

## 8 The Police

### Introduction

The societal role of the police is to prevent and fight crime, to maintain order, and to deliver a variety of related services to communities. Notwithstanding social and cultural differences (Hills 2009), the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force and its connection with what is called 'policing a social order' are societally accepted elements of the self-understanding of police forces in Western democracies (Lange/Schenck 2004; Monjardet 1996). Inasmuch as policing is understood as a core state function, it is argued that police services cannot be privatized – at least not without careful considerations. The police incorporate the social contract between the state and its citizens, in which the latter have to obey to the law in order to be protected by the state. The distinctive feature is that the public police exercise authority in the name of law and order (the state) over the respective population (the nation). As the maintenance of (social and public) security is defined as the direct task of the state, the police are said to render a key service to the interior stabilization of a nation-state. Thus, the distinctiveness of the police lies not only in their production of a public good, but in being the 'specialist repositories for the state's monopolization of legitimate force in its territory' (Reiner 2000, p. 1; see also Brodeur 2010).

However, since the end of the 'Golden Age' of TRUDI, the strong tie between the state and the police has loosened. Security provision is abandoned by the central state in different dimensions: outwards to commercial security markets, downwards to municipalities and private organizations, and upwards to transnational institutions (Loader/Walker 2001, p. 10). Referring to these trends, the UK Government speaks of extending the 'police family' (Home Office 2001), and governments aim for a broadened 'security architecture' (the German conceptual equivalent to the term 'family') on the local, national, and global scale. Obviously, the thrust towards privatization of state functions has not halted before the police, and the emergence of commercial and non-profit security markets is a reality (Eick 2011; Wakefield 2003),<sup>1</sup> often summarized as the 'pluralization' of policing (Jones/Newburn 1998; Loader 2000). Nevertheless, the 'regulatory state' (Grande 1997) is still the

sole provider of public police, understood as the 'monopoly of legitimate coercion, the delivery of civic governance, the guarantee of collective provision and the symbolism of state and nation' (Loader/Walker 2001, p. 9).

With regard to recruitment and qualification, policing represented an occupational culture with a strong focus on police experience and daily work. Typically, policing was considered a job for the average citizen, with physical attributes and moral persuasions more important for recruitment than actual specific skills or qualifications.<sup>2</sup> This conception began to change after the Second World War. From the 1970s onwards, higher demands on the delivery of security and public order and new technologies required more specific skills and competencies. Since then, police work has successively professionalized, emphasizing systematic and theoretical training in specific training institutions (Roché 2005, pp. 322-4; White/Escobar 2008; Karp/Stenmark 2011; Fyfe 2013; Haselow/Kisman 2003). Recruitment strategies reflected not least quests and needs for gender and ethnic diversity. While high public reputation, specific employment conditions, and a unique work ethos make the police an attractive employer (Kroos et al. 2011), hiring personnel for specific tasks, such as management positions and IT, and representing the growing diversity of the society still constitute major challenges. Although entry requirements are relatively low in the countries under study, most police forces struggle to recruit women into a profession biased in favour of men, and to increase diversity within an ethnically homogenous 'white' institution.<sup>3</sup>

The legal, organizational, and executive responsibility for the provision of public policing continues to be located in the state. As we show in this chapter, this continuity is reflected in the stability of the police's employment system, based on special employment conditions (Kroos et al. 2011).

Nevertheless, all four countries implemented NPM features at the organizational level (Briken 2014). The purpose of the following section is to conceptually locate the police sector in the public service of Germany, France, and Sweden using the United Kingdom as reference case<sup>4</sup>. We then illustrate the core employment conditions of the police forces across the four countries. The chapter ends with a summary highlighting common features and differences of employment regulation across countries, and identifying sector specific differences within national employment regimes.

Apart from a document analysis, information on sector-specific employment regulation is based on an exploratory survey and expert interviews in Germany, France, and Sweden with different actors within the police. Since HRM in the police in these countries is, at least to some degree, part of the negotiations between the employer and the unions, the expert interviews include HR managers and union representatives. With the exception of Germany, all interviews were conducted at the central state level. For the German case, three distinct *Länder* were chosen to reflect the heterogeneous structure of the German police. From December 2009 to March 2010, 22 interviews were conducted across the three countries. In Sweden, the interviews took place in Stockholm and covered both HR managers (n=3) and union representatives (n=2). In France, two members of the *Direction de la Formation de la Police* and one member of the *Direction de l'Administration de la Police* (n=3), as well as three union representatives (n=3) from the three main police *corps*<sup>5</sup>, were interviewed in Paris. In Germany, the interviews represented HR management (n=6) and union representatives (n=5) from the three *Länder* of Bremen, Baden-Württemberg, and Brandenburg. This sample reflects the basic structure of the German federal state, including a so-called city-state (Bremen), a prosperous regional state (Baden-Württemberg), and a regional state from the former German Democratic Republic (Brandenburg). Over all countries and positions, the questionnaire focused on the interviewees' perception of the most recent changes in core work and employment structures.<sup>6</sup>

## **Overview: Basic Features of the Police**

In this section, we focus on the police as a modern democratic institution whose organization varies in the way the central state exerts control. The administrative systems range from an until recently locally appointed and locally accountable police (Sweden)<sup>7</sup> to that of a local police accountable to a central government (UK), to that of an accountability system on a *Länder* level with an overlapping Federal Police (Germany), to that of a strictly centralized system (France).

*United Kingdom.* The origins of the *British police* can be traced back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>8</sup> In 1829, the Metropolitan Police Service (Metropolitan Police Act 1829, c. 44) was established by the Conservative politician Robert Peel in London. The responsibilities for the police were added to the Home Office. With the Municipal Corporation Act 1835, this 'Peel model' was exported to the rural areas and ended the rather uncontrolled and heterogeneous interplay of the 'police' forces in the parishes and privately paid watchmen. In contrast to the bureaucratization and the rise of strict central administrative structures characteristic of the French nation-state and Prussia (see Chapter 5), the Home Office would not intervene directly on the local (communal) level (Knöbl 1998, p. 194). Additionally, the Peel model introduced a strict distinction between the military forces and the police. Even today, the British police remain unarmed.<sup>9</sup>

The relatively autonomous structure changed fundamentally with the introduction of the Police Act 1964. Command and control structures were centralized within the Home Office. Police power was divided into a tripartite system between the chief constables, local authorities, and the Home Office. Over time, the power of the Home Office within this system increased. The Home Office became responsible for police administration, decisions on the general budget lines (Johnston 1992, p. 7), and the setting of the general missions for the police. England and Wales are policed by 43 territorial forces staffed with around 220,000 police staff. In addition, Special Forces (such as the British Transport Police, Civil Nuclear Constabulary, Ministry of Defence Police) provide policing focusing on particular tasks, such as transport or energy.

The territorial forces differ in manpower and resources according to the size of the respective territory. The Metropolitan Police of London is a 'giant', staffed with 33,367 officers, overseen by a commissioner (the London equivalent of the chief constable). The second- and third-largest police forces with about 8,000 officers each are the West Midlands Police and the Greater Manchester Police. In stark contrast, more than half of the remaining 41 provincial police administrations rely on a police force of only about 1,000 to 2,000 officers.

The British police have institutionalized the single career principle. Every sworn police officer in England and Wales is a 'constable' regardless of rank. By a sworn oath and warrant, the Office of

Constable provides the constable with additional legal powers to arrest and to control the public. Those powers are not 'delegated' powers because police officers are not employees, but rather office holders. The system is based on a standardized set of ranks every police officer has to go through during his or her career.<sup>10</sup> The commissioner of the Metropolitan Police is often considered to be the highest-ranking UK police officer. In general, every chief constable and two additional commissioners are supreme over their respective forces and are not answerable to any other officer. Police officers do not belong to the very small group of British civil servants, but are sworn officers. This means they have a similar status as civil servants, based on statutory regulations instead of regular labour law (Gash 2008, p. 27), entailing prerogatives such as higher employment security and more extensive social benefits. Nevertheless, roughly 40 per cent of the police staff are non-uniformed civilians fulfilling tasks defined to be 'sovereign duties' without sovereign powers. Furthermore, the police officers are supported on the street by uniformed non-sworn staff. The two groups are part of what the Home Office named the 'extended police family' in 2001 (Home Office 2001) and consist of uniformed non-sworn Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), civilian staff integral to the Neighbourhood Policing Teams (implemented by the Police Reform Act 2002), and uniformed Special Constables, a volunteering force spending a minimum of four hours per week policing their neighbourhood streets. The Police Reform Act 2002 allowed the delegation of limited legal powers to a semi-civilian police category and even to the volunteer constabulary, with the effect of increasing visible police presence without increasing costs.

Over the last decades, police resources have been extended and the police force peaked in 2010, when its numbers were nearly twice as high as in 1980 (see Table 8.1). However, beginning in 1988, the police were scrutinized by the Audit Commission (AC), an independent body established by the Local Government Finance Act 1982 to monitor and promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the management of local government. While the first reports focused on the financing of police funding and budget allocation, later reports focused on operational matters, including crime management, and patrol work (Audit Commission 1996). Though the recommendations are not prescriptive, they have been commonly implemented (Mawby/Wright 2005, p. 7). Under the then

Labour government, 'Best Value' indicators were implemented, and within the Police Performance Assessment Framework of 2004 (PPFA), police authorities were put under a national benchmarking scheme, the results of which are made publicly available. From 2010 onwards, this performance culture was combined with a stronger focus on the reduction of spending and crime rates. Crime statistics were refined and a new control body, the Police and Crime Commissioners, was set up in order to control the budget on the local level instead of on the level of the police authorities (HMIC 2014). Furthermore, the government ordered a 20-per-cent cut of all territorial police force budgets within four years.<sup>11</sup> To reach these tight goals, most police authorities initiated reductions in personnel by reducing their civilian police staff, convincing sworn officers to retire once they reached their 30 years of service, and cutting some of the higher-ranked senior positions (see Table 8.1). Some forces also engaged in extensive outsourcing of back office services and contracted with private security.<sup>12</sup> These reforms from 2010 onwards led to a decline in police employment, affecting mainly the share of civilian employment. Irrespective of the quantitative employment dynamics, the share of women in the police forces has increased, reaching 27.8 per cent in 2014 (see Table 8.1). As to interest representation, under UK labour law the police are legally prohibited to join trade unions to defend pay and working conditions, but they are allowed to associate. In 1919, the Police Federation was established by the Police Act as an alternative system to resolve disputes through arbitration. Today, the Police Federation of England and Wales is the statutory staff association for police constables, sergeants, inspectors, and chief inspectors in the 43 territorial police forces, with approximately 127,000 members in January 2014. The higher ranks are represented by the Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales (PSA). The civilian police staff is organized in the service union UNISON and possesses all rights for industrial action.

