

Globalization, Religiosity and Vote Choice: An Empirical Test

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Building on recent research that examines the impact of globalization in domestic political behaviour, particularly on economic voting, this chapter proposes that globalization strengthens the influence of religiosity on individual voting decisions (the 'religious vote' or 'religious voting'). It further hypothesizes that the effect of globalization on the religious vote depends on the structure of the religious economy: some religious contexts will be more fertile settings for religious voting. The analysis combines individual-level data from CSES Module 2 (2001-2006) with two types of country-level information: globalization indices and a measure of the religious context. The main finding is that globalization strengthens the link between religiosity and right-wing party choice. This effect can be interpreted as an anti-globalization backlash that takes place within a shrinking pool of religious voters. The findings contribute to our understanding of a hitherto ignored relationship between globalization and the non-economic foundations of political behaviour.

As a key driver of societal modernization, globalization has been gathering speed in recent decades and especially post-1989 with positive and negative consequences across countries. In the standard definition by Dreher, Gaston and Martens (2008), a country's openness or exposure to globalization takes place along dimensions that include cross-border economic activity (economic globalization), as well as cultural integration (social globalization). Economic globalization entails, among other features, increased international trade flows and foreign investment, and low tariff barriers on imported goods. Social or cultural globalization involves a rise in the volume of international telephone/post/tourism traffic, and a high presence of foreigners in a given country. So, apart from the obvious economic transformation, globalization can be seen as a catalyst for changes in various fields: culture (westernization and homogenization, but also the erosion of traditional identities), religion (fundamentalism, but also the ecumenical movement), and politics (democratization, but also international terrorism).

This chapter assesses whether and in what way globalization moderates the influence of religion in domestic political behaviour. In doing so, it updates scholarship in two research fields. First, comparative studies that discuss whether modernity amplifies or suppresses the importance of religion in political attitudes and behaviour have ignored the globalizing aspects of modernity (e.g. Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Esmer and Pettersson 2007). Second, an expanding body of scholarship that studies the influence of international processes on domestic public opinion has focused so far on voters' economic considerations (Hellwig 2001, 2008; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Kayser 2007; Vowles 2008; however, see Bekhuis, Meuleman and Lubbers 2013). Our focus here is on the overlooked implications of globalization for the link between individual religiosity and party choice. We call this link the 'religious vote' to summarize the well-established cross-national tendency of the more devout to vote for political parties to the right of the ideological spectrum (Manza and Brooks 1999; Olson and Green 2006).

As a first step, we use various existing theoretical perspectives to develop two competing expectations regarding the fate of the religious vote in the context of a globalizing world. According to the first expectation, globalization triggers economic and social/cultural changes that eventually marginalize religion to its own narrow sphere

(see versions in Wilson 1966; Berger 1967; Dobbelaere 2002). A weakening influence of religiosity on vote choice in more ‘open’ (globalized) societies would provide empirical support to this narrative. The second expectation anticipates the opposite outcome. Specifically, globalization undermines existing certainties, and generates existential and ontological anxiety. To combat this undesirable psychological state, populations retreat to sources of authority and identity that offer certainty, religion being a prime example of such sources (Robertson 1992; Beyer 1994; Casanova 1994; Berger 1999; Kinnvall 2004; Held and McGrew 2007). In this reading, globalization preserves or even boosts the influence of religiosity on individual political decisions. A stronger impact of religiosity on party choice in more ‘open’ societies would provide empirical support to this narrative.

As a second step, we combine data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey program (CSES Module 2: 2001-2006) and direct measures of globalization (the KOF indices by Dreher et al. 2008) to produce a robust empirical test of the two competing narratives. Since we do not expect the impact of globalization on the religious vote to be homogenous across countries, we stratify our analysis by national religious context using measures of religious regulation (Grim and Finke 2007). For a more meaningful interpretation of our findings, we also supplement our analysis with data from the World and European Values Surveys that allow us to establish religiosity trends over time.

