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Dynastic Politics: Family Ties in the Greek Parliament, 2000-2012
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Abstract:
Fluctuations in the presence of dynastic politicians in national legislatures are seen as an important indicator of political modernisation. Drawing on original biographical details of Greek Members of Parliament (MPs) from the six most recent parliamentary terms we document the existence of a substantial and relatively stable pool of dynastic MPs. Their numbers only appear to shrink, albeit not too dramatically, in the 2012 elections, which also marked the collapse of the traditional party system. Findings highlight patterns of stability that have remained unnoticed under more visible shifts in party competition during the economic crisis.

Keywords:
Greece, Crisis, Members of Parliament, Elections, Elites, Political Families
This contribution takes a systematic look at a core feature of Greek politics, namely dynastic Members of Parliament (MPs). Dynastic MPs are defined here as deputies from a family that has at least another close member serving in the same or in a previous parliamentary term.

Empirical studies of the phenomenon find a substantial presence of dynastic politicians across national legislatures. Having largely ignored the Greek case, these analyses conclude that individuals from a political family enjoy career advantages in various regime types ranging from single-party states to mature democracies (Clubok, Wilensky & Berghorn 1969; Camp 1982; Tanner & Feder 1993; Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 2009; Feinstein 2010; for a systematic study of Greek politics that also covers dynastic parliamentarians see Legg 1969). Regarding the substantive implications of the phenomenon, dynastic politicians are considered a form of traditional political authority. A decline in their numbers is treated as evidence of the modernisation of the political system.

This paper employs original biographical data to document the presence of dynastic MPs in the Greek parliament at the beginning of six recent sessions: 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, May 2012, and June 2012. Greece is studied as a critical case (Eckstein 1975). A cultural setting where kinship is still central and an electoral system where voters are free to choose individual candidates rather than closed party lists, the country serves as a most-likely instance of observing an extensive dynastic phenomenon in twenty-first century Europe (Mouzelis 1986; Lyrintzis 1991; Nitsiakos 1993). A key question examined is whether the trend that applies to other Western democracies for which we have systematic
information also applies to Greece. Put differently, is the pool of dynastic MPs shrinking over time and, by extension, is this evidence of political modernisation?

We focus on the six general elections that took place between 2000 and 2012 as the early twenty-first century marks a period of important changes for Greece. It starts very positively with the country’s qualification for Eurozone entry and relatively high rates of economic growth among South European countries. This gives way to deteriorating public finances and an international bailout in 2010, followed by profound fiscal consolidation, a severe, protracted recession, and record levels of public disaffection with the political class. The two electoral races of 2012, the most recent ones to date, effectively mark the collapse of the traditional party system (Lyrintzis 2011; Pappas 2013). Studying the dynastic phenomenon between 2000 and 2012 allows us to observe its dynamics during a transformative period for the country.

The structure of the paper is as follows. An overview of existing scholarship examines the parliamentary presence of dynastic politicians across party systems. The text continues with a discussion of the Greek context in cultural, historical and current terms in order to justify case selection. This is followed by a description of the biographical data and then, by key results. We find that kinship ties among Greek legislators are extensive and resilient over time. We also witness a modest drop in the numbers of dynastic MPs in the 2012 elections. We acknowledge that it is too early to determine whether the 2012 elections have set off a long-term dynastic decline. The conclusion considers various limitations of the
analysis, along with implications for our understanding of developments in comparable settings.

**Dynastic Office in Comparative Perspective**

Empirical analyses of family connections among politicians cover a wide variety of cases that range from the United States (Clubok, Wilensky & Berghorn 1969; Kurtz 1989; Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 2009; Feinstein 2010), various Latin American countries (for example, see Camp 1982), Ireland (Gallagher 1985, 2003), Britain (Guttsman 1963), India (Chhibber 2013), China (Tanner & Feder 1993), Taiwan (Li & White 1988), the Philippines (Querubin 2010), and Japan (Isibashi & Reed 1992). There is wide variation in the measurement of kinship ties among elected politicians. Differences in operationalisation often impede direct comparisons across studies. For instance, while most systematic works employ censuses of elected members of the national legislature, others also examine governors (Querubin 2010), party officials (Tanner & Feder 1993) or those in ‘public service’ including diplomats (Guttsman 1963). Similar inconsistencies affect what counts as a ‘relative’ or ‘close relative’, with some definitions being more precise and restrictive than others.

