

1 Chapter 1 1
2
3 The Fallacy of Securitizing Migration: 2
4 Elite Rationality and Unintended 3
5 Consequences 4
6 5
7 6
8 7

9 Georgios Karyotis 8
10 9
11 10
12 11
13 12
14 13

14 **Introduction** 14
15 15

16 It has become commonplace to argue that migration in Europe and beyond is 16
17 intimately linked to questions of security. As mentioned in the introduction to 17
18 this book, migration is associated with a range of threats covering the whole 18
19 socioeconomic and political spectrum. Immigrants and asylum seekers are often 19
20 seen as a threat to public order and stability. They are also believed to be ‘plotting’ 20
21 to exploit national welfare provisions and available economic opportunities at the 21
22 expense of citizens. Above all, they are seen as a threat to the identity of societies 22
23 and thus as a challenge to the very existence of a traditional pattern of living. 23
24 Attempting to capitalize on such fears, Nick Griffin (2003), chairman of the 24
25 British National Party (BNP) claimed in an official statement, that while not racist, 25
26 his party and society as a whole ‘must not become multi-racist either’, a message 26
27 repeated by right-wing parties across Europe. 27

28 The horrific attacks of 11 September 2001, as well as subsequent terrorist 28
29 incidents in Madrid and London, exacerbated public anxiety towards migrants 29
30 in Europe (Faist, 2002; Bigo, 2006). In all cases, the perpetrators matched a 30
31 specific ethnic profile, while some of those involved in the U.S. attacks, had 31
32 previously lived in Hamburg for years. Nevertheless, these events did not cause 32
33 the insecurities, uncertainties, ambiguities and complexities that characterize 33
34 migration policies at both domestic and European Union (EU) level. Rather, they 34
35 strengthened and legitimized the security logic that has dominated asylum and 35
36 immigration policies in Europe since the late 1970s (Huysmans, 2000, 2006; 36
37 Geddes, 2003; Karyotis, 2007). 37

38 Lavenex (2001) refers to this logic as the ‘realist policy frame’, which contains 38
39 a dominant interpretation of migration as a security problem. Framing generally 39
40 involves making some aspects of a perceived reality more salient in discourse ‘in 40
41 such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 41
42 moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993: 52). In 42
43 the case of migration, the realist frame is rooted in a state-centric philosophy, 43
44 emphasizing the need to secure borders, restrict migration and homogenize all 44

1 categories of migrants into a single policing-repression scheme. In contrast, the 1
 2 liberal frame focuses on the individual. It is primarily concerned with the protection 2
 3 of migrant human rights and the reduction of barriers to labour migration, which is 3
 4 considered beneficial to the economy. 4

5 Once a frame has gained prominence, it becomes established as the ‘correct’ 5
 6 or the ‘standard’ way to define an issue. The construction of the security frame in 6
 7 particular is known as ‘securitization’, where an issue enters the realm of security, 7
 8 not because of the objective threats it poses but because it is presented as such 8
 9 (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). Securitization is therefore a process through which elites, 9
 10 with ‘the most effective means of public persuasion and the best resources for 10
 11 suppressing or marginalizing alternative opinions’ succeed in defining an issue 11
 12 as an existential threat to fundamental values of society and the state (Van Dijk, 12
 13 1993: 45). 13

14 The implication is that the elites’ decision to securitize migration is a 14
 15 deliberate and calculated one. While both civil society and scholars have widely 15
 16 criticized the moral bankruptcy of the realist frame for its impact on migrant 16
 17 rights in particular (McSweeney, 1996; Lohrmann, 2000; Thouez, 2002; Guild, 17
 18 2003), the consequences of securitization on the state and its elites has received 18
 19 scarce attention. The aim of this chapter is to address this imbalance and explore 19
 20 securitization from the perspective of securitizing elites. In doing so, it seeks to 20
 21 provide a pragmatic, rather than an ethical assessment of the political practice 21
 22 of linking migration to security in Europe. Findings highlight the fallacies of 22
 23 securitizing migration, arguing that as a policy option, it is more costly than often 23
 24 assumed. 24

25 The argument is developed progressively over three interconnected parts. The 25
 26 first section addresses the philosophical and normative aspects of securitization, 26
 27 which are underpinned by a belief that security justifies any sacrifice, particularly 27
 28 at the expense of migrants. The second part questions whether the decision to 28
 29 securitize is in fact ever based on rational calculations. The final part explores the 29
 30 consequences of the securitization of migration, which it argues serves only short- 30
 31 term needs, while harming in the long-term other interests, including those that 31
 32 supported the security discourse in the first place. 32

33 33
 34 34

35 **Security values and trade-offs** 35

36 36

37 Many of the normative criticisms of securitization can be located in a long- 37
 38 standing philosophical debate concerning the importance of security and the cost 38
 39 and potential trade-offs associated with its pursuit. In its broadest formulation, 39
 40 this involves a question of whether security, as a value and policy goal, justifies 40
 41 the compromise of other key values, such as freedom or justice. This section 41
 42 will briefly address this and in doing so, draws attention to the ethical dilemmas 42
 43 associated with the securitization of migration. 43

44 44

1 Traditionally, the realm of security has been dominated by realist ideas, which 1
 2 consider the state as the only referent object of security, i.e. the actor that is to 2
 3 be secured. Accordingly, during the Cold War when realism was at its prime, 3
 4 security became synonymous with ‘national security’ (Yergin, 1997). The survival 4
 5 of the state at any cost was the agenda of security studies, while the state was 5
 6 simultaneously the focus and provider of security. This reasoning echoes Hobbes’ 6
 7 state of nature, described in *Leviathan* as ‘a war of all men against all men’. The 7
 8 sovereign state comes into existence to provide order and security, ‘while in the 8
 9 absence of authority, unrestricted competition driven by quite rational individual 9
 10 calculation brings about unwished for and disastrous outcome for all concerned’ 10
 11 (Hampsher-Monk, 1992: 25). 11

