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Patrolling the Line

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Abstract

Patrolling games were recently introduced by Alpern, Morton and Papadaki to model the problem of protecting the nodes of a network from an attack. Time is discrete and in each time unit the Patroller can stay at the same node or move to an adjacent node. The Attacker chooses when to attack and which node to attack, and needs $m$ consecutive time units to carry it out. The Attacker wins if the Patroller does not visit the chosen node while it is being attacked; otherwise the Patroller wins. This paper studies the patrolling game where the network is a line graph of $n$ nodes, which models the problem of guarding a channel or protecting a border from infiltration. We solve the patrolling game for any values of $m$ and $n$, providing an optimal Patroller strategy, an optimal Attacker strategy and the value of the game (optimal probability that the attack is intercepted).

Subject classifications: Search and surveillance: patrolling.
Area of review: Military and Homeland Security
1 Introduction

This paper applies the theory of patrolling games on networks, as introduced by Alpern et al. (2011), to the classical problems of guarding a channel or patrolling a border. We adopt a discrete model in which an antagonistic Attacker has the choice of where to attempt an infiltration: in particular, which node of the Line graph $L_n$ ($\text{nodes } 1, 2, \ldots, n$) to attack. He can also choose when to attack, i.e. any discrete time interval of $m$ consecutive periods, where $m$ represents the difficulty of infiltration. To thwart the attack or attempted infiltration, the Patroller walks along the line, hoping to be at the attacked node at some time within the attack period. If she thus intercepts the attack, she wins the game; otherwise the attack is successful and she loses (the Attacker wins). This is a win-lose game, which is a finite zero-sum game with payoff 1 to the maximizing Patroller if she wins, otherwise payoff 0. Clearly both players must adopt mixed strategies. The solution depends in a delicate way on the two parameters $n$ and $m$ and hence covers an infinite number of cases.

The situation is familiar from the context of national border security as many borders have well defined end points (the US-Mexican or US-Canadian borders, the former border between East and West Berlin, the “Greenline” in Cyprus patrolled by UN peace keeping troops). However it is also familiar in more abstract settings, as in the military operations research problem of “patrolling a channel” introduced in the classic early text of Morse and Kimball (1951) in which an aircraft patrols a channel with a view to intercepting a submarine. Related problems are described in our literature review.

Our discrete model considers a setting for which the border can be penetrated at designated points along its length. A classic example would be checkpoints on the Berlin Wall, but for a more contemporary example consider the problem faced by an airport dog patrol which has to cover a bank of security checkpoints at the entrance to the departure lounge. Consider also the example that when animals cross a river, there are limited locations where the slope down from the higher land is such that river level can be reached. These locations are well known to the Patrollers (predators in that context). A final interpretation is that IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devises) can be placed at certain points along a road where they are hidden from sight – they must be found before they explode.

We view this paper as having a similar role to that of Gal (1979) in the related field of search.
games for an immobile hider on a network, with our Patroller analogous to his Searcher and
our Attacker analogous to his Hider. In that field, early work began in a rough way for general
networks, and then went forward to special classes of networks: trees and Eulerian. These
were then put together to cover weakly cyclic networks and then weakly Eulerian networks by
Gal (2000) and others. See Alpern (2013) for a discussion of this history. The introduction of
Patrolling Games in Alpern et al. (2011) gave a rough outline of the patrolling game theory for
general graphs and started the particular theory by covering cycle graphs. This paper gives a
complete solution for the Line graph. We plan to extend this work to trees in the first instance
and then to more general classes of graphs. But we also believe that the Line graph is of interest
in itself, as it models the classic problem of guarding a border.

The reason that the results in this paper are complex and varied is that the “obvious”
solution for patrolling a line - simply going back and forth - is not optimal. It leaves nodes near
the ends especially vulnerable to attack. See Figure 3 for an illustration. An anecdote from the
second author illustrates this problem: “I was watching my daughter taking a group swimming
lesson. The teacher lined up seven children along the short side of the pool and went back and
forth, taking a child for a short swim before replacing her back on the poolside. After a while
I realized that my daughter (at position 7 on the end) was getting only half the attention of
her neighbour, who always got to swim immediately before and after my daughter. However
I was unable to convince the swimming teacher that there was a problem with her method.”
The significance of this anecdote for patrolling the line is not the frequency with which a patrol
visits an end but rather the gap between visits, particularly the size of this gap relative to \( m \),
the length of an attack.

Game theory plays an important role in the study of security problems, for instance the work
of Pita et al (2008) which created randomized security policies at Los Angeles Airport. Other
important applications of game theory to security problems can also be found in Baykal-Gürsoy

2 Literature Review

We divide our literature review into two parts. First we review the literature on preventing
an infiltrator from crossing a boundary or perimeter, or guarding a channel, which relates to
the Line graph on which we concentrate. Then we review the literature on patrolling a general graph or network that has developed since our introduction of patrolling games in Alpern et al. (2011).

2.1 Guarding a channel or infiltrating a border

Since the original work in the classic text of Morse and Kimball (1951), several authors have modeled the problem of guarding a channel or border. Washburn (1982) estimates the detection probability obtainable by a channel patroller. Baston and Bostock (1987) consider a problem where the Attacker has to cross from the left side to the right side of a rectangle while avoiding static blocks of the Patroller (in our terminology). This work is extended in Baston and Kikuta (2009) to the case where the Attacker has a non-zero width (maybe in our format this might correspond to requiring attacks on adjacent nodes rather than at a single node). Baston and Kikuta (2004) consider the possibility of several attackers. Washburn (2010) considers conditions under which the Attacker can get through observable moving barriers in the case of a line or circle.

Collins et al. (2013) suppose that only some portions of a boundary of a region are important to protect and show how multiple patrollers should optimally patrol individual sections of the search space separately. Zoroa et al. (2012) also consider a guarding a boundary (cycle graph), but against multiple attacks. Chung et al. (2011) consider multiple patrollers of a channel with periodic trajectories. Szechman et al. (2008) model the problem faced by a moving Patroller (a sensor) on a border trying to detect infiltrators who arrive according to a Poisson process.

None of these papers use our graph patrol model, but they give fairly similar models to ours of the infiltration game on a line or circle.

2.2 Patrolling games on a graph

Since our introduction of patrolling games in Alpern et al. (2011), a number of papers have a Patroller on a general graph or network. Lin et al. (2013) have a graph model similar to ours and apply approximate methods for a wider class of problems than ours. They consider targets (nodes) which can have different values. Their algorithms seem to work very well for complex problems, for both random and strategic attacks. This work is further extended in Lin et al.
Basilico et al. (2012, 2015) apply simulation techniques to large scale problems, also obtaining robust algorithms. Hochbaum et al. (2014) use a Stackelberg approach to solve the games where the attacks are nuclear threats on edges of the network, with theoretical results on the k-vehicle rural Chinese Postman Path.

3 Model and preliminary results

This section recalls the definition of patrolling games on general graphs and specializes to the case of a Line graph. Some general properties of the game for general graphs are stated, and some new ones established.

3.1 Defining the Discrete Patrolling Game

As introduced in Alpern et al. (2011), a patrolling game is based on the following given data: a graph $Q$ with $n$ nodes $N$ and edges $E$, an attack duration $m$ and a time horizon $T = \{1, 2, \ldots, T\}$ of length $T$. The Attacker chooses an attack $(i, I)$ where $i$ is the attacked node and $I \subset T$ is a subinterval of size $m$, which implies that $T \geq m$. The time duration $m$ represents the time required to carry out an attack, or perhaps if $G$ is a border, the time required cross it. The Patroller chooses a patrol, a walk $w : T \to N$. This means that $w(t)$ and $w(t+1)$ are the same or adjacent nodes. The Patrolling game is a win-lose game; the Patroller wins if he successfully intercepts the attack, that is, if $w(t) = i$ for some $t \in I$. The Attacker wins if he is undisturbed while carrying out his attack. In zero-sum notation, the Patroller is the maximizer, with payoff 1 if she wins and payoff 0 otherwise. Thus the value $V = V(Q)$ of the game is the optimal probability that the Patroller intercepts the attack. In this paper we shall solve the patrolling game on the Line graph $L_n$, with nodes $N = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$ and consecutive numbers considered adjacent. The two significant parameters will be the size $n$ of the line and the attack duration $m$ – the time horizon $T$ will not be important as the solution will be constant for $T$ sufficiently large, namely for $T \geq 2m$. This is because some optimal attacker strategies take $2m$ periods to complete and none of them need more than $2m$ periods to complete. If $T < m$ the attacker will never succeed because there is not enough time to carry out the attack. For $m \leq T < 2m$, then in some cases the attacker’s optimal strategy becomes unavailable. In these cases the probability of a successful attack is bounded above by
the values that we give in this paper, since the value of the game is non-increasing with $T$ (see Alpern et al. (2011), Proposition 3.1).

It is clear that in patrolling games it is not sufficient for the players to adopt pure strategies. However finite mixtures of pure strategies are sufficient. In some cases, for example in describing mixed attack strategies, it is useful to mention multiple attacks with the understanding that each of these is adopted with a given probability.

3.2 Decomposition results

A notion introduced in Alpern et al. (2011) is the decomposition of a graph $Q = (N, E)$ into simpler graphs $Q_j = (N_j, E_j)$ where $\cup N_j = N$ and nodes in $Q_j$ are adjacent if they are adjacent in $Q$. The Patroller has the option of choosing each graph $Q_j$ with some probability and then patrolling optimally on $Q_j$ with some probability $p_j$. Thus an attack on a node in $Q_j$ will be intercepted with probability at least $p_jV_j$, where $V_j$ is the value of the patrolling game on $Q_j$. By choosing the $p_j$ to equalize these probabilities, the following result was obtained as Lemma 6 of Alpern et al. (2011).

**Lemma 1 (Patroller Decomposition Lemma)** Suppose a graph $Q$ is decomposed into graphs $Q_j$, $j = 1, \ldots, J$. Then the value $V$ of the patrolling game on $Q$ satisfies

$$V \geq \frac{1}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} 1/V_j}.$$ 

We now introduce a new decomposition result from the point of view of the Attacker, which will be needed in later sections. First observe that for any graph $Q$ the value $V(Q)$ can be written as a rational number $a/b$, where the Attacker has an optimal strategy of equiprobably choosing among $b$ attacks, no more than $a$ of which can be intercepted by a single patrol. To see this observe that as the patrolling game is a finite game with rational payoffs it has a rational value and the Attacker can choose among the finite number of attacks such that the probability of choosing attack $j$ is a rational number $p_j$. Write the rationals $p_1, p_2, \ldots$ as $p_j = a_j/b$ with a common denominator $b$. In this way the Attacker chooses equiprobably between the $b$ attacks of which $a_j$ attacks are of type $j$. 

