Padgett, S.A. (2004) Welfare bias in the party system: a neo-downsian explanation for gridlock in economic reform. German Politics, 13. pp. 360-83. ISSN 0964-4008
Full text not available in this repository. (Request a copy from the Strathclyde author)Abstract
Employing neo-Downsian theory, the article seeks a party system explanation for the difficulties experienced by political actors in seeking to reform the declining German economy. Taking the UK as a comparator, it investigates the linkages between voter preferences, party positions and government programmes in relation to the market economy and welfare. Whilst the main German parties have recently leapfrogged their UK counterparts in the emphasis placed on the market economy, there is still a 'welfare bias' that inhibits them from adopting sharply defined market positions. Welfare bias is attributed to voter preferences, and, in particular, to the diffuse distribution of voter preferences across the party system.
| Item type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ID code: | 1492 |
| Keywords: | neo-Downsian theory, german economy, voting, political parties, Economic Theory, Germany, Political institutions (Europe) |
| Subjects: | Social Sciences > Economic Theory History > Germany Political Science > Political institutions (Europe) |
| Department: | Faculty of Humanities And Social Sciences > Politics |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing user: | Strathprints Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Aug 2006 |
| Last modified: | 12 Mar 2012 10:36 |
| URI: | http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/id/eprint/1492 |
Actions (login required)
| View Item |