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Predicting Stateless, Nationalist Regionalist Party members' attitudes to immigration: evidence from the Scottish National Party and Frisian National Party

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Abstract

Support for cultural pluralism, pro-immigration policies and positive attitudes towards multiculturalism are important aspects for maintaining an inclusive party image of civic Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs). Negative attitudes towards such issues can cause considerable damage to the party image due to the negative linkages that can be made with their nationalist ideology. SNRPs are united in their desire for constitutional change in their polity but are broad churches that attract support from across the political spectrum. Its members often hold eclectic views on a range of issues, including issues involving cultural pluralism and immigration. Based on SNRP literature and the broader party political three factors - ideological position, conceptions of national identity and position in the party hierarchy – are examined that help to explain divergent attitudes towards cultural pluralism in SNRP memberships. The paper empirically tests the relation between these factors and attitudes towards cultural pluralism in two SNRPs – the Scottish National Party and Frisian National Party. The paper draws evidence from two unique full party membership studies and is supported with evidence from documentary analysis.

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1.1 Introduction

Negative linkages between nationalism and issues such as cultural pluralism, immigration and multiculturalism can cause considerable damage to Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs) party image. A political party's public image can be considered one of its key electoral assets (Wallas 1948). Most voters form general perceptions and broad impressions of political parties (Trilling 1976) when making electoral choices. These are based on a few mental associations that relate to the parties overall image (Johns 2012). However, this necessity to protect the party's image can be a source of tension in relation to attitudes that are held by party members in certain policy areas. Issues in relation to cultural pluralism which include immigration control policies, integration policies and multiculturalism, are a salient example of policy areas in which such tensions can occur.ⁱ Over the past two decades, there has been a hardening of attitudes amongst the public and a certain level of desensitisation of the language used by political parties in relation to cultural pluralism (Mulvey 2010). However, parties are careful when adopting more negative language in relation to these issues as they are concerned that they are labelled as 'nasty' which may have repercussions for their overall party image (Quinn 2008).ⁱⁱ Such tensions are perhaps particularly salient for SNRPs due to the perceived negative connotations and loaded nature of terms such as 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' (Tamir 1993: 5; Kuzio 2009; MacCormick 1982). Voters, but also members of SNRPs, can feel a certain level of discomfort with such terms which become particularly salient when associated with restrictive and negative policies and language in relation to cultural pluralism. This paper examines the potential sources of tensions in SNRPs in relation to issues around cultural pluralism.

Although previous research has identified a variety of reasons that explain why SNRPs have pro-immigration and pro-multicultural policies (economic, political, ideological) (Hepburn 2009b). These policies are also useful to shield the party's broader image from accusations of narrow nationalism. Although the overall influence of party members has in many cases declined, their attitudes towards certain policy areas can still be important sources of tension in parties, particularly in parties that are rely on grassroots organisations. SNRPs are often 'broad churches'

in terms of membership, able to attract support from across the political spectrum, making for an eclectic membership that has at least the potential to become a source of tension. Based on evidence from literature in relation to SNRPs and broader political party literature, this paper examines three potential sources of tension – ideological position on the left right scale, conceptions of national identity and position in the party hierarchy in SNRPs in relation to issues around cultural pluralism.

The findings are based on data from two membership studies of two self-styled civic SNRPs - the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Frisian National Party (FNP). On the one hand, certain similarities which make the two parties interesting case studies for a number of reasons. In both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, immigration issues have become highly salient at the state-wide level but less so at the sub-state level (Scotland and Friesland) which is the primary political arena for these parties. As such both parties have, at least on occasions had to formulate a political narrative that responds to issues around immigration and cultural pluralism. On the other hand, there are considerable differences between the two parties. The SNP is a relatively large governing party in Scotland with a membership of around 15,000 and professional party machinery (Mitchell *et al.* 2012). It formed a minority administration in Scotland in 2007 and won an overall majority in 2011. The FNP has historically operated at provincial and municipal level in the province of Friesland in the north of the Netherlands. Since 2011 it has been part of the Frisian executive. It represents a much smaller territory and is much smaller in terms of membership (1,300). It is a grassroots party and largely depends on volunteers (Hemminga 2006). The SNP also has a strong grassroots element but has become increasingly sophisticated and professionalised in the past two decades. The FNP is mostly associated with linguistic and cultural issues. Both parties seek constitutional change for their polity but the SNP desires for Scotland to be independent from the rest of the UK, whereas the FNP strives for a limited form of federalism for Friesland (Lucardie *et al.* 1987). Considering these differences, to a certain extent the SNP and FNP are representative of the very diverse nature of what is by some described as the autonomist party family (De Winter and Türsan 1998; Hepburn 2009a).

The methodological approach followed in this article builds upon that taken in Mitchell *et al.* (2012) seminal study of the SNP membership but is distinctive in two ways. First, the comparative approach not only means that valuable insights into the FNP are provided, a party which has, to date, received very little attention in academic literature, but it also provides a different perspective on the SNP. By comparing the two cases it is possible to draw out specific differences and reflect on the origins of such variations. Second, the article specifically focuses on immigration issues in these two SNRPs; an area of research which has received relatively little attention (Hepburn 2009b) and is not specifically addressed by Mitchell *et al.*. The analysis is complemented by documentary evidence which draws from manifestos, minutes of meetings, newspaper articles, party magazines and other archival sources.

The article first sets out the theoretical framework formulating the main hypotheses. Next an overview of the context in which debates around immigration and cultural pluralism in both the UK and the Netherlands as well as Friesland and Scotland takes place is provided. The focus in this section is specifically on the differences between the state and sub-state level. The following section discusses the responses to these issues in both the SNP and FNP. Then the data sources and research design are introduced, followed by the main results and analysis based on the survey data. The conclusion provides some reflections on the findings and how they can potentially be interpreted in relation to issues around party image.