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Now suppose that the nodes $N$ of a graph $Q$ are the union of two node sets $N_1$ and $N_2$. It turns out that attack strategies on the associated graphs $Q_1$ and $Q_2$ can be usefully combined to form an attack strategy on $N$ if they agree on the intersection nodes $N_1 \cap N_2$. This is analogous to the result that two continuous functions form a continuous function on the union of their domains, as long as they agree on the intersection. We also need a condition that attacked nodes which are not in the intersection are not too close to the intersection. The precise formulation is as follows.

**Lemma 2 (Attacker Decomposition Lemma)** Suppose the graph $Q = (N, E)$ is the union of two connected graphs $Q_i$, $i = 1, 2$, whose intersection is the set of nodes $S$. That is, $N = N_1 \cup N_2$, $N_1 \cap N_2 = S$. For $i = 1, 2$, write $V_i = V(Q_i) = a/b_i$ as rationals with the same numerator so that there are optimal attack strategies on $Q_i$ which equiprobably use $b_i$ attacks (some with duplication) of which at most $a$ can be intercepted by a single patrol. Suppose the following two conditions hold:

1. The two optimal attack strategies on $Q_1$ and $Q_2$ have the same $c$ pure attacks (at the same times, same nodes) on $S$.

2. If a patrol intercepts one of $b_1$ attacks in $Q_1$ and one of the $b_2$ attacks in $Q_2$, then one of these must be in $S$.

Then the value $V$ of the patrolling game on $Q$ satisfies the inequality

$$V \leq \frac{a}{b_1 + b_2 - c} = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{V_1} + \frac{1}{V_2} - \frac{c}{a}}.$$

**Proof.** It is easy to combine the two optimal attack strategies for $Q_1$ and $Q_2$ as a feasible attack strategy for $Q$. Simply make all the $b_1$ attacks on $Q_1$ and all the $b_2$ attacks on $Q_2$, equiprobably, without duplicating the $c$ attacks on $S$. This makes $b_1 + b_2 - c$ attacks, by item 1. By item 2, the number of these that can be intercepted by a single patrol is still at most $a$.

To illustrate Lemma 2 with an example, consider $Q = Q_1 \cup Q_2$ with $m = 4$ as in Figure 1, with $S = \{C, F\} = \{Z, W\}$. Clearly $V(Q_1) = V(Q_2) = 2/3 = a/b$, because the Attacker can attack equiprobably at the 3 nodes $X, Z, W$ at the same time, say 1, and no patrol can
Figure 1: $Q$ can be decomposed as $Q_1 \cup Q_2$.

intercept more than 2 of them. This gives $c = 2$. The Patroller can equiprobably adopt the periodic patrols $XYZYX$, $ZYWYZ$, $WYXYW$, two of which intercept any attack. It follows from the above result that

$$V(Q) \leq \frac{a}{b + b - c} = \frac{2}{3 + 3 - 2} = \frac{1}{2}.$$  

Note that the Patroller cannot use Lemma 1 to obtain an optimal strategy, as that estimate gives only

$$V(Q) \geq \frac{1}{2/3 + 1/3} = \frac{1}{3}.$$  

In fact, $V(Q) = 1/2$, as can be seen by considering that the Patroller equiprobably adopts the periodic walk $ABCBA$ and the 3 others symmetric to it. An attack at any node is intercepted by two of these four patrols.

### 3.3 Oscillations and Random Oscillations

Oscillations will play an important role in patrolling the Line graph $L_n$.

**Definition 3** An oscillation on a subinterval $L_j = \{k+1, \ldots, k+j\}$ for any $0 \leq k \leq n-j$ of the Line graph $L_n$ is a walk starting at any node in $L_j$, going in either direction (unless starting at an endpoint), and turning around whenever reaching an endpoint of $L_j$ (reflecting). Note that there are two oscillations starting at each interior node of $L_j$ and one starting at each end node. In total this makes $2j - 2$ oscillations. A random oscillation is an equiprobable choice between these $2j - 2$ oscillations.
The use of oscillations in patrolling strategies will become clearer later in this section. Note that a random oscillation is a mixed strategy.

There are two general observations about oscillations. The first is that if \( n \) is sufficiently small with respect to \( m \), then an oscillation on \( L_n \) intercepts all possible attacks on \( L_n \). The second is that when \( n \) is large with respect to \( m \), a random oscillation has constant probability of intercepting attacks near the middle of \( L_n \), tailing off at the ends. (This can be seen in equation (1) on the calculation of \( \omega(i) \), as plotted in Figure 3.)

To analyze the first observation, note that when leaving a node of \( L_j \) an oscillation is away for at most \( 2(j - 2) + 1 = 2j - 3 \) periods before returning, with this maximum achieved when the node is an endpoint. The first term \( 2(j - 2) \) counts the periods away at one of the \( j - 2 \) interior points of \( L_j \), and the second term counts the single period the oscillation is away at the opposite endpoint. Thus if \( m > 2j - 3 \) the attack interval is too long to be contained in one of these periods away from a node, and will be intercepted. Thus we have shown the following.

**Lemma 4 (Oscillation Lemma)** Suppose that \( j \leq (m + 2)/2 \). Then

1. An oscillation on \( L_j \) intercepts any attack on \( L_j \), and therefore
2. \( V(L_j) = 1 \) (any oscillation is a winning pure strategy).

Observe that the second part of the lemma shows that we need only consider cases \( n > (m + 2)/2 \) or equivalently \( n > \hat{m} = \lfloor \frac{m+2}{2} \rfloor \) (where \( \lfloor k \rfloor \) and \( \lceil k \rceil \) are respectively the floor and ceiling of an integer \( k \)), as the Patroller can surely win otherwise.

To analyze the second observation (on random oscillations), we calculate the probability that a random oscillation on \( L_n \) intercepts an attack at node \( i \).

Suppose the attack is at a node \( i \) near the middle of \( L_n \) as pictured in Figure 2(a) for \( i = 5 \). The oscillations can be viewed as clockwise movements of period \( 2(n - 1) \), starting at a random node. We label nodes on the circle where the oscillation is moving left with a star. Suppose the attack is at node \( i \) on the line starting at some time \( t \). Then it will be intercepted by oscillations located at the \( 2m(= 6) \) nodes labeled with \( x \) or \( y \) at time \( t \). For example the oscillation at location \( i - 1(= 4) \) at time \( t \) will intercept the attack at time \( t + 1 \). Thus here the intercepting oscillations are described by two disjoint arcs of size \( m(= 3) \) and since the
sample space has size $2(n - 1)$ the probability that an attack at $i = 5$ is intercepted is given by $(2m) / (2(n - 1)) = m / (n - 1)$. When $i$ is small with respect to $m$ the two arcs (determined by the nodes labeled $x$ and those labeled $y$) overlap, as shown in Figure 2(b), where there are 5 starting points which intercept an attack on node 2, which gives value $5/18$ where $18 = 2(10) - 2$ is the total number of oscillations.

Thus the probability that an attack at node $i$ of $L_n$ is intercepted by a random oscillation on $L_n$ is given by $\omega(i)$, where

$$\omega(i) = \min \left( m + 2(i - 1), \frac{2m}{2(n - 1)} \right)$$

for $i \leq \frac{n + 1}{2}$, with $\omega(i) = \omega(1 + (n - i))$ for $i > \frac{n + 1}{2}$. 

For the case $n = 10$ and $m = 3$ illustrated in the two previous figures, the interception probabilities $\omega(i)$ are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 2: (a) An attack at $i = 5$ is intercepted with probability $6/18$, $m = 3$. (b) An attack at $i = 2$ is intercepted with probability $5/18$, $m = 3$.

Figure 3: Probabilities $\omega(i)$ of intercepting attack at $i$ for $n = 10$, $m = 3$. 

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3.4 Independence and covering strategies

We now describe a pair of strategies that give further bounds on the value of the game. A patrol \( w \) is called intercepting if it intercepts every attack on a node that it visits. We emphasize that whether or not \( w \) is intercepting depends on the value of \( m \). For example, Lemma 4 says that if \( j \leq \frac{m+2}{2} \) then any oscillation on \( L_j \) is intercepting. A set of intercepting patrols is called a covering set if every node of \( Q \) is visited by at least one of the patrols. The covering number \( C_m \) is the minimum cardinality of any covering set. We use the subscript of \( m \) to indicate the dependence of the covering number on the length of the attack period. We define the covering strategy as an equiprobable choice between the intercepting patrols of a minimum covering set. Note that intercepting patrols may visit overlapping sets. For example when \( n = 5 \) and \( m = 4 \) the oscillations on \( \{1, 2, 3\} \) and on \( \{3, 4, 5\} \) form a covering set. But so do the oscillations on \( \{1, 2, 3\} \) and \( \{4, 5\} \).

A set of nodes is called an independent set if no two attacks at two nodes of the set taking place in the same time interval (simultaneously) can be intercepted by the same patrol. This means that the nodes are at least \( m \) edges apart. The independence number \( I_m = I_m(Q) \) is the cardinality of a maximum independent set. We define the Attacker’s independent strategy as an equiprobable choice of attacks on a maximum independent set during a fixed time interval.

These notions of the independence and covering number are taken from Alpern et al. (2011) and they can be seen to be equivalent to the well-known graph-theoretic definitions of independence and covering numbers for a suitably defined hypergraph.

These strategies give the following bounds, obtained in Alpern et al. (2011), Lemma 12.

**Lemma 5 (Covering-Independence Lemma)** The value satisfies

\[
\frac{1}{C_m} \leq V \leq \frac{1}{I_m},
\]

where the upper bound is guaranteed by the Attacker using the independent strategy and the lower bound is guaranteed by the Patroller using the covering strategy.

We also have \( I_m \leq C_m \). This follows from Lemma 5, but it can also be argued using the definition of independent and covering sets: each node in an independent set is covered by at least one patrol from a covering set and at the same time each intercepting patrol in a
covering set cannot cover more than one node from an independent set, thus there are no fewer intercepting patrols than there are independent nodes.

