Equity issuance, CEO turnover and corporate governance
McColgan, P. and Hillier, D.J. and Linn, S.C. (2005) Equity issuance, CEO turnover and corporate governance. European Financial Management, 11 (4). pp. 515-538. ISSN 1354-7798 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-7798.2005.00295.x)
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There is substantial evidence on the effect of external market discipline on chief executive turnover decisions in poorly performing companies. In this study we present evidence on the role of institutional monitoring in these decisions through the equity issuance process. We find that firms which undertake equity offerings are associated with an increased rate of forced CEO turnover that is focused on the managers of poorly performing companies. At the same time, equity offerings increase the likelihood of a new CEO being appointed from outside the current management team. We also provide evidence that independent boards are more likely to forcibly remove CEOs from their position, although this is not conditional on poor performance.
ORCID iDs
McColgan, P. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7980-6175, Hillier, D.J. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1591-4038 and Linn, S.C.;-
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Item type: Article ID code: 5587 Dates: DateEvent2005PublishedKeywords: CEO turnover, equity issuance, board structure, Commerce, Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all), Accounting Subjects: Social Sciences > Commerce Department: Strathclyde Business School > Accounting and Finance Depositing user: Strathprints Administrator Date deposited: 16 Mar 2008 Last modified: 04 Jan 2024 21:54 URI: https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/5587