*Germany.* In 1848, Prussia established a strong and tightly organized police force, coordinated by a civil administrative body but following the military model (Funk 1986, p. 61). After the unification of Prussia with the other German states in 1870, the Prussian model became the benchmark model of police organization. Recruitment was largely from the military: serving in the army for a minimum of

nine years was a pre-condition in Prussia to become a police officer until 1893 (Funk 1986, p. 290).

The further sophistication of police organization in the Weimar Republic was interrupted by National Socialism, which transformed the police into an instrument of Nazi dictatorship.

The development of a modern and democratic German police force started after 1945. For a short period, the German police were under the supervision of the Allied governments, who also started setting up police schools for training. In 1950, the 11 West German *Länder* obtained the power to establish their own police forces, and the police are part of the executive force according to the German Constitution (GG Art. 20 Para. 3). Until the mid-1970s, a *Polizeigesetz* (Police Law) was established in all *Länder*, defining the core functions of the police. After reunification in 1990, the police forces in the five East German *Länder* followed the structure of their Western counterparts.

The German Constitution refers the regulation, planning, design, and supervision of the police to the parliaments of the *Länder*, which are the main arenas of political decision-making in relation to issues of internal security, while the ministries of the interior are in charge of the implementation. Even though the police are subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, the administration of the police is governed in two different ways. In some *Länder*, the police are integrated into the central administration (*Einheitsverwaltung*), and a ministerial department is the responsible authority. In others, the police have their own administration (*Sonderverwaltung*), with a police president as head of the police, appointed by the president of the *Land*. An assessment of the hierarchical and organizational structure of the police forces shows that every state has its own structure and wording for different units and departments, making it difficult even for police experts in Germany to compare the police forces (Groß 2008). In 2010, more than 260,000 individuals were employed in the 16 *Länderpolizeien*, the largest one being North Rhine-Westphalia (up to 40,000), and the smallest being Saarland (approximately 2,800). In terms of police density, Berlin has about 162 inhabitants per police officer, whereas North Rhine-Westphalia counts 404 inhabitants per police officer (Groß 2008, p. 21).

In all *Länder*, the police are integrated into the overall civil servant employment and career scheme (see Chapter 5). Each police trainee has to pass the same basic training, based on framework

guidelines by the German Ministry of the Interior since 1967, in specific police schools or in a university of applied sciences before entering the police force. The majority of German police officers are civil servants, whereas about 17 per cent are public employees. In Hamburg, Hesse, Berlin, and Saxony the latter are called *Angestelltenpolizei* (public employee police). Their number remains relative stable over time, and the police public employees fulfil tasks like traffic control, handling of administrative offences, or object protection. As in the United Kingdom, from the mid-1990s onwards, lay people have been recruited to strengthen the link between the police and the population in some states (*Freiwilliger Polizeidienst* in Hesse; *Sicherheitswacht* in Bavaria and Saxony; *Sicherheitspartner* in Brandenburg; since 2006, *Freiwilliger Ordnungs- und Streifendienst* in Lower Saxony). The uniformed volunteers work closely together with the police, and in Baden-Württemberg they even wear weapons (Groß 2008, p. 48). In sum, around 4500 to 5000 individuals are involved in this supplementary police service (Pütter/Kant 2000, own account). At the same time, the number of security partnerships between the police and commercial security increased. According to the German Ministry of the Interior, 32 partnerships in ten of the *Länder* were counted in 2011. While no direct police tasks are outsourced, information and communication are shared, and commercial and public security forces cooperate in case of an accident (IMK 2011).

The introduction of NPM ideas started in most of the German *Länder* with the decentralization of budget responsibilities from the Ministry of the Interior or the central police governor to the sub-units. The first mover, Baden-Württemberg, started in 1993, the others followed in the years between 1997 and 2001 (Lange/Schenck 2004, pp. 151-90). By 2011, controlling and target agreements have been introduced in all German police forces, while the so-called impact-oriented police work (*wirkungsorientierte Polizeiarbeit*) and the use of balanced scorecard models frames the working conditions for the officers (Lange/Schenck 2004, pp. 151-90; Ritsert 2011).<sup>13</sup>

The German police forces are unionized, but due to their civil servant status, they have no right to strike. Two major unions aim to represent the overall police forces, namely the *Gewerkschaft der Polizei* (GdP) and the *Deutsche Polizeigewerkschaft* (DPoIG). The much smaller *Bund deutscher Kriminalbeamter* (BdK) organizes the detective constables. DPoIG and BdK are both part of the



German Association of Civil Servants (*Beamtenbund und Tarifunion*, DBB), whereas the GdP is one of the eight unions under the umbrella of the German Federation of Trade Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, DGB).

France. The French police appeared as a specialized and public organization in 1667 (*édit royal de mars 1667*). Until 1699, the post of a *lieutenant general de police* (general lieutenant of the police) was created in every French city to serve the demands of the feudal elites for security, thereby forming the first network constituting a national police system. During the French Revolution in 1789, these first forms of police organization were abolished. The new government transformed the forces into the *police municipale* with the respective mayor holding the responsibility for the force. A first uniformed, preventive patrolling force was established in 1829. Unlike the English 'bobbies', the French *sergents de ville* were armed with a cane by day and a sabre by night. A high proportion of *sergents* were former soldiers, and an emphasis on military discipline characterized the Parisian police. In the Third Republic, the first police training school was opened in Paris in 1883, offering a three-month training to the recruits. During the phase of rapid industrialization and urbanization, urban unrest and strikes led the elites to establish a state police (*étatisation*), but still the mayor fulfilled the main oversight functions. In the provinces, training was poor, and policing varied across the country both in quality and strength. The Vichy regime centralized control over the different police forces in 1941. The *Police Nationale* was founded (*Loi du 23 avril 1941*) and became responsible for policing all towns with a population of 10,000 or more. Despite this centralization, France has three different types of police forces. At the national level, the centrally-controlled civilian force is subordinated to the French Ministry of the Interior (the National Police) and a centrally-controlled, militarized force (the *gendarmerie*, circa 98,500 soldiers) was subject to the Ministry of Defence<sup>14</sup> and responsible for policing the rural areas. At the local level, a multitude of municipal forces are paid by and answerable to the mayors (*police municipale*, circa 18,000 in 3500 municipalities).

In 2010, about 141,000 individuals worked for the French National Police. The majority of police officers are employed under civil servant status (*fonctionnaire*). The National Police comprises four *corps*, each with its own tradition, its own territorial competencies, its own career ladder and rules for recruitment, training, promotion, and remuneration, as well as its own trade unions. This structure mirrors the hierarchical and segmented structure generally characteristic for professions in France (OECD 2012, pp. 189f.; Horton 1996, pp. 53ff.). Three hierarchical levels are differentiated: the *corps d'encadrement et d'application*, constituting the largest group in the police workforce, represented by the *gardiens de la paix* and *brigadiers*; the *corps de commandement*, mainly consisting of the *officiers*; and the *corps de conception et de direction*, mainly composed of *commissaires*.

Since 1997, auxiliary police workers on fixed-term contracts, concluded after a three-year period and eligible for one renewal for another three-year period, are integrated as so-called *contractuel* or *adjoints de sécurité*.<sup>15</sup> In addition, in 1987 young men doing their national service were admitted as 'short-term police officers', and their number increased to 10 per cent of the total workforce in the mid-1990s (Horton 1995, p. 125). Moreover, the *policiers municipals* form an increasingly formalized part of the French policing system. In 1994, their status was strengthened by integrating them officially into the *fonction publique territoriale* (FPT, see Chapter 5).<sup>16</sup> Over the last decades, their role has been professionalized both in terms of function and career (Cayrel/Diederichs 2010, pp. 10ff.). Each of the status groups has its own trade union. French police trade unions have a long and complex history of mergers, separations, and emergence of new trade unions. Today, there are five main trade unions according to the results of the *élections professionnelles* (Loubet del Bayle 2010, p. 65). The UNSA-Police and *Alliance Police Nationale* represent the *gardiens de la paix*. SNOP-UNSA and *Synergie Officiers* both represent the *officiers*. The smallest group of the police workforce, the *commissaires*, is represented by a single trade union, the SCPN. UNSA-Police and SNOP-UNSA traditionally support left-wing policies, whereas *Alliance Police Nationale* and *Synergie Officiers* are closer to right-wing parties (Loubet del Bayle 2010, p. 166). In total, and in stark contrast to other sectors, 70 per cent of the police are trade union members (Loubet del Bayle 2010, p. 60).

NPM reforms reached the French police by the end of the 1990s. Under the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin, the French police followed the trend to adopt its own concept of community policing (*police de proximité*) in order to increase the presence of the police in the public sphere (Mouhanna 2009).<sup>17</sup> However, it was only under the Conservative government of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-12) that the implementation of more NPM-focused reforms took place. First, Sarkozy abolished the *police de proximité*, increased personnel and technical equipment, and focused on the repression of delinquency and crime.<sup>18</sup> He also established a culture of results, the so-called *politique du chiffre*, including performance indicators. Moreover, Sarkozy announced the reward of good performance with bonuses (*prime aux résultats exceptionnel*) and the creation of more career opportunities for the higher ranks (Matelly/Mouhanna 2007). The individual performance-related pay system was introduced in 2008, but applied within the police forces only to the (few) top positions since the police officers successfully defended the principle that police work is teamwork (Mouhanna 2009).<sup>19</sup> In 2013, the performance-oriented *prime* system was abolished for the public service in general (see Chapter 5).

*Sweden.* By 1848, the development of a modern Swedish police force in the sense of an organized and trained force gained momentum and was based on the benchmark model of the time, the London Metropolitan Police (Furuhagen 2004, 2009; Nyzell 2014). In line with the administrative structure of the Swedish state (see Chapter 5), responsibility for the police remained with the municipal advisory citizens' boards until the 1920s. In 1925, the national government began to coordinate police operations nationwide. Furthermore, in response to the worldwide economic depression of the 1930s and increasing crime rates in the urban areas, the central government established state police forces to reinforce local police (Lord 1998; Becker/Hjellemo 1976).

The Swedish Police Service was nationalized in 1965. A local government reform consolidated the 554 separate police districts into 118, each headed by a county police commissioner appointed by the government. While local police chiefs were independent in operational decisions, the budget was centrally allocated out of national resources (Becker/Hjellemo 1976; Gurr et al. 1977). Local

authorities are controlled by police boards, whose task it is to control adherence to the governmental guidelines and the efficient use of resources. The local police board also decides on the operational plan, budget, internal organization, and rules of procedure for the authority, while the chief commissioner has responsibility for the day-to-day operations and finances. Between 1965 and 1991, the prospering economy allowed the National Police Board to provide the districts with the majority of requested resources, such as equipment or training for officers (Weiland 1995). During the 1990s, the autonomy of local police chiefs was even extended by a new system of central government grants, entailing less detailed regulations from the centre as well as increasing autonomy related to budgets.

With the reform of 1965, however, long-term planning responsibilities shifted from the local to the central administration, where the *Rikspolisstyrelsen* (National Police Board, NPB) was created (Rikspolisstyrelsen 1973; Ivarsson Westerberg 2004, pp. 78f.). The NPB is the central administrative and supervisory authority of the police.

