Pinto, Helena (2010) Do ownership structures affect the risk incentive provided by managerial portfolio holdings? An empirical analysis of UK alternative investment market companies. In: EFMA 2010, 2010-01-01.
EFMA2010_0155_fullpaper.pdf - Accepted Author Manuscript
Download (370kB) | Preview
This paper analyzes the wealth and risk incentive effects of managerial options and shareholdings on the hedging probability of UK listed Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies. We find that the wealth incentive effect provided by managerial option holdings increases the hedging likelihood. On the contrary, the wealth incentive effect provided by managerial shareholdings decreases the hedging likelihood. Further tests show that the incentive effect provided by managerial shareholdings is significantly different if managers are not substantial shareholders of the company. Managers with substantial ownership are significantly less risk averse. Thus, the size and ownership structure characteristics of AIM companies seem to result in similarities between managers‟ and owners‟ behavior.
|Item type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Keywords:||risk, ownership, managerial portfolio, alternative investment market companies, Finance|
|Subjects:||Social Sciences > Finance|
|Department:||Strathclyde Business School > Accounting and Finance|
|Depositing user:||Miss Donna McDougall|
|Date Deposited:||28 Jul 2011 13:41|
|Last modified:||04 Aug 2016 04:03|