1.2 Theoretical framework

Butler and Rose (1960) define party image as how the party appears ‘to the picture left by its surface characteristics’. These pictures are often vague and inconsistent and are based on a few mental associations made by voters which are linked to a clear stance on a controversial issue (For example: European integration, immigration or decisions to go to war, etc). ‘These associations that people have are often persistent over time and shared by large proportions of the electorate’ (Johns 2012). They can be expected to be particularly powerful when controversial issues can be linked with a party’s core ideology which in the case of SNRPs is nationalism.

Nationalism is based on the ‘perceived similarity of some people that are different from others’ (Hjerm 1998). This means that concepts such as nations, nationalism

and national identities necessarily impose boundaries between those who belong and those who are excluded (Verdery 1994; Anderson 1996: 6-7). Therefore it is often considered problematic to provide a normative defence of nationalism from a liberal perspective. Nationalism, nationalist and even the more neutral term 'national' remain, at least for some, and to some extent, 'loaded' terms (Tamir 1993: 5; Kuzio 2009; MacCormick 1982). Historic experiences of extreme nationalism are a basic explanation for such negative perception of nationalism but above all it is the inherent divisiveness of nationalist ideologies that troubles many liberal scholars. One example of tensions in relation to this broader conceptualisation is that multicultural practices and nationalism are often thought of as difficult to reconcile theoretically. Hussain and Miller (2006: 2-3), for example, argue that the term 'multinational nationalist' is an oxymoron; and that a 'multicultural nationalist' movement comes very close to being one'. Such a statement seems to be contradicted by the attempts that civic SNRPs make to portray themselves as multiculturalist and pro-immigration parties (Hepburn 2009b), often more so than non-nationalist parties.

That said, Brubaker and Cooper warn us that it is necessary to make a distinction between political practice and political analysis. Concepts such as nations, nationalism and national identity are both used in the public sphere and as analytical tools and these are 'marked by close reciprocal connection and mutual influence' (Brubaker and Cooper 2004: 31). Giddens (1976) argues that there is a double hermeneutic problem; ideas and concepts, constructed by social scientists, are filtered back into the population and often simplified. Subsequently, these concepts are reinterpreted by social scientists whose tasks it is to avoid confusing political practice with political analysis. Thus, even though the political practice may indicate that SNRPs are able to link their nationalist ideology to a multicultural perspective on society, this does not mean that the conceptual difficulties of linking the two are necessarily less problematic.

Another important consideration when analysing attitudes towards cultural pluralism is to what extent issues in relation to immigration control/integration, multiculturalism are salient within a given territory. These issues are often linked to other concerns such as poverty, state welfare, low levels of education, high crime rates and high

unemployment rates (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001; Esses *et al.* 1998; Citrin *et al.* 1997; Simon and Lynch 1999) and is perceived to put pressure on indigenous populations. It can therefore be expected that in areas where immigration pressures are high there is less incentive for political actors to formulate policies that support cultural pluralism and which can be considered pro-immigration. On the other hand, previous research has shown that people in areas that do not experience high levels of immigration can also form negative attitudes towards immigrants, following a process which has been described as fear of the unknown (Sim and Bowes 2007a). This is particularly the case when external impulses that reinforce negative perceptions of immigration and immigrants are conveyed by political parties or media reports (Mulvey 2010). Such external conditions cannot be considered the cause of internal party tensions in relation to cultural pluralism, the main concern of this paper, but the external conditions are a potential source of salience of these issues and therefore an important consideration.

Three underlying factors, ideological position on the left – right spectrum, conception of national identity, and position in the party hierarchy - can be informative when considering tensions in relation to cultural pluralism in SNRPs. First, as already mentioned, SNRPs are often described as broad churches able to attract voters from across the left-right spectrum. Historically, many SNRPs did not take clear left-right ideological positions, arguing that their cause transcended the ideological left-right cleavage. Since the 1970s many SNRPs have moved, or attempted to move, from a 'niche' political position to becoming more mainstream position actors (Elias and Tronconi 2011). This has required them to adopt a 'normal' ideological position on the left-right spectrum which is reflected in their political programmes. Despite this process of 'ideological normalisation', in many cases, SNRPs remain able to attract supporters from across the ideological spectrum (Masseti 2009). Although a somewhat simplistic generalisation, it is broadly accepted that those that position themselves on the right of political spectrum often have more restrictive attitudes towards immigration (Geddes 2003) and are less likely to support multiculturalist policies and cultural pluralism than those of the left of the political spectrum. The ability of SNRPs to attract a broad spectrum of supporters with varying ideological views can become a source of tension in relation to immigration issues. Therefore the first hypothesis is:

H1: those members of SNRPs that position themselves at the right of the political spectrum hold more anti-immigration positions in comparison to those that position themselves on the left.

Second, national identity is an important aspect of the politics of SNRPs. However, conceptualising identities is notoriously difficult. One issue is that people can have multiple territorial identities that are mutually inclusive (Marks 1999). In those cases where there is a strong minority nationalist movement the state-wide territorial identity and sub-state identities can become politicised. SNRPs' members will inherently have a strong attachment to the sub-state identity but this does not necessarily mean that they do not have an attachment to the state identity. Some have argued that the intensity with which a national identity is felt can be considered important in relation to attitudes towards cultural pluralism. One way of measuring is by examining the type of relation members have to the sub-state and state-wide identity (Carey 2002), e.g. whether SNRP members have an attachment to both state-wide and sub-state identities or just the latter. McCrone and Bechhofer (2010), for example show that thinking of oneself 'exclusively national' is a critical factor in explaining why people reject other peoples claims of a national identity. Following this logic it could be hypothesised that:

H2a: SNRPs members with both state and sub-state are more likely to support cultural pluralism than those that have an exclusive attachment to the sub-state identity.