At least from the late 1990s onwards, also in Sweden the number of police constantly rose. In response to an increased feeling of public insecurity at the end of the 1990s, the visibility of police in the streets and in the rural areas was raised (Lindstrom 2015).<sup>20</sup> Between 2000 and 2010, the resources allocated to the police forces grew by more than 40 per cent, and the number of police employees increased by 26 per cent to 28,000, of whom 20,300 were police officers. The number of employees varies between the different police authorities. The largest police authority is the Stockholm County Police with about 6500 employees, of which 5000 are police officers (SCP 2009, p. 12). The smallest police authority is the Gotland County Police with 140 employees, of which about 100 are police officers.

The Swedish police are organized according to the single career principle with a strong emphasis on systematic training.<sup>21</sup> After the training phase, each Swedish police officer enters the police force as *Polisassistent* (police constable) with the possibility, in principle, to advance through the full scale of ranks. The Swedish police have a long tradition of civilian police staff, and the share of civilians has remained relatively stable at about one-third of the workforce (Swedish National Police Board 2012,

p. 63). The abolition of the civil servant status in most of the public services (see Chapter 5), combined with the rise of administrative tasks during the 1970s due to computerization and the introduction of new accounting principles, led to the early integration of non-police officers, and the term 'civil employee' was first used in 1973. Since then, the share of civil police employees has been rising on all levels (administrative, technical, as well as scientific support) (Ivarsson Westerberg 2004, pp. 87f.). Nevertheless, no extension or further differentiation of street patrol or uniformed forces, like in the United Kingdom, has taken place. Although the Swedish Police Service integrated the British community policing model into their organizational concept, they did not outsource duties to the extent that Britain did. Instead, the Swedish Police Service tightened its ties to 'supplementary' public order providers, and forged security partnerships with commercial security companies, public transport guards, and voluntary neighbourhood watch schemes (Rolandsson 2015, p. 32).

In Sweden, NPM policies were carried forward both by left- and right-wing governments. Three major waves can be distinguished (Auffenberg/Kittel, 2015). During the 1990s, police tasks were devolved and more autonomy in organizational issues was transferred to local police authorities. Each local unit overlooked a global budget with full responsibilities regarding spending. In this way, the NPB's influence declined and its role changed from a directing to a more service-oriented agency (Ivarsson Westerberg 2004, p. 101, pp. 123ff.) Moreover, the Swedish version of community policing (*närpolisreform*) with a strong focus on citizens' well-being was introduced. In order to implement the reform, the number of so-called contact officers on the municipal level was increased at the expense of cuts in other fields of the police (Auffenberg/Kittel 2015). In the second wave, output-orientation and performance measurement were put on the agenda. Clearance rates, delinquency rate, and citizens' trust in the police served as main statistical indicators to measure the efficiency of police work. The third wave was initiated in 2005. While the police staff increased, a bundle of new management methods like the balanced scorecard model and total quality management (TQM) were tested and implemented.

In 2010, the Police Service became the largest state-controlled activity in Sweden, but neither the rise in the staff level nor the new police government methods implicated a fall in crime rates. For this

reason, the Swedish Government initiated a further major police reform by restructuring the police 'multi-agencies' and the autonomous local and regional agencies, and by unifying them in one central agency (Statskontoret 2010).<sup>22</sup> The goal was to form an integrated 'mono-agency'. As of 1 January 2015, the Swedish Police Service was fully centralized and the county police lost their autonomy to pursue their own strategies and to control the budgets. Now the NPB is responsible for setting the budgets as well as stipulating the recruitment strategies on the local level. It is also the supervisory authority of the National Laboratory of Forensic Science and is responsible for the development of new work methods and technological support. All law enforcement services in Sweden are provided by one single police organization. Through the National Police Academy, NPB is responsible for the training of police officers. NPB is the central administrative and supervisory authority of all police services and reports to the Swedish Ministry of Justice in charge of developing overall police strategies. In addition, each of the county police authorities, which have been reduced to 21, is responsible for maintaining public order and security and preventing crime in its own county, headed by a county police commissioner. The County Police Board, comprising local politicians and the commissioner, the latter appointed by the Government of Sweden, reports to the NPB.

Collective bargaining in the Swedish police sector is framed by the central collective agreement (*Ramavtal löner inom staten*, RALS) and concluded at the central level by the Swedish Agency for Government Employers (*Arbetsgivarverket*) (see Chapter 5). In the police sector, the *Rikspolisstyrelsen* and the *Polisförbundet* conclude the local agreement, which is then further specified by the local police departments (Polisförbundet 2013). The Swedish Police Union *Polisförbundet* organizes more than 96 per cent of all police officers in Sweden (Polisförbundet 2013). In 1977, the right to take action, such as going on strike, was restricted both by the Public Employment Act and by collective agreements in order to avoid conflicts that could endanger public safety, especially in sectors such as healthcare, firefighting, and police work. Yet, the 'doctrine of freedom of the labour market' (see Chapter 5) is a very strong, fundamental principle in Swedish industrial relations, and forcible intervention by the state is very rare. Consequently, the overall 'ban'

on strikes is self-imposed and confirmed in every collective agreement, but is not registered in labour law (Stokke/Thörnqvist 2001, pp. 246ff.).

Table 8.1 Development of Police Forces in the UK, Germany, France and Sweden, 1980-2012

	Development of police force numbers	Share of civilian employment	Share of female employment	
			Among total police force	Among civilian employees
UK (England and Wales)	1980: 112,958 <sup>p</sup> 1985: 118,620 <sup>p</sup> 1995: 186,622 FTE <sup>q</sup> 2005: 223,426 FTE <sup>q</sup> 2010: 244,497 FTE <sup>r</sup> 2014: 207,843 FTE <sup>s</sup>	1980: 0% 1985: 0% 1995: 31.8% <sup>q</sup> 2005: 36.1% <sup>q</sup> 2010: 41.2% <sup>r</sup> 2014: 38.2% <sup>s</sup>	1980: 8.5% <sup>p</sup> 1985: 9.3% <sup>p</sup> 1995: 14.0% <sup>p</sup> 2005: 21.1% <sup>q</sup> 2010: 25.7% <sup>r</sup> 2014: 27.9%	1980: n/a 1985: n/a 1995: n/a 2005: 66.5% <sup>q</sup> 2010: 63.7% <sup>r</sup> 2014: n/a
Germany (only <i>Länder</i> ; before 1990 only West-Germany)	1980: 199,801 <sup>g</sup> 1985: 207,637 <sup>h</sup> 1995: 280,103 <sup>i</sup> 2005: 269,096 <sup>j</sup> 2010: 263,316 <sup>k</sup> (FTE: 252,369) <sup>k</sup> 2013: 266,291 (FTE: 255,921) <sup>x</sup>	1980: 17.1% <sup>g</sup> 1985: 17.0% <sup>h</sup> 1995: 17.7% <sup>i</sup> 2005: 15.7% <sup>j</sup> 2010: 14.7% <sup>k</sup> 2013: 37.6% <sup>x</sup>	1980: 11.2% <sup>g</sup> 1985: n/a 1995: 18.4% <sup>i</sup> 2005: 22.9% <sup>j</sup> 2010: 24.9% <sup>k</sup> 2013: 69.9% <sup>x</sup>	1980: n/a 1985: n/a 1995: 57.3% <sup>i</sup> 2005: 59.6% <sup>j</sup> 2010: 59.9% <sup>k</sup> 2013: 22.5% <sup>x</sup>
France	1980: 112,677 <sup>a</sup> 1986: 123,325 <sup>a</sup> 1996: 129,235 <sup>a</sup> 2005: 147,772 <sup>b</sup> 2010: 141,126 <sup>c</sup> (FTE: 139,061) <sup>c</sup> 2012: 138,959 (FTE: 136,758) <sup>y</sup>	1980: n/a 1985: n/a 1995: n/a 2005: 1.9% <sup>d</sup> 2006: 8.2% <sup>e</sup> 2010: 7.3% <sup>c</sup> 2012: 10.9% <sup>y</sup>	1980: n/a 1985: n/a 1995: n/a 2005: 22.0% <sup>d</sup> 2009: 27.3% <sup>f</sup> 2012: 25.6% <sup>y</sup>	n/a
Sweden	1980: 1985: 1997: 22,755 <sup>l</sup> 2005: 23,940 <sup>m</sup> 2010: 28,017 <sup>m</sup> 2014: 28,689	1980: 1985: 1997: 26.2% <sup>l</sup> 2005: 28.7% <sup>m</sup> 2010: 27.6% <sup>m</sup> 2014: 30.1%	1980: 1985: 1995: 2005: 35.7% <sup>n</sup> 2010: 39% <sup>o</sup> 2014: 42%	1980: 1985: 1995: 2005: 71% <sup>n</sup> 2010: 69% <sup>o</sup> 2014: 68%

FTE: Full-time equivalents; n/a: no data available

**Note:** Due to country specific-statistics, the latest figures available vary from 2012-2014.

Sources:

- a: Ministère de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l'état 2004, pp. 86f.;
- b: Ministère du budget, des comptes publics, de la fonction publique et de la réforme de l'état 2009, pp. 386f.;
- c: Ministère de la réforme de l'état, de la décentralisation et de la fonction publique 2012, p. 294;
- d: Ministère du budget, des comptes publics et de la fonction publique 2007, p. 248;
- e: Ministère du budget, des comptes publics et de la fonction publique 2008, pp. 296f.;
- f: Ministère de la fonction publique 2011, p. 314;
- g: Statistisches Bundesamt 1982, pp. 47, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 68, 74, 75;
- h: Statistisches Bundesamt 1987, pp. 40, 42, 44, 46, 94;
- i: Statistisches Bundesamt 1997, pp. 72, 78;
- j: Statistisches Bundesamt 2007, p. 82;
- k: Statistisches Bundesamt 2011, pp. 63f., 69;
- l: Rikspolisstyrelsen 2010;

m: Rikspolisstyrelsen 2013;  
n: Körlin et al. 2006, p. 5;  
o: Rikspolisstyrelsen 2011, p. 46;  
p: Grahame 2001, pp. 13ff., 20, 25, 35;  
q: Nasreen et al. 2004, pp. 3, 5, 13f., 19f.;  
r: Sigurdsson/Dhani 2010, pp. 3, 14, 21f.;  
s: see Home Office 2015;  
x: Statistisches Bundesamt 2014, pp 46, 47, 49;  
y: Ministère de la fonction publique 2012, pp. 275, 288.

## **Work and Employment Regulation in the Police**

In this section, we focus on work and employment relations, namely the entry requirements and recruitment, pay system, career advancement and further training, and equality politics in the countries under study.

