McColgan, P. and Hillier, D.J. and Linn, S.C. (2005) Equity issuance, CEO turnover and corporate governance. European Financial Management, 11 (4). pp. 515-538. ISSN 1354-7798Full text not available in this repository. (Request a copy from the Strathclyde author)
There is substantial evidence on the effect of external market discipline on chief executive turnover decisions in poorly performing companies. In this study we present evidence on the role of institutional monitoring in these decisions through the equity issuance process. We find that firms which undertake equity offerings are associated with an increased rate of forced CEO turnover that is focused on the managers of poorly performing companies. At the same time, equity offerings increase the likelihood of a new CEO being appointed from outside the current management team. We also provide evidence that independent boards are more likely to forcibly remove CEOs from their position, although this is not conditional on poor performance.
|Keywords:||CEO turnover, equity issuance, board structure, Commerce, Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all), Accounting|
|Subjects:||Social Sciences > Commerce|
|Department:||Strathclyde Business School > Accounting and Finance|
|Depositing user:||Strathprints Administrator|
|Date Deposited:||16 Mar 2008|
|Last modified:||20 Feb 2017 01:02|