

Chapter 10. ‘Bairns not Bombs’: The Scottish Peace Movement and the UK Nuclear Weapons State

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Introduction

Mobilisation against nuclear weapons in Scotland is surprisingly under-researched. While historians, sociologists and the like have agreed that peace movements are “best studied within their national framework”, given their intimate interrelation with a national politics of defence,¹ these scholars have also tended to assume that nation and state in the UK are coterminous and homogenous. For example, as Christopher Hill points out, studies of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) have failed markedly to pay attention to

... the complexities of ‘the nation’ and of territorial politics within the UK and within anti-nuclear organising; instead ‘the nation’ tends to be based on and extrapolated from the politics of a group of intellectuals associated with the *New Statesman* in London.²

For Hill, this does a disservice to the vibrant localism of CND in England in the 1960s and 80s,³ as well as seriously misrepresenting the trajectory and significance of anti-nuclear activism in Wales and Scotland.⁴

In that light, this chapter offers a preliminary account of anti-nuclear/peace campaigning⁵ in Scotland and its contribution to nuclear politics in the UK. It asks: in what ways and to what degree is such campaigning in Scotland distinguishable from that south of the border? And what is its relevance today, in the context of continued constitutional uncertainty and the looming ‘Main Gate’ decision(s) on Trident renewal?⁶ In what follows, I will argue for the existence of a distinct Scottish peace movement – one, moreover, that is likely to play a continuing role in symbolising and channelling opposition to the UK nuclear weapons state in Scotland.

Anti-nuclear activism in Scotland

Even the limited sources currently available indicate that, notwithstanding significant convergence with its southern counterpart, there are distinctive elements to Scottish anti-nuclear activism. To begin with, there has long been a parallel organisational framework. This emerged early on, with the establishment of a Scottish organisation (SCND) in Edinburgh on 22 March 1958 in the aftermath of the launch of CND in London.⁷ The two groups were driven by different sets of individuals⁸ and, as Hill argues, the focus and activities of the activists in Edinburgh were distinctively Scottish:

Despite the similarities to English CND, the Edinburgh Council appealed to Scottish figures and institutions. Its members wrote to known or suspected sympathisers throughout Scotland; provided speakers or speaking panels of meetings of Edinburgh societies of one sort or another; [and] kept an eye on the local and national Scottish press...⁹

Beyond SCND, a wider and deeper Scottish organisational network emerged which, while retaining links to organisations in England, gained a dense texture of its own. SCND in its early years seems to have been limited in its scope to the central belt and independently-minded groups often with only loose affiliation to CND headquarters sprang up elsewhere, from the Iona community to YCND in Aberdeen.¹⁰ In the 1960s, these groups increasingly worked together, as well as with England-based direct action groups, notably in the 'anti-Polaris coordinating committee' in Glasgow.¹¹ The 1980s saw the establishment next to Faslane nuclear base of a peace camp, which had links with similar camps in the south but which, Carter argues, "prompted much less local antagonism ... one of its founders was elected to the local district council of Dumbarton in 1984."¹² The camp still provides support today for a range of groups taking action at the base. And more recent examples of Scottish-specific networking can be seen with the establishment of the umbrella organisations Scrap Trident and Scotland's For Peace.¹³ Prominent SCND figure Isobel Lindsay claims that it has been relatively easy to build broad alliances in what is, after all, a small country, and that this is a distinctive feature of Scottish anti-nuclear campaigning.¹⁴ Thus it seems a distinct organisational infrastructure has emerged, linked to but autonomous from English groups.¹⁵

In addition, the membership of the movement has distinct features in Scotland, both in terms of who participates and in what numbers. With regard to the former, Scotland conforms to some extent to the truism that anti-nuclear campaigners are drawn from the educated middle classes, particularly those from the public sector¹⁶ – the founders of SCND,