12 In this light, security and liberty are assumed to be set in a zero-sum game, in 12
 13 which more of one is taken to mean less of the other (Zedner, 2009: 135). This 13
 14 dichotomy is not inescapable, since the two could be seen as ‘interrelated, mutually 14
 15 reinforcing goods’ (Dinh, 2002: 400; Huysmans, 2006). By controlling dangers, 15
 16 the state enables individuals to realize their freedom, while, in turn, the lack of 16
 17 oppression contributes to the maintenance of order within the state. Nonetheless, 17
 18 the presence of imminent threat, real or perceived, stimulates the antagonistic 18
 19 framing of security and other key values, such as freedom. 19

20 If we were to accept that such a trade-off exists, then, according to realism, we 20
 21 must prioritize security and allow the state enough power to ensure it. As Hobbes 21
 22 (1985: 225) puts it, ‘there can be no peace without subjection’ and therefore the 22
 23 state can legitimately constrain civil liberties and individual values in order to 23
 24 establish order and unity. Even classical liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill 24
 25 (1991: 190–91), who opposed unlimited state control, recognized security as ‘the 25
 26 most vital of all interests’, because in its absence ‘we would have no ability to look 26
 27 forward with any degree of confidence to the future’. 27

28 However, placing security above all other values is ethically questionable. 28
 29 Benjamin Franklin famously noted that ‘they that can give up essential liberty to 29
 30 obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety’ (Dinh, 2002: 399). 30
 31 Drawing on this, and in contrast to the realist approach, critical security scholars 31
 32 have sought to re-orientate security away from the state and toward ‘human security’ 32
 33 (Ayoob, 1997; McSweeney, 1996). Introduced in the United Nations Development 33
 34 Programme (UNDP) report of 1994, human security is a concept calling for the 34
 35 pursuit of the ‘security of individuals, not just the security of their nations’, in other 35
 36 words, it is about the ‘security of people, not just security of territory’. This is based 36
 37 on a core, moral belief that the only appropriate referent object of security is the 37
 38 individual, whose welfare, wellbeing and freedom cannot be compromised in order 38
 39 to safeguard the state as a political unit. After all, Dworkin (2005: 86) maintains, 39
 40 ‘among the most fundamental of all moral principles is the principles [*sic*] of shared 40
 41 humanity: that every human life has a distinct and equal inherent value.’ 41

42 An overemphasis upon statist security at the expense of individual freedoms 42
 43 is, according to Ken Booth (1991: 320), not only immoral but also illogical. To 43
 44 illustrate this, he draws an analogy between a house and its inhabitants: 44

1 A house requires upkeep, but it is illogical to spend excessive amounts of money 1
 2 and effort to protect the house against flood, dry rot and burglars if this is at 2
 3 the cost of the well-being of the inhabitants. There is obviously a relationship 3
 4 between the well-being of the sheltered and the state of the shelter, but can there 4
 5 be any question as to whose security is primary? 5
 6
 7 In this critique, Booth concludes that states should be the means of security rather 7
 8 than its end, whereas individuals, citizens or not, should be its primary focus. To 8
 9 extend Booth's analogy (1991: 319), what would the value of security really be, 9
 10 if its pursuit required the imposition of such 'physical and human constraints', 10
 11 which would stop the inhabitants of the house 'from carrying out what they would 11
 12 otherwise freely choose to do'? 12
 13 Relating these to migration, the two contrasting approaches correspond to what 13
 14 Lavenex (2001) referred to as the realist and liberal policy frames. The former sees 14
 15 migration as a vulnerability to state security, while the latter examines it primarily 15
 16 through a humanitarian perspective. At the European Union level, this translates 16
 17 to an observed tension between the policy objective of managing the perceived 17
 18 threats from migration on the one hand and the protection of human rights on the 18
 19 other (Balzacq and Carrera, 2006). The conclusion reached by most analysts is 19
 20 that the realist imperative is the one that has been driving policy developments, at 20
 21 the expense of humanitarian or other considerations (Geddes, 2003; Guiraudon, 21
 22 2003; Huysmans, 2006). In other words, as Didier Bigo (2006: 35) notes, the EU's 22
 23 headlining goals of promoting freedom, security and justice is 'infiltrated and 23
 24 contaminated' by an overemphasis on strengthening security. While this security 24
 25 bias is not new (Huysmans, 2000), the war on terror has further strengthened it, 25
 26 with the overzealous application of various security practices and border controls in 26
 27 Europe and beyond (see chapters by Maguire and Ribas-Mateos in this volume). 27
 28 The dominance of the realist frame on migration points towards an updated 28
 29 reformulation of the philosophical debate between security and freedom: the 29
 30 suggested trade-off is in fact between the 'liberties of the few against the security 30
 31 of the majority' (Waldron, 2003: 194). In other words, the common claim is that 31
 32 *our* security justifies limitations to *their* rights. The securitization of migration is 32
 33 a crucial manifestation of this dichotomy, since it legitimizes repressive measures 33
 34 against migrants, particularly those that match a given ethnic, religious or political 34
 35 profile. This attempt to mobilize a 'we' against a supposedly threatening 'them' is 35
 36 not only a central tenant of social identity theory and self-categorization (Tajfel 36
 37 and Turner, 1986) but also, according to Carl Schmitt, the essence of politics. As 37
 38 he put it, an act or antithesis 'transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently 38
 39 strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy' (Schmitt, 39
 40 1996: 37; Huysmans, 1998). 40
 41 The conceptual link of securitization with the Schmittian legacy of 'realpolitik' 41
 42 unsurprisingly adds fuel to the critics' concerns about its ethical integrity and 42
 43 responsibility (McSweeney, 1996). Proponents of the liberal policy frame and 43
 44 human security in particular reject the focus on the state and the pursuit of security 44

1 at the expense of other values. Further to the philosophical arguments discussed 1
 2 above, this rejection reflects unease with the exploitation and violation of the 2
 3 human rights of migrants, who, in a securitized frame, are perceived as inherently 3
 4 inferior and/or dangerous (Guild, 2003; Thouez, 2002; Lohrmann, 2000). For 4
 5 instance, Togral in her contribution to this volume explains how the securitization 5
 6 of migration results in the masking of a new form of racism in Europe. 6

