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To see ourselves as others see us: identity and attitudes towards immigration amongst civic nationalists

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ABSTRACT
This article examines how different conceptions of national identity can be linked to attitudes towards cultural pluralism. The tensions between more culturally pluralistic societies and sustained support for nationalism represent an important political issue in modern western European politics. Such tensions are of particular relevance for stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) for whom national/regional identity is a major political driver. This article empirically tests the relationship between different conceptions of national identity and attitudes towards cultural pluralism in two SNRPs—the Scottish National Party and the Frisian National Party. The article draws upon evidence from two unique full party membership studies and is supported with evidence from documentary analysis. A key finding is that the manner in which members conceptualise national identity has significant implications for their attitudes towards cultural pluralism, which has the potential of becoming a source of tension within SNRPs. A key implication of the article is that there is evidence that attitudes of general members and officially stated party positions and narratives diverge on issues relating to cultural pluralism and national identity. These tensions could potentially be harmful for the party’s overall civic image.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 1 March 2015
Accepted 24 August 2015

KEYWORDS
Nationalism; immigration; territory; Scottish national party; Frisian national party

Introduction
This article examines the relationship between different conceptions of national identity and attitudes towards cultural pluralism. Nationalism and cultural pluralism appear to be theoretically contradictory concepts. The former emphasises the unity of a relatively homogenous group that shares certain cultural traits and common ancestry myths (Smith 1986). The latter considers heterogeneity, uniqueness and diversity to be a common good. Squaring the two has been one of the major concerns of politics in the past 50 years (Young 1993). Despite the effects of globalisation and the associated increase in immigration to Western Europe (Geddes 2003), the nation-state, national identities and nationalism have not withered (De Winter and Türsan 1998; Marks 1999; De Winter, Gómez-Reino, and Lynch 2006; Keating 2008; Elias 2009)—or at least less than predicted by some (Ohmae 1995). Therefore, newcomers have had to be incorporated into societies. This has, on the one hand, led to national identities becoming more permeable and less culturally uniform. On the other hand, in response to the increasingly culturally heterogeneous societies in Western Europe, a certain level of entrenchment of more traditional understandings of national identity has taken place (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).
Some conceptions of national identity are better able to accommodate cultural diversity than others. Central to this discussion has been the distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity (Plamenatz 1975; Kellas 1998; Kohn 2005 [1944]) often linked to modernist (Gellner 1983; Billig 1995; Anderson 2006) and primordial/ethnosymbolist (Smith 1986) interpretations of national identity. Modernist conceptions provide room for civic dimensions whereas ethno-symbolism stresses the ethnic basis of nationalism. However, the division and relations between different dimensions is far more complex (Leith and Soule 2011, 12). Instead national identities consist of multiple, non-competitive dimensions (Mitchell et al. 2012; van der Zwet 2015). This article goes beyond the examination of different dimensions of national identity and analyses the implications of supposedly different dimensions by focusing on the relation between different dimensions and attitudes towards cultural pluralism. Attitudes towards cultural pluralism are a tangible reference point for assessing the ‘true’ inclusiveness and exclusiveness of national identity (Kellas 1998), which is the basis of the binary civic versus ethnic model.

For political parties, narratives and policies related to cultural pluralism (e.g. immigration, multiculturalism, citizenship) can have a profound impact on a party’s image. Over the past two decades, there has been a hardening of public opinion in many western European countries and a certain level of desensitisation to the language used by political parties in relation to cultural pluralism (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Mulvey 2010). However, parties are aware of the need to use moderating rhetoric as they are concerned that they can be labelled as ‘nasty’, which may have repercussions for their overall party image (Quinn 2008). Tensions are perhaps particularly salient for stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) due to the perceived negative connotations and the loaded nature of terms such as ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationalist’ (MacCormick 1982; Tamir 1993; Kuzio 2009). Furthermore, ‘as immigration has become ‘rescaled’ across several levels of the multilevel state’ (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014a, 17), SNRPs have become more directly involved in issues regarding cultural pluralism, potentially leading to tensions.

Recent research (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero 2014b) has shown that SNRPs do not hold uniform positions in terms of their rhetoric in relation to cultural pluralism. Some have developed very negative positions (e.g. Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) whereas others are more supportive (e.g. Parti Québécois, Scottish National Party (the SNP), Frisian National Party (FNP)). A variety of economic, political and ideological reasons can explain SNRP attitudes to cultural pluralism (Hepburn 2009b).

This article aims to contribute to this growing body of research by demonstrating that at the micro-level, intra-party tensions regarding cultural pluralism are noticeable; by examining the membership of two self-styled civic SNRPs, it is argued that attitudes towards cultural pluralism are not uniform and that positions taken by members are, at least, to some extent, related to divergent conceptions of national identity. The broad consequence of this finding is that there is a potential disconnect between, the narrative used at the elite/macro-level and those at the members/micro-level. Such findings chime with previous research noting a divergence between elite voice and mass voice in relation to national identity (Leith and Soule 2011). These differences are particularly important in the context of SNRPs that proclaim to be civic, as opposed to ethnic, for them narratives and policies in relation to cultural pluralism protect the party’s overall image. Potential intra-party tensions on these issues could have significant implications of how these parties are perceived.