However, in these cases much depends on the context in which debates around cultural pluralism take place at the state and sub-state level and how these are linked to identities. If the sub-state identity is strongly linked to cultural pluralism then it may be the case that holding a strong exclusive sub-state identity relates more strongly to positive attitudes towards cultural pluralism.

People not only have varied conceptions of the relations between different territorial identities but can also have a different understanding in terms of the substance of those identities. In other words, what are considered the criteria that determine someone's identity. An often made distinction is that between civic and ethnic conceptions national identities; the former being more attuned to cultural pluralism

than the latter (Kohn 2005 [1944]; Plamenatz 1975; Kellas 1998). Such an dichotomous framework is not without its problems and more recently scholars have favoured multi-dimensional conceptions of national identity (Kuzio 2002; Shulman 2002; Björklund 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009). There is evidence that if, in terms of content, more restrictive criteria such as ancestry and birth are included in the conceptualisation of national identity then it becomes more difficult for immigrants to adopt a national identity and therefore they are more likely to be excluded (Brubaker 1996). A similar argument applies, but to a lesser extent, to cultural criteria. For example, if language is part of the conception of a nation then those that are unable to speak that language are excluded. On the other hand, language can of course be learned and are therefore less restrictive than birth and ancestry.ⁱⁱⁱ There are also criteria that are used to conceptualise the nation in more inclusive terms, in which immigrants would have more or less a free choice to be considered as part of the nation. Criteria related to sentiment are inclusive as it's largely the individual's choice whether they 'feel' part of the nation and want to adopt it as a national identity. Additionally, adherence to laws, rules and institutions of a country is regarded as a civic and inclusive criterion. Residence, is similarly inclusive, nationhood is extended to all those residing on its territory. However, this would appear somewhat more ambiguous as it necessarily excludes those that are not residing in the territory (Byrne 2011; Esses *et al.* 2006). Taking these different dimensionsⁱⁱⁱ into account the following hypothesis can be formed:

H2b: Those members of SNRPs that include more exclusive characteristics (ancestry, birth and to a lesser extent language) in their conceptions of national identity are more likely to hold negative perceptions of cultural pluralism.

A third factor which can be a source of tension in relation to immigration issues and cultural pluralism is whether different attitudes are held in different levels in the party hierarchy. Political elite demonstrate sensitivity towards the negative connotations of nationalism (Opalski 2002) and are familiar with simplified conceptual models such as civic and ethnic nationalism. As a consequence elites in SNRPs will look for ways in which their party can avoid accusations of narrow nationalism. Accentuating the inclusive nature of the party through formulating positive policies in relation to

cultural pluralism and immigration can be a powerful strategy. There is a body of literature which argues that attitudes within political parties are structured according to different positions individuals have in a party (May 1973; Kitschelt 1989; Norris 1995). Non-office holding members will often display more inflexible and ideological positions than those that do hold office (party representatives) which can cause difficulties for the leadership and in some cases leading to dissent within a party. Those that hold party or public office are more likely to toe the party line, have been socialised to adopt certain views and often better understand the importance of unity for political parties. Party representatives can be expected to be more electorally savvy; their views can be considered more pragmatic and more in tune with the general public. In relation to issues around cultural pluralism, party representatives are more likely to show awareness of the party's overall image. Therefore the third hypothesis is:

H3: SNRP members are more likely to have negative attitudes towards cultural pluralism than party representatives.

1.3 The context: Immigration pressures in Scotland and Friesland

This section provides an overview of the state-wide and sub-state context in relation to immigration policies in which SNP and FNP operate. In the last decade immigration and multiculturalism have become the topic of fierce debates in the UK and the Netherlands. Since the 1970s immigration to both the Netherlands and the UK has been rising. Until the late 1990s there existed an elite consensus in both countries that the best way to maintain societal harmony was through adopting multicultural policies. In the last 15 years real and perceived pressures from immigration and dramatic events^{iv} both globally and nationally have triggered a hardening of attitudes against immigrants and more generally to those that are considered 'outsiders' (Sniderman and Hagedoorn 2007). Political parties have responded to these changed attitudes. The level of controls on immigration as well as the extent to which immigrants are expected to integrate in society has changed dramatically. Both UK and the Netherlands have for example introduced citizenship tests for newcomers that require immigrants that want to attain citizenship to demonstrate a basic understanding of the language, customs and traditions.

When considering the sub-state context, in Scotland immigration pressures have been less significant than in many other parts of the UK (Sim and Bowes 2007b: 730). Census data from 2011 shows that 13 % of residents in England and Wales are foreign born^v compared to Scotland where 6 % is foreign born (ONS 2011). Therefore, the supposed pressures that immigrants can place on services may not have been felt to the same extent in Scotland as it has in parts of England and therefore immigration issues have not polarised and politicised (Audrey 2000: 10). A similar argument applies to the case in Friesland where the number of immigrants as a proportion of the population is lower than in the Netherlands as a whole (and particular in comparison to the west of the country) (van der Zwet 2011).


These differences in immigration levels have, according to some, led to different, more welcoming, attitudes towards immigrants at the sub-state level. Evidence suggests that ethnic minorities find it easier to adopt a Scottish identity than ethnic minorities in England find adopting an English or British identity (Saeed *et al.* 1999) and there is strong opposition in Scotland to some UK's immigration and asylum seekers policies which are perceived as too punitive (for example dawn raids and holding children of to be extradited asylum seekers in detention centres) and incompatible with Scottish culture and society (Skilling 2007). As immigration levels in Scotland remain relatively low, political actors in Scotland are not under the same pressure as their counterparts south of the border to formulate policies that address the issue. Furthermore, support for parties strongly associated with an anti-immigration agenda (BNP and UKIP) is relatively low in Scotland. On the other hand, research has repeatedly shown that there are also negative attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities in Scotland (Audrey 2000: 10) and Bromley *et al.* (2006: v) demonstrate that concerns about Muslim culture increased between 2002 and 2005 in Scotland at the same rate as in England.

