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What kind of party is UKIP?

The future of the extreme right in Britain or just another Tory party?

This article aims to further our understanding of the nature of UKIP. Our approach differs from much of the existing literature on party families, by analysing public attitudes towards UKIP in comparison with other parties. Multidimensional unfolding is utilised to map UKIP's place in the British party system, Tobit regressions are employed to compare UKIP's support base with that of the BNP and the Conservatives and, finally, latent class analysis is used to assess the heterogeneity in UKIP's support base. The conclusion is that, with increasing success, UKIP has establishing itself as the only viable electoral option for British extreme right voters while also making serious inroads into more traditional conservative circles, who are Eurosceptic but not extreme. This bridging position between the mainstream and the extreme makes UKIP distinctive from other British parties, and has parallels with the positions of anti-establishment, EU sceptical and immigration-critical parties elsewhere in Europe.

Single-issue, mainstream or extreme right?

Despite considerable electoral impact the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has been largely over-looked in the comparative literature. It is striking how much more attention has been paid to the much smaller British National Party (BNP), as a quick check on Google Scholar would show. The most plausible reason is that BNP has been treated as the only British extreme right party of inter-est, with UKIP brushed aside as a single-issue oddity. An illustrative example is Roger Griffin (2007:246), who notes that UKIP has made manifesto statements about immigration which "would not be out of place" in continental neo-populist parties, but still argues that the single-issue anti-EU nature means that it cannot be classified into the same category as BNP (compare also John and Margetts 2009). More in-depth studies of UKIP also tend to play down its degree of radicalism. Ford and Goodwin (2014:7), for example, argue that BNP and UKIP "are very different parties", in terms of ideology as well as origin. To this can be added different patterns of international co-operation (e.g. McGowan 2014), and the fact that BNP is quite often labelled as "fascist" in serious scholarly work (e.g. Goodwin 2011; Copsey 2008), which is not the case with UKIP.

That there are important differences between UKIP and BNP is quite clear. This, however, leaves the question about the nature of the former party unanswered. On its own, the distinctiveness from BNP does not preclude UKIP from being treated as a member of the broader, quite diverse, family of European far right parties. That the party cannot be dismissed as an irrelevance, or as a transi-tional phenomenon, is increasingly clear. It has been represented in the EU parliament since 1999, it was the biggest UK party in the 2014 EU election and it received the third highest number of votes in the 2015 General Election. Even though the European Union membership referendum on 23 June 2016 resulted in a majority for "Brexit", it cannot be assumed that UKIP will disappear.

To treat UKIP as a single-issue party may have been justifiable in its early years, but has become increasingly questionable. In the 2015 General Election UKIP produced a 76-page manifesto, cov-ering a wide range of areas. Of course EU opposition is a key priority, but in addition the party wants to reduce taxes, repeal the Climate Change Act, increase the number of grammar schools, increase resources to the police, increase prison capacity, make convicted criminals serve their full sentences, introduce citizen initiatives and recall votes for Members of Parliament, etc. Not least important, UKIP wants to tighten control of immigration, and rejects multiculturalism (UKIP 2015).

The main purpose of this article is to add to the rather sketchy knowledge about the nature of UKIP. The analysis will be conducted with two main points of reference. One is the view of UKIP as a somewhat more radical, but non-extreme, extension of mainstream conservatism. There is much to suggest that this is the preferred self-image in large parts of the party. Indeed, several leading UKIP representatives, including its two MPs elected in 2014-15, were defectors from the Conservative Party. It is of course true that UKIP has also targeted disgruntled Labour voters, but they have not done so with left-leaning economic rhetoric or policies. Rather, the attempts to woo former Labour voters have highlighted immigration, and how money saved from leaving the EU can be used for health care, education etc. A second approach is to view UKIP as a member of the broader European extreme right party family. The vociferous EU criticism, and the increasingly negative stance on immigration, means that UKIP has at least as much in common with, e.g., the

Swiss People's Party and Lega Nord – at a stretch even the "de-demonised" French Front National – as with the British Tories.

What we thus aim to investigate is which of two models fits UKIP best – the Tory model or the European Extreme Right (EER) model (the label Extreme Right will be used in full awareness that other designations exist). Our approach will be different to the existing literature on party classification and party families. Instead of looking at party history and documents (compare Mair and Mudde 1998), focus will be on perceptions in the electorate. Employing like-dislike scales as the main variable, the public perception of UKIP will be investigated, and compared with the other main British parties plus BNP. The main aim is to locate and characterise the groups who like, and dislike, UKIP and compare them to the groups liking, and not liking, other British parties.

Three questions will be given particular attention. First, where does UKIP fit into the British party system, in terms of sympathies/antipathies? Are they mostly like BNP, i.e. marginalised if not ostracised, or have they moved closer towards the mainstream of UK politics? Second, how similar are the support patterns of UKIP in comparison with what is known about the EER? The EER support patterns will be referred to as the Extreme Right Template, and presented below. The question we aim to answer is whether UKIP, when the template is applied, is more similar to BNP or the Conservatives. Third, where do UKIP votes come from? How homogenous or heterogeneous is their support? Are they single-issue Eurosceptics, do they fit better with the Extreme Right template – or are they also taking votes from traditional Tory or Labour support?

The analysis covers two time points, using data from the 2010 and 2015 British Election Studies (BES). This will allow us to assess whether the standing of UKIP among British voters remained stable during a period when the party went from being an outside irritant to become a major threat against the mainstream parties. Despite being punished by the electoral system used in Westminster elections, its share of the vote has become big enough to affect the strategies of other parties. BNP, meanwhile, seemed on the verge of a breakthrough after winning two seats in the 2009 EU election, but soon succumbed to internal splits. The party still existed in 2017, but was in serious decline. This also means that the 2015 BES data could be the last opportunity to include BNP in a comparison of British parties.

The Extreme Right template

There is a vast literature on voting for extreme right parties (e.g. Givens 2005; van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Rydgren 2008), but a brief summary should be sufficient here. Beginning with socio-demographic characteristics, the extreme right vote is predominantly male (Mudde 2007:111-118). Extreme right voters also tend to be young, and working or lower middle class (Hainsworth 2008:95-104; Givens 2005:60-66). The unemployed tend to be overrepresented (Givens 2005, ch. 4; Norris 2005:143). Comparative studies on employment sector are scarce, but country-specific studies suggest that extreme right votes tend to come from the private sector (e.g. De Weert and De Witte 2007; Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013:139; Andersen and Andersen 2007:214f). Extreme right voters tend, finally, to have comparatively low levels of education (Norris 2005:141f; Hainsworth 2008:95f); and not to be religious (Lubbers et al. 2002).

Regarding attitudinal factors, it is almost too obvious to mention that extreme right voters are against immigration. This is not to say that they necessarily hold outright racist views (Rydgren 2008), but immigration has become a more or less universal factor behind extreme right voting (Lubbers et al. 2002; Stockemer 2016). Extreme right voters are also unhappy with the political establishment, even though the notion of an empty protest vote meets with little support in the literature (e.g. van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Oesch 2008). Other possible attitudinal factors include authoritarian views about law and order, and obedience to authority, which is a key part of the extreme right message (Mudde 2007). EU criticism is a core value for the vast majority of extreme right parties in Europe, although this was not always the case historically (Müller 2002). Regarding the economy, most extreme right parties have adopted a pro-welfare stance, referred to as welfare chauvinism (Mudde 2000).

A third set of variables is to do with the personal characteristics of extreme right voters. Findings by Wilcox et al. (2003), based on macro-level data, suggest that extreme right parties tend to perform better in countries with low levels of social capital. An individual-level analysis by Rydgren (2009), spanning six West European countries, does not find evidence to support any crude generalisations of extreme right voters as isolated and socially inept, but the exact results vary according to the indicators used, and also across different countries. Despite the ambiguities, social capital is a factor that cannot be overlooked, and will be included in our analysis.