The empirical section in this article is based on data from two unique membership studies of two self-styled civic SNRPs—the SNP and the FNP. These data are complemented by evidence drawing on manifestos, minutes of meetings, newspaper articles, party magazines and other archival sources. There are certain similarities that make the two parties interesting case studies for comparison. In both the Netherlands and the UK, immigration issues have become highly salient at the state-wide level, but are less prominent at the sub-state level (Scotland and Friesland). The sub-state level is the primary political arena for these parties. Finally, both parties, but in particular the SNP, are generally described as civic nationalist parties (Keating 2001, 220; McCrone 2001; Mitchell
et al. 2012; van der Zwet 2015) and are members of the European Free Alliance (EFA). However, this assessment does not go unchallenged. FNP’s close association of ‘Frisianness’ with language imbibes it with a stronger ethnic dimension. Moreover despite the SNP’s lauded civic credentials, particularly outside of Scotland, some argue that an ethnic dimension in Scottish nationalism has long been overlooked (Itchijo 2004; Leith and Soule 2011; Mycock 2012).

There are considerable differences between the two parties as well. The SNP is a large governing party in Scotland. Until the 2014 independence referendum, the party had a membership between 15,000 and 25,000 (Mitchell et al. 2012). Since 2007, it has been the governing party in Scotland, first forming a minority administration in 2007, and then winning a majority in 2011. FNP has historically operated at the provincial and municipal levels in the province of Friesland in the north of the Netherlands (Huisman 2003). Since 2011, it has been part of the Frisian Provincial Executive. It represents a much smaller territory and is much smaller in terms of membership (1300). It is a grassroots party and largely depends on volunteers (Hemminga 2006). FNP is mostly associated with linguistic and cultural issues whereas the SNP’s main objective is an independent Scottish state. Considering these differences, the SNP and the FNP are representative of the very diverse autonomist and SNRP party families (De Winter and Türsan 1998; Hepburn 2009a).

The methodological approach adopted in this article builds upon that taken in Mitchell et al. (2012) seminal study of the SNP membership, but is distinctive in three ways. First, the comparative approach not only means that valuable insights into FNP (a party which has, to date, received very little attention in academic literature) are elucidated, but it also provides a different perspective on the SNP. By comparing the two cases, it is possible to draw out specific differences and reflect on the origins of such variation. Second, the article specifically focuses on immigration issues in these two SNRPs. This is an area of research that has received relatively little attention (Hepburn 2009b) and is not specifically addressed by Mitchell et al. (2012). Finally, another key contribution is that the article makes broader theoretical implications concerning the compatibility of national identity and cultural pluralism.

The article first formulates the main hypotheses. The next section discusses the narratives regarding cultural pluralism and national identity employed at the elite level in the SNP and FNP. Next, the data sources and research design are introduced, followed by the main results and analysis based on the survey data. Finally, the conclusion discusses the implications of the findings for intra-party tensions within SNRPs and their public party images.

**Cultural pluralism and national identity in SNRPS**

National identity ‘is based on the similarity to some people and difference (perceived or actual) from others’ (Hjerm 1998, 357). As a consequence, nations, nationalism and national identities necessarily impose boundaries between those who belong and those who are excluded (Verdery 1994; Anderson 2006). From a liberal stance this boundary creation imposes normative difficulties and terms such as ‘nationalism’, ‘nationalist’ and even the more neutral term ‘national’ remain, at least for some ‘loaded’ terms (MacCormick 1982; Tamir 1993; Kuzio 2009). Historic experiences of extreme nationalism are one basic explanation for such negative perceptions, but above all it is the inherent divisiveness of nationalist ideology that troubles many liberal scholars. Kohn (2005 [1944]) attempts to reconcile such tensions by making a distinction between a civic and ethnic dimension. This binary model has come under increased scrutiny but remains an important prism through which national identity is analysed.

To an extent these differences are closely linked to debates concerning the modern (Gellner 1983; Anderson 2006) or primordial (Smith 1986) nature of nationalism. The former regards nationalism as a relatively new invention, and at least in its original form constitutes civic elements of the *demos*. The latter suggests that identities are based on long-standing *ethnies* (Smith 1986). In an increasingly globalised world, with large migratory flows and culturally heterogeneous societies, the modernist position is perceived to be more malleable and permeable, and thus able to adapt in order to
incorporate ‘others’. The primordial position is less flexible in terms of accommodating cultural heterogeneity. At best, it requires ‘others’ to incorporate cultural elements of an already existing national identity in order to be considered fellow nationals. At worst, characteristics are ascriptive (e.g. birth, ancestry, race) which cannot be obtained through volition.

