikingly clear in all of these is that adding capabilities to the analyses adds little or nothing to the results for any of the specifications except for the right-hand panel in Figure 2, which is, once again, the case of those who were identified by all the data sets as leaders of military regimes and who initiate disputes that become violent. In the other three other graphs there is either no result or differences so small the 95 per cent confidence intervals overlap. The last graph, however, shows a sharp difference between the more exclusive type of military regime and hostility.⁷

⁶ It would have been inadvisable to use the year of the dispute or the year before a dispute, because, of course, not all leaders initiated a dispute; hence it is not clear which data should be entered for them.

⁷ Since the result of this interaction is not significant, there might be an objection to its consideration. However, as Brambor et al, (2006: 74) point out “it is perfectly possible for the marginal effect of X on Y

While the right-hand panel of Figure 2 shows capability having an effect on both the military regimes and all the other states, the effect is far less pronounced for the military regimes identified by all the studies. Put simply, while capability makes a difference of all the regimes—that is, as capability increases, time to dispute goes down—the effect of capabilities on the military regimes is significantly less than on the others. The leaders of these governments appear to enter disputes more rapidly than other regimes even when their capabilities are relatively modest. Given that these were disputes involving violence, the inclination for being trigger-happy is unmistakable.

But are there other factors whose effects we need to consider as possible elements leading to a spurious relationship? Three elements stand out. First, states engaged in a lengthy series of disputes with another state—what are termed rivalries (Thompson, 2001)—may be more inclined to have military governments because of the need to mobilize their population. We include a dummy variable coded 1 if the leader's first dispute was with a rival and 0 otherwise. Second, alliances can have some of the same effects as capabilities on the calculations leaders make about conflict. For each state we sum the number of defense alliances in place when the leader enters office. Because the data are skewed we take their log plus one. Third, some states are located in a “bad neighborhood” in which the collocation of both disputes and military governments may be driving the results. We consider this possibility by including dummy variables for each of the geographic areas given in the COW listing, but omitting North America

to be significant for substantively relevant values of the modifying variable Z even if the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant. Note what this means. It means that one cannot determine whether a model should include an interaction term simply by looking at the significance of the coefficient on the interaction term.”

(Singer and Small, 1972). We also control for the number of borders a state has (Gibler and Tir, 2010).

The results are shown in Table 8. The results for the regime type and capabilities are not greatly different from those in Table 7 and like the previous result the coefficient for interaction is not statistically significant. Statistically significant results are shown for the alliance and rivalries. The regional dummy for the Middle East is statistically significant but none of the other regional variables are meaningful.

-----Table 8 goes here-----

The impact of these new variables is shown in Figure 3, where pattern previously shown in Figure 2b remains in place, but with one noticeable difference: the gap between the two types of leaders closes at higher levels of capabilities before separating when states have a capability lower than 1.25. Removing the regional dummies has no effect on these results.

Conclusion

On the basis of the above, there are some points worthy of brief discussion. First, from the rapidity with which the military regimes initiated violent disputes it is apparent there was relatively little in the way of constraints on the choices of their leaders that led to violent disputes. An examination of the cases in which there was this rapid inclination to violence shows that the regimes in place are fairly evenly divided between juntas and strongmen, a pattern at slight variance with the results Weeks reports on the frequency of the initiation of all disputes where strongmen are generally the most belligerent (Weeks, 2014, Table 2: 44-5). If one argues that strongmen are the most belligerent because they have fewer constraints, then the behavior of the juntas seems incongruous. Juntas are by definition groups, and it is reasonable to infer that a

group will need more time to make a decision than a single individual. That said, there no reason to believe that juntas are necessarily immune to what has been termed “groupthink” (Janis, 1972), particularly when the members of the group all share the views typically attributed to the military about the use of force. In such a case a speedy course of action could easily be undertaken.