There is currently no research that provides evidence of divergent attitudes towards immigration and ethnic minorities between Friesland and the rest of the Netherlands. However, one proxy for attitudes towards immigrants is support for anti-immigration parties in Friesland. The Party for Freedom (PVV) fought the 2006 and 2010 parliamentary elections on an anti-immigration (anti-islamic) and anti-establishment ticket (Mair 2008). The PVV made a major breakthrough in 2010, becoming the third

largest party in the Netherlands with 15.5 % of the vote. The party's support was strongest in the west and south of the country. In Friesland the party was relatively unsuccessful, receiving 11.4 % of the vote; together with the neighbouring province Groningen it was the worst result for the PVV in any of the Dutch provinces.


Finally it is worth considering that both Friesland and Scotland have seen relative low levels of population growth in comparison to the state-wide level. In Scotland this is particularly considered problematic as the population has been falling in real terms for large parts of the past two decades (Wright 2006). Figure 1 compares the population growth in England and Scotland in three decades. In every year the total growth in Scotland has been lower than that of England. Furthermore, until 2002 population growth in most years was close to zero or negative. This would suggest that Scotland has different migration requirements from other parts of the UK. Although in Friesland population has not declined in real terms, it has not increased at the same rate as the state-wide level (Figure 2). However, perhaps due to the relative proximity of urban centres or the rural nature of Friesland, the lack of demographic growth is not regarded as problematic in Friesland to the extent it is in Scotland.

Figure 1: Population Growth (as % change) in England and Scotland



Source: Office for National Statistics (percentage change for 1982 = 1981)

Figure 2: Population Growth (as % change) in Friesland and the Netherlands



Source: Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek

1.4 SNP and FNP and immigration

Due to the increased salience of immigration as well as wider debates on cultural pluralism in both Dutch and UK politics both the SNP and FNP have had to address these issues. In this section, the parties' narrative in relation to these issues will be considered. Both SNP and FNP are self-styled civic SNRPs and are members of the European Free Alliance (EFA), 'an alliance of regionalist and civic, democratic nationalist parties in Europe' (EFA 2011). The official doctrine of the SNP is described as firmly civic (Hearn 2000: 59-66; Keating 1996: 694; Mitchell 2008; McCrone 1998). The 2003 party manifesto states: 'the SNP has an open and inclusive approach to Scottish citizenship. The automatic right of citizenship will be open to all those living in Scotland, all those born in Scotland and all those with a parent born in Scotland. All others are free to apply' (SNP 2003). In comparison to many other SNRPs the SNP lacks a strong cultural dimension (Keating 1996: 188; Healsy 2005). The FNP is also considered a civic SNRP (De Winter *et al.* 2006) but because language is the most distinct marker of 'Frisianness' and the FNP's conception of Frisianness is closely linked to the Frisian language, it is perhaps perceived as more exclusive. According to one scholar the FNP's conception of 'Frisianness' can be summarised as follows: preserve the Frisian language and culture, protect the Frisian countryside, focus on agriculture and small scale development in industry, recreation and housing (Hemminga 2006: 152).

The SNP prides itself in its long history of pro-multiculturalism. Hepburn (2009b) asserts that the SNP conceptualises 'national belonging as voluntary participation in a multicultural society' (also see Leith 2008). Immigration has been a policy area where the party has particularly attempted to claim that Scotland's needs are different from those of other parts in the UK and that the main state-wide parties (Labour and Conservatives) do not take into account Scotland's immigration requirements. Whilst both Labour and Conservatives have both adopted tougher immigration policies over the last decade (Mulvey 2010), the SNP has argued that Scotland's demographic^{vi} and economic challenges require a more flexible approach. The SNP 2010 manifesto states:

Scotland [has] to take responsibility for immigration so that we can develop a system here at home that more closely meets our needs. An 'earned citizenship' system, similar to those in Canada or Australia, would allow Scotland to attract high-skill immigrants who can add to the strength of our economy and help deliver growing prosperity for the whole nation (SNP 2010).

In an attempt to restrict immigration, the UK government announced a new point based immigration system in 2009. SNP MP and immigration spokesman, Peter Wishart, responded by arguing that Scotland needed its own point system. The SNP did not disagree with the policy of a point based system but stressed the need for flexibility: 'Scotland's population and immigration requirements are completely different from the rest of the UK, and this has to be recognised when points are added up' (Sunday Herald 2009).

Although in pro-immigration and pro-multiculturalism are firmly embedded in the SNP's thinking, in the past there have been occasions where the party mainstream has had to take actions against members that held more exclusive conceptions of Scottishness and that rejected cultural pluralism openly causing considerable embarrassment. For example, in the 1980s a group called Siol Nan Gaidheal (SNG), meaning Seed of the Gaels, drew a lot of its members from the SNP. These members belonged to the fringes of the SNP and had a strong cultural conception of Scottishness. Its members would parade wearing military style Highland dress and the rhetoric used was much more inflammatory and militant (Mitchell 1990: 54-55).

The SNG's conception of Scottish society clashed with the SNP's mainstream and leadership's understanding of what it meant to be Scottish and the members of the group were expelled from the SNP (Mitchell 1996: 230). These events reflect the commitment of the SNP's mainstream to a civic national identity and demonstrate the party's discomfort with those that have a more culturally and exclusive conception of Scottishness.