3.5 Division of \((n, m)\) space and main results

The aim of this paper is to solve the patrolling game on the line \(L_n\) with attack duration \(m\) for arbitrary values of \(n\) and \(m\). The solution comes in several types, according to a partition of \((n, m)\) space. For \(n \leq (m + 2)/2\) the game is trivial, as the Patroller can intercept every possible attack by simply going back and forth between the end nodes (see Lemma 4). So we assume throughout that \(n \geq (m + 2)/2\). For \(n < m + 1\) the solution is also fairly simple, as shown in Theorem 16 Alpern et al. (2011): the optimal strategy for the Attacker is to attack simultaneously at the ends (diametrical strategy), the optimal strategy for the Patroller is the random oscillation and the value of the game is given by

\[
V(\mathbf{L}_n) = \frac{m}{2(n-1)}, \quad \text{when} \quad \frac{m+2}{2} \leq n < m+1. \tag{3}
\]

For the purposes of this paper, we partition the \((n, m)\) space into five regions: regions \(S_1\) and \(S_2\) are described above and we partition the remaining region \(n > m + 1\) into three further regions which will have separate solution types. (Actually the previous paper covered the case \(n = m + 1\) as well, but we shall cover that case differently in this paper.)

![Figure 4: \((n, m)\) space partitioned in sets \(S_1\), \(S_2\), \(S_3\), \(S_4\), and \(S_5\).](image)
\[S_1 = \{(n, m) : n < (m + 2)/2\},\]
\[S_2 = \{(n, m) : (m + 2)/2 \leq n < m + 1\},\]
\[S_3 = \{(n, m) : m = 2, n \geq 3\},\]
\[S_4 = \{(n, m) : n = m + 1, \text{ or } n = m + 2 \text{ and } m \geq 3 \text{ is even}\},\]
\[S_5 = \{(n, m) : n \geq m + 3, \text{ or } n = m + 2 \text{ and } m \geq 3 \text{ is odd}\}.
\]

The partition of \((n, m)\) space into these regions is shown in Figure 4.

The two cases \(S_3\) and \(S_4\) will be solved by similar techniques (a kind of covering-independence argument) in Section 4, summarized as Theorem 10. The remaining case \(S_5\) will be solved in Sections 5 and 6, summarized as Theorem 13, with detailed proofs of the subcases outlined in Section 6 and proved in the Appendix.

In the following result two derived parameters that are important are \(\rho = (n - 1) \mod m\) and \(\bar{V} = m/(n + m - 1)\). Further, \(S_1\) is trivial, \(S_2\) has been proved in [2] and \(S_3, S_4, S_5\) cover all the results of this paper.

**Theorem 6** The solution to the Patrolling Game on the Line graph \(L_n\), for attack duration \(m\), is given in the following three cases:

\((n, m) \in S_1\) The value of the game is given by \(V = 1\); the oscillation strategy is optimal for the Patroller and all strategies are optimal for the Attacker.

\((n, m) \in S_2\) The value of the game is given by \(V = \frac{m}{2(n-1)}\); the random oscillation strategy is optimal for the Patroller and equiprobably attacking at the endpoints (diametrical) is optimal for the Attacker.

\((n, m) \in S_3\) The value of the game is given by \(V = \frac{1}{m/2^k}\); the covering strategy is optimal for the Patroller and the independent strategy is optimal for the Attacker.

\((n, m) \in S_4\) The value of the game is \(V = \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{E_m} = \frac{1}{C_m}\), and the covering and independent strategies are optimal for the players.
(n, m) \in S_5 \text{ The value of the game is } \bar{V} = m/(n + m - 1), \text{ the end-augmented oscillation strategy (as defined later in Definition 11) is optimal for the Patroller and the optimal Attacker strategy depends on } m \text{ and the parameter } \rho = (n - 1) \mod m.

4 Optimal Patroller and Attacker strategies on \( S_3 \) and \( S_4 \)

In this section we solve the patrolling game on \( L_n \) for sets \( S_3 \) and \( S_4 \). The main tool is Lemma 5.

4.1 Independence and Covering numbers for the line

For the game played on \( L_n \) we can explicitly calculate the independence number and covering number, as defined in Subsection 3.2. This will be useful in the next section when we give optimal strategies for the Patroller. We denote the independence number and covering number of \( L_n \) by \( I_{m,n} \) and \( C_{m,n} \) respectively.

Lemma 7 When \( Q \) is the Line graph \( L_n \), the covering and independence numbers are given by

\[
C_{m,n} = \left\lceil \frac{n}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor + 1} \right\rceil \quad \text{and} \quad I_{m,n} = \left\lfloor \frac{n + m - 1}{m} \right\rfloor, \tag{4}
\]

Proof. From the Oscillation Lemma (Lemma 4, part 1), we see that if \( n = c\hat{m} \), where \( \hat{m} = \left\lfloor \frac{m+2}{2} \right\rfloor \), we can cover \( L_n \) with \( c \) disjoint intercepting patrols and hence \( C_{m,n} \leq c = n/\hat{m} \). This clearly still holds for smaller \( n \), \( n \leq c\hat{m} \). Since an intercepting patrol cannot cover an interval of size larger than \( \hat{m} \), it follows that

\[
C_{m,n} = \left\lceil \frac{n}{\hat{m}} \right\rceil = \left\lceil \frac{n}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor + 1} \right\rceil.
\]

To calculate the independence number, we obtain a maximally independent set by placing \( i \) attacks at \( 1, 1 + m, 1 + 2m, \ldots, 1 + (i - 1)m \), where

\[
1 + (i - 1)m \leq n \leq 1 + im, \text{ and hence } i = I_{m,n} = \left\lfloor \frac{n + m - 1}{m} \right\rfloor.
\]
Since we know $I_{m,n}$ and $C_{m,n}$ we have bounds on the value $V$ from Lemma 5. A particularly useful and easy application of Lemmas 5 and 7 occurs when the fraction involved in the formula (4) for $I_m$ is an integer, that is, when $n = qm + 1$ for some integer $q$ and so $(n + m - 1) / m = (q + 1)m/m = q + 1$. In this case we have $\bar{V} \equiv m / (n + m - 1) = 1/I_m$. For purposes related to the statement of Theorem 13, we write the condition $n = qm + 1$ as $\rho \equiv (n - 1) \mod m = 0$.

**Corollary 8** If $\rho \equiv (n - 1) \mod m = 0$, then the independent strategy ensures an expected payoff not exceeding $\bar{V} \equiv m / (n + m - 1)$ and hence $V \leq \bar{V}$.

**Proof.** By Lemma 7 it is sufficient to prove that $1/I_{m,n} = \bar{V}$. However the hypothesis implies that $(n + m - 1) / m$ is an integer, and so $I_{m,n}$ can be calculated from Lemma 4 as $I_{m,n} = 1/[(n + m - 1) / m] = 1/\bar{V}$.

It turns out that $\bar{V} \equiv m / (n + m - 1)$ is the value of the game for $n \geq m + 3$, and the above result provides the (tight) upper bound.

### 4.2 When are $C_{m,n}$ and $I_{m,n}$ equal?

According to the Lemma 5, the value of the patrolling game on the line is simply $V = 1/I_{m,n} = 1/C_{m,n}$ when $C_{m,n} = I_{m,n}$, with the optimal mixed strategies for the Patroller and Attacker being the covering strategy and the independent strategy, respectively. As formula (4) in Lemma 7 gives $C_{m,n}$ and $I_{m,n}$ in terms of $m$ and $n$, it is not difficult to identify all the cases in which the patrolling game on the line can be simply solved in this manner. In particular we find $C_{m,n} = I_{m,n}$ on $S_3$ and $S_4$ (and in one other case). We begin by calculating a table with entries $C_{m,n} - I_{m,n}$ for some small values of $n$ and $m$, $n \geq m + 1$.

The 0s in the table obviously correspond to the $C_{m,n} = I_{m,n}$ cases. They come in the four types: a diagonal of 0s with $n = m + 1$; a diagonal $n = m + 2$ with alternating 0s and 1s, the column for $m = 2$ and the apparently anomalous 0 at (9,4). We explain these 0s and furthermore show that there are no others, in the following result.

**Proposition 9** Suppose $m \geq 2$ and $n \geq m + 1$. Then the covering number $C_{m,n}$ and independence number $I_{m,n}$ are equal in the following four cases:
Table 1: $C_{m,n} - I_{m,n}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$n \setminus m$</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) $m = 2$ $(C_{m,n} = I_{m,n} = \lceil n/2 \rceil)$,

(b) $n = m + 1$ $(C_{m,n} = I_{m,n} = 2)$,

(c) $n = m + 2$ and $m$ is even $(C_{m,n} = I_{m,n} = 2)$,

(d) $n = 9$ and $m = 4$ $(C_{m,n} = I_{m,n} = 3)$.

Furthermore,

(e) $C_{m,n} > I_{m,n}$ in all other cases.

Proof.

Case (a) follows from the observation that for $m = 2$, by Lemma 7, $C_{m,n} = \lceil n/2 \rceil = \lceil (n + 1)/2 \rceil = I_{m,n}$.

For cases (b) and (c) we have following: If $n = m + 1$ then $I_{m,n} = \left\lceil \frac{(m+1)+m-1}{m} \right\rceil = \left\lceil \frac{2m+1}{m} \right\rceil = 2 + \frac{1}{m} = 2$. If $m$ is even then $\left\lfloor \frac{2n}{m+2} \right\rfloor$. If also $n = m + 1$ then $C_{m,n} = \left\lceil \frac{2m+2}{m+2} \right\rceil = \left\lceil 2 - \frac{2}{m+2} \right\rceil = 2$, and if instead $n = m + 2$ then $C_{m,n} = \left\lceil \frac{2(m+2)}{m+2} \right\rceil = 2$. If $m$ is odd and $n = m + 1$ then $C_{m,n} = \left\lfloor \frac{2m+1}{m+1} \right\rfloor = 2$.

Case (d) follows from Lemma 7, which implies that $C_{4,9} = I_{4,9} = 3$.

The proof of result (e) is in the Appendix, since we don’t use that in the rest of the paper.

Note the one additional 0 for $m = 4$ and $n = 9$, where $C_{m,n} = I_{m,n} = 3$ and $V = 1/3$. Here the independent set is $\{1, 5, 9\}$, and the covering intervals are $[1, 3]$, $[4, 6]$ and $[7, 9]$, as shown
in Figure 5. So the attacks are equiprobable on the independent set (denoted by \(x\) below) and the Patroller oscillates equiprobably on the three stated intervals.

\[
\begin{array}{ccccccc}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Figure 5: Solution for \(m = 4, n = 9\).

Combining Proposition 9 with Lemma 5 in cases \(S_3\) and \(S_4\) we get that the value of the game is \(\frac{1}{c_{m,n}}\).

**Theorem 10** For \(S_3\) and \(S_4\) the value of the patrolling game on \(L_n\) is \(\frac{1}{c_{m,n}}\), which for \(S_3\) is \([n/2]\) and for \(S_4\) is \(\frac{1}{2}\). Furthermore, the optimal strategies are the covering and the independent strategies.

This establishes the first two cases of our main theorem (Theorem 6).