The electoral advantage of dynastic politicians has been explained with reference to various types of capital transfers from first generation legislators to their offspring (Putnam 1976; Laband & Lentz 1985; Kurtz 1989; Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 2009; Feinstein 2010). These transfers include: i) political capital (family contacts within the party machine, and across donor and canvassing networks; constituent loyalty to the family
‘brand’ name); and ii) human capital (socialisation that develops a heightened sense of civic duty; political knowledge and efficacy; and generally a ‘talent’ for politics).

On the basis of the most recent and robust evidence, political capital flows appear to be the key explanation of dynastic advantage (Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 2009; Feinstein 2010). That is to say, dynastic candidates are more likely to be elected in parliament on the basis of their membership to a social category per se (family links to other MPs) rather than on the basis of superior abilities developed through that membership. The implications for the quality of democracy are negative. Political capital transfers imply that power becomes ‘self-perpetuating’: belonging to a political family allows you to have a career in politics irrespective of - even despite – personal abilities (Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Snyder 2009, p. 115).

Inherited political power is considered a threat to equality and representation. The existence of dynastic politicians violates basic principles upheld by modern liberal democracies. Specifically, the dynastic presence means that political personnel are recruited on the basis of ascriptive rather than universal criteria. The political class is ‘closed’ to outsiders and overrepresents insiders (self-reproducing, oligarchic tendencies). This, in a negative feedback mechanism, discourages political involvement from outsiders. More generally, power is distributed unfairly. In this sense, the presence of political families in a legislature has been used as a rough measure of political modernisation. A decline in the numbers of dynastic politicians is interpreted as a sign of the opening up
of the party system to a broader mass of citizens, and of the erosion of traditional, non rational political loyalties, such as those based on local, familial, ethnic or religious foundations (Clubok, Wilensky & Berghorn 1969, p. 1038; cf. Huntington 1966).

Regarding the prevalence of the phenomenon, Isibashi and Reed (1992) report the dynastic presence in the Japanese Diet at 45 per cent. Querubin (2010) cites an even higher figure for the Philippines, where more than half of all elected members of Congress and governors are preceded by a relative in office. These political systems, however, are not ideal as points of comparison with the Greek context.

To review more comparable countries we turn to Western democracies. Some of these cases, such as Ireland and the USA, resemble Greece even further in the sense that election to office there requires high personal visibility. Starting with Ireland, the dynastic presence in the Dail fell slightly from 25 per cent in 1982 to 22 per cent in 2002 (Gallagher 1985, 2003). A similar pattern of dynastic erosion has been found in the Netherlands in the 1970s (Leijenaar & Niemöller 2003). An extensive study of the United States documents 24 per cent dynastic members serving in Congress during 1790, a number that becomes 14 per cent by 1860, and five per cent by 1960 (Clubok, Wilensky & Berghorn 1969). Dogan’s analysis (1979) of French ministerial careers finds a similar decline in the percentage of dynastic Cabinet members between 1870 and 1978. In Britain, the curtailment of the number of hereditary peers in the unelected House of Lords (House of Lords Act 1999), and the long-term weakening of the upper house’s formal powers (see ‘weak bicameralism’
in Lijphart 1999) point to a declining dynastic trend. In all cases, these developments can be interpreted as evidence of the modernisation of the political system.

**The Greek Case**

The following section provides an overview of the Greek setting in cultural, historical and current terms in order to justify case selection and to offer a detailed description of the 2000-2012 period covered by the data.

*A Dynastic Tradition*

Numerous works highlight the pivotal role of the ‘southern family’ model, an ideal type that applies to Greece and to other countries of the Mediterranean region (Campbell 1964; Peristiany 1976; Nitsiakos 1993). Key features of this model of family organisation include strong intergenerational ties and a collectivist ethos, which extend to matters of social care, welfare support and business transactions.

The family is equally prominent in Greek politics not least because of the foundational role of local clans in modern Greek history. With its origins in the nineteenth century, the country’s political system revolved around the extensive clientelist networks built by a number of notable families (*tzakia*). These families had played an important role during the war of independence from Ottoman rule in 1821-1832 (Mouzelis 1986; Lyrintzis 1991).¹ The major electoral advantage of individuals from a political family was their access to client-patron mechanisms built by other family members. Mouzelis defines the phenomenon in more general terms
as ‘oligarchic parliamentary rule’ to describe a political arrangement developed in Greece and other countries of the semi-periphery after their independence. Oligarchic parliamentary rule featured a number of political families that used their local power to constrain and channel mass (lower class, typically agrarian) political participation, but retained a formal system of apparently pluralistic representation (Mouzelis 1986, p. 3).