The results suggest that: a) country exposure to globalization moderates the relationship between individual religiosity and (right-wing) party choice; b) it does so in an expected direction, according to one of the key narratives: greater exposure to globalization is linked to a stronger effect of religiosity on party choice; and c) this effect might be more intense only for certain religious contexts. The chapter begins with an overview of existing research on modernity, globalization and religion, followed by a discussion of globalization’s relevance for religious explanations of political behaviour. We review the datasets and methods, and present findings from a series of logit models. The conclusion discusses limitations of the analysis and key implications of our findings.

The Consequences of Globalization

While the joint investigation of globalization and religion is a growing field of study, empirical research on the consequences of globalization has largely ignored the religious vote. Early scholarship examined the Catholic Church as one of the first global organizations (Valuer 1971), while more recent works have focused on the role of religion in shaping attitudes towards transnational trade and free-market capitalism (von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003), and in promoting international development and world peace (Banchoff 2008).

Another limitation of comparative studies on religion and political behaviour is that, when discussing the consequences of societal modernization for religion they ignore the globalizing aspect of modernity by using independent variables that measure GDP, income inequality, human development or the size of the industrial sector (e.g. Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Esmer and Pettersson 2007). While these indicators may be related to globalization, they are not direct measures of a country's exposure to the forces of global economic, political and social openness.

Research that does employ direct measures of globalization as explanations of domestic political behaviour has focused so far on the 'economic vote', that is the economic concerns of voters, rather than on the 'religious vote', which is of interest here (e.g. Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hellwig 2008; see also, Kayser 2007). According to this literature, globalization triggers economic, social and political changes that expose individuals to risk and insecurity. Individuals seek compensation and protection from these risks by turning to the state, particularly to its welfare functions. The state might be able to protect the individual (for example, through welfare expansion) or might be unable to countenance the negative outcomes of globalization (e.g. outsourcing). In the latter case, citizens might even turn to other, non-economic areas of government performance as their guiding considerations when choosing a party on Election Day. Voters' reactions to globalization, and to the state's reaction in this context, are then translated into electoral decisions. We argue that these reactions can incorporate a religious dimension.

A weaker effect of religion in political behaviour?

While there is a paucity of robust evidence on the religious vote as a function of globalization, extant scholarship highlights two competing hypotheses. The first anticipates that globalization will lead to a weakening importance of religiosity in individual social and political decisions. This expectation draws heavily on modernization theory as reflected in the secularization thesis (this is a vast literature, but see examples in Wilson 1966; Berger 1967; Chaves 1994; Dobbelaere 2002). It asserts that advanced modernity of the kind promoted by globalization will curtail religion's relevance in the social system, leading to the eventual privatization of religion: faith will bear no impact on citizens' social and political choices. Details follow on the two mechanisms through which globalization might be thought to constrain the religious vote as part of this process.

In economic terms, a globalizing world is often linked to increasing affluence. If we treat religion as the refuge only of vulnerable populations against material deprivation, then improving material circumstances should decrease the individual 'need' for religious goods (see the 'secure secularization' thesis in Norris and Inglehart 2004). If globalization increases affluence, more affluent populations might feel less anxious regarding their well-being and, by extension, secure enough to ignore the consolations of religion and its promises of metaphysical rewards in the after-life. Religious faith may even turn into a private matter, a lifestyle 'choice' with little significance for social and political choices. The positive economic consequences of globalization prepare us for a decline in religion's importance in individual political decisions.

Globalization has also been connected to how individuals see themselves (Robertson 1992). In cultural/identity terms, globalization activates population, communication and information flows that build up a pluralistic environment. This allows multiple, often competing sources of meaning and authority to emerge, especially in previously 'closed' cultures. In these cultures, the individual used to interpret his or her existence through a unique (local/national) frame of reference. When exposed to the pluralistic pressures of globalization, a single frame of reference ceases to function as the authoritative meaning

system. Multiple sources of information challenge the claims of previously dominant meaning systems - the nation or the church - to an ultimate truth (see the 'sacred canopy' metaphor in Berger 1967).¹ Cultural relativism diminishes religious authority over the individual by undermining the taken-for-granted nature of one's faith. This process curtails the influence of faith in individual political decisions. This expectation can be summarized as follows:

[H1a]: In more globalized countries individual religiosity will have a weaker effect on party choice.