The final group of factors will be media consumption. Research evidence indicates that levels of support for an extreme right party are not primarily affected by the reporting about the party itself, but rather the treatment of the party's prioritised issues. An obvious example is immigration – it plays into the hands of an extreme right party if the media frequently report immigration as a problem, such as immigrant crime or difficulties with integration (Walgrave and de Swert 2004). In a similar vein, media outlets that frequently provide negative reports about the EU can be expected to benefit an EU critical party. We will, therefore, test the impact of reading different newspapers with varying perspectives on immigration and the EU.

Data

The data used will be from the last two British Election Studies, namely the 2010 Campaign Internet Panel Survey (CIPS) (Clarke et al. 2011) and the 2014-17 British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) (Fieldhouse et al. 2015). This provides large numbers of respondents sympathising with even relatively minor parties, like BNP or UKIP (as the latter still were in 2010). A disadvantage is that some of the variables discussed above do not appear in the most straightforward form. Also, since both are internet surveys, they suffer from under-representation of certain social groups which in our case may be of particular interest, given the social composition of extreme right party support. However, it has been found that the Internet-based YouGov surveys used for the BES compare quite well with face-to-face surveys, and CIPS as well as BESIP provide weight variables. For the following analyses, we have used data from the pre-campaign wave of the CIPS panel (the only survey asking like/dislike questions about all parties of interest, including BNP) and from the fourth wave of BESIP (the pre-campaign wave in 2015). For all analyses, we are using the standard weight variable for the full sample.

Our main variable of interest is not voting or vote intention, but the following question: "On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how to you feel about party x?" In BESIP, a split sample design was employed where half the sample was asked this like/dislike question, while the other half was asked a propensity to vote question (PTV): "How likely is it that you would ever vote for each of the following parties?" The PTV question tends to be more discriminating in the responses it elicits, but otherwise the trends are very comparable. In all our analyses here, we focus on the measure that is comparable across studies, the like/dislike scale.[1]

In contrast to vote choice, this variable allows for a more nuanced analysis. A comparison of vote choice models including BNP also becomes impossible to estimate due to the very small N for BNP in 2015 (around 50 out of a sample of over 30,000). The independent variables for the second part of our analysis include socio-demographics, attitudinal variables and media consumption in order to compare each party's support with the above-discussed "extreme right template". There are some differences with regard to measurement and availability of variables across the two panels, which are discussed below. The British Election Study started to include like/dislike scales for both UKIP and BNP only in 2010, which means that 2010-2015 is the only period where a detailed analysis of attitudes towards parties including BNP and UKIP is possible.

The position of UKIP in the British party system

The starting point of this research was the simple observation that when like/dislike scores were correlated among all available pairs of British parties[2] in 2010, the largest positive correlation was between UKIP and BNP (see Table 1.1). It was only matched by the negative correlation between Labour and the Conservatives - the dominant partisan divide in British politics. To our knowledge, it is unprecedented to find a positive association in attitudes towards two British parties coming so close to emulating the negative association between the two main players in British party politics.

Table 1.1 HERE

Perhaps surprisingly, we continue to observe a large positive correlation between UKIP and BNP in 2015 (see Table 1.2), despite the widely diverging electoral fortunes of the two parties - UKIP securing more than 3.8 million votes and BNP reduced to 1,667 votes.

Table 1.2 HERE

Seen in isolation, the correlations reported in Tables 1.1-1.2 imply some systematic co-occurrence of antipathy as well as sympathy towards both parties. For example, a majority of remaining BNP sympathisers become UKIP voters by 2015. At the opposite end almost everyone who scored UKIP zero on the like/dislike scale also gave BNP a zero. But the correlation, while strong, is far from perfect. It does not mean that every supporter of UKIP also likes BNP, or that everyone who

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[1] We ran robustness checks with PTV scores and the general pattern of findings was consistently confirmed. The main difference is that correlations between PTV scores tend to be lower, reflecting the somewhat different distributions of answers that PTV scores tend to obtain compared with thermometer scores.

[2] We are only considering the six parties competing Britain-wide, excluding regional parties like the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru.

despises BNP is equally dismissive of UKIP. We should, indeed, not just look at this relationship in isolation. Tables 1.1-1.2 show a complex, but not unstructured, pattern of positive and negative associations across British parties. Attitudes towards parties that are traditionally understood to be on the right of the political spectrum (Conservatives, UKIP, BNP) are all positively correlated, as are attitudes towards all three parties traditionally located to the left, or centre-left (Labour, Liberal Democrats, Greens), while across the left-right divide correlations are negative. The only real exceptions to this pattern are (a) the Tory-LibDem coalition partners becoming positively associated by 2015 and (b) weak negative correlations between BNP, LibDems and Greens losing significance in 2015, a consequence of almost universal disapproval, and increasing irrelevance, of BNP.

But, importantly, the patterns of negative and positive correlations do not imply a straightforward unidimensional party preference space that runs from the far right to the far left. Remember that the strongest negative correlation is between two non-extreme parties, Labour and the Conservatives.

A better way to illustrate where UKIP as a political party fits into the British party system, how systematically similar to the BNP it is perceived and whether it has made any inroads into the mainstream of British politics, is multidimensional unfolding (Coombs 1950, Busing 2010). This is a technique that jointly maps row (in our case respondents) and column entities (in our case political parties) from either ranking or rating data in a low-dimensional common space. The already utilised 0-10 like-dislike scales will be used as data input. Mapping respondents and parties from these input data results in a representation of party preference rank orderings, where the distance between a respondent and a party is inversely related to how highly the respondent rates that party compared with all other parties.[3] As already mentioned, there are good reasons to argue that a unidimensional representation of the latent preference space is not an option - a simple left-right dimension is not sufficient to map all the variation in party preference orders across individuals. However, a two-dimensional solution proves easily sufficient, not just conceptually but also in terms of model diagnostics.

Including only respondents who answered the like-dislike question for all six parties, we arrive at sample sizes of N=13,923 for 2010 and N=13,596 for 2015. We are using PREFSCAL[4], one of the few algorithms for multidimensional unfolding that guarantees avoiding degenerative solutions (Busing 2010). The unfolding analysis maps over 13,000 row items (respondents) and six column items (parties) in a two-dimensional space, with proximities defined as similarities and ties being kept (i.e. identical scores for two parties translate into equidistance from the respondent). The arrived solutions show no degeneracy, account in each case for 93% of dispersion in the original data, for 73% of variance in 2010 and 72% in 2015. The left panel in Figure 1 presents the latent party preference space in 2010 and the right panel the preference space in 2015.

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[3] The metaphor of 'unfolding' relates to Coombs' (1950:147) original unidimensional conceptualization but can be equally be used to illustrate a two-dimensional solution: if you were to lift the plane that represents the latent party preference space at the location of any respondent and fold it into one scale, the top of that scale (the location of the respondent) would represent the ideal point, and the parties would be located in descending order along the scale. Multidimensional unfolding is what Busing (2010: 9) calls the "reverse operation": we begin with the preference orders of individual respondents and the objective is to find the joint party preference space.
[4] PREFSCAL is available as a module in IBM SPSS Statistics.

Two important caveats are in order before interpreting these unfolding graphs: first, this should not be misunderstood as a latent policy space. While the latent preference space may be informed by left-right or other ideological dimensions, the two dimensions of our unfolding map do not directly translate into those. Hence, any movement of a party between 2010 and 2015 only implies that its relative popularity vis-à-vis other parties has altered. Second, while the unfolding algorithm used here retains object *rankings* it does not retain precise object *ratings*. The closest party in the latent policy space revealed by unfolding is simply the highest ranked of that respondent, the second-closest the second-highest ranked and so on. This would remain the case also if, for example, a respondent put all parties below the mid-point of the 0-10 scale.

