The interest in animals within the Humanities is emerging as a new and important area of study. Scholars and students are turning away from what was regarded as the unquestionably central figure of the human in a range of different disciplines, and the animal is being brought into a new and important focus. In different ways, and using a wide variety of materials, the place of animals and humans is being re-addressed. The animal is no longer confined to ethical debates within philosophy, it has become an issue in the study of literature, visual art, history, geography, cultural studies; the list could go on.

But there is, perhaps, one central question which faces all of us who are working on animals in the Humanities, whatever our disciplinary context. That question is: what can our work do to change current perceptions? On one level change is needed within the academy itself. There is a perception held by some colleagues that the idea of ‘working on animals’ is eccentric, archaic: I remember very clearly how furious I was when about eight years ago a fellow graduate student at Sussex University told me that it was ‘nice’ that I could still write a thesis on bear-baiting in early modern England, as if this area of research was mere antiquarianism, and not in any way theoretically engaged. As many recent books and articles show, reading animals is not a new form of an old, rather dusty kind of scholarship - a gathering together of interesting anecdotes - rather, it is an area of research which is revealing many new insights into some very significant areas of interest to the Humanities, particularly about the nature of the human and the human relationship with nature. What emerges in work focusing on animals is a new way of thinking about some established ideas. For a start, the notion of the human itself comes under a new, and revealing scrutiny.

However, more important than this academic (purely academic?) issue is the question of the ethical role of writing about animals. What does re-reading the history of human relationships with animals tell us about how we should think about the non-human animal now? What function does reading literature which represents animals have at a time of real dangers and real struggles against extinction and exploitation in the non-human animal world? These questions are crucial to the development of this area of study, and if we cannot answer them then reading animals (I return to look at this phrase later) becomes just another angle for research, another shelf-filling strategy by academics.
There is, I want to argue, clearly much more to an intellectual engagement with the representation of animals than this, and it is perhaps worth thinking briefly about the meaning of the animal in the Humanities at the moment. As the main focus of this issue is upon cultural production - the written word, visual art - I will focus on how reading animals can be conceptualised in terms of recent theoretical developments, or rather, how one recent theoretical development - ecocriticism - offers both possibilities and limitations for those of us engaged in reading animals.

Reading animals and anthropocentrism

Before getting to this theoretical discussion, however, the concept of ‘reading animals’ itself needs to be considered. As a way of conceptualising a large and fast growing area of research it is immediately problematic in that it places the non-human animal as the object of research, rather than as the subject. Or, to put it another way, instead of undercutting the dominion of humanity, reading animals actually reveals the continuing centrality of humanity: the various anthropocentrisms which the study of animals should be attempting to counter are reproduced in its very act of being. We read animals as if they were texts, just as human cultures have exploited animals as if they were objects. There is potentially, to extend this analogy, a terrifying symmetry, therefore, between writing a history and baiting a bear; between reading a poem and hunting a fox, and this is an analogy which the acts of writing and reading would wish, hope, to deny.

This is a genuine problem, not least because one of the main intentions of many of us engaged in reading animals is that it should upset the assumed centrality of the human vision; should slant the gaze in a new and challenging way. But if reading animals always already reproduces one of the central ideas which it attempts to counter, then how can it stand against anthropocentrism? Are we not engaged in a form of deconstructive analysis (deconstructive of anthropocentrism) which can itself be deconstructed? Keith Tester has noted a similar paradox in animal rights literature, and much of what he says might also be applicable to an ecocriticism concerned with animals. In Animals and Society Tester writes:

it would be interesting, and not too deliberately polemical, to explore the hypothesis that animal rights is not concerned with animals at all; that, on the contrary, the idea says rather more about society and humans. Animal rights might really be about social actions and only incidentally focus on animals.²

Likewise we can argue that reading animals has an ethical position, but the ethics are always potentially compromised by the paradox which exists at its heart.
Reading animals is always going to have to in some ways relegate the animal to the status of a text, something there to be read, interpreted. This is always the case because - with the exception of an archaeological or evolutionary history of animals, which might concern itself with the remains of real animals - reading animals in historical and cultural texts is always going to be reading human representations of animal lives. We have yet to find a document created by an animal which can be interpreted aright. We can attempt to read mating rituals, the marking of territories, but we have only our own meanings to apply, not the animals’ own; we have only our own perceptions not theirs. Who is to say that a display of tail feathers, a toad’s swollen throat really means what we say it does? Only the animal can know that, but we can never know the animal. For this reason any study of animals is always going to be a study of texts created by humans, and so it makes sense, to return to Tester’s work, that any theoretical position concerning animals is always going to concentrate on the humans who are (in liberal animal-rights speak) the agents.