7 Notably, proponents of securitization theory themselves recognize the dangers 7
 8 of securitizing societal issues like migration, and argue that ‘security’ should not 8
 9 be idealized but seen as a failure to deal with issues as ‘normal politics’ (Buzan 9
 10 *et al.*, 1998: 29). Therefore, according to Waever (2000: 6-7), ‘the ideal of the 10
 11 securitization approach is – *ceteris paribus* – desecuritization, that issues are 11
 12 not lifted above normal politics with an urgency and ‘necessity’ that has often 12
 13 antidemocratic effects.’ The implication is that securitizing actors, typically 13
 14 political and security elites, should have a heightened sense of responsibility when 14
 15 they talk security. However, the limitation of any normative calls to overturn 15
 16 the security frame on migration, advocates the need to take a closer look at the 16
 17 rationality of the elites that supported the securitization of migration in the first 17
 18 place, an issue examined in the next section. 18

19 19
 20 20

21 **Elite rationality and securitization** 21

22 22
 23 One key assumption about security decision making is that it differs from other 23
 24 policy areas in the degree of centralization and pluralism. Security ‘is a structured 24
 25 field’ and only those with the societal currency, knowhow and status are able 25
 26 to write legitimate security discourses. Threat perceptions are constructed and 26
 27 appropriate responses are determined by those in positions of power that allow them 27
 28 to be generally accepted as voices of security (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 31). Therefore, 28
 29 although in principle nobody is excluded from becoming a securitizing actor, the 29
 30 field of security is biased in favour of political elites and ‘security professionals’ 30
 31 (Bigo, 1994). 31

32 Securitization occurs when securitizing actors, speaking or acting in the 32
 33 name of a referent object, succeed in convincing a relevant section of society that 33
 34 exceptional measures are needed in response to an existential threat. Any issue 34
 35 can through this mechanism become a security one, not necessarily because of 35
 36 the nature or the objective importance of the threats it poses but because it is 36
 37 presented as such (on the role of ‘speech acts’ see Waever, 1995). Accordingly, 37
 38 securitization, Huysmans explains (1998: 571), becomes a governmental technique 38
 39 ‘which retrieves the ordering force of the fear of the violent death by a mythical 39
 40 replay of the Hobbesian state of nature. It manufactures a rupture in the routinized, 40
 41 everyday life by fabricating an existential threat which provokes experiences of 41
 42 the real possibility of violent death’. 42

43 The motives of securitizing actors in framing an issue in security terms remain 43
 44 surprisingly undertheorized in securitization research (Balzacq, 2005; Karyotis, 44

1 2007b:275). Do elites support the security frame on migration out of a genuine 1
2 concern for the existential threats they believe it poses? Are their discourse and 2
3 policies based on a cost-benefit assessment of a range of possible responses? What 3
4 other factors impact on their decision to make a securitizing move? Although it is 4
5 obviously not possible to get inside elites' heads to fully understand their positioning 5
6 on an issue, understanding the migration-security nexus, let alone attempting to 6
7 untangle it, requires a closer investigation of security decision making. 7

8 As discussed, securitization is considered a purposeful, orchestrated, elite- 8
9 driven process. Implicitly, elites are assumed to be acting rationally, in terms of both 9
10 personal interests and their professional responsibility. The tangible consequences 10
11 of successful securitization, the theory goes, are an increased urgency to deal with 11
12 the issue, with additional resources and exceptional means outside the formal and 12
13 established procedures of politics (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). If the decision to securitize 13
14 was to be seen as rational, it should theoretically lead to a better handling of an 14
15 issue, while promoting the vested interests of political elites, security professionals 15
16 and the mass media, all of which are deemed to benefit from the securitization of 16
17 migration in particular (Boswell, 2008; Bigo, 2002). 17

18 However, if by 'rational' we refer to the classic expected-utility model, then 18
19 the assumption of rationality in securitization instances is false for at least three 19
20 reasons. First, information overload, uncertainty and complexity 'make it almost 20
21 impossible' for policy makers 'to live up to the ideal of rational method' (Hill, 21
22 2003: 102). In the case of irregular migration, this is very relevant, since statistics 22
23 about its size and impact are notoriously slippery and unreliable (Brochmann 23
24 and Hammar, 1999). Second, psychological factors, influenced by a particular 24
25 cultural and social context, also limit pure rationality. These include pre-existing 25
26 beliefs, emotions and ideas about their own role and the values that need to be 26
27 protected (e.g. identity), which shape their 'operational environment' (Sprout and 27
28 Sprout, 1969). Third, path-dependencies and historical conditions associated with 28
29 a perceived threat can either facilitate or restrict policy-makers' ability to define it 29
30 in security or alternative terms (Hay, 2006). 30

31 These do not suggest that decision makers are irrational (Gigerenzer and Selten, 31
32 2002). Indeed, 'they want to make rational decisions, but they cannot always do 32
33 so' (Jones, 1999: 298), since the constraints discussed above make it impossible 33
34 to reach the optimized solution to a policy problem. This 'bounded rationality' 34
35 (Simon, 1995) leads them to accept the first outcome which approximates their 35
36 preferences, rather than strive for the best option, which may be costly and 36
37 unattainable (Hill, 2003). In turn, once a particular way of viewing or dealing with 37
38 an issue becomes established and institutionalized, it is likely to resist change, 38
39 even if the social power relations that facilitated its emergence have changed 39
40 (Coleman, 1998; Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010). 40

41 The crucial question then is how to reverse securitization and, in our case, 41
42 the security frame which has come to dominate migration policy in Europe. The 42
43 problem for the analyst is that that '[e]ven when one writes about security with 43
44 the aim of achieving de-securitization or to sensitise everybody to the problems 44