For the FNP, issues around cultural pluralism and immigration are a more peripheral issue. In its 2011 provincial election manifesto, immigration issues are covered in a brief section which states that: 'The FNP promotes an open society which shows hospitality and respect to other cultures and ways of living. Immigrants should adapt to our culture while being able to be themselves. They must get the possibilities and the respect to do so' (FNP 2010: FNP translation). The FNP does not show strong opposition to measures that have been introduced by state-wide parties (integration courses, citizenship tests, etc.). The party does not regard immigration as a solution for economic growth in Friesland. Although population growth has been lower in Friesland when compared to other areas in the country the FNP does not consider this problematic.^{vii}

Within the FNP there have been no organised groups that upheld a more exclusive conception of Frisianness but there have been occasions on which the party has had to distance itself from more 'exclusive' remarks expressed by some of its members. In 1985, a prominent party member, Jan Bearn Singelsma,^{viii} was accused of making alleged racist remarks. In a radio programme he had argued that foreigners who had only been in the Netherlands for a short time should not be allowed to vote. He was quoted to have said '*this country is already a heaven (el Dorado) for foreigners*' (Leeuwarder Leeuwarder Courant 1985a: - author's translation). Singelsma claimed that his comments had been taken out of context, that the interviewer had asked leading questions, and that he was speaking in personal capacity (LeeuwarderLeeuwarder Courant 1985b). Nevertheless, the FNP was quick to disassociate itself from his comments. In a press statement the party referred to the FNP's manifesto at the time which stated: '*Discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation and disability has to be actively fought against*' (Leeuwarder Courant 1985c: - author's translation). Thus, if Singelsma's arguments

were of an anti-immigrant/racist nature, such views were not supported by the party mainstream that recognised the potential harm of the remarks. A similar scenario transpired in 2007 when a local councillor, after hearing that a family of asylum seekers was to be housed in his street, declared that '*such a family does not belong here... it will become a mess, these people have never been taught in Africa how to trim the hedges*' (Leeuwarder Courant 2007: - author's translation). The story was picked up by the national newspapers (NRC 2007) and led to considerable negative press for the FNP. However, within the party there was no public support for the councillor 's remarks and the party leadership condemned them. The councillor resigned a few days later from his post but was allowed to remain a member.

In conclusion, both parties have civic doctrines and conceptualise Scottishness and Frisianess in culturally pluralistic terms. Although the party mainstream may hold such conceptions, not all members may agree but if members do hold more exclusive perception of Scottish and Frisian society then this is at the personal level and do not constitute an organised faction in the party. In both parties the mainstream has distanced itself from overtly exclusive and does not wish to be associated with anti-immigration ideas or rhetoric. Finally, the party mainstream also seems aware of the potential damage that anti-immigration remarks can have for the parties' image.

1.5 Data and Research design

The findings in this paper are based on two unique SNRP membership studies; an ESRC funded (RES-062-23-0722) SNP membership survey (N=7112) conducted by Mitchell et al., (2012) in 2007;^{ix} and an FNP membership survey which followed the design of the SNP membership survey conducted by the author in 2009 (N=572).^x The response rates for respective survey were 53.9 % and 47.9 %. The FNP survey was translated into Frisian by a qualified translator. In order to test the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variable bivariate statistics (correlations and t-tests) are reported in the results section. Here, a brief overview of the dependent and independent variables is provided.

The dependent variable consists of responses to the statement:

It is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions.

Respondents were asked to answer using a 5 point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree). The question measures favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards cultural pluralism and can be considered a proxy of attitudes to immigration issues. As already mentioned, the issues of cultural pluralism, multiculturalism and immigration issues is, at least in the public's eye often blurred (Baubock and Rundell 1998; Kymlicka 1995). The question captures a broader attitude towards those with other customs and traditions which is captured in the term cultural pluralism.

The paper's main aim is to examine three sources of tension – ideological position, national identity and position in the party hierarchy - in relation to attitudes towards cultural pluralism. There are various ways in which a person's ideological position can be measured and there is little agreement of the 'optimal response format' (Kroh 2007). One standard approach is through a self-identification scale on which a respondent chooses its position in terms of being left, centre or right wing. Such scales assume an understanding of left – right positions. This scale can have different lengths – in this case 11 point for SNP and 7 point FNP – which provides comparison in terms of extreme left/ right, centre left/right, centre.

The most common way of measuring the combination of state and sub-state identities is the so-called 'Moreno question' which is used in several regional and national surveys in Spain¹, Canada² and Scotland³. It takes the form of a bi-polar scale where respondents are asked:

Which if any of the following best describes yourself?

and were able to choose from a five point scale which include options for an exclusive sub-state and state identity and three options for dual identities (more sub-state than state, equally sub-state and state, more state than sub-state).

The conceptualisation of national identity is a notoriously difficult and consists of many different dimensions that can relate to ethnicity, culture, territory and/ or psychological sentiment (van der Zwet 2011). The variables used in the analysis for

¹ See Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials <http://www.icps.cat/>

² See CROP survey <http://www.crop.ca/en/>

³ See Scottish Social Attitude Surveys 1999 – 2013 <http://www.scotcen.org.uk/series/scottish-social-attitudes>

this paper – ancestry, birth, language, residence, loyalty to rules and political institutions, and feeling of national identity - tap into all these aspects but can also be considered as proxies for inclusive and exclusive understanding of national identity as discussed in the theoretical part of this article. Members were asked to rate the importance of the different aspects using the following prompt:

Some people say the following things are important for being truly Scottish. Others say they are not important. How important do you rate each of these aspects:

The options used in the analysis below include: To have Scottish/Frisian ancestry; To have been born in Scotland/Friesland; to live in Scotland/Friesland now; To have lived in Scotland/ Friesland for most of one's life; To respect Scottish/ Frisian political institutions and laws/rules; to feel Scottish/ Frisian; to be able to speak English, Gaelic or Scots/ Frisian.

Party hierarchy can also be measured in different ways. The SNP survey included a detailed question which allowed respondents to select specific party and public offices (e.g. branch office bearer, constituency office-bearer, member of National Executive Committee, member of National Council, MEP, MP, MSP, councillor) whereas the FNP members were asked to whether they had fulfilled party or public office without allowing respondent to identify which office. Therefore, for comparative purposes the SNP's answers have been merged into a dichotomous variable consisting of an ordinary party member and party representative.