It is interesting to see how the part of the above result, for the case \(n = m + 2\) where \(m\) even, can be obtained from the Patroller Decomposition Lemma (Lemma 1). We decompose \(L_n\) into two copies of \(L_{n/2}\), that is into \(L_a\) and \(L_b\) where \(a = b = n/2\). Since \(n/2 = (m + 2)/2\), it follows from Lemma 4 that \(V(L_a) = 1\). Hence the Patroller Decomposition Lemma says that \(V(L_n) \geq 1/(1/V(L_a) + 1/V(L_b)) = 1/2\).

5 Optimal Patroller strategy on \(S_5\)

This section considers the Patroller’s strategy when the parameters \((n, m)\) belong to the set \(S_5\), that is, \(n \geq m + 3\), or \(n = m + 2\) and \(m > 2\) is odd. In the first instance, the Patroller might consider simply adopting a random oscillation on the full line. However, as seen in Figure 3, this strategy gives a poor interception probability near the ends. So one solution, which turns out to be optimal, is to add to the mixed Patroller strategy random oscillations on intervals of size \(\hat{m} = \left\lfloor \frac{m+2}{2} \right\rfloor\). Since in particular \(\hat{m} \leq \frac{m+2}{2}\), the first part of the Oscillation Lemma (Lemma 4) shows that the oscillation on such intervals intercept any attack in that interval (they are intercepting patrols).

We state the Patroller strategy more precisely below.
Definition 11 We define the end-augmented oscillation strategy on $L_n$ as follows. With probability $p = (n - 1) / (m + n - 1)$ the Patroller adopts the random oscillation on $L_n$ and with probability $q = m / (2 (m + n - 1))$ adopts any oscillation on the left interval of size $\hat{m} = \lfloor \frac{m+2}{2} \rfloor$ and also with probability $q$ adopts any oscillation on the right interval of size $\hat{m}$. (Note $p + 2q = 1$.) The left interval of size $\hat{m}$ is the interval $\{1, \ldots, \hat{m}\}$ and the right interval is $\{n - \hat{m} + 1, \ldots, n\}$.

Lemma 12 For $n \geq m + 2$, the end-augmented oscillation strategy ensures that the value $V$ satisfies $V \geq m / (n + m - 1) \equiv \bar{V}$.

Proof. We give the proof for even $m$, where $\hat{m} = \frac{m + 2}{2}$. Note that the end oscillations intercept every attack in their interval and that the full random oscillation intercepts an attack at node $i$ with probability $\omega(i)$ as defined in (1). Thus an attack at any node $i \leq \hat{m}$ or $i > n - \hat{m}$ (in the two end intervals) is intercepted with probability

$$q * 1 + p * \omega(i) \geq q * 1 + p * \omega(1) \geq \frac{m}{2 (m + n - 1)} + \frac{n - 1}{(m + n - 1) 2 (n - 1)} m \bar{V}. $$

An attack at any middle node $\hat{m} < i \leq n - \hat{m}$ is intercepted with probability $\omega(i) = m / (n - 1)$ if the Patroller is adopting the full random oscillation on $L_n$, and thus with probability

$$p * \frac{m}{n - 1} = \frac{n - 1}{(m + n - 1) n - 1} m \bar{V}. $$

The proof for odd $m$, where $\hat{m} = \frac{m + 1}{2}$, is similar. ■

It is interesting to compare the end-augmented oscillation strategy in the case $n = 9$ and $m = 4$ to the covering strategy, which we saw was optimal for these parameters in Section 4.2. The end-augmented oscillation strategy chooses random oscillations on $L_9$ with probability $p = 2/3$ and with probability $q = 1/6$ adopts an oscillation on each of the intervals $[1, 3]$ and $[7, 9]$. In Figure 6 we show the probability the attacks at each of the nodes are intercepted when the Attacker uses each strategy. Even though both strategies are optimal, the end-augmented oscillation strategy weakly dominates as it detects attacks at some nodes with probability strictly higher than $1/3$, whereas the covering strategy detects attacks at all nodes.
Figure 6: Probability of interception of an attack at node $i$ for (a) the covering strategy and (b) the end-augmented oscillation strategy ($n = 9$, $m = 4$).

with probability exactly $1/3$.

6 Optimal Attacker strategies on $S_5$

This section states the main theorem for the patrolling game on the line for $S_5$. We consider five types of attack strategies (A,B,C,D,E) and show that one of these always guarantees that $V \leq \bar{V} \equiv m/(m + n - 1)$. Since we already showed in the previous section that the Patroller can insure that $V \geq \bar{V}$ by adopting the end-augmented oscillation, this will establish that $V = \bar{V}$. We have already shown (Corollary 8) that if $\rho \equiv n - 1 \mod m = 0$ then $V \leq 1/I_{m,n} = \bar{V}$ and thus the independent attack strategy (A) is optimal. We will describe the other four attack strategies (B-E) in the subsections below. Each of these attack strategies is optimal for certain pairs of $m$ and $n$, as described in the following main result.

**Theorem 13** Consider the patrolling game on the line $L_n$ with attack duration $m$. If $n \geq m + 3 \geq 6$, or $n = m + 2$ and $m$ is odd, the value is given by $V = \bar{V} \equiv m/(m + n - 1)$ and the end-augmented oscillation is an optimal patrol. The type of optimal attack strategy is either the independent attack (A), the horizontal attack (B), the vertical attack (C), the zig-zag attack (D) or the extended zig-zag attack, depending on the values of $m$ and $\rho \equiv (n - 1) \mod m$ as follows:
The partition of \((m, \rho)\) space into regions where the various attack types are optimal can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. The pattern of letters is easy to describe. Aside from the top row of A’s and the second row of alternating B and E, the remaining grid can be viewed as a chessboard, with the corner \((2,3)\) a white square. Then all the black squares have B and the white squares alternate C and D along diagonals. Clearly the squares with \(\rho \geq m\) are empty, as \(\rho\) is a number modulo \(m\).

### 6.1 Outline of proof of Theorem 13

We already know from Lemma 12 that \(V \geq \bar{V} = m/(n + m - 1)\), which means that the Patroller can guarantee winning with probability \(\bar{V}\). So we need to show that in all cases there is an Attacker mixed strategy which intercepts any attack with probability at least \(\bar{V}\).

The proof of Theorem 13 will be carried out in five parts, corresponding to each of the cases in Table 3. As we will see below, the case A with \(\rho = 0\) is easily proved. So for each pair \(n, m\) with \(n > m + 2\) and \(\rho \geq 1\) we decompose the line \(L_n\) into two lines \(Q_1 = L_r\) (with nodes \(1, \ldots, r\)) and \(Q_2 = L_{qm+1}\) (with nodes \(r, \ldots, n\)) which overlap at the single node \(r\). Thus \(n = qm + r\) and the choice of \(r\) determines \(q\). For cases B, C and D, we take \(r = m + \rho + 1\) and for case E we take \(r = 2m + \rho + 1\). In each case we explicitly define a family of \(b_1 = r + m - 1\) attacks on \(Q_1 = L_r\), of which at most \(m\) can be intercepted by a single patrol (walk) and such that there are exactly \(m\) attacks at node \(r\), either (i) one each at times 1, 2, \ldots, \(m\) or (ii) two each at times 2, \ldots, \(m\) (this requires \(m\) is even). We then use Lemma 15 to cover the graph

### Table 2: The partition of \((m, \rho)\) space depending on optimality of attack strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(m \setminus \rho)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1 even, (\geq 2)</th>
<th>odd, (\geq 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>even</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>odd</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Partition of \((m, \rho)\) space into optimal attack types.
\(Q_2 = L_{qm+1}\) (where \(q\) is defined by the equation \(n = qm + r\)) with \(b_2 = (q+1)m\) attacks, of which at most \(m\) can be intercepted by any patrol and such that the attacks at the end node \(r\) are of the same type \(A(i)\) or \(A(ii)\) as the \(c = m\) attacks on \(Q_1 = L_r\). As in the proof of Lemma 2, with \(a = m\), this gives a total of

\[
b_1 + b_2 - m = (r + m - 1) + (q + 1)m - m = n + m - 1
\]

attacks on \(L_n\), of which at most \(m\) can be intercepted by a single patrol. Or, to use the inequality in Lemma 2, we have

\[
V(L_n) \leq \frac{1}{V(L_r)} + \frac{1}{V(L_{qm+1})} \cdot \frac{m}{m} = \frac{1}{m} + \frac{(q+1)m}{m} - \frac{m}{m}
\]

\[
= \frac{(r + m - 1) + (q + 1)m - m}{m}
\]

\[
= \frac{m}{n + m - 1}.
\]

The significance of this Attacker decomposition is that we only have to describe the optimal attack strategy on the short line \(L_r\), rather than on the full line \(L_n\).

Thus the proof of Theorem 13 reduces to Lemmas 15, 19, 22, 25 and 28, which are dealt with in separate subsections below.

6.2 Case A: refining the independent attack strategy

For the case \(\rho = 0\), that is, \(n = qm + 1\), we have already shown in Corollary 8 that the independent strategy is optimal, and so in this case \(V \leq 1/I_{m,n} = \bar{V}\). However, for later purposes it is useful and maybe necessary to have two additional optimal strategies, which we will call \(A(i)\) and \(A(ii)\).

**Definition 14 (Attack Strategies \(A(i)\) and \(A(ii)\)).** The attack strategies \(A(i)\) and \(A(ii)\) on \(L_n\), \(n = qm + 1\) (where \(\rho = 0\)) each place \(m\) attacks at each node \(km + 1\), \(k = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, q\), so \((q+1)m\) attacks in all, equiprobably. Strategy \(A(i)\) starts the \(m\) attacks at each node at times \(1, 2, \ldots, m\). Strategy \(A(ii)\) is only defined when \(m\) is even, and starts the \(m\) attacks with two each at times \(2, 4, \ldots, m\).
Lemma 15  Assume \( n = qm + 1 \), or equivalently \( \rho = 0 \). Of the \((q+1)m\) attacks in the attack strategy \( A(i) \), at most \( m \) can be intercepted by a single patrol. If \( m \) is even, the same statement holds for the attack strategy \( A(ii) \).

**Proof.** The claim of the lemma is easy to verify directly, as if a patrol is last at an attacked node \( km + 1 \) at time \( t \) (intercepting at most \( t \) attacks there) then the earliest it can arrive at an “adjacent” attacked node \((k \pm 1)m + 1\) is at time \( t + m \). In this case it can intercept attacks there starting after time \( t \), so at most \( m - t \) such attacks. Thus in total it can intercept at most \( t + (m - t) = m \) attacks. ■

![Figure 7: Attack strategies (a) A(i) and (b) A(ii) on \( L_n \) for \( n = 13, m = 4 \).](image)

The lemma can also be established by induction on \( q \), using the Attacker Decomposition Lemma (Lemma 2).