1 of securitization, one securitizes by way of putting these issues in security terms' 1
 2 (Waever, 2000: 15; Huysmans, 1998). As for policy makers, their bounded 2
 3 rationality that contributed to the securitization of migration in the first place is 3
 4 likely to make more liberal frames and policies appear risky and costly. This is 4
 5 despite any ethical or moral considerations, which, when security is at stake, are 5
 6 sidelined and perceived as expendable. Therefore, instead of focussing on moral 6
 7 or normative calls for desecuritization, a possibly more fruitful avenue would be to 7
 8 attempt to convince elites that the securitization of migration is counterproductive 8
 9 and damaging. 9
 10 10
 11 11
 12 **Securitization aims and unintended consequences** 12
 13 13
 14 Elites that support the security-migration nexus do so because they believe they 14
 15 are serving their country's, and in some cases, their own interests. Nobody wants 15
 16 to feel that their ideas and policies are unjust or immoral, which is why even 16
 17 right-wing parties attempt to legitimize and justify their hostile position towards 17
 18 migrants. For instance, Ian Cobain (2006) from *The Guardian*, who had worked 18
 19 undercover in the extreme-right BNP for seven months, reported that members 19
 20 were explicitly instructed to avoid using racist or anti-semitic language in public, 20
 21 in an attempt to clean the party's image. To pursue electoral gain, one BNP member 21
 22 was quoted as saying, 'people must stop seeing us as ogres.' 22
 23 The main reasons that are commonly used to support the need for securitization 23
 24 are critically examined in the first part of this section. Drawing on these, the second 24
 25 part looks at the unintended consequences of securitization, while the final part 25
 26 assesses the extent to which securitization actually promotes the self-interests of 26
 27 the elites that support it. 27
 28 28
 29 *Deconstructing the security-migration nexus* 29
 30 30
 31 Migration is perceived as a threat for reasons that cut through a range of societal, 31
 32 criminological and economic arguments. The conviction that migration poses 32
 33 existential threats to European states and to the EU appears to be the driving force 33
 34 behind their restrictive policies. This is not surprising according to Ceyhan and 34
 35 Tsoukala (2002: 22) since, the natural tendency is to fear the 'different, the alien, 35
 36 the undocumented migrant, the refugee, the Muslim, the non European'. However, 36
 37 when assessing the objective significance of the threats that migration in Europe 37
 38 is deemed to be posing, the legitimation for securitization becomes more difficult 38
 39 to defend. 39
 40 The overarching, underlying concern is that migration is, above all, a threat 40
 41 to societal security. Waever (1993: 23) notes that societal security 'concerns the 41
 42 ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions 42
 43 and possible or actual threats'. The sacred values that are deemed to be threatened 43
 44 and need to be protected relate to 'traditional patterns of language, culture, 44

1 association, and religious and national identity and custom' (Waever, 1993: 23). 1
2 Cultural norms, which define belonging in a community, can be seen to be violated 2
3 by 'unwanted migrants' (Weiner, 1992). Therefore, elites in Europe, who often 3
4 see themselves as defenders of national purity and societal security, may feel that 4
5 their role demands they deal with immigrants and asylum seekers as a threat to 5
6 communal harmony and cultural homogeneity (e.g. Ibryamova, 2002). 6

7 The reality however is that identity can never be seen as frozen or monolithic, 7
8 as such securitizing discourses suggest (McSweeney, 1996). European societies 8
9 are not static entities but have been evolving and developing in a rather 9
10 harmonious way, despite the influx of migrants. After all, all European societies 10
11 are the result of 'multiple migration and crossbreeding processes' and their culture 11
12 is 'deeply influenced, even sometimes determined by migrant cultures' (Ceyhan 12
13 and Tsoukala 2002: 29). Notably, perspective securitizing actors, the likes of Jörg 13
14 Heider in Austria or Jean-Marie Le Pen in France to mention but a few high-profile 14
15 examples, should be reminded of the traumatic warnings from recent European 15
16 history about misusing the terms 'ethnic purity' and 'racial unity'. As Lohrmann 16
17 (2000: 9) succinctly puts it 'the fact that receiving countries are confronted with 17
18 immigrants with different cultural backgrounds does not represent a threat in itself. 18
19 Rather, it is the political exploitation of these cultural differences that confers a 19
20 security dimension to immigration.' 20

21 A discourse related to the identitarian axis sees migration as a threat to 21
22 public order and internal security. The 'criminal migrant' thesis is based on the 22
23 demonization of the 'other' and the creation of an artificial continuum between 23
24 migration, crime, drug-trafficking and terrorism. This 'security continuum' is not 24
25 just a rhetorical one but also reflected in EU institutional structures (Bigo, 1994). 25
26 To be precise, starting in 1975, the EU's migration policy evolved gradually 26
27 within intergovernmental fora, such as the TREVI Groups, the Ad hoc Group on 27
28 Asylum and Immigration, the Schengen Treaties and Europol, all of which were 28
29 preoccupied with internal security, thus strengthening the defensive and repressive 29
30 logic of migration management (Karyotis, 2007a). 30

31 However, studies assessing the links between migration and crime have 31
32 challenged the prejudicial stereotyping of migrants as inherently prone to deviant 32
33 behaviour. Despite some legitimate security concerns, for instance about the links 33
34 of migration to organized crime and human trafficking, the overall impact of 34
35 migration on the crime rate and on the internal security of host countries in Europe 35
36 is grossly exaggerated (Lohrmann, 2000). For instance, the Association of Chief 36
37 Police Officers in the UK confirmed that there is no evidence of a higher rate of 37
38 criminality among refugees and asylum seekers, who are in fact more likely to 38
39 be the victims of crime in the UK (ACPO, 2001). Furthermore, the participation 39
40 of migrants in serious criminality does not appear to be dramatic compared to 40
41 citizens (Karyidis, 1998), while where discrepancies are observed, these can 41
42 typically be attributed to socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. age, education 42
43 and income of migrants), rather than ethnicity (Hatton and Williamson 2007). 43
44 Finally, crimes committed by migrants tend to receive greater -often biased and 44