The tension concerning nationalism and liberalism becomes particularly apparent in the context of SNRPs when considering issues concerning cultural pluralism. For example, multiculturalism and nationalism are often thought of as difficult to reconcile theoretically (Kymlicka 1995). This has important practical implications for SNRPs. Hussain and Miller (2006) argue that the term ‘multinational nationalist’ is an oxymoron and that a ‘multicultural nationalist’ movement comes very close to being one. Such a position seems, however, undercut by the fact that SNRPs, such as the SNP and the FNP, portray themselves as multiculturalist and pro-immigration parties (Hepburn 2009b), often more so than state-wide parties. The civic versus ethnic distinction goes some way to explain the tension in that it may be the case that multicultural ethnic nationalist is a contradiction, but multicultural civic nationalist is not.

Within the specific context of SNRPs these debates have featured prominently. Most scholars, for example, categorise Scottish nationalism and the SNP as civic (Keating 2001, 220; McCrone 2001). Similarly, FNP shares many similar features despite its linguistic focus (van der Zwet 2015). However, in the case of the SNP, a number of scholars (Itchijo 2004; Leith and Soule 2011; Mycock 2012) have provided an alternative perspective to the modernist/civic position, arguing for a ‘pluralism of Scottish national identities’ and challenging ‘the notion that Scottish nationalism is of an overwhelmingly civic, open and pluralistic type’ (Leith and Soule 2011, 13).

At a micro-level, it is not always clear who is a civic or ethnic nationalist. First people can have multiple inclusive territorial identities (Marks 1999). SNRP members will inherently have a strong attachment to the sub-state identity, but this does not necessarily preclude an attachment to the state identity. Some have argued that the intensity with which a national identity is felt is important in the context of attitudes towards cultural pluralism. One way of measuring this intensity is by examining the types of relationships members have to sub-state and state-wide identities (Carey 2002). In other words, do SNRP members have an attachment to both state-wide and sub-state identities, or just the latter? McCrone and Bechhofer (2010), for example, show that thinking of oneself as ‘exclusively national’ is a critical factor in explaining why people reject other peoples’ claims of national identity. Following this logic it could be hypothesised that:

H1: SNRP members with both state and sub-state identities are more likely to support cultural pluralism than those who have an exclusive attachment to the sub-state identity.

People have varied conceptions of the relations between different territorial identities, but can also have a different understanding of the content of those identities. In other words, which criteria determine someone’s identity? The civic versus ethnic framework as set out above is not without its problems and more recently scholars have favoured multi-dimensional conceptions of national identity (Kuzio 2002; Shulman 2002; Björklund 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009).

However, the framework does have some merit. There is, for example, evidence that if more restrictive criteria, such as ancestry and birth, are included in the conceptualisation of national identity, then it becomes more difficult for immigrants to adopt a national identity and therefore more likely to be excluded (Brubaker 1996). A similar argument applies, but to a lesser extent, to cultural criteria. For example, if language is part of the conception of national identity and language is a core feature of peoples’ identity then those who are unable to speak that language are excluded (Urúa 2012, 67). On the other hand, language can of course be learned and is therefore a less restrictive criterion than birth and ancestry. There are also criteria that are used to conceptualise national identity in more inclusive terms, allowing newcomers a relatively free choice to be considered as part of the nation. Criteria related to sentiment are inclusive as it is largely the choice of an individual as to whether they ‘feel’ part of the nation and want to adopt the corresponding national identity. Additionally, adherence to laws, rules and institutions of a country is regarded as a civic and inclusive
criterion. Residence is similarly inclusive; nationhood is extended to all those residing within the territory of a nation. However, this would appear somewhat more ambiguous as it necessarily excludes those that are not residing in the territory (Esses et al. 1998; Byrne 2011). Taking these different dimensions into account the following hypothesis can be formed:

H2: Members of SNRPs who include more exclusive characteristics (ancestry, birth and, to a lesser extent, language) in their conceptions of national identity are more likely to hold negative perceptions of cultural pluralism.

The two hypotheses formulated here suggest that the narrative that is constructed at the elite level concerning both cultural pluralism and national identity is not, in all cases, coherent with actual perceptions of most SNRP party members. This is, perhaps, not surprising, as SNRPs are often broad churches able to attract members (and voters) from across the political spectrum. However, divergent views on both conceptions of national identity and cultural pluralism have the potential to affect the party’s overall public image.

A political party’s public image can be considered one of its key electoral assets (Wallas 1948). Butler and Rose (1960) define party image as how the party appears ‘to the picture left by its surface characteristics’. Most voters form general perceptions and broad impressions of political parties (Trilling 1976) when making electoral choices. These pictures are often vague and inconsistent and are based on a few mental associations made by voters linked to, for example, a clear stance on a controversial issue (e.g. European integration, immigration, foreign policy), as well as a few mental associations relating to overall party image (Johns 2012). These associations are often persistent over time and are shared by a large proportion of the electorate in most contexts (Johns 2012). They can be expected to be particularly powerful when controversial issues can be linked to a party’s core ideology—nationalism in the case of SNRPs. Political elites demonstrate sensitivity towards the negative connotations of nationalism and are familiar with simplified conceptual models such as civic and ethnic nationalism (Opalski 2002). As a consequence, elites in self-styled civic SNRPs will look for ways in which their party can avoid accusations of narrow nationalism. Accentuating the inclusive nature of the party through formulating positive policies in relation to cultural pluralism and immigration can be a powerful means to such an end.