Since the main focus here is on the relative standing of UKIP within this party preference space, the data in Figure 1 are presented in the form of a "heat map" with reference to UKIP. The red-shaded (warmest) area contains respondents who rank UKIP highest in their preference order. The pink-shaded area contains those who rank UKIP within the top two of their preference order, while the blue-shaded (coldest) area contains those ranking UKIP and BNP at the bottom of their preference orders.

Figure 1 HERE

Primarily, the maps illustrate how UKIP remains at the margins of the British party system and is, by far, the party closest to BNP. In contrast to BNP, however, UKIP bridges the space between the extreme right fringe and the political mainstream. Almost all BNP supporters (of which few are left in 2015) have UKIP as their second choice,[5] and about half of UKIP supporters rank BNP second.[6] By 2015, UKIP have certainly expanded their reach into the extreme right, becoming the primary choice of most of those with any sympathies for BNP.

The expansion of UKIP's electoral reach in 2015 is evident also on other fronts. While in 2010 UKIP was outside the top two in an overwhelming majority of preference orders (blue- and white-shaded areas combined), by 2015 the red- and pink-shaded areas have both expanded considerably, indicating that UKIP has become competitive among a much larger portion of the electorate. At the same time UKIP has become a more polarizing force. The blue-shaded area, containing those who reject UKIP and pigeon-hole them together with BNP, has also expanded. This segment is almost exclusively populated by those favouring Liberal Democrats, Greens and Labour. There is little indifference (white areas) left in the 2015 map.

UKIP has expanded both in terms of outright support and competitiveness. The red-shaded area has increased, and is also more populated in 2015, implying that more respondents favour the party above all others. This growth comes from taking away outright support from both BNP and Conservatives. But, perhaps more importantly, the lighter pink-shaded area (respondents who rank them within their top two) has increased considerably, implying that UKIP are much more competitive. On that front they are encroaching considerably on Conservative and to a lesser extent on Labour territory. UKIP has become more competitive, and perhaps electable, in some parts of the

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[5] The lower pink triangle contains over 90% of those ranking BNP top; the rest are in the adjacent white area and rank Labour second.

[6] Almost exactly the bottom half of the red-shaded area in 2010, and the less populated bottom two thirds of the red shaded area in 2015.

electorate at the same time as having become more maligned and pigeon-holed as an extreme right party in other parts. The party has soaked up more far right support in 2015, with BNP being ever more marginalised, but at least as much of the growth in popularity has been through expansion into the mainstream of British party politics.

Critically, the "warm" areas in the heat map from unfolding analysis show UKIP as nested between BNP and the Conservatives. About half of those who rank UKIP top have BNP as second preference; the other half has the Conservatives second. UKIP is much more likely to be second-ranked to the Conservatives than to Labour in anyone's preference order – which is evident from the pink-shaded area next to the Conservatives comfortably exceeding the size of the corresponding area closest to Labour. So if, in terms of preference orders, UKIP shares about as much with BNP as with the Conservatives, how does that translate into the nature of their support base? Does UKIP support follow the Extreme Right Template, meaning that it has links not only to BNP but to a broader European extreme right party family, or does it have more in common with more traditional centre-right support of a party like the Conservatives? That question is what we turn to next.

Comparing UKIP's support base with that of BNP and the Conservatives

The preceding analysis implies that UKIP are deriving support and sympathies from the extreme right fringe as well as some section of the British population that falls into the political mainstream. To understand this bridging position of the party a bit better, we aim in our second step to test the extent to which UKIP fits the earlier described Extreme Right Template. In order to test that overall relationship as well as its evolution over a period in which UKIP became significantly more popular, while BNP almost disappeared as an electoral option, we ran regressions on data from again both 2010 and 2015. Most of the independent variables in the models presented below are straightforward, but changes in the questionnaires mean that it is not possible to replicate the analysis exactly across the two time points. The 2015 survey lacks information about, for example, sector employment, prospective personal finances and social capital. On the other hand, it includes items from which we could construct an authoritarianism scale which was missing in the 2010 panel. In some cases question wordings and response options have been altered. Nevertheless, there is enough similarity between the two time points to allow meaningful comparison. (See Appendix A for a summary of how variables were measured in both surveys.)

The nature of our dependent variables (feeling thermometer scores for UKIP, BNP and the Conservatives) makes the choice of an adequate model for analysis anything but straightforward, however. The more general question of whether a 0-10 scale is better understood as a continuous or ordinal variable is not at the heart of our problem, since thermometer scales, just as PTV scores, tend to meet the fundamental requirements for treating an ordinal scale as though it were continuous (Kim 1975).[7] Our main problem lies not in the measurement, but in the frequency distribution of our dependent variables. These are shown in Figure 2, and it becomes quite clear that our dependent variables deviate considerably from a normal distribution. In particular, they consistently expose a severe floor effect, with respondents clustering at 0 (=extreme dislike of the party in question); more so in case of BNP than UKIP or the Conservatives, and much more so in 2015 than earlier across all three parties.

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[7] We did, however, carry out robustness checks by re-running analyses with ordered logit, and none of the substantive findings change.

Figure 2 HERE

The problem of a dependent variable which is constrained, and exposes severe clustering at the constraint, can be tackled with a Tobit, or *censored regression* model (Long 1997, Cameron and Trivedi 2009). If there is severe clustering at zero, using OLS regressions will result in an under-estimated intercept and overestimated slope, because "the censored observations on the left pull down that end of the regression line" (Long 1997: 189). Tobit models deal with this problem by estimating the effects on a latent variable that is not censored, i.e. can take on values below the constraint.[8] More specifically, Tobit models work through maximum likelihood estimation that combines a probit and a linear regression element modelling, first, the impact of the independent variables on the probability of a score being above zero and, second, combining this with their linear impact on variation in values above zero.[9] Tobit models are particularly useful for our purposes insofar as they allow calculating standardized coefficients – albeit less straightforward than in OLS (Long 1997, pp. 207f). This provides us with a suitable tool to analyse and visualise the extent to which the support base of UKIP resembles that of either of the other two parties. Results are reported in Figures 3 and 4 for the 2010 and 2015 models, respectively.[10] Full model specifications can be found in Appendix B.

Figure 3 AND Figure 4 HERE

The findings from both years, but particularly from 2010, are quite remarkable. Almost without exception, the same socio-economic indicators are significant and pull attitudes towards both BNP and UKIP in the same direction. In contrast, the effects of most socio-economic variables point in the opposite direction when it comes to the Conservatives. Evaluations of both UKIP and BNP improve among young,[11] male, working class respondents on low incomes and with low levels of

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[8] It is of course understood that feeling thermometer scores, just as PTV scores, are constrained not by failing to report negative scores, but by having zero as one of its endpoints. In our case, however, there is something intuitive about considering the notion of an underlying latent variable that is not censored: imagine that respondents were in addition to the rating of parties on these scales also asked to rank-order them, from most- to least-liked party. It is quite reasonable to assume that many, if not most, of those respondents who scored both UKIP and BNP zero would rank BNP below UKIP. This would imply that the scale is indeed censored by not allowing expression of residual non-random variation in party preference among those scoring more than one party zero. Indeed, the use of Tobit models for the analysis of survey data with 11-point scale dependent variables has been suggested before (Auspurg and Hinz 2015).

[9] Dependent variables can be modelled as censored from below, or from both below and above. Technically, the 0-10 scales are censored from above and below, but since there is no clustering at 10, there is no gain in comparison with OLS from defining the dependent as censored from above, so we restricted to imputing a censoring at zero.

