Wind generator behaviour in a pay-as-bid curtailment market

Hawker, Graeme and Kane, Laura and Bell, Keith (2013) Wind generator behaviour in a pay-as-bid curtailment market. In: 12th International Workshop on Large-scale Integration of Wind Power into Power Systems as well as on Transmission Networks for Offshore Wind Power Plants, 2012-10-22 - 2013-10-24. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

A pay-as-bid curtailment market, where Wind Power Plants (WPPs) may offer prices to have their output reduced in the event of network balancing or stability constraints, is one approach towards the market integration of a high proportion of wind energy onto a power system. Such a market aims to procure curtailment at a cost close to the marginal value of the electricity plus renewable subsidies and incentives, reducing risks for WPPs while minimising costs to the Independent System Operator (ISO). Through the use of game theory and market modelling, a key set of bidding strategies are identified that may evolve within such a market, which may act in opposition to the goals of the ISO. These are applied to a variety of network conditions in order to determine their likely impact and the resulting bidding signals provided to market participants. Bidding behaviours and market fluidity may also be affected by factors particular to wind power plants. Through analysis of both ex ante and ex post case studies, the existence of these behaviours is demonstrated, illustrating that a pay-as-bid curtailment market may not be efficient at price discovery in practice.

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