A stronger effect of religion in political behaviour?

The recent reappearance of religious actors in national and international politics challenges the expectation of a religious decline in a globalizing world. This trend coincides with a recent wave of negative reactions towards globalization, ranging from xenophobia and Euro-scepticism to isolationist and protectionist policies. Defying the predictions of the secularization paradigm, religion often appears as a powerful public actor that reinforces such particularism against transnational integration. In this sense, globalization could produce the opposite outcomes than those described in the previous section: it can preserve or strengthen religious authority over the individual. Details follow on the two mechanism through which globalization might be thought to promote the religious vote.

In economic terms, international integration is not necessarily linked to positive material outcomes for ordinary citizens. As many studies argue, globalization may undermine the welfare state and reduce opportunities in the job market, producing 'losers' across countries (Goesling 2001; Rodrik 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Kayser 2007). By focusing on deteriorating economic circumstances, the 'secure secularization' thesis by Norris and Inglehart (2004) expects that growing income and employment insecurity can lead to a sense of anxiety regarding survival. A turn to religion for spiritual or

¹ Although related to Christianity, we use the term "church" to denote any organized religion.

material consolation or welfare is one of the consequences of this negative psychological state (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013). This retreat to religion is especially plausible when globalization highlights the inability of the state to enforce social protection from negative economic outcomes (Mishra 1999). In this sense, globalization may lead individuals to embrace alternative sources of authority, such as the church (Tossutti 2002). For these reasons, cross-border economic interdependence can be seen to urge vulnerable populations to be more responsive towards religious messages. This account expects individuals to be more susceptible to religious authority, including in their political choices.

The role of globalization in religion and politics is more often discussed with reference to non-economic developments (Robertson 1992; Beyer 1994; Casanova 1994; Clark 1997; Haynes 1998; Huntington 1998; Berger 1999; Kinnvall 2004). Cultural openness is often seen as a challenge to established identities. It creates a feeling of embattlement. As a reaction, individuals might seek to reaffirm their distinctiveness by retreating to familiar sources of authority and identity. Religious faith and the absolute truths it promises are seen as key sources of stability and identity in times of anxiety. This is what Robertson refers to as the ‘invention’ and ‘imagination’ of tradition as a reaction against globalization (1995: 35). A very similar expectation is shared by those who interpret religious fundamentalism as an anti-modernist reaction (Marty and Appleby 1991; Tétreault and Denmark 2004). Consequently, discontent regarding global cultural integration is likely to reinforce religious authority over the individual, which can also find expression in electoral decisions. This expectation can be summarized as follows:

[H1b]: In more globalized countries individual religiosity will have a stronger effect on party choice.

The importance of religious context

Which one of these two expectations we actually observe in our data might also depend on local context. The idea that the outcomes of modernity - and by extension, globalization – are not uniform, but depend on historical and cultural idiosyncrasies is a recurring one (Martin 1978; Robertson 1995; Eisenstadt 2000). For our purposes, we

identify a key dimension of local context that might moderate the relationship between globalization and the religious vote: the structure of the religious economy. The relevant scholarship identifies two ideal types as examples of arrangements in the religious economy (Iannaccone 1991). One arrangement is the open religious economy, in which society treats all denominations equally favourably. Society does not repress religious groups that do not belong to the dominant religious traditions(s). As a case in point, this arrangement captures the features of the American denominational experience. A second arrangement is a 'closed' religious economy, in which society is unfavourable towards religious groups other than the dominant one(s). Here dominant churches enjoy strong social support. This arrangement describes the operation of many churches in Europe, such as the Greek Orthodox Church.