for example, were parents and teachers associated with the Steiner school in Edinburgh.¹⁷ As Hill notes, “the utopian idealism of nuclear disarmament did not necessarily fit with the everyday materialism of working-class life”¹⁸ and, while working class anti-nuclear activism has a long history in Scotland, it was organised at least initially outside the SCND framework, through communist parties and unions.¹⁹ Hill also argues, however, that ideals about peace, social justice and national identity were to converge in Scotland by the early 1960s, in tandem with more cross-class anti-nuclear alliances. Particular importance is placed by Hill on the role of Presbyterian churches and ecumenical societies “in connecting rural and working-class communities to SCND” in its early years, as well as on the links with unions.²⁰ It is in this context that we can understand the claim from Janey and Norman Buchan that anti-nuclear campaigning in Scotland at this time was “more widely based; more representative of the people in general, and therefore, in a word, more working class in character than the early days of CND elsewhere in Britain.”²¹ And the trend for working-class involvement and cross-class alliances in Scotland seems to have continued in later decades with, for example, the founders of Faslane Peace Camp drawn from the housing schemes of the nearby Vale of Leven,²² and the umbrella organisations mentioned above constituted by groups reflecting a broad cross-section of Scottish society: SCND, peace campers, church groups, unions and an array of centre-left and socialist political parties.²³

Turning to levels of participation, the peaks and troughs of Scottish anti-nuclear mobilisation mirror those in England to a great degree, with the first peak in 1959-61, the second in the early 1980s and a ‘third wave’²⁴ in the 2000s, emerging from opposition to the Iraq war. However, although it is impossible to provide definitive figures without further primary research, the picture does seem to be more complicated in Scotland. For a start, Lindsay implies that the first wave of activism continued longer in Scotland, only fully tailing off with the election of the pro-nuclear Wilson Labour government in 1964.²⁵ In addition, others assert that activism revived in the 1970s in Scotland, much earlier than elsewhere, and that SCND had a greater continuity of personnel and active membership during that time.²⁶ Finally, it seems that the referendum in 2014 precipitated another (fourth?) wave of enthusiasm for the anti-nuclear cause. The threatened closure of Faslane Peace Camp was averted, and there was a temporary surge in the numbers of people staying there, for example,²⁷ there was also a marked increase in membership of SCND,²⁸ and the ‘Bairns Not Bombs’ demonstration in Glasgow on 4 April 2015 reportedly had between 2,500 and 4000 attending.²⁹ This reflects the antipathy to nuclear weapons among the wider public in

Scotland, much higher than in England, with several opinion polls in recent years showing that 60 per cent or more of Scots oppose the renewal of Trident.³⁰

Peace activists in Scotland also have their own political priorities. Just as elsewhere, local nuclear installations have proved a particular bone of contention and Scottish activists have a particularly longstanding and deep-rooted complaint in this regard. The announcement in November 1960 that an American Polaris base was to be sited at Holy Loch on the Clyde “prompted an upsurge of popular protest on Clydeside, where a long tradition of socialist militancy combined with Scottish national consciousness” to ensure a relatively high level of local opposition.³¹ The next few months saw thousands of Scottish activists demonstrating in Glasgow and Dunoon, and, subsequent to the high-profile sit-down in Whitehall by the Direct Action Committee, valiant if ultimately ineffectual efforts by activists on canoes to disrupt the progress of the American submarines up the Clyde (the canoeists memorably dismissed by US naval commander Lanin as ‘a bunch of goddam eskimos!’).³² As participants from the period make clear, seeing actual nuclear submarines in the estuary was “an enormous stimulant to action”, one which continued as “the Clyde estuary grew into the most horrifying nuclear base in Western Europe. First Holy Loch, then [the British nuclear facility at] Faslane, then an entire mountain excavated for nuclear storage in Glen Douglas alongside Loch Lomond.”³³ The expansion of the nuclear presence in Scotland over the ensuing decades is surely a factor in the continuity of anti-nuclear organising remarked upon above.³⁴ Certainly, the decision to introduce Trident to the Faslane naval base (and the adjacent storage and loading facility at Coulport) was key in precipitating the establishment of the peace camp in 1982, with the founders also inspired by the example of other camps south of the border.³⁵ With the end of the Cold War and the closure of US bases in the UK, Faslane/Coulport became home to all British nuclear missiles, ensuring a unique and enduring focal point for local anti-nuclear resistance.

