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The good, the bad and the populist : a model of political agency with emotional voters

Jennings, Colin (2011) The good, the bad and the populist : a model of political agency with emotional voters. European Journal of Political Economy, 27 (4). pp. 611-624. ISSN 0176-2680

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Abstract

This paper extends the political agency approach to an environment in which voting is categorised into informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’, and uninformed due to‘rational irrationality’. Politicians may be “good”, “bad”, or “populist”. Initially the existence of only good and populist politicians is assumed: the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists are investigated and the implications for voter welfare are explored. Then the consequences of the inclusion of bad politicians are considered. The paper makes three main contributions. First, I provide a rational choice analysis of populism as populism is commonly understood. Second, I locate a potential role for government as a persuasive provider of information regarding the quality of policy. Third, when bad politicians are added tothe analysis, it is shown that a little potential corruption can improve voter welfare.

Item type: Article
ID code: 34464
Keywords: political agency, expressive voting, rational irrationality, democratic inefficiency , populism, Political Science, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
Subjects: Political Science
Department: Strathclyde Business School > Economics
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Depositing user: Pure Administrator
Date Deposited: 21 Oct 2011 15:24
Last modified: 27 Mar 2014 09:41
URI: http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/34464

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