A possible disjuncture between perceptions of national identity at the elite level and those of the masses has been an important theme in recent research, focusing on the actions and narratives of elites and their resonance with views in the population (Guiberneau 2007; Risse 2010). Additionally, some have argued that there is not enough attention being paid to non-civic elements—particularly at the non-elite level (Leith and Soule 2011). To an extent such differences are mirrored between elite and members of the SNP and the FNP (van der Zwet 2012). If attitudes towards cultural pluralism are linked to these different conceptions of national identity as hypothesised in H1 and H2, then it leads to the re-assessment of the interplay between civic and non-civic elements in theoretical terms. In practical terms, it points towards cultural pluralism as a possible area of intra-party tension for SNRPs. Such tensions exist in most parties and elite—and electorate opinion on the issue often differs at the national (Freeman 2006; Consterdine 2015) and the European level (Lahav and Messina 2005)—but for SNRPs the linkages between cultural pluralism and nationalism provide an added dimension.

Cultural pluralism in the SNP and the FNP

The SNP and the FNP have adopted a largely positive attitude towards immigrants and immigration in Friesland and Scotland. In both Scotland and Friesland immigration is a much less salient issue than in other parts of the UK and the Netherlands. However, due to the increased salience of immigration, as well as wider debates on cultural pluralism in Dutch and UK politics, both the SNP and the FNP have had to address these issues. In this section, the party narratives in relation to these issues will be considered. Both the SNP and the FNP are self-proclaimed civic SNRPs and are
members of the EFA, ‘an alliance of regionalist and civic, democratic nationalist parties in Europe’ (EFA 2011). The official doctrine of the SNP is described as firmly civic (Keating 1996; McCrone 1998; Hearn 2000; Mitchell 2008). The 2003 party manifesto states:

SNP has an open and inclusive approach to Scottish citizenship. The automatic right of citizenship will be open to all those living in Scotland, all those born in Scotland, and all those with a parent born in Scotland. All others are free to apply. (SNP 2003)

In comparison with many other SNRPs, the SNP lacks a strong cultural dimension (Keating 1996; Haeisy 2005). FNP is also considered a civic SNRP (De Wouter, Gómez-Reino, and Lynch 2006), but because language is the most distinct marker of ‘Frisianness’ and the FNP’s conception of ‘Frisianness’ is closely linked to the Frisian language, it is perhaps perceived as more exclusive. According to one scholar, the FNP conception of ‘Frisianness’ can be summarised as follows: preservation of the Frisian language and culture, protection of the Frisian countryside, a focus on agriculture and small scale development in industry, recreation and housing (Hemminga 2006).

The SNP prides itself in its long history of pro-multiculturalism. Hepburn (2009b) asserts that the SNP conceptualises ‘national belonging as voluntary participation in a multicultural society’. Immigration has been a policy area in which the party has attempted to claim that Scotland’s needs are different from those of other parts of the UK and that the main state-wide parties (Labour and Conservatives) do not take into account Scotland’s immigration requirements. Whilst both Labour and Conservatives at the state-wide level have both adopted tougher immigration policies over the last decade (Mulvey 2010), the SNP has argued that Scotland’s demographic and economic challenges require a more flexible approach. The SNP (2010) manifesto states:

Scotland [has] to take responsibility for immigration so that we can develop a system here at home that more closely meets our needs. An ‘earned citizenship’ system, similar to those in Canada or Australia, would allow Scotland to attract high-skill immigrants who can add to the strength of our economy and help deliver growing prosperity for the whole nation. (SNP 2010)

In an attempt to restrict immigration, the UK government announced a new point-based immigration system in 2009. The SNP MP and immigration spokesman, Peter Wishart, responded by arguing that Scotland needed its own point system. The SNP did not disagree with the policy of a point-based system but stressed the need for flexibility: ‘Scotland’s population and immigration requirements are completely different from the rest of the UK, and this has to be recognised when points are added up’ (New Points System for Immigrants 2009).

Support for cultural pluralism is firmly embedded in the SNP’s thinking and Scottish national identity is presented by the party as neither ‘xenophobic nor exclusive’ (Williamson 2009, 65). The dominant view is that Scottishness is based on civic markers and lacks—unlike many other sub-state regions with autonomist movements—a linguistic dimension (Hepburn and Rosie 2014, 341). The position of the SNP concerning the ethnic dimension of Scottishness has changed overtime. Throughout the party’s history, anti-English sentiment by its members has been discouraged by the mainstream; groups, such as the ‘55 Group and Siol Nan Gaidheal (SNG) in the 1980s, were expelled (Lynch 2002). These groups formulated a conception of Scottish society that clashed with the SNP mainstream and leadership’s understanding of what it meant to be Scottish and the members of the group were expelled from the SNP (Mitchell 1996). These events reflect the SNP mainstream’s increased commitment to a civic national identity and illustrate the party’s discomfort with cultural and exclusive conceptions of Scottishness. The party’s ideological positioning on the centre left of the political spectrum in the 1990s has cemented its civic, territorial-based and inclusive conception of Scottishness at the elite level. Particularly, since the election of Alex Salmond as leader in 1990, Scottishness is equated to equality, solidarity and social justice (McEwen 2006). The narrative around Scottishness has also become more outward looking, most significantly with the adoption of the ‘Independence in Europe’
strategy in the early 1990s (Jolly 2007). The party ‘deploys a black sheep nationalism that seeks to denigrate rival constructions of Scottish national identity’ (Mycock 2012, 54) in order to safeguard an untainted conception of Scottish identity.