But this does not mean that we should accept that reading animals is always doomed to failure, and this is where we must depart from Tester’s assertion of the futility of trying to think ethically about animals. He takes the impossibility of a non-anthropocentric vision to an extreme which is, I think, highly questionable in a number of ways. To put it simply, he argues that all philosophical positions concerning the human relation to animals - whether the utilitarian-liberationist line of Peter Singer, the ecological outlook of Stephen Clark, or the liberal view of Tom Regan - can be rendered meaningless. Moving through some of the most important work on the human relation to the animal of this century, by Elia, Thomas, Lorenz, Lévi-Strauss, Midgley, Douglas, Leach (the list could go on), he argues that there is a paradox at the heart of any writing about animals, animal rights philosophies included, and that ultimately the latter must themselves be questioned on the grounds of logic.

Think for a moment about who asserts animals’ rights. Is it a laboratory rabbit, veal calf, or hunted fox? Not at all. Animal rights is exclusively asserted by society and it is intended to restrain human practices. It says that animals are morally the same as humans, and then asks humans to treat them as if they were human; it is up to us to struggle for animal rights because animals cannot fight for themselves. In other words, they are different. Animal rights classifies animals as non-moral objects which are metonymical to moral (human) subjects, and as a metaphorical society which is morally relevant since human society is morally relevant. Society thinks about animals to think about itself. If animals were not given rights, the classificatory distinctions between the human and the animal would be threatened with collapse.
Tester then takes this logic into an analysis of vegetarianism:

Most people probably think that ‘vegetarian’ is derived from ‘vegetable-arian’; that is, they think it means a person who eats plants. They are wrong. The word was deliberately coined from the Latin *vegetus* which means whole, sound, fresh, and lively. Vegetarianism has always involved a concern with natural well-being and health. It has never really been about carrots and turnips at all.\(^5\)

Logically speaking animal rights are about humans under another name; etymologically speaking vegetarianism is about health and self-preservation. Morality, for Tester, does not come into it because morals are not a part of the logic he is applying.

In *Natural Relations* Ted Benton offers a succinct reply to what he calls these ‘daft’ views. In response to Tester’s extended logic which proposes that ‘a fish is only a fish if it is classified as one’ Benton writes ‘perhaps, if we were to impose the socially produced category of fish upon the viper its bite would lose its venom?’\(^6\) There is, Benton argues, a real animal which exists outside of the possibilities of Tester’s stance, and, in parallel, I want to argue that there is a morality at stake in vegetarianism which Tester ignores. The signifier ‘vegetarian’ may be etymologically traced back to its original signified, self-preservation, rather than to an acknowledgement of a vegetable diet, but if, as Saussure said, meaning is made through custom, ‘general acceptance’,\(^7\) then the meaning of vegetarianism must take in its current usage: the signifier can come to represent a kind of ethics not contained in the original use of the signified. To deny morality here, as Tester does, is clearly misreading the sign.

This separation of the original meaning of the signifier and current meaning of the signified in the term ‘vegetarian’ can also allow us a way of thinking about the possibility of reading animals ethically. On the one hand there is the original, the anthropocentric objectification of animals - they are texts for interpretation - and with that, the further aggrandising of humanity; on the other hand, however, there is the possibility that the interpretations, the results of the objectification, might in fact work to undo the aggrandisement. I have argued elsewhere, that reading anthropocentrism is not necessarily the same as being anthropocentric; in fact, reading anthropocentrism can uproot the possibility of its existence.\(^8\)

In her influential study of vegetarianism and feminist thought, *The Sexual Politics of Meat*, Carol J. Adams argues that in meat-eating animals become absent referents. ‘Animals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist.’\(^9\) The reminders of lived existence, the abattoir, and slaughter must all be removed for flesh to become a pleasurable object for consumption. Adams is surely right in this, but in other areas of human interaction with animals a reversal of this process
takes place. In fact, one of the most constant sites of interaction between humans and animals always calls on the continued and meaningful presence of the animal. When humans proclaim their own status, show that they are human, the animal is always invoked as that which the human is not. But in this invocation the animal is always a presence to be denied rather than an absence which is forgotten. Where we must forget the animal to be able to eat it, we must remember the animal in order to be able to deny it and be human. And it is this paradox of anthropocentrism - its reliance on and simultaneous denial of animals - which reveals it to be constantly, and seriously, threatened, even as it appears to proclaim that *anthropos* is always central, never under threat.