1 inaccurate- coverage, while stories about occurrences of racism are much rarer 1
2 (Triandafyllidou, 2002; Buonfino, 2004). 2
3 Economic concerns too, add to the prevailing insecurity towards immigrants 3
4 and asylum seekers, who are seen as ‘free riders’, ‘scroungers’ or ‘bogus’, plotting 4
5 to exploit the socio-economic fabric of host European societies. The economic 5
6 burden they pose includes increasing unemployment, ‘straining housing, 6
7 education, and transportation facilities’ (Weiner, 1992: 114) and overburdening 7
8 ‘already dilapidated welfare systems’ (Held *et al.*, 1999: 313). The local resentment 8
9 generated leads to what Huysmans (2000: 767) describes as welfare chauvinism, 9
10 whereby ‘immigrants and asylum-seekers are not simply rivals but *illegitimate* 10
11 recipients of socio-economic rights’. 11
12 Yet, few dispute anymore that migration has a largely positive impact on 12
13 European economies. Exaggerated concerns about migration lowering wages, 13
14 causing unemployment or damaging the welfare system are unfounded. For 14
15 instance, Home Secretary David Blunkett noted in 2001 that immigrants contributed 15
16 £2.5 billion more in taxes than they consumed in tax-supported services in the UK 16
17 (cited in Karyotis, 2007a:11). Immigrant communities bore the heaviest brunt of 17
18 the restructuring of European economies in the 1980s (Held *et al.*, 1999: 325) and 18
19 will have an even greater role to play in the future. This is because, as a report 19
20 by the European Commission (2000: 21) explains, there are ‘growing shortages 20
21 of labour at both skilled and unskilled levels’, amplified by the ‘declining and 21
22 ageing populations in Europe’, which make migrants’ contribution ‘to the labour 22
23 market, to economic growth and to the sustainability of social protection systems’ 23
24 of crucial importance. Indeed, if the current demographic trend continues, the 24
25 United Nations (2000) predicted, European economies will need 700 million 25
26 immigrants for the fifty years to come in order to sustain growth and support their 26
27 social security systems. 27
28 From the above it can be concluded that the dominant belief that migration 28
29 poses existential threats to society and the state is a fallacy that can be convincingly 29
30 refuted, if a cost-benefit assessment was to be conducted. Yet, to explain why political 30
31 elites, in many cases continue to reproduce fabricated truisms that heighten public 31
32 anti-immigration attitudes, we need to recognize that their rationality is bounded. 32
33 Preconceived ideas about their responsibility to protect the symbolic boundaries 33
34 of the nation, in all its manifestations, provide a speculative answer for their 34
35 persistence on securitization. An additional reason can be sought in the historical 35
36 and operational context in Europe which saw receiving countries adopt highly 36
37 restrictive policies since the 1970s. Since the security frame was subsequently 37
38 fully institutionalized and adopted by the EU and even new immigration countries, 38
39 policy makers may be hesitant to challenge it, despite the weight of the evidence 39
40 against it. 40
41 41
42 42
43 43
44 44

1 *Unintended consequences of securitization* 1
 2 2 2
 3 Deriving from the above, a second related fallacy is that securitization is the 3
 4 best option to manage perceived or real threats from migration. Occasionally, 4
 5 securitization of certain issues can indeed bear fruitful results for society and 5
 6 the state (e.g. see counterterrorism policies in Greece in Karyotis, 2007b). With 6
 7 regards to migration however, securitization is a counter-productive management 7
 8 strategy, even if we were to accept that the threats discussed merit urgent attention. 8
 9 The unintended consequences of securitization are explored in this section. 9
 10 First, securitization as a response to perceived threats to the identity of the host 10
 11 nation has the opposite of the desirable effect. Typically, migration in Europe has 11
 12 been short-term, with the majority of economic migrants opting to eventually return 12
 13 to their country of origin. For instance, despite increased migration movements 13
 14 from Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s, permanent migration declined 14
 15 substantially in the same period (Grabbe, 2001). Paradoxically, it is the very 15
 16 restrictive policies advocated by the security frame that are more likely to lead 16
 17 migrants into settlement. This is because not only do restrictionism and inflexible 17
 18 barriers to entry encourage irregular movements but also they discourage migrants 18
 19 from investing and keeping strong ties with their own countries, in order to secure 19
 20 their access to work in Europe. This was the case for example in Germany after the 20
 21 oil crises in the 1970s, when the restrictive policies introduced encouraged family 21
 22 reunification and ultimately increased Turkish settlement (Entzinger, 1985). As 22
 23 Harris (2002: 31) explains ‘preventing people working so that they would not 23
 24 become citizens forced them to become citizens in order to work’. 24
 25 Second, the securitization of migration also leads to an increased rather than a 25
 26 reduced possibility of physical threats to public order. The scapegoating of migrants 26
 27 and reproduction of the criminal-migrant discourse, amplified by misinformation 27
 28 given by the media and politicians poses a major obstacle to their inclusion in 28
 29 European societies. In turn, as sociologist Robert Agnew (1992) explains, an 29
 30 increased intensity and frequency of strain experiences for migrants, e.g. through 30
 31 discrimination and presentation of negatively valued stimuli, is likely to trigger 31
 32 migrant anger, aggression and criminal behaviour, not reduce it. Examples of such 32
 33 racial tensions include the 2001 Bradford riots in Britain, the 2005 civil unrest in 33
 34 France, and the 2010 riots in Rosarno, Southern Italy. In the last case, hundreds of 34
 35 mostly African immigrants clashed with police during a demonstration, blaming 35
 36 racism and their atrocious living conditions for the violence and carrying placards 36
 37 which read ‘We are not animals’. 37
 38 Furthermore, justifying restrictive policies with reference to the threat of 38
 39 terrorism, particularly since the Seville European Council in 2002, has the 39
 40 unfortunate effect of blurring all types of migrants and incorporating illegal 40
 41 immigrants, labour immigrants and asylum-seekers into a single policing- 41
 42 repression scheme (Statham, 2003; Karyotis, 2007a). For instance, newspapers, 42
 43 such as Britain’s biggest selling tabloid *The Sun* play on public fears, by claiming 43
 44 that ‘asylum in Britain is now a Trojan Horse for terrorism’ (20 January 2003) 44