[10] Figures 4 and 5 include only independent variables that have significant effect on at least one of our different dependent variables. Insignificant effects are indicated by lighter shades. Two caveats with regard to the comparison of standardized coefficients in Figures 4 and 5: first, we cannot use a weight variable when calculating standardized coefficients for a Tobit model, so these are from unweighted models, which does result in minor differences but does not alter the direction of any individual regressor. Second, it is of course understood that standardized coefficients cannot be directly compared across models, since they only calculate explanatory power in relation to other factors included in the same model. Especially since inclusion and measurement of variables differs somewhat across time points, Figures 4 and 5 should only be taken as a graphic illustration of a rough comparison of relative impact of the same independent variable in the separate models.

[11] The age effect for UKIP is counter-intuitive, given that their support base tends to be older, but once we control for attitudes, newspaper readership etc., the residual age effect does turn negative. This is also borne out by robustness checks using ordered logit (see note 7).

education, and in 2010 (when measured) particularly among those working in the private sector. All of these are socio-demographic characteristics that fit the extreme right template. The only socio-demographic factor that clearly goes against the extreme right template is religion, which was insignificant for both parties in 2010, and had a positive effect on both parties in 2015. Tentatively, this could be related to both parties' intensifying criticism of Islam. In 2010 evaluations of the Conservatives are higher among females, high income earners and private sector employees, while they go down among respondents with routine and manual occupations. In 2015, we find less impact of gender. Income and class still matter, while there is no data on sector employment. Not unexpectedly, religion has a positive effect on attitudes to the Conservatives on both occasions.

Things look different when it comes to political efficacy or political integration. Here, UKIP support is much more similar to that of the Conservatives. BNP support maximises among those with low levels of trust, satisfaction with democracy and political attention. At least in 2010 the opposite is the case for both UKIP and the Conservatives – the impact is much stronger for the Conservatives. By 2015, UKIP becomes a little more located between the other two. Political attention now only has a positive effect on what respondents think of UKIP. And while satisfaction with democracy has a much larger impact on what you make of the Conservatives (a clear incumbency effect), it continues to be insignificant for UKIP and has become insignificant for BNP.

Newspaper readership tends to pull largely in the same direction for all three parties, but more frequently so for UKIP and Conservatives than for BNP. All three parties are unpopular among Guardian readers, but popular among Daily Mail readers in 2010, and Sun readers in 2015. The Mail effect disappears for BNP in 2015, while Sun readers actually take more to all three parties in 2015 than in 2010. The Telegraph consistently pulls readers towards UKIP and, especially, the Conservatives, but not BNP.

When it comes to attitudes, some marked differences are apparent. Being economically right-wing, while pulling in the same direction throughout, has by far the strongest effect on Conservative support, and the least impact on what you think of BNP, with UKIP in between. Interesting changes over time occur with regard to attitudes towards immigration and EU integration. The EU consistently matters most for UKIP, but disappears as a factor for BNP in 2015. For the Conservatives the EU issue remains significant, but has consistently much less impact than on UKIP. Immigration has a comparatively limited effect on Conservative support. Unsurprisingly, the effect is much stronger for BNP, with UKIP in between. In 2015, however, the effect of immigration on UKIP support has almost caught up with that of BNP. Authoritarian attitudes (only available in 2015) also maximise BNP as well as UKIP support almost equally, while mattering a lot less for attitudes towards the Conservatives.

Overall, then, the picture is mixed. As far as socio-demographics and attitudes are concerned, the basis of UKIP support comes across as much more similar to that of BNP than of the Conservatives. On the other hand the analysis indicates that UKIP supporters are more politically integrated than their BNP counterparts; in that respect being more Tory than extreme right. However, the analysis presented in this section averages effects across entire survey samples, and combines factors explaining sympathies as well as antipathies. The unfolding plot from the previous section implies that while BNP supporters come across as relatively homogenous in their – largely positive

– evaluations of UKIP, not all UKIP supporters seem to reciprocate. There could, therefore, be significant variations in how they relate to both the extreme right and the moderate centre-right neighbour. In addition, although some UKIP supporters share demographic and attitudinal characteristics with BNP supporters, others may not. The appropriate method to disentangle such potential heterogeneity in UKIP support is latent class analysis (LCA), which is what we move to in the final step of the analysis.

The heterogeneity of UKIP support

In order to investigate in more detail whether, and to what extent, support for right wing parties and mutual appreciation among supporters of such parties is heterogeneous across societal groups, we conduct a latent class analysis (LCA).[12] LCA is a method that seeks to locate groups, or subtypes of cases (latent classes), in multivariate categorical data. In our case, the aim is to find subgroups in the British electorate that are characterised by within-group homogeneity and between-group heterogeneity in how they assess UKIP, BNP and the Conservatives. The main purpose is to disaggregate patterns of UKIP support: does the party have different types of supporters, and can we estimate the extent to which UKIP attracts extreme right voters compared with its competitiveness among more mainstream voters?

For these purposes, we created dummy variables from like-dislike scores for all three parties of interest – UKIP, BNP and Conservatives. Given that 0 is the modal category for each party, we kept scoring a party 0, i.e. rejecting it, as a separate category. We then simplified, in order not to have eleven dummy variables per party, and created three further categories summarizing negative (1-3), neutral (4-6) and positive (7-10) evaluations. Only including respondents who answered the like-dislike question for all of our studied parties, we arrive at 12 items per respondent, with each respondent providing three responses (1) and nine non-responses (0). In the LCA plugin, parameters are estimated by maximum-likelihood, with Gamma (γ) parameters expressing correspondence between observed items and latent classes, and Rho (ρ) parameters expressing item-response probabilities conditional on latent class membership. We ultimately arrived at a model with seven latent classes, on the basis of both model fit and theoretical fit. Evaluating model fit, we found that neither Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) nor Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) improved beyond a seven class solution, while entropy, i.e. classification uncertainty, only tended to reduce up to that point. On the theoretical side, while more parsimonious solutions (three or four class models) were possible, only with seven latent classes were we able to distinguish key subgroups. It was, in addition, found that a model with seven latent classes produces persuasively similar patterns for both the 2010 and the 2015 data. Figures 5 and 6 graphically illustrate the item-response probabilities (Rho (ρ) parameters) for the party dummies derived from the like-dislike scale across the seven classes. We are using a similar colour coding to the earlier "heat map"– red indicates supporting and blue rejecting a party.

Figure 5 AND Figure 6 HERE

The latent classes can be meaningfully labelled – the first class as the "Extreme Left", characterized by joint rejection of all three parties: the probability of rejecting BNP (0) is .97 in 2010 and

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[12] We ran the analysis in Stata, using the LCA Stata plugin from The Methodology Centre at Penn State University (https://methodology.psu.edu/downloads/lcastata).

approaches 1.0 in 2015. In fact in 2015, probability of rejecting both UKIP and BNP approaches 1.0 while giving the Conservatives a negative score (1-3) equally approaches certainty. There is slightly more variation in 2010 but not much. The second class, labelled "Centre-Left", is characterized by large-scale rejection of both UKIP and BNP while the probability of giving the Conservatives a neutral (4-6) or positive (7-10) score is less than .5. The picture becomes more mixed moving through classes 3 ("Centre"), 4 ("Centre-Right") and 5 ("Conservative"). The probability of giving the Conservatives a neutral or positive score stabilizes at .6 or higher, while BNP remains largely rejected by the "Centre", and negatively evaluated by the "Centre-Right" and "Conservative" groups.