Thus, while recognising that reading animals is about humans as much as, if not more than, animals I do not think that this means that we are not engaging with a moral issue, not engaging the question of the ethical treatment of animals. What we are engaging with is the unquestionable sense that the relationship with the animal can only be understood through the ideas, attitudes, worries of the human agents. If we refuse to recognise human centrality then we close down the subject of the animal altogether, and without reassessing what is assumed to be natural - human superiority - there can be little change.

It is for this reason that I see reading animals as entering an ethical debate. To look at the human is not to acknowledge the defeat of the possibility of an interest in animals, it is to return to the source. If we can trace the constructed (as opposed to natural) nature of our relation to animals then we might be able to change it. To question the authority of anthropocentrism raises questions about the human relation to the animal. And these are questions which are, I think, worth asking.

Ecocriticism and Animals

There is emerging within the humanities at the moment a new interest in environmental issues, a desire for an engagement with the environmental, the ecological, and ultimately the ethical. The nature of that engagement is still being played out, and it is worth pausing to think about some of the ideas, issues and implications which the debates within ecocritical studies in the humanities are currently throwing up. At the heart of the debate, I suspect, is the as yet unvoiced question of the broader role of the humanities in culture. What can reading texts - whether literary, visual or historical - do in the twenty-first century? What is the point of the humanities? This is clearly far too big a question to attempt to answer here, but we can begin to think about one of the ways in which an answer has been proposed. I am concentrating here on the place of environmentalism within the study of literature, but I hope that many of the implications which can be drawn out
of this area of the Humanities might remain relevant for scholars working in other fields.

One of the most high profile texts in the critical debate about the relation of the humanities to the environment in the UK is Jonathan Bate’s *Romantic Ecology* (1991). Bate’s book is particularly important in that it has introduced the possibility of engaging with environmental concerns *within* canonical English courses, as opposed to an environmental concern being voiced at the margins of literary study. And whatever my criticisms of the book may be, it is worth recognising this aspect of Bate’s work: it is a significant advertisement for ecocriticism within the academy. However, having said that, it is also worth remembering that Bate himself figures the book as a sketch, not a complete landscape painting. He writes that it ‘might be described as a preliminary sketch towards a literary ecocriticism’. This is important, because there are issues in Bate’s representation of the natural world which are particularly problematic for those of us writing about animals, and it is worth thinking about how an ecocriticism concerned with animals can use his ideas to think about future developments.

Put simply Bate reads the Romantics as a way into reassessing our current relation to the natural world: he is offering, in Hegelian terms, the past as a vision for the future. Bate argues that in Wordsworth’s poetry can be traced a true relation with the land and that it is the work of the ecocritic to outline this true relation because through it we can begin to rethink our current relation with the natural world. There is a sense of a lost world, an Edenic relation which must be reclaimed. Nostalgia for a lost Romanticism, it would seem, is a way forward.

In parallel to Bate’s work Greg Garrard calls on Stephen Clark’s belief that ‘The proper mode of thought, if only we can recover it, is that of peasants deeply rooted in the soil’. Dwelling, a Heideggerian term, is invoked to define this idealised relationship. But the return to a lost Eden is, like all other arcadian ideas, backward-looking and mythical: there never was such a perfection. And the notion of the ‘implausibility’ of dwelling which is acknowledged even by those who pronounce its necessity - the term comes from Garrard - underlines a sense of the unsatisfactory nature of this kind of critical response. Can an ethical criticism really base itself on a mythical and implausible idealism? The desire to return to a lost past which *Romantic Ecology* hints at immediately presents problems for an attempt at a truly ecological step forward.