1 and that ‘terrorists are using Britain’s asylum shambles to sneak into the UK and 1
 2 go into hiding’ (19 July 2005). Stories like the former, with headlines instructing 2
 3 readers to ‘Read this and get angry’ inevitably fuel social tensions and insecurities, 3
 4 while being legitimized with reference to official police statistics. Nevertheless, 4
 5 the 2005 London attacks would not have been prevented by stricter immigration 5
 6 and asylum policies or a closing down of borders, which would instead only make 6
 7 it more difficult to scrutinize and screen those that would subsequently attempt to 7
 8 enter European states through illegal routes. 8

9 In sum, the assumption that by securitizing migration elites are promoting their 9
 10 country’s greater good is also a fallacy. Securitization does not create a safer society 10
 11 but one that lives in permanent fear from real or perceived threats. Paradoxically, 11
 12 it exacerbates negative effects on societal homogeneity and harmony through its 12
 13 distractive unintended consequences. Thus, even if we if we were to accept that 13
 14 migration poses existential threats to identity and public order, securitization does 14
 15 not appear to be conducive to a better way of managing it. 15
 16 16

17 *The political legitimacy trap* 17

18 18
 19 The discussion so far suggests that securitization is an excessive and ineffective 19
 20 response to the need for migration management. Does it at least serve the 20
 21 interests of the main securitizing actors that support it? In some cases, security 21
 22 professionals and law enforcement agencies involved in the provision of internal 22
 23 security may benefit from the securitization of migration, which may allow them 23
 24 to attract more resources (Bigo, 1994; 2002). However, since migration is ‘a highly 24
 25 institutionalized field with a relatively weak level of civil society engagement’, it 25
 26 is political elites that are best placed to shape public attitudes and determine ‘in 26
 27 a relatively autonomous way’ policy outcomes (Statham and Geddes, 2006: 248). 27
 28 This section explores the unintended consequences of securitization to political 28
 29 elites that support it in the first place. 29

30 Other than a threat to societal security, migration represents a direct threat 30
 31 to the legitimacy of political elites and the systems of government of the state 31
 32 (Buzan, 1991: 19). Determining who belongs in a community –commonly in an 32
 33 adversarial way- and controlling access to its territory is a defining function of 33
 34 the state, one which, in the final instance, is always determined by its elites. Since 34
 35 migration calls into question these symbolic boundaries of belonging, political 35
 36 elites use securitization in order to maintain a certain myth of control and thus 36
 37 safeguard their legitimacy (Bigo, 1998). A soft stance on migration, elites worry, 37
 38 may prove costly in electoral terms or ‘lead to xenophobic popular sentiments and 38
 39 to the rise of anti-migrant political parties that could threaten the regime’ (Weiner, 39
 40 1992: 114). Under these circumstances, elites may sustain the security frame on 40
 41 migration to cement their power positions and prevent public reactions. 41

42 Securitization is, in the short term, a convenient and easy way of shifting blame 42
 43 and responsibility for all society’s ills and their own failings (Guiraudon, 2003). 43
 44 The climate of crisis it creates, however, disguises its longer-term consequences. 44

1 Paradoxically, Bhagwati (2003: 99) notes, ‘the ability to control migration has 1
 2 shrunk as the desire to do so has increased. The reality is that borders are beyond 2
 3 control and little can be done to really cut down on immigration.’ A vicious 3
 4 circle is the outcome: The ‘decisively restrictionist stance’ of elites (Statham and 4
 5 Geddes, 2006: 248) creates unattainable public expectations for effective ‘defence’ 5
 6 against the perceived existential threats that migration poses. Inability to deliver 6
 7 on their promises leaves governing elites and security professionals responsible 7
 8 for controlling migration susceptible to scrutiny and public criticism, which is 8
 9 exploited by anti-migrant parties and other political opponents (Boswell, 1998). 9
 10 This in turn, makes political elites sustain the security frame, even verging in some 10
 11 cases on outright xenophobia, since they feel that ‘their policy proposals must 11
 12 compete for this political territory’ (Statham, 2003: 167). 12
 13 These suggest that while securitization may protect the political legitimacy of 13
 14 elites in the short-term, it ends up undermining it in the medium and long term. 14
 15 Securitization hampers elites’ ability to support contradictory aims, such as those 15
 16 relating to labour needs for immigration. This is because, as discussed above, 16
 17 under conditions of securitization, the distinctions between ‘desirable’ economic 17
 18 migrants, asylum seekers and irregular migrants become muddled in the public 18
 19 mind. As a result, construction of the security frame from the top-down creates 19
 20 demand for more securitization from the bottom-up, thus constraining political 20
 21 action and choices. 21

22 22
 23 23

24 **Conclusion** 24
 25 25

26 The analysis in this chapter suggests that securitizing migration is not just a 26
 27 question of ethics and humanity, relating for instance to the rights of migrants 27
 28 and to Europe’s pursuit of justice and freedom. It is also not just a philosophical 28
 29 debate between proponents of security vs. liberty, which effectively translates to 29
 30 limitations in the freedom of migrants, who are seen as inferior and dangerous, for 30
 31 the benefit of the security of citizens. It is above all a question of consequences. 31
 32 Since securitization is a top-down process, orchestrated by goal-maximizing 32
 33 elites, it is their inherently bounded rationality that should be questioned in order 33
 34 to explore ways of untangling the security- migration nexus. 34

35 Through assessing the consequences of securitization, a number of 35
 36 contradictions can be traced and exemplified. First, the assumption that migration 36
 37 poses such grave dangers that legitimize its securitization and the adoption of 37
 38 exceptional measures by the state is a fallacy. As discussed, many studies have 38
 39 demonstrated that these threat perceptions are socially constructed and grossly 39
 40 exaggerated. Similarly, the conjecture that securitization reduces the level of 40
 41 threat and thus it results in better management of migration is equally false. In 41
 42 the end, securitization has unintended consequences that reduce not only the 42
 43 security of migrants and asylum seekers but also that of those it seeks to protect, 43
 44 by exacerbating threats to identity and public order. Finally, securitization creates 44