The importance of these two attack strategies on \( L_{qm+1} \) is that all of the later attack strategies \( B, C, D, E \) attack one of the end nodes of \( L_r \) in the same manner as either \( A(i) \) or \( A(ii) \) and consequently the overlapping node of the decomposition of \( L_n \) into \( L_{qm+1} \) and \( L_r \), \( qm + r = n \), satisfies the condition on \( S \) in the Attacker Decomposition Lemma.

**Example 16**  \((n = 13, m = 4)\) In Figure 7 we illustrate the attack strategies \( A(i) \) and \( A(ii) \) on \( L_{13} \), where \( 13 = mq + 1 \) with \( m = 4 \) and \( q = 3 \). In each case, we show with a dotted line a
patrol that clearly intercepts only 4 of the attacks.

The attack strategy \( A(i) \) will be used for cases \( B \) and \( C \) and the attack strategy \( A(ii) \) for cases \( D \) and \( E \).

6.3 Case B of \( m + \rho \) even, \( \rho > 0 \): horizontal attack strategies

We first consider the horizontal strategy (B), which is optimal when both \( m \) and \( \rho \) are positive and even or when they are both positive and odd. In this case we define \( r \) by

\[
r = m + \rho + 1,
\]

which is odd and denote by

\[
k = (1 + r) / 2, \text{ the middle node of } L_r.
\]

Note that \( L_r \) has even length \( 2d = r - 1 \), where

\[
d = (m + \rho) / 2.
\]

In this case the optimal attack strategy on \( L_r \) is as follows.

**Definition 17 (Horizontal Strategy)** The horizontal attack strategy on an odd size interval \( L_r \) consists of \( 2m + \rho = r + m - 1 \) attacks. Of these, \( m \) start at each end (nodes 1 and \( r \)) at times 1, 2, \ldots, \( m \). Also there are \( \rho \) attacks at the middle node, node \( k \), at the middle \( \rho \) of the times 1, \ldots, \( m \). These times go from time \( M - \delta \) to time \( M + \delta \), where \( M = (1 + m) / 2 \) and \( \delta = (\rho - 1) / 2 \).

Note that the horizontal strategy has a time symmetry property, in that for any given node the number of attacks that are taking place at a time \( t \) is equal to the number of attacks taking place at time \( 2m - t \) (note that we do not mean the number of attacks that start at time \( t \)).

In other words there is symmetry around time \( t = m \). In fact, all the attack strategies in cases \( B, C, D \) and \( E \) have a similar time symmetry property, and we will exploit this to simplify the analysis.

**Example 18 (\( n = 14, m = 5, r = 9 \))** We note that \( \rho = 13 \mod 5 = 3 \) and hence \( r = 5 + 3 + 1 = 9 \), as shown in Figure 8. In Figure 8 the top six nodes 9 – 14 represent \( L_6 = L_{m+1} \) with attack
strategy $A(ii)$. Using the decomposition result, we take $q = 1$. The middle node of $L_r$ is $k = (1 + 9)/2 = 5$. So the attacks on $L_r$ for the horizontal strategy are at the ends, nodes 1 and 9 and at the middle node $k = 5$. At the ends, the start times of the attacks (indicated by solid circles in the space-time diagram) are $1, 2, 3, 4, 5 = m$. The middle of these times is $M = 3$ and the ‘radius’ $\delta = (\rho - 1)/2 = 1$. Hence the middle attacks go from the integers $M - \delta = 2$ to $M + \delta = 4$. In all there are $r + m - 1 = 13$ attacks. From Figure 8, it is easy to see that no more than $m = 5$ of these can be intercepted by a single patrol. Note that an attack whose start is indicated by a solid black circle will be intercepted by a walk that reaches that height (node) at a time no more than $m - 1 = 4$ periods after the start of the attack. The number of attacks intercepted by a walk arriving at an attacked node $(1, 5, 9)$ is indicated by a red integer. For example the patrol (walk) staying at node 1 till time 2 and then moving to the right in each period (shown by a dashed line in the figure) intercepts two attacks at node 1, three attacks at middle node 5 and no attacks at node 9. By our decomposition result, we only need to show that no patrol can intercept more than $m = 5$ of the attacks on $L_r$. Note also that the time symmetry property holds: the number of attacks taking place at a node $x$ at time $t$ is equal to the number of attacks at $x$ taking place at time $2m - t = 10 - t$. Because of this vertical line of symmetry shown in Figure 8 at $t = m = 5$, the second dashed line in the figure starting at node 8 and going to node 5 and then node 1 intercepts the same number of attacks as the first.
The importance of the horizontal strategy lies in the following.

**Lemma 19** Consider the horizontal strategy on $L_r$, $r = m + \rho + 1$ for Case B: $m + \rho$ even. Of the $2m + \rho = r + m - 1$ attacks, at most $m$ can be intercepted by any walk $w$ of the Patroller.

The proof is in the Appendix.

### 6.4 Case C of $m$ odd, $\rho$ even: vertical attack

We now consider the case of $m$ odd and $\rho$ even, where we define $r = m + \rho + 1$ and $k = (1 + r) / 2$ as in the previous subsection. Observe that now $r$ is even and $k$ lies between two integers. In this case the following attack strategy is optimal.

**Definition 20 (the vertical attack strategy)** For $m$ odd and $\rho$ even, the vertical attack strategy consists of $r + m - 1 = 2m + \rho$ attacks. Of these, $m$ start at each end (nodes 1 and $r$) at times $1, 2, \ldots, m$. Also there are $\rho$ attacks at the middle time $M = (1 + m) / 2$, one each at the middle $\rho$ nodes of $L_r$. These middle nodes go from node $k - \delta$ to node $k + \delta$, where $\delta = (\rho - 1) / 2$.

![Figure 9: Vertical strategy on $L_r$ for $n = 13, m = 5, r = 8$](image)

**Example 21** ($n = 13, m = 5$) We illustrate the vertical strategy in Figure 9 for the case $n = 13$ and $m = 5$. We have $\rho = 12 \mod 5 = 2$ and we take $r = m + \rho + 1 = 8$ (giving $q = 1$ again). Here the middle of the nodes of $L_r = L_8$ are at $k = 4.5$ and the middle of the time $1, \ldots, m = 5$ is the integer time $M = 3$. So the attacks at the ends 1 and 8 of $L_8$ start at times 1 to $m = 5$. 
and the attacks at the middle nodes start at time $M = 3$. We have $\delta = (\rho - 1)/2 = 1/2$, so the attacked middle nodes go from $k - \delta = 4$ to $k + \delta = 5$.

As in the previous subsection, the importance of this strategy is shown in the following lemma.

**Lemma 22** Consider the vertical strategy on $L_r$, $r = m + \rho + 1$ for Case C: $\rho$ even and $m$ odd. Of the $2m + \rho = r + m - 1$ attacks, at most $m$ can be intercepted by any walk $w$ of the Patroller.

The proof is in the Appendix.

### 6.5 Case D of $m$ even, $\rho > 1$ odd: zig-zag attack

In the case D of $m$ even and $\rho$ odd, we write $\rho = 2s + 1$ and take

$$r = m + \rho + 1 = 2k,$$

as $r$ is even.\(\text{(5)}\)

Thus the two middle nodes of $L_r$ are those labeled $k$ and $k + 1$. The middle $\rho$ periods of the time interval $M = \{1, \ldots, m + 1\}$ can be labelled as $t_1$, $t_2$, $\ldots$, $t_\rho$, centered so that $(t_1 + t_\rho)/2 = (1 + (m + 1))/2$, given by

$$t_i = \frac{m - \rho + 1}{2} + i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, \rho. \quad \text{(6)}$$

**Definition 23 (the zig-zag attack strategy)** For $m$ even, $\rho$ odd and $r = m + \rho + 1 = 2k$, the zig-zag strategy places $r + m - 1 = 2m + \rho$ equiprobable attacks on $L_r$ as follows:

**bottom** We place $m$ attacks on the bottom node 1 one each starting at times 1 and $m + 1$, and two each starting at odd times 3, 5, $\ldots$, $m - 1$.

**top** We place $m$ attacks at the top node $r$, two each starting at even times 2, 4, $\ldots$, $m$.

**middle** We place $\rho$ attacks at the middle nodes $k$ and $k + 1$, starting at the middle times $t_i$, $i = 1, \ldots, \rho$, given by (6). The attacks at $k$ start at the $s + 1$ odd indexed times $t_i$, $i = 1, 3, \ldots, \rho$; those at $k + 1$ start at the $s$ even indexed times $t_i$, $i = 2, 4, \ldots, \rho - 1$.\(\text{25}\)
Example 24 \((n = 18, m = 6)\) We illustrate the zig-zag strategy in Figure 10 for the case \(n = 18\) and \(m = 6\). We have \(\rho = 17 \mod 6 = 5\) and we take \(r = m + \rho + 1 = 12\) (once again giving \(q = 1\)). The two middle nodes of \(L_r = L_{12}\) are at \(k = 6\) and \(k + 1 = 7\) and the middle time periods are given by \(t_1 = 2, t_2 = 3, \ldots, t_5 = 6\). The bottom attacks comprise one starting at times 1 and \(m + 1 = 7\) and two starting at the odd times, 3 and 5 between 1 and 7. The top attacks comprise two starting at each of the even times between 2 and \(m = 6\). The middle attacks comprise one attack starting at each of the \(s + 1 = 3\) odd indexed times \(t_1, t_3, t_5\) at node \(k = 6\) and one attack starting at each of the \(s = 2\) even indexed times \(t_2\) and \(t_4\) at node \(k + 1 = 7\).

The importance of the zig-zag attack lies in the following.

**Lemma 25** Consider the zig-zag strategy on \(L_r\), \(r = m + \rho + 1\) for Case B: \(m\) even and \(\rho\) odd. Of the \(r + m - 1\) attacks, at most \(m\) can be intercepted by any walk \(w\) of the Patroller.

The proof is in the Appendix.

6.6 Case E of \(m\) even, \(\rho = 1\): the extended zig-zag strategy

Finally, we illustrate the case E where \(m = 2a\) is even and \(\rho = n - 1 \mod m = 1\). We take \(r = 2m + 2\), which differs from the common \(r\) value used in the previous three cases. In this case the extended zig-zag attack strategy is optimal. This strategy uses the same \(2m\) end attacks.
as the zig-zag strategy (case D). The middle attacks are on the middle $m$ nodes of $L_r$ defined by
\[ x_i = a + 1 + i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, m. \]

For example, the middle 4 nodes of $L_{10}$ with $m = 4$ are 4, 5, 6, 7.