UKIP received exclusively negative scores by the "Centre" and "Centre-Right" groups, and neutral scores by "Conservatives" in 2010, while faring slightly better in the "Centre-Right" class in 2015. BNP fared much better among the sixth and seventh classes, "Eurosceptics" and "Extreme Right", in 2010 than in 2015. In 2010 the odds of BNP being rejected, or receiving negative or neutral scores by "Eurosceptics" were roughly even, but in 2015 they were outright rejected. While, furthermore, the probability of positive scores for BNP from the "Extreme Right" class was approaching 1.0 in 2010, it changed to a .65 probability of neutral and .35 probability of positive scores in 2015. For UKIP, the "Eurosceptic" group is a secure source of positive evaluations, while the probability of positive scores from the "Extreme Right" class increased from .55 in 2010 to .85 in 2015.

While the patterns look remarkably similar when comparing 2010 and 2015, the relative sizes of the latent classes differ, in some cases considerably, between the two time points. The three latent classes to the right ("Conservatives", "Eurosceptics" and "Extreme Right") have all declined in size by 2015, while the "Centre-Right" and "Centre-Left" groups have both roughly doubled (see percentages reported below each class). The "Extreme Left" class has declined to almost half its size from 2010.

In order to externally validate the substantive meaning of these latent classes, the "best index" variable that LCA creates (an indicator of which latent class is the best match for each individual based on posterior probabilities) is merged back into the 2010 and 2015 BES internet panel datasets. It can then be estimated how well socio-demographic and attitudinal factors explain latent class membership. Differently put: how much more likely does a certain individual characteristic make it for a respondent to be assigned to one of the seven classes? We ran multinomial regressions, separately for each year, using the "Centre" latent class as reference category. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report the unstandardized B coefficients from multinomial regressions.

Table 2.1 AND Table 2.2 HERE

Age matters little and only insofar as the "Extreme Right" is typically younger. Gender matters much more – the further to the right, the more likely respondents are to be male. Education matters much more in 2015 than in 2010. In the former year only respondents in the "Extreme Right" group were significantly less likely to have a degree than those in the "Centre". In 2015 almost all other groups, apart from the "Extreme Left", showed lower levels of education than the "Centre". On the other hand, class mattered more in 2010, with the working class flocking to the extremes – everyone but the "Centre-Right" were more likely to be of working class background than those

in the "Centre". In 2015, this had disappeared. In terms of social composition the now smaller "Extreme Left" group has changed considerably. In 2010, this group was made up by members of the working class, secular and with low incomes. In 2015 it is over-proportionally female, financially well-off (i.e. not significantly different from the "Centre" class which is significantly better off financially than everyone to the right of the spectrum) with high levels of education, but low levels of political attention.

Dissatisfaction with democracy is characteristic of those at both extremes in the political spectrum. Our changing economic left right variables (tax-v-spend in 2010, redistribution scale in 2015) show similar patterns: the two classes on the left are considerably more to the left economically than those in the "Centre", while everyone from the "Centre" to the "Extreme Right" is economically right wing to an almost equal extent. Differences emerge instead with regard to attitudes towards the EU, immigration and, in 2015, authoritarianism. The further to the right, the more extreme respondents are on all of these. Notably, however, anti-European attitudes maximize within the "Eurosceptic" class, while anti-immigration and authoritarian attitudes maximize strongly in the "Extreme Right" class. Newspaper readership is related to latent class membership largely as expected, but it is interesting to note that in 2015 reading the Sun is increasingly becoming an indicator of being further to the right in the spectrum. The Daily Mail is rejected by "Extreme left" and "Centre-Left", but almost equally likely to be read among all other groups, from "Centre" to "Extreme Right".

The model works marginally better in 2015 than in 2010 – but overall this nicely confirms the socio-demographic and attitudinal coherence within groups, and the meaningful contrasts between groups, produced by the LCA. It is important to remember that these co-variates were not used in any form to initially identify latent classes; the latter were entirely based on analysis of like-dislike scales vis-à-vis our three parties of interest. But the analysis shows that there is a clear social and attitudinal basis to how party ratings among respondents relate to each other.

Finally, we can use the LCA "best index" variable to estimate vote shares of all parties across latent classes. And indeed, as can been seen from tables 3.1 and 3.2, voting behaviour has changed considerably in some instances between 2010 and 2015. Not so much in case of the "Extreme Left" class, which continues to reject UKIP, BNP and Conservatives alike at the ballot box. The "Centre-Left" also rejects UKIP and BNP, but the Conservatives come out second or third strongest party in both elections. In 2010 the Conservatives had the largest vote share among all five remaining latent classes, from "Centre" to "Extreme Right", while UKIP only gained a serious vote share among "Eurosceptic" and "Extreme Right" voters. In 2015, however, we see how UKIP soars and does so from the Centre-Right group onwards. Among "Eurosceptics" and "Extreme Right" it almost exactly matches the vote share of the Conservative Party. So, while in 2010 having the largest probability (even a certainty) to receive high scores did not translate into largest vote shares for either UKIP among "Eurosceptics" nor for BNP among the "Extreme Right", by 2015 UKIP managed to translate appreciation into votes.

Table 3.1 AND Table 3.2 HERE

As was already indicated by the earlier unfolding analysis, UKIP has at the same time become a core electoral option for "Extreme Right" voters as well as for "Eurosceptics". Both groups already

had strong sympathies for UKIP in 2010, but did not yet vote for them in large numbers. By 2015, both groups were equally likely to vote UKIP or Conservative. That is a remarkable finding, indicating the growing reach and electoral competitiveness of UKIP on different fronts. In addition UKIP made inroads among more traditional Tories not obsessed with the EU, not authoritarian and not strongly anti-immigration. They had established themselves as an alternative centre-right party while at the same time having converted many extreme right supporters into voting for them. The picture is thus one of remarkable heterogeneity in UKIP support.

One can tentatively go one step further, and use the figures from Table 3.2 to compare the relative importance of the divergent groups (the latent classes) for UKIP's overall electoral performance. In 2015 the "Extreme Right" contributed about 20% of UKIP voters, while "Eurosceptics" accounted for roughly a third. The rest came from the "Conservative" (14%) and "Centre Right" (30%) classes. This is indeed a varied mix which raises important questions about what kind of party UKIP wants to be in the long run. At the extremes it already emulates the vote share of the Conservative Party, but almost half of the UKIP votes in 2015 came from moderates who remain much more likely to vote Conservative. These centrist classes are much more populated than the "Eurosceptics" and "Extreme Right", and hence offer more potential for growth. The question then is whether UKIP wants to grow into a mainstream party or solidify its position as the party of choice for the more extreme parts of the electorate. An important additional question will of course be what becomes of "Eurosceptics" post-Brexit. They could fall back into the centre-right fold, or become more immigration-obsessed – much depends on what "Brexit" will mean in practice.

<u>Conclusion</u>

The research presented above has been guided by three main questions. The first, where UKIP fits into the British party system, was answered with unfolding analysis. The results were not unequivocal. On the one hand UKIP was by far the closest party to BNP in both 2010 and 2015. Thus, it is not unreasonable to argue that UKIP has been located at the margins of the British party preference space at both time points. On the other hand the outreach of UKIP expanded between 2010 and 2015. In the latter year the party had taken over almost all latent BNP support, but at the same time become much more competitive among Tory and, to a lesser extent, Labour supporters. Thus, while there is a clear element of UKIP having moved towards the mainstream, it has not abandoned the fringes.

The second question was how similar the support patterns of UKIP were in comparison to the European Extreme Right template. Using Tobit regression analysis, the comparison also involved the Conservative Party and BNP. The overall impression is that both BNP and UKIP fit the Extreme Right template rather well, the main difference being social and political integration where UKIP comes across as more mainstream. The Tories also display some similarities to the template, but if the relative strengths of the effects are taken into account, BNP and UKIP display a better fit.