However, this does not necessarily mean that ethnic understandings of Scottishness no longer have purchase. Some suggest that civic conceptions of Scottishness are not uniformly shared (Leith and Soule 2011). Reicher, Hopkins, and Harrison (2009, 35) claim that ‘ethnic claims to Scottishness retain more purchase than civic claims’. This should not be understood as a normative criticism, suggesting that the SNP are ‘wolves in sheep clothing’. Instead it relates to Smith’s point that all nations require ethnic cores—ethnies—and cannot be constructed solely of civic dimensions (Smith 1986). Thus even though the SNP may use a civic narrative in terms of conceptualising national identity, the actual understanding includes ethnic criteria nevertheless (van der Zwet 2015).

For FNP, cultural pluralism and immigration are peripheral issues. In its 2011 provincial election manifesto, immigration issues were covered in a brief section stating that:

FNP promotes an open society which shows hospitality and respect to other cultures and ways of living. Immigrants should adapt to our culture while being able to be themselves. They must get the possibilities and the respect to do so. (FNP 2010)5

The FNP does not demonstrate strong opposition to measures introduced by state-wide parties (e.g. integration courses, citizenship tests). The party does not regard immigration as a means of achieving economic growth in Friesland. Although population growth has been lower in Friesland than other regions in the country, FNP does not consider this problematic.

Within FNP there have been no organised groups upholding a more exclusive conception of ‘Frisianness’, but there have been occasions during which the party has had to distance itself from ‘ethnic’ remarks expressed by some of its members. In 1985, a prominent party member, Jan Bearn Singelsma,6 was accused of making racist remarks. In a radio programme he had argued that foreigners living in the Netherlands for a short time should not be allowed to vote. He was quoted to have said ‘this country is already heaven (el Dorado) for foreigners’ (Leeuwarder Courant 1985a). Singelsma claimed that his comments had been taken out of context, that the interviewer had asked leading questions, and that he was speaking only of his personal opinions (Leeuwarder Courant 1985b). Nevertheless, FNP was quick to disassociate itself from his comments. In a press statement the party referred to the FNP’s manifesto at the time, which stated: ‘discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation and disability has to be actively fought against’ (Leeuwarder Courant 1985c). Thus, if Singelsma’s arguments were of an anti-immigrant/racist nature, such views were not supported by the party mainstream, which recognised the potential harm to its image and support. A similar scenario transpired in 2007 when a local councillor, after hearing that a family of asylum seekers was to be housed in his street, declared that ‘such a family does not belong here … it will become a mess, these people have never been taught in Africa how to trim the hedges’ (Leeuwarder Courant 2007). The story was picked up by the national newspapers (NRC 2007) and led to considerable negative press for FNP. However, within the party there was no public support for the councillor’s remarks and the party leadership condemned them. The councillor resigned a few days later from his post, but was allowed to remain a member.

In conclusion, both parties have civic doctrines and conceptualise ‘Scottishness’ and ‘Frisianness’ in culturally pluralistic terms. Although the party mainstream may hold such conceptions, not all members may agree—but if members do hold more exclusive perceptions of Scottish and Frisian society, they will be palpable at the personal level. Such members do not constitute an organised faction in either party. In both parties the mainstream has distanced itself from overtly exclusive understandings of identity and does not wish to be associated with anti-immigration ideas or rhetoric. Finally, in each case the party mainstream seems aware of the potential damage that anti-immigration remarks can do to party image.
Data and methodology

The findings in this article are based on two unique SNRP membership studies: an ESRC funded (RES-062-23-0722) the SNP membership survey \((N = 7112)\) conducted by Mitchell et al. \((2012)\) in 2007 and an FNP membership survey, which followed the design of the SNP membership survey, conducted by the author in 2009 \((N = 572)\). The response rates for the surveys were 53.9% and 47.9% respectively. In order to test the relationship between the dependent variable and independent(s) variable, bivariate statistics (correlations and \(t\)-tests) are reported in the results section. Here, a brief overview of the dependent and independent variables is provided. The dependent variable consists of responses to the statement:

It is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions.

Respondents were asked to answer using a five-point ‘Likert’ scale (i.e. strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree). The question measures favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards cultural pluralism. As already mentioned, cultural pluralism, multiculturalism and immigration issues are—at least according to public perception—often blurred (Kymlicka 1995; Bau- bock and Rundell 1998). The question captures a broader attitude towards those with other customs and traditions, which is captured in the term cultural pluralism.