1 a vicious circle of supply and demand for security, which is unattainable and 1
 2 ultimately harms the political legitimacy of securitizing actors and constraints 2
 3 them from pursuing contradictory goals in the area of migration. Elites should 3
 4 therefore seek ways to overturn the hegemony of the security frame, which, it is 4
 5 argued, is damaging to the state as well as to their own interest in the long term. 5

6
 7

8 References 8

9

- 10 ACPO (2001) 'Guide to Meeting the Policing Needs of Asylum Seekers and 10
 11 Refugees', accessed at: <http://www.acpo.police.uk/policies/index.html> 11
- 12 Agnew, R. (1992) 'Foundation for a General Strain Theory', in *Criminology*, Vol. 12
 13 30, No. 1, pp. 47–87 13
- 14 Ayoob, M. (1997) 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective' in Krause, 14
 15 K. and Williams, M. C. (eds) *Critical Security Studies*, Minneapolis: University 15
 16 of Minnesota Press 16
- 17 Balzacq, T. (2005) 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience, 17
 18 Context', in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 18
 19 171–201 19
- 20 Balzacq, T. and S. Carrera (2006) *Security Versus Freedom? A Challenge for* 20
 21 *Europe's Future*, Aldershot: Ashgate 21
- 22 Bhagwati, J. (2003) 'Borders Beyond Control', in *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb, 22
 23 pp. 98–104 23
- 24 Bigo, D. (1994) 'The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a 24
 25 Newly Developing Area of Police Intervention' in Anderson, M. and den Boer, 25
 26 M. (eds) *Policing across National Boundaries*, London: Pinter, pp. 161–73 26
- 27 Bigo, D. (1998) 'Frontiers and Security in the European Union: The Illusion of 27
 28 Migration Control' in Anderson, M. and Bort, E. (eds) *The Frontiers of Europe*, 28
 29 London: Pinter, pp. 148–64 29
- 30 Bigo, D. (2002) 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the 30
 31 Governmentality of Unease', in *Alternatives*, Vol. 27, pp. 63–92 31
- 32 Bigo, D. (2006) 'Liberty, Whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and the 32
 33 Conception of Freedom' in Balzacq, T. and Carrera, S. (eds) *Security versus* 33
 34 *Freedom? A Challenge for Europe's Future*, Aldershot: Ashgate 34
- 35 Booth, K. (1991) 'Security and Emancipation', in *Review of International Studies*, 35
 36 Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 313–27 36
- 37 Boswell, C. (2008) 'Migration Policy Debates in Europe after 9/11: Securitization, 37
 38 Embedded Liberalism, or the Quest for Legitimation?' in Givens, T. E. Freeman, 38
 39 G. P. and Leal, D. L. (eds) *Immigration Policy and Security: U.S., European,* 39
 40 *and Commonwealth Perspectives*, New York: Routledge 40
- 41 Brochmann, G. and Hammar, T. (eds) (1999) *Mechanisms of Immigration* 41
 42 *Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies*, Oxford: 42
 43 Berg Publishers 43
 44 44

- 1 Buonfino, A. (2004) 'Between Unity and Plurality: the Politicization and 1
 2 Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe', in *New Political* 2
 3 *Science*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 23–49 3
 4 Buzan, B. (1991) *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security* 4
 5 *Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn, Boulder: Lynne Rienner 5
 6 Buzan, B., Waever, O and de Wilde, J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for* 6
 7 *Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner 7
 8 Ceyhan, A. and Tsoukala, A. (2002) 'The Securitization of Migration in Western 8
 9 Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies', in *Alternatives*, No. 27 9
 10 (suppl.), pp. 21–39 10
 11 Cobain, I. (2006) 'Exclusive: Inside the Secret and Sinister World of the BNP', in 11
 12 *The Guardian*, 21 December 2006 12
 13 Coleman, W. D. (1998) 'From Protected Development to Market Liberalism: 13
 14 Paradigm Change in Agriculture', in *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14
 15 Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 632–51 15
 16 Dinh, V. D. (2002) 'Freedom and Security after September 11', in *Harvard Journal* 16
 17 *of Law and Public Policy*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 399–406 17
 18 Dworkin, R. (2005) 'Terror and the Attack on Civil Liberties' in Rockmore, T., 18
 19 Margolis, J. and Marsoobian, A. T. (eds) *The Philosophical Challenge of* 19
 20 *September 11*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 20
 21 Entman, R. M. (1993) 'Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm', 21
 22 in *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 51–8 22
 23 Entzinger, H. (1985) 'Return Migration in Western Europe', in *International* 23
 24 *Migration*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 263–90 24
 25 European Commission (2000) 'Communication from the Commission to the 25
 26 Council and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy', 26
 27 COM (2000) 757 final, Brussels, 22 November 2000 27
 28 Faist, T. (2002). 'Extension Du Domaine de la Lutte': International Migration 28
 29 and Security before and after 11 September 2001', in *International Migration* 29
 30 *Review*, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 7–14 30
 31 Geddes, A. (2003) *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, London: 31
 32 Sage 32
 33 Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R. (2001) *Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox*, 33
 34 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 34
 35 Grabbe, H. (2001) *The Sharp Edges of Europe: Security Implications of Extending* 35
 36 *EU Border Policies Eastwards*, Western European Union: Occasional Paper 13 36
 37 Griffin, N. (2003) 'The BNP: Anti-asylum Protest, Racist Sect or Power-Winning 37
 38 Movement?', 2004, BNP website, accessed at: [http://web.archive.org/](http://web.archive.org/web/20071010043702/http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/race_reality.htm) 38
 39 [web/20071010043702/http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/race_reality.htm](http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/race_reality.htm) 39
 40 Guild, E. (2003) 'International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and 40
 41 Borders Policy: The Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2001', in *European* 41
 42 *Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 331–46 42
 43 43
 44 44