The third question, tackled with Latent Class Analysis, was how UKIP support can be characterised. The results here are complex, but in essence they reinforce the indications provided by the unfolding analysis, namely that UKIP draws on two main sources of support; one quite extreme with the closest links to BNP, and one more moderately Eurosceptic, closer to the Conservatives.

In both 2010 and 2015 the biggest contribution to UKIP voting come from the "Eurosceptic" class, ahead of the "Extreme Right". Of course UKIP support is more diverse than that, with sizeable minority contributions from the "Conservative" and, in 2015 especially, "Centre-Right" classes. Still, the most appropriate summary is that UKIP support is primarily a mix of non-extreme Euroscepticism and more extreme right-wing radicalism.

Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis does not seem to show UKIP in direct competition with Labour. Ford and Goodwin (2014; 2016) argue that the growth of UKIP in the 2010s to a significant extent was the consequence of disillusioned working class voters abandoning Labour. Evans and Mellon (2016 a; b) disagree, arguing that the disgruntled working class voters had abandoned Labour before UKIP was a serious political force (2016a:477), and that the second preferences of UKIP supporters place the Tories well ahead of Labour (2016b:494f). Our findings lend more support to Evans and Mellon; the unfolding analysis shows UKIP and Labour far apart in the preference orders of most respondents. The contrast to the Conservative Party is striking. This does not necessarily mean that UKIP has not taken Labour support. Rather, in line with Evans and Mellon, it seems that the shift from the Conservatives to UKIP is a comparatively smooth process, where some feelings remain for the former favourite party, but that the shift from Labour to UKIP seems conflictual, breeding resentment towards the previously preferred party. It may also be a longer process, with moves to other parties, or abstention, between departure from Labour and arrival at UKIP.

Thus, the classification of UKIP is far from straightforward. There are elements of radicalism, but also with more mainstream right-of-centre traits. Arguably, the latter dominate. If BNP is the sole point of reference, the near-consensus in the literature about UKIP being a non-extreme party is supported. This said, there are also links to BNP. These should not be overstated, but nor are they trivial. If, furthermore, the frame of reference is extended, parallels can be detected with at least some members of the broader European extreme right party family. The impact of immigration on UKIP support is unequivocal, in 2015 close to that of BNP (see Figures 3 and 4). The most striking difference to BNP, social and political integration, does not make UKIP distinctive from several other European extreme right parties.

The argument is not that UKIP can be conclusively classified as extreme right. For that more comparative research is needed. But while not straightforwardly extreme, nor is UKIP straightforwardly mainstream. As shown by the unfolding and Latent Class analyses, the position of UKIP in the British party system can be described as a link between the mainstream and the extreme. This makes UKIP distinctive from other British parties, a distinctiveness with parallels to the positions of anti-establishment, EU sceptical and immigration-critical parties elsewhere in Europe. These parallels are hardly negated by the distinctiveness from the now almost defunct BNP.

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Table 1.1: Correlations between party feeling thermometer scores in 2010

	UKIP	Conserva-tives	Labour	Liberal Democrats	Greens
BNP	**.522***	.173*	-.199*	-.139*	-.112*
UKIP		.336*	-.318*	-.091*	-.107*
Conservatives			**-.529***	-.065*	-.185*
Labour				.209*	.293*
Liberal Democrats					.432*

* Correlation significant at .001
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 (Clarke et al 2011)

Table 1.2: Correlations between party feeling thermometer scores in 2015

	UKIP	Conserva-tives	Labour	Liberal Democrats	Greens
BNP	**.457***	.095*	-.028*	.006	-.015
UKIP		.314*	-.268*	-.130*	-.283*
Conservatives			**-.438***	.220*	-.312*
Labour				.197*	.348*
Liberal Democrats					.271*

* Correlation significant at .001

Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2015 (Fieldhouse et al. 2015)

Table 2.1: Multinomial model: co-variants of latent class membership, 2010

	Extreme Left vs Centre	Centre-Left vs Centre	Centre-Right vs Centre	Conservative vs Centre	Euro-sceptic vs Centre	Extreme Right vs Centre
	B	B	B	B	B	B
Age	0.025	**0.090****	0.023	-0.049	0.028	**-0.218*****
Sex (male=1, female=2)	-0.141	-0.050	-0.131	**-0.183****	**-0.452*****	**-0.658*****
Income	**-0.031****	-0.018	-0.004	-0.009	-0.017	**-0.055*****
Education	0.143	0.090	-0.115	-0.112	-0.130	**-0.283***
Middle class	0.091	0.088	0.046	**0.212****	0.076	0.169
Working class	**0.323****	**0.315****	0.204	**0.318****	**0.260***	**0.606*****
Private sector	-0.021	-0.059	0.342	0.049	-0.367	0.027
Public sector	0.247	0.055	0.304	-0.027	-0.339	-0.089
Religion	**-0.316*****	**-0.238****	-0.146	-0.071	-0.108	-0.140
Personal finance (retrospective)	-0.002	0.022	0.022	-0.007	0.012	0.011
Personal finance (prospective)	0.030	-0.053	-0.009	-0.051	-0.052	-0.039
Political attention	-0.017	**0.061*****	**-0.117*****	-0.019	**0.069*****	0.035
Satisfaction with democracy in UK	**-0.208*****	**-0.172*****	**-0.152****	**-0.133****	**-0.192*****	**-0.212*****
Trust in people	0.008	**-0.044***	-0.024	0.013	0.014	**-0.088*****
Tax vs spend	**0.132*****	**0.116*****	-0.026	-0.032	**-0.062****	-0.039
EU integration	**0.186*****	**0.258*****	-0.015	**-0.393*****	**-1.045*****	**-0.812*****
Attitude towards immigration	**0.128*****	**0.099*****	**-0.163*****	**-0.147*****	**-0.250*****	**-0.406*****
Daily Mail	**-0.361****	**-0.238***	**0.282***	**0.325*****	**0.295****	**0.375****
Daily Star	0.414	-0.053	0.449	0.618	-0.583	0.483
Guardian	**0.577*****	**0.535*****	-0.165	**-0.472****	**-1.130****	-0.245
Sun	**-0.322***	**-0.403****	0.207	-0.040	-0.154	-0.158
Telegraph	**-0.814*****	**-0.446****	-0.155	0.001	-0.030	0.007
N	*10,878*					
-2 Log Likelihood	*35238.633*					
Pseudo R-Square						
Cox and Snell	*0.479*					
McFadden	*0.168*					

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p,.001
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 (Clarke et al 2011)

Table 2.2: Multinomial model: co-variants of latent class membership, 2015

	Extreme Left vs Centre	Centre-Left vs Centre	Centre-Right vs Centre	Conservative vs Centre	Euro-sceptic vs Centre	Extreme Right vs Centre
	B	B	B	B	B	B
Age	-0.004	0.005	**-0.010****	**-0.007***	0.001	**-0.022*****
Sex (male=1, female=2)	**0.378*****	**0.398*****	**-0.189***	**-0.216***	**-0.501*****	-0.216
Income	0.022	-0.022	**-0.041****	**-0.030***	**-0.039***	**-0.050****
Education	0.019	**-0.314*****	**-0.256****	**-0.460*****	**-0.443*****	**-0.576*****
Middle class	-0.101	-0.102	0.008	-0.094	0.138	-0.193
Working class	-0.030	-0.083	0.097	0.109	-0.097	0.143
Religion	-0.013	-0.090	**0.211***	0.176	-0.026	0.022
Personal finance (retrospective)	-0.072	**-0.109****	-0.039	-0.030	-0.070	-0.107
Political attention	-0.043	**0.090*****	-0.018	0.025	**0.179*****	**0.125*****
Satisfaction with democracy in UK	**-0.130***	**-0.160*****	-0.091	-0.057	**-0.135***	**-0.157***
Redistribution (self)	**0.114*****	**0.119*****	-0.024	-0.030	-0.025	-0.012
EU integration	**0.109*****	**0.095*****	-0.014	**-0.112*****	**-0.334*****	**-0.097*****
Attitude towards immigration	**0.124*****	**0.084*****	**-0.124*****	**-0.095*****	**-0.147*****	**-0.280*****
Authoritarianism	**-0.064*****	0.012	**0.073*****	**0.063*****	**0.096*****	**0.153*****
Daily Mail	**-0.746*****	**-0.665*****	0.097	0.016	**0.266***	-0.310
Daily Star	**1.340***	**1.085***	**0.910***	**1.156****	**1.187***	**1.533****
Guardian	0.225	**0.292***	-0.269	**-0.517***	**-1.504****	-0.446
Sun	-0.243	-0.150	**0.556*****	**0.404****	**0.353***	**0.625*****
Telegraph	**-0.969*****	**-0.605*****	-0.038	0.112	-0.032	-0.509
N	7,996					
-2 Log Likelihood	24073.888					
Pseudo R-Square						
Cox and Snell	0.586					
McFadden	0.226					