As well as some of the dangers of nostalgia, what is also problematic in the kind of links between the environment and the humanities made in Bate’s work is the unacknowledged closeness some of his arguments bear to the Thomist line on the human relation with the non-human. At one point in *Romantic Ecology* Bate quotes from Ruskin’s *Modern Painters*: ‘supposing all circumstances otherwise the same with respect to two individuals, the one who loves nature most will be always
found to have more *faith in God* than the other.¹⁶ The natural world in this instance completes the human world: gives access to the supernatural. For Ruskin this is the reason we should respect nature.¹⁷ There is no sense of the natural world as valuable in and of itself: in Romantic representation the natural world is understood as a way in which humans can realise their true humanity. Implicitly Bate assents to this idea.

In *Summa Theologiae* Thomas Aquinas argued that animals could be ‘loved from charity as good things we wish others to have, in that by charity we cherish this for God’s honour and man’s service’.¹⁸ Peter Drum has summarised this position: Aquinas ‘argues that because animals feel pain they can be pitied, and persons who feel pity for animals’ suffering are less likely to permit their fellows to suffer than those who do not. Hence the point of the law is human good, not that of animals’.¹⁹ This was summarised somewhat more succinctly in London in 1612 by John Rawlinson who wrote ‘Save a beast’s life and save a mans’.²⁰ For Aquinas animals have no qualities which are deserving in and of themselves, rather they are property which should be respected and which can enhance human qualities. The reason for the dismissal of any sense of animal moral worth is highlighted in *Summa Contra Gentiles* when Aquinas proposes

> In the souls of brute animals ... there is no operation superior to those of the sensitive part, since they neither understand nor reason ... The souls of brutes, then, are incapable of any operation that does not involve the body. Now, since every substance is possessed of some operation, the soul of the brute animal will be unable to exist apart from its body; so that it perishes along with its body.²¹

The animal is merely an instrument, it is not a moral agent.

By taking up what looks like a very Thomist reasoning in his adherence to the Romantic representation of nature, by making nature complete humanity, Bate is placing humanity at the centre and seeing the environment as, in Neil Sammells’ phrase, ‘a moral exercise-yard’.²² We affirm our own status through our relation to the natural world, we are not a part of the natural world other than as the recognisers of its beauty, value and significance. As Bate writes, there is in Romantic writers ‘an attempt to enable mankind the better to live in the material world by entering into harmony with the environment.’²³ The separation of humanity from environment here reiterates the anthropocentrism of earlier instrumentalist ideas. As an ecological stance it is a very dubious one.

But there are other problems as well. Despite a recognition that ecology represents a study of the whole of the natural world - organic and inorganic - what follows in Bate’s work is a slippage from the use of the term ecology to the term environment and an avoidance of and silence about the place of non-human
animals. Green earth, fresh air and clear waters are the subjects of Bate’s enquiry which might be termed not only Thomist but, to coin a phrase, inorgani-floracentric. In fact, the influence of Heidegger on Bate’s more recent work, and the avoidance of discussion of the animal seem to go hand in hand when he discusses Hazlitt’s argument that nature is ‘a universal home’ which owes its power to ‘its endurance, its constancy.’ Bate continues to paraphrase, and endorse Hazlitt’s model: ‘A tree helps us to live because it is the same as the trees we saw in our childhood. If we destroy all the trees, we will irremediably disrupt not only the economy of nature but also our own social and psychological economy.’ If one tree is all trees then the impersonality of the tree is necessary. If we recognise something specific and individual in a tree we are automatically discounting the possibility of universality because if that one individualised tree dies we cannot replace it. We need, in following the Romantic relation to nature, to have a nature which transcends its individual elements: Nature with a capital N, if you like. Tom Regan, one of the principal proponents of animal rights, calls this refusal to individualise ‘environmental fascism’. There is, Regan argues, an interest in ‘the stability, diversity and beauty of biotic communities’ which ignores in dangerous ways the rights of the individual. Regan writes that this is ‘not seeing the forest for the trees - or, more accurately, ... not seeing the trees for the forest.’

This refusal to recognise the significance of the individual, or the proposition that the individual is significant only as a representative of the whole rather than worthy in and of itself sits comfortably with the Thomist echoes which resound in Bate’s reliance on the Romantic representation of nature. The environment is separate from the human, it completes the human, and it is to be considered in general terms because it is so anthropocentrically important. Because of this many of the ideas proposed by Bate, while important in that they highlight the significance of ecological awareness in a reading of literary texts, are distanced from any meaningful relation to a literary or historical interest in animals because the anthropocentrism which remains in place in the Romantic picture of nature must be displaced if we are to truly reassess our place in the order of nature.