The era of oligarchic parliamentarism came gradually to an end in Greece with the rise of new, middle-class social forces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Mouzelis 1986, p. 42). In line with this observation, Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2002), who update data from Legg (1969), report that between 1878 and 1910 more than half of all Cabinet ministers came from political families. The dynastic tendency at ministerial level shows a steady decline after that period (Sotiropoulos & Bourikos 2002, pp. 194-195).

However, the presence of political families benefiting from established patronage networks remained more prominent in parliament. Though the data are fragmentary, Legg reports four in ten deputies in 1964 as coming from a political family (Legg 1969, pp. 265-271). The dynastic component of that parliament, which was concentrated in the two main parties, was even higher than in a previous election held in 1958. Although applying an unclear operational definition of political family ties, Legg documents a clear electoral advantage of candidates from political families during that period.

The dynastic presence in parliament survived the collapse of the military regime in 1974 and the transition to democratic politics. In the
first elections that were held after the military regime even the new, socialist party that would soon dominate Greek politics included MPs descending from established political families of the pre-dictatorship era. This seems to have reflected an effort by the party leader, a dynastic politician himself, to capitalise on name recognition and old patronage networks in his party’s first electoral contests (Pappas 2009, pp. 321-323). For the entire period that begins in 1974 and up to 2004, political commentators report a summary figure of 193 dynastic members in a total of 1,191 MPs from all parties, or approximately 16 per cent (Tziovaras & Chiotis 2004, p. 39). A comparison of this figure with Legg’s account suggests a declining, but still sizeable parliamentary presence over time.

Regarding prime-ministers in the same period, Table 1 shows that six out of eight Greek prime ministers since 1974 have been close relatives of political figures that preceded them in politics. One of the exceptions to this trend, Konstantinos Karamanlis, was himself the founder of the Karamanlis political dynasty.

[Table 1 about here]

From a more qualitative perspective (cf. Clogg 1987, p. 143), we note that supporters in the electorate and the media still distinguish among prime ministers from the same family using forenames only: for example, ‘Andreas’ for Andreas Papandreou to differentiate him from his father and his son. In other words, the family name is taken for granted. Dynasty
founders or senior members of a political family are often referred to as ‘geros’ (old man). For instance, the label is still used today for Georgios Papandreou (1888-1968) and Konstantinos Karamanlis (1907-1998). The use of ‘geros’ is also common at constituency level to refer to older generation MPs in cases where candidates share the same family name. Finally, family names serve as typical labels that demarcate factions, not necessarily ideological in nature, within parties. Examples are ‘Papandreikoi’ or ‘Karamanlikoi’, which are semi-formal labels still in use today.2

The Electoral Context: 2000 to 2012

After seven years of military rule, the country’s transition to democratic politics in 1974 and particularly the 1981 election marked the birth of a dominant feature of contemporary Greek politics that survived until recently: a succession of strong single-party governments formed either by ND (Νέα Δημοκρατία – New Democracy, centre right) or PASOK (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα - Panhellenic Socialist Movement, centre left) (Pappas 2003). These two cartel parties, ‘being in control of a generous state keen to distribute political rents’ (Pappas 2013, p. 42), were highly successful in elections as evident in their combined share of the national vote, typically above 80 per cent. For instance, the combined share of the vote for ND and PASOK was 87 per cent in 2000 and a relatively ‘meagre’ 77 per cent in 2009. Table 2 gives a summary of recent general election results.
The operation of the Greek political system in the last three decades, built around the iteration in office of ND and PASOK up to and including the 2009 election, has been identified as a key domestic explanation of the ongoing economic crisis. Particular features of the system have been highlighted including ‘the fiscal profligacy of the Greek state, clientelism and corruption, the populist practices of the Greek political parties, [and] the inefficiency of the state machine’ (Kyritzis 2011, p. 2). Along with EU-related processes, Pappas describes two key mechanisms that explain the survival of the system for such a long time, as well as its sudden collapse:

A state bent on handing out political rents to practically every member of society; and a party system built to ensure the distribution of these rents in an orderly and democratic way—that is, by turns rather than in one go. Taken together, these two mechanisms led to a fine coordination of aims between the political class and the vast majority of Greeks, enabling both sides to exploit the state and its resources in a seemingly non-zero-sum fashion (Pappas 2013, p. 33).