We consider countries that host closed religious economies a more fertile ground for a stronger effect of religiosity on political behaviour as a reaction against globalization (H1b). First, a dominant church operating in a socially closed religious economy perceives itself as the nation's voice (speaking on behalf of 'the people') and is, by extension, likely to be vocal on the perceived negative economic and cultural consequences of globalization. This is particularly relevant when political elites are seen as too enthusiastic about the outcomes of globalization. Second, religious voters that inhabit a socially open religious economy are less likely to react against social/cultural globalization, as they are already accustomed to the reality of pluralism and cultural relativism. On the contrary, religious voters that operate in a socially closed religious economy are more likely to react publicly in order to protect their traditionally dominant social position against the pressures of cultural relativism. For the same reasons, it is exactly in closed religious economies where political entrepreneurs are more likely to adopt positions that appeal to religious populations – and therefore, that encourage religious voting. It is in this setting, then, that we expect to document a stronger impact of religiosity on vote choice. This leads to our auxiliary hypothesis (see also diagram):

[H2:] The interaction effect of globalization and religiosity on party choice will be stronger in more 'closed' religious economies.

[Diagram about here]

Data and Methods

Module 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) is the core database used in this analysis. Data limitations inherent to comparative surveys reduce our original sample of 39 countries and 41 election studies to 27 countries and 28 election studies in total. Question availability (the church attendance question has not been asked in all countries in Module 2) and other considerations (for instance, we could not include Hong Kong in our models any longer) are the main reasons for this reduction in cases. This is not ideal, but is not prohibitive for running the models reported below.²

The CSES provides the two main level-1 variables used in the voting models: i) a dichotomous dependent variable that measures right-wing voting; and ii) the key independent variable of religiosity, operationalized here as church attendance. Our main hypothesis states that the effect of church attendance on right-wing voting is conditional upon the country's 'level' of globalization. While church attendance is a standard measure of religiosity (Olson and Green 2006), a question emerges as to what constitutes 'right-wing' voting, our dependent variable. Using expert judgments on party families reported in the CSES we construct the dependent variable to include voting for conservative, Christian Democratic, religious, national, ethnic, regional, monarchist, extreme right and orthodox-calvinist political parties (we employ here the labelling of party families as it appears in the CSES data). There are few cases where we also

² Countries included in the analysis: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea (S), Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal (2 elections), Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Britain, and the United States. Countries excluded from the analysis: Canada, Chile, Taiwan, Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Norway, Peru, Russia, and Spain.

include right-wing liberal parties (as is the case of Forza Italia in the 2006 Italian General Election). The dichotomous dependent variable is scored 1 for voters of these parties and 0 if otherwise in all countries.

Regarding the variable that we employ to measure globalization, we use data from the KOF index of globalization (Dreher et al. 2008). The yearly updates of the index are fully comprehensive in terms of coverage, making it a valuable analytical tool especially for the sort of hypotheses explored here. The KOF data include various indicators that seek to tap into social, political, and economic facets of globalization, which form the KOF composite index. We use the latter. All models reported here have been replicated using trade openness, capital inflows, and cultural globalisation. The results remain substantially the same.

The following equation presents the basic model specification:

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Right-wing vote} = & B_1 \textit{church attendance} + (\textit{controls}) && \text{(level 1)} \\ & + B_2 \textit{ch. attendance} * \textit{globalization} && \text{(cross-level)} \\ & + B_3 \textit{globalization} && \text{(level 2)} \end{aligned}$$

In this hierarchical model, we expect the interaction effect to be $B_2 > 0$, if the relationship resembles H1b. Since higher values in the church attendance variable indicate higher frequency in churchgoing (higher value is ‘at least once a week’), it is reasonable to expect a positive relationship with right-wing voting. So, a positive sign for B_2 would indicate a stronger effect of church attendance on right-wing vote as globalization increases. Conversely, we expect the same effect to be $B_2 < 0$, if the relationship resembles H1a. A negative sign would indicate a declining moderating role for globalization. Control variables include self-placement on the left-right economic dimension and age at the individual level, while we control for (real) GDP per capita at the country level.