1.6 Results: Sources of tension

Table 1 reports the results of the dependent variable that is used in the analysis. A minority of SNP and FNP members support the statement 'it is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions', rejecting cultural pluralism. Most members are either in favour of cultural pluralism (disagreeing with the statement) or are neutral (neither agree nor disagree). In the SNP 49 % of members have a positive attitude towards cultural pluralism and a slightly higher number of FNP (58 %) disagree or strongly disagree with the statement. However, in the SNP just under a third and in the FNP just under a fifth of the members appear to support a more culturally uniform society. So despite both parties' official support a cultural pluralist

vision of Scottish and Frisian society there are a considerable number of members that hold more exclusive views. The next sections will examine which members are more likely to hold either inclusive or exclusive views.

Table 1: Responses to the statement: ‘It is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions’

| | SNP% (n) | FNP% (n) % |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Strongly agree | 10 (654) | 5 (26) |
| Agree | 19 (1291) | 13 (72) |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 21 (1432) | 24 (139) |
| Disagree | 37 (2505) | 43 (245) |
| Strongly disagree | 12 (817) | 15 (87) |
| N | 6699 | 569 |

Source: SNP membership survey 2007 (Mitchel *et al.* 2011)

Source: FNP membership survey 2009


1.6.1 Ideological position

Historically, the FNP identified itself as neither left nor right wing (Huisman 2003: 126) and also the SNP historically rejected class-based politics. They attempted to politicise the centre-peripheral cleavage and argued that national interests transcended the left-right ideological spectrum. As such they were able to appeal to voters and members from across the political spectrum. In the 1980s and early 1990s both FNP and SNP became progressive centre left political parties, making clearer ideological choices in relation to the left – right political cleavage. However, as Figure 3 and 4 demonstrate both parties have continued to attract members from across the political spectrum. Thus despite their centre left policies they continue to be able to attract more right wing orientated members. This is in part explained by the lack of alternative options. Neither in Scotland nor Friesland is there a nationalist right wing alternative.

This diverse membership can become a source of tension in terms of the type of policies choices the party makes. Tougher controls on immigration and negative attitudes towards cultural pluralism are often associated with the political right (Geddes 2003). In both cases ideological position significantly correlates with attitudes towards cultural pluralism. (SNP $r = -.22$, $p < .001$; FNP $r = -.23$, $p < .001$). Those members that have more right-wing positions are more likely to reject cultural


pluralism whereas those that have more left wing positions are more likely to support cultural pluralism. Therefore, hypothesis H1, right wing members are more likely to demonstrate negative attitudes towards immigration, is confirmed in both cases.

Figure 3: Ideological self-position of SNP members (n=6168)



Source: SNP membership survey 2007

Figure 4: Ideological self-position of FNP members (n=496)



Source: FNP member survey 2009

1.6.2 Conceptions of national identity

People can hold mutually inclusive territorial identities (Marks 1999). As can be expected in the case of the SNP the vast majority of respondents 80 % report an exclusively Scottish identity (see Table 2). However, almost a fifth (19.5%) also reports a British identity of which the vast majority feel more Scottish than British (16.6%). A very small percentage reports an exclusively British identity (.3%). The proportion of FNP members that consider themselves exclusively Frisian is much smaller 26.9% than in the FNP and a much larger proportion report a dual identity (72.8%) of most feel more Frisian than Dutch (60.1%). Similar to the SNP members only a very small minority has a stronger sense of Dutchness than Frisianness. The

categories more Scottish/Frisian than British/Dutch, equally Scottish/Frisian and British/Dutch and more British/ Dutch than Scottish/Frisian have been merged to create a dichotomous variable consisting of those members that have an exclusive sub-state identity and those members that have a dual identity.^{xi}

Table 2: Moreno question SNP and FNP members

| | SNP (%) | FNP (%) |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|
| Scottish/Frisian not British/ Dutch | 80.2 | 26.9 |
| More Scottish/Frisian than British/ Dutch | 16.6 | 60.1 |
| Equally Scottish/Frisian than British/Dutch | 2.7 | 12.4 |
| More British/Dutch than Scottish/Frisian | .2 | .3 |
| British/Dutch not Scottish/Frisian | .4 | .4 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |
| N | 6537 | 566 |

The difference in attitudes towards cultural pluralism between SNP members that report a single Scottish identity and members that report a dual identity is significant. Respondent that have an exclusively Scottish identity were more likely to report positive attitudes towards cultural pluralism ($M=3.25$, $SE = .02$) in comparison with those that reported dual identities ($M=3.1$, $S.E. = .03$). For ease of interpretation Table 3 only reports the combined scores for those respondents that disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement '*It is better for a country if everyone shares the same customs and traditions*', 50.6% of SNP members with an exclusively Scottish identity had a positive score for cultural pluralism in comparison to 44.6% of those with a dual identity. In the FNP there was no statistically significant difference between members that report an exclusively Frisian ($M=3.53$, $S.E. = .09$) and dual Frisian and Dutch identity ($M=3.50$, $S.E. = .05$). Therefore hypothesis 2a can be rejected; those members with a single territorial identity are not more likely to have negative attitudes towards cultural pluralism than those that have dual identities. If anything, in the SNP the opposite appears to be the case.