Once the global recession of 2008/2009 reached Europe, the dire state of the country’s finances was quickly revealed. These combined an upwardly revised budget deficit and an unsustainable debt burden. Faced
with the risk of disorderly default, PASOK and, later, ND supported the implementation of an extensive austerity programme. The programme was attached to the acceptance of an international bailout package in May 2010. The prolonged economic recession that ensued turned rapidly into unprecedented social unrest and public frustration with the political establishment. Eurobarometer data for Greece suggest a collapse of trust towards the key components of the political system (political parties, parliament and government). Table 3 provides evidence of this decline with 2010 marking a defining moment.

[Table 3 about here]

After a few months of caretaker government with the support of the two major parties, voters expressed their resentment in the general election of May 2012. The contest led to a hung parliament, a very rare occurrence in Greek politics of the post-1974 period. ND came first in that election. SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς – Radical Left Coalition), the main anti-bailout party, emerged as the second most popular party, while PASOK finished third – for the first time since the 1970s. The repeat election of June 2012 led to another hung parliament, but also strengthened SYRIZA’s position as second party and as leading party of the opposition. A three-party coalition government was eventually formed after the June 2012 election with the support of ND, PASOK and DIMAR (Δημοκρατική Αριστερά - Democratic Left).
The June 2012 electoral contest was not conducted under the same rules as the other races examined here as it involved closed party lists. The previous elections had allowed voters to mark preferred candidates from a specific party. Inclusion and order of appearance of candidate names in the June 2012 lists was based on the results of the May 2012 election. This led to minimal discrepancies between the results of the two races that were held in 2012. Although the results of the two elections mark two different parliamentary terms (14th and 15th respectively), we will treat the two elections of 2012 as a single observation.

A Familiar Pattern of Decline?
The dynastic phenomenon appears to be in secular decline in most liberal democracies for which there is systematic evidence. The few relevant studies of twentieth century Greece, although not directly comparable due to dissimilar or unclear definitions of the dynastic variable, also imply a similar trend (Legg 1969; Tziovaras & Chiotis 2004). There is reason to expect that this trend continues in twenty-first century Greece, especially due to the most recent developments in the country.

In particular, the two elections of 2012 were conducted under record levels of voter dissatisfaction with the political establishment (see reports by Dinas & Rori 2013; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2013). The two races were fought along a novel fault line: pro-bailout/pro-austerity against anti-bailout/anti-austerity. The combined share of the vote for ND and PASOK fell to 32 per cent in May 2012, and to 42 per cent in June 2012 (see Table 2). The post-2010 period is seen by commentators as marking
the end of the *Metapolitefsi*, the political arrangement that followed the transition to democracy in 1974 (Lyrintzis 2011; Mavris 2012; Pappas 2013). The repeated inability of ND or PASOK to form a single-party majority government in the 2012 races, the rise of the left, and the entry of a larger than usual number of minor parties in parliament have been interpreted as an electoral indictment of the ‘old regime’ and its practices.

In this setting dynastic politicians might offer a clear target for electoral punishment. Previous research has noted the electoral implications of deteriorating economic conditions, especially their punitive consequences for the political actors seen as responsible. Economic shocks such as sovereign defaults, depressions and the fiscal responses to these conditions can undermine the stability of autocracies and democracies alike; within democratic polities, these shocks can increase electoral volatility and political extremism (see examples in O’Donnell 1973; Linz 1978; Lewis-Beck 1988; Jackman & Volpert 1996; Bosco and Verney 2012; Lewis-Beck, Costa Lobo & Bellucci 2012). Since the Greek political class is publicly seen as responsible for the crisis and its management, and dynastic politicians serve as archetypal representatives of that class, voters may be particularly reluctant to vote for those politicians. This applies especially to dynastic politicians that belong to extended political families due to their salient, decades-long presence in parliament and the well-known patronage networks that surround them.

A note is in order. We cannot test the mediating, micro-level mechanism regarding the way in which voters attribute responsibility for the ongoing crisis and its management. We remain agnostic as to
individual motives: voters may blame the political establishment for mismanaging the country’s economy in past decades or, more cynically, they may blame it for its current inability to distribute rents under austerity. However, we are able to observe the hypothesised outcome of these mechanisms as a decline in the number of dynastic MPs in the two ‘austerity’ elections of 2012 compared to the pre-crisis elections. The decline should take place despite the electoral advantages associated with belonging to a political family.

Data

The dataset documents the number of dynastic MPs at the beginning of six recent parliamentary terms. Since Greece lacks the equivalent to the British History of Parliament series or the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, we had to collect primary information on kinship ties for the universe of MPs elected in the six races.