The most common way of measuring the combination of state and sub-state identities is the so-called ‘Moreno question’ used in several regional and national surveys in Spain, Canada and Scotland. It takes the form of a bipolar scale, with respondents asked:

Which if any of the following best describes yourself?

Respondents are able to choose from a five-point scale that includes options for an exclusive sub-state identity, exclusive state identity, and three options for dual identity (i.e. more sub-state than state, equally sub-state and state, more state than sub-state).

The conceptualisation of national identity is notoriously difficult and consists of many different dimensions relating to ethnicity, culture, territory and/or psychological sentiment (van der Zwet 2015). The variables used in the analysis for this article—ancestry, birth, language, residence, loyalty to rules and political institutions, and feelings of national identity—tap into all these aspects but can also be considered as proxies for inclusive and exclusive understandings of national identity, as discussed in the theoretical section of this article. Members were asked to rate the importance of these different aspects using the following prompt:

Some people say the following things are important for being truly Scottish/Frisian. Others say they are not important. How important do you rate each of these aspects?

The options used in the analysis below include: to have Scottish/Frisian ancestry; to have been born in Scotland/Friesland; to live in Scotland/Friesland now; to have lived in Scotland/Friesland for most of one’s life; to respect Scottish/Frisian political institutions and laws/rules; to feel Scottish/ Frisian; to be able to speak English, Gaelic or Scots/Frisian.

Results: The SNP and the FNP membership, national identity and cultural pluralism

Table 1 reports the results of the dependent variable used in the analysis. A minority of the SNP and FNP members support the statement that ‘it is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions’, rejecting cultural pluralism. Most members are either in favour of cultural pluralism (disagreeing with this statement) or are neutral (neither agree nor disagree). For the SNP, 49% of members have a positive attitude towards cultural pluralism and a slightly higher number of FNP members (58%) disagree or strongly disagree with this statement. However, in the SNP just under a third of members, and in FNP, just under a fifth of members appear to support a more culturally uniform society. So despite both parties’ official support towards
culturally pluralist visions of Scottish and Frisian society, a considerable number of members hold more exclusive views. The next sections will examine which members are more likely to hold either inclusive or exclusive views.

Individuals can hold mutually inclusive territorial identities (Marks 1999). As can be expected in the case of the SNP, the vast majority of respondents (80%) report an exclusively Scottish identity (see Table 2). However, almost a fifth (19.5%) also report having a British identity. The vast majority of this group feel more Scottish than British (16.6%) whilst a very small percentage report having an exclusively British identity (0.3%). The proportion of FNP members who consider themselves exclusively Frisian is much smaller (26.9%) — a much larger proportion report a dual identity (72.8%). Of this larger proportion, most feel more Frisian than Dutch (60.1%). In a similar manner to the SNP members, only a very small minority have a stronger sense of ‘Dutchness’ than ‘Frisianness’. The categories ‘more Scottish/Frisian than British/Dutch’, ‘equally Scottish/Frisian and British/Dutch’ and ‘more British/Dutch than Scottish/Frisian’ have been merged to create a dichotomous variable consisting of those members who have an exclusive sub-state identity and those members who have a dual identity. 8

The difference in attitudes towards cultural pluralism between the SNP members who report a single Scottish identity, and those who report a dual identity, is significant. Respondents who have an exclusively Scottish identity are more likely to report positive attitudes towards cultural pluralism ($M = 3.25$, $SE = 0.02$) in comparison with those who report dual identities ($M = 3.1$, $SE = 0.03$). For ease of interpretation, Table 3 only reports the combined scores for respondents who disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, ‘it is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions’. 50.6% of the SNP members with an exclusively Scottish identity had a positive score for cultural pluralism, in comparison with 44.6% of those with a dual identity. For FNP, there was no statistically significant difference between members reporting an exclusively Frisian ($M = 3.53$, $SE = 0.09$) and dual Frisian and Dutch identity ($M = 3.50$, $SE = 0.05$). Therefore hypothesis 1 can be rejected; those members with a single territorial identity are not more likely to have negative attitudes towards cultural pluralism than those who have dual identities. If anything, the opposite appears to be the case for the SNP.

For most people, national identity is an important part of who they are. For SNRP members it is often their primary identity (Mitchell et al. 2012; van der Zwart 2012), but understandings of national

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identity vary. Some members find some aspects of national identity more important than others. The SNP and the FNP members were asked how important a certain criterion is for their conception of ‘Scottishness’ and ‘Frisianness’ on a four-point scale (Table 4). These criteria include ancestry, birth, residence (current and long-term), language, attachment to political institutions and laws and rules, and sentiment.