Second, it is unfortunate there is not more agreement on regime classifications across the three studies on which we drew. As we noted above, it is somewhat distressing that agreement on juntas, presumably the easiest to identify because of their group character, was so low. Unfortunately, most governments do not label themselves for us and those who do so are usually guilty of misrepresentation (e.g., “The People’s Democratic Republic of _____”). Hence, it is necessary for those who are interested in governmental types to make decisions, not all of which are clear cut. For example, some of the differences across the data sets may be due to *ex post* coding; that is, what starts out as a junta may become a strongman as one leader either eliminates others or reduces their influence to an exiguous level. If the assignments of regime type focus on the regime at different points in time, variation in category assignment may occur. That said, it is to the credit of the reported research that the data are easily available and those wishing to use it can readily determine the extent to which it is useful and appropriate for their purposes.

Finally, it is clear from our analysis that the leaders of the most clearly identified military regimes, even those with low capability, which is most of them, are indeed trigger-happy and are not only quick to initiate a dispute but to do so in a situation that becomes violent. Unlike the leaders of other low capability states that are either slow to initiate a dispute or do not do so before the leader leaves office, the leaders of the military regimes are unusually forceful in their choices.

If this seems pessimistic, we can end on a positive note. Military regimes and their leaders have always been in a minority of contemporary regimes. For their type they are unusually involved in international disputes, but these disputes are not large in their number because the number of these regimes is not large. In fact, according to Wikipedia's regime identifications there is only one military regime in place at the time of this writing.⁸ We may hope that the decrease in their number will make the world a safer place, even if it is a small degree.

⁸ No points for guessing Thailand.

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Table 1: Regime Typologies, Years Covered and Categories

Author(s)	Debs and Goemans (2010)	Weeks (2012)	Lai and Slater (2006)
Time coverage	1946-1996	1949-1999	1950-1992
Categories (N)	Civilian Dictatorship (335)	Strongman (69)	Strongman (135)
	Military Dictatorship (252)	Junta (106)	Junta (50)
	Royal Dictatorship (37)	Machine (73) Boss (51)	Machine (266) Boss (75)
Total Autocracies	624	299	526

Table 2: Duration Model Results for Initiation of Any Level of MID

	DG				Weeks				Lai and Slater					
	Military	Civilian	Monarch	Constant	Junta	Strongman	Machine	Boss	Constant	Junta	Strongman	Machine	Boss	Constant
Coef.	0.37**	0.09	-0.15	-6.05**	0.58**	0.50**	0.18	-0.18	-6.06**	0.21	0.60**	0.21	-0.04	-6.09**
S.E.	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.25)
H.R.	1.44	1.10	0.86		1.78	1.64	1.20	0.83		1.24	1.82	1.24	0.96	
Chi ²	9.83				18.60					14.69				
N	1673				1476					981				

** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Table 3: Duration Model Results for Initiation of MID with Use of Force or War

	DG				Weeks				Lai and Slater					
	Military	Civilian	Monarch	Constant	Junta	Strongman	Machine	Boss	Constant	Junta	Strongman	Machine	Boss	Constant
Coef.	0.69**	0.20	-0.23	-6.30**	0.81*	0.70**	0.12	0.05	-6.23**	0.55	0.86**	0.32	0.08	-6.22**
S.E.	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.34)	(0.28)
H.R.	2.00	1.22	0.80		2.24	2.02	1.13	1.05		1.73	2.37	1.38	1.08	
Chi ²	24.65				24.36				21.66					
N	1673				1476				981					

** p < 0.01;

* p < 0.05

Table 4: Description of Independent Variables Categorizing Military Leaders and Failure Variables Determining the Time Until Conflict

Variable	Description	Role
Military Any	Leader coded as being military in at least one categorization, including all categorizations.	Independent variable.
Military All	Leader coded as being military in all of the categorizations.	Independent variable.
Military Not All	Leader coded as being military in at least one categorization, but not all categorizations.	Independent variable.
Initiate Any Level	Leader initiated a MID of any level during their tenure.	Failure variable.
Initiate Level 1-3	Leader initiated a MID at level 1, 2, or 3 during their tenure. These are conflicts that do not become violent.	Failure variable.
Initiate Level 4/5	Leader initiated a MID at level 4 or 5 during their tenure. These are conflicts involving the use of force or war.	Failure variable.