### **Entry Requirements and Recruitment**

*United Kingdom.* In England and Wales, there are few formal educational or physical requirements to enter the police service. The profession is open to persons of all ages with a minimum age of 18 and a structural limit set by the retirement age, and all (or even no) schooling backgrounds, that is, graduates, individuals in possession of a Higher National Diploma qualification, and non-graduates alike. Recruitment and selection procedures are managed by the local police forces, applying a nation-wide competency-based framework. Entry is open to British and Commonwealth citizens, European Community (EC) and European Economic Area (EEA) citizens, and foreign nationals who have no restrictions on their leave to remain in the UK. However, since 2012, a Certificate in Knowledge of Policing (CKP) exists, initially intended to be compulsory for the Metropolitan Police Service only, but meanwhile adopted by several other local police forces as a prerequisite for joining. The course includes law, national policy, and processes required to be a police officer, and costs about GBP 500-850. Furthermore, since 2014, for the very first time in its history, the British police opened its organization for direct entrants at a higher hierarchical level, namely the superintendents for the Metropolitan Police. According to the lead programme superintendent, Nicola Dale, the direct entry intends to attract senior leaders from outside the police force to fill positions at superintendent



rank (about 800 positions in the 43 police forces) in order to integrate financial and business leadership expertise (Guardian 2014-05-23)<sup>23</sup>. The direct entry programme was initiated in November 2014 with nine successful applicants. All probationary police constables in England and Wales go through a professional training programme (Initial Police Learning and Development Programme IPLDP), preparing for the Level 3 Diploma in Policing (QCF) during their first two years of service. Training takes place at different venues and throughout a number of workplace assessments. Since 1997, specific legal qualifications are no longer a requirement for all posts for the civilian police staff, with the exception of specific qualifications attached to the role (that is, specific qualifications and expertise in forensics). Most back office work is done by civilian employees on all hierarchical levels from accountancy to administration, finance to forensics, HR to IT, and occupational health to operational support.

*Germany.* Entry requirements and recruitment for the German police are defined according to the different *Länder*. In general, applicants must be EU citizens possessing a proper police clearance certificate. Application is possible for two different career brackets, one based on occupational training geared towards medium-level careers (*mittlerer Polizeivollzugsdienst*), the other based on university studies geared towards management and specialist positions in the higher career class (*gehobener Polizeivollzugsdienst*). For the occupational training pathway, police recruits are required to have completed at least intermediate education and be aged 24 at maximum. This training consists of two-and-a-half to three years of courses in special training institutions with a broad set of subjects taught.<sup>24</sup> Police training at universities of applied sciences, established in the 1970s, requires a higher secondary school certificate and takes three years with a maximum entry age of 36 years. It represents a more professionalized path combining scientific and practically oriented knowledge for police work. Moreover, with this kind of training, the students acquire the same kind of education as other employees in the state administration (Pagon et al 1996). The entry exams vary, but focus on physical capabilities, general knowledge, and social skills.

*France.* Entry requirements and recruitment for the French *Police Nationale* are centralized and highly standardized, following regulations for the whole civil service (see Chapter 5). Entry is through competitive exam (*concours*) for all hierarchical levels, and all applicants must be of French nationality, under 35 years of age (under 30 for the *adjoint de securite*), and have proof of specific physical qualities. The *adjoint de sécurité* do not need a diploma but can directly participate in the *concours*. For the *gardien de la paix*, the grade *baccalauréat* (or similar) is required, while for *officiers* a *licence* (or BAC+3) is needed, and for the *commissaire* the Master 2 (or BAC+5). The different *concours* are also open for internal applications. The officer's rank often depends upon his or her educational level, whether secondary or post-secondary. Once selected, police recruits for the highest *corps* attend the Saint-Cyr School at Mont d'Or for ten months, while the *officiers* attend the Canet-Cluse School for six months, and *gardien de la paix* attend the Superior School for six months.

*Sweden.* Unlike in other parts of the Swedish public sector (see Chapter 5), there is a single recruitment procedure for the Swedish police. Application to the police is open to all persons with a high school degree or the equivalent. The Swedish police are a very popular employer, and only 5 to 10 per cent of all applicants can be offered a position.<sup>25</sup> To enter the Swedish police, the potential police officers must apply for a studentship at the Swedish National Police Academy. The Academy has two recruitment dates each year, one in March and the other in September. After an admission test, recruits undergo basic training at the academy. Since 2000, police education and training was established at the Universities of Umeå and Växjö. In 2002, distance learning courses, comprising the same subjects, content, and duration as the on-campus courses, are provided for prospective police officers. The Swedish recruits' training consists of four terms of full-time study. The goal is to offer both a theoretical and practical foundation. At the end, the recruits are placed in police departments where they are assigned to senior officers who evaluate their ability to perform specific skills.<sup>26</sup> Whereas recruits were paid during training prior to 1994, now students must pay their own fees and are only paid for the six months of practical work after training.

The civilian staff is in charge of duties such as corporate issues, staff development, legal and financial matters, IT, and crime investigations, and is recruited according to the special skills needed. The turn to NPM-inspired practices is reflected in the hiring of economic specialists instead of legal specialists for administration, and placing new emphasis on the development of leadership skills (Anderson and Tengblad 2009; Elefalk 2001). Recruitment strategies in this area depend on the specific needs of each and every unit.

## **Pay**

*United Kingdom.* Irrespective of the decentralized organization of the British police forces, pay and conditions have been set centrally since the Desborough Committee Report of 1919. Since 1978, pay and terms of employment of all UK police officers are negotiated through the Police Negotiating Board (PNB), set up after an inquiry by Lord Edmund-Davies on conditions of police service and pay (Police Act 1996 § 61.).<sup>27,28</sup> Wages are fixed by the Home Secretary on advice from the PNB. Until 1994, sworn police officers benefited from rent and housing allowances.

Within the PNB, the local government employers represent the employers, while the police officers are represented by the Police Federation, the Association of Superintendents, and the Staff Association of the Chief Police Officers. Among the issues negotiated through the PNB are: hours of duty, leave, pay, additional allowances, and pensions. The PNB should negotiate agreements between the employers and employees, which are then recommended to the Home Secretary. If accepted by the Home Secretary, they are placed within a draft statutory instrument, called Police Regulations, and submitted to Parliament for approval. Once placed in the regulations, PNB agreements are legally binding. For the civilian staff, the Police Staff Council's (PSC) national agreements are only binding if police authorities and chief constables agree to incorporate them in the employment contracts of their employees. The Metropolitan Police Service, City of London, Kent, and Surrey police forces, for example, do not take PSC agreements into account.

In general, the pay system can be described as a career-based remuneration system. Salaries are determined by working hours and length of service within a specific rank. In 2002, special priority

payments were agreed upon as part of a new pay and conditions settlement. These include up to GBP 400 on top of the basic salary for all the federated ranks and bonus payments for occasional work of an outstanding, demanding, unpleasant, or important nature, as well as competency-related payments.<sup>29</sup> In addition, a competence-related 'threshold payment' can be awarded to constables at the top of their pay scale who could only earn more by being promoted. Although this award was originally only meant to reward highly competent performance, it has become an automatic annual payment for most of the eligible officers. However, it was abolished for new entrants in 2012. A general overtime pay agreement exists. Contrary to the public sector in general, police officers are allowed to retire after 35 years of service and regardless of their age.

For the civilian police staff, pay is also based on hours of work and length of service, but there is no standardized system of promotions, and pay increases are less substantial than for police officers. In general, their pay is lower than police officers' pay, and neither police-specific pension schemes nor special retirement agreements exist. Since civilian police staff have the right to unionize, pay is negotiated by the public service sector union UNISON.

*Germany.* The pay system for German police officers is similar to the public service system in general (see Chapter 5), and thus standardized and directly linked to ranks. Pay supplements are awarded for so-called 'heavy working conditions' and for shift work. On top of this, there exists a specific supplement for the police (*Polizeizulage*), mainly meant to compensate for the dangerous aspects of police work. Police officers normally retire at the age of 62 instead of 65. As functions are not directly linked to ranks, a large share of police officers are not paid in accordance with the functions they fulfil due to budget restrictions. Performance-based bonuses, though allowed by civil service law, so far have not been implemented, both for budgetary reasons and because of the common understanding that police work is teamwork (Behr 2000; Lange/Schenck 2004).

*France.* In the French police system, as in the general French civil service, pay is career-based and depends on hierarchical status and length of service. Pay increases, thus, are similar to the general

pay scheme for the public sector (see Chapter 5). Like in other sectors, employees benefit from police-specific pay supplements for shift work and dangerous jobs. In addition, the French police have a long-standing tradition of informal performance-related bonuses, paid in cash and on a small scale. Heavily criticized by the *Cour des Comptes* in 1998, the system was transformed into an additional allowance for all police officers that can be topped up if necessary. Twenty-five per cent of the *commissaires* (highest hierarchical level) and 25 per cent of the *officiers* (mid-level) are paid special police allowances that can be topped up to between EUR 100 and 200 per month. Since 2004, individual bonus payments for exceptional performance by higher-ranked officers, or collective bonus payments for very successful units, can be distributed. Even though it seems to closely follow quantitative results, the system lacks a clear definition for the distribution of funds between the forces and rather reflects the power relations inside the institution instead of performance (Matelly/Mouhanna 2007).

*Sweden.* The Swedish police salary structure is established by framework agreements on salaries for employees in the public service, RALS (*Ramavtal löner inom staten*), and is negotiated in collective agreements between the parties in each agreement area. Central agreements regulate matters such as pensions, holidays, work hours, and other general employment conditions (see Chapter 5). After conclusion of the central agreements, local negotiations are conducted within the police between the Swedish National Police Board and the four local unions (the Swedish Police Union, ST-The Union of Civil Servants, Saco-S, and Seko). The local agreements contain principles for setting salaries within the police, where there are a number of collective agreements which have adopted the rules and regulations to the exigencies of police activities. For example, the police have their own agreements on work hours, holidays, reimbursement of expenses, parental allowances, extra pension allocations, reimbursement for loss of income in case of work-related injury for police officers, and collaboration. Salaries of individual employees are regulated by the police authorities, and pay is individually negotiated, at least within a fixed frame for mid-level and high positions in the police. Special police allowances were reduced in a collective agreement in 2008 (Polisförbundet 2008), which means that

the pay-setting system has become even more comparable to the rest of public employment.

Nevertheless, from the HRM point of view, this is compensated by the pension scheme now allowing police officers to retire much earlier than the age of 65:

But they gained so many other things. There is a pension agreement, they have. It is unique in the whole public service! I do not think you can find it any other sector or even in the industry. (Interview PSE3)

Swedish police officers benefit from extra pay for heavy work and shorter working hours compared to general working hours in the public sector (34 instead of 40 hours). This changed with the implementation of a new shift system in 2008, according to which police officers work up to 36 hours a week. While the police unions officially complained about the worsened working conditions, they successfully negotiated a special pension system. A small portion of police officers' pay is used to finance early retirement schemes. Unlike other public sector employees, the police have the opportunity to retire at the age of 60 (Polisförbundet 2008, 2010) As regards the civilian employees, pay and social benefits are less generous than for comparable police officers. However, in professions where the police compete with the private sector to recruit individuals with 'high potentials' for specialized fields (such as cybercrime), the police must upwardly adjust remuneration to market salaries. For this reason, in 2006 the National Police Board provided funding to hire 300 such specialized experts (Anderson/Tengblad 2009).