The six general elections marked the start of the respective parliamentary terms (terms 10 to 15). The maintaining election of 2000 was closely won by the incumbent party (PASOK). The 2004 election produced an alternation in government between PASOK (outgoing) and ND (incoming). The maintaining election of 2007 was won by the incumbent party (ND). The 2009 election produced an alternation between ND (outgoing) and PASOK (incoming). These elections allowed us to compare any changes in the phenomenon of interest in typical races of the post-1974 period. To cover the crisis period we collected data for the May 2012 election and the June 2012 election (the current term at the
time of writing), the only ones conducted so far. Any conclusion we draw from this more recent period can only be tentative.

The dataset contains information on whether each elected MP has a family connection with another MP of the current or a previous term. We collected kinship information from public sources such as personal websites and official biographies. When this failed to produce conclusive information, we contacted Library of Parliament staff and, when possible, the MPs themselves.

The operational definition of a ‘dynastic politician’ used here is narrow enough to facilitate application across party systems and over time (cf. Kurtz 1989). According to this definition, a dynastic MP comes from a family with two or more members who hold or have held a seat in parliament. Kinship is defined on the basis of two criteria: one consanguineous, more specifically descent from a common grandparent through the male or female line; another affinal, that is relationship by marriage, including current or former spouse, brother/sister in law, father/mother in law, son/daughter in law. Applying these criteria, second cousins do not count as relatives as they do not come from a common grandparent. First cousins do. The definition was not applied retrospectively. For instance, consider two MPs, A and B, who are related. A was elected at time t, while B was elected at time t-1. Using the present definition, B does not count as a dynastic MP at time t-1. In short, B becomes a dynastic MP only once A also enters parliament.

We also distinguish between a hard and a soft form of dynastic status. In particular, we record whether a dynastic MP is related to more than one
other MP (‘multiple’ dynastic) or not (‘single’ dynastic). This allows us to capture extended political families (‘multiple’), which usually have a long-standing presence in parliament, and to differentiate those families from one-off connections between two MPs (‘single’). The former can be considered as the core of the dynastic phenomenon. For an illustration of the family networks around ‘multiple’ dynastic MPs, and their hereditary and lasting nature, see the diagram in Figure 1.

Finally, we note the fact that the communist KKE (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας - Communist Party of Greece) was banned from participating in elections for the decades that followed WWII and the Civil War, and until the collapse of military rule in 1974. Therefore, MPs related to historically prominent but formally unelected KKE members cannot be classified as ‘dynastic’ in our dataset. On the whole, the restrictive definition of kinship applied in the present analysis (close family ties among elected MPs going back a maximum of two generations) possibly underestimates the extent of the dynastic phenomenon.

**Results**

This section begins with some general observations. By far the most common type of kinship ties among MPs is between parent and child, and predominantly between father and son. This applies to more than half of the dynastic politicians that we identified in each election. These vertical
ties fit with what the literature describes as hereditary (intergenerational) capital flows between MPs.

There are three main ways in which family connections appear in parliament in the period covered. First, the junior dynastic MP enters the fray only once the senior MP has withdrawn from electoral competition altogether. For an example of this very common pattern of succession, see case F15 in the Appendix. This particular SYRIZA MP was elected for the first time in parliament in 2012, while her father was last elected in the same constituency in 2004. Second, the junior MP successfully contests the same election as the senior MP, in the senior MP’s traditional constituency, but the latter has now moved to a different constituency. For an example see case F28 in the Appendix. This ND MP was elected for the first time in parliament in 2000, in the same constituency that his father used to hold, but the latter had already moved successfully to a different constituency in that same year. In a third way, two MPs from the same family successfully compete in the same election and in the same multimember constituency. For example, cases F10 and F11, from ND and PASOK respectively, are first cousins.

Table 4 contains a summary of results discussed in this section (see a separate Appendix for the full list of dynastic MPs). The percentages in the bottom row of Table 4 compare directly the six elections. The overall presence of dynastic MPs in parliament remained unchanged from 2000 to 2009 (14% to 16% of all seats were dynastic, i.e. more than 40 seats in each term). This fell to nine and ten per cent in May 2012 and June 2012 respectively. The modest decline in 2012, which could be either a one-off
result or the start of a trend, took place in a climate of economic recession and austerity, social unrest and the collapse of the two-party system, which was mostly driven by the collapse of the PASOK vote.  

