Hillier, D.J. and McColgan, P. (2009) Firm performance and managerial succession in family managed firms. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 36 (3-4). pp. 461-484. ISSN 0306-686XFull text not available in this repository. Request a copy from the Strathclyde author
This paper investigates whether the family status of a company's top officer affects managerial replacement decisions. We report evidence that family-managed companies are characterized by higher levels of board control and potentially weak internal governance systems. Family CEOs are less likely than non-family CEOs to depart their position following poor performance. Stock prices react favorably and operating performance improves when companies announce the departure of a family CEO. Overall, our evidence suggests that shareholders benefit when a powerful CEO leaves their position in the company.
|Keywords:||CEO turnover, corporate restructuring, family managed firms, firm performance, Finance, Finance, Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous), Accounting|
|Subjects:||Social Sciences > Finance|
|Department:||Strathclyde Business School > Accounting and Finance|
|Depositing user:||Miss Donna McDougall|
|Date Deposited:||22 Jan 2010 15:59|
|Last modified:||22 Mar 2017 10:25|