As stated in our auxiliary hypothesis (H2), we also examine the impact of globalization separately across two different types of religious contexts. We conduct this comparison via stratification of the CSES participating countries into socially closed or open religious economies. To operationalize religious context, we use a variable from Grim

and Finke's Religious Freedom Indices, specifically from the aggregate 2001-2003-2005 file (see details in Grim and Finke 2007). Grim and Finke's indices are based on the quantitative coding of *US State Department International Religious Freedom Reports* and measure, among other things, government favoritism of religion (GFI) and the social regulation of religion (SRI). We use the SRI, because it captures bottom-up, social features of the religious economy, rather than a formal, legal characteristic. We focus on this bottom-up feature since our analysis (and our dependent variable) refers to individual decisions.

The SRI summarizes the extent of the following in each country: negative societal attitudes to other religions, especially non-traditional, minority and foreign ones; negative attitudes toward conversions and proselytizing; existing religions shut out new religions; social movements oppose certain religions. This is a subtle measure of the social and cultural enforcement of religious uniformity in a country. It is not a measure of overall religiosity in a given country or of religious establishment, which is a formal, legal arrangement that does not provide adequate insights into how individuals view organized religion.

We recode the original SRI in a way that splits the sample of CSES participating countries into two groups: those in which society is unfavourable towards other religious groups or 'socially closed religious economies' (medium or high SRI score), and those in which society is more comfortable with the presence of other religious groups or 'socially open religious economies' (low SRI score). Since the USA is missing from these reports, we have imputed its score as 'low SRI' (Iannaccone 1991). Table 1 presents the composition of each group in our stratification.³

³ The key results are robust to two alternative measures of religious context. Acknowledging that the SRI taps an informal dimension of the religious economy, we have also replicated our analysis stratifying by GFI, the more legal, administrative dimension that refers to state activities vis-à-vis organised religion. We have also used another stratifying variable from the same dataset, which measures the degree of religious fractionalization or competition that exists among different churches in a given country (how many choices of religious brand available in country).

[Table 1 about here]

Results

Table 2 reports results from multilevel logistic models with random effects. Estimating a pooled data model in the 28 election studies in our sample can lead to erroneous conclusions if there are unobserved differences between countries (Hsiao 2003; Greene 2007). Thus we estimate a model that takes into account country-specific effects to ensure that unobserved differences between countries are not driving key findings. We have opted for a random effects estimation, which does deal with some of these potential problems with clustered data (see Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009).

[Table 2 about here]

The first column in Table 2 reports model coefficients for the full country sample. Columns (2) and (3) report coefficients for the two subsamples, socially open or closed religious economies respectively, based on the SIR index. Some clear patterns emerge. First, the control variables seem to work as expected. They are correctly signed and significant.⁴ For example, voters who place themselves on the right end of the left-right scale are prone to vote for right-wing parties. The same is true for older voters. Second, and more importantly, the interaction term between church attendance and globalization is significant and positively signed in the three models. Therefore, as regards hypotheses H1a and H1b, it seems that the hypothesized moderating effect is present, and as H1b suggests, it indicates stronger religious-voting patterns in highly ‘globalized’ environments.

However, regarding the auxiliary hypothesis H2 it is not wholly clear whether globalization boosts the importance of religiosity in individual voting decisions only in

⁴ Note that additional controls for gender and income in no way alter the results presented here.

socially closed religious economies. The size of the coefficient does not really tell us much. In any case it is not very different from that observed in socially open religious economies. We attribute the negative sign of the significant main effect for church attendance to the fact that this coefficient reports the effect of religiosity on right-wing voting for the cases in which globalization levels are at their lowest. As ever, interaction graphs are more informative. Figures 1 to 3 graph the interaction effect between church attendance and globalization for the three models presented in Table 2. The graphs illustrate how the marginal effect of religiosity on right-wing voting changes according to values of the KOF index of globalization. The graphs also include the 95% confidence intervals, which guide us to the significance of the relationship between X on Y along values of Z.