**Definition 26 (Extended zig-zag)** When $m = 2a$ is even and $\rho = 1$ (Case E), we define the extended zig-zag strategy on $L_r$, $r = 2m + 2$ as follows. We place $r + m - 1 = 2m + (m + 1)$ equiprobable attacks, $m$ at each of the ends and $m + 1$ in the middle $m$ nodes of $L_r$. The $2m$ end attacks are placed in the same way as for the zig-zag attack (two each at even times $2, 4, \ldots, m$ at node $r$; two each at odd times $3, \ldots, m - 1$ and one each at times $1$ and $m + 1$ at node 1). The $m + 1 = 2a + 1$ middle attacks are as follows. One attack is at time $a + 1$ at node $x_m$ (the top middle node) and the others are at the nodes $x_1, x_3, \ldots, x_{m-1}$, one each at times $a$ and $a + 2$.

**Example 27** Let $n = r = 10$ and $m = 4$. So $\rho = 1$. Figure 11 illustrates the $m + n - 1 = 13$ equiprobable attacks, of which no more than $m = 4$ can be intercepted by any walk. The middle attacks are at times $a, a + 1, a + 2$, that is, times $2, 3, 4$. The middle nodes are those from 4 to 7, with two attacks at nodes $x_1 = 4$ and $x_3 = 6$ and one attack at node $x_4 = 7$.

![Figure 11: Extended zig-zag strategy on $L_r$ for $n = 10, m = 4, r = 10$.](image)
Lemma 28 Consider the extended zig-zag strategy on $L_r$, $r = 2m + 2$ for Case E: $m$ even and $\rho = 1$. Of the $r + m - 1 = 3m + 1$ attacks, at most $m$ can be intercepted by any walk $w$ of the Patroller.

The proof is in the Appendix.

7 Redundant Edges and Perfect Decomposition

In the patrolling literature, for example in Collins et al. (2013) an important qualitative question is whether the network under attack can be defended with non overlapping patrols, either by separate patrollers (when there are several) or when the patrols are mixed probabilistically. To deal with this question, we first introduce a new concept in patrolling games on a network $Q = (N, E)$. We say that an edge $e \in E$ of $Q$ is redundant if the value of the patrolling game on the graph $Q - e = (N, E - e)$ is the same as that of the original network $Q$. The Patroller can avoid traversing a redundant edge without reducing her chances of intercepting the attack. In general, removing edges cannot help the Patroller, as it reduces her pure strategies; but it can hurt her and reduce the value. Similarly, we say that $Q$ can be perfectly decomposed into $Q_1$ and $Q_2$ if the inequality in the Patroller Decomposition Lemma (Lemma 1) holds with equality. That is, if

$$V(Q) = \frac{1}{1/V(Q_1) + 1/V(Q_2)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

For the Line graphs the decomposition equation (7) becomes

$$V(L_{a+b}) = \frac{1}{1/V(L_a) + 1/V(L_b)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Clearly if $Q$ is the Line graph $L_n$ and an edge $e = (i, i + 1)$ is redundant then equation (8) holds for $a = i$ and $b = n - i$. Note that if $L_n$ is a case of $C_{m,n} = I_{m,n}$ for some $m$, as in Proposition 9 (for example $(n, m) \in S_3 \cup S_4$), then $L_n$ can be perfectly decomposed, possibly in several ways. For example, if $m = 4$ and $n = 9$ (where $C_{m,n} = I_{m,n} = 3$) we can take $a = 3$ and $b = 6$ and decompose $\{1, 2, \ldots, 9\}$ into $\{1, 2, 3\}$ and $\{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}$. It turns out that there are some classes of parameters $(n, m) \in S_5$ for which $C_{m,n} \neq I_{m,n}$ but nevertheless the Patroller can perfectly decomposed the line $L_n$ and patrol each part separately. In this section
we completely determine those parameters \((n, m)\).

For example when \(m = 7\) and \(n = m + 2 = 9\), we can perfectly decompose \(L_9\) into \(L_4\) and \(L_5\). We have \(V(L_4) = 1\), \(V(L_5) = 7/(2 \times 4) = 7/8\) and (8) is satisfied because

\[
V(L_9) = \bar{V} = \frac{7}{9 + 7 - 1} = \frac{7}{15} = \frac{1}{1 + 7/8} = \frac{1}{1/V(L_4) + 1/V(L_5)}.
\]

This is a particular case of the class \(n = m + 2\), \(m\) odd. Thus the two ‘middle edges’, those between nodes 4 and 5 and between nodes 5 and 6, are each redundant. Of course we cannot simultaneously remove both edges without changing the value.

Next consider the same attack duration \(m = 7\) but now \(n = 10\). Here we take \(a = b = 5\), with the same calculation \(V(L_a) = 7/8\) and so

\[
V(L_{5+5}) = \bar{V} = \frac{7}{10 + 7 - 1} = \frac{7}{16} = \frac{1}{8/7 + 8/7} = \frac{1}{1/V(L_5) + 1/V(L_5)}.
\]

This is a particular case of the other class, \(n = m + 3\). In this case the unique middle edge is redundant, the one between 5 and 6.

Figure 12 shows the value function \(V(L_n)\) (top) and \(\bar{V}(L_n)\) (bottom), the best that can be obtained by a non-trivial decomposition of \(L_n\),

\[
\hat{V}(L_n) \equiv \max_{1 \leq a < n} \frac{1}{1/V(L_a) + 1/V(L_{n-a})}.
\]

The plot on the left considers the case \(m = 7\) and \(n\) from 9 to 15. When \(n = 9\) the lines coincide because \(n = m + 2\) and \(m\) is odd. When \(n = 10\), they again coincide because \(n = m + 3\). For larger \(n\), decomposing the line is suboptimal. The case of \(m = 4\) is plotted on the right, with \(V(L_n)\) on top and \(\bar{V}(L_n)\) below. The curves (defined only for integers) can be seen to intersect at \(n = m + 3 = 7\) and for the anomalous case \(n = 9\) where \(C_{m,n} = I_{m,n} = 3\).

It turns out that the cases we have just considered, \(n = m + 2\) when \(m\) is odd, and \(n = m + 3\) without any restriction, together with the anomalous case \(n = 9, m = 4\), are exhaustive.

**Theorem 29** For \((n, m) \in S_5\) there are three cases where it can be optimal for the Patroller to decompose the line \(L_n\) into two lines \(L_a\) and \(L_b\), \(a + b = n, a \leq b\). Otherwise, such decomposition is always suboptimal.
Figure 12: Plots of $V(L_n)$ and $\hat{V}(L_n)$, where $V \geq \hat{V}$, $m = 7, n = 9$ to 15 (left), and $m = 4, n = 7$ to 15 (right).

1. $n = m + 3$: In this case the perfect decomposition is into two equal sized sets, $a = b = (m + 3)/2$ when $m$ is odd; or $a = m/2 + 1$ and $b = m/2 + 2$ if $m$ is even. If $n$ is even, the middle edge is redundant; if $n$ is odd, the two middle edges are redundant.

2. $m$ is odd and $n = m + 2$: In this case $a = (m + 1)/2$ and $b = (m + 3)/2$. The two middle edges are redundant.

3. $m = 4$ and $n = 9$: This is an instance of $C_{m,n} = I_{m,n}$. In this case $a = 3$ and $b = 6$.

(Note that here $L_6$ can be further partitioned into two copies of $L_3$.)

The proof is in the Appendix.

8 Discussion and Conclusions

We see our work as an important building block to building general theory of patrolling games. From an application point of view, one might argue that there are two canonical cases: patrolling a perimeter and patrolling a line, ie a border with endpoints. Alpern et al. (2011) provide a complete solution to the first problem, and in this paper we provide a complete solution to the second. As can be seen, the problem poses a surprising level of complexity, and the strategies involved are subtle and sometimes counterintuitive. However, we consider that the work of this paper provides the groundwork necessary to embark on a solution framework for patrolling tree graphs; and subsequently for more general graphs consisting of tree-like structures which
link up multiple embedded Hamiltonian graphs (this might model the situation of a security guard who has to patrol multiple buildings on a site). We are currently unsure how far analytic results will be possible and how far optimal strategies will have to be computed by black box algorithms. Either way, the results of the current paper can be expected to provide a critical piece of the puzzle. Other interesting avenues for exploration are as follows:

- there could be several patrollers, who may have responsibility for different (perhaps overlapping) sections of the border;
- there may be multiple attackers, who may or may not be able to coordinate their attacks;
- there could be variable (rather than constant) distance between crossing points, or crossing times could be different at different points along the border;
- attackers may be partially detectable (that is, when they start to cross the guard becomes aware and can move towards them);
- patrollers might be restricted to starting at certain locations, known to the attacker;
- we could consider the problem where the utility to the attacker of a successful attack at node \( i \) depends on \( i \).

We leave these as challenges which may be of interest to future researchers in this area.

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References


Patrolling the Line: Online Appendix

In this section we complete the proof of Proposition 9 part (e). Then we present the proofs of cases $B - E$ for the Attacker strategies described in Section 6 for set $S_5$. Finally, we present the proof of Theorem 29.

**Proof of Proposition 9 part (e)**

To prove part (e), we consider three sub-cases which we deal with separately.

The first sub-case is when $n = m + 2$ but $m = 2k + 1$ is odd. In this case, $\lfloor m/2 \rfloor = k$ so by Lemma 7,

$$C_{m,n} = \left\lceil \frac{n}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor + 1} \right\rceil = \left\lceil \frac{2k + 3}{k + 1} \right\rceil = \left\lceil 2 + \frac{1}{k + 1} \right\rceil = 3.$$  

But

$$I_{m,n} = \left\lfloor \frac{n + m - 1}{m} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor \frac{4k + 3}{2k + 1} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor 2 + \frac{1}{2k + 1} \right\rfloor = 2.$$  

The second sub-case is $n/2 \leq m \leq n - 3$. In this case, $2m \leq n + m - 1 \leq 3m$, so

$$2 \leq \frac{n + m - 1}{m} \leq 3 \text{ and by Lemma 7, } I_{m,n} = \left\lfloor \frac{n + m - 1}{m} \right\rfloor = 2.$$  

Also, since $\lfloor m/2 \rfloor \leq (n - 3)/2$, Lemma 7 also implies that

$$C_{m,n} = \left\lceil \frac{n}{\lfloor m/2 \rfloor + 1} \right\rceil \geq \left\lceil \frac{2n}{n - 1} \right\rceil = 3 > I_{m,n}.$$  

The final sub-case is $n/2 > m$. We consider the difference, $C_{m,n} - I_{m,n}$, which by Lemma 7 satisfies

$$C_{m,n} - I_{m,n} \geq \frac{2n}{m + 2} - \frac{n + m - 1}{m} = \frac{n(m - 2)}{m(m + 2)} + 1 - \frac{m}{m} > \frac{2(m - 2)}{m + 2} + 1 - \frac{m}{m} \text{ since } n/m > 2 \Rightarrow \frac{1}{m(m + 2)}(m^2 - 5m + 2) \geq 0 \text{ if } m \geq 5.$$
We just need to check that if \( m = 3 \) or \( 4 \) then \( C_{m,n} > I_{m,n} \). First suppose \( m = 3 \). Then it is easy to verify that \( C_{m,n} = \lceil n/2 \rceil > \lfloor (n + 2)/3 \rfloor = I_{m,n} \) for \( n/2 > m = 3 \). If \( m = 4 \), then it is easy to verify that unless \( n = 9 \), we have \( C_{m,n} = \lceil n/3 \rceil > \lfloor (n + 3)/4 \rfloor = I_{m,n} \) for \( n/2 > m = 4 \).