As outlined in the theoretical section of this article, ancestry, birth and, to a lesser extent, language are often associated with more exclusive conceptions of national identity. Party members who regard these criteria as important aspects of Scottishness/Frisianness are therefore less likely to support cultural pluralism. Residence, attachment to political institutions and law/rules, and sentiment, are criteria considered to be more inclusive. Therefore members who find these criteria important are less likely to hold negative attitudes towards cultural pluralism. Nevertheless, the theoretically inclusive dimensions remain positively correlated with the dependent variable. In the case of the SNP, preferences towards ancestry and (to a lesser extent) language criteria demonstrate higher correlations with a preference for cultural uniformity. In addition, the long-term residence criterion also has a relatively high correlation with the dependent variable. The current residence and ‘respecting institutions’ variables, and especially the ‘feeling Scottish’ variable have a lower correlation but a positive correlation remains. This suggests that those who find these criteria important also prefer cultural uniformity, albeit to a lesser extent. It should be noted that almost all the SNP members consider these latter three criteria to be very important or important. For FNP, ancestry and birth also have a strong correlation with cultural uniformity. Residence, both long-term and current, and respect for institutions have slightly lower correlation scores but remain positive. Neither language nor ‘feeling Frisian’ significantly correlates with the dependent variable. It should be noted that almost all the SNP members consider these latter three criteria to be very important or important. Nevertheless, hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed: members who value more restrictive criteria as part of their conception of ‘Scottishness’ and ‘Frisianness’ are more likely to report negative attitudes towards cultural pluralism. However, it is not the case that members favouring less restrictive criteria are more likely to support cultural pluralism. In other words, the dimensions are considered non-competitively (van der Zwet 2015).

### Table 3. Support for cultural pluralism by single and dual identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>SNP % (n)</th>
<th>% support cultural pluralism (n)</th>
<th>FNP % (n)</th>
<th>% support cultural pluralism (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive identity</td>
<td>80.5 (5243)</td>
<td>50.6 (2599)</td>
<td>27 (152)</td>
<td>54.4 (81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual identity</td>
<td>19.5 (1273)</td>
<td>44.6 (550)</td>
<td>73 (412)</td>
<td>59.3 (242)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Independent t-test for SNP t(1962.634)= 4.22, p < .05. Independent t-test for FNP t(241.575)=0.24, p < .05.

### Table 4. Dimensions of national identity and cultural pluralism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SNP % imp for nat. id (n)</th>
<th>Correlation cultural pluralism</th>
<th>FNP % imp for nat. id (n)</th>
<th>Correlation cultural pluralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To have Scottish/Frisian ancestry</td>
<td>56.3 (3715)</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>68.4 (379)</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have been born in Scotland</td>
<td>62.7 (4160)</td>
<td>0.29**</td>
<td>56 (310)</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To live in Scotland/Friesland now</td>
<td>79.3 (5227)</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>65.6 (663)</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have lived in Scotland /Friesland for most of life</td>
<td>65.5 (4308)</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>59.6 (330)</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To feel Scottish/ Frisian</td>
<td>96.2 (6333)</td>
<td>0.04**</td>
<td>97.1 (540)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To respect Scottish/Frisian political institutions and laws</td>
<td>92.7 (6096)</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>81 (444)</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To speak language</td>
<td>72.5 (4754)</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>99.8 (568)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All the bivariate correlations were tested in a multivariate model that included socio-demographic attributes, and found that the key relationships are not artefacts of age, gender, education and income.

**p < 0.05.
Conclusion and discussion

Squaring nationalism and cultural pluralism has been a major challenge in many Western European states over the past two decades (Young 1993). Globalisation has changed the nature and magnitude of migration patterns. On the one hand, it has led to more culturally permeable national identities. On the other hand, nationalism, nations and national identities remain potent forces in contemporary politics (De Winter and Türsan 1998; Marks 1999; De Winter, Gómez-Reino, and Lynch 2006; Keating 2008; Elias 2009). These issues are closely linked to long-standing theoretical debates on the nature of nationalism and national identity. One position being that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and allows for conceptions of national identity to be permeable and incorporate the characteristics of newcomers. The opposing position is that national identity has an ethnic core, which seems to suggest that national identities are less permeable (Plamenatz 1975; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986; Anderson 2006; Kellas 1998; Kohn 2005 [1944]). In this sense, the links between attitudes towards cultural pluralism and conceptions of national identity can provide important insights into the inclusive or exclusive nature of national identity.

As stated in the introductory contribution to this volume (Jeram, van der Zwet, and Wisthaler 2015), the contradiction between increasingly culturally heterogeneous identities and sustained support for nationalism is particularly relevant for SNRPs. National identity is one of the key reference points for SNRP politics. SNRPs have been careful in formulating narratives of national identity and are aware of the loaded nature of nationalist terms (MacCormick 1982; Tamir 1993; Kuzio 2009). SNRPs may find it politically necessary to explicitly identify as civic parties. However, previous research suggests a more complex relation between civic and ethnic dimensions in which a multitude of theoretically contradictory concepts of national identity are applied by SNRPs (Hussain and Miller 2006; Leith and Soule 2011; Mycock 2012; van der Zwet 2015).