A Way Forward

This emphasis on the need to rethink the human is shown in various ways in all four of the essays in this special issue. Chris Mounsey’s essay, ‘Edible Bulls and Drinkable Mice: eighteenth-century taxonomy and the crisis of Eden’ looks at the ways in which language, which is usually understood, in Christian terms, to emerge from Adam’s naming of the beasts in Genesis 2.19, failed in the face of the eighteenth-century discovery of animals like the platypus and the kangaroo, animals which challenged the established categories which organised the natural world. Mounsey looks at the work of the eighteenth-century writer Christopher
Smart to trace a new system to explain human language. What emerges in Mounsey’s essay is the fact that that which - post-Descartes - was assumed to represent the difference between human and animal - communication through language - remains explicable only through animals. As with anthropocentrism more generally, there is a reliance upon and a simultaneous denial of animals in this new system of language.

In her essay, “That Ghastly Work”: Ruskin and Anatomy, Dinah Birch makes links between John Ruskin’s aesthetic ideas and his stance against vivisection by reading his writings about anatomy and vivisection alongside his work on the role of the artist. If seeing is the true function of the artist, then seeing the bones, innards would seem to be a logical step. But Ruskin, Birch argues, distances himself from this: far from leading to a keener knowledge of the world the dismemberment of live animals (a truly vivid display of anthropocentrism) reduces the capacity for beauty and leaves only mechanics. Ultimately art cannot utilise this development in science, Ruskin argues; to preserve the realm of beauty the two must stand apart. Anthropocentrism here undermines the capacity to produce what might be seen as truly exceptional - even truly human: art.

Debbie Sly’s reading of T.H. White’s Arthurian cycle, ‘Natural Histories’, traces the changes in the way in which White’s characters relate to the natural world. Using the Second World War as the point of change, Sly argues that the hierarchical, medieval world view which can be traced in the earlier work gives way to an interpretation of the place of humanity in nature more influenced by nineteenth-century scientific developments, particularly evolution. The horrors of war - the clearest illustration of humanity’s lack of humanity - is evidenced, Sly argues, in White’s growing acknowledgement of the creatureliness of man (the masculine term is used deliberately).

Finally, in her essay on Alice Walker’s The Temple of My Familiar Amanda Greenwood reads the link which Walker traces between women and animals, and using ecofeminist theory, defends Walker’s alignment. Where the naturalisation of women and the feminisation of nature has been used to devalue both women and nature in patriarchal discourse, Graham argues that in Walker’s story the alignment is actually a celebratory one - a recognition that oppression can create in the oppressed a sense of community with other oppressed groups, and that in this sense of community can be found a more ‘human’ mode of existence. In this sense, phallocentrism leads not only to the oppression of women (and of animals) but to the dehumanisation of the male, and paradoxically, to a restatement of status by those who appear to have none.

Ultimately, all of the essays in this issue offer very different ways of thinking about the possibility of reading animals. What they have in common is, perhaps, a recognition that it is through the animal that we can begin to think again about our own status as human which will, in turn, impact upon our relationship with
animals. In recognising this anthropocentrism is not merely acknowledged, it is actually undercut. To be human we need the animal, but in this necessity lies a recognition of the impossibility of being the thing we proclaim ourselves naturally to be. In this recognition we are turning anthropocentrism against itself. We do not just accept that we need animals and therefore should protect animals (an anthropocentric vision of the world, not unlike that held by the Romantics), rather, we acknowledge that our reliance upon them bespeaks a wider environmental concern; that of the status of the human itself. If we can place ourselves under scrutiny then we are surely moving away from an acceptance of the inevitability of dominion.

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4. Tester, *Animals and Society*, p.44.


10 In North America the wider and more established interest in environmentalism within the field of literature has produced a larger and more varied number of texts and approaches. Over 100 English Departments in North America currently run courses on literature and the environment, many more than exist in the UK, and
ASLE, the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment, is a very active organisation. I am grateful to Richard Kerridge for the figures here.

12. Bate writes ‘ecology has to be an attitude of mind before it can be an effective set of environmental policies.’ *Romantic Ecology*, p.83.
17. Dinah Birch’s essay in this issue gives a different interpretation of Ruskin’s relation to *animals*, and it is interesting in the context of what I am saying about Bate’s work, that he does not refer to this in *Romantic Ecology*.