**Proof of Lemma 19**

Any walk \( w \) first intercepts an end attack (say at node 1) or a middle attack (node \( k \)). In the latter case, since \( \rho < m \), in order to intercept at least \( m \) attacks, a patrol would have to proceed to travel to either node 1 or \( r \). By the time symmetry property, we need not consider this case since the “time reverse” patrol first intercepts an end attack.

So consider the former case and let \( x \) denote the last time \( w \) is at node 1 from that first visit, with \( 1 \leq x \leq m \), so that \( w(x) = 1 \) and

\[
w(t) \leq 1 + (t - x) \text{ for } t \geq x. \tag{9}\]

The walk \( w \) reaches middle point \( k \) not earlier than time \( x + d \) and reaches the top node \( r \) not before time \( x + 2d \). Let \( A_1, A_k, A_r \) denote the attacks intercepted by \( w \) at nodes 1, \( k, r \), respectively. We may as well assume the walk \( w \) intercepts the attacks at node 1 which start at times \( 1, \ldots, x \) so number of attacks intercepted at node 1 is

\[
\#(A_1) = x. \tag{10}\]

After reaching node \( k \) the patrol could continue to the top node \( r \) or return to node 1 at some future point. By symmetry of the attack patterns at nodes 1 and \( r \), we need only consider the case that the patrol continues to node \( r \). The proof now divides into two cases, depending on whether or not \( w \) intercepts any attacks at the top node \( r \).

1. **No attacks at top node \( r \) are intercepted.** This is the case where \( x + 2d \) (the earliest possible arrival time of \( w \) at \( r \)) is larger than \( 2m - 1 \) (the last time an attack at \( r \) can be intercepted), or simply

\[
x \geq 2m - 2d. \tag{11}\]

Since the walk \( w \) reaches the middle node \( k \) not before \( x + d \), it intercepts the attacks
there which start not earlier than \((x + d) - (m - 1)\). Since the last attack at \(k\) is at time \(M + \delta\), the number \(#(A_k)\) attacks intercepted by \(w\) at node \(k\) satisfies

\[#(A_k) \leq (M + \delta) - ((x + d) - (m - 1)) + 1 = m - x\] (12)

Hence the total number of attacks that can be intercepted in this case is

\[#(A_1) + #(A_k) \leq m\], by (10) and (12).

2. **Attacks at top node \(r\) are intercepted** Since \(x\) takes integer values, the negation of condition (11) is given by

\[x \leq 2m - 2d - 1 = m - \rho - 1\] (13)

In this case only attacks starting at the top node \(r\) at times from \((x + 2d) - (m - 1)\) to \(m\) are intercepted so

\[#(A_r) \leq m - ((x + 2d) - (m - 1)) + 1 = m - x - \rho.\] (14)

At most \(\rho\) attacks at \(k\) are intercepted,

\[#(A_k) = \rho.\] (15)

So we have by (10), (15) and (14), that

\[#(A_1) + #(A_k) + #(A_r) \leq (x) + (\rho) + (m - x - \rho)\]

\[= m.\]

So we are done.
Proof of lemma 22

As in the previous section, we consider walks \( w \) satisfying (9). For small \( x \) (small enough that attacks at node \( r \) are intercepted), those satisfying (13), at most \( \rho \) middle attacks are intercepted, as well as \( x \) attacks at node 1. As in the case of the horizontal attack, \( w \) reaches node \( r \) not before time \( x + 2d \) and as in that case it intercepts at most \( m - x - \rho \) attacks at node \( r \) as shown in (14). In total, the number of attacks intercepted by a walk \( w \) is at most

\[
(x) + (\rho) + (m - x - \rho) = m.
\]

The calculations for large \( x \), those satisfying (11) are slightly different than the previous case. Suppose we label the \( \rho \) middle nodes as

\[
z_i = k - \delta - 1 + i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, \rho.
\]  \hspace{1cm} (16)

The walk \( w \) reaches node \( z_i \) at time \( t_i \) given by

\[
z_i = w(t_i) \leq 1 + (t_i - x), \quad \text{by (9), or}
\]

\[
t_i \geq z_i + x - 1.
\]  \hspace{1cm} (17)

Suppose that \( w \) intercepts the attack at \( z_i \) which starts at time \( M \). Then we must have:

\[
t_i - M \leq m - 1, \quad \text{or}
\]

\[
(z_i + x - 1) - M \leq m - 1, \quad \text{by (17), or}
\]

\[
z_i + x \leq M + m, \quad \text{or}
\]

\[
(k - \delta - 1 + i) + x \leq M + m, \quad \text{by (16), or}
\]

\[
i + x \leq M + m - k + \delta + 1 = m
\]

But if \( i \) is the highest index of an attack at node \( z_i \) which is intercepted by \( w \), then \( i + x \) is the total number of attacks intercepted by \( w \), which is bounded above by \( m \).
Proof of lemma 25

First observe that no patrol can intercept attacks at both ends 1 and \( r \) of \( L_r \). There are three cases to consider, where the first attack to be intercepted by a patrol \( w(t) \) is at the bottom, middle or top. If the first attack to be intercepted is in the middle, then since the total number of attacks at the middle node is \( \rho < m \), we can assume the patrol continues to the top or bottom node. Hence by the time symmetry property we need not consider this case.

1. **Bottom attack intercepted first** Suppose the first attack intercepted by \( w \) is at node 1 and the last time \( w \) is at 1 is time \( j \leq m \). We can assume \( j \) is odd, as otherwise just as many attacks can be intercepted by leaving at time \( j - 1 \). Such a patrol will intercept exactly \( j \) attacks at the bottom node 1. In this case the most attacks will be intercepted if \( w \) moves up in every period, that is, if \( w(t) = t - j + 1 \) for all \( t \geq j \). Thus the patrol \( w \) arrives at node \( k \) at time \( t^k = k + j - 1 \) and at node \( k + 1 \) at time \( t^{k+1} = k + j \). All these times are at least \( t_\rho \), so all the middle attacks have already started by the time nodes \( k \) and \( k + 1 \) are reached. The patrol intercepts attacks at node \( k \) starting after time \( t^k - m \) and attacks at node \( k + 1 \) starting after time \( t^{k+1} - m \). Thus it intercepts middle attacks starting after time \( t_i \), where \( t_i = t^{k+1} - m \). By (6), \( i \) is given by

\[
\frac{m}{2} - s + i = (k + j) - m, \text{ or } i = k + j + s - 3m/2.
\]

Thus the walk intercepts attacks at middle nodes starting at times \( t_{i+1} \) through \( t_\rho \), or \( \rho - i \) attacks at middle nodes. We evaluate

\[
\rho - i = (2s + 1) - (k + j + s - 3m/2)
= 3m/2 + s - k - j + 1 \quad (18)
\]

Since this patrol intercepted \( j \) attacks at node 1, in all it will intercept \( j + (\rho - i) \) attacks,
and by (18)

\[ j + (\rho - i) = 3m/2 + s - k + 1 \]

\[ = m + \frac{1}{2} (m + \rho + 1 - r) \]

\[ = m, \text{ as } r = m + \rho + 1. \]

Thus is this case at most \( m \) attacks can be intercepted by any patrol.

2. **Top attack intercepted first** We can assume the patrol intercepts an even number \( j \) of top attacks starting at times 2, 4, \ldots, \( j \). The earliest such a patrol can reach node \( k + 1 \) is at even indexed time

\[ \tilde{t} = j + (k - 1). \]

It will intercept middle attacks (earliest one is at node \( k + 1 \)) starting from even indexed time

\[ t_i = \tilde{t} - m + 2. \] (19)

Thus the total number of middle attacks which will be intercepted is given by

\[ \rho - (i - 1) \]

and the total number of attack intercepted (at top and middle) will be

\[ \# = j + \rho - (i - 1) = (j - i) + (\rho + 1) \]

It remains to determine \( i \) from the above equations. We have

\[ t_i = \frac{m - \rho + 1}{2} + i = \tilde{t} - m + 2, \text{ or} \]

\[ \frac{m - \rho + 1}{2} + i = j + (k - 1) - m + 2, \text{ or} \]

\[ j - i = \frac{m - \rho + 1}{2} + (m - k - 1). \]
So we have

\[
\# &= (j - i) + (\rho + 1) \\
&= \frac{m - \rho + 1}{2} + (m - k - 1) + \rho + 1 \\
&= \frac{m + \rho + 1}{2} + m - k \\
&= \frac{r}{2} + m - \frac{r}{2} \\
&= m.
\]

**Proof of lemma 28**

Once again we divide the proof up into three cases: where the first attack to be intercepted by a patrol \( w(t) \) is at the bottom, middle or top, noting that \( w(t) \) certainly cannot intercept attacks both at the bottom and the top.

1. **Bottom attack intercepted first** As for the zig-zag attacks, let \( j \leq m \) be the last time \( w \) is at node 1. As before, we can assume that \( j \) is odd and that \( w \) intercepts \( j \) attacks at node 1. To intercept the largest number of attacks, \( w \) must reach node \( x_i \) at time \( j + x_i - 1 \) for each \( i = 1, \ldots, m \). For \( i \) odd, the attack at node \( x_i \) at time \( a \) is therefore intercepted by \( w \) if and only if \( a \leq j + x_i - 1 \leq a + m - 1 \), or

\[
a + 1 - j \leq x_i \leq a + m - j.
\]

The odd values of \( i \) for which \( x_i \) satisfies (20) are \( i = 1, 3, \ldots, m - j - 2 \), the total number of which is \((m - j - 1)/2\).