Table 3: Support for cultural pluralism by single and dual identities

| | SNP % (n) | % support cultural pluralism | FNP % (n) | % support cultural pluralism |
|--------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|
| Exclusive identity | 80.5 (5243) | 50.6 (2599) | 27 (152) | 54.4 (81) |
| Dual identity | 19.5 (1273) | 44.6 (550) | 73 (412) | 59.3 (242) |

Independent t-test for SNP $t(1962.634) = 4.22, p < .05$

Independent t-test for FNP $t(241.575) = .24, p > .05$

A person's national identity is for most people an important part of who they are and for SNRPs members it is often their primary identity (Mitchell *et al.* 2012; van der Zwet 2009) but the understanding of national identity varies. Some members will find some aspects of national identity more important than others. SNP and FNP members were asked how important a certain criterion is for their conception of Scottishness and Frisianness on a four point scale (Table 4). The criteria include ancestry, birth, residence (current and long term), language, attachment to political institutions and laws and rules, and sentiment.

Table4: Dimensions of national identify and cultural pluralism

| | SNP % imp for nat. id (n) | Correlation cultural pluralism | FNP % imp for nat. id (n) | Correlation cultural pluralism |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| To have Scottish/ Frisian ancestry | 56.3 (3715) | .31** | 68.4 (379) | .26** |
| To have been born in Scotland | 62.7 (4160) | .29** | 56 (310) | .25** |
| To live in Scotland/Friesland now | 79.3 (5227) | .10** | 65.6 (663) | .17** |
| To have lived in Scotland /Friesland for most of life | 65.5 (4308) | .21** | 59.6 (330) | .23** |
| To feel Scottish/ Frisian | 96.2 (6333) | .04** | 97.1 (540) | .01 |
| To respect Scottish/Frisian political institutions and laws | 92.7 (6096) | .11** | 81 (444) | .16** |
| To speak language | 72.5 (4754) | .20** | 99.8 (568) | .03 |

Source: SNP survey 2007 and FNP survey 2009

As outlined in the theoretical section of this paper, ancestry and birth and to a lesser extent language are often associated with more exclusive conceptions of national identity and members who regard these criteria as important aspect of Scottishness/Frisianness are therefore less likely to support cultural pluralism. Residence, attachment to political institutions and law/rules, and sentiment are

criteria that can be considered more inclusive and therefore members that find these criteria important are less likely to hold negative attitudes towards cultural pluralism. Nevertheless, the theoretically inclusive dimensions remain positively with the dependent variable. In the SNP's case preferences for ancestry and to a lesser extent language criterion demonstrate higher correlation with a preference for cultural uniformity. Also the long term residence criterion also has a relatively high correlation with the dependent variable. The current residence and respecting institutions, and especially feeling Scottish variable have a lower correlation but a positive correlation remains suggesting that those that find these criteria important also prefer cultural uniformity but to a lesser extent. It should be noted that almost all SNP members find these latter three criteria very important or important. For the FNP ancestry and birth also have a strong correlation with cultural uniformity. Residence, both long-term and current, as well as respecting institutions have slightly lower correlation scores but remain positive. Neither language nor feeling Frisian significantly correlates with the dependent variable. Also here it should be noted that almost all members find feeling Frisian and language important or very important. The skewed scores make correlation based statistical modelling for these criteria less suitable. Nevertheless, the hypothesis two is partially confirmed; those members that value more restrictive criteria as part of their conception of Scottishness and Frisianness are more likely to report negative attitudes towards cultural pluralism. However, it is not the case that members that favour less restrictive criteria are more likely to support cultural pluralism. In other words, the dimensions are considered non-competitively (van der Zwet 2011).

1.6.3 Party hierarchy

Table 5 reports the differences in support for cultural pluralism between those SNP and FNP members that hold party or public office and 'ordinary' members. In the SNP party representatives (M=3.40, S.E. = .02) are statistically significantly more likely to have favourable attitudes towards cultural pluralism than 'ordinary' members (M= 3.15, S.E. = .02). For the FNP there also appears to be a difference between representatives (M = 3.6, S.E. = .09) and 'ordinary' members (M=3.5, S.E. = .05) but the difference is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 3 can only be confirmed in the case of the SNP. However, in the FNP's case the evidence suggests that the direction of the association is similar. It appears that there is a slight disconnect

between ordinary members and party representatives. Perhaps party representatives are more aware of the importance of issues in relation to cultural pluralism and how important they are for the overall party image. It could also be the case that members that favour cultural pluralism are more likely to be selected as party representatives. A third explanation could be that a process of party socialisation takes place in which those members that are most active (and are most likely to take up party and public office) are becoming increasingly familiar with the party's position in relation to immigrants and minorities and recognise the importance of a positive position in relation to the party's image.

Table 5: party position and cultural pluralism

| | <i>SNP % (n)</i> | <i>SNP % support for cultural pluralism (n)</i> | <i>FNP % (n)</i> | <i>FNP% support cultural pluralism (n)</i> |
|-------------------------|----------------------|---|----------------------|--|
| Member | 68.3 (4854) | 46.5 (2089) | 73.9 (428) | 57.2 (241) |
| Party representative | 31.7 (2258) | 55.9 (1233) | 25.7 (148) | 63.0 (91) |

Independent t-test for SNP: $t(4727.088) = 8.697, p < .001$

Independent t-test for FNP: $t(564) = 1.062, p > .05$

1.7 Conclusion

This contribution started by claiming that certain policy areas can have an important impact on the party's overall image and that for SNRPs issues around cultural pluralism and immigration are a particularly good examples where this is the case. Currently the salience of these issues is relatively low in both Scotland and Friesland when compared to the state-wide level. Nevertheless, as attitudes towards immigration and cultural pluralism have hardened in the UK and the Netherlands and are high on the political agenda at the state-wide level SNRPs will need to formulate a narrative in relation to these debates. They have to strike a balance between appearing to tackle the challenges without being branded 'nasty'. For SNRPs this challenge is even of greater importance due to the negative connotations of nationalism which due to its inherent divisiveness can be relatively easily linked to more restrictive immigration policies resulting in a negative impact on the parties' overall image.