### **Career Advancement and Further Training**

In general, career advancement in all four countries is 'through the ranks' and has a long tradition. Further training, too, is an integral part of the overall training schemes and has become an important issue for police departments from the 1970s onwards in reaction to technological innovations, changes in society, and a more theoretical approach to policing strategies.

*United Kingdom.* Career advancement in the British police forces follows a strict pathway, and all senior officers once started at the bottom. Even though the procedures for promotion differ

between the regional police authorities, in general, promotion to the ranks of sergeant and inspector must be based on qualifying examinations. Since the 1990s, the Home Office set in motion programmes to standardize the promotion exams, ascertaining that all officers are trained to a minimal standard defined internally by the police. Within the context of development centres, exercises and competency-based interviews are validated and assessed against the police's National Competency Framework (NCF) by comparing skills and abilities to the defined standards. In March 2013, a new method for promoting police officers through work-based assessments was announced. With the proposed system, officers who are deemed eligible for promotion and who have passed their legal examinations would enter a selection process at the local level to assess their ability to perform at the next rank. The successful applicants would then be given a temporary promotion for 12 months and, if they passed that work-based assessment programme, they would be substantively promoted. Alex Marshall, Chief Executive of the College of Policing, underlined that the introduction of the scheme would represent 'the first significant change to the promotion process for many years' (see SFJUK 2013).

As for further training, the National Police College has provided junior, intermediate, and senior command courses since 1948 for inspectors and chief inspectors, superintendents, and chief superintendents, respectively. Additionally, special courses for sergeants were also offered. Further training was put on the agenda again in 1999 within the framework of the report 'Managing learning: A study of police training' (HMIC 1999). In essence, further training was implemented as a standardized tool by linking training and career progression to training needs analysis in order to better meet the given performance plans. With the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, the Central Police Training and Development Authority (Centrex) was established. Re-named and re-organized twice since then (National Policing Improvement Agency [NPIA] in 2007, College of Policing since 2013), it constitutes the first step to standardizing training measurements and assuring a nationwide comparable level.

*Germany*. Career advancement in the German police is highly formalized and was originally channelled into four different service classes. Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, the lowest service (*Einfacher Dienst*) has lost ground in all *Länder* due to job cuts and higher qualification requirements. In some *Länder*, starting in 2000 in Bremen, a more condensed two-tiered service class system (*zweigliedrige Laufbahn*) has been introduced.<sup>30</sup> Even though police unions and HRM stress the positive motivational aspect for police officers, the costs are still deemed high, and due to the restricted number of posts in the higher ranks, not every police officer can advance upwards on the career ladder as expected (see below).

In general, career advancement is through the ranks and follows either a promotion (*Beförderung*, BBG §22, BLV §§ 35ff.), meaning the conferment of a higher service grade within the same service class, or advancement to a higher service class (*Aufstieg*, BBG §17; BLV § 35), the latter based on meeting pre-described qualification requirements. Since all new appointed officers start in the lowest position within the career bracket corresponding to their entry qualification, promotion is the normal mode of advancement. Procedures for promotion take into account performance, but also time served in terms of experience; thus advancement is still linked to seniority. Performance appraisals entail the evaluation of suitability (*Eignung*), capability (*Befähigung*), and professional performance (*fachliche Leistung*), the latter gaining more and more ground, as one HR expert underlined:

I mean, I am an advocate of the idea, I mean, 'Suitability, Performance, Qualification', even if it sounds a bit flawed, but it takes more and more space. Sure, seniority, that still exists. Within the last reform (*Dienstrechtsreform*),<sup>31</sup> the age groups have been adapted and extended. (...) Now we have some funds to promote a colleague slightly earlier in case he did a good job. But it must all fit in...all boxes ticked. (Interview PDE10)

At the same time, several interviewees (PDE2, PDE3, PDE5) referred to the concept of 'social promotion', meaning that if an older police officer did a decent job for a long time, but is not performing as well as a younger officer, the older officer is nonetheless perceived of as deserving a promotion.



[...] And if we would follow the performance principle, and we would have a look at one specific year only, the staff that had shown a good but not outstanding performance over several years would never be promoted, because the year's outstanding staff would get all the promotions. This is something we would say, it's about – how can I put it – to a certain degree, social aspects play a role. (Interview PDE2)

Tensions between performance and seniority have become aggravated since both the advancement to higher service grades within a given service class, and the advancement to a higher service class (*Laufbahngruppe*), are institutionally restricted by the number of posts defined in the respective budgets. On the one hand, according to evaluation-based promotion, only those officers who receive the best grade in the performance assessment can be promoted. On the other hand, grades are apportioned. For example, only a given share of applicants can achieve an 'A' on the assessment. Therefore, in order to be able to promote older officers for social reasons, young officers often only receive mediocre grades even if they are high performers. This bottleneck in promotion (addressed as *Beförderungstau*), while characteristic for German public administration in general, is perceived of in the police as particularly demotivating and counterproductive, especially given the rising public demands for high quality police work (Interviews PDE2, PDE7, PDE10). Mobility restrictions also occur in the rare cases of advancement to higher service classes by way of examination, since here too, the number of available posts at each level in the hierarchy is fixed annually with the police budget and usually does not match the organizational requirements of the police. Therefore, many police officers occupy posts that are usually linked to a higher rank, and even if the respective officer is eligible for promotion, this might not be possible for budgetary reasons. In practice, therefore, many police officers do not receive the pay they would deserve for their performance (Interviews PDE2, PDE 3, PDE 8). In some German police forces (for example, in Bremen), this challenge is met by attempts to establish the idea of 'expert careers' within the police by becoming a specialist without a management function.

France. Even more pronounced than in Germany, advancement in the French civil service is generally pre-determined by the established, strict career group system (*corps*) (see Chapter 5). Reforms of this system in the police, starting in the 1970s with the merger of the formerly separated uniformed and non-uniformed *corps*, impacted on the career chances of the respective groups, though with different group effects as the more recent reforms show. In 1995, the 'reform of *corps* and career' (*réforme des corps et des carrières I*) led to a fusion of *corps* into three new *corps*. In 2004-05, a follow-up reform (*réforme des corps et des carrières II*) aimed at widening the lowest *corps* and integrating the majority of *gardiens* (46 per cent of police staff) into one *corps*.<sup>32</sup> This was combined with a reduction in size of the higher *corps*, which decreases chances for promotion in the longer run. On the other hand, the lower levels profited from better chances for internal mobility, as one HR manager stressed:

In terms of individual careers, we facilitated the passages. A Guardian of Peace, for example, he didn't have much of a choice, he could choose between two different careers, the public security or the riot police. Today, with the same educational level, he has a whole range of different career path to choose from. In the past, we also had a very localized approach. You started in one department and made your career there. Today, we have a lot more freedom of movement, and you can do your career by passing through investigation in this department, and doing public security in another department and so on. We really facilitated the changes. Changes that are, from our perspective, extremely enriching. (Interview PFR3)

Modes of career advancement encompass seniority and performance. While promotions within a *corps* are mainly seniority-based, promotions into higher *corps* are based on entrance examinations or performance-based selection processes. However, the share of internal promotions has increased at the expense of external staffing. Furthermore, similar to Germany, the notion of 'social promotion' of older police officers exists. Or, as one HR manager put it:

And without being the exception, the last resort that remains is the criterion of seniority. You are comparing staff, you compare the marks, you compare the jobs they do. The more important a job is, the higher the chances to get to the superior level. If we have competing candidates that

have the same important job, the same responsibilities, the same performance, we still have seniority, and we will take the most senior in that case. That's it. (Interview PFR3)

Despite the fact that career pathways through the *corps* are outlined and flexibility has increased, employees are increasingly faced with restricted entry and advancement chances due to limited availability of posts. Even though about 73 per cent of the *adjoints de sécurité* find a job after termination of their contract, it is difficult for them to continue their career within the police.

Internal vacancies have been restricted by the General Review of Public Policies (Révision générale des politiques publiques, RGPP) and the number of *concours* has been reduced. For example, between 2006 and 2011 only three of these contests for internal vacancies took place. This is also the case for the three bodies of the national police, where access to senior positions has tightened since the RGPP.<sup>33</sup>

In response to two government reports in the 1980s indicating poor qualifications and competencies of police officers, training and further training have been professionalized. The Socialist government initiated a programme aiming at the modernization of equipment and eliminating the nepotistic structures of the old regime (Roché 2005). This programme entailed a so-called 'real training' policy, which had notable effects on the level of recruitment and initial training. Whereas up to the early 1980s, the sole selection criteria were traditional computing and orthography skills, the 1982 Police Training Charta defined management tasks and leadership concepts for the first time. New training schools were opened and curricula for in-house training were developed. Since 1990, 40 hours of in-house training are mandatory, and since 1992, *commissaires* and higher ranks must participate in police management workshops (10-15 days within a two-year period). Since then, continual training is not only linked to the general improvement of competencies, but half of it is also dedicated to the preparation for exams necessary for internal promotions or for exams which follow promotions. In other words, French police officers have the duty to participate in job-specific further training and the right to participate in promotion-oriented training.

*Sweden.* In Sweden, both career advancement and further training have been modernized. Although a career-based system persists, the so-called 'glass ceiling reform' of 1997 eased career advancement and partly overturned standardized promotion paths. For example, career trajectories allow for leaving out one or two steps on the career ladder in order to advance directly to higher positions.

According to one HR manager:

It has opened up, yes. Today, you also have this that you can, as a civilian, join our programme and be within the leader organization of policemen. Of course, you have to practice some theory within that. You are not allowed to go out and work on the street, still you are in a leading organization of the police. (Interview PSE3)

Although a rank system based on seniority still exists, especially in rural areas, it is perceived by the interviewees as a 'nostalgic' element. Apart from some general requirements for promotion to senior positions, promotion procedures still differ between police authorities. The 1997 reform also abolished the requirement of a law degree for becoming a regional police chief in favour of other university degrees, such as business or engineering. Promotions based on seniority were perceived as unjust by all interviewees:

But we are quite clear in our policies what it is about: competencies are first and seniority is second. We are coming more and more to very clear recruitment processes where the profiler ... [A competence profiler?] Yes. In the recruitment process where you have to start with the analysis about what do we need today and in the future? So you just do not recruit the same person as the one who had left. You have to make a very clear and neutral profile and an open transparent process. We just launched the recruitment process and it is very... people have been...the authorities have been longing for it. It is a big impress and it has got a lot of approvers, people really like it. I think it is needed, because you had to see the whole process. We are definitely more about competences, not persons or seniorities... (Interview PSE2).