[Table 4 about here]

The partisan distribution of dynastic MPs is noteworthy. The major concentration of dynastic MPs in the pre-crisis elections of 2000 and 2009 is found in the two major parties, ND and PASOK. Roughly one in five ND legislators and one in ten PASOK legislators are dynastic. These ratios remain similar in the two austerity elections of May and June 2012 despite the declining electoral share of both parties. Also worth noting is that three of the four parties that gained entry in parliament in 2004 were headed by ‘multiple’ dynastic MPs, i.e. legislators related to more than one other MP (cases B1, B15 and B35 in the Appendix). In 2007 and 2009 each of the two major parties was also headed by a ‘multiple’ dynastic member.

Could the modest dynastic decline in 2012 mean that voters turned their backs on dynastic MPs – the latter, in one interpretation, seen as the embodiment of a political system responsible for the economic crisis? Rather than only looking at levels across different elections, we also compared what happened to individual MPs over time. In detail, we examined directly whether dynastic MPs were affected differently by the crisis compared to non dynastic MPs. We compared the 2009 contest, the final election before the crisis, and the June 2012 contest, the most
bitterly fought election in the crisis period, which also did not return ND and PASOK as the two most popular parties. This comparison allowed us to determine whether dynastic MPs elected in 2009 were equally likely to survive in June 2012 as their non-dynastic counterparts. The percentage splits in Table 5 suggest that a dynastic MP elected in 2009 (second row) was slightly more likely to achieve re-election in June 2012 compared to a non-dynastic MP (first row).

This is confirmed further if we adopt a more fine-tuned approach. The third and fourth rows in Table 5 split the dynastic MPs of 2009 into ‘single’ (related to only one other MP) and ‘multiple’ (related to more than one other MP) respectively. While eight in ten ‘single’ dynastic MPs failed to get re-elected, ‘multiple’ dynastic MPs survived the election of June 2012 with minimal losses – only one failed to get re-elected.7

The importance of distinguishing between ‘single’ and ‘multiple’ ties becomes clearer in Figure 2. The trend indicates that the percentage of ‘multiple’ dynastic MPs (dashed line) remains stable across the six elections. This implies the existence of an advantage of extended political families regarding their members’ success in parliament even in unstable times, compared to all other MP types (‘single’ dynastic or non-dynastic). In total, if we exclude one-off family connections between two single MPs (solid thin line), the dynastic persistence becomes clearer especially during the collapse of the traditional two-party system.
We note here that the dynastic advantage is not simply about securing a seat in parliament. As the literature suggests, belonging to a political family can also determine promotion to ministerial office and other salient posts (Legg 1969; Sotiropoulos & Bourikos 2002). Focusing on the parliamentary class that came out of the most recent election, that of June 2012, we will compare the careers of ‘single’ and ‘multiple’ dynastic MPs. This exercise takes into account the Cabinet reshuffle that took place in June 2014. While six in 14 ‘single’ dynastic members have served or are serving in junior or senior Cabinet posts, the ratio among ‘multiple’ dynastic MPs is a striking 14 in 17. This implies a clear career advantage for the latter dynastic group. However, ‘multiple’ dynastic MPs tend to come overwhelmingly from ND or PASOK, and would be more likely to have served in ministerial positions for that reason alone rather than for their dynastic status. To control for this, we limit our comparison only to dynastic MPs that come from PASOK and ND. This produces a similar pattern. While five in eight ‘single’ dynastic members have served or are serving currently in Cabinet positions, the ratio among ‘multiple’ dynastic MPs is 14 in 15. Belonging to the latter category seems to help promote one’s political career, although the advantage is not as pronounced as in the case of simple re-election.

All this leads to a cautious conclusion. It appears that a series of seismic changes – the sharp decline of the electoral share of the former
parties of government, the rise of a radical left party as the main opposition party for the first time since 1958, and the entry of various protest parties in parliament – have not challenged the substantial presence of dynastic members in the Greek parliament. ‘Multiple’ dynastic MPs seem to be particularly resilient in this respect. Although we have not examined directly the relative validity of standard explanations of the dynastic electoral advantage (human or political capital flows), the electoral resilience of such MPs implies that this advantage remains potent in good times (2000 to 2009) and in bad ones; for instance, under record levels of voter dissatisfaction. In fact, the modest drop that was documented in 2012 seems to be an artefact of simple ‘incumbent punishment’ as expressed in the electoral collapse of PASOK - the governing party that negotiated and first signed the international bailout terms, and then applied the austerity programme - rather than an indictment of dynastic politicians or of the old regime per se.