[Figures 1 to 3 about here]

Figure 1 plots marginal effects for the full country sample. The confidence intervals reveal that in the lower end of the KOF index (low globalization) the link between religiosity and voting is actually nonexistent (except when KOF is very low). It is only after a certain point (in cases with a KOF score over 67) that this link becomes significant, and actually increases along with the index, as hypothesized in H1b. So the negative sign for church attendance that we observed in Table 2 is present, but as the confidence intervals suggest, it is not significant. And it seems to be driven by countries with an extremely low KOF score (e.g. Albania).

Figures 2 and 3 tell essentially the same story regarding the link between church attendance and voting in cases where integration into the global financial and cultural system is very low. The more important question regarding these two figures is whether they carry any extra information as to the auxiliary hypothesis (H2). The moderating effect seems to be present in both figures, but the marginal effect is much less 'steep' for socially open religious markets (Figure 2), where the confidence intervals almost overlap. In other words, the moderating effect of globalization on the religious vote might be stronger in socially closed religious markets (Figure 3).

A final note is in order. Taken at face value, a stronger correlation between church attendance and party choice appears to support the claim that globalization may not be detrimental to the impact of religion in domestic politics. However, this claim can only be made if we look at the numbers of religious voters. In particular, a stronger impact of individual religiosity on right-wing vote in more globalized settings (H1b) obtains a different meaning if the number of religious voters remains stable –or even goes up– over time than if the number of religious voters declines. If the number of religious voters remains stable or increases, the documented effect suggests that religion is still a powerful force in national elections. But if the number of religious voters declines, the same effect would have less dramatic implications for election results.

Taking a closer look at the link between globalization and religiosity per se gives a first indication of what is actually happening to the pool of religious voters. Figure 4 indicates that countries with greater exposure to globalization (KOF values in the horizontal axis) are less religious in terms of church attendance (CSES country averages in the vertical axis). Therefore, the stronger effect of attendance on right-wing vote that our models documented for more globalized societies seems to be a product of a shrinking pool of committed religious voters. There are two plausible interpretations here. First, as the less enthusiastic religious voters disappear, the ones left behind feel threatened and thus become more willing to align their political choices with their faith. This could serve as indication that globalization indeed generates a feeling of embattlement amongst the religious members of a society. The theoretical discussion posited that the emergence of this feeling serves as the triggering mechanism for H1b. In an alternative interpretation, those left behind do not experience any dramatic change in their electoral behaviour, but as a more homogenous group produce this stronger average effect regarding the religious vote. In all, the relationship in Figure 4 does not necessarily suggest that religion is becoming more important in election results.⁵

⁵ We have also considered the possibility that the main finding might be driven by processes mostly related to modernization and not globalization. All models presented here have been run with the inclusion of an interaction term between GDP per capita and church attendance and results remain unchanged.

[Figure 4 about here]

The longitudinal trend produced by data from the World and European Values Surveys (WVS/EVS) is interesting in this respect. Tables 3 and 4 show that there has been a steady decline of religious practice and mass confidence in organized religion across most of the countries included in our analysis. In addition, the few countries that defy this secularization trend, those that register zero or positive change, are not necessarily socially closed religious economies. In other words, religiosity appears to be declining even in those countries in which the regression models documented a stronger positive effect of globalization on the religious vote. This leads us to interpret the moderating influence of globalization in our regression models as follows: within a shrinking constituency of religious voters, those who remain actively religious are more homogenous politically and may be becoming even more so. This is not a case of more people voting for right-wing parties because of religious considerations, but it seems to be a case of religiosity becoming more clearly associated with the right wing as a consequence of globalization.