This article builds on this previous research by examining the relationship between divergent conceptions of national identity and attitudes towards cultural pluralism in the SNP and the FNP (Hepburn and Rosie 2014; van der Zwet 2015). At the macro-level these parties have constructed different narratives concerning cultural pluralism. The SNP emphasises the economic and demographic benefits of immigrants. Newcomers are considered to be fellow Scots by means of their contribution to Scottish society and the territorial dimension is strongly accentuated in conceptions of Scottish identity. However, whilst presenting the Scottish identity as open, inclusive and modern, some have also argued that the party is also comfortable with celebrating more ethnic and cultural aspects of the Scottish identity (Reicher, Hopkins, and Harrison 2009; Mycock 2012). Nevertheless, particularly when regarded in an international comparative perspective, Scottish nationalism in general, and that of SNP specifically, primarily ‘rests upon territorial or civic markers’ (Hepburn and Rosie 2014). The party’s strong emphasis on solidarity and equality, outward-looking internationalism, and welcoming narrative towards immigration reinforces this position.

FNP’s narrative concerning cultural pluralism is more nuanced and underlines the inherent right of all people to preserve their identity and culture. This narrative runs parallel to FNP’s objective of protecting and preserving Frisian identity. However, FNP’s focus on language also represents a potential difficulty. The party argues that newcomers should integrate into Frisian society, implicitly suggesting that they should learn the Frisian language. However, the state requires that immigrants integrate into Dutch society; all integration tests are based on this principle. Furthermore, almost all Frisians speak Dutch as well as Frisian. Hence it would be logical to expect that immigrants would prioritise Dutch integration and language learning. Asking immigrants to both learn Dutch and Frisian could be seen as excessively restrictive and unrealistic.

At the micro-level, a more diverse range of attitudes towards cultural pluralism is revealed upon examination of the opinions of party members. These attitudes are to a certain extent linked to how members conceptualise identity. Comparing the state and sub-state affiliation of members reveals, unsurprisingly, that a high proportion of members have an exclusive sub-state identity—they consider themselves to be Scottish/Frisian and not British/Dutch. However, a large minority report dual
identities, particularly in the case of FNP. In the case of the SNP, having an exclusive Scottish identity does not lead to a more negative view of cultural pluralism when compared to those members with dual identities. Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case: those members who have dual identities are more likely to oppose cultural pluralism. For the FNP, there is no difference between exclusive Frisian identifiers and those with dual identities.

The results show that both parties are able to attract members who hold very divergent views on issues concerning cultural pluralism (Müller-Rommel 1990). Part of the explanation for this could be based on the fact that the desire for constitutional change overrides many other differences party members may have. Here it is important to note that neither SNP nor FNP have to electorally compete with other SNRPs. By way of contrasting examples, in Catalonia and Flanders, both left-wing and right-wing SNRPs are part of the party system. In such a situation (in which SNRPs must compete on other issues) attitudes are likely to be less divergent. Further research on the ability of parties to attract members (and voters) with diverging attitudes on issues related to cultural pluralism is to be welcomed.

For self-styled civic SNRPs like SNP and FNP, these intra-party differences over cultural pluralism are particularly important. The findings in this article contribute to a body of recent research that point towards differences between elite and mass perceptions of national identity (Leith and Soule 2011). Although the focus of this article is SNRP memberships the findings suggest that the pattern is repeated, which has potentially important implications. Members whose attitudes differ from those of the party mainstream cannot only cause problems for their party’s narrative on cultural pluralism, but can have a significant impact on overall party image. All political parties aim to strike a balance between formulating policies in response to public concerns towards issues, such as immigration (Guiradon and Joppke 2001), whilst guarding themselves against accusations of narrow nationalism and being branded ‘nasty’. For SNRPs this challenge is even of greater importance due to the negative connotations associated with nationalism. The differences between SNRP elites and the voters are an additional interesting field for enquiry. A key question—particularly in the context of May’s law of curvilinearity (May 1972)—is whether voters’ attitudes mirror those of members or elites.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professor James Mitchell (University of Edinburgh), Professor Laura Cram (University of Edinburgh) and Professor John Bachtler (University of Strathclyde) for comments on earlier version.

Funding
Thanks to the ESRC for their financial support (ES/J003468/1).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes
1. Cultural pluralism incorporates a broad range of issues around immigration control, integration of immigrants, asylum policies and multiculturalism. Although these are of course all distinctive concepts that are quite different from each other, in the public’s mind they are often blurred.
2. Post-referendum the membership has soared to over 80,000 and continues to rise.
3. Such research has mainly focussed on European identity formation.
4. It should be noted that it is not only the SNP that regards demographic developments as a key concern. Former Labour First Minister Jack McConnell, for example, also argued that it was an important challenge. However, perhaps due to the close ties between Scottish and UK Labour party, the party did not argue for a differentiated approach in terms of immigration policy.
5. All translations from Dutch and Frisian sources by author.
6. Singelsma was FNP’s first member of the Provincial Council in 1966.
7. The FNP survey was translated into Frisian by a qualified translator. For further detail see van der Zwet (2012).
8. The number of respondents who report an exclusively state-based identity for both the SNP and FNP has been omitted from the further analysis.

References