Discussion
The study used biographical details of MPs elected in 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009 and 2012 (May and June) to document the extent of the dynastic presence in the Greek parliament. We found that the phenomenon was not negligible, and that it was remarkably stable over time, and in comparison with previous research (Tziovaras & Chiotis 2004). The timing of the most recent elections also allowed us to ask whether the extent of the phenomenon had been affected by the economic downturn and the ongoing implementation of the austerity programme. Family ties among
parliamentarians became less common in the 2012 races compared to the elections that preceded the economic crisis, although this did not apply to ‘multiple’ ties, that is to say those referring to notable political families, which remained stable. In addition, the modest overall decline of dynastic MPs was not as sharp as the decline of the combined share of the vote for ND and PASOK, the latter party suffering more. We take this as an indication of the relative persistence of the phenomenon despite the predicted eroding effect of the economic shock. Future election results will allow more meaningful conclusions on this point.

The analysis leaves some unexamined aspects. First, practical constraints led to the use of a narrow definition of ‘dynastic politician’, which also ignored candidates. Second, six elections might not offer a long enough time-span in which to detect changes in the dynamics of the phenomenon. Also, using a single year (2012) to tap trends in the ‘crisis’ era neglects the finding of previous research that dynastic erosion is of a glacial nature. We might be able to observe a clear decline in the numbers of dynastic MPs as future data points come in. Inversely, we might observe an increase in their ranks if the country re-enters normal politics; for instance, once party formations become more stabilised. Finally, we are aware that part of our argument is based on inferences about what motivates political behaviour without having access to the relevant empirical information. To overcome this limitation, we would need to analyse survey responses on popular stereotypes of the Greek political class with special reference to political families and their patronage networks. To our knowledge, this information simply does not exist.
Limitations notwithstanding, the relative resilience of dynastic politicians permits some tentative conclusions. The findings suggest that an economic shock, which then turns into a political crisis, cannot mitigate the dynastic electoral advantage at least in the short term. This is rather impressive since the 2012 results registered some remarkable changes in the Greek political landscape and are commonly interpreted as a watershed moment. In the same context, it seems that stereotypes of dynastic politicians as key elements of an apparently dysfunctional political system do not matter negatively at the polls, even though that ‘system’ is typically condemned in public discourse as the cause of the country’s current predicament (cf. Konstantinidis & Xezonakis 2013).

The absence of comparable systematic information from other European countries, along with the labour-intensive nature of collecting the required biographical details, hinders direct crossnational comparisons. However, case studies of the dynastic presence in similar contexts will be able to determine whether Greece is *sui generis* regarding dynastic resilience in twenty-first century Europe, especially under major economic and political system shifts.

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References


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<tr>
<th>Name (tenure as PM)</th>
<th>Preceding generation in politics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Konstantinos Karamanlis (1974-1980)</td>
<td>[None preceding] a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgios Rallis (1980-81)</td>
<td>Father (MP); uncle (premier); grandfathers (premiers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreas Papandreou (1981-89; 1993-96)</td>
<td>Father (premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konstantinos Mitsotakis (1990-93)</td>
<td>Father (MP); uncle (MP); grandfathers (MPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostas Simitis (1996-2004)</td>
<td>[None preceding] b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostas Karamanlis (2004-09)</td>
<td>Uncle (premier); uncle (MP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Papandreou (2009-11)</td>
<td>Father (premier); grandfather (premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonis Samaras (2012-present)</td>
<td>Uncle (MP); grandfather (MP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table excludes unelected heads of collaborationist (WWII), caretaker, transitional and national unity governments.
a: Karamanlis also served as Prime Minister in the pre-dictatorship era. He was related by marriage (1951) to the Kanellopoulos and Gounaris political families. This however happened decades after he was first elected in parliament (1935). Clogg (1987: 47) still considers this as another example of the dynastic nature of modern Greek politics.

b: This is a debatable point. Georgios Simitis, father of Kostas Simitis, was a member of the (unofficial) Communist-influenced government that, following elections, ruled large parts of Greece in the end of World War II.
Table 2 Recent Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PASOK (centre left)</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(158)#</td>
<td>(117)</td>
<td>(102)</td>
<td>(160)#</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(33)#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND (centre right)</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(125)</td>
<td>(165)#</td>
<td>(152)#</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
<td>(129)#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE (communist)</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN/SYRIZA (radical left)</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOS (radical right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Greeks (nationalist right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Dawn (far right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMAR (left)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(17)#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: Cell entries show vote shares, with seats in parentheses. The first party receives a bonus in seats. A majority government needs 151 of a total of 300 seats.