Similarly, the attack at node \( x_i \) at time \( a + 2 \) is detected by \( w \) if and only if \( a + 2 \leq j + x_i - 1 \leq a + m + 1 \), or

\[
a + 3 - j \leq x_i \leq a + m - j + 2,
\]

and the odd values of \( i \) for which \( x_i \) satisfies (21) are \( i = 1, 3, \ldots, m - j \), the total number of which is \((m - j + 1)/2\). This sums to a total of \((m - j - 1)/2 + (m - j + 1)/2 = m - j\)
middle attacks intercepted. (It is clear that the attack at node $x_m$ is not intercepted.) Added to the $j$ attacks intercepted at node 1, this gives $(m - j) + j = m$ attacks in total.

2. Top attack intercepted first Next suppose the first attack to be intercepted is at node $r$, and let $j \leq m$ be the last time $w$ is at this node. We can assume that $j$ is even and that $j$ attacks are intercepted at node $r$. We can also assume that $w(t) = 2m + 2 + j - t$ for $t \geq j$, so that the most number of attacks possible are intercepted.

First note that at time $t = j + a + 1$ the patrol is at node $w(j + a + 1) = a + 1 + m = x_m$. The attack at $x_m$ happens from time $a + 1$ to time $a + m$, and $t$ is within this range if and only if $j \leq m - 1$. So there are two sub-cases: $j = m$ and $j \leq m - 2$. In the former case, it is clear that not only is the attack at $x_m$ not intercepted, but neither are any of the other middle attacks, so $m$ attacks in total are intercepted.

In the latter case when $j \leq m - 2$, the patrol reaches a node $x_i$ at time $2m + 2 + j - x_i$. So for odd $i$, the attack at node $x_i$ at time $a$ is intercepted by $w$ if and only if $a \leq 2m + 2 + j - x_i \leq a + m - 1$ or

$$a + j + 3 \leq x_i \leq 2m - a + j + 2.$$  \hfill (22)

The odd values of $i$ for which $x_i$ satisfies (22) are $i = j + 3, j + 5, \ldots, m - 1$, which are $(m - j - 2)/2$ in number.

The attack at node $x_i$ at time $a+2$ is intercepted by $w$ if and only if $a+2 \leq 2m+2+j-x_i \leq a + m + 1$ or

$$a + j + 1 \leq x_i \leq 2m - a + j.$$  \hfill (23)

The odd values of $i$ for which $x_i$ satisfies (23) are $i = j + 1, j + 3, \ldots, m - 1$, which are $(m - j)/2$ in number. So the total number of attacks intercepted at odd indexed middle nodes is $(m - j - 2)/2 + (m - j)/2 = m - j - 1$.

Adding this number to the $j$ attacks intercepted at node $r$ and the 1 attack intercepted at node $x_m$ gives a grand total of
\[(m - j - 1) + j + 1 = m.\]

3. **Middle attack intercepted first** Finally, suppose the first attack to be intercepted is one of the \(m + 1\) middle nodes. By time symmetry we can assume that no attacks at node 1 or \(2m + 2\) are intercepted. The only way all of the middle nodes could be intercepted is if \(w\) intercepts both attacks at node \(x_1\) and the attack at node \(x_m\). We can assume, by time symmetry, that \(w\) goes from \(x_1\) to \(x_m\). In order to intercept both the attacks at \(x_1\), the patrol must be at \(x_1\) at some time \(t \geq a + 2\), which means it cannot reach \(x_m\) until at least time \(t + m - 1 \geq a + m + 1\). But the attack at \(x_m\) only lasts between times \(a + 1\) and \(a + m\), so it cannot be intercepted. Hence all the attacks at the middle nodes cannot be intercepted, to the number of them that can be intercepted is at most \(m\).

**Proof of Theorem 29**

The proof of Theorem 29 uses the formulae that we have derived for the value for various parameter pairs \((n, m)\). We list these formulae in the following table. Since the theorem assumes that \((n, m)\) belongs to \(S_5\) we can assume that \(m > 2\) so the row for \(S_3\) will not be needed, and is included only for completeness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>set of ((n, m))</th>
<th>(V)</th>
<th>(C_{m,n} = I_{m,n})</th>
<th>optimal attack</th>
<th>optimal patrol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(S_1: n &lt; (m + 2)/2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>all attacks fail</td>
<td>oscillation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S_2: (m + 2)/2 \leq n &lt; m + 1)</td>
<td>(m/(2(n - 1)))</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>diametrical random oscillation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S_3: m = 2, n \geq 3) (the rest have (m &gt; 2))</td>
<td>(1/2)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>independent</td>
<td>covering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S_4: n = m + 2, m) even; (n = m + 1)</td>
<td>(m/(n + m - 1))</td>
<td>(9, 4) only</td>
<td>five classes (Theorem 16)</td>
<td>end augmented osc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S_5: n = m + 2, m) odd; (n \geq m + 3)</td>
<td>(m/(n + m - 1))</td>
<td>(9, 4) only</td>
<td>five classes (Theorem 16)</td>
<td>end augmented osc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4: Summary of results.**

**Proof.** Since we are assuming that \((a + b, m)\) is in \(S_5\) we have

\[V(L_{a+b}) = \frac{m}{a + b + m - 1}.\] (24)

The proof considers the possibilities that \((b, m)\) belongs to the sets \(S_5, S_4, S_2\) and \(S_1\) in turn.

**Case (i):** \((b, m) \in S_5\). In this case we have by the table that \(V(L_b) = m/(b + m - 1)\). Then
by (8)
\[
\frac{m}{a + b + m - 1} = \frac{1}{V(L_a) + \frac{b+m-1}{m}}, \quad \text{or}
\]
\[
V(L_a) = \frac{m}{a}.
\]

If \((a, m)\) is in \(S_1\), \(V(L_a) = 1\) so \(a = m\) and hence \(m < (m+2)/2\), or \(m/2 < 1\), or \(m < 2\), which is excluded.

If \((a, m)\) is in \(S_2\), this means that \(m/a = m/(2(a - 1))\), or \(a = 2(a - 1)\), so \(a = 2\) and \(m \leq a = 2\) is also excluded.

If \((a, m)\) is in \(S_4\), this means that \(m/a = 1/2\), or \(a = 2m\). But since \(a\) is \(m + 1\) or \(m + 2\), it follows that \(m\) is 1 or 2, which are excluded.

If \((a, m)\) is in \(S_5\), this means that \(m/a = m/(a + m - 1)\), or \(m = 1\), which is excluded. So there are no cases of decomposition with \((b, m)\) in \(S_5\).

**Case (ii):** \((b, m) \in S_4\). In this case \(V(L_b) = 1/2\).

If \((a, m)\) is in \(S_2\), we have \(V(L_b) = 1/2\) and \(V(L_a) = m/(2(a - 1))\). So the decomposition equation gives
\[
\frac{m}{a + b + m - 1} = \frac{1}{\frac{2a-2}{m} + 2} = \frac{m}{2a - 2 + 2m}, \quad \text{or}
\]
\[
a = b - m + 1
\]

There are two cases for \((b, m) \in S_4\): if \(b = m + 2\), \(m\) even, then \(a = 3\). Since \((a, m) \in S_4\), we have \((m+2)/2 < 3 = a\), or \(m < 4\), which means \(m \leq 2\), which is excluded. If \(b = m + 1\) then \(a = 2\) so \((m+2)/2 < 2\), or \(m < 2\), which is excluded.

If \((a, m)\) is also in \(S_4\) then \(V(L_a) = 1/2\) so by (8), \(V(L_{a+b}) = 1/(2+2) = 1/4\). So \(m/(n + m - 1) = 1/4\), or \(4m = n + m - 1\), \(n = a + b = 3m + 1\). But \(a\) and \(b\) are both either \(m + 1\) or (if \(m\) even) \(m + 2\). If \(m\) is odd then \(a = b = m + 1\) so \(a+b = 2m + 2\) and hence \(3m + 1 = 2m + 2\), or \(m = 1\), which is excluded. So assume \(m\) is even, in which case \(a+b\) is one of the numbers \(2m + j, j = 2, 3\) or 4. Hence \(3m + 1 = 2m + j\), \(m\) is \(j - 1\), which is 1, 2 or 3. The only one of these which is even is \(m = 2\), which is excluded.
If \((a, m)\) is in \(S_1\) then \(V(L_a) = 1\) and hence the decomposition equation gives \(V(L_{a+b}) = 1/(1 + 2) = 1/3\). Equating this with (24), \(m/(n + m - 1) = 1/3\), or \(3m = n + m - 1\), \(n = 2m + 1\). So we either have \(a = m - 1\) and \(b = m + 2\) and \(m\) is even or \(a = m\) and \(b = m + 1\). In the former case \(a = m - 1 \leq (m + 2)/2\) gives \(m \leq 4\) and hence \(m = 4\). Then \(a = 3\) and \(b = 6\) and \(a + b = 9\). This is item 3 of the theorem. In the latter case \(m \leq (m + 2)/2\) gives \(m \leq 2\), which is excluded.

**Case (iii):** \((b, m) \in S_2\). In this case \(V(L_b) = m/(2(b - 1))\).

If \((a, m)\) is also in \(S_2\) then \(V(L_a) = m/(2(a - 1))\) and the decomposition equation gives \(V(L_{a+b}) = m/(2(b - 1) + 2(a - 1))\). Equating this with (24) gives \(a + b + m - 1 = (2(b - 1) + 2(a - 1)) = 2(a + b) - 4\). So \(n = a + b = m + 3\). By the definition of \(S_2\) we have \((m + 2)/2 \leq a, b\). If \(m\) is even the only solution is \(a = (m + 2)/2\) and \(b = (m + 2)/2 + 1\), with \(n\) odd. If \(m\) is odd (and \(n\) is even) the only solution is \(a = b = (m + 3)/2\). This is item 1 of the theorem.

If \((a, m)\) is in \(S_1\) then \(V(L_a) = 1\) and by (8) we have \(V(L_{a+b}) = m/(m + 2(b - 1))\). Equating this with (24) gives \(a + b + m - 1 = m + 2(b - 1)\), or \(b - a = 1\). Since \((a, m) \in S_1\) we must have \(a \leq (m + 1)/2\) and hence \(b = a + 1 \leq (m + 3)/2\). Consequently \(a + b \leq (2m + 4)/2 = m + 2\). Since \((a + b, m) \in S_5\), this implies that \(m\) is odd and \(a + b = m + 2\), so \(a = (m + 1)/2\) and \(b = (m + 3)/2\). This is item 2 of the theorem.

**Case (iv):** \((b, m) \in S_1\) Since we are assuming \(a \leq b\), we have that \(a, b < (m + 2)/2\) and hence \(a + b \leq m + 1\). It follows that \((a + b, m)\) cannot belong to \(S_5\) violating the hypothesis of the theorem.

\(\blacksquare\)