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p,.001

Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2015 (Fieldhouse et al. 2015)

Table 3.1: Vote choice by latent class membership, 2010

|	*Extreme Left*	*Centre- Left*	*Centre*	*Centre- Right*	*Conser- vative*	*Euro- Sceptic*	*Extreme Right*	*Total*
No, did not vote	7.1%	6.8%	6.2%	11.1%	6.7%	4.5%	8.9%	*7.0%*
Conservative	**2.1%**	**21.0%**	**37.5%**	**30.4%**	**46.2%**	**48.3%**	**37.9%**	***32.0%***
Labour	40.8%	35.4%	26.2%	26.8%	18.6%	10.0%	15.6%	*25.6%*
Liberal Democrat	43.1%	30.4%	26.9%	25.8%	20.7%	14.4%	15.8%	*26.3%*
SNP	2.3%	2.5%	1.0%	1.7%	0.9%	0.8%	1.1%	*1.5%*
Plaid Cymru	0.6%	0.4%	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.2%	0.0%	*0.3%*
Green Party	1.3%	1.8%	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%	0.3%	0.1%	*0.9%*
UKIP	**1.4%**	**0.4%**	**0.1%**	**1.3%**	**3.5%**	**18.7%**	**10.6%**	***4.0%***
BNP	**0.1%**	**0.0%**	**0.2%**	**0.1%**	**0.8%**	**0.7%**	**8.4%**	***1.0%***
Other	1.1%	1.4%	1.2%	1.8%	1.3%	2.2%	1.5%	*1.4%*
Total	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*
N	*1,804*	*1,660*	*1,820*	*939*	*2,832*	*1,146*	*808*	*11,009*

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2010 (Clarke et al 2011)

Table 3.2: Vote choice by latent class membership, 2015

|	*Extreme Left*	*Centre- Left*	*Centre*	*Centre- Right*	*Conser- vative*	*Euro- Sceptic*	*Extreme Right*	*Total*
No, did not vote	4.5%	6.0%	5.3%	8.5%	7.0%	4.0%	13.2%	6.7%
Conservative	**2.8%**	**22.7%**	**37.9%**	**40.0%**	**50.8%**	**39.8%**	**28.8%**	**32.9%**
Labour	54.2%	44.5%	30.3%	23.0%	23.0%	10.3%	24.1%	31.6%
Liberal Democrat	18.3%	10.9%	14.9%	7.8%	5.7%	2.5%	1.4%	9.3%
SNP	7.7%	7.6%	3.6%	2.4%	2.3%	1.2%	1.5%	4.2%
Plaid Cymru	1.2%	0.7%	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%
Green Party	10.9%	5.9%	4.6%	1.8%	1.4%	1.3%	0.9%	3.9%
UKIP	**0.0%**	**0.3%**	**1.4%**	**16.0%**	**8.7%**	**39.8%**	**28.7%**	**9.9%**
BNP	**0.0%**	**0.0%**	**0.0%**	**0.0%**	**0.1%**	**0.0%**	**0.7%**	**0.1%**
Other	0.4%	1.5%	1.5%	0.3%	0.8%	0.9%	0.6%	1.0%
Total	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*	*100.0%*
N	*943*	*3,601*	*1,816*	*2,321*	*2,033*	*1,020*	*881*	*12,615*

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2015 (Fieldhouse et al. 2015)

Figure 1: Unfolding analysis: UKIP in relation to other parties and voters in the latent party preference space

2010   2015

Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015)

Figure 2: Frequency distributions, dependent variables 2010 and 2015

Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015)

Figure 3: Predictors of Conservative/UKIP/BNP feelings in 2010 (stand. coefficients)

Note: Bars show standardized effects based on an unweighted version of the Tobit model presented in Appendix B. Fully shaded, non-transparent bars indicate significant effects.
*Source:* British Election Study Internet Panel 2010 (Clarke et al 2011)

Figure 4: Predictors of Conservative/UKIP/BNP feelings in 2015 (stand. coefficients)

Note: Bars show standardized effects based on an unweighted version of the Tobit model presented in Appendix B. Fully shaded, non-transparent bars indicate significant effects.
Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2015 (Fieldhouse et al. 2015)

**Figure 5: Probability of party evaluation by latent class membership, 2010**

Note: *LCA model without covariates, seven classes, twelve binary items, 100,000 seed draws, calculated using LCA Stata plugin. Graph shows Rho (ρ) parameters which are item-response probabilities conditional on latent class membership.*
Model fit statistics: AIC = 33643.218; BIC = 34324.03; Entropy Raw = 1.1300089; Entropy R^2 = .99995925; Degrees of freedom = 4005
Source: *British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015)*

Figure 6: Probability of party evaluation by latent class membership, 2015

Note: *LCA model without covariates, seven classes, twelve binary items, 100,000 seed draws, calculated using LCA Stata plugin. Graph shows Rho (ρ) parameters which are item-response probabilities conditional on latent class membership.*
Model fit statistics: AIC = 29834.033; BIC = 30516.181; Entropy Raw = .95711676; Entropy R^2 = .99996599; Degrees of freedom = 4,005
Source: *British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015)*

Appendix A. Details of variables used in multivariate analysis (Table 5; Figures 4-5 and Appendices B and C). BES question numbers (2010) and variable names (2015; in italics) refer to BES 2010 pre-election survey questionnaire (available via http://bes2009-10.org/bes-data.php) and BES Wave 4 2015 (available via http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/).

	2010	2015
Age	Year of birth reversed	Year of birth reversed
Gender	Gender	Gender
Education (University degree)	Dummy, based on BES q159 (What is the highest qualification you have?)	Dummy, based on *qeducation* (What is the highest educational or work-related qualification you have?)
Income	BES q166 (Which of the following represents the total income of your household from all sources before tax - including benefits, saving and so on?) [16 response options, from less than £5,000 to more than £100,000)	*profile_gross_household* [15 response options, from less than £5,000 to £150,000 and over]
Intermediate occupations	Dummy, based on BES q 171 (From the following, please tell me which best describes the sort of work you do. (If not working now, please tell me what you did in your last job)) [8 categories]	Dummy, based on *ns_sec_analytic*
Routine/manual occupations	As above	As above
Private sector	Dummy, based on BES q175, (From the following, please tell me which type of organisation you do or did work for).	n/a
Pers. finances retrospective	BES q86 (How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?	*econPersonalRetro* (Now, a few questions about economic conditions. How does the *financial situation of your household* now compare with what it was 12 months ago?)
Pers. finances prospective	BES q88 (How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months?)	n/a
L-R economic outlook	BES q104 (Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where	*redistSelf* (How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements; Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off)