In line with these changes, assessment centres are increasingly relied upon in decisions regarding the internal staffing of vacant posts, and annual individual assessments have been introduced. Even

though they so far have not impacted individual pay levels, the HR managers interviewed considered this linkage as a logical further step.

Like training, further training has a long tradition in the Swedish police, with courses offered in the national police training centres for senior constables, inspectors, and commissioners from the 1950s onwards (Lord 1998). Career development initiatives in the Swedish Police Service are focused on leadership training and on broadening the base from which managers are recruited. Career development takes various forms, from counselling or tailor-made programmes for a specific member of staff, to courses arranged for a group of employees at the request of a police authority. Leadership issues are coordinated by the National Police Board. In order to keep up-to-date in this field, the NPB has set up a Leadership Training Centre (LTC) at the National Police Academy. The LTC is a knowledge management centre which tracks developments in the Police Service and other organizations, monitors the publication of books, articles, and research papers in the field, provides advice on leadership strategies, and supports pilot schemes at the police authorities. In addition to providing leadership training, the Police Service also arranges competence-development courses for both police and civilian staff, for example in the use of IT or crime investigation duties. The police authorities usually prioritize training courses focused on operational duties, such as tactical police work and various practical skills (NPB 2005; 2010).

### **Job Security**

Job security in all four countries is high and combined with an unlimited employment status. Police officers usually cannot be dismissed unless they violate specific rules of conduct. The majority of complaints stem from citizens accusing police officers of inappropriate behaviour, such as racism or excessive violence. However, most of the proceedings are rejected and the number of dismissals within the police is minimal.<sup>34</sup>

*United Kingdom.* Police officers, in general, cannot be made redundant, but they can be obliged to take compulsory retirement after 30 years of service. Only a very small proportion of sworn police

officers are dismissed, but no overall statistics are available. The Metropolitan Police reported 124 dismissals due to misconduct between 2006 and 2011.<sup>35</sup> In contrast to the high job security of the sworn officers, according to the general regulation, all non-sworn and civilian staff can be made redundant, as is the case with employees in private sector. Thus, since the announced cost cuts in 2010, the proportion of civilian staff having left the police is higher than the number of sworn police officers.<sup>36</sup>

*Germany.* German police are civil servants and thus have a lifelong employment guarantee. Dismissal is only possible after a disciplinary procedure, which is regulated by disciplinary law (*Bundesdisziplinargesetz*). In order to dismiss a civil servant, departments and agencies must bring action before the administrative court that decides over the dismissal. In case of dismissal, a civil servant loses all entitlements and can neither regain the civil servant status nor be appointed to another public employment relationship. A dismissal is the hardest possible sanction following from a disciplinary procedure. Other sanctions include a letter of censure, a fine, a reduction of pay, or downgrading. The gravity of the sanction must correspond to the severity of the misconduct. The number of police officers dismissed usually is not published and made available to the public, but must be requested by the political parties that are members of the *Länder* parliaments via 'minor parliamentary questions' (*Kleine Anfrage*).

*France.* In France, the majority of the police are still employed as *fonctionnaire* and benefit from high job security (see Chapter 5). However, with a new regulation implemented in 2010, police officers can be dismissed if they refuse replacement three times.<sup>37</sup> The *adjoints de sécurité* or *contractuels*, employed on a fixed-term contract, enjoy less employment security. Prior to 2012, the contracts, which are usually issued for a three-year period, could only be extended for another three years, thus making conversion into the police force impossible. Since 2012, however, a new regulation for contracted staff allows the employer to issue permanent contracts.<sup>38</sup>

*Sweden.* The Swedish police staff benefit from the job security set in national collective agreements between *Arbetsgivarverket* and the unions. Police employment in Sweden is barely distinguishable from private sector employment, and due to the harmonized employment relations (see Chapter 5), job security for the police forces is rather high.

### **Equal Opportunity Policies**

In all of the countries under study, equal opportunity policies regarding gender and ethnic diversity have become relevant in the police as a consequence of both the admission of women to the police forces and the increasing ethnic diversity of the population. Given the tradition of a predominantly male workforce and a male occupational culture, one challenge has been the inclusion of women in both the civilian and the police staff. Additionally, the colonial past of some of the countries and the rise in migration flows toward Western Europe have increased social diversity, thus challenging the traditional ethnic homogeneity of the police forces.<sup>39</sup> While women's quest for access to the police goes back to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the demand for more ethnic diversity is more recent. From the 1970s onwards, not least stipulated by EU anti-discrimination policies, most police forces in the Western European sphere have emphasized equal opportunity policies, with the aim of recruiting more women and people of diverse ethnic backgrounds.<sup>40</sup>

*United Kingdom.* In the United Kingdom, female police officers were fully attested in 1923 but had limited powers to arrest and worked in separate units. It was not until 1973 that female police were integrated into the main force. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 required the police to abolish separate departments and career structures for women and to fully integrate women into the service. From then on, male and female officers competed on equal terms for entry, promotion, and transfers, and subsequently, the number of female officers increased. The British Association for Women in Policing was founded in 1987 in order to support women at all levels and to lobby for equal rights. While in 1998, women made up only 16 per cent of the total sworn police constable population (Westmarland 2001), this share grew to 27.3 per cent in 2013 (Home Office 2013).

However, women are still under-represented in higher ranks. In 2013, women in senior ranks across England and Wales only accounted for 18 per cent of the total police workforce as compared to women at the constable level representing 29.7 per cent of the total workforce (Home Office 2013).

In order to tackle this issue, a wide range of mentoring and development programmes for female police officers and female police staff have been initiated, both on the level of the regional police forces and on the level of the training institutions (Carson 2009).

In 2013, the share of ethnic minority police officers within the police forces in England and Wales reached 5 per cent (Home Office 2013). Until the late 1990s, verbal racism was reported to be endemic to the police in England and Wales (Smith/Gray 1985, pp. 388-9; Holdaway 1996). This is in line with the Scarman Report (Scarman 1981) and the Macpherson Report (Macpherson of Cluny 1999), which uncovered structural racism within the police forces. In consequence, sensitization programmes were set up and the recruitment of ethnic minorities was encouraged (Silvestri et al. 2013).

*Germany.* Women were fully integrated into the main police forces of the German *Länder* by the end of the 1980s (Wilz 2005, p. 159). While quotas or positive action for female police officers do not exist, the general gender equality regulations for the civil service and public employees apply.<sup>41</sup> In line with the general German policy orientation emphasizing reconciliation of work and life rather than equal rights, concepts to manage work and life are fostered in all police forces, be it through part-time work offers, programmes to reintegrate female police officers after parental care leave, or provision of childcare services. With a share of less than 20 per cent, women are still under-represented in the higher level career groups.<sup>42</sup> While interviewees stressed the fact that the police follow the rules set up for the public service in general, at the same time there are reservations with respect to the 'fit' of equality norms for the police, as the following interview sequence illustrates:

On the beat, we have around 30 per cent female police officers. Physical characteristics could be extremely different – even though we have standards while recruiting. Some women won't go on the beat with another woman. According to them, they feel uncomfortable in a conflict situation



without a male partner. If the share of female police officers gets too high, in some areas, this is seen as discriminating – by men also. We try to handle this. But that's why I am against quota. You need to specify the area. In which areas does gender play a role? It isn't about gender, it's about the tasks the people can fulfil. (Interview PDE9)

The same holds true for ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities are still under-represented, and figures in the German police forces vary from 0.4 per cent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to 17.6 per cent in North Rhine-Westphalia, which approximates the roughly 20 per cent in the overall population (Die Zeit 2014). Following the general rules applied to the public service, no positive discrimination can take place.

There isn't a quota for colleagues with ethnic background. We wouldn't agree with that, because this just wouldn't work. We expect people to do the training, and we don't want to decrease the standards (...). We want the same standards and from that point on everybody is welcome. And we already have colleagues with ethnic background, quite a few. (Interview PDE11)

However, police recruitment strategies have recently had a stronger focus on ethnic minorities, and both police and academic research have investigated the barriers for ethnic minorities to enter the police (Hunold et al. 2010; Regge 2013). According to our interviewees, more targeted recruitment is successful; the number of applicants is already increasing, and some change in the composition of the workforce is expected within the next years. (Interview PDE10)

*France.* In France, women have been able to become police officers in the highest *corps* since 1974, in the middle *corps* since 1976-77, and in the lowest *corps* since 1979. Until 1992, negative quotas officially restricted the share of women in the police. Since then, the share of female employees has increased to values ranging from 17 per cent for *gardien de la paix* to 22 per cent for *commissaires* and *officiers*. In this context, the higher representation in the higher *corps* (*officiers* and *commissaires*) can presumably be attributed to the system of multiple entry points and exam-based recruitment and promotion procedures. At the same time, neither positive discrimination nor positive action exists, and interview partners disapproved of positive action, as careers in the

*fonction publique* are supposed to be based on merit and *égalité des chances*. However, all interview partners agreed that policing is a predominantly male job, and assumed that women are more prone to prioritize family or care work.

But we have the problem with the female condition. The police occupation is an extremely hard job, with flexible working times, and I think, there's a moment in which the women will have difficulties in combining work and family life, especially if she wants children. She will be absent, she will get on parental leave, she will take, one, two, three years, because that's the right you have in the public service. And once she's back, she will take part-time. (Interview PFR5)

Due to the French republican approach to citizenship, no statistical account exists for ethnic minorities. According to our interview partners, there is still a distinct under-representation of these groups in the French police. To them, this can be explained by the problems in policing groups from the same racial or ethnic background.

So, in France, it's forbidden. But, ... but admittedly, we do it anyway. The time we created the *adjoints de sécurité* (in 1997), it was Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the then minister. He said: We need to recruit the police that look like the population in the *quartiers*. Off the record, this meant to recruit black and Arab people. So that's what we did. It didn't work neither better nor worse. Because in any way, the moment the police officers arrests someone, it doesn't matter whether he's black or Arab, ... So it didn't change a lot. (Interview PFR6)

*Sweden*. In Sweden, the first women entered the police as early as 1908, although they were not yet accepted as part of the official police (Dahlgren 2007, p. 37). From 1958 onwards, women were allowed to go on the beat, and equal access to all functions was established in 1971 (Dahlgren 2007, p. 52). In 2008, women made up about 25 per cent of all police officers, and in 2006, the share of women in managing positions stood at about 19 per cent. Until 2014, the respective shares rose to 31 and 20 per cent (Polismyndigheten 2015, p. 61). Female careers have been facilitated by way of recruitment efforts, as well as mentoring programmes and leadership training programmes designed for women, but quotas have not been implemented.

No, we have very explicitly chosen not to do that. We think the way, and I think we had some really good reasons for thinking so, is that transparent processes where you do not pick a person, where you say we need this and this and you have an open search...., good competence development, clear career path etc. is promoting women. Because nothing is more about taking away obstacles rather than telling women, go to this programme then you would be a better leader. I mean, the problem is not with the women, the problem is in the organization. (Interview PSE1)

Women obviously benefit from the increased use of assessment centres in promotion procedures, as they allow for objective decision-making (see interviews PSE2, PSE3). However, from the point of view of our interviewees, women still have to perform better than men to achieve the same hierarchical level.