[Tables 3 & 4 about here]

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the importance of globalization for the non-economic foundations of political behaviour. Combining survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, globalization indices, and structured information on local religious context, the analysis tested two widely theorized, but empirically overlooked expectations. In a conventional reading of the secularization thesis, the globalizing aspect of societal modernization was expected to suppress the importance of religiosity in individual decisions. The opposite expectation held that globalization would heighten feelings of insecurity, which would then strengthen the role of faith in individual choices. We proposed a model that used robust procedures to assess empirically the impact of globalization on the religious vote, that is, on the domestic link between

individual religiosity and party choice. Taking into account the structure of the religious economy, we also examined the impact of globalization separately for different types of religious contexts.

The analysis was not without limitations. First, our discussion implies change over the long term, although the survey data at hand only allows for short-term or cross-sectional analyses. Second, while the country-level variables that we employed (globalization and religious economy) cover most countries in the world, the CSES data were limited to those countries that fielded a survey questionnaire, and, among the latter, to those countries that included the (optional) church attendance item. These countries were mostly industrialized economies, and almost exclusively belonged to the historical Christian world. Third, the discussion of the moderating role of religious context makes reference to certain supply-side mechanisms (responses by party elites and religious organizations) that may connect globalization and the religious vote. However, our model focuses on the examination of individual-level considerations. Finally, it has not escaped us that globalization may change the composition of the religious economy itself, for instance by facilitating the transition from a socially closed to an open religious economy. Yet, this type of change is glacial – testing it would require a much longer series of data than the ones presently available.

With these limitations in mind, the models we specified suggested that: a) a country's exposure to globalization indeed moderated the relationship between individual religiosity and (right-wing) party choice; b) it did so in the expected direction (according to one of the key narratives), since higher exposure to globalization was associated with a stronger connection between religiosity and right-wing party choice; however, c) it is not wholly clear whether or in what way this effect was more intense for socially closed than for open religious economies.

Religiosity trends established with data from the World and European Values Surveys provided additional information that facilitated the interpretation of this result. The stronger effect of religiosity on vote choice that was registered in more globalized countries appears to be related to the ongoing decline in religiosity that affects most countries in our analysis. Regarding the wider electoral implications of the findings,

these may indicate that a contracting pool of religious voters react against the pressures they face in a globally integrated setting – or at least, that this pool is becoming increasingly homogenous in religious and political terms. Existing research suggests the former scenario may be more likely (see, for example, Beyer 1994; Berger 1999; Tossutti 2002; Kinnvall 2004; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013).

In all, the presence of a politically concrete religious minority, which is highly homogenous and potentially better coordinated, should be placed within the wider temporal context. In an era of partisan dealignment and growing disconnect between the general public and electoral politics, we argue that the existence of such a group provides powerful incentives to political entrepreneurs, especially from those parties of the right that wish to capitalize electorally on anti-globalization sentiments.

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Table 1. CSES Module 2 countries by type of religious economy

Socially open (low social regulation)	Socially closed (medium/high social regulation)
Albania	Belgium
Australia	Bulgaria
Brazil	France
Czech Republic	Germany
Denmark	Israel
Hungary	Italy
Iceland	Mexico
Ireland	Netherlands
Korea (S)	Philippines
New Zealand	Poland
Portugal (2 elections)	Romania
Sweden	Slovenia
Switzerland	
Britain	
United States	

Source: SRI index (Grim and Finke 2007)

Table 2. Logit models of right-wing party vote (stratification by religious economy)