#: In government

Source: Official results
Table 3 Declining Trust in the Political System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries show the percentage of those who tend to trust the institution. Other responses are excluded (tend not to trust/don’t know).

Source: Eurobarometer, annual averages. Question: ‘For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PASOK (centre left)</td>
<td>17/158</td>
<td>13/117</td>
<td>12/102</td>
<td>20/160</td>
<td>5/41</td>
<td>3/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND (centre right)</td>
<td>29/125</td>
<td>29/165</td>
<td>33/152</td>
<td>18/91</td>
<td>17/108</td>
<td>20/129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE (communist)</td>
<td>1/11</td>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>0/22</td>
<td>2/21</td>
<td>1/26</td>
<td>1/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN/SYRIZA (radical left)</td>
<td>0/6</td>
<td>1/6</td>
<td>1/14</td>
<td>0/13</td>
<td>2/52</td>
<td>5/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOS (radical right)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0/10</td>
<td>1/15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Greeks (nationalist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/33</td>
<td>0/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Dawn (far right)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2/21</td>
<td>2/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMAR (left)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0/19</td>
<td>0/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>47/300</td>
<td>44/300</td>
<td>46/300</td>
<td>41/300</td>
<td>28/300</td>
<td>31/300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% dynastic MPs)</td>
<td>(16%)</td>
<td>(15%)</td>
<td>(15%)</td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td>(9%)</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Cell entries show the ratio of dynastic MPs to the total number of MPs for each party

*Source:* Online Appendix
### Table 5: Dynastic MPs More Likely to Survive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MP type (2009)</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non dynastic</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Base=259]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynastic</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Base=41]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single dynastic</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Base=26]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple dynastic</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Base=15]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[N=300]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: A 'multiple' dynastic MP is related to more than one other MP.*

*Source: Online Appendix*
**Figure 1** An example of multiple kinship ties among MPs

Note: The kinship network in the above example extends to local government (excluded from the diagram).
Figure 2 Kinship ties and electoral survival

Note: A ‘multiple’ dynastic MP is related to more than one other MP.

Source: Online Appendix
These included, among others, the Avgerinos, Zaimis, Deligiannis, Mavrokoridatos, Mavromichalis, Koumoundouros, Stefanopoulos, Theotokis, Trikoupis, and Tsatsos families.

The following observation comes from ethnographic fieldwork in central Greece during local mayoral elections in the 1980s (Nitsiakos 1993, pp. 66-67). Due to the small scale of the electorate taking part in local contests, it was sometimes easy to predict the final distribution of votes purely on the basis of kinship networks. The alignment between kinship and political support was so close that on those rare occasions when members of one network broke ranks and voted for the candidate of another network, trouble ensued.

For an illustration of the rather unpopular transformations that have been taking place since 2010 with the aim of fiscal consolidation, the government suspended all new appointments for 2010 in the public sector (central government, municipalities, public companies, local governments, state agencies and other public institutions). To reduce further the public sector’s workforce the government adopted a general rule for the period 2011-2013: a ratio of one hire to five departures (Law 3833/2010: articles 10 & 11, with exceptions), which later become one to ten. This provision was also included in the bailout agreement known as the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies that the Greek government signed with its international creditors (Law 3845/2010).

Polarisation on the new fault line was less intense in the May campaign. Up to that point the two traditional contenders for power were still PASOK
and ND, both on the pro-austerity side. This changed after the May election, when ND and the anti-austerity SYRIZA became the two main contenders.

5 We cannot discount empirically the possibility that the number of dynastic MPs remained approximately stable in parliament, but the number of dynastic candidates increased dramatically in the 2012 elections. This case of electoral punishment of dynastic politicians would remain undetected in the present analysis, which does not have access to data on losing candidates. However, we do not consider this increase in dynastic candidates very plausible, especially in the context of unprecedented public disaffection with the Greek political class.

6 One of the dynastic MPs elected with the new party ‘Independent Greeks’ in May 2012 was a former ND MP (case E23 in the Appendix). One of the dynastic MPs elected with SYRIZA in June 2012 was a former PASOK and KKE MP (case F22 in the Appendix).

7 The one ‘multiple’ dynastic MP that was not re-elected in 2012 (case D15 in the Appendix) defected from her party and participated as leader of a new party, which then failed to enter parliament.