She has to work, I think, two or three or four times as hard as anyone else to get the mandate from her own organization to succeed, I guess. She needs a lot of support. (Interview PSE2)

The integration of ethnic minorities follows generally applicable equal opportunity rules, and no further programme or specific support exists. However, the integration of ethnic minorities in the Swedish police forces remains critical. Recent research underlines the fact that already during the recruitment process, applicants with an ethnic minority background have to demonstrate a greater share of loyalty, and this is seen as a barrier to successful recruitment and integration (Peterson/Uhnoo 2012; Uhnoo 2015).

To sum up, while the inclusion of women in the police has progressed, with the Swedish Police Service being a forerunner, evidence on better integration of ethnic minorities is poor, presumably not only due to a lack of statistical documentation. All police forces claim to improve and change the male-biased, 'white' police cultures, but advancement still seems to be slow (Rabe-Hemp 2007; Silvestri et al. 2013; Fassin 2011; Loftus 2008).

## Summary

In all countries except Germany, the size of the police forces has grown considerably since the 1980s, unlike most other areas of public employment. At the same time, police forces in the UK and, to a lesser degree, in Sweden diversified their workforce and increased the number of civilian staff. This change in the workforce structure is a major factor accounting for the increase in the share of women, contributing to an overall share of women in the police force of more than one-quarter in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. In Sweden, where the police have a strong tradition of service in the sense of care for the community and where women are highly integrated in the labour market, the female share even rose to more than 40 per cent in 2014 (see Table 8.1), thus strongly attenuating the male culture generally attributed to the police. With regard to career advancement, women are less under-represented on higher hierarchical levels in France and Sweden than in Germany and the United Kingdom. This suggests that formalized, non-bureaucratic promotion procedures, such as assessment centres or exam-based recruitment, ease female career development within the police. In contrast to the inclusion of women, reaching ethnic diversity in the police workforce still poses a challenge, although equal opportunity and anti-discrimination norms apply in all countries studied.

Table 8.2 Dimensions of Change in Public Employment Regulation: Police, England and Wales

<b>Dimensions and characteristics</b>	<b>Pre-1990s</b>	<b>Early 2010s</b>
<b>1. Regulation of employment conditions</b>		
Legal status	Sworn officers	Sworn officers (SO) Civilian staff (CS)
Collective regulations	Unilateral	SO: Unilateral, external negotiation agency CS: Collective agreements
Regulation of labour conflicts	No right to unionize; No active right to strike due to executive powers	SO: No right to unionize; No active right to strike due to executive powers CS: Right to strike
<b>2. Personnel system</b>		
Mode of advancement	Career-based	SO: Front-line police: Career-based; Back office: Position-based for specific tasks (IT,

		Forensics, Management) CS: No specific pathway
Openness	Low	SO: Front-line police: Low; Back office: High for some special tasks CS: High
<b>3. Personnel management</b>		
Entry requirements	Formalized, low	Formalized, low
Recruitment	Special police training pathways through the ranks	SO: Special police training pathways through the ranks; Open for other disciplinary backgrounds in some specialized areas CS: Minor special training
Pay structure	Negotiation-based, centralized	Negotiation-based, centralized
Evaluation and assessment	Yes (police unit level)	Yes, increasingly individualized
Performance incentives	No	SO: Few, higher ranks, collective rewards on unit level CS: None
Opportunities for promotion	Seniority-based	SO & CS: Partly individualized, performance-based
Further education	No	SO & CS: Flexible, customized
<b>4. Integration function of public employment regime</b>		
Payment, social security	High	SO: High CS: Low
Employment security	High	SO: High CS: Low
Equal opportunity and treatment at the workplace	High	SO: Average public sector CS: Average public sector
<b>5. Specificity of public employment regime</b>		
Difference as compared to private sector employment regime	Average	SO: Lowered CS: None

SO: Sworn Officers; CS: Civilian staff

Although police forces in all countries under study have been subject to efficiency-oriented organizational reforms and to some extent also to re-regulation of employment, employment conditions in the police still *correspond to the ideal type civil servant* in many dimensions. This is most obvious with regard to employment security. Not only in Germany and France, where a legally based and unaltered civil servant status is dominant, but also in the United Kingdom, where a special status of sworn officer applies, and in Sweden, where the civil servant status had been abolished in the 1970s, the police workforce enjoy either tenure or unlimited contracts, and dismissal is strongly

regulated and restricted. Moreover, in all countries some form of collective interest representation is in place, counterbalancing the unilateral power of the state as employer and allowing for some negotiation with regard to pay and working conditions.

Table 8.3 Dimensions of Change in Public Employment Regulation: Police, Germany

<b>Dimensions and characteristics</b>	<b>Pre-1990s</b>	<b>Early 2010s</b>
<b>1. Regulation of employment conditions</b>		
Legal status	Civil servant ( <i>Beamter</i> )	Civil servant ( <i>Beamter</i> )
Collective regulations	Authoritative/unilateral	Authoritative/unilateral
Regulation of labour conflicts	No right to strike	No right to strike
<b>2. Personnel system</b>		
Mode of advancement	Career-based	Career-based
Openness	None	Low for core policing tasks; High in specialized areas such as IT, forensics, strategic planning
<b>3. Personnel management</b>		
Entry requirements	Formalized, low	Formalized, high ( <i>Abitur</i> )
Recruitment	Special police training pathway	Special police training pathway
Pay structure	Determined by law	Determined by law
Evaluation and assessment	Seniority rules	Performance-based but on collective level (units, not single staff)
Performance incentives	None	None
Opportunities for promotion	Seniority-based	Seniority-based but focusing more on performance in case of competing candidates
Further education	Legally determined, standardized	Legally determined, customized
<b>4. Integration function of public employment regime</b>		
Payment, social security	High	High
Employment security	High	High
Equal opportunity and treatment at the workplace	Low	High, but mismatch between equal opportunity programmes (talk) and diversity within the forces (action)
<b>5. Specificity of public employment regime</b>		
Difference as compared to private sector employment regime	High	High

Reluctance in the alignment to the ideal type service provider is also observed in the pay structure, where no major changes occurred. Only in Sweden does the introduction of individual performance-related pay systems as a significant characteristic for the service provider model go beyond mere rhetoric. In the other countries, performance-related incentives are small and only apply to the higher ranks, whereas on the level of the police units, if at all, small collective rewards dominate. This reflects the understanding of police work as teamwork, as well as caveats with regard to performance measurement, especially when it is linked to crime rates and crime solving.

Nevertheless, in all four countries, the focus on collective performance has strengthened, and either New Police Management as in the United Kingdom (Metcalf 2004), the balanced scorecard or comparable models, or value-for-money concepts were introduced to improve the police units' performances and to identify 'objective' results for legitimizing the distribution of resources.

Further *commonalities* in the development of employment in this sector refer to recruitment and training. In all countries except the United Kingdom (where everyone can apply if he or she fulfils the general physical requirements and only a few authorities have started introducing compulsory certificates), entry requirements have increased, and in all countries training has become more professionalized. Likewise, further training has been enhanced, strengthening the role of both compulsory and voluntary continuing education.

Table 8.4 Dimensions of Change in Public Employment Regulation: Police, France

Dimensions and characteristics	Pre-1990s	Early 2010s
<b>1. Regulation of employment conditions</b>		
Legal status	Civil servant ( <i>Fonctionnaire; Fonction publique d'Etat</i> )	Civil servant ( <i>Fonctionnaire</i> ): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Police Nationale</i> (PN): <i>Fonction publique d'Etat</i>;</li> <li>• <i>Police Municipale</i> (PM): <i>Fonction publique territoriale</i></li> </ul> Public employee ( <i>Non-fonctionnaire</i> ): <i>Adjoint de sécurité</i> (ADS)
Collective regulations	Authoritative/unilateral	Authoritative/unilateral
Regulation of labour conflicts	No right to strike	PN: No right to strike PM: Right to strike ADS: Right to strike

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<b>2. Personnel system</b>		
Mode of advancement	<i>Corps</i> model	<i>Corps</i> model
Openness	None, internal examinations	PN: None, internal exam PM: High ADS: High
<b>3. Personnel management</b>		
Entry requirements	Depending on <i>corps</i>	Depending on <i>corps</i>
Recruitment	Special police training pathways	PN, PM, ADS: Special police training pathways
Pay structure	Determined by law	Determined by law
Evaluation and assessment	Seniority rules	PN: Mix of seniority rules and performance-based (for higher ranks) PM: Seniority rules ADS: -
Performance incentives	No	PN: Few for higher ranks, collective rewards on unit level PM: No ADS: No
Opportunities for promotion	Seniority-based, internal exam	PN: Seniority-based, internal exam PM: Internal exam ADS: Internal exam to get into PN
Further education	Legally determined, standardized	Legally determined, standardized
<b>4. Integration function of public employment regime</b>		
Payment, social security	High	PN: High PM: Average, high ADS: Low, low
Employment security	High	PN: High PM: High ADS: Low
Equal opportunity and treatment at the workplace	Low	Low
<b>5. Specificity of public employment regime</b>		
Difference as compared to private sector employment regime	High	PN: High PM: Average ADS: Low

PN: *Police National* ; PM: *Police Municipale* ; ADS: *Adjoint de Sécurité*

Irrespective of these commonalities, important *differences* in the employment regulation and personnel policies can also be observed. To some extent, they are in line with the specificities of the national trajectories in public employment. Thus, the police in Germany and France, in accordance with the persistent bureaucratic features of their civil service in general, still adhere to a career-based system and tend to privilege years served over performance, although the restructuring and condensing of career classes and the growing emphasis on performance contribute to more flexible



and competitive advancement. The police in Sweden and the United Kingdom, in contrast, show a stronger performance orientation and more leeway for position-based advancement, be it by fast track programmes or staffing by external recruitment, corresponding to the more far-reaching change of the national public employment towards a service provider model.

Finally, the emergence of second-class policing jobs in the United Kingdom and France should be mentioned. Characterized by fixed-term contracts, a lack of career prospects, and low wages, they either serve to compensate the lack of numerical and financial flexibility of the established workforce as in the United Kingdom, or to satisfy increasing demands on public security and police presence as is the case in France with the *adjoints de sécurité* (Mouhanna 2011). In both cases, a polarization of the police workforce can be observed. In the United Kingdom this is in line with the general alignment of the public service to private labour market employment conditions, whereas in France this precarious job category departs from the rather privileged and still distinct employment conditions in public employment.