Table 5: Duration Model Results for Leaders Categorized as Military in Any Typology and as Military in All Typologies

	<i>Initiate Any Level</i>	<i>Initiate Any Level</i>	<i>Initiate Level 4/5</i>	<i>Initiate Level 4/5</i>
Military Any	0.36**		0.64**	
S.E.	(0.11)		(0.12)	
H.R.	1.44		1.90	
Military All		0.59**		0.85**
S.E.		(0.14)		(0.16)
H.R.		1.80		2.33
Constant	-6.10**	-6.07**	-6.34**	-6.26**
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Chi ²	10.58	14.94	23.93	23.06
N	1710	1710	1710	1710

** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Table 6: Duration Model Results for Leaders Categorized as Military in Fewer than All Typologies and as Military in All Typologies

	<i>Initiate Level 1-3</i>	<i>Initiate Level 1-3</i>	<i>Initiate Level 4/5</i>	<i>Initiate Level 4/5</i>
Military Not All	-0.47		0.32*	
S.E.	(0.31)		(0.17)	
H.R.	0.62		1.38	
Military All		-0.09		0.85**
S.E.		(0.31)		(0.16)
H.R.		0.92		2.33
Constant	-7.58**	-7.62**	-6.25**	-6.26**
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Chi ²	2.68	0.08	3.55	23.06
N	1710	1710	1710	1710

** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Table 7: Duration Model Results for Leaders Categorized as Military in Fewer than All Typologies and as Military in All Typologies

<i>Initiate Level 1-3</i>						
	Military Not All	Capability	Mil Not All*Cap	Military All	Capability	Mil All*Cap
Coef.	-0.28	0.94**	-0.20	-0.10	0.94**	0.64
S.E.	(0.35)	(0.11)	(0.60)	(0.41)	(0.11)	(0.96)
H.R.	0.75	2.55	0.82	0.91	2.55	1.90
Constant	-8.38**			-8.42**		
	(0.38)			(0.38)		
Chi ²	55.86			54.86		
<i>Initiate Level 4/5</i>						
	Military Not All	Capability	Mil Not All*Cap	Military All	Capability	Mil All*Cap
Coef.	0.42	0.82**	0.04	0.85**	0.85**	0.46
S.E.	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.08)	(0.49)
H.R.	1.52	2.28	1.04	2.35	2.33	1.59
Constant	-6.88**			-6.92**		
	(0.25)			(0.25)		
Chi ²	78.23			101.71		
N	1667			1667		

** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Table 8: Duration Model Results for Military All at Hostility Level 4/5 with Controls

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Hazard
Military All	0.57**	(0.23)	1.76
Capabilities	0.50**	(0.11)	1.65
Military All* Capabilities	0.42	(0.56)	1.52
Number Alliances	0.09	(0.06)	1.09
Number Borders	0.05*	(0.03)	1.05
Rival	1.50**	(0.14)	4.46
Asia	0.48	(0.29)	1.61
Middle East	0.95**	(0.24)	2.59
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.26	(0.29)	0.77
Europe	-0.04	(0.25)	0.96
South America	-0.08	(0.26)	0.93
Constant	-7.88**	(0.36)	
Chi ²	293.30		
N	1565		

** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Figure 1: Predicted Time to Conflict for Military Leaders at Initiate Level 1-3




Figure 2: Predicted Time to Conflict for Military Leaders at Initiate Hostility Level 4/5




Figure 3: Predicted Time to Conflict for Military Leaders at Initiate Hostility Level 4/5 with Controls