	would you place yourself on this scale?)	
Attitude towards EU	BES q103 (Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Britain's membership in the European Union?)	*eesEUIntegrationSelf2* (Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union. Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Union. Where would you place yourself on this scale? [from 0=Unite fully with the European Union to 10=Protect our independence from the European Union])
Authoritarianism	n/a	Index, based on *al1* (Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values), *al2* (For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence), *al3* (Schools should teach children to obey authority) and *al5* (People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences).
Immigration	Based on BES q26. The four positive items (happy, hopeful, confident, proud) were added and then the four negative items (angry, disgusted, uneasy, afraid) were subtracted, resulting in a scale from +4 (all four positive words chosen) to -4 (all four negative words chosen)	Index, based on *immigEcon* (Do you think immigration is good or bad for Britain's economy?[scale from 1=bad to 7=good]) and *immigCultural* (Do you think immigration enriches or undermines cultural life?[scale from 1=undermines to 7=enriches])
Trust in people	BES q121 (On balance, would you say that most people can't be trusted or that most people can be trusted? Please use the 0-10 scale to indicate your view.)	n/a
Satisfaction w/ democracy	BES q128 (On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in this country?)	*satDemUK* (On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way that democracy works in...The UK as a whole)
Attention to politics	BES q131 (On a scale of 0 to 10, how much attention do you generally pay to politics?)	*polAttention* (How much attention do you generally pay to politics? [scale; 0= Pay no attention;10= Pay a great deal of attention])
Religion	Dummy, based on BES q163 (Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?)	Dummy, based on *profile_religion*

Daily Mail reader	Dummy, based on BES q147 (Which daily morning newspaper do you read most often?)	Dummy, based on *profile_newspaper_readership_201* (Which daily newspaper do you read most often?)
Guardian reader	As above	As above
Daily Star reader	As above	As above
Telegraph reader	As above	As above
Sun reader	As above	As above
Feelings UKIP	BES q 67 (On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how to you feel about the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)?)	*likeUKIP* (And how much do you like or dislike each of the following parties?...UKIP [scale from 0=strongly dislike to 10=strongly like])
Feelings BNP	BES q68. As above, but about the British National Party (BNP)	*likeBNP*. As above, but about BNP

Appendix B1: Tobit regression - explaining feelings towards Conservatives, UKIP and BNP, 2010

	Conserva-tives Coeff. (SE)	**UKIP** Coeff. (SE)	**BNP** Coeff. (SE)
Constant	**3.547** (.306)	**-.973** (.296)	**-4.767** (.509)
Age	.004 (.002)	**-.014** (.002)	**-.036** (.004)
Gender	**.462** (.062)	**-.245** (.060)	**-.578** (.103)
Education (Univ. degree)	**.206** (.071)	**-.146** (.068)	**-.788** (.122)
Income	**.086** (.009)	-.011 (.008)	-.007 (.015)
Intermediate occupations	**-.191** (.072)	**.203** (.070)	.131 (.120)
Routine/manual occupa-tions	**-.680** (.085)	**.271** (.081)	**.787** (.135)
Private sector	**.405** (.060)	**.119** (.058)	**.351** (.099)
Religion	**.467** (.060)	.090 (.057)	.104 (.099)
Pers. finances retrospec-tive	**-.221** (.034)	-.047 (.033)	-.022 (.057)
Pers. finances prospective	.021 (.035)	-.053 (.034)	-.025 (.059)
L-R economic outlook	**.340** (.015)	**.125** (.014)	**.159** (.024)
Attitude towards EU	**-.350** (.027)	**-1.104** (.026)	**-.969** (.044)
Authoritarianism	n/a	n/a	n/a
Immigration	**-.254** (.021)	**-.276** (.020)	**-.786** (.036)
Trust in people	**.112** (.014)	**.054** (.013)	**-.125** (.022)
Satisfaction w/ democracy	**.275** (.037)	.045 (.035)	**-.246** (.061)
Attention to politics	**.048** (.013)	**.036** (.013)	**-.116** (.022)
Daily Mail reader	**1.505** (.087)	**.676** (.083)	**.674** (.138)
Guardian reader	**-1.101** (.137)	**-1.028** (.136)	**-1.742** (.303)
Daily Star reader	.047 (.276)	**.821** (.272)	**2.148** (.410)
Telegraph reader	**1.659** (.126)	**.504** (.119)	.104 (.209)
Sun reader	**1.039** (.087)	**.226** (.084)	**.730** (.134)
Left-censored observations	1,831	2,534	6,952
Uncensored observations	10,101	8,414	4,870
Number of observations	11,932	10,948	11,822
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	**3,075.49**	**4,345.27**	**3,146.22**
Prob χ^2	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R^2	**.06**	**.09**	**.08**
Log likelihood	*-26,145.457*	*-21,453.44*	*-17,157.326*

Note: All four models were calculated with the *tobit* command in Stata, treating the dependent variable as left-censored (= con-strained at 0). Reported are unstandardized coefficients that report impact on an unobserved latent variable that is not censored. All estimations use the full population weight variable for each British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015).

Appendix B2: Tobit regression - explaining feelings towards Conservatives, UKIP and BNP, 2015

	Conserva-tives Coeff. (SE)	UKIP Coeff. (SE)	BNP Coeff. (SE)
Constant	**-4.556** (.375)	**2.018** (.437)	.524 (.638)
Age	**-.011** (.003)	**-.017** (.003)	**-.057** (.005)
Gender	.048 (.077)	**-.775** (.090)	-.250 (.134)
Education (Univ. degree)	**.243** (.087)	-.186 (.103)	**-.595** (.158)
Income	**.058** (.012)	-.025 (.014)	**-.102** (.021)
Intermediate occupations	.025 (.103)	.171 (.120)	-.347 (.182)
Routine/manual occupa-tions	**-.371** (.113)	.076 (.129)	.252 (.186)
Private sector	n/a	n/a	n/a
Religion	**.570** (.079)	**.399** (.092)	**.583** (.137)
Pers. finances retrospec-tive	**.955** (.041)	.043 (.048)	**-.263** (.071)
Pers. finances prospective	n/a	n/a	n/a
L-R economic outlook	**.397** (.013)	**.190** (.056)	**.089** (.023)
Attitude towards EU	**-.156** (.015)	**-.368** (.018)	-.050 (.026)
Authoritarianism	**.080** (.014)	**.164** (.017)	**.172** (.026)
Immigration	**-.042** (.011)	**-.321** (.013)	**-.344** (.020)
Trust in people	n/a	n/a	n/a
Satisfaction w/ democracy	**1.175** (.048)	.083 (.056)	**.230** (.082)
Attention to politics	**-.075** (.020)	**.066** (.023)	**-.117** (.034)
Daily Mail reader	**1.786** (.113)	**.905** (.130)	-.138 (.194)
Guardian reader	**-1.003** (.236)	**-1.266** (.335)	**-1.290** (.589)
Daily Star reader	.455 (.318)	**.927** (.361)	**1.024** (.495)
Telegraph reader	**1.746** (.181)	**.976** (.209)	-.239 (.337)
Sun reader	**1.236** (.103)	**1.090** (.117)	**1.181** (.165)
Left-censored observations	2,378	3,311	5,996
Uncensored observations	5,723	4,765	2,029
Number of observations	8,101	8,076	8,025
Likelihood Ratio χ²	**4,495.59**	**3,857.65**	**1,388.67**
Prob χ²	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R²	**.12**	**.11**	**.07**
Log likelihood	*-16,406.98*	*-14,942.896*	*-8,618.8625*

Note: All four models were calculated with the *tobit* command in Stata, treating the dependent variable as left-censored (= constrained at 0). Reported are unstandardized coefficients that report impact on an unobserved latent variable that is not censored. All estimations use the full population weight variable for each British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015).