Sample:	(1) All countries	(2) Socially open religious economy	(3) Socially closed religious economy
<i>Individual level</i>			
Church attendance	-.46*** (.06)	-.19** (.09)	-.82*** (.11)
Ideological position (l-r)	.33*** (.006)	.32*** (.009)	.35*** (.01)
Age	.002** (.001)	.004*** (.001)	.001 (.001)
<i>Country level</i>			
Globalization index	-.070*** (.022)	-.067** (.026)	-.064* (.038)
GDPpc	.00008*** (.00002)	.00008*** (.00002)	.00008** (.00003)
<i>Cross-level interaction</i>			
Church attendance × Globalization index	.007*** (.0008)	.003*** (.001)	.013*** (.001)
Constant	.60 (1.41)	.38 (1.80)	.12 (2.32)
Observations	27853	16164	11157
Number of groups	28	16	12

Source: Survey data from CSES (Module 2); globalization data from KOF (Dreher et al. 2008); social regulation of religion data from SRI (Grim and Finke 2007).

Note: Random effects estimation with *xtlogit* in Stata 11. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed).

Table 3. Church attendance over time (% at least weekly)

Country	1981	1990	1999	2008	Δ^*
Ireland	82	81	59	40	-42
Belgium	30	23	18	11	-19
Hungary	24	14	11	9	-15
Australia	28	-	17 ^a	14	-14
Mexico	59	43	56	46	-13
Germany (W)	22	19	16	10	-12
Netherlands	27	21	14	15	-12
Switzerland	-	24	12 ^a	12	-12
Albania	-	-	20	10	-10
Portugal	-	33	37	23	-10
Poland	-	66	59	58	-8
United States	44	43	45	36	-8
France	12	10	8	6	-6
Slovenia	-	23	17	19	-4
Italy	36	41	40	34	-2
New Zealand	-	-	17 ^a	15	-2
Britain	14	13	14	12	-2
Korea (S)	31	21	30	30	-1
Sweden	6	4	4	5	-1
Bulgaria	-	6	9	6	0
Czech Rep.	-	8	7	8	0
Denmark	3	3	3	3	0
Iceland	3	2	3	4	1
Romania	-	19	25	27	8
Brazil	-	33	36 ^a	48	15
Average Δ : socially open religious economies					-7
Average Δ : socially closed religious economies					-1

Source: WVS / EVS

*: Point difference (most recent – least recent). Negative sign shows declining attendance.

a: 1995-1998

Table 4. Confidence in churches over time (% great deal)

Country	1981	1990	1999	2008	Δ^*
Ireland	52	40	22	19	-33
Poland	-	46	33	24	-22
United States	47	46	37	25	-22
Belgium	25	14	11	8	-17
Australia	21	-	12 ^a	7	-14
Brazil	-	41	35 ^a	29	-12
France	18	12	11	7	-11
Albania	-	-	32	23	-9
Mexico	48	46	55	39	-9
Germany (W)	19	12	10	11	-8
Britain	19	16	10	11	-8
Iceland	21	19	13	14	-7
Korea (S)	24	21	16	17	-7
Slovenia	-	14	12	7	-7
Netherlands	13	9	7	9	-4
New Zealand	-	-	11 ^a	7	-4
Denmark	13	10	9	10	-3
Sweden	8	7	7	5	-3
Hungary	16	22	18	14	-2
Czech Rep.		9	5	8	-1
Italy	28	30	27	28	0
Portugal	-	23	35	23	0
Switzerland	-	-	7 ^a	8	1
Bulgaria	-	12	13	14	2
Romania	-	38	48	55	17
Average Δ : socially open religious economies					-8
Average Δ : socially closed religious economies					-6

Source: WVS / EVS

*: Point difference (most recent – least recent). Negative sign shows declining attendance.

a: 1995-1998

Figure 1. The marginal effect of church attendance on right-wing vote across KOF levels (all countries)




Figure 2. Marginal effect of church attendance on right-wing vote across KOF levels (socially open religious economies)




Figure 3. Marginal effect of church attendance on right-wing vote across KOF levels (levels (socially closed religious economies))




Figure 4. Church attendance by globalization





Diagram. Causal Relationships

A. RELIGIOUS VOTE



B. HIERARCHICAL MODEL