- 1 Guiraudon, V. (2000) 'European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy- 1
 2 Making as Venue Shopping', in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, 2
 3 No. 2, pp. 251–71 3
- 4 Hampsher-Monk, I. (1992) *A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political 4
 5 Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 5
- 6 Harris, N. (2002) *Thinking the Unthinkable: The Immigration Myth Exposed*, 6
 7 London: I. B. Tauris 7
- 8 Hatton, T. and Williamson, J. (2007) *Global Migration and the World Economy: 8
 9 Two Centuries of Policy and Performance*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 9
- 10 Hay, C. (2006) 'Constructivist Institutionalism' in Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, S. A., 10
 11 Rockman, Bert A. (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Oxford: 11
 12 Oxford University Press, pp. 56–74 12
- 13 Held, D. et al. (1999) *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, 13
 14 Cambridge: Polity Press 14
- 15 Hill, C. (2003) *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave 15
 16 Macmillan 16
- 17 Hobbes, T. (1985) *Leviathan*, London: Penguin [first published 1651] 17
- 18 Huysmans, J. (1998) 'The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics 18
 19 of Horror in Political Realism', in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 19
 20 Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 569–89 20
- 21 Huysmans, J. (2000) 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration', 21
 22 in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 751–77 22
- 23 Huysmans, J. (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the 23
 24 EU*, London: Routledge 24
- 25 Ibryamova, N. (2002) 'Migration from Central and Eastern Europe and Societal 25
 26 Security in the European Union', The Jean Monnet Chair, University of Miami: 26
 27 Florida 27
- 28 Jones, B. D. (1999) 'Bounded Rationality', in *Annual Review of Political Science*, 28
 29 Vol. 2, pp. 297–32 29
- 30 Karydis, V. (1998) 'Criminality or Criminalization of Migrants in Greece? An 30
 31 Attempt at Synthesis' in Ruggiero, V., South, N., Taylor, I. (eds) *The New 31
 32 European Criminology*, London and New York: Routledge, pp.357–9 32
- 33 Karyotis, G. (2007a) 'European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 33
 34 11: The Security–Migration Nexus', in *Innovation: The European Journal of 34
 35 Social Science Research*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1–17 35
- 36 Karyotis, G. (2007b) 'The Securitization of Greek Terrorism and the Arrest of 36
 37 the 'Revolutionary Organization November 17'', in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37
 38 Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 271–93 38
- 39 Karyotis, G. and Patrikios, S. (2010) 'Religion, Securitization and Anti-Immigration 39
 40 Attitudes: The Case of Greece', in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 40
 41 pp. 43–57 41
- 42 Lavenex, S. (2001) 'Migration and the EU's New Eastern Border: Between 42
 43 Realism and Liberalism', in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 43
 44 pp. 24–42 44

- 1 Lohrmann, R. (2000) 'Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity: Current Threats to
2 Peace', in *International Migration*, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 3–22 2
- 3 McSweeney, B. (1996) 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school',
4 in *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 81–93 4
- 5 Mill, J. S. (1991) 'Utilitarianism' in Gray, J. (ed.) *On Liberty and Other Essays*,
6 Oxford: Oxford University Press [first published 1861] 6
- 7 Schmitt, C. (1996) *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago: University of Chicago
8 Press [first published 1936] 8
- 9 Simon, H.A. (1995) 'Rationality in Political Behavior', in *Political Psychology*,
10 Vol. 16, pp. 45–61 10
- 11 Sprout, H. and Sprout, M. (1969) 'Environmental Factors in the Study of
12 International Politics' in Rosenau, J. N. (ed.) *International Politics and Foreign
13 Policy*, New York: The Free Press 13
- 14 Statham, P. (2003) 'Understanding the Anti-Asylum Rhetoric: Restrictive Politics
15 or Racist Publics?', in *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 163–77 15
- 16 Statham, P. and Geddes, A. (2006) 'Elites and Organized Publics: Who Drives
17 British Immigration Politics and in Which Direction?', in *West European
18 Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 248–69 18
- 19 Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. (1986) 'The Social Identity Theory of Inter-group
20 Behavior' in Worchel, S. and Austin, W. (eds) *Psychology of Intergroup
21 Relations*, Chicago: Nelson-Hall 21
- 22 Thouez, C. (2002) 'Migration and Human Security' Paper prepared by the
23 International Migration Policy Programme, for the Commission on Human
24 Security, accessed at: www.humansecurity-chs.org 24
- 25 Triandafyllidou, A. (2002) 'Greece' in ter Wal, J. (ed.) *Racism and Cultural
26 Diversity in the Mass Media: An Overview of Research and Examples of Good
27 Practice in the EU Member States, 1995-2000*, Vienna: EUMC, pp. 149–72 27
- 28 UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*, New York: Oxford University Press 28
- 29 United Nations (2000) *Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and
30 Ageing Populations?*, United Nations, Population Division, Economic and
31 Social Affairs, New York 31
- 32 van Dijk, T. (1993) *Elite Discourse and Racism*, Newbury Park, Ca: Sage
33 Publishers 33
- 34 Waever, O. (1993) 'Societal Security: the Concept' in Waever, O. *et al. Identity,
35 Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London: Pinter 35
- 36 Waever, O. (2000) 'Security Agendas Old and New, and How to Survive Them',
37 Paper prepared for the Workshop on 'The Traditional and New Security Agenda:
38 Inferences for the Third World', Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Working Paper
39 No. 6, Buenos Aires 39
- 40 Waldron J. (2003) 'Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance', in *Journal of
41 Political Philosophy*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp.191–210 41
- 42 Weaver, O. (1995) 'Securitization and Desecuritization' in Lipshutz, R. D. (ed.)
43 *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 46–86 43
- 44 44

1	Weiner, M. (1992) ‘Security, Stability and International Migration’, in <i>International</i>	1
2	<i>Security</i> , Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 91–126	2
3	Yergin, D. (1997) <i>Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National</i>	3
4	<i>Security State</i> , Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company	4
5	Zedner, L. (2009) <i>Security</i> , Key Ideas in Criminology Series, London: Routledge	5
6		6
7		7
8		8
9		9
10		10
11		11
12		12
13		13
14		14
15		15
16		16
17		17
18		18
19		19
20		20
21		21
22		22
23		23
24		24
25		25
26		26
27		27
28		28
29		29
30		30
31		31
32		32
33		33
34		34
35		35
36		36
37		37
38		38
39		39
40		40
41		41
42		42
43		43
44		44

Proof Copy