Picture of person typing on laptop with programming code visible on the laptop screen

World class computing and information science research at Strathclyde...

The Strathprints institutional repository is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde's Open Access research outputs. Strathprints provides access to thousands of Open Access research papers by University of Strathclyde researchers, including by researchers from the Department of Computer & Information Sciences involved in mathematically structured programming, similarity and metric search, computer security, software systems, combinatronics and digital health.

The Department also includes the iSchool Research Group, which performs leading research into socio-technical phenomena and topics such as information retrieval and information seeking behaviour.


Economics of intelligent selection of wireless access networks in a market-based framework : a game-theoretic approach

Konka, Jakub Wojciech and Irvine, James and Atkinson, Robert (2012) Economics of intelligent selection of wireless access networks in a market-based framework : a game-theoretic approach. IARIA International Journal on Advances in Networks and Services, 5 (3&4). pp. 210-224. ISSN 1942-2644

iaria12.pdf - Final Published Version

Download (735kB) | Preview


The Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework where network operators offer communications services with competition at the call level. It strives to address a tussle between the actors involved in a heterogeneous wireless access network. However, as with any market-like institution, it is vital to analyze the Digital Marketplace from the strategic perspective to ensure that all shortcomings are removed prior to implementation. In this paper, we analyze the selling mechanism proposed in the Digital Marketplace. The mechanism is based on a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction where the network operators represent the sellers/bidders, and the end-user of a wireless service is the buyer. However, this auction format is somewhat unusual as the winning bid is a composition of both the network operator’s monetary bid and their reputation rating. We create a simple economic model of the auction, and we show that it is mathematically intractable to derive the equilibrium bidding behavior when there are N network operators, and we make only generic assumptions about the structure of the bidding strategies. We then move on to consider a scenario with only two network operators, and assume that network operators use bidding strategies which are linear functions of their costs. This results in the derivation of the equilibrium bidding behavior in that scenario.