Table 8.5 Dimensions of Change in Public Employment Regulation: Police, Sweden

Dimensions and characteristics	Pre-1990s	Early 2010s
<b>1. Regulation of employment conditions</b>		
Legal status	Employees with some privileges and duties	Employees
Collective regulations	Collective agreements	Collective agreements
Regulation of labour conflicts	Right to strike	No active right to strike due to executive powers
<b>2. Personnel system</b>		
Mode of advancement	Career-based	Front-line police: Career-based Back-office: Position-based for specific tasks (IT, Forensics, Management)
Openness	Closed	Front-line police: Closed Back-office: Opened for some special tasks
<b>3. Personnel management</b>		
Entry requirements	Formalized, low	Formalized, basic qualification for university or equivalent ( <i>Folksskolen</i> )
Recruitment	Special police training pathways	Special police training pathways

		Open for other disciplinary background in some specialised areas
Pay structure	Negotiation-based, centralised	Negotiation-based, agency level, individual
Evaluation and assessment	No	Individual level
Performance incentives	No	Few, higher ranks, collective primes on unit level
Opportunities for promotion	Seniority-based	Individualised, performance-based
Further education	No	Flexible, customised
<b>4. Integration function of public employment regime</b>		
Payment, social security	High	High
Employment security	High	High
Equal opportunity and treatment at the workplace	High	High
<b>5. Specificity of public employment regime</b>		
Difference to private sector employment regime	Low	Lowered

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## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> In most Western European countries, non-sovereign tasks can be delegated to private providers, such as in-house paper work, property policing, or stationary traffic. In some cases, sovereign rights are transferred to private providers by contract, ordinance, or law (such as *Beliehene* in Germany), or the sovereign rights are transferred to the private provider acting as if they are public police (like airport security). On the other hand, some police services can be bought by the public or are subject to a fee. In such cases 'the police retain their legal status and the access this provides to the legitimate use of physical, including deadly, force' (Ayling/Shearing 2008, p. 29).

<sup>2</sup> This is reflected in public (media) representations and male police officers' perceptions of their job. Prominent points of reference are the idea of crime fighting and the exercise of physical force, two strongly gendered functions. Although women today are admitted in all Western European police forces, the professional or 'cop culture' is reported to entail 'doing masculinity' (Manning 2003; Behr 2000).

<sup>3</sup> For the United Kingdom, see Loftus (2009), for Germany, see Künkel (2014), for France, see Fassin (2011), and for Sweden, see Uhnöo (2015).

<sup>4</sup> Information on the police in the UK refers to England and Wales and is based on document analysis and secondary literature.

<sup>5</sup> These *corps* are listed in increasing hierarchical order: the *Corps de maîtrise et d'application* (Authority and Enforcement Corps), the *Corps de commandement et d'encadrement* (Command and Management Corps), and the *Corps de conception et de direction* (Conception and Direction Corps).

<sup>6</sup> Interviews in France were conducted in French, in German in Germany, and in English in Sweden. Translation of the French and German interview quotes are by the authors. For cited interviews, the sector code for police is P, while the country codes are DE for Germany, FR for France, SE for Sweden, and UK for United Kingdom, followed by the number of the interview.

<sup>7</sup> The police organization in Sweden is due to be reformed in 2015. In 2015, there will be one national headquarter and seven regional police areas (SOU 2012, p. 13, *En sammanhållen svensk polis*).

<sup>8</sup> In this chapter, we focus on England and Wales.

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<sup>9</sup> All major police forces in Europe, as well as in the US, Canada, and Australia routinely carry firearms. The exceptions are Britain, the Irish Republic, and New Zealand. In Norway, officers carry arms in their automobiles but not on their person. About 5 per cent of all police officers in England and Wales have the permission to wear guns (see BBC 2012).

<sup>10</sup> Variations apply to the most senior ranks within the Greater London Metropolitan Police Service and within the City of London Police.

<sup>11</sup> In terms of allotted shares to the police, the central government provides 51 per cent directly/an additional 29 per cent indirectly to local authorities; the remaining 20 per cent of funds are paid through the local police precept channelled to the police from local rates and community charges (Hunter 2003, p. 33). Chief constables are to decide how best to use those resources by, *inter alia*, setting staffing levels and the workforce mix; the Home Office does not interfere with staffing decisions.

<sup>12</sup> Outsourcing included the impounding of vehicles, human resources, emergency call handling, and finance capabilities, as well as IT services. For an overview, see the official guidelines of the National Audit Office and HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary (National Audit Office 2013).

<sup>13</sup> The balanced scorecard (BSC) is a strategic performance management tool stemming from business and the private sector and has been extensively used since the 1990s. Generally, it consists of a semi-standard structured report, supported by design methods and automation tools that can be used by managers to keep track of the execution of activities by staff within their control and to monitor the consequences arising from these actions. The agreed characteristics that define a balanced scorecard are: the focus on the strategic agenda of the organization; the selection of a small number of data items to monitor; and a mix of financial and non-financial data items.

<sup>14</sup> Since 2009, the budget and staff management of the *gendarmerie* are under the review of the Ministry of the Interior.

<sup>15</sup> *Loi n° 97-940 du 16 octobre 1997 relative au développement d'activités pour l'emploi des jeunes.*

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<sup>16</sup> *Décret n° 94-732 du 24 août 1994 portant statut particulier du cadre d'emplois des agents de police municipale.*

<sup>17</sup> *Loi n° 95-73 du 21 janvier 1995 d'orientation et de programmation relative à la sécurité.*

<sup>18</sup> *Loi n° 2011-267 du 14 mars 2011 d'orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la sécurité intérieure.*

<sup>19</sup> *Décret n° 2008-1533 du 22 décembre 2008 relatif à la prime de fonctions et de résultats.*

<sup>20</sup> Even though statistics showed no real increase in overall crime rates, the number of threats, violations, and crimes against liberty increased. According to criminal sociology experts, this leads to a general feeling of insecurity in public space (Fritzell et al. 2010, p. 59).

<sup>21</sup> Already in 1954, police training centres were founded in Malmö, Norrköping, Örebro, Gävle, and Luleå. According to Lord (1998), training for police officers was centralized even before local departments were transformed into a national force. By 1962, basic training consisted of eight weeks of academy training and 12 weeks of job training, and an additional course of 21 weeks was offered for constables (Lord 1998).

<sup>22</sup> This trend already started in the 1990s (see Chapter 5, Statskontoret 2010).

<sup>23</sup> 'How to join the police force at a senior level through the direct entry scheme.'

<http://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2014/may/23/how-to-join-police-senior-jobs>, date accessed 22 March 2015

<sup>24</sup> Following public unrest in the 1960s, police schools broadened the curriculum and started to employ teaching practitioners, professionals, psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists (Schulte 1995).

<sup>25</sup> Email communication by the authors with the Swedish National Police Academy on 8 February 2015.

<sup>26</sup> Besides the field training in a police department, the Swedish recruits also work with a local social service agency and judicial agency, facilitating the cooperation among agencies and familiarizing the new officer with the functions and limitations of the other agencies. This exposure to public social

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problems is meant to develop a higher level of understanding and problem-solving skills (Ackerman 1996).

<sup>27</sup> In 1978, against a background of chronic under-payment of police officers with regard to the private sector employees and rapid rises in the cost of living, the Edmund-Davies committee recommended a basic pay increase of up to 45% for police constables. To ensure that their level of pay did not drop to unacceptable levels in the future, Edmund-Davies recommended that police pay should be annually updated in accordance with an index of private sector non-manual worker pay. The government agreed to a 40 per cent phased increase in police earnings following the report, and the new PNB machinery applied a pay formula that linked changes in police pay rates to movements in the average earnings index (for all workers) for the preceding 12 months. This index was modified in 1984 when the underlying index of average earnings was substituted. In 1994, a new formula was introduced, relating police pay increases to non-manual settlements (Hunter 2003, p. 41). Since then, no major changes regarding the pay system were implemented..

<sup>28</sup> The PNB is a United Kingdom non-departmental public body established by an Act of Parliament in 1980 to negotiate the pay and employment terms and conditions of the British police. It is funded by the Department for Work and Pensions, and the Office of Manpower Economics provides the Board with an independent Secretariat. The PNB consists of an independent chairman and deputy chairman, both appointed by the prime minister. They are to supply independent voices in all negotiations.

<sup>29</sup> In detail, competence refers to professional competence and results, commitment to the job, relationships with the public and colleagues, and willingness to learn and adjust to new circumstances. (see MPA 2002)

<sup>30</sup> Currently, six *Länder* have implemented the two-tiered model: Bremen, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony.

<sup>31</sup> The interviewee refers to a reform of age groups relevant for promotion, dating back to 1997 (the so-called *Dienstrechtsreform*, see Chapter 5).



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<sup>32</sup> At the same time, an increase of *non-titulaire (contractuels)* was projected to integrate specialized knowledge more easily without extending the number of civil servants (see increase of civilians between 2005 and 2010, Table 8.1).

<sup>33</sup> For all changes, see Police Nationale 2004.

<sup>34</sup> For the UK, see Cotton (2005) and Walker and Lewis (2012); for France, see Schneider (2014, p. 132); for Germany see Singelstein (2013, pp. 4-5, 9); for Sweden, see Ramalingam (2012, p. 25).

<sup>35</sup> See MET 2012.

<sup>36</sup> According to UNISON police staff, over the course of the early 2010s, about 20 per cent of the workforce has been made redundant. (UNISON 2015). Following the annual governmental reports, the number of sworn police officers made redundant from 2011 to 2012 is 2.9 per cent, as opposed to 4.9 per cent of losses in police staff (Home Office 2013, p. 4).

<sup>37</sup> *Décret n° 2010-1402 du 12 novembre 2010 relatif à la situation de réorientation professionnelle des fonctionnaires de l'Etat.*

<sup>38</sup> *Loi n° 2012-347 du 12 mars 2012 relative à l'accès à l'emploi titulaire et à l'amélioration des conditions d'emploi des agents contractuels dans la fonction publique, à la lutte contre les discriminations et portant diverses dispositions relatives à la fonction publique.*

<sup>39</sup> There is strong evidence that police culture tends to encourage stereotypical, masculine values like aggression, physical activity, strong heterosexual orientations, paternalistic attitudes towards women, and prejudices against marginalized people and people of colour. Those values strengthen in-groups with exclusionary effects towards out-groups like women and ethnic minorities (Rabe-Hemp 2007; Silvestri et al. 2013; Fassin 2011; Loftus 2008).

<sup>40</sup> We are not including disability-related policies. Such policies are systematically not of relevance when it comes to core police work due to the physical exigencies of the work. For the rest of the civilian police staff, the general policies of the public sector apply.

<sup>41</sup> See *Gesetz zur Umsetzung europäischer Richtlinien zur Verwirklichung des Grundsatzes der Gleichbehandlung* (EUGleichbUmsG) (2006), BGBl. I: 1897, and *Gesetz zur Durchsetzung der*

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*Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern (Gleichstellungsdurchsetzungsgesetz, DGleiG) (2001), BGBl. I: 3234.*

<sup>42</sup> Findings from a study on women in the German police indicate that women are structurally under-evaluated when it comes to job assessments and thus are disadvantaged with respect to promotions (Tondorf/Jochmann-Döll 2013).