The evidence suggests that the basis for different attitudes towards cultural pluralism amongst SNRP members is related to deeper lying structures concerning:

ideological position on the left-right spectrum, differences in terms of conceptions of Scottishness and Frisianness, and at least in the SNP's case different positions in the party strata. In terms of position on the left-right spectrum both parties place themselves on the centre left of the political spectrum and a majority of their members take a similar position. Nevertheless, a large minority place themselves on the right of the political spectrum and in terms of immigration this can be a source of tension. The results confirm that those members that identify themselves as more right-wing are more likely to hold negative views on immigration. National identity is one of the key drivers in relation to the politics of SNRPs. However, the way in which national identity is understood differs. Comparing the state and sub-state affiliation of members reveals, unsurprisingly, that a high number of members report an exclusive sub-state identity, e.g. they consider themselves Scottish/ Frisian and not British/Dutch. However, particularly in the case of the FNP but also a large minority in the SNP report dual identities. Of these most members prioritise their Scottish/Frisian identity but also recognise a British/Dutch identity. Somewhat contrary to expectations, having an exclusive Scottish identity does not lead to a more negative view of cultural pluralism when compared to those members that report dual identities. Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case that those members that have dual identities are more likely to oppose cultural pluralism. The SNP's efforts to provide a cultural pluralistic vision of Scottishness and Scottish society may be part of an explanation here. For the FNP, there is no difference between exclusive Frisian identifiers and those with dual identities. Although both parties consider themselves civic a majority of members regard ancestry and birth which can be classified as more exclusive, an important aspect of Frisianness and Scottishness. The exclusive nature of ancestry is reinforced by the fact that it is the strongest predictor of negative attitudes towards immigrants. The evidence in relation to divergences in the party hierarchy is less conclusive, partly due to methodological issues in the case of the FNP. For the SNP there is evidence that there is a divergence between 'elite' members and 'ordinary' members - with the latter reporting, on average, more negative views of cultural pluralism.^{xii}

SNRPs can successfully harbour such a range of different attitudes because the desire for constitutional change overrides all other differences. Both the SNP and FNP are in a position where it does not have to compete with other SNRPs. For

example in Catalonia and Flanders, both left wing and right wing SNRPs are part of the party system. In such a situation where SNRPs have to compete on other issues and it can be significantly more difficult to attract such an elective membership and therefore attitudes in relation to cultural pluralism will more likely be uniform. For the SNP there is an added challenge. Within the context of the current referendum debate the party will be asked how Scotland would manage immigration. Tensions have already emerged between on the one hand the party's intention for more liberal immigration policies in Scotland and its desire to maintain a common travel area with other parts of the UK. Assuming that the UK will maintain its current course of more restrictive immigration and integration policies, an independent Scotland with more liberal policies could undermine the UK's policy goals. Considering the issue is highly salient in parts of England such a situation is unlikely to be allowed to occur. Furthermore, despite the plausible economic and demographic arguments for a more liberal immigration policy, attitudes towards immigration, immigrants and cultural pluralism amongst the Scottish population is not significantly different from other parts of the UK, making the SNP mainstream policies potentially unpopular which provides a basis for internal descent which in turn could impact the party's overall image.

The FNP's focus on language offers also a potential difficulty. The party argues that newcomers require to integrate in Frisian society; implicitly suggesting that they should learn the Frisian language. However, from the immigrants' perspective the state requires them to integrate in Dutch society and all integration tests are based on this principle. Furthermore, almost all Frisian speak Dutch as well as Frisian. Hence it would be logical to expect that immigrants would prioritise their Dutch integration/ language learning. Asking immigrants to both learn Dutch and Frisian seems excessively restrictive and unrealistic.

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ⁱ Cultural pluralism incorporates a broad range of issues around immigration control, integration of immigrants, asylum policies and multiculturalism. Although these are of course all distinctive concepts that are quite different from each other, in the public's mind they are often blurred. Hence in this paper the term cultural pluralism is used in order to capture a more general attitude to those people whom can be considered 'outsiders'.

ⁱⁱ The British Conservative party has particularly struggled with these issues but also the Labour party.

ⁱⁱⁱ Some special consideration in terms of the nature of minority languages and their impact on immigrants' ability to adopt a language is required, especially when minority languages are used in daily life activities alongside majority languages. The ability of an immigrant to speak a majority language can be regarded to form the basis for civic integration in society. In the case when minority languages are used in conjunction with majority languages immigrants often are forced to choose learning the majority language as it is more useful, not least because people that speak the minority language will also speak the majority language. Learning a second 'less valuable' minority language is therefore less likely. This means that immigrants are inevitably excluded from being part of the minority nation if the minority language is a key requirement for membership. In other words, in those cases where the sub-state nation speaks the same language as the other parts of the state, language criterion is less exclusionary whereas in those cases where the minority language at the sub-state level competes with the majority language that is spoken at the state level and at sub-state level it becomes more exclusive.

^{iv} For example, the Twin Tower attacks, London bombings in 2007, the murder of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands

^v Within England and Wales there are huge variations. For example in the London area 34 % is foreign born whereas in Wales this is only five %

^{vi} It should be noted that not only the SNP regards demographic developments as a key concern. Former Labour First Minister Jack McConnell, for example, also argued that it was an important challenge. However, perhaps due to the close ties between Scottish and UK Labour party, the party did not argue for a differentiated approach in terms of immigration policy.

^{vii} Quite the contrary is the case the FNP is committed to a rural Friesland of small villages and would not encourage immigration to Friesland.

^{viii} Singelsma was FNP's first member of the Provincial Council in 1966

^{ix} I am grateful to the authors of this study for allowing me access to the SNP membership survey data.

^x For details see van der Zwet 2011.

^{xi} The number of respondents that report an exclusively state identity for both the SNP and FNP has been omitted from the further analysis.

^{xii} I tested all the bivariate correlations in a multivariate model that included socio-demographic attributes, and found that the key relationships are not artefacts of age, gender, education and income).