In this context, Scottish anti-nuclear activists have developed a distinctive collective identity, the most obvious feature of which is the connection to a sense of Scottish national identity. Hill’s analysis of the movement in the late 1950s and 60s shows how the “conceptualisation of nuclear disarmament as a national rather than British cause” relied upon and strengthened “emotive” attachments to the Scottish landscape and fears about its vulnerability to nuclear fallout, as well as speaking to a sense of Scotland’s threatened radical, internationalist traditions.³⁶ Hill also shows how the movement at that time built “on the community cultures of Christianity, folk and socialism.”³⁷ Peace activists consciously

sought to bridge the sectarian divisions which scarred the west coast of Scotland in particular, and they drew on and contributed to the development of high-profile ecumenical groups; they were influenced by the burgeoning local folk scene; and they were often rooted in labour movement and socialist traditions.³⁸ All these factors were manifested in the cultural expressions of the first wave of activism in Scotland, most obviously in the music. “At Aldermaston the songs were hymn-like and aspirational. On the Clyde they were popular, based on street songs, cheeky and irreverent and cocking a snook.”³⁹ They were also filled with local cultural references, “salty” Scots slang and “Glasgow vernacular”, and sometimes set to sectarian anthems, as exemplified in Morris Blythman’s musical riposte to Lanin:

Hullo! Hullo! we are the Eskimos

Hullo! Hullo! The Glesga Eskimos

We’ll gaff that nyaff caa’d Lanin

We’ll spear him whaur he blows

We are the Glesga Eskimos.⁴⁰

In the decades since, peace activism has continued its inventive deployment of ‘Scotticisms’ and references to local identities, culture and landscape. Examples range from the construction by Highland CND of an enormous Loch Ness monster to take to a 1983 Hyde Park demonstration (with the slogan ‘no more monsters in Scottish lochs’),⁴¹ to the lone piper accompanying the effort “to reclaim land used by the Ministry of Defence” at Coulport during an action by peace campers in March 1994;⁴² and from the face paint and tartan of the ‘Braveheart’ protest of February 1997, when protestors stopped the convoy on Hadrian’s wall,⁴³ to the recent campaign slogans ‘Nae Nuclear’ and ‘Bairns not Bombs’.⁴⁴ Through such actions, symbols and slogans, anti-nuclear activism in Scotland has acquired a collective identity in which a commitment to internationalism, anti-militarism, nonviolence and the like are rooted in particular place and community, often expressed in a popular vernacular, and constructed in opposition to the British state.

Finally, the movement is distinguished from its counterparts by the specific political setting within which it operates: autonomous Scottish political and civic institutions, the wider range of political parties and the recent creation of a Scottish Parliament all present the movement north of the border with distinctive opportunities for influence. Those peace activists more concerned with swaying political elites in order to shape government policy have not had to confine their efforts, as have their English peers, to the Labour Party. Most

obviously, there has long been a key relationship with the Scottish National Party (SNP). Several of the founders of SCND were or became prominent in the SNP;⁴⁵ additionally, right from 1961 when Labour first rejected unilateralism, peace activists sought influence over the SNP and, conversely, proved fertile territory for recruitment as party members and office-bearers.⁴⁶ While it may be the case that nationalists are not natural bedfellows of internationalist peace politics, they have in Wales and Scotland “for historic reasons been hostile to defence policies decided in London and to the nuclear bases on their territories.”⁴⁷ Certainly the SNP has a pronounced hostility to the 'British imperial tradition', perceived to have been “an important factor in the development and maintenance of a nuclear-based defence policy” as well as in the cavalier indifference of the British nuclear weapons state to public safety, public opinion and public access to land in Scotland.⁴⁸ In addition, since devolution and the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, anti-nuclear campaigners are not restricted in their party political efforts to the SNP, as a range of smaller parties (the Greens and socialists) have also functioned as a conduit for an anti-nuclear perspective.

The opening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 is crucial in expanding the range of political opportunities to peace activists in Scotland. Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker remind us that the Scotland Act of 1998 which established the Parliament “unequivocally reserves defense and foreign policy to London”, including nuclear weapons policy, but they also point out that it

... undoubtedly complicates the *implementation* of nuclear weapons policy by the UK government. The operation and maintenance of the Trident force and its installations inevitably involve civil activities and authorities, responsibilities for which are either clearly devolved ... or fall into some legal no-man's land ... Examples of the former are land-use planning, policing, and environmental protection. Examples of the latter are emergency planning and accident response.⁴⁹

While Chalmers and Walker rightly emphasise the consequent necessity for “close and continuous cooperation between political and administrative bodies north and south of the border”,⁵⁰ my point here is rather is that a range of institutional pressure points (in addition to Westminster and international organisations) have thus opened up for peace campaigners in Scotland. In this way, the establishment of the Parliament gave “opponents of Trident some cause for hope.”⁵¹

In sum, anti-nuclear campaigning north of the border has, since its emergence in the late 1950s, had its own organisational structure, membership dynamics, political priorities, and collective identity, and it has faced a unique set of political opportunities. In light of these distinctive characteristics, it seems more than legitimate to refer to a *Scottish peace movement*, one connected to but distinguishable from the movement in England and requiring much more scholarly attention in its own right, particularly subsequent to 1962. In the second half of the chapter, I will discuss the character and significance of the challenge this movement poses to the British nuclear weapons state.

Challenging the UK nuclear weapons state

The Scottish peace movement documented above has not succeeded in directly persuading the Westminster government to adopt unilateral disarmament, and is unlikely to do so in the near future. This does not mean, however, that it is without impact or that its impact has been insignificant.⁵²

The past cultural and political influence of the movement in Scotland is hard to deny. To begin with, there is its contribution to the cultural trends of the 1960s – its “lasting effect on the spirit of the times.”⁵³ It may be true that the most radical elements of 60s counterculture were limited in their appeal ‘in staid Scotland’,⁵⁴ but the same could not be said of the folk revival, which is still flourishing today. Already underway when SCND emerged and (as we have seen) a key element in the cultural expression of peace activists in the 1960s, the folk revival was provided with both a focus and an audience by the movement, such that “the struggle for peace and disarmament ... became synonymous with the struggle for cultural and linguistic distinction and harmony.”⁵⁵ Undoubtedly, the movement helped the traditional music scene flourish; arguably, it also contributed a radical edge in the form of a willingness to experiment musically and a commitment to popular involvement and political change. In addition, the movement played an important role in the construction of contemporary Scottish national identity. This is the core claim of Christopher Hill’s analysis: that peace activism in Scotland (and also Wales) was not just a by-product of a growing sense of nationhood but constitutive of it, because it bridged the sectarian divide, tapped into popular cultural vernaculars, was not party-political and provided a glaring and unifying symbol of oppression, bringing diverse elements together in a struggle against the British political establishment.⁵⁶

Connectedly, the Scottish peace movement has had a significant political impact in the past by helping to create the modern SNP. It supplied both a “new generation of activists”⁵⁷ and a normative vision of a progressive Scotland as a nation of peace in the world. Hill rightly warns that the relationship between organised nationalism and the peace movement in Scotland is “not a complete symbiosis”, citing as an example the recent acceptance by the SNP of continued NATO membership.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the overall thrust of his argument is that the movement helped the SNP reinvent itself in the 1960s as a “dynamic younger party that contrasted favourably with Labour”⁵⁹ and to shift the party’s political vision “leftward” toward a more egalitarian and internationalist perspective.⁶⁰ It could be also argued that the movement has, if indirectly and over the longer-term, contributed to the eclipse of Scottish Labour, by undermining its claims to radicalism and the common touch since its abandonment of unilateralism in the 1980s.⁶¹

Today, the movement still has considerable political influence in Scotland. This is because of the highly favourable current political conjuncture north of the border. Since the SNP achievement of an outright majority in the Scottish Parliament in the elections of 2011 and its near-clean sweep of Scottish constituencies in the Westminster elections of 2015, the peace movement now has had an open door to much of the Scottish political establishment. Indeed, it could be argued that anti-nuclear activists, at least some of them, are an integral part of that establishment. The peace movement and the current crop of SNP MPs and MSPs share not only political values, but also actual personnel – an obvious example is First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, who joined CND before she became an SNP member, spoke at the Bairns not Bombs rally and declared Trident a ‘red line’ issue in the last election.⁶² Furthermore, with Scottish Labour’s decisive vote at its 2015 conference to oppose Trident renewal (in line with new Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn’s views, but in contrast to the Labour Party official policy position), supporters of renewal are now isolated in the political class in Scotland, and opponents have an astonishing numerical supremacy.⁶³

This means that the people and perspectives of the Scottish peace movement will have a high-profile role in Scotland in debating the upcoming Main Gate decision(s). Anti-nuclear views and activities are likely to be widely reported, receive a sympathetic reception in many households in Scotland, and permeate Scottish government policy positions. None of which is to say that they will gain traction south of the border, where there is unlikely to be sympathetic media coverage or much attention from a Conservative government bent on renewal. We are thus facing a similar scenario to 2007 when, as Chalmers and Walker point

out, “the March 2007 UK Parliament’s decisive vote in favor of the nuclear modernization plan was followed in June 2007 by the Scottish Parliament’s equally decisive but inconsequential vote against.”⁶⁴ The Scottish peace movement may have increased its political representation since 2007, but its representatives, even if numerous and vocal, do not have the power to avert a decision in favour of housing a modernised Trident submarine system at Faslane. Ignoring them, however, will not be without cost for the Westminster government. Taken as it will be in the context of a government with one lone cabinet member from Scotland and which can count on only two votes from Scottish-based MPs in Parliament, a Main Gate decision to house the upgraded Trident fleet at Faslane will “feed the Scottish narrative about England’s imperial imposition.”⁶⁵ Thus it is likely to enhance recruitment to the peace movement *and* to strengthen dissatisfaction in Scotland with current constitutional arrangements. In these ways, it will strengthen longer-term opposition to Trident in Scotland even if renewal is enforced.

How this plays out in the future cannot be anticipated with confidence. As Chalmers and Walker note, the 2007 decision “took for granted” the Scottish location of British nuclear missiles, failing to foresee the SNP majority in 2011 or the referendum of 2014 that effectively placed the future of the British nuclear weapons system in ‘Scottish voters’ hands.⁶⁶ Although the majority of those voters ultimately plumped to stay in the union, the “Scottish spanner” (or monkey wrench?) in British nuclear policy is not likely to go away any time soon.⁶⁷ The movement and now its allies in the Scottish establishment will have multiple opportunities to resist the implementation of Trident renewal on the ground, given the extent of institutional cooperation required in Scotland. And there remains, of course, the possibility of another referendum, which the imposition of a Main Gate decision as outlined above seems to make more rather than less likely. With that comes “the real possibility that Scotland would gain independence within the new Trident system’s lifetime”,⁶⁸ in which case a future can be envisaged in which the Scottish peace movement will achieve its goal and remove Trident from Scotland – and even, perhaps, from the UK. Chalmers and Walker do not rule out this scenario entirely, even if they find it improbable.⁶⁹ In whatever ways the current uncertainties are resolved, it seems certain that the Scottish anti-nuclear movement will continue to be a thorn in the side of the British nuclear weapons state for some time, preventing the cultural and political normalisation of a new generation of nuclear weapons in Scotland.

Conclusion

I have made two broad arguments in this chapter, mapping on to its two parts. First, I have asserted that there is a Scottish peace movement, embedded in and connected to peace organising in the UK and elsewhere but distinguished by its own organisational infrastructure, its distinctive composition and political setting, its local focus, and its particular collective identity. Second, I have made a claim for the past and ongoing significance of that movement. Although it is likely that the renewal of the Trident weapons system and its location in Scotland cannot be prevented in the short-term, anti-nuclear activism is likely to play a continuing role in preventing the normalisation of the British nuclear weapons state north of the border. In sum, the anti-nuclear movement in Scotland has been shaped by its national context and remains umbilically tied to the modern struggle for national self-determination in ways that affect the long-term stability of British nuclear policy. This movement thus merits more serious political engagement from the British government, as well as more sustained attention from scholars of peace movements, particularly to its activities since 1962. I hope I have shown, at the very least, that subsuming Scottish anti-nuclear activism within studies of ‘the British peace movement’ underplays the significance of the former and misrepresents both.

¹ April Carter, *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics since 1945* (Harlow: Longman, 1992), 40-41; see also Holger Nehring, *Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Lawrence S. Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

² Christopher R. Hill, "Nations of Peace: Nuclear Disarmament and the Making of National Identity in Scotland and Wales," *Twentieth Century British History* (2015): 4. See for eg. Paul Byrne, *The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* (London, New York and Sydney: Croon Helm, 1988); Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard, *The Protest Makers* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980).

³ See, for a corrective on this point, Jonathan Hogg, "Cultures of nuclear resistance in 1980s Liverpool," *Urban History* 42, 4 (2015): 584-602.

⁴ Fiona McKay makes a similar point in relation to the study of feminist organising: "Much of what is passed off as British feminism might more accurately be characterised as English feminism. Scant attention has been paid to the territorial diversity of the women's movement/s in Britain ... [But] territory and level are significant in understanding the form and trajectory of contemporary women's movements, their identities and their strategic engagement with conventional power politics." ("The State of Women's Movement/s in Britain: Ambiguity, Complexity and Challenges from the Periphery," in *Women's Movements: Flourishing or in Abeyance?*, ed. Sandra Grey and Marian Sawyer (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 18.)

⁵ 'Peace' and 'anti-nuclear' activism are not synonymous terms. The latter encompasses (and sometimes implies solely) campaigning against nuclear energy, while the former includes opposition to specific wars, war in general and/or a culture of militarism. However, in popular usage, and in the

literature, the terms are often used interchangeably, a practice I adopt here insofar as it indicates that opposition to nuclear weapons (and energy) is often articulated as part of a wider opposition to militarism and armed conflict

- ⁶ As discussed in Andrew Futter's introduction to this book, the UK government is committed to making the long-deferred final decision (or what may now be a series of decisions) in 2016 on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines, see <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/successor-submarine-programme-factsheet/successor-submarine-programme-factsheet>.
- ⁷ SCND is often referred to as a regional branch of CND (e.g. Hill, "Nations of Peace."), and it is hard from the published historical record to discern the exact status of the Scottish group when it was launched. However, the current constitutions of both organisations makes SCND organisational autonomy clear, see http://www.cnduk.org/images/stories/Constitution_for_website_2013_Nov_reformatted.pdf and www.banthebomb.org/.../CONSTITUTION%205%20Nov%2005.doc.
- ⁸ John Ainslie, "Origin of the Scottish CND," *Scottish CND*, <http://www.banthebomb.org/history/originscottishcnd.html>.
- ⁹ Hill, "Nations of Peace," 7.
- ¹⁰ Ainslie, "Origin of the Scottish CND"; Anonymous, "Scotland's radical youth - 1960s Scotland: Ban the Bomb and anti-Vietnam movement in Aberdeen," <https://lenathehyena.wordpress.com/2011/10/25/scotlands-radical-youth-1960s-scotland-ban-the-bomb-and-anti-vietnam-movement-in-aberdeen/>.
- ¹¹ Isobel Lindsay, "Coalition Building in Scotland," *Nuclear Free Scotland* 50th Anniversary, May (2008).
- ¹² Carter, *Peace Movements*, 130. See also Members of the Faslane Peace Camp, *Faslane: Diary of a Peace Camp* (Edinburgh: Polygon Books, 1984).
- ¹³ <http://scraptrident.org/>; <http://www.scotland4peace.org/>
- ¹⁴ Lindsay, "Coalition Building in Scotland," 5.
- ¹⁵ This chimes with the thesis put forward by James G. Kellas, originally in the 1970s, that Scotland "is remarkably self-contained in its range of organised groups, and by inference, its own decision-making network" to the extent that there exists an autonomous "Scottish political system" (*The Scottish Political System*, 4th edition ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 178, 211.)
- ¹⁶ E.g., Byrne, *The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*, chap. 4.
- ¹⁷ Ainslie, "Origin of the Scottish CND".
- ¹⁸ Hill, "Nations of Peace," 15;.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9-11.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10-11, also 17, 20. For discussion of the interrelation between the churches and anti-nuclear activism in more recent years, see Bernadette Meaden, *Protest for Peace* (Glasgow: Wild Goose Publications, 1999), chapter 2. And on trades unions, see Jane McKay, "Trade Unions and the Peace Movement," *Nuclear Free Scotland* 50th anniversary special issue, May (2008).
- ²¹ Janey Buchan and Norman Buchan, "The Campaign in Scotland: Singing into Protest " in *The CND Story*, ed. John Minnion and Philip Bolsover (London: Allison and Busby Ltd, 1983), 53. The Buchans were active in the peace movement before becoming long-serving Labour Party politicians.
- ²² Author interview with 'Nick', 27/11/14

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- ²³ Lindsay, "Coalition Building in Scotland," 5.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Buchan and Buchan, "The Campaign in Scotland."; Ian Davison, "The Scottish Revival," in *The CND Story*, ed. John Minnion and Philip Bolsover (London: Allison and Busby Ltd., 1983).
- ²⁷ Faslane Peace Camp, "The Phoenix has Risen," Wordpress blog, <https://faslanepeacecamp.wordpress.com/2013/06/02/the-phoenix-has-risen/> and author interviews with campers 'Charlie' and 'Denise' (23/10/14) and ex-camper 'Fiona' (25/10/14).
- ²⁸ As reported at the SCND AGM, 23 November 2014
- ²⁹ BBC News, "Thousands attend anti-Trident rally in Glasgow," (2015), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-scotland-32181463>.
- ³⁰ 2010 YouGov poll cited in Nick Ritchie, "'Wi Dinnae Waant Yer Bombs': UK National Identities and Scottish Independence," International Studies Association annual convention, http://bisadev.smartdata.co.uk/index.php/component/bisa/?task=download_paper&format=raw&passed_paper_id=430; and CND 2013 poll cited in George Eaton, "Is the Scottish Public really Opposed to Nuclear Weapons?," *New Statesman*, <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/05/scottish-public-really-opposed-nuclear-weapons>. Eaton also discusses Lord Ashcroft's rival poll that questions the solidity of the anti-nuclear perspective in Scotland, albeit by incorporating in its survey very conservative figures of the cost of Trident renewal. We should also note the sustained support for Trident in Scotland in the local area around Faslane and from connected politicians and unions, who chiefly mobilise economic arguments in Trident's favour, see discussion in Nick Ritchie, "Relinquishing Nuclear Weapons: Identities, Networks and the British Bomb," *International Affairs* 86, 2 (2010): 478-9.
- ³¹ Carter, *Peace Movements*, 50; see also her account in John Minnion and Philip Bolsover, eds., *The CND Story* (London: Allison and Busby Ltd, 1983), 49 -52.
- ³² Marion Blythman, "We Were on the Side of Anything that Made the Americans Mad," *Nuclear Free Scotland* 50th anniversary special issue, May (2008): 8-9. For more detail on the protests see Susana Medeiros, "Scots and Peace Activists Protest US Navy Base at Holy Loch, Scotland 1960-61," Global Nonviolent Action Database, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/scots-and-peace-activists-protest-us-navy-base-holy-loch-scotland-1960-61>; and Minnion and Bolsover, *The CND Story*, 21-22; 49-52.
- ³³ Buchan and Buchan, "The Campaign in Scotland," 53-4.
- ³⁴ The expansion of the UK nuclear weapons state in Scotland is documented in Scottish CND, "Fortress Scotland," <http://www.banthebomb.org/militaryscotland/>.
- ³⁵ The 1978-80 campaign against the nuclear reactor at Torness may also be a part of this story, see Ian Welsh, "Anti-Nuclear Movements: Failed Projects or Heralds of a Direct Action Milieu?," *Sociological Research Online* 6, 3 (2001), <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/6/3/welsh.html>.
- ³⁶ Hill, "Nations of Peace," 12-16.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 16.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 16-24.
- ³⁹ Buchan and Buchan, "The Campaign in Scotland," 53.
- ⁴⁰ Gordon McCulloch, "aka Thurso Berwick: Doon Amang the Eskimos," *The Bottle Imp* 9, May (2011), <http://asls.arts.gla.ac.uk/SWE/TBI/TBIIssue9/McCulloch.html>; see also Blythman, "We Were on the Side of Anything that Made the Americans Mad."

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- ⁴¹ John Jappy, "The Highland Federation of CND Groups: A Short History," *Nuclear Free Scotland* 50th anniversary special issue, May (2008): 10-11.
- ⁴² "All Along the Watchtower on Pipes," *The Herald*, Monday 21 March 1994. Note, however, that such tropes are few and far between in the camp newsletter archive. In the 1980s, political references drawn from cross-UK movement subcultures – anarchism, feminism, nonviolent direct action, peace camps – were far more prevalent. In the 1990s, the newsletter was also infused with Celtic symbolism. So the argument about collective culture applies to the movement as a whole more than to Faslane Peace Camp specifically.
- ⁴³ Brian Quail interviewed in Meaden, *Protest for Peace*, 32. The Braveheart references were controversial among protesters, see Jane Tallents, "Trident Stopped on Hadrian's Wall," *Nuclear Free Scotland* (1997), <http://www.banthebomb.org/archives/magazine/nfsb4.htm>.
- ⁴⁴ See <http://www.banthebomb.org/index.php/publications/leaflets/1549-nae-nuclear> and <http://scraptrident.org/bairns-not-bombs/>
- ⁴⁵ See, e.g., Roseanna Cunningham, "Obituary: Mairi Stewart - Pioneering Nationalist who encouraged generations of aspiring SNP politicians," *The Scotsman*, <http://www.scotsman.com/news/obituaries/obituary-mairi-stewart-pioneering-nationalist-who-encouraged-generations-of-aspiring-snp-politicians-1-1905969#ixzz3x3Syboxb>.
- ⁴⁶ On Labour's brief period of unilateralism in the early 1960s (and subsequent re-adoption of unilateralism in the 1980s) see the overview in Chapter 1 of this volume by David Salisbury. While some of the campaigners mentioned in my chapter remained active in the Scottish Labour Party, the mutual interdependence of SCND and the SNP is much more marked, see Richard Finlay, "The Early Years: From the Inter-War Period to the mid-1960s," in *The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power*, ed. Gerry Hassan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 29; Gerry Hassan, "'The Auld Enemies': Scottish Nationalism and Scottish Labour," in *The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power*, ed. Gerry Hassan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 156; Hill, "Nations of Peace," 6. Hill rightly reminds us that, though the interplay of peace and nationalist movements has been largely ignored in peace studies, it has certainly been recognised by researchers of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, albeit with peace activism portrayed as a by-product of nationalism rather than the two perceived as co-constitutive (*ibid.*, 5.)
- ⁴⁷ Carter, *Peace Movements*, 140. The idea of innate hostility between nationalism and peace politics is disputed by Lindsay in "CND and the Nationalist Parties," in *The CND Story*, ed. John Minnion and Philip Bolsover (London: Allison and Busby, 1989), 136.
- ⁴⁸ Lindsay, "CND and the Nationalist Parties," 135; see also Ritchie, "'Wi Dinnae Waant Yer Bombs'" 7-13.
- ⁴⁹ Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, "The United Kingdom, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question," *Nonproliferation Review* Spring (2002): 5. Emphasis in original.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ Meaden, *Protest for Peace*, 46.
- ⁵² I note here the increasing insistence of social movement scholars on a more complex, longer-term and multi-dimensional approach to the political, social and cultural outcomes of activism. E.g., Cristina Flesher Fominaya, *Social Movements and Globalization* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 11-15; Lorenzo Bosi and Katrin Uba, "Introduction: The Outcomes of Social Movements," *Mobilization* 14, 4 (2009); Welsh, "Anti-Nuclear Movements: Failed Projects or Heralds of a Direct Action Milieu?"
- ⁵³ Blythman, "We Were on the Side of Anything that Made the Americans Mad," 8.
- ⁵⁴ Finlay, "The Early Years," 29.
- ⁵⁵ Hill, "Nations of Peace," 18.

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- ⁵⁶ Ibid., 16.
- ⁵⁷ Finlay, "The Early Years," 29.
- ⁵⁸ Hill, "Nations of Peace," 24-5.
- ⁵⁹ Finlay, "The Early Years," 29.
- ⁶⁰ Hill, "Nations of Peace," 6.
- ⁶¹ Hassan, "'The Auld Enemies'," 157.
- ⁶² See for example, The Scotsman, "Nicola Sturgeon signs 'Rethink Trident' pledge," (2015), <http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/nicola-sturgeon-signs-rethink-trident-pledge-1-3865803>.
- ⁶³ Brian Taylor, "Scottish Labour votes to scrap Trident," (2015), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-34687735>.
- ⁶⁴ Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, "Will Scotland Sink the UK's Nuclear Deterrent?," *Washington Quarterly* 36, 3 (2013): 110.
- ⁶⁵ William Walker, "Trident's Replacement and the Survival of the United Kingdom " *Survival* 57, 5 (2015): 13.
- ⁶⁶ Chalmers and Walker, "Will Scotland Sink the UK's Nuclear Deterrent?," 107-8.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., 109.
- ⁶⁸ Walker, "Trident's Replacement and the Survival of the United Kingdom " 16.
- ⁶⁹ Chalmers and Walker believe the SNP will likely sacrifice their commitment to a nuclear-free Scotland on the altar of independence ("The United Kingdom, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question," 10.), a view that has received support from an unexpected quarter. In interviews, several peace campers, past and present, whose anarchist leanings give them little faith in established politics and who are suspicious of SNP instrumentalism, have articulated a similar argument to me. I remain unconvinced by it, however, given the long-standing synergistic relation between the nationalist and anti-nuclear cause I have described in this chapter. Chalmers and Walker explore a host of future scenarios in their articles and in their original book, *Uncharted